Ancient Greek and Indian Social Contract Theories: a Comparison

Old World: Journal of Ancient Africa and Eurasia (2024) 1–26 Ancient Greek and Indian Social Contract Theories: a Comparison Otto Linderborg Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Mid Sweden University, Sundsvall, Sweden otto.linderborg@miun.se Received 5 October 2022 | Accepted 23 April 2023 | Published online 8 October 2024 Abstract This article analyses and compares ancient Greek and Indian social contract theories. On the Greek side, social theories comprising a contractual understanding of the origins of society are encountered, inter alia, in the works of Herodotus, Plato and Polybius – while comparable Indian accounts may be gathered from the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, the Dīgha Nikāya and the Mahābhārata. Through close readings of these and other texts, it is shown that both the Greek and Indian theories largely rely on the concept of monarchy as the cornerstone of social order. The Greek and Indian accounts also incorporate certain elements reoccurring in early modern European social contract theories, yet in other respects the former fundamentally differ from the latter. Keywords ancient Greek social contract theories – ancient Indian social contract theories – Early Modern Social Contract Theories – state of nature Downloaded from Brill.com 10/12/2024 02:45:50PM Published with license by Koninklijke Brill bv | doi:10.1163/26670755-20240002 via Open Access. This is an open access article distributed under the terms © Otto Linderborg, 2024 | ISSN: 2667-0755 (online) of the CC BY 4.0 license. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the CC BY 4.0 license. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ 2 10.1163/26670755-20240002 | linderborg Introduction1 The overall objective of this study is to enhance our understanding of the nature of ancient Greek and Indian social contract theories. Particularly, the present investigation seeks to rectify two common misconceptions with respect to these: i) that the ancient Indian theories possess distinct characteristics and cannot be directly compared to their Greek counterparts, and ii) that the social contract theories which emerged in early modern Europe were essentially foreshadowed by the accounts of society’s origin encountered in ancient Greece and/or India. Instead, it will be demonstrated here that the Greek and Indian theories bear a stronger resemblance to each other than previously acknowledged, while essentially remaining at a remove from modern European accounts. To begin with, it is important to clarify the conceptual assumptions underlying the approach to ancient social contract theories assumed in this investigation. Traditionally, social contract theories have been defined based on the paradigms provided by early modern European theorising surrounding the origins of society. These early modern theories typically follow a tripartite model: starting with a state of nature, recognising its deficiencies, and transitioning to social life through intersubjective agreement (cf. Robitzsch 2023:394–5). Here, however, I have chosen to adopt a slightly different working definition, which I conceive of as being more in line with the examples of social contract theories encountered in ancient Greek and Indian literary works. In these instances, a common characteristic is the presence of an unwritten contract, or pact, between the people and their leader(s) – which in my understanding is tantamount to the core of social contract theories. Moreover – similarly to their early modern counterparts but showcasing a more blurred distinction – these accounts generally also evince an understanding of a change from pre-social modes of existence to social life, as well as of the earliest constitutional arrangements following upon this transition. One more point worth mentioning right from the beginning is that comparisons of ancient European and Indian languages and cultures have been conducted since the late eighteenth century – i.e., ever since the possibility of an original Indo-European civilisation was first suggested. Notably, there has also been previous scholarly attempts to compare the social theories that emerged – or that were developed based on earlier accounts – in these geographically distant regions. However, in point of fact, a common trait in 1 This paper was originally delivered at the conference Sino-Indo-Hellenica, conjointly arranged by Mid Sweden University and Södertörn University in May 2022. Downloaded from Brill.com 10/12/2024 02:45:50PM Open Access. This is an open access article distributed under the terms Old World: Journal of Ancient viaAfrica and Eurasia (2024) 1–26 of the CC BY 4.0 license. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ 3 ancient greek and indian | 10.1163/26670755-20240002 Indo-European comparisons of this kind has been to overlook the ancient Greek evidence. A clear example of this tendency can be seen in Georges Dumézil’s comparative studies centred on early kingship theories – wherein he identified variations of the theme of a king’s ‘original sin’ (assuming the shape of deceitful hubris), followed by the dissolution and reinstatement of his monarchy – in various pre-modern cultural spheres, including India, Iran, Rome, and Ireland, but not Greece (Dumézil 1988:108–129). Thus the distinction between Greek and Indian traditions may be seen to have overshadowed even the recognition of their shared Indo-European ancestry. In fact, the perception that ancient India, similar to China, embodies an altérité when compared to ancient Greece is a commonplace (cf. Linderborg 2021:89). This view is typically embraced by both Western and Indian researchers, albeit in differing ways. Accordingly, Western researchers have mostly introduced comparisons between the socio-intellectual traditions of ancient Greece and India in order to supply ‘alternative perspectives’, or pinpoint ‘differences in social and political structures’ – for instance, by proposing a fundamental contrast between Greek egalitarian principles and Indian hierarchical organisations (Dumont 1970:1–4; Roelcke 1987; Gray 2017:1–2).2 These investigations – whatever their merits – have hence served to corroborate the idea of the ‘otherness’ of the Indian cultural sphere. Indian scholars, in contrast, have traditionally been more prone to acknowledge Western counterparts to their endogenous traditions. These parallels have usually been recognised, however, with a view to elevating the ancient Indian socio-intellectual heritage above its Graeco-Roman counterpart. A case in point is the contention that the ancient Indian thinkers were the first to formulate social contract theories akin, or even superior, to those developed in early modern Europe – and that similar theories were not conceived of in ancient Greece or Rome (Bandyopadhaya 1927:15; Sharma 2022:9–15; Sharma 1996:38). In fact, Western scholars have shown the same enthusiasm as their Indian colleagues to project core aspects of modern European social contract thinking on their endogenous ancient literary evidence. Specifically, it has been repeatedly presumed that the ancient Greek and Roman accounts showcase the same vision of a clear-cut distinction between a ‘state of nature’ and social life – which we are familiar with from the work of Thomas Hobbes and other early modern social contract theorists (see Hobbes, Lev. 13 and Rousseau, Du. cont. soc. 1.6., cf. Cole 1990:8–10; Robitzsch 2023:394–396). In the course of this investigation it will be pinpointed, however, that precisely this feature seems to be generally lacking in both the ancient Greek and Indian sources. 2 For a recent notable exception to this contrast-assuming approach, see Seaford 2020:3–6. Downloaded from Brill.com 10/12/2024 02:45:50PM via Open Access. This is an open access article distributed under the terms Old World: Journal of Ancient Africa and Eurasia (2024) 1–26 of the CC BY 4.0 license. