Diversity and unity in federal countries: comparative conclusion

13_Conclusion.fm Page 379 Wednesday, February 17, 2010 12:39 PM Comparative Conclusions césar colino and luis moreno diversity and unity: the issues As we emphasized in the introduction to this volume, old and new diversities in several countries and their potential to create conflict have been frequently addressed through federal arrangements. As the country chapters in this volume show, federal institutions and ideas have helped accommodate ethno-linguistic or religious diversities, empower ethnic or linguistic minorities, manage conflicts, and establish a legitimate, stable, and cohesive order in many states.1 Of course, there are huge differences in the ways and degrees to which countries have achieved conflict management, stability, and legitimacy. But in most of the cases, a combination of both recognizing diversity and encouraging integration or cohesion in the federation has been pursued. All federations have had to find ways of accommodating diversities through different institutional-design strategies, for example, either by expressing diversity through constituent units or by having the boundaries of constituent political units cut across these diversities. This has raised several issues about the consequences of federalism for managing politicized diversity. The first issue is the kind of diversity. Not all federal countries reflect the same degree and type of diversity. Particular configurations of social and political diversities may be found in different systems due to historical factors or to more recent developments. Federal arrangements may have been created originally to deal with one or several types of diversity that may be changing because of later social transformations. New diversities and cleavages may arise that have to be dealt with through adaptation of the old federal arrangements or through new policies. Old and new diversities may or may not be present in several federations and may combine in different ways, thus making the existence of mobilized minorities and the need for accommodation and conflict management more or less contingent or structural. 13_Conclusion.fm Page 380 Wednesday, February 17, 2010 12:39 PM 380 César Colino and Luis Moreno If the configuration of diversity is also diverse in itself and the overlapping of diversities makes a difference for the stability and success of a federation, a review of the twelve cases included in this volume shows the shortcomings of the usual differentiations between homogeneous and heterogeneous, national and plural, mono-national and multinational federations, as well as the distinction between ethnic and territorial or administrative federalism. Certainly, the picture is more complex and defies easy categorization. Drawing upon some traits of old and new diversity, it seems useful to group several configurations of diversities in separate categories that may indicate an increasing degree of challenge for institutional design, stability, and legitimacy. Ranging from less to more politicized old and new types of diversity, we may identify six ‘ideal types’ characteristic of the empirical cases under observation: 1 National federations that are mostly monolingual and have historical and newly created political units with new groups of immigrants unequally distributed across the constituent units. Political parties are predominantly federation-wide, and institutional arrangements and resources are fairly centralized or shared concurrently (e.g., Germany). 2 National federations with small indigenous populations, old immigrant or settler groups, different religions, a dominant lingua franca, and predominantly federation-wide parties. New diversities are not concentrated territorially, and the federal government retains a significant political role (e.g., Australia, Brazil, and United States). 3 Multilingual, multi-unit, recently established federal countries, with a dominant lingua franca and a dominant national identity but with several mobilized minority national groups and increasing new religious and cultural diversity. There are strong federation-wide parties but also strong regional parties in some constituent units, and there are certain elements of asymmetry and considerable decentralization in institutional arrangements (e.g., Spain). 4 Multilingual and multicultural federations (largely bi- or tri-communal) with no national lingua franca, but which have strong local identities compatible with a federation-wide identity. There are weak, or nonexistent, federation-wide parties, and there is increasing new poly-ethnic diversity within the constituent units, and the distribution of competences is very decentralized (e.g., Belgium and Switzerland). 5 Bilingual federations where several national groups are mobilized, with one of them being dominant, and where indigenous populations are also mobilized. Non-federation-wide parties are strong, and there is an increasing poly-ethnicity due to high new immigration with institutional 13_Conclusion.fm Page 381 Wednesday, February 17, 2010 12:39 PM Comparative Conclusions 381 arrangements characterized by decentralized powers and resources (e.g., Canada). 6 Multi-ethnic, multilingual, and multi-religious federal countries with multiple constituent units that are designed mainly along ethnic or linguistic lines, although there may be one lingua franca or major ethnic group in several units. There are different configurations of party systems, strong socio-economic disparities, and large internal migration flows (e.g., Ethiopia, India, Nigeria, and Russia). Although the classification of these cases may be controversial, this typology allows us to place additional cases of federations in these categories and to introduce a taxonomical order, somewhat provisionally, among the twelve federations. Thus, a synthetic scale of federal diversity among the cases in this volume would range from Germany, Australia, United States, Brazil, Spain, Belgium, and Switzerland to Canada, Russia, India, Nigeria, and Ethiopia. Another dimension we should consider in order to understand the propensity for conflict and the success of the federation in managing diversity is the extent to which the said kinds of diversity reinforce or cut across each other; the extent to which socio-economic resources and economic development are concentrated territorially within particular constituent units or are dispersed fairly evenly among the constituent units; and the extent to which there are secessionist movements in the federation, especially ones that are capable or willing to resort to violence to achieve their demands. A second issue has to do with the assessment of the federal responses to different sets or configurations of diversities in the twelve countries presented in this volume. The question is the extent to which federal arrangements are adequate to deal simultaneously with both old diversities (e.g., national-ethnic identities and demographic or economic divergence) and new diversities (e.g., aboriginal peoples’ recent demands based on old, previously ignored, claims, as well as new immigration), or whether federal arrangements may be appropriate means for managing only some of these diversities. To test the claim that federalism is the most able means to conciliate respect for diversity with a common purpose or unity, we need to discuss and assess the capacity of different types of federal arrangements to respond to different types or configurations of diversities. Institutional responses to tackle specific types of diversity are articulated in federal countries showing an array of strategies and values. These strategies sometimes emphasize the inclusion and recognition of ethnic differences, the empowerment and autonomy of specific groups, or their integration and participation in the federal institutions. These strategies appear in different combinations and are more likely to be more present, workable, and effective in some contexts than in others. 