Complexity and the relationship between knowledge and action

Futures, 2005

Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 2 (5): 15, 2013

This essay explores the relationship between knowledge (in the form of scientific risk assessment) and action (in the form of technological innovation) as they come together in policy, which itself is both a kind of knowing and acting. It first illustrates the dilemma of timely action in the face of uncertain unintended consequences. It then introduces the precautionary and proactionary principles as different alignments of knowledge and action within the policymaking process. The essay next considers a cynical and a hopeful reading of the role of these principles in public policy debates. We argue that the two principles, despite initial appearances, are not all that different when it comes to formulating public policy. We also suggest that principles in general can be used either to guide our actions, or to determine them for us. We argue that allowing principles to predetermine our actions undermines the sense of autonomy necessary for true action.

Political Studies, 2012

The trend in government and public policy towards evidence-based policy making has recently been the subject of criticism from authors such as Ian Sanderson who argue that the insights of complexity theory undermine the claims of evidence that these forms of policy design advocate.While taking on board the primary claim of this critique, this article examines the contribution of complexity theory in more detail to suggest that the epistemological obstacles that complexity science identifies also challenge the kind of pragmatic, deliberative model that Sanderson prefers. Instead, it examines the work of Michael Freeden on failure and Michel Foucault on error to demonstrate the ways in which approaches that are less wedded to epistemological certainty can enable policy makers to think more creatively about the complex terrain they must navigate and develop more innovative and less risk-averse forms of political action. Error is the permanent contingency [aléa] around which the history of life and the development of human beings are coiled (Foucault, 1998, p. 477). In his recent article in Political Studies, Ian Sanderson (2009) provides a much-needed and thought-provoking critique of evidence-based policy making and the 'what works' rationality that was fundamental to the development of Third Way theory, New Labour discourse in the UK and, more recently, the agenda of the Rudd/Gillard Federal Labor government in Australia. Sanderson's argument cogently expresses the limitations of evidence-based policy making on the grounds that 'evidence' is highly contested and that policy design, implementation and evaluation are bound up with a number of other contingent factors. Thus, issues such as the structure of power, the politics of influence and judgements about the contextual constraints in any policy environment have a direct bearing on whether the policies that are actually pursued are grounded in evidence or whether the evidence is manufactured to suit the policy agenda. Sanderson points to the additional constraints that emanate from complexity theory to suggest that, at best, recent policy developments have been 'evidence informed' rather than 'evidence based'. On this foundation he constructs an argument for a much more pragmatic approach to policy processes which relies less heavily on the normative arguments for specific policies and instead concentrates on deliberative processes to justify particular courses of action given the epistemological limits that conditions of complexity impose.

What is the relationship between knowledge and action? Hawthorne and Stanley (2008) propose an intimate connection between the two. They offer a knowledge-norm account of action comprised of two principles, which they take to be jointly necessary and sufficient conditions for rational ac- tion. They believe these principles capture the way we blame and criticize agents for reasoning or acting upon premises that fall short of knowledge. However their account is unable to accommodate ascriptions of blame or criticism in ethical situations, where unknown moral facts seem to be in force. There seems to be a tension between what Hawthorne and Stanley are committed to saying is proper reasoning, and what intuitively seems to be improper and blameworthy reasoning/action. This paper highlights this problem, and considers two ways in which Hawthorne and Stanley might try to respond, ultimately concluding that their view is unable to do so.

A discourse on reality and limits of human knowledge

The paper analyses several complicated phenomena from the study of language, economy, financial markets, and human history to formulate a more effective decision-making process for senior managers. Even though not strictly meant as a political manifesto, the paper's conclusions make a strong case in support of liberal-democratic systems. However, a more immediate goal was to outline a case for utilizing doubt as a tool for making better strategic decisions. Paper strongly advocates for managers to adopt humility as a personal trait and inquisitive mind as the driving principle in their work.

International Journal of Knowledge and Systems Science, 2012

2013

This paper highlights some theoretical and epistemological reflections about the relevance of action for managerial studies. These reflections show how the cybernetic paradigm of complexity management can be used for better decision making that unites knowledge and action in a comprising, dynamic, and evolving approach. Cybernetics can help to overcome the fear of decision making in the face of uncertainty in complex scenarios, and can be an effective tool for improving the viability and competitiveness of firms in the twenty-first century.

Construction Site for Possible Worlds - Edited By A. Beech and R. Mackay, Urbanomic 2020, 2020

We have at our disposal today the most advanced predictive technologies, and yet we are also exposed to unprecedent uncertainties. Risk no longer consists of a finite number of calculated dangers against which we may deploy precise measures for prevention, according to an attitude of control. As new risks constantly emerge unpredictably, forcing us into an attitude of resilience whereby plans, means, and ends can be modified at any moment, our practices are liable to lead to unsatisfactory or undesirable results rather than to the expected benefits. The uncertainty we are experiencing today is that of a situation where the risk estimation of a future decision is modified by the very activity of improving the efficacy of predictive hypotheses-an activity which, like the evolution of scientific knowledge, cannot be forecast.