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ 4 10.1163/26670755-20240002 | linderborg Nevertheless, it will be noted, too, that both the ancient Greek and Indian socio-intellectual traditions demonstrate accounts of society’s origin, which foreshadow some elemental features in the social contract theories of early modern Europe. Western scholars have also rightly pointed out that at least the core of social contract theories – the notion that the social order originated in an agreement among its individual members – is well-represented also in GraecoRoman thought (Mulgan 1979:121). Moreover, if we broaden our material to incorporate some ancient Greek sources neglected in previous research, it becomes clear that social contract theories of the very kind developed in ancient India were in fact approximated around the same time also in Greece.3 Such a reconsideration of the sources will also help us close the gap between the ancient European and Indian cultural spheres – at least as far as their respective theories of the origins of the social order goes – and hopefully lead the way for future research towards less estranging cross-cultural comparisons. The investigation at hand is structured in the following way. To begin with, the bifold historically comparing method employed in the examination is overviewed. Thereafter, a background to the choice of sources is provided. Basically, it will show that the sources in focus represent case studies pertaining to what I identify as a shared characteristic in the Greek and Indian social contract theories: the pivotal role of monarchy in shaping the foundation of society. In the section that follows, the ancient Indian instances of social contract theories are analysed. The examples dealt with here form part of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad4 (Book I), the Dīgha Nikāya5 (Book xxvii; the Aggañña Sutta (‘the discourse on what is primary’)), and the Mahābhārata6 (Book xii; Śāntiparvan (‘the section on peace’)). After this, a Greek analogue to these Indian theories is scanned: the account of the origins of monarchy coming to the fore in Herodotus’ Histories7 (Book I; the so-called Deioces 3 Particularly, the Deioces episode in Herodotus Book I (96–100) has not been dealt with in research focusing on ancient social contract theories prior to the present investigation. 4 The Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, one of the earliest Upanishads, discusses the nature of the self, the concept of Brahman, the interconnectedness of all beings, and shows the path to spiritual enlightenment. 5 The Dīgha Nikāya, ‘the long collection’, contains some of the earliest representations of the teachings of the Buddha on various aspects of life, including ethics, meditation, and ultimate liberation, as well as the origins of the social order. 6 The Mahābhārata is an ancient Indian epic that recounts the story of a great war between two rival families, the Kauravas and the Pandavas, and explores profound themes of righteous conduct, family, and the complexities of human nature and society. 7 Herodotus’ Histories is a comprehensive account of the Persian Wars, chronicling the background and events of the Graeco-Persian conflict. It also provides valuable insights into the ancient world at large. Downloaded from Brill.com 10/12/2024 02:45:50PM Open Access. This is an open access article distributed under the terms Old World: Journal of Ancient viaAfrica and Eurasia (2024) 1–26 of the CC BY 4.0 license. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ancient greek and indian | 10.1163/26670755-20240002 5 episode, telling of the first Median king). Next, the Indian and Herodotean accounts are contrasted against the exposition of the origins of society met with in Plato’s dialogue Protagoras.8 Finally, the social contract theory in Polybius’ Histories9 (Book vi) is overviewed. A Note on Method The methodology employed in the present study consists in part of a traditional historical-philological method with a comparative outlook. The function of this methodological component is to derive from the narrative context the conceptual contents and types of reasoning that the examined texts evince – indicating in particular how these thought contents correlate and contrast with corresponding ideas detectable in other endogenous and exogenous texts (cf. Ostwald 1969:10). In addition, a historical-comparative approach will aid the textual analyses carried out in the research. The historical-comparative method allows for the construction of overarching theoretical models and categories. These, in turn, may be employed to analyse a variety of historical and cultural contexts (Cf. Gray 2017:2–6). In this connection, the silent presumption is that the projected categories – e.g., ‘social contract theory’, ‘monarchy’, ‘social’ and ‘pre-social’ – may be applied to both the Greek and Indian socio-intellectual traditions without falling prey to inadequate hypostatisation. Selection of Sources As mentioned, the kernel of social contract theories – the conception of intersubjective compact lying at the basis of the social order – is comparatively frequent in both ancient Indian and Graeco-Roman literary sources. On the Greek side, the earliest extant attestation of this idea is encountered in a fragment of the pamphlet ‘On Truth’ – ascribed to the fifth-century bc sophist Antiphon. Here, the author draws on the opposition between law and nature (νόμος and φύσις) to state that 8 In Plato’s dialogue Protagoras, the essence lies in the exploration of virtue and its teachability. 9 Polybius’ Histories provide a comprehensive account of the rise of Rome as a dominant power in the Mediterranean, analysing its political, military, and social institutions. It emphasises the cyclical nature of political regimes and the importance of balanced governance for the longevity and success of an empire. Downloaded from Brill.com 10/12/2024 02:45:50PM via Open Access. This is an open access article distributed under the terms Old World: Journal of Ancient Africa and Eurasia (2024) 1–26 of the CC BY 4.0 license. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ 6 10.1163/26670755-20240002 | linderborg τὰ μὲν τῶν νόμων ὁμολογηθέντα οὐ φύντα ἐστίν, τὰ δὲ τῆς φύσεως φύντα οὐχ ὁμολογηθέντα Antiph. 44a I (pendrick). the laws are not born but agreed upon, whereas nature is not agreed upon but born.10 On the Indian side, on the other hand, already the Ṛgveda11 (ca. 1500–1000 bc) seems to articulate the idea that the appointment of a ruler (the god Indra) was a matter of concord – although here it is not at all clear who the subjects of the agreement are, and whether the contract is thought to have been completed among humans or in the godly sphere (rv 8.97.10).12 The Aitareya Brāhmaṇa13 (ca. 1000–500 bc), in turn, gives a more clear account of how the godly society first came to be ruled by a king. It is crucial to recognise that in this text, the individuals selecting the king are not gods but humans, choosing him for his military skills rather than his ability to govern. However, the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa also sheds light on how the relationship between the human and divine realms was conceived of in ancient Indian thought. In this account, the rule of the primeval divine monarch (Soma) is envisioned to begin when the gods (‘devāḥ’ देवाः) are forced into combat with demons (‘asurāḥ’ असुराः). Initially, the latter defeat the former in all directions of the compass. Indeed, it is only after they realise that their vanquishment is due to lack of kingly rule, and the concomitant enthroning of Soma, that the tide of war changes. Headed by Soma, the gods finally manage to subdue the demons in all directions (“somena rājñā sarvā diśo’jayan” सोमेन राज्ा सवावा ददशोऽजयन्). This mythical defeat is then duly reflected in liturgy, in that the Brahmans are instructed to consecrate the rule of the human king (‘rājā’ राजा) by placing him on a cart. They rotate the cart in all directions in sequence – thereby 10 11 12 13 Trans. Pendrick (2002). The Ṛgveda is a sacred collection of hymns and chants that form the earliest known literary work in the Indian tradition. It consists of 1,028 hymns divided into ten books and is revered as a foundational text in Hindu religious and philosophical thought. “viśvāḥ pṛtanā abhibhūtaraṃ naraṃ sajūstatakṣurindraṃ jajanuśca rājase kratvā” ववशाः पृतना अिभभूतरं नरं सजूसततक्ुररन्द्ं जजनुश्च राजसे। ��वा (“The superior man who is even more dominant over all battles – Indra have they jointly fashioned and begotten for ruling …”). Trans. Jamison & Brereton (2014). The Aitareya Brāhmaṇa is one of the oldest and most important brahmanas, detailing the priestly functions and ceremonies of the ancient Vedic religion – particularly the Ṛgvedic elements in the liturgy. Downloaded from Brill.com 10/12/2024 02:45:50PM Open Access. This is an open access article distributed under the terms Old World: Journal of Ancient viaAfrica and Eurasia (2024) 1–26 of the CC BY 4.0 license. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ancient greek and indian | 10.1163/26670755-20240002 7 performing a ritual with the intended effect of making the earthly monarchy’s power coincide with its godly model. (Ait. Br. 1.14).14 Turning to the ancient Greek side, it may be surprising to learn that the concept of kingly rule as the terminus for social disorder is prevalent here, too. For the most part, however, the notion among the Greeks seems to have been that the monarchic order preceded any kind of social contract – or that it belonged to pre-social life. Thus Book iii of Plato’s Laws,15 for instance, mentions a communal order termed δυναστεία (‘headship’), which is envisioned to have succeeded a wholesale social cataclysm. In this initial stage of post-apocalyptic societal re-ordering, then, the people are thought to have organized themselves spontaneously in small-scale communities – in tribes or in single households (κατὰ μίαν οἴκησιν καὶ κατὰ γένος) – and the kings in charge are in this context equivalent to the tribal elders (ἐν αἷς τὸ πρεσβύτατον ἄρχει). (Pl. Laws 680b–e). Correspondingly, Book I of Aristotle’s Politics16 assumes that all city-states were originally monarchies (πρῶτον ἐβασιλεύοντο αἱ πόλεις) – as this would have been the natural outgrowth from the kingly rule of the eldest prevalent in each singular household (πᾶσα γὰρ οἰκία βασιλεύεται ὑπὸ τοῦ πρεσβυτάτου). (Arist. Pol. 1252b.19–22). Both Plato and Aristotle presume, too, that an elementary social contract succeeded these monarchically ordered early societies. Presumably, this contract would have been first agreed on when the small-scale communities were united into larger societies, with the tribal leaders – or their representatives – coming together to institute the earliest actual constitution (πολιτεία). In Plato’s view, this first proper constitution assumed the shape of either aristocracy or monarchy (ἀριστοκρατίαν τινά […] ἢ καί τινα βασιλείαν) – while Aristotle in contrast imagined it to have entailed the termination of monarchy, as well as the beginnings of constitutional change (from oligarchy through tyranny to democracy). (Pl. Laws 681c–d; Arist. Pol. 1286b.10–20).17 We do, however, also find among our Greek sources the conception of a primeval social contract resulting exactly in the initiation of kingly rule. Particularly, this notion occurs in a source to be examined more thoroughly 14 15 16 17 For references to scholarly works on ancient Indian royal consecration ceremonies, see Ludo 2012:339. The Laws is one of Plato’s later dialogues exploring the idea of an ideal state governed by laws. Notably, Socrates no longer figures as the main protagonist in the text. Aristotle’s Politics is a foundational work of political philosophy that examines the nature and purpose of the city-state, including how it should be organised and governed. It also explores various forms of government in the Greek world and beyond. Anticipations of the Aristotelian notion of constitutional transformation are found elsewhere in Plato’s corpus: see e.g. Pl. Rep. 550d. Downloaded from Brill.com 10/12/2024 02:45:50PM via Open Access. This is an open access article distributed under the terms Old World: Journal of Ancient Africa and Eurasia (2024) 1–26 of the CC BY 4.0 license. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ 8 10.1163/26670755-20240002 | linderborg below: the Deioces episode in Book I of Herodotus. Here, we are told of the first king of the Medes, Deioces. In the same vein as Soma, Deioces comes to power in a state of heightened social disorder. And just like Soma, Deioces is coronated as a result of a majority decision stemming from the realisation that order may only be generated by a sole ruler. In truth, even the wordings in the respective Indian and Greek narratives detailing this decision are rather much alike: The Devas said, it is on account of our having no king, that the Asuras defeat us. Let us elect a king (‘rājānaṃ karavāmahā’ राजानं करवामहा) Ait. Brāh. 1.14.18 Since we cannot go on living in the present way in the land, come, let us set up a king over us (στήσωμεν ἡμέων αὐτῶν βασιλέα) Hdt. 1.97.3.19 Now, the idea that social disorder results in monarchy is in fact a commonplace in ancient socio-political thought more globally. Accordingly, already in the Babylonian myth of creation, the Enūma Eliš (ca. 2000–1000 bc), kingly rule is conceived of as resulting from the gods being forced to grant supreme authority to the strongest among them (Marduk) – since otherwise he would have refused them his protection (En. El. 2.123–162). And both in ancient Greece and India, the idea that monarchy is the outcome of, and bulwark against, social disorder finds expression in other literary sources as well (see e.g. Anon. Iambl. 7.12 (Diels); Arth. 1.13.5.; cf. MDh 7.20). As will be seen, however, deviations from this common pattern are attested in both socio-intellectual traditions, too. On the Indian side, the three instances of social contract theories in focus in the remainder of this study span a time period from the late Vedic to the beginning of the Gupta period (ca. 1000 bc–400 ad) – with the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad (ca. 900–600 bc) falling in the beginning of this era, the Aggañña Sutta (ca. 500–200 bc) in the middle and Śāntiparvan (ca. 300 bc–300 ad) at the end. On the Greek side, in turn, the time period ranges from the early Classical to the mid-Hellenistic age (ca. 450–150 bc). Here again, the Herodotean Deioces episode (ca. 450–400 bc) represents the earliest cut into this time span, while Plato’s Protagoras (ca. 400–350 bc) falls in the middle and Polybius Book vi (ca. 170–120 bc) at the end. 18 19 Trans. Haug (1922). Trans. Godley (1920). Downloaded from Brill.com 10/12/2024 02:45:50PM Open Access. This is an open access article distributed under the terms Old World: Journal of Ancient viaAfrica and Eurasia (2024) 1–26 of the CC BY 4.0 license. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ancient greek and indian | 10.1163/26670755-20240002 9 In addition to the six main sources mentioned above, this study will also examine other early Greek and Indian social contract theories. On the Greek side, examples include ideas on the origins of society found in the writings of the Presocratic Democritus (ca. 460–370 bc) and the Epicurean Lucretius (ca. 99–55 bc). On the Indian side, theories of the beginnings vis-à-vis purpose of kingship encountered in the Arthaśāstra20 (ca. 500 bc–500 ad) and the Manusmṛti21 (ca. 300 bc–300 ad) will also be considered. The aim of this analysis is to offer insight of the varieties and developments of ancient Greek and Indian social contract theories, seen in comparison and across varying time periods. However, it is important to note that this survey is not exhaustive. There are many other instances of Greek and Indian social contract theories that are not included in the analysis.22 The Indian Accounts To begin with, it may be noted that the ancient Indian social contract theories do not really relate to the establishment of society per se – and that this marks a contrast to their early modern European counterparts (cf. Sharma 2022:10).23 Thus in Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan, for instance, it is famously stated that a state of nature would amount to an outright pre-cultural and pre-moral mode of existence – i.e., to a life so void of security that it can be nothing but “solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short” (Hobbes, Lev. 13). According to the Hobbesian account, the only way to avoid this utterly unsocial and miserable condition would be to choose a monarch – alternatively, a limited number of rulers – endowed with the power to defend them from the invasion of Forraigners, and the injuries of one another, and thereby to secure them in such sort, as that by their owne industrie, and by the fruites of the Earth, they may nourish themselves and live contentedly hobbes, Lev. 17. 