13_Conclusion.fm Page 382 Wednesday, February 17, 2010 12:39 PM 382 César Colino and Luis Moreno In this sense, we need to be aware of what has been called the paradox of federalism2 or its Janus-faced nature, which means that under certain conditions, federalism, that is, the autonomy and recognition of territorially based groups, may be able to accommodate territorially based ethnic, cultural, and linguistic differences, thereby safeguarding the integrity of existing states and managing potential conflict. In other cases, however, such empowerment and recognition may, in the long run, strengthen conflict between those units and federal institutions and also perpetuate differences between groups, providing those ethnic groups with the institutional tools for eventual secession. That leads to the issues of how to establish the adequacy of federal institutions to manage differences and how to define the success of federal arrangements to manage diversity. Different groups within the federation may have different visions of what a successful diversity-accommodation means. Normatively, we may consider stability and the absence of violence and of threats to the integrity of the federation itself – such as strong secessionism – as the main criteria for success. However, we can also posit that to be adequate, the management of conflict has to be consistent with the values of constitutionalism, the rule of law, democratic practice, and social justice or equality.3 Finally, another complicated question is one of cause and effect. We still do not know enough to be able to attribute the survival of a federation to its institutions or its policies of diversity accommodation, which means that it is tricky to recommend federal institutional solutions or conflict-management strategies for non-federal or federalizing countries. In any case, the purpose of this chapter is to explore some of these issues even if no definitive answers can arise from the exploration. Drawing on the rich information provided by the country studies in this volume, this comparative overview presents briefly the multiple configurations of diversity in federal countries and their commonalities and differences. It looks at the federal governance of diversity, that is, to some of the general institutional design options – e.g., self-government and autonomy arrangements, integration and participation in the federal institutions, and other strategies (such as collective rights and symbolic recognition) – that different federations pursue in their treatment of the more relevant socio-political diversities and their institutional responses to accommodating multiple diversities and achieving unity. It examines and compares some examples of specific federal or constituent units’ policies or institutions for managing three types of diversity: ethnic or national diversity, language or religious diversity, and diversity produced by multiculturalism and recent immigration. m u lt i p l e c o n f i g u r at i o n s o f d i v e r s i t y in federal countries As described in the preceding country chapters, when looking at the socio-political basis of diversity in federations, the most important cleavages 13_Conclusion.fm Page 383 Wednesday, February 17, 2010 12:39 PM Comparative Conclusions 383 that usually influence the emergence, design, and operation of federal arrangements are race and ethno-territorial identity, language and religion, demographic and spatial diversity, economic development and economic divergences, and party systems. Let us review some examples. Race and Ethno-territorial Identity Federations vary in the extent to which there is one predominant cultural ethnic group and several minorities, or in the way different ethnic groups are distributed among the total population and more or less concentrated territorially in one unit or across several of the constituent units. For instance, some of the more diverse federations are the African ones. In Nigeria, there exist three principal ethnies, the Hausa-Fulani, the Yoruba, and the Ibo, which collectively account for two-thirds of the country’s total population. In Ethiopia, the constitution defines more than eighty “nations, nationalities and peoples.” Of these, four nationalities (Oromos with 34.5 percent, the Amhara 26.9 percent, Somali 6.2 percent, and Tigrayans 6.1 percent) constitute about 74 percent of the total population. In Russia, the largest ethnic group is composed of the ethnic Russians (79.8 percent) followed by four autochthonous groups with more than 1 million people each (Tartars with 5 million, Chuvashians with 1.6 million, the Bashkirs with 1.6 million, and the Chechens with 1.1 million). Among the non-Russian ethnic groups, forty-one are defined as ‘titular’ ethnic groups that provide the name for a region of the federation, even if most republics and autonomous districts are strongly ‘Russified.’ In twenty-one republics, however, the titular ethnic group accounts for the majority of the population (e.g., Chechnya, 93.5 percent; Dagestan, 95 percent; and Ingushetia, 77 percent). In some cases, federations appeared historically through the settlement of Europeans alongside – or interfering with – aboriginal peoples or indigenous populations (called ’First Nations’ in Canada). Although these indigenous peoples are not numerous as a share of the population of the federation, they may be increasingly mobilized and may make claims for justice or special arrangements and autonomy, or even for home rule of their own territories of residence. In Canada, Aboriginal peoples – Indians, Métis, and Inuit – make up about 4 percent of the population, around 1.3 million people. Traditional policies have provoked the mobilization of Aboriginal peoples to maintain their societies and cultures, to regain control over land and resources, and, thus, to achieve a degree of self-government and to interact with other Canadians on a ‘nation-to-nation’ basis. Several negotiations led to the creation of the Territory of Nunavut with a large Inuit majority, and the Quebec-based Inuit, for example, have been able to gain control over a new territory, Nunavik, created in the north of the province. In the United States, Indian groups are the only peoples that enjoy collective 13_Conclusion.fm Page 384 Wednesday, February 17, 2010 12:39 PM 384 César Colino and Luis Moreno national rights, possess communal territories (i.e., reservations), and have authority to confine membership in their tribes to blood members. There are 310 Indian reservations and more than 550 federally recognized tribes. The largest is the Navajo Nation with 250,000 people covering a large territory. Federal law is still criticized for not recognizing enough autonomy for them as nations. In Australia, Aboriginal peoples account for 2.5 percent of the overall national population, but they represent a very significant 32 percent of the population of the Northern Territory. In Brazil, indigenous peoples amount to around 700,000 people, around 4 percent of the total population. They correspond to 227 different ethnic groups in 608 designated areas – 422 of them in the Amazon region – encompassing 1,097,774 square kilometres (13 percent of the national territory). In other federations, racial groups do not define themselves in ethno-territorial terms. They may not be territorially concentrated or may have been more easily assimilated into the majority cultural group, even if they keep their identities as separate groups, and spatial and economic segregation of many of these racial groups may be considerable. In the United States, for example, 66 percent of the population is white, 15.1 percent Hispanic or Latino (of which 52.3 percent identify also as white), 12.3 percent African American, 4.3 percent Asian, and 0.7 percent American Indian or Alaska Native. Brazil has a large number of Afro-descendants, 49.5 percent of the population versus 49.7 percent whites. But even more homogeneous federations such as Germany have some small official ethnic minorities that are territorially concentrated, such as the Sorbs in the states of Brandenburg and Saxony, the Frieslanders in Lower Saxony and Schleswig-Holstein, and the Danes in Schleswig-Holstein. Language