Eos XCV 2008
ISSN 0012-7825
PLATO’S AMBIVALENCE ABOUT RHETORIC IN THE GORGIAS
By
MIKOŁAJ DOMARADZKI
ABSTRACT: The main thesis of the present paper is that Plato’s attitude towards rhetoric
appears to have been complex to the point of ambivalent, for as one reads the Gorgias, one cannot
avoid getting the impression that in spite of his overt castigation of rhetoric, the philosopher did
covertly resort to it in the very dialogue. Thus, the article will seek to demonstrate that even though
Platonic Socrates repudiated rhetoric understood as political demagoguery and cynical adulation,
he did employ some sort of art of persuasion designed to inveigle his interlocutors into accepting
a worldview that must have appeared extremely paradoxical for the then mentality.
In the course of his discussion with Callicles, Socrates differentiates (503a)
between rhetoric understood as “lattery” (kolake…a) or “shameful oratory”
(a„scr¦ dhmhgor…a) on the one hand and “some other” (›teron) which is characterized as “noble” or “ine” (kalÒn) and whose task consists, according to the
philosopher (503b), in:
trying to perfect the souls of the citizens and struggling to ensure that the
best things are said, whether they be more pleasant or more unpleasant for
the hearers (tÕ paraskeu£zein Ópwj æj bšltistai œsontai tîn politîn aƒ
yuca…, kaˆ diam£cesqai lšgonta t¦ bšltista, e‡te ¹d…w e‡te ¢hdšstera
œstai to‹j ¢koÚousin)1.
While Socrates points out (ibid.) to Callicles that “he has never seen such
rhetoric”, the paper will argue that in the Gorgias Platonic Socrates applies this
mysterious and noble rhetoric with the view to making his interlocutors accept
a given axiology. It has to be emphasized that the rhetoric that Socrates employs
is a philosophical one, as it is ancillary to his dialectic. Yet, even though the
1
In the present article, the Greek text of the Gorgias was consulted with the editions of
E.R. Dodds (London 1959) and M. Wohlrab (Lipsiae 1887), while the English with the translations
made by J.A. Arieti and R.M. Barrus (Newburyport 2007), R. Waterield (Oxford 1994), D.J. Zeyl
(Indianapolis 1987) and T. Irwin (Oxford 1979). Occasionally, F. Schleiermacher’s (Frankfurt/M.
1991) translation has also been consulted.
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MIKOŁAJ DOMARADZKI
objective of this dialectical rhetoric is far more lofty than the objective of the
rhetoric applied at public assemblies, the method of the former – as we will show
– does not differ that much from the method of the latter.
The Leitmotiv of Plato’s Gorgias is a conlict (¢gèn) of two, mutually exclusive, axiologies. According to the irst one, there does exist objective good and
morality which can be reached through rational cognition and, therefore, serve
as the very foundations of ethics. According to the other, the existence of such
imponderables is – to say the least – disputable. Whereas the former view is represented by Platonic Socrates and the latter by the sophists, it is worth accentuating that the conlict which is to be found in the dialogue could, arguably, be seen
as a relection of Plato’s own internal struggle. Hence, one might purport that
Plato’s suggestive portrayals of rhetoricians – presumably – testify to the philosopher’s wavering between making use of rhetoric in commune bonum, one the
one hand, and discarding it, on the other. Consequently, the purpose of our paper
is to investigate the aforementioned eventuality and to ascertain whether and, if
so, to what extent, it would be justiiable to maintain that contrary to his declarations one does in fact encounter clandestine rhetoric in Platonic Socrates2.