20 21 22 23 The Arthaśāstra is an ancient Indian instructional manual for kings and their advisors, providing a comprehensive guide to statecraft, politics, and economic policy. The Manusmṛti is an ancient Indian legal text that lays down the social and moral codes of behavior for different castes and individuals. For a survey of Greek social contracts theories, see Gouch 1936:ch. 2. For a useful discussion of Indian social contract theories, see McClish & Olivelle 2012:xlvii–li. It may be worth pointing out, as well, that it is impossible for us to tell in which ways and to what extent the Indian accounts relate to historical societies: cf. Ludo 2012:333. Downloaded from Brill.com 10/12/2024 02:45:50PM via Open Access. This is an open access article distributed under the terms Old World: Journal of Ancient Africa and Eurasia (2024) 1–26 of the CC BY 4.0 license. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ 10 10.1163/26670755-20240002 | linderborg In our Indian sources, in contrast – much like in the understandings of Plato and Aristotle recounted above – the social contract is agreed on only at a somewhat later stage of societal development. Unlike in ancient Greece, however, kingship is here generally not conceived of as the starting point, but rather as the telos of pre-social development. Beginning with the kingship theory found in the Aggañña Sutta, this can be viewed as a specifically Buddhist social origins myth, possibly intended to satirise Brahmanical creation myths (see Gombrich 1992; cf. Huxley 1996:413– 416).24 Despite its possible ironical undertones, the theory is integral to a historical narrative that describes the emergence of a Buddhist hierarchical social structure, including kings, Brahmans, artisans, servants, and ascetic recluses (see Dīgh. Nik. 27.20–26, cf. Collins 1993:317 and; Linderborg 2023:488). In this context, the establishment of kingship is of paramount importance, since it entails the ending of social disorder, and marks the transition from unlawful pre-social to norm-abiding social existence (Dīgh. Nik. 27.20–21). Prior to the inauguration of monarchical rule and the beginnings of social life, however, an original state of harmonious and non-sedentary existence is first naturally succeeded by more settled forms of agricultural life. This societal progression gives rise to previously unheard-of customs – such as marriage and the recognition of private property (Dīgh. Nik. 27.11–18. Cf. Collins 1993:303– 6). These new communal practices, in turn, are what cause robbery (‘ādāna’ आदान) and lying (‘musāvāda’ मुसावाद) to emerge – and consequently the need for accusation (‘garahā’ गरहा) and punishment (‘daṇḍa’ दण्ड) also arises (Dīgh. Nik. 27.19).25 It is first at this point, then, that the primordial social contract between the king and the people transpires: Then, monks, those beings came together and lamented “bad things have appeared for us beings, in that stealing, accusation, lying and punishment have become known (“yatra hi nāma adinnādānaṃ paññāyissati, garahā paññāyissati, musāvādo paññāyissati, daṇḍādānaṃ paññāyissati” यत्र वह नाम अददन्ना दानं प�ञाययससवत, गरहा प�ञाययससवत, मुसावादो प�ञाययससवत, दण्डादानं प�ञाययससवत); what if we were to appoint one being to criticise 24 25 For the early Buddhist take on social contract theories, see further Collins 1996, Huxley 1996a, Huxley 1996b and Singh 2017, esp. ch. 1. In the satire De Lycksaliges ö [‘The Isle of the Blessed’] – written by the nineteenthcentury Swedish genius author August Strindberg – a blissful reversal of the pre-social development described in the Aggañña Sutta is envisioned. Having been ship-wrecked on a sub-tropical island – where there is just enough food in the form of fruits and vegetables to prevent everyone from starving – the characters in Strindberg’s story soon realise that they no longer require laws to protect their private property, since they have none: Strindberg 1983:29–30. Downloaded from Brill.com 10/12/2024 02:45:50PM Open Access. This is an open access article distributed under the terms Old World: Journal of Ancient viaAfrica and Eurasia (2024) 1–26 of the CC BY 4.0 license. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ancient greek and indian | 10.1163/26670755-20240002 11 whoever should be criticised, accuse whoever should be accused, and banish whoever should be banished? We will (each) hand over to him a portion of rice.” Then, monks, those beings went to the being among them who was most handsome and good-looking, most charismatic and with greatest authority and said “come, being, (you) criticise whoever should be criticised, accuse whoever should be accused, and banish whoever should be banished (“sammā khīyitabbaṃ khīyi, sammā garahitabbaṃ garahi, sammā pabbājetabbaṃ pabbājesi” सममा खीययत�बं खीयय, सममा गरवहत�बं गरवह, सममा प�बाजेत�बं प�बंाजेसस); we will each hand over to you a portion of rice. He agreed [and did as they asked]; they (each) gave him a portion of rice. ‘Appointed by the people’ [mahājanena sammato], monks, (is what) mahāsammata (means); ‘mahāsammata’ was the first term (for the kṣatriya class) which appeared. ‘Lord of the Fields’ [khettānaṃ pati] is what is what khattiya means: ‘khattiya’ was the second term (for the kṣatriya class) to appear. “He brings joy to others [paresaṃ … rañjeti] according to Dhamma”, is what rājā (‘king’) means: ‘rājā’ was the third term (for the kṣatriya class) to appear. dīgh. Nik. 27.20–21.26 The basic premise inherent in the above account is that of disorder leading to the establishment of monarchy. The prevalence of this idea in ancient socio-political thought worldwide has already been acknowledged, and we can observe a similar principle at play in the non-Buddhist Śāntiparvan, too. Nevertheless, a difference is present here, as the following passage suggests that the people resorted to a sole ruler only after their own attempts at maintaining order had proven unsuccessful: We have learned that peoples without kings have vanished in the past, devouring each other, the way fishes in the water eat the smaller ones (“parasparaṃ bhakṣayanto matsyā iva jale kṛśān” परसपरं भक्यन्ो मत्सया इव जले कृशान्). We’ve been taught that people got together and made agreements: “We must get rid of the men who talk tough, the men who carry clubs, the men who ravish other men’s wives, take what is not theirs, and the like” (“vākkrūro daṇḍapuruṣo yaśca syātpāradārikaḥ, yaśca na svamathādadyāttyājyā nastādṛśā” वा�कूरो दण्डपुरुषो यश्च ्सयातपारदाररकः, यश्च न �वमथादद्ात्याजया नसता�शा). But after they had made this agreement for the purpose of 26 Trans. Collins (1993). For the popular etymology connecting the nominal stem rājan (‘king’) with the verbal root rañj- (‘to be delighted’), see Ludo 2012:339–340. Downloaded from Brill.com 10/12/2024 02:45:50PM via Open Access. This is an open access article distributed under the terms Old World: Journal of Ancient Africa and Eurasia (2024) 1–26 of the CC BY 4.0 license. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ 12 10.1163/26670755-20240002 | linderborg inspiring confidence in all the orders of society without distinction, they did not abide by it. Miserably tormented, they went all together to the Grandfather, and said, “We are being destroyed, blessed one, we have no lord. Appoint for us a lord whom we might honor all together, a lord who shall protect us” (“anīśvarā vinaśyāmo bhagavannīśvaraṃ diśa, yaṃ pūjayema sambhūya yaśca naḥ paripālayet” अनीशरा ववन�यामो भगवन्ीशरं ददश, यं पूजयेम समभूय यश्च नः पररपालयेत्). He appointed Manu for them. MBh 12.67.17–21.27 The Aggañña Sutta and Śāntiparvan hence share a common perspective – they both suggest that the rise of the primeval king was instrumental in curbing the rampant lawlessness (‘mātsyanyāya’ मात्सयन्याय); ‘the law of the fish’) prevalent in early settled communities (cf. Arth. 1.13.5). However, there is a notable discrepancy in how these texts approach the first social contract. In Śāntiparvan, the prospective sovereign initially rejects the power bestowed upon him by the people: Manu did not make them happy. Manu said: “I am afraid of the cruel deeds. Kingship is extremely difficult to do, especially among humans who constantly behave wrongly” (“bibhemi karmaṇaḥ krūrādrājyaṃ hi bhṛśaduṣkaram, viśeṣato manuṣyeṣu mithyāvṛttiṣu nityadā” वबभेमम कमवाणः �ूराद्ाजयं वह भृशदुषकरम्, ववशेषतो मनुषयेषु ममथयावृमतिषु यनतयदा). MBh 12.67.21–22.28 It will show, then, that what is required to persuade the prospective king to assume his role is the promise of a great increase in his private wealth: The people said to him: ‘Do not be afraid. The sin of these deeds will go away. (“mā bhaiḥ karmaṇaino gamiṣyati” मा भैः कमवाणन ै ो ग िमषयत). And we will enlarge your treasury by giving you one fiftieth of our cattle and gold, and a tenth portion of our grain […] Suffused with all this Merit so easily obtained, protect us in every way, as Śatakratu (Indra) does the Gods […] 27 28 Trans. Fitzgerald (2004). Trans. Fitzgerald (2004). In his De lycksaliges ö (see fn. 25), August Strindberg – who was well-versed in ancient Chinese and Indian classics – has one of his ship-wrecked characters convey a similar fear with respect to their future on the island: “Han kände människornas ondska, och när dessa många odågor gått sysslolösa en tid, skulle man snart se huru deras samhälle skulle komma att störas av ofrid” [He was familiar with the evil of humans, and when these many scoundrels had gone idle for a while, it would soon be seen that their society was troubled by disorder]: Strindberg 1983:29. Downloaded from Brill.com 10/12/2024 02:45:50PM Open Access. This is an open access article distributed under the terms Old World: Journal of Ancient viaAfrica and Eurasia (2024) 1–26 of the CC BY 4.0 license. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ancient greek and indian | 10.1163/26670755-20240002 13 Surrounded by a great army, that tremendously brilliant man went out on an expedition. MBh 12.67.23–29.29 The Aggañña Sutta thus suggests a rapid establishment of kingship, while Śāntiparvan describes a more protracted process, where the interests of both parties – the ruler and his subjects – are first extensively negotiated. However, both sources adhere to the common presupposition that early settled societies elected their primeval kings due to increased lawlessness and insecurity (cf. Garg 2004:79–80). Interestingly, the latter idea is totally absent in Book I of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad. For here – adhering to the philosophical monism characteristic of the Upanishads of the late Vedic period Cf. McEvilley 2002:61) – we find a metaphysical perspective that transforms the notion of monarchy into a distinct entity: In the beginning this world was only brahman, only one. Because it was only one, brahman had not fully developed. It then created the ruling power, a form superior to and surpassing itself [i.e, the Ksatriya caste] (“brahma vā idamagra āsīdekameva tadeka sanna vyabhavat, tacchreyo rūpamatyasṛjata kṣatram” ब्रह्म वा इदमग्र आसीदेकमेव तदेक सन्न वयभवत्, तच्छ्े यो रूपमतयसृजत क्त्रम्). Bṛ. Up. 1.4.11.30 In the above passage, the beginning of kingship (or the institution of the rule of the Ksatriya class) is explained as a self-enhancing emanation of an original Brahmanical oneness (‘ekam’ एकम्). This self-advancement is followed by the formation of the lowermost two of the four main varnas, or hierarchically ordered Indian social classes, (the Vaisyas and the Sudras) – which are here likewise conceived of as Brahmanical self-enhancements (Bṛ. Up. 1.4.12–14). In the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, we are thus confronted with a deviation from the normal pattern of disorder resulting in monarchy. This variant understanding assumes the shape of a social contract postulate which solely 29 30 Trans. Fitzgerald (2004). In the Arthaśāstra the portion of grain allocated to the king is one-sixth, which is also the standard tax for various (material and immaterial) goods mentioned in other ancient Indian literary and inscriptional sources: see Arth. 1.13.6 and Lubin 2018:813. Trans. Olivelle (1998). Downloaded from Brill.com 10/12/2024 02:45:50PM via Open Access. This is an open access article distributed under the terms Old World: Journal of Ancient Africa and Eurasia (2024) 1–26 of the CC BY 4.0 license. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ 14 10.1163/26670755-20240002 | linderborg revolves around the self-proclaimed superior social group (the Brahmans).31 With these observations in mind, the key findings gathered thus far may now be summarised. It may be concluded, then, that the ancient Indian sources examined do promote a comprehension of the diachronic development of social contract theories in India – particularly in relation to how the kingly order was thought to have originated. Hence, we may observe how an initial understanding of inter-elite concord projected onto the divine sphere (Aitareya Brāhmaṇa), alternatively an idea of intra-elite self-transformation (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad), evolves into the concept of an agreement necessitated by the process of societal organization between the populace and their future leader (Aggañña Sutta). This, ultimately, reveals the arbitrary nature of the rulersubject pact – since it relies on the shared interests of the king and his people (Śāntiparvan). The later development may also be seen as an indication of the heightened understanding of the monarchic order as a human construct. In the Arthaśāstra, this understanding of the mundane nature of monarchy is also evident, as the theory of the beginnings of kingship in social disorder is here recounted by a spy, who is seemingly aware of his narrative’s purpose of justifying the king’s collection of taxes and fines (see Arth. 1.13.2–13, cf. Linderborg 2023:488–489).32 In truth, this later development may be understood to anticipate a feature of modern European social contract thinking, too: the idea that the agreement between the sovereign and his subjects can be broken, or that the constitution may be replaced. This is how this principle was conceived by John Locke in his Second Treatise of Government: the beginning of politic society depends upon the consent of the individuals, to join into and make one society; who, when they are thus incorporated, might set up what form of government they thought fit locke, Sec. Tr. 8.106. 31 32 The traditional model for explaining how the relationship between the two uppermost varnas developed from the late Vedic period onwards is to view the Brahmans as “spiritually preeminent but materially dependent upon” the Ksatriyas as the (secularly) ruling caste: see Raheja 1988:501, cf. Derrett 1976:600. The ‘secularised’ kingship theory found in Book 1 of the Arthaśāstra may be contrasted against the religionised view of kingship encountered in Book 7 of the Manusmṛti. In the latter, the monarchic order is closely associated with the divine sphere in that its administration of justice is believed to have a profound impact on both nature and the gods: MDh 7.26–29. This discrepancy may be conceived of in terms of a contrast between two different outlooks: pragmatic and ideological takes on social relations: see McClish 2019:20–21. Downloaded from Brill.com 10/12/2024 02:45:50PM Open Access. This is an open access article distributed under the terms Old World: Journal of Ancient viaAfrica and Eurasia (2024) 1–26 of the CC BY 4.0 license. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ancient greek and indian | 10.1163/26670755-20240002 15 Here, Locke articulates the view that individuals coming together to form a society will result in the selection of a specific form of government, which could potentially entail choosing monarchy. In the context of the ancient Indian social contract theories, the order of events is reversed, however – for the latter generally rely on one main principle for social order: kingly rule. For this, there are no explicit alternatives admitted, and the transition from presocial to social life presumes the establishment of a monarchic order. In what follows, the discussion turns to the ancient Greek social contract theories. The first of these, the Deioces episode, presents a Greek parallel to the Indian accounts – since it too acknowledges the presence of kingship as part and parcel of the social order.33 It should be emphasised, however, that the Deioces episode, as well as the whole Herodotean Μηδικὸς λόγος it forms a part of, lack historicity in as far as the Median empire as imagined by Herodotus in all likelihood never existed (see Linderborg 2018:87–88). The Greek Accounts This is how the Medes first came to opt for kingship, according to the account of Herodotus: There was among the Medes a clever man called Deioces: he was the son of Phraortes. Deioces was infatuated with sovereignty (ἐρασθεὶς τυραννίδος), and so he set about gaining it. Already a notable man in his own town (one of the many towns into which Media was divided), he began to profess and practice justice more constantly and zealously than ever, and he did this even though there was much lawlessness throughout the land of Media (καὶ ταῦτα μέντοι ἐούσης ἀνομίης πολλῆς ἀνὰ πᾶσαν τὴν Μηδικὴν ἐποίεε), and though he knew that injustice is always the enemy of justice. Then the Medes of the same town, seeing his behavior, chose him to be their judge (δικαστήν μιν ἑωυτῶν αἱρέοντο), and he (for he coveted sovereign power) was honest and just. By acting so, he won no small praise from his fellow townsmen, to such an extent that when the men of the other towns learned that Deioces alone gave fair judgments (having before suffered from unjust decisions), they came often and gladly to plead before Deioces; and at last they would submit to no arbitration 33 Someone might object against the use of the Deioces episode as an instance of Greek social contract theories on the ground that the episode is set in Media. However, scholars have long recognised that specifically Greek socio-theoretical preoccupations are mirrored in the Herodotean account: cf. Linderborg 2018:89–90. Downloaded from Brill.com 10/12/2024 02:45:50PM via Open Access. This is an open access article distributed under the terms Old World: Journal of Ancient Africa and Eurasia (2024) 1–26 of the CC BY 4.0 license. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ 16 10.1163/26670755-20240002 | linderborg but his. The number of those who came grew ever greater, for they heard that each case turned out in accord with the truth. Then Deioces, seeing that everything now depended on him, would not sit in his former seat of judgment, and said he would give no more decisions; for it was of no advantage to him (he said) to leave his own business and spend all day judging the cases of his neighbors. This caused robbery and lawlessness to increase greatly in the towns (ἐούσης ὦν ἁρπαγῆς καὶ ἀνομίης ἔτι πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἀνὰ τὰς κώμας); and, gathering together, the Medes conferred about their present affairs, and said (here, as I suppose, the main speakers were Deioces’ friends), “Since we cannot go on living in the present way in the land, come, let us set up a king over us; in this way the land will be well governed, and we ourselves shall attend to our business and not be routed by lawlessness.” With such words they persuaded themselves to be ruled by a king. The question was at once propounded: Whom should they make king? Then every man was loud in putting Deioces forward and praising Deioces, until they agreed that he should be their king (ἐς ὃ τοῦτον καταινέουσι βασιλέα σφίσι εἶναι). Hdt. 1.96.1–1.98.1.34 As seen, the Indian social contract theories evinced in the Aggañña Sutta and Śāntiparvan both embodied the concept of the anarchic ‘law of the fish’ (‘mātsyanyāya’ मात्सयन्याय) – generally conceived of as preceding the shift towards kingly order. We may now note that a parallel idea is given expression to in the above Greek account, too. For here, the narrator focalises the ‘great lawlessness’ (ἀνομία πολλή) prevailing in the land of the Medes when Deioces first started his career. However, the Herodotean account includes a twist: Deioces is not made king right away. Instead, he begins his career as a locally functioning judge (δικαστής), then extends his jurisdiction to cover also other village communities, whereafter he temporarily resigns. The rationale behind the latter act is that his resignation will result in renewed lawlessness – which eventually will secure his election as king (βασιλεύς), too. In the Aggañña Sutta and Śāntiparvan, in contrast, the kingly order was established immediately – or at least there was no mention here of any intermediate steps lying between the primeval state of social disorder and the rule of the first king: Mahā Sammata or Manu. Merely in the account of Śāntiparvan, did we witness negotiations leading up to the first king’s election. However, in the Deioces episode, the origins of kingly rule is for the first time portrayed as a completely self-conceived act undertaken by the would-be 34 Trans. Godley (1920). Downloaded from Brill.com 10/12/2024 02:45:50PM Open Access. This is an open access article distributed under the terms Old World: Journal of Ancient viaAfrica and Eurasia (2024) 1–26 of the CC BY 4.0 license. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ancient greek and indian | 10.1163/26670755-20240002 17 ruler (Linderborg 2023:489). This intensifies and highlights the sense of arbitrariness in the kingly order – a subjectiveness which seems merely tacitly acknowledged in Śāntiparvan. What is more, on the Greek side social contract theories that completely exclude monarchy as a principle of social organisation are encountered as well. Particularly this is the case with respect to Plato’s dialogue Protagoras. Here, in the central myth of the dialogue as recounted by Socrates’ main antagonist Protagoras, the assigning of qualities to the ‘kins of mortals’ (τὰ θνητὰ γένη, i.e., humans as well as animals) falls upon Prometheus and Epimetheus. These are the two titan gods responsible for ensuring that all mortal species become endowed with traits suited to their natural disposition. Epimetheus – who has been entrusted with the crucial task of distribution – aims above all to protect the beings from extinction. However, when performing this task, he commits a fatal error: he squanders all available resources on speechless animals (τὰ ἄλογα). This in turn leaves the entirety of humanity vulnerable. (Pl. Prot. 320c–321c). In the midst of this feebleness, Prometheus emerges as the saviour. With the intent to empower humanity, he takes it upon himself to snatch fire and ἡ ἔντεχνος σοφία – the knowledge of the arts – from Hephaestus and Athena. Provided with this know-how, the people soon gain the capacity to obtain life’s necessities, but it is not yet sufficient to shield them from wild creatures – or each other. This is because they are still deficient in πολιτικὴ σοφία. Without political wisdom, the formation of functional societies becomes an impossible feat – since there is nothing to promote the ability of the humans as a collective to defend themselves against predators, nor to restrain the individual members of the society from committing harm against each other. (See Pl. Prot. 321d–322b, cf. Despotopoulos 1987:179). When Zeus becomes aware of the misery of the people, a concern arises in him that the entire human race will perish. He therefore provides the Olympian messenger, Hermes, with two complementary qualities – δίκη and αἰδώς, righteousness and shame – to be passed on to the humans. It is Zeus’ answer to Hermes’ question concerning whom these qualities should be bestowed upon, then, which reveals the diametrical opposition between the monarchically oriented narratives encountered thus far, and Protagoras’ version of the social contract theory on the other hand: Hermes asked Zeus in what manner then was he to give men right and respect: “Am I to deal them out as the arts have been dealt? That dealing was done in such wise that one man possessing medical art is able to treat many ordinary men, and so with the other craftsmen. Am I to Downloaded from Brill.com 10/12/2024 02:45:50PM via Open Access. This is an open access article distributed under the terms Old World: Journal of Ancient Africa and Eurasia (2024) 1–26 of the CC BY 4.0 license. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ 18 10.1163/26670755-20240002 | linderborg place among men right and respect in this way also, or deal them out to all?” “To all,” replied Zeus; “let all have their share (ἐπὶ πάντας […] καὶ πάντες μετεχόντων): for cities cannot be formed if only a few have a share of these as of other arts”. Pl. Prot. 322c–d.35 This statement, in point of fact, presents the most democratic explanation for the origins of social order in ancient times (Clapp 1950:490–491). By explicitly disassociating itself from any concentration of power at the outset of the social ordering process, the above account proposes a radical egalitarian perspective. It suggests that the fundamental norms – or virtues (ἀρεταί) – required for the establishment and governing of city-states (πόλεις), were evenly distributed among all humans (ἐπὶ πάντας ἀνθρώπους). In truth, this presupposition sets the Protagorean account apart from all ancient Indian expositions of the origins of the social order – as well as from most early modern European social contract theories.36 In the final instance of ancient social contract theories to be examined in this article – that of Polybius Book vi – we once again encounter the notion of kingship as the central element in the organisation of society. However, what distinguishes the following account from the ones previously discussed is the differentiation between two early forms of kingly rule: Originally then it is probable that the condition of life among men was this, – herding together like animals and following the strongest and bravest as leaders (ζῳηδὸν συναθροιζομένων καὶ τοῖς ἀλκιμωτάτοις καὶ δυναμικωτάτοις ἑπομένων). The limit of this authority would be physical strength, and the name we should give it would be despotism (μοναρχία). But as soon as the idea of family ties and social relation (συντροφία καὶ συνήθεια) has arisen amongst such agglomerations of men, then is born also the idea of kingship (βασιλεία), and then for the first time mankind conceives the notion of goodness and justice (καὶ τότε πρώτως ἔννοια γίνεται τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ δικαίου τοῖς ἀνθρώποις). polyb. 