and Religion Federations also vary in the number of different languages (mother tongues) spoken and as to the presence of a common language or lingua franca in which different peoples of the federation can communicate. In some cases, issues related to linguistic differences are politicized and become a source of societal cleavages. In other cases, language is not a source of conflict due to recourse to bilingualism or the use of an ‘internal’ or ‘external’ lingua franca. Switzerland, for example, is a federation with four national languages: German (64 percent of the population), French (20 percent), Italian (6.5 percent), and Romansh (0.5 percent). Despite this variety, cantons are fairly homogeneous in terms of language, with twenty-two being officially unilingual (seventeen German, four French, and one Italian), three being bilingual (Berne, Valais, and Fribourg), and one being trilingual (Grisons with German, Romansh, and Italian). In the United States, although there is a common language in the federation, little more than 82 percent of us residents speak 13_Conclusion.fm Page 385 Wednesday, February 17, 2010 12:39 PM Comparative Conclusions 385 English at home; nearly 11 percent speak Spanish, 0.6 percent Chinese, 0.6 percent French, 0.5 percent German, and so forth. In Canada, language and religion were particularly salient at the formation of the confederation, and the Constitution in 1867 expressly attempted to deal with language issues in terms of religious affiliation. Quebecers are mainly Roman Catholic; most other Canadians are Protestant. Currently, 80 percent of French Canadians are territorially concentrated within Quebec’s borders, and there are 1 million French-speaking Canadians outside Quebec who constitute minorities in several other provinces such as New Brunswick, the only officially bilingual province. In Ethiopia, despite the existence of more than eighty languages, the 1995 federal Constitution declares Amharic to be the working language of the federal government but does not specify the working language for communication between the federal government and the states (in practical terms, Amharic is that working language). In India, twenty-two official languages are listed in the Constitution. Of these, fifteen belong to the Indo-Aryan variant of Indo-European languages, while four are from the Dravidian group. The census lists one hundred other languages, of which sixty-six belong to the TibetoBurmese group. India’s linguistic and religious minorities, therefore, exist within almost all states, and language was the main factor behind the reorganization of Indian states along linguistic lines in 1956. The Constitution encourages public institutions to provide education in the mother tongue wherever possible. English and Hindi have maintained roles as co-official languages for purposes of communication between the Union and the states, and English has served as an ‘external’ lingua franca for higher education and employment purposes, as is also the case in Nigeria. Castilian Spanish (castellano) spoken throughout Spain, serves as a lingua franca, including in regions with other languages (e.g., the Basque Country, Catalonia, and Galicia). Portuguese is spoken by the vast majority of the people in the Brazilian federation, with some exceptions among isolated aboriginal peoples tribes. As regards religion, many federations feature several religious denominations, and in many of them there are religious minorities. In Russia, for example, there are around 25 million Muslims, forming the largest religious minority. In India are found all the world’s major religions that originated on the Indian subcontinent – Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, and Sikhism –,as well as Judaism, Zoroastrianism, Christianity, and Islam, which arrived in the country long ago. Hindus account for 80.5 percent of the population, and Muslims constitute the largest single religious minority (13.4 percent) even after partition. They are followed by other religious minorities, such as Christians (2.3 percent), Sikhs (1.9 percent), Buddhists (0.8 percent), and Jains (0.4 percent). In Ethiopia, 44 percent of the population professes Orthodox Christianity, and 34 percent is Muslim. Switzerland has traditionally hosted the two major Christian religions (42 percent Roman Catholic and 33 percent Protestant), similar to Germany. In these two countries, where 13_Conclusion.fm Page 386 Wednesday, February 17, 2010 12:39 PM 386 César Colino and Luis Moreno historically religion played a role as the most divisive cleavage, it is no longer a very significant one. Finally, in other diverse countries, religion does not play a role due to the dominance of a single religion in the different constituent units (e.g., Belgium and Spain). Within a federation, language and religious differences may reinforce each other (e.g., Canada) or cut across each other (e.g., Switzerland and India), which is a significant factor in the extent of conflict and the need for conflict-management devices. In Switzerland, for example, religious, language, and communal identities do not necessarily overlap. The cantonal identities cut across the two other elements of cultural diversity, religion and language. That fosters stability and makes the identification of minorities and majorities ambiguous. It means that almost every Swiss person belongs at the same time to a majority (e.g., language) and a minority (e.g., religion). In India, diversities do not necessarily reinforce each other. In the case of religion, the Muslims of South India (e.g., Kerala and Tamil Nadu) are different in terms of language and culture from their religious brethren of the North. In other cases, such as Ethiopia and Belgium, differences are sometimes mutually reinforced, which may make accommodation harder. Demographic and Spatial Diversity The territorial concentration of different groups or the dispersion of ethnocultural groups across several constituent units is also a characteristic that differentiates federations. In some instances, ethno-linguistic or cultural groups are concentrated within a particular geographic area, and minorities are attached to identifiable territories of their own (e.g., Canada and Switzerland). In others, majority groups are dispersed throughout the territory of the federation in several units (e.g., Brazil, Russia, Spain, and United States) or diversities may cut across different territories and groups (e.g., India and Nigeria). As an example of this, the design of the federation’s constituent units in Nigeria means that the population of each of the major groups – the Hausa-Fulani, the Yoruba, and the Ibo – is distributed among at least five states. Although this diffusing strategy has not eliminated the cohesion of these groups as they compete with each other in bidding for power and resources in the national arena, it has produced significant intra-ethnic mobilization and competition, thereby diluting the violent ethnic separatism that had developed around the old regional system. Economic Development and Economic Divergences Another source of diversity relevant for the stability of federations is the extent to which socio-economic resources are territorially concentrated – or controlled by specific groups – and economic development diverges sharply 13_Conclusion.fm Page 387 Wednesday, February 17, 2010 12:39 PM Comparative Conclusions 387 among the different constituent units. Often there is a non-congruence between political and economic centres. Some constituent units may be much more underdeveloped than others, a situation that may lead to redistribution demands. Conversely, revenues from natural resources may be concentrated in some constituent units, bringing about autonomy claims by the resource-rich units. In Nigeria, for example, the incidence of poverty is worse in the demographically and politically dominant northern states than elsewhere in the federation. In India, the rapid growth of some states due to globalization and economic liberalization has given rise to new forms of diversity that have led to regular flows of