We believe that the entire dialogue can be characterized as a relection of
Platonic Socrates’ vacillation with regard to two positions. On the one hand,
the philosopher aptly asks (453d) whether it is not so that “whoever teaches
anything, persuades about what he teaches” (Óstij did£skei Ðtioàn pr©gma,
pÒteron Ö did£skei pe…qei À oÜ) and, on the other, he boldly asserts (473 b) that
“the truth can never be refuted” (tÕ g¦r ¢lhqj oÙdšpote ™lšgcetai). Arguably,
the Gorgias pivots, then, on this acute tension between a “realistic” plea for rhetorical effectiveness and sober pragmatism, on the one hand, and an “idealistic”
plea for objectivity and axiological neutrality, on the other. Naturally, one is
immediately prompted to ask the question whether rhetoric can be true in the irst
place, but apart from that, it has to be observed that insofar as Platonic Socrates
seems to be identifying did£skei with pe…qei, one might profess the identiication
to be a token of his awareness of the indispensability of rhetoric.
Consequently, Socrates’ profound insight could be interpreted as revealing the
fact that in order to make somebody acknowledge that the only proper mode of
acting is that which follows the lÒgoj, one has to apply a non-rational strategy,
for choosing rationality, like choosing any worldview, revolves around appeals
to emotions and, therefore, remains a matter of believing in the validity of given
values rather than of providing some rational justiication. Accordingly, when
Our investigation will make no sharp distinction between Platonic Socrates and the “authentic” one due to our fundamental assumption that one of Plato’s rhetorical strategies consists in fabricating all of his dramatis personae. The issue of the extent to which Plato’s dialogue represents
Socratic philosophy accurately has received a great deal of scholarly attention, but it is neither
possible nor necessary to enumerate all diverse approaches. The reader is referred to the following
works: Fie ld 1969; G u th rie 1975; H a re 1982; Irw in 1989; Sa nta s 1979 and V la s tos 1991.
2
PLATO’S AMBIVALENCE ABOUT RHETORIC IN THE GORGIAS
21
Platonic Socrates endeavours to inveigle his interlocutors into abiding by his
“rational” worldview, he stoops to the noble rhetoric, which – as earlier observed
– “perfects the souls of the citizens”. In other words, the philosopher applies
various tools of rhetorical persuasion, for in the long run one becomes persuaded
and, thus, resolves to believe in the intellect and the value of rational argumentation. This interpretation might help to explain why Platonic Socrates purports to
be persuaded solely by reason, whereas the preponderance of his arguments – as
we will demonstrate – must be seen as rhetorical appeals to his interlocutors’
passions rather than to their reason.
Platonic Socrates is determined to rationally prove two paradoxical theses: (1)
that it is worse to perpetrate evil than suffer it and (2) that it is better for a man
who has perpetrated evil to be punished. Needless to say, the view that doing
injustice is worse than suffering it was entirely incomprehensible for the then
mentality and for this reason Polus describes (473a) Platonic Socrates’ views
as ¥topa, which means “extraordinary to the point of being absurd”. What is
important for our considerations is that inasmuch as the position of Platonic
Socrates sounded absurd not only to Polus, but to almost every Greek who came
to listen to the Greek thinker, it was precisely this “absurdity” of his stance that
compelled Platonic Socrates to resort to rhetoric3.
In the light of the above, it becomes understandable why the attempts to
establish what rhetoric is result in discussing issues as lofty as the nature of
good and evil or the question of universal morality. If, in the inal analysis,
the Greek thinker acquiesces in the impossibility of proving that a moral life
is better in the sense that it guarantees happiness, then it is – as we believe
– due to Plato’s not being oblivious to the fact that there is just no irrefutable
logical explanation why a moral life should be preferred to an immoral one. In
other words, Plato was perfectly aware of the fact that when it comes to such
axiological issues as morality, no rational demonstration can substantiate the
validity of a moral choice. That is why although Platonic Socrates does seek to
highlight the contrast between the art of persuasion, on the one hand, and the
rational dialectic, on the other, he ultimately ends up obfuscating it and inally
turns himself a rhetorician.