6.5.9–10.37 35 36 37 Trans. Lamb (1967). However, in Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s conception of a legitimate political order consisting of a sovereign people governed by its own general will, we do encounter a similar radical egalitarianism: see Rousseau, Du cont. soc. 1.7, cf. Bertram 2012:403. Trans. Shuckburgh (1889). Downloaded from Brill.com 10/12/2024 02:45:50PM Open Access. This is an open access article distributed under the terms Old World: Journal of Ancient viaAfrica and Eurasia (2024) 1–26 of the CC BY 4.0 license. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ancient greek and indian | 10.1163/26670755-20240002 19 In contrast to Plato’s Protagorean vision of the origins of social order – which was noticed to rely on the widespread diffusion of the most fundamental social norms: δίκη and αἰδώς – Polybius’ account represents a retrogression. For he again aligns with the age-old belief that kingly rule lies at the basis of the social order. However, what sets Polybius apart from previous accounts is his assertion that social order and socio-moral norms originate at the intersection of the pre-social and the social – more particularly in the transition from a purely force-based to a genuinely constitutionalised form of kingly rule: μοναρχία on the one hand, and βασιλεία on the other.38 Although the text does not explicitly state that this transition entails a compact between the king and the people, such an agreement is implied in that Polybius considers the earlier communities to have been spontaneously formed associations of individuals of the same species (εἰς τὸ ὁμόφυλον συναγελάζεσθαι), whereas the later stage involves more organised social relations (συνήθεια) (Polyb. 6.5.7; 6.5.10).39 In its continuation, however, Polybius’ account seems to follow the precedent established by Aristotle’s Politics (cf. Cole 1964:444–447). For just like Aristotle did in his interpretation, so too does Polybius’ account envision the establishment of constitutional monarchy as having been superseded by constitutional change – albeit with a slight variation in the presumed order (monarchy-oligarchy-democracy in Polybius vs. Aristotle’s oligarchy-tyrannydemocracy) (Polyb. 6.7–9). The review of Polybius account concludes the survey of ancient Greek social contract theories. Compared to their Indian counterparts, the Greek theories we have examined demonstrate a greater range in terms of recognising different principles for social ordering. While the Indian theories admit merely one main principle for forming and maintaining order (monarchy), our Greek sources (particularly Plato’s Protagoras) even evinces the radical alternative notion that the establishment of order presupposes an equal distribution of socio-politically guiding norms.40 For the most part, however, the ancient 38 39 40 In Book V of Lucretius’ De Rerum Natura, from the Roman classical age, we again encounter a somewhat novel understanding of the function of monarchy in the transition from presocial to social modes of life. Here, kings (reges) are given the role of establishing the first cities (urbes) and beginning the division of cattle and land (pecudes et agros divisere), after an initial extended period of pre-social development involving the invention of fire and the discovery of the arts: see Lucr. 5.1105–12. Like Plato and Aristotle, Polybius too conceives of the pre-social formations as following on an extinction level event: Polyb. 6.5.5. The idea of a spontaneous conjoining of the post-apocalyptic survivors, again, may ultimately derive from Democritus: see fn. 42. In the principal doctrines of Epicureanism, as well as in some of the texts building on these, for instance in Porphyry’s De asbtinentia ab esu animalium, the social ordering process is also explained in terms excluding kings. The alternative explanation proposed Downloaded from Brill.com 10/12/2024 02:45:50PM via Open Access. This is an open access article distributed under the terms Old World: Journal of Ancient Africa and Eurasia (2024) 1–26 of the CC BY 4.0 license. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ 20 10.1163/26670755-20240002 | linderborg Greek socio-intellectual tradition, too, prioritises kingship as the foundation of the social ordering process (as witnessed in Plato’s Laws, Aristotle’s Politics, Herodotus Book I, and Polybius Book vi). Summary and Conclusion In global histories of ancient socio-political thought, the ancient Greek and Indian socio-intellectual traditions have – both in their respective ways – been distinguished from their Egyptian, Mesopotamian, and Persian counterparts. One crucial difference, then, has been taken to lie in the former traditions’ supposedly diminished reliance on the concept of ‘sacred monarchy’: the perception that the authority of the king derives from his relationship with the gods. Accordingly, the ancient Indian tradition would have been distinct since the caste system was here conceived of as more fundamental for the ordering of society than kingship (Black 2016:73–74). The Greek tradition, in turn, has been presumed to have been differentiated by its factual non-dependence on monarchy (Black 2016:161–163). However, what the present investigation has demonstrated is a rather contrasting view – namely, that in fact both the ancient Greek and Indian social contract theories generally have at their core the institution of kingship as the bulwark of social order. On the Indian side, the most common type of social contract theory (witnessed inter alia in the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa, the Aggañña Sutta and Śāntiparvan) is one leading more or less directly from heightened social disorder to the initiation of monarchy. A theory following this world-historically dominant pattern is attested also in our Greek sources (in the Deioces episode in Herodotus Book I). Nevertheless, the prevailing type of social contract theory on the Greek side is one where kingship forms the central ordering principle merely in the context of early settled societies – whereas a wider variety of constitutional alternatives (monarchy, oligarchy and democracy, as well as their variations) are here acknowledged at a relatively early stage of social development (as, for instance, in Plato’s Laws, Aristotle’s Politics and Polybius Book vi). All the same, both in Greece and India deviations from these common monarchy-dominated patterns are found. However, at least some of these variations may be explained in terms of breaks within the social history of here is that society, at least in its most basic form, originated from a spontaneous collective agreement driven by the desire to avoid suffering harm: see Epic. rs 31–33 and Porph. Abst. 1.10–11. Hence, the Epicurean tradition can be seen to provide another alternative to social contract theories centred on monarchy. Downloaded from Brill.com 10/12/2024 02:45:50PM Open Access. This is an open access article distributed under the terms Old World: Journal of Ancient viaAfrica and Eurasia (2024) 1–26 of the CC BY 4.0 license. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ancient greek and indian | 10.1163/26670755-20240002 21 the respective cultural spheres. On the Indian side, the monistic social theory encountered in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad may thus be interpreted as the outgrowth of a breakdown in the earlier kin-based social systems – which transpired in the late Vedic period. For concomitant with this undermining of the old tribal order was the inception of the caste-based social structure (the varnas), in the context of which the Brahmans managed to secure their place on top of the hierarchies by maintaining control over the communal ritual practice (Jha 1991:24–28). The Upanishad’s conception of the four varnas as an emanation of a metaphysically conceived Brahmanical oneness may thus be seen to form an early forceful assertion of this emerging social resettling.41 On the Greek side, in turn, the radically egalitarian perspective encountered in Plato’s Protagoras – where the creation of social order is tantamount to the equal distribution of socially guiding norms – could naturally only have been contrived in the context of the real-world radical democracies flourishing exclusively during the Greek Classical age (480–323 bc) (Linderborg 2019:13– 14). Furthermore, these respective Indian and Greek deviations from the typical patterns could potentially be considered as not even falling under the category of social contract theories. This is because both the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad and Plato’s Protagoras appear to lack, or at the very least diminish, the importance of intersubjective agreement preceding the transition to social life (cf. Robitzsch 2023:395–396).42 What distinguishes both the ancient Greek and Indian accounts from their early modern European counterparts, on the other hand, is the common idea that the primeval social contract is agreed on only at the conclusion of a relatively lengthy process of pre-social development. Thus Plato’s Laws, for instance, envisions a post-apocalyptic state – where the bulk of humanity is scattered in small-scale communities led by tribal elders. The primeval 41 42 The initial serious challenge to the post-Vedic Brahmanical dominance was presented during the Mauryan age (322–184 bc) by the broadening of religious privilege to include also representatives of various ascetic sects – such as Buddhists and Jainists: Olivelle 2012:128–129. Interestingly, the alternative non-monarchy-centred account of the origins of society encountered in the Epicurean tradition does involve the notion of intersubjective agreement: see fn. 40. This variant may thus be conceived of as a departure from the dominant monarchy-centred view. Moreover, the concept of society’s origins in a spontaneous conjoining, as seen in Epicurean philosophy, may have roots in the teachings of the Presocratic philosopher Democritus: cf. Cole 1990:170–173 and Democr. fr. B165 (dk): καὶ γὰρ ζῷα, φησίν, ὁμογενέσι ζῴοις συναγελάζεται (“Democritus asserts that all animals naturally unite with others of their own species”). If this is true, Plato’s Protagoras would not be the only known example of an anti-monarchical social contract theory from the Greek classical age. Downloaded from Brill.com 10/12/2024 02:45:50PM via Open Access. This is an open access article distributed under the terms Old World: Journal of Ancient Africa and Eurasia (2024) 1–26 of the CC BY 4.0 license. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ 22 10.1163/26670755-20240002 | linderborg social contract occurs when the various community leaders first come together to settle the terms for co-living on a larger scale. (Pl. Laws 681c–d). Correspondingly in the Aggañña Sutta, the social contract is arrived at as a consequence of the prior development of more settled forms of agricultural life, resulting in the arising of new customs, which in turn lead to disorder and force the communities to settle for kingship (Dīgh. Nik. 27.20–21). Consequently, the Hobbesian idea of a definitive separation between a state of nature and the beginning of society appears to be largely missing in both Greek and Indian literature (pace Cole 1990:8–10). On the Greek side, the myth of Protagoras, in particular, has been interpreted as suggesting a natural state, as it depicts humans living in scattered communities before Zeus’ gift of δίκη and αἰδώς allowed them to establish city-states (see Robitzsch 2023:395). It is worth noting, however, that it was Prometheus who initiated the process of civilisation by providing humans with the arts necessary for survival (Pl. Prot. 321d–322b). Thus the Protagorean conception of life before society also differs from Hobbes’ vision of a ‘brutish’ existence.43 On the Indian side, in turn, the social disorder exemplified by the concept of ‘mātsyanyāya’ मात्सयन्याय has often been taken as a parallel to the modern idea of a state of nature (see Slakter 2011:33). However, the Indian accounts, too, clearly lack the early modern perception of the natural state as inherently unsuitable for more organised societal co-living. Thus, in Śāntiparvan, there is a depiction of an earlier, primitive but harmonious, era of human societies characterised solely by righteousness (‘dharma’ धमवा), which was disrupted by the infiltration of the demonic power of ‘asurāḥ’ असुराः into the bodies of men (MBh 12.283.8–9). This may be contrasted with Rousseau’s understanding of early settled life. Here, the norms of traditional life forms are stipulated to last only for as long as humans have enough resources to survive on their own. However, as soon as they become parts of larger aggregates, problems start to emerge, and a resettling in the form of a social contract becomes a necessity (Rousseau, Du cont. soc. 1.6).44 The comparisons scholars have made between ancient Greek and Indian conceptions of pre-social existence and early modern concepts of states of nature are thus open to questioning; however, a feature of modern European 43 44 In truth, the closest Graeco-Roman counterpart to the Hobbesian conception of a state of nature is extant in Lucretius’ De Rerum Natura – where in the context of the earliest stages of pre-social development men are imagined to be leading a wandering life in the manner of beasts (volgivago vitam tractabant more ferarum): Lucr. 5.932. In a similar vein, both Hobbes and Locke presume that an uncurbed state of nature will likely result in ongoing war (Hobbes’ bellum omnium contra omnes): Locke, Sec. Tr. 3.20–21; Hobbes, Lev. 14. Downloaded from Brill.com 10/12/2024 02:45:50PM Open Access. This is an open access article distributed under the terms Old World: Journal of Ancient viaAfrica and Eurasia (2024) 1–26 of the CC BY 4.0 license. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ancient greek and indian | 10.1163/26670755-20240002 23 accounts does come to the fore also in our ancient Greek and Indian sources (e.g. in Śāntiparvan and Herodotus Book I). This is the awareness of the arbitrary nature of the social order – i.e., the understanding that the ruler-subject pact is contingent and dependent on the continued mutual interest of all parties, and hence that the social contract may be broken. Consequently, a kind of transcendence of the concept of sacred monarchy may truly be ascribed to the ancient Greek and Indian socio-intellectual traditions. For the social theories developed in these cultural spheres seem to have offered the earliest visions of the monarchic order – and correspondingly of the social order at large – as a human agreement. The comparison of ancient Greek and Indian social contract theories thus reveals both significant similarities and dissimilarities. The primary distinction resides in the absence of an alternative to kingship as the main social ordering principle in the Indian sources – whereas the Greek accounts in general recognise a variety of such principles. The Indian accounts are distinct, too, in that the late- and post-Vedic social contract theories also contain etiological justifications of the caste system as a whole. However, these differences are counterweighted by crucial similarities. Thus both the Greek and Indian sources – notwithstanding some notable exceptions on the Greek side (cf. fn. 42) – generally recognise monarchy as a major unifying force in the early stages of societal development. This may well point towards a factual parallelism in the prehistory of the respective cultural spheres, assuming the shape of locally dominant leaders – denominated perhaps βασιλεύς/‘rājā’ राजा (‘king’) or δεσπότης/ ‘viśpati’ वव�पवत (‘master’) – endowed with religiously authorised power to autonomously decide over communal matters (cf. Black 2016:13–18; Scharfe 1985:547). Moreover, encountered within both cultural spheres is the conception of a lengthy pre-social development, progressing through gradually more settled forms of communal life, and leading towards the eventual outcome in the shape of a primeval social contract. 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