internal migration (from the rural hinterland to large cities, primarily). In Russia, the socioeconomic discrepancy between regions is widening. Also, in Belgium, inter-regional socio-economic disparities are on the rise with potential knock-on effects for the stability of the federation. In Canada, inter-provincial differences in wealth and income are also large. In Switzerland, economic disparities among the cantons are reflected in wages, which are 20 percent higher for the canton of Zurich than in the lower-salary cantons. Likewise, the rate of unemployment among cantons varies widely. In Australia, there is a significant difference between the economic performance and fiscal capacities of the two largest states (New South Wales and Victoria), the two fastest growing states (Queensland and Western Australia), the two smallest states (South Australia and Tasmania), and the two territories (the Northern Territory and Australian Capital Territory). Structures of the Party System Federations differ in the extent to which there are significant regional or non-federation-wide parties governing constituent units or represented in the federal parliament. The strength of these parties may account for the stability and degree of decentralization of the federal arrangements. The parties also have major impacts on intergovernmental relations and on the representation of territorial minorities in the federation-wide institutions. Regionally based parties may form coalitions in the federal arena and command different degrees of legitimacy to represent the whole population in the various units and layers of government. In countries such as Australia, the United States, Brazil, Germany, and Russia, federation-wide parties are dominant in the national and regional legislative bodies. In Belgium, federation-wide parties are non-existent, and in other countries, such as Canada, India, and Spain, federation-wide parties co-exist with regionally based parties both in the federal parliament and in the constituent units. In India, regional political parties have captured power in many states. This development has produced a “federalization of the party system” giving more space and voice to diversity and consolidating India’s federal democracy. It 13_Conclusion.fm Page 388 Wednesday, February 17, 2010 12:39 PM 388 César Colino and Luis Moreno has led to the de facto emergence of consociational political practices of proportional representation and coalition governments. In Spain, non-federation-wide parties have been very influential in the national arena when forming informal parliamentary coalitions, or providing parliamentary support to minority governments formed by federation-wide parties. In some other diverse federations, the non-existence of regional parties is explained by the constitutional ban on regional and ethnic parties (e.g., Nigeria and Russia). In Russia, regionally based parties have been forbidden by law since 2001, justified by a Constitutional Court decision in 2005. Therefore, only national parties run for elections. Forbidding regional or ethnic parties may prevent party fragmentation; however, it certainly reduces the opportunities to articulate, aggregate, and represent regional preferences. Also relevant for the party system and the functioning of the federation is the extent to which there are secessionist movements or parties in the country as well as the extent to which they resort to violence or terrorism to achieve their objectives. In India, for example, several movements in the Northeast have demanded secession, the most serious of which was the case of the Punjab, where the establishment of a Punjabi Suba in 1966 did not satisfy some groups, which persisted with their demands for greater autonomy stretching to a “separate homeland.” After the June 1984 storming of the Golden Temple at Amritsar by Indian security forces seeking to dislodge militants, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was assassinated by her Sikh bodyguards in October 1984, and thousands of Sikhs were massacred in the capital and surrounding states. The situation has much improved since then. In Russia, nationalist mobilization varied significantly among the republics. Although popular support for nationalist mobilization declined in most republics, Chechnya opted in 1992 to seek secession and independent statehood, while Tatarstan preferred an associated, confederal status. Secessionist demands in Chechnya escalated in interaction with violent military reactions by the Russian government. Nigeria experienced the Ibo-led Biafran secession attempt in the late 1960s. Nigeria now has some secessionist or quasi-separatist movements, such as the Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (massob), which seeks to revive the failed 1967–70 secession attempt and has mainly engaged in peaceful and symbolic activities, enjoying considerable symbolic appeal at the mass level but less support among the Ibo political elites, who do not espouse secession. More violent is the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (mend), which seeks “resource control,” ecological rehabilitation, and political empowerment for the Niger Delta within a restructured or more decentralized Nigerian federation. In Belgium, the separatist movement in Flanders is estimated to be popular among 10 percent of Flemings and practically non-existent among French-speakers. In Canada, Quebec’s secession in some form or other 13_Conclusion.fm Page 389 Wednesday, February 17, 2010 12:39 PM Comparative Conclusions 389 ranging from different versions of sovereignty-association to complete secession has extended support among that province’s population, although votes on secession have failed to muster majority support. In Spain, specifically in the Basque Country and Catalonia, parties that advocate secession receive support from around 20 percent of the electorate. Terrorist action by the separatist Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (eta) in the Basque Country seeks secession for Euskalherria with the annexation of the Spanish region of Navarre and the French Basque Country by means of armed violence. New Diversity Produced by Migration The growing inequalities in the world’s economic system and the spreading of new technologies of transport and electronic communication have led to the emergence of transnational migrant networks, especially the migration of millions of immigrants into developed countries. In several federations, the proportion of foreign-born residents coming from several continents has increased hugely, representing a new type of diversity to which federal arrangements and policies are pressed to respond. Many federations were designed to deal with different types of diversity affecting groups of territorially concentrated peoples. This new type of diversity generated by immigration is generally distributed unequally. Its impacts are felt not only across the whole of the recipient federation, but particularly in the constituent units that attract the most immigrants, which have to deal with a new type of diversity when immigrants are not willing to be assimilated by the local societies and struggle to retain their cultural practices and languages. In some cases, immigrants retain elements of their culture and their language, but in many cases, their descendants progressively abandon their parents’ national language and culture. In those federations with distinct national identities in several constituent units, such as Catalonia in Spain and Quebec in Canada, the integration of immigrants with different languages and cultures is regarded as a further strain on their political aspirations or nation-building projects. Some examples of these phenomena have been described on this volume. In Canada, for instance, there are more than 6 million foreign-born people, accounting for virtually 20 percent of the population. Between 2001 and 2006, Canada’s foreign-born population increased by 13.6 percent. In some metropolitan areas, such as Toronto and Vancouver, the proportions of foreign-born residents are 45.7 percent