We wish to underscore that the rhetorical stratagems of Platonic Socrates do
remain subordinate to his dialectical method, inasmuch as the philosopher observes (458a) that he ‘gladly’ (¹dšwj) not only refutes those who say something
not true but also himself becomes refuted when he says something not true.
3
It goes without saying that from the perspective of a person raised in Christian culture, the
paradoxicalness of Socrates’ position is less obvious, for the thesis that it is a greater evil to do wrong
than to suffer it anticipates the very core of Christ’s message. Sufice it to quote the teaching (1 Pet.
3, 17) that it is better to suffer for well doing than for evil doing (kre‹tton g¦r ¢gaqopoioàntaj […]
p£scein À kakopoioàntaj).
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MIKOŁAJ DOMARADZKI
Whenever Socrates insists (506a) that he solely “seeks in common with
his interlocutors” (zhtî koinÍ meq’ Ømîn), whenever he actually encourages
(506b) Callicles to ‘attack’ (™pilamb£nou) him, then the “rhetoric” of Platonic
Socrates does remain dialectical and can by no means be identiied with the
elocutionary displays of the sophists. A rhetorical discourse is monologic, while
a philosophical one – at least in the way that Socrates conceived of it (448d) – is
dialogic, inasmuch as his dialšgesqai connotes a rational discussion. Hence,
when we say that Platonic Socrates supports his dialectic with some sort of art
of persuasion, we hardly equate the Socratic discourse strategy with the sophistic
one. We solely wish to demonstrate that Platonic Socrates is perfectly aware of
the fact that it is simply unfeasible to settle an axiological dispute by means of
rational argumentation alone. It is only in this sense that we purport that Platonic
Socrates turns himself a rhetorician. Let us see how this happens4.
During his discussion with Polus, Socrates identiies (463b) rhetoric with
some sort of “lattery” or “adulation” (kolake…a) and seems to suggest that
rhetoric is somewhat base and despicable. Nonetheless, throughout the dialogue,
Platonic Socrates himself “latters” his interlocutors. He appeals, for instance, to
Polus’ aesthetic taste when he asks (474d) the sophist whether doing injustice
is not “worse” (k£kion) and “uglier” (a‡scion) than suffering it5. As a matter of
fact, it is already the antonymous pair kakÒj – kalÒj that stresses the obvious
axiological dimension, since the former means not only “bad”, but also “ugly”
and “unsightly”, whereas the latter – not only “good”, but also “pretty” and
“beautiful”. Still, a„scrÒj makes things even more obvious, as it implies
disgraceful ugliness6. If Platonic Socrates equates (ibid.) “beautiful” with “good”
and “bad” with “ugly” (kalÒn te kaˆ ¢gaqÕn kaˆ kakÕn kaˆ a„scrÒn), then he
subsequently identiies (476b, e) “all that is just with the beautiful” (t¦ d…kaia
p£nta kal£), so as to conclude (477a) that “if beautiful, then good” (e‡per kal£,
¢gaq£). It needs to be accentuated here that Platonic Socrates exceeds thereby the
rigid frames of a rational discourse, for by suggesting that morality is something
beautiful, he appeals not so much to his interlocutors’ reason, but rather to their
emotions. It seems that the philosopher does realize that identifying morality
4
As our exposition is organized in accordance with the heart of the matter, we deliberately
reverse the chronological order and address Socrates’ dispute with Gorgias at the end of our considerations.
Conceivably, the term “aesthetic” can sound slightly unfortunate due to its modern connotations. Undoubtedly, it is only from our present perspective that beauty can be seen as an aesthetic
value, since for a Greek it had irst of all a moral and practical sense. Throughout the article, we use
the term “axiological” to capture the broad understanding of beauty that was characteristic of the
antiquity.
5
6
Indisputably, a language as rich as Greek offers numerous translation possibilities for both
k£kion and a‡scion. Schleiermacher’s decision to render them as “schlimmer” and “hässlicher”,
respectively, seems to corroborate our interpretation.