and 39.6 percent respectively. In the United States, a country historically formed by several waves of foreign immigration, 12.6 percent of the population (38.1 million people) is foreign-born (with 11.7 million coming from Mexico, 1.9 million from China, 1.7 million from the Philippines, 1.5 million from India, and around 1 million each from countries such as El Salvador, Vietnam, 13_Conclusion.fm Page 390 Wednesday, February 17, 2010 12:39 PM 390 César Colino and Luis Moreno and Korea). In long-standing federations, such as Switzerland, the number of foreigners increased from 120,000 (6 percent of Switzerland’s population) in 1950 to 1.7 million (22.1 percent) in 2007. In turn, 25 percent of the labour force is composed of foreigners. Germany’s foreign-resident population, coming mostly from Turkey and Eastern Europe, amounts to 6.7 million, which is 8.2 percent of the total population, with an unequal distribution of immigrants throughout the Länder. The immigrant population has also increased dramatically in Spain during the last ten years. It doubled from 2,664,168 (6.2 percent of the total population) in 2003 to 4,482,568 (10 percent) in 2007. Immigrants are mainly from Latin America, Morocco, and Romania. federal governance of diversity Different Values and Institutional Conceptions of Integration and Accommodation Institutional responses to tackle specific types of diversity articulated in federal countries show an array of strategies and values. Two main approaches can be distinguished among the various federations: 1 In managing diversity, federal countries have tended to emphasize, in some instances, integration and inclusion of ethnocultural differences and its privatization by means of securing individual rights and promoting citizens’ equality before the law.4 These federations generally have rejected the institutional recognition of group identities, although they accept and respect cultural or other diversity in private realms (e.g., Brazil, Germany, Nigeria, and United States). In many cases, this set of values is reflected in the institutional design, whose basic purpose is to ensure that the federation’s constituent units cut across various diversities both functionally and territorially. The prototypical example is the United States, where there is a civic conception of the American national community. Minority rights are protected irrespective of the territory where citizens reside, and equality and non-discrimination among individuals and territories are recognized by both the federal and state constitutions. In Nigeria, for example, although the Constitution does not include any specific provisions for minority rights, it guarantees the fundamental rights of “every person” to life, dignity of the human person, personal liberty, fair hearing, private life, freedom of expression and conscience, and peaceful assembly and association. 2 In other federations, institutional arrangements and values try to publicly recognize differences and empower specific groups with collective rights. The boundaries of the constituent units may reflect those group differences or identities. They also advocate the representation of 13_Conclusion.fm Page 391 Wednesday, February 17, 2010 12:39 PM Comparative Conclusions 391 groups and minorities as such, not as individuals, with full institutional recognition of differences (e.g., Belgium and Ethiopia). Typically, there is a constitutional distinction between ‘nationality-based units’ and federated constituent units that are considered as subdivisions of a larger national majority group. The constitution –and/or subsequent legal and political developments – seek to ‘channel’ the country’s fundamental diversities through the constituent units. Some federations, however, present features that, formally or informally, combine these two approaches. There are some elements of recognition to specific groups territorially concentrated and/or with a specific national identity – like indigenous or aboriginal groups that are granted special collective rights or internal self-defined nations – and, at the same time, most diversities are considered to pertain to the individual sphere and are protected through individual rights (e.g., Canada, India, Russia, and Spain). The reason for this is that even in those federations that attempt to recognize some nationality or ethnically based constituent units, some population overlaps are unavoidable; therefore, some arrangements to protect minorities within minorities have been considered desirable. As has been recently acknowledged in the literature, the two main functions of federal arrangements, if they are to be successful, are inclusion and responsiveness to differences – “building in” – and autonomy and empowerment of groups –“building out.”5 In response to the various configurations of diversity, and in order to preserve unity and manage diversity, different institutional responses and strategies can be observed in the federal countries analyzed in this volume. The two functions are reflected, on one side, in mechanisms designed to accomplish shared rule, integration, and units’ participation in the common business of the federation and, on the other side, in mechanisms intended to achieve self-government, autonomy, and accommodation through constitutional safeguards and guarantees for constituent units. These strategies are often accompanied by the protection of collective and individual rights and the establishment of symbolic elements for the recognition of differences. Self-government and Autonomy Arrangements The number and size of constituent units forming the federation are of foremost importance. Some federations have dealt with diversity – trying to defuse conflict in units – by increasing the number of units, thus seeking more homogeneity in them. In some cases, they have done this in order to avoid the concentration of ethnic or religious cleavages in specific constituent units (e.g., Switzerland). In other cases, they have increased the number of units to allow specific groups to be majorities in certain units (e.g., Ethiopia and India). 13_Conclusion.fm Page 392 Wednesday, February 17, 2010 12:39 PM 392 César Colino and Luis Moreno Several federal constitutions (e.g., Ethiopia and India) have flexible procedures for reorganizing the internal boundaries of the federation. In India, the boundaries of a state may be altered and new states created with the concurrence of the concerned state legislative assembly. Since 1956, there have been several splits, carving out homogeneous states from existing heterogeneous ones. For instance, when the attempt to retain a multilingual Bombay state failed, it was split into Maharashtra and Gujarat. Subsequently, a separate state of Nagaland was carved out of Assam in the North-East, and Haryana was pulled out of Punjab. In Switzerland, and drawing on the creation of the Jura canton out of a bigger one, the 1999 Constitution lays down procedural rules for redrawing internal boundaries. Article 53 requires the consent of the local population and the cantons involved, as well as the approval of the federal parliament (in case of changes in territory) or the approval of the people and the cantons at large (in case of a change concerning the number of federal units). Some federations have stayed with two or three units reflecting mainly bicommunal cleavages (e.g., Belgium), which has proved risky in certain cases in terms of stability and conflict potential. Constitutionally entrenched asymmetries of powers for specific units are also sometimes put into place so that diversities can be accommodated. Some of these asymmetries may be incorporated into the constitution; others may be built into the federal or constituent units’ legislation. In India, there are asymmetric provisions for the states of Jammu and Kashmir, Mizoram, Nagaland, and Sikkim. The Fifth and Sixth Schedules of the Indian Constitution designate further territories with special administrative structures at the district level. Differential treatment is also incorporated into central legislation pertaining to income taxation as well as state laws regulating ownership of land. In Russia, the most important elements of asymmetry were the bilateral treaties signed between the central government and individual regional executives during the early 1990s. They served as a mechanism for conflict regulation that accommodated regional and ethnic interests to the federation as a whole. Over time, they were extended to other non-ethnic regions, too, mainly in order to regulate the implementation of the wide range of joint competences enshrined in the constitution. In Spain, there are asymmetries such as those related to competences on co-official languages and traditional civil-law systems, as well as special economic-fiscal and financing regimes in several units. Other arrangements to guarantee self-government and autonomy are (a) a separation and exclusivity of powers and own-source revenues for the constituent units (e.g., Canada and Switzerland), (b) a decentralization of powers for cultural or nation-building policies (e.g., Belgium, Canada, and Spain), and (c) the participation of constituent units in constitutional amendment procedures (e.g., Canada and Switzerland). 13_Conclusion.fm Page 393 Wednesday, February 17, 2010 12:39 PM Comparative Conclusions 393 Integration and Participation in the Federal (Central) Institutions Second chambers usually provide a typical form of participation in common federal institutions. They may directly represent constituent units at the federal level or they may be designed to give voice or some veto powers to certain minorities. In Nigeria, for example, the Senate, the second chamber of the bicameral National Assembly, represents a powerful mechanism for restraining the hegemony of the federal executive and for tempering majoritarian rule. In Germany, representatives of all Land governments sit in a quasi-second chamber, the Bundesrat, and act as the voice of their Land government, which means in practical terms that they have no free mandate. They vote unanimously and only in accordance with decisions made by the Land government. A special case is the so-called House of the Federation in Ethiopia, which is constitutionally granted the power to ‘interpret’ the Constitution, solve disputes among the regions, and decide on intergovernmental subsides and joint taxes. Also for integration or participation purposes, there are several powersharing or consociational mechanisms and devices that may be formally entrenched or may work informally as political conventions. These include: 1 Arrangements to guarantee various groups a place in national decisionmaking. For example, Belgium requires that the principle of majority rule be mitigated through consociational techniques in those spheres where the two linguistic communities must come together (i.e., the federal sphere and the Brussels-Capital Region). This also applies to the composition of the federal government. According to Article 99, § 2 of the Constitution, “with the possible exception of the Prime Minister, the Council of Ministers includes as many French-speaking ministers as Dutch-speaking ministers.” Convention also requires that the government have the confidence of a majority of each linguistic group in the House of Representatives. If all the French-speaking ministers or all the Dutch-speaking ministers oppose a decision, the rule of parity in the Council of Ministers results in somewhat of a right to veto. Switzerland also displays a proportional representation of the various political, linguistic, and religious communities in all federal institutions. The Federal Assembly, for instance, has to seek a fair representation of regional and linguistic groups within the Federal Council. Also, the convention applies that the French- and Italianspeaking minorities hold at least two and often three out of seven government seats. Affirmative action through quotas is also pursued in India. Seats are reserved in the national Parliament and in state legislatures for the castes and tribes deserving of this measure. Similarly, quotas have been carved out in education institutions and in government employment, and the Union government observes quotas of 15 percent for the 13_Conclusion.fm Page 394 Wednesday, February 17, 2010 12:39 PM 394 2 3 4 5 César Colino and Luis Moreno most deprived and excluded castes (the dalits) and 7.5 percent for members of backward tribes. The representation of all groups or territories in the federal cabinet. In Canada, for instance, there is a strong convention that provinces and groups should be represented in the federal cabinet. In Ethiopia, as a result of both constitutional principle and practice, the executive composition seeks to reflect the country’s diversity. In Nigeria, under the “federal character” principle enshrined in the Constitution, a candidate for president or governor is not only required to enjoy a geographic spread in electoral support to be elected, but she or he is also expected to exercise his or her “powers of appointment” with due “regard to the federal character of Nigeria” or “the diversity of people within the state,” and the need to promote national unity. The president is specifically required to “appoint at least one minister from each state, who shall be an indigene of such state.” In Switzerland, the composition of the Federal Council has mirrored the representation of the four major political parties in the federal parliament, none of which holds a majority. Collective or rotating presidencies. In Switzerland, for example, powersharing is also encouraged by the annually rotating presidency of the Federal Council and by the fact that the federal councillor who holds the presidency has mainly a representative role. In Belgium, no rotation in the position of prime minister is provided for; in practice, it has been held by a Dutch-speaker for more than thirty years. Similarly, in Canada, a French Canadian has been the prime minister for most of the recent decades (i.e., Pierre Trudeau, Brian Mulroney, and Jean Chrétien). The conventional allocation of specific portfolios to politicians coming from certain units. In Spain, for instance, specific portfolios are often reserved for ministers from certain autonomous communities. Electoral systems devised to produce a sufficient degree of proportionality to reflect existing minorities. (e.g., Belgium, Spain, and Switzerland). Protection of Individual and Collective Rights and Symbolic Recognition Diversity among constituent units or different ethno-linguistic groups or minorities may be recognized in the constitution or the laws (e.g., Belgium and Ethiopia). The constitution may also explicitly recognize the presence of aboriginal peoples, nationalities, or linguistic groups and protect them through collective rights. Minority rights applicable to religious or linguistic minorities may take the form of education and cultural rights and may be related to territories or to individuals. Constituent units may be allowed to develop their own distinctive bills of rights. Other minorities may be protected by constitutionally recognized principles of equality or non-discrimination or by inclusive definitions of citizenship 13_Conclusion.fm Page 395 Wednesday, February 17, 2010 12:39 PM Comparative Conclusions 395 determined by the federal government or by the constituent governments (e.g., Switzerland). Finally, the federation government, through individual rights and other means, may take an active role to protect ethnic or linguistic groups that make up the majority in the federation arena but represent a minority within the boundaries of one particular constituent unit (“minorities within the minorities”) when their rights may be put in danger by the constituent government (e.g., Canada). institutional and policy responses to main diversities The aforementioned arrangements – self-government and autonomy, integration, and participation in the federal institutions, and protection of individual and collective rights and symbolic recognition – appear in different combinations according to the type or configuration of diversities prominent in the specific federation and