PLATO’S AMBIVALENCE ABOUT RHETORIC IN THE GORGIAS
23
with beauty is tantamount to appealing to Polus’ aesthetic taste, for he openly
states (473a) that he seeks to “make” (poiÁsai) Polus “say the same things that
he says” (taÙt¦ ™moˆ lšgein). But then again, in order to make Polus say what
Platonic Socrates says, i.e., to make the sophist agree with him, the philosopher
must have recourse to the noble rhetoric (ancillary to dialectic), whose high goal
is to talk the adversary into Platonic Socrates’ rational ethic.
The same strategy is employed by Platonic Socrates during his “clash” with
Callicles. When the philosopher resorts (523b) to his famous myth of “the prison
of retribution and justice” (tÕ tÁj t…seèj te kaˆ d…khj desmwt»rion), one can
hardly maintain that he remains within the rules of a purely rational discourse.
One should rather say that he appeals to fear of severe punishment, when he
talks (525b) of being an “example for the others” (parade…gmati to‹j ¥lloij)
and of suffering which makes people “fear and improve” (foboÚmenoi belt…ouj
g…gnwntai). No matter how noble the ends and how lofty the ideals that guide
Platonic Socrates were, arguments such as fear of punishment have little to do
with morality.
Furthermore, inasmuch as Platonic Socrates resorts to myths, he employs
scarcely a dialectical strategy, but rather a rhetorical one, since he appeals to the
listener’s emotions and beliefs and not to his reason. Although rhetoric is here
subordinate to dialectic its indispensability is due to the fact that hardly anybody
can rationally be made to accept Socrates’ paradoxical ethic and, therefore,
they have to be inveigled into doing it. Where reasoning bears no fruit, other
arguments must be put forward and that is why in the Gorgias, Socrates’ entire
polemic with Callicles pivots on a quasi-Orphic myth. Nevertheless, the recourse
to such a myth is clearly a rhetorical measure.
Plato’s proclivity for supporting his philosophical ideas with myths can be observed not only in the Gorgias, but also in dialogues as various as Meno, Republic,
Phaedo or Timaeus. In view of this, we should note that Plato’s attitude towards
myths is just as complicated and ambivalent as his attitude towards rhetoric. On
the one hand, he severely criticizes the traditional mythology, repudiating for example the Greek anthropomorphism, and on the other – he exploits miscellaneous
myths so as to “reinforce” his epistemology (Meno), ethic (Gorgias) or cosmology (Timaeus). It is crucial to understand Plato’s dialectic of myth, for there is
a certain signiicant parallel between myth and rhetoric in Plato, who at the same
time condemns and uses them both. On the one hand, the philosopher seeks to
rationalize myths, as in the Republic, and, on the other, he illustrates some of his
theses by means of myth, as in the Gorgias. The apparent ambivalence can be explained as Plato’s reluctance to disregard the irrational component of the human
soul. This helps to explain why Platonic Socrates resorts not only to rhetoric, but
to myths as well, taking both with sober criticism: even though he remains suspicious of them, Plato employs in his works rhetoric and myths, as these appeal
mainly to the extra- or trans-rational in man. The Phaedo provides us with a prime
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MIKOŁAJ DOMARADZKI
testimony to this strategy, when Platonic Socrates, having presented a mythological justiication of his eschatology, entreats (114d) every “man endowed with
some intellect” (noàn œconti ¢ndr…) not to “insist stubbornly” (diiscur…sasqai)
on literal interpretation of myths told the by philosopher. A similar approach is to
be found in the Gorgias, where Platonic Socrates appears to perceive myths and
rhetoric as mala necessaria, the former being useful heuristic and rhetorical ictions, whose purpose is to illustrate and, in the long run, persuade the reader into
accepting the worldview of Platonic Socrates.