the main diversities to be addressed (e.g., ethnic and national diversity, language and religious diversity, or multiculturalism and immigration). Ethnic and National Diversity Some federal countries disregard ethnic cleavages and, as a result, territorial boundaries of the constituent units cut across ethnic groups (e.g., Brazil, Nigeria, Switzerland, and United States). As mentioned above, some federal constitutions recognize the possibility and flexibility for redesigning the internal boundaries along ethnic or ethno-linguistic lines, or for adding units to the federation, which are sometime carved out of existing units (e.g., Ethiopia and India). In many federations, such as the United States, there is no practical constitutional means to re-design state or local boundaries to encompass cultural groups. States have limited powers to enforce cultural or language policies because many such policies would violate federal and state bills of rights. However, due to federal and state policies of affirmative action and non-discrimination, federal, state, and local government agencies have become more representative of the country’s diversity, even if some minorities remain under-represented. Other federations make visible the territorial distribution of ethnic groups (e.g., Belgium, Ethiopia, and India). In some instances, the boundaries of the constituent units reflect the country’s territorial ethno-linguistic diversity, although the largest ethnocultural group – and other groups – are also distributed across many of those units (e.g., Canada, Nigeria, Russia, and Switzerland). The Russian Constitution mentions minorities, but refrains from defining them. Its Constitution proclaims everybody’s 13_Conclusion.fm Page 396 Wednesday, February 17, 2010 12:39 PM 396 César Colino and Luis Moreno right to declare his or her ethnic belonging, use her or his mother tongue, and freely choose his or her language of communication, upbringing, education, and creative work. The protection of the rights of “national minorities” belongs to the category of joint competences of the Russian Federation. Awarding different constitutional status to the various types of constituent units is also an option for managing diversity (e.g., Russia). The principle of “federal character” in Nigeria, meaning the aspiration of equitable representation of constituent state “indigenes” in the country’s national political institutions, is another example of accommodation. This principle has created some tensions because it prohibits sectionalism (including ethnic political parties), while mandating the effective representation of state indigenes (defined not residentially but by descent from parents or grandparents belonging to a community indigenous to a state) in the political parties and other federal institutions. A further option to deal with ethnic and national diversity within a federation can be labelled “constitutional ambiguity.” Leaving the constitutional definition of the constituent communities or the scope of the federal arrangements ambiguous may allow several groups to interpret their membership differently. This may avoid the ‘swallowing’ of a particular definition of diversity or nationality favoured by majoritarian groups (e.g., Canada and Spain). Also, the right of secession can be constitutionally recognized in order to ‘forestall’ forced territorial assimilation of the constituent units. A case in point is provided by Ethiopia. Article 39 of Ethiopia’s Constitution expressly incorporates the right of nationalities to secede after complying with certain procedures – and not even a state of emergency can suspend this right. First, a demand for secession must be made to the legislative council of the nation, nationality, or people concerned and be approved by a two-thirds majority of the same body. Second, the federal government has to organize a referendum in the state or locality within three years from the time it received the concerned council’s decision for secession. Third, the demand for secession must be supported by a simple-majority vote in the referendum. Fourth, the federal government must transfer its powers to the council of the nation, nationality, or people who have voted for secession. Finally, assets must be divided in a manner prescribed by law. In contrast, no right of secession is recognized in most of the other traditional federations. In Switzerland, for example, although the Constitution allows for the redrawing of internal boundaries, it does not grant the cantons a unilateral right to secede from Switzerland. In the absence of any secessionist claims, a constitutional right to secession has so far never been vindicated. In Canada, the Supreme Court established in 1998 a political requirement for negotiation, ruling that unilateral secession was constitutionally invalid and that secession would require a constitutional amendment agreed to by both the federation and the constituent unit concerned, but that in the 13_Conclusion.fm Page 397 Wednesday, February 17, 2010 12:39 PM Comparative Conclusions 397 circumstances where a clear will of the population concerned had been expressed after consultation, there is an obligation on the federal government to negotiate the secession matter. Management of Language and Religious Diversity A variety of mechanisms has been employed to deal with language diversity. A common option has been the establishment of one official language – or the promotion of a common lingua franca – so that different peoples can easily communicate (e.g., Amharic in Ethiopia, English and Hindi in India, English in Nigeria, Russian in the Russian Federation, and CastilianSpanish in Spain). This course of action has frequently been combined with the constitutional recognition of the local languages, and the right for citizens to use their vernacular language. In Ethiopia, for example, five states have adopted their own majority language as the working language of their respective regional administrations. Three other states that do not have a majority ethnic group have chosen Amharic as their working language. A third alternative has been adopted by the Harari Regional State, where Harari and Oromiffa have been chosen as working languages. Switzerland has preferred official unilingualism in most of the cantons. Canada has advocated bilingualism at the federal level and different arrangements according to the provinces. Spain has co-official regional languages in six autonomous communities. There have also been non-territorial arrangements to deal with language diversity. These arrangements apply to individuals and disregard citizens’ place of residence (e.g., communities in Belgium, the official federal bilingualism statutory program in Canada for dealing with French-speakers anywhere within the federation, or “national-cultural autonomy” for some groups in Russia). Concerning religion, there is also a considerable variety of institutional responses, ranging from the secularist exclusion of all religious matters from the public sphere to corporatist forms of religious inclusion in the federal or constituent units’ institutions. As well, some constituent units may recognize religious law (such as sharia in Nigeria). Multiculturalism and Immigration Diversity New diversity brought about by foreign immigrants is generally dealt with through traditional mechanisms of minority rights – which may be constitutionally protected – and by citizenship regulations. In some cases, different orders of government may grant citizenship status to immigrants, as is the case in Switzerland, where there is a sort of “layered citizenship” (i.e., municipality, canton, and federal). The three levels of citizenship have an 13_Conclusion.fm Page 398 Wednesday, February 17, 2010 12:39 PM 398 César Colino and Luis Moreno important symbolic function, exemplifying the composed nature of Swiss nationhood based on three complementary identities and loyalties. To respond to the new diversity created by immigration and related incorporation or integration demands, some federations or constituent units within them have actively implemented policies of a multicultural nature. These policies aim at guaranteeing that individual inclusion and group recognition of cultural differences can be achieved simultaneously. Such policies go beyond mere non-discrimination and seek to (a) extend antiracism policies, (b) reform education curricula to incorporate the inputs and contributions of immigrant groups, and (c) publicly fund the cultural practices of immigrant groups6. In Canada, for example, the policy of multiculturalism was entrenched in the Constitution Act, 1982, which includes a clause requiring the Charter of Rights and Freedoms to be interpreted in light of Canada’s multicultural character, as well as in the Multiculturalism Act of 1988, which defines multiculturalism as fundamental to Canadian identity. With respect to social integration, these policies have helped to forge a Canadian identity based on a multiplicity of cultures. The policy of multiculturalism has been controversial in Quebec because some Quebec nationalists believe that the policy reduces Quebec and French Canadians to the status of just another minority group within the country they believe they have co-founded. In some instances, constituent governments have required migrants to learn their local language, even if a common language exists in the federation. Some units such as Quebec in Canada and Catalonia in Spain have actively used their self-government powers to secure the incorporation and integration of immigrants by means of implementing their own education, labour, and language policies that support their nation-building policies. Along these lines, constituent units’ governments have often been keen to require immigrants to learn the vernacular language of the constituent unit (e.g., Quebec). A clear example is Quebec’s policies requiring the children of immigrants to attend French-language schools. This province has advanced a policy of so-called ‘interculturalism’ – parallel to policies in other provinces of multiculturalism – that tries to assist immigrant integration by insisting on a moral contract between immigrants and the host society. In other federations, language and citizenship tests have been established for immigrants. In Germany, the standards set by the immigration legislation that came into force in 2005 incorporated two mechanisms: the (federal) state offers, as a core element, the so-called ‘integration courses’ for immigrants (600 hours of German as a foreign language and 30 hours introduction to German civilization and culture), and the immigrant is requested to take an examination on the matters learned in these courses. The implementation of these courses relies on co-operation between the federation and the Länder based on the idea of Bundestreue, or 13_Conclusion.fm Page 399 Wednesday, February 17, 2010 12:39 PM Comparative Conclusions 399 principle of mutual trust, between the various orders of government in the German Bund. concluding remarks The twelve cases examined in this book provide numerous illustrations of how the apparent contradiction of diversity and unity can operate in federal countries. In its various manifestations, the federal formula cannot be regarded simply as a panacea to achieve the tenets of the ‘good society’ without friction and, in many cases, conflict. However, in its different guises, federalism in these countries has proved to be relatively successful in preventing a recurrence of the type of large-scale disruption that ravaged some federations in the recent past (e.g., Nigeria, and its Civil War during 1967–70; Ethiopia; and post-partition India). This overview has shown how, depending on the type and the combination of diversities in a federation, different strategies and institutional mechanisms are more adequate or successful, if we measure success in terms of the peaceful, stable, and fair management of conflict. This means that federalism, in its different manifestations of institutional autonomy, participation in federal decisions, and recognition and protection of minorities, can be recommended not just for territorially concentrated diversities but increasingly for new non-territorial diversity. Yet, there will be some federations where the conflict between historically recognized cultural communities and the individual rights of immigrants, women, gays, and so on will be more acute. The degree of politicized diversity and its combination of overlapping identities associated with language, ethnicity, race, and the like among majorities and minorities will determine the appropriate institutional solution. Certainly, globalization and the parallel revival of a variety of territorial identities have coincided with an increasing challenge to the centralist model of the unitary state. In plural polities, decentralization, federalization, and subsidiarity have sought to accommodate responses to the stimuli of the diversity or plurality of the polities involved. The latter, as shown in the twelve cases analyzed in this volume, often comprise groups and countries with differences of identity, history, language, or traditions, which are often reflected in different party systems, channels of elite representation, and interests’ articulation. But federalism also provides countries with a sense of unity or common purpose that makes them more legitimate and accountable to the wishes of their citizens. The federal countries under scrutiny in this book share a political culture of intergovernmental pact and of territorial autonomy (central, regional, and local) in the development of public policies. In all of them, an emphasis on the inherently liberal nature of the federal 13_Conclusion.fm Page 400 Wednesday, February 17, 2010 12:39 PM 400 César Colino and Luis Moreno agreements and mechanisms is observable in the conciliation of the general and the particular. As it could not be otherwise, the maintenance of federal democratic constitutions and legislative frameworks is highly contingent on the permanent negotiation of arrangements, institutions, and policies, which is characteristic of the federal culture. Let us hope that other cases of federations and federal-like countries around the world can be added to this systematic comparative exploration as has been the purpose of this endeavour sponsored by the Forum of Federations and the International Association of Centres for Federal Studies. notes 1 2 3 4 5 6 The authors are grateful to Ronald L. Watts and John Kincaid for their comments and suggestions during the preparation of this chapter. See Akhtar Majeed, Jonah A. Elaigwu, Thomas Fleiner, and Mahendra Prasad Singh, “Building on and Accommodating Diversities.” In Building on and Accommodating Diversities, vol. 1, eds. Ronald L. Watts and Rupak Chattopadhyay (New Delhi: Viva Books, 2008), 3–20. Jan Erk and Lawrence Anderson, “The Paradox of Federalism: Does Self-Rule Accommodate or Exacerbate Ethnic Divisions?” Regional & Federal Studies 19:2 (2009): 191–202 and David Cameron, “The Paradox of Federalism: Some Practical Reflections,” Regional & Federal Studies 19:2 (2009): 309–19. See Richard Simeon, “Managing Conflicts of Diversity.” In Watts and Chattopadhyay, Building on and Accommodating Diversities, 54–69. See John McGarry, Brendan O’Leary, and Richard Simeon, “Integration or Accommodation: The Enduring Debate in Conflict Regulation.” In Constitutional Design for Divided Societies: Integration or Accommodation? ed. Sujit Choudhry (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 41–90 and Nicola McEwen and André Lecours, “Voice or Recognition? Comparing Strategies for Accommodating Territorial Minorities in Multinational States,” Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 46 (2008): 220–43. Richard Simeon and Christina Murray, “Recognition without Empowerment: Minorities in a Democratic South Africa.” In Choudhry, Constitutional Design for Divided Societies, 409–37. See Matthias Koenig and Paul de Guchteneire, “Political Governance of Cultural Diversity.” In Democracy and Human Rights in Multicultural Societies, eds. Matthias Koenig and Paul de Guchteneire (Aldershot: Ashgate/unesco, 2007).