With regard to the myth that concludes Socrates’ discussion with Callicles,
two things need to be stressed. Firstly, Socrates explicitly says that he expects
(523a) Callicles to regard his tale as nothing more than màqoj, even though he
treats it as lÒgoj, i.e. a parable not utterly devoid of an intellective element. And
secondly, having suggested that myths can and should be rationalized so that
they could serve useful purposes, Platonic Socrates states (ibid.) that “he will
present as truth what he intends to say” (æj ¢lhqÁ g¦r Ônta soi lšxw § mšllw
lšgein). We may ask why the philosopher asserts that he will present his tale
“as truth” (æj ¢lhqÁ)? Socrates makes it clear (527a) that although Callicles is
bound to “despise” (katafrone‹n) the myth, there is nothing “better and truer”
(belt…w kaˆ ¢lhqšstera) that could “demonstrate” (¢pode‹xai) what kind of life
one ought to live. This astonishing statement makes the philosopher’s parable
somewhat ambiguous. On the one hand, the verb ¢pode‹xai suggests the idea
of proof in the sense of the Latin demonstratio, since Platonic Socrates aims to
prove the value of a moral life. On the other hand, this candid admission can
be taken as Socrates’ consciousness of the impossibility to rationally prove the
superiority of a moral life over an immoral one. Inasmuch as Socrates acquiesces
in the fact that there is simply no irrefutable logical proof that morality guarantees earthly happiness, the philosopher has no other option but in order to make
his interlocutor live a moral life he is forced to deceive them into morality by
dint of a rhetorical reference to the fable of the afterlife. The fact that Platonic
Socrates appeals to such incentives as fear of punishment, shows not only his
determination to induce his interlocutors to live morally, but, at the same time,
his helplessness with regard to the task. In the end, it does not matter how hard
Platonic Socrates endeavours to refute Callicles position, since he succeeds only
seemingly and at the end of the day offers no proof or reason, but rather silences
the opponent by spinning his yarn about the afterlife. It is hardly possible to
speak of any rebuttal here, and the reader is left with the impression that Platonic
Socrates manages to talk his adversary down only due to the fact that it was Plato
who authored the dialogue.
It is crucial to note that Plato does not attempt to reinterpret traditional myths
so as to ind some hidden and deeper meaning in them. If there is no allegorical
interpretation of myths in Plato, it is because the philosopher uses them exclusively for a very special purpose: to persuade the interlocutor to succumb to
PLATO’S AMBIVALENCE ABOUT RHETORIC IN THE GORGIAS
25
a given view. Hence, myths can be seen in Plato as heuristic instruments of
rhetorical persuasion. The fact that Platonic Socrates eventually has recourse to
rhetoric relects not only the inner conlict between reason and passion that Plato
must have experienced, but also his awareness of the impossibility of rationally proving the necessity to live morally. Thus, the Gorgias can be perceived
as a result of Plato’s dilemma whether to attribute the highest value to rational
cognition or accept the vital role of non-rational factors in the process of adopting a given set of values. Yet, even if Plato saw clearly that it is not viable to
rationally demonstrate the superiority of a moral life, the obvious question that
we must pose now is whether the fact that Platonic Socrates does apply some
sort of rhetoric is not – at least to some extent – a sort of its justiication? To
this Platonic Socrates could naturally reply that he does not employ rhetoric
with a view to dominating and subjugating his interlocutor politically, i.e. that
he applies it justly, but then again, “justly” is a matter of one’s perspective and
Callicles would point out that Socrates begs the question, as the task of the dispute was only to establish what justice is at all.
All things considered, the Platonic conviction about the indispensability of
rhetoric stems from his anthropology: the philosopher divides (Resp. 441a sqq.)
human soul into the rational (logistikÒn) and the irrational (™piqumhtikÒn and
qumoeidšj in his terminology) and it is precisely for this reason that adequate,
i.e. rational and irrational strategies must be applied, these being dialectic and
rhetoric (together with the appropriate myths). Plato was, thus, perfectly aware of
the fact that human beings cannot be reduced to reason alone, since we have also
been endowed with passions and that is why λόγος is accompanied in the Gorgias
by πάθος and dialectic is assisted by rhetoric7. Now, if the philosopher does not
appeal to the intellect alone, then we must not overestimate the so-called rationalism or intellectualism of Platonic Socrates, who himself at times enchants his
listener rhetorically. As it is plainly impossible to persuade somebody intellectually to do good, and as the emotional and passionate in human require a different
approach, myth becomes a matter of the utmost importance in the Gorgias, for
Platonic metaphysics serves there the very rhetorical purpose to persuade to the
worldview that Socrates advocates. In the light of the fact that Platonic Socrates
has recourse to myths, it seems advisable to revise the trite cliché of Socrates’
intellectualism. Now, we must turn to Socrates debate with Gorgias, where the
philosopher also seems to employ the noble and reined rhetoric.
Plato awareness of it is testiied by his remark (Resp. 607b) about “an ancient controversy
between philosophy and poetry” (palai¦ mšn tij diafor¦ filosof…v te kaˆ poihtikÍ). Inasmuch
as philosophy (being oriented towards Intellect) is in Plato identical with dialectic and inasmuch as
poetry (being oriented towards emotions) is for him – at least to some extent – afined with rhetoric,
then the Gorgias is a classical presentation of the perennial conlict between the rational, i.e. philosophy and dialectic, on the one hand and the “irrational”, i.e. poetry and rhetoric, on the other.
7
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MIKOŁAJ DOMARADZKI
When Gorgias praises highly (452e) the ability – or power – (dÚnamij)
“to speak and persuade the masses” (lšgein kaˆ pe…qein t¦ pl»qh), Socrates,
accordingly, deines (453a) rhetoric as the “craftsman” or “agent of persuasion”
(peiqoàj dhmiourgÒj). Socrates and Gorgias agree (454e) that rhetoric produces
persuasion from which “conviction without knowing” (pisteÚein ¥neu toà
e„dšnai) comes. However, Socrates’ conclusion (455a) that the rhetorician cannot
teach about the just and unjust seems to be rather hasty, if not downright erroneous,
and his contempt for rhetoricians who “solely produce conviction” appears to
be unwarranted. When Socrates maintains (ibid.) that rhetoric is “designed to
produce conviction, but not to educate about the just and unjust” (pisteutikÁj
¢ll’ oÙ didaskalikÁj perˆ tÕ d…kaiÒn te kaˆ ¥dikon), he disregards the fact
that every axiology is founded on conviction and faith (p…stij) – rather than
on knowing and that, consequently, it is hardly possible to know what is just or
unjust, since it is only possible to believe that. The view that one can actually
possess objective knowledge with regard to values is naturally Platonic to the
core. Nevertheless, the question remains open whether it is possible at all to
avoid any persuasion in a discussion that concerns values.
It follows from what has been said so far that it is only on the surface that
Platonic Socrates rejects all art of persuasion, as beneath the veneer of an
avowed enemy of rhetoric (understood as “lattery”, “adulation” and political
demagoguery), the philosopher does resort in the course of his discussion with the
sophists to some sort of rhetoric (understood as an art of persuasion indispensable
in every axiological debate). Just as Plato’s dialogues are literary works of an
astounding persuasiveness, so contrary to the philosopher’s intransigent insistence
that philosophy and dialectic be distinguished from rhetoric, signiicant rhetorical
ruses do appear throughout the dialogue on both sides of the dispute. Inasmuch as
Plato in his Gorgias seeks through Socrates to inveigle the listener into accepting
an ethic whose rationalism leads to theses that sound paradoxical, the philosopher
very often appeals to faith and emotions rather than to reason and in the long run
talks of (506a) “agreeing” (Ðmologe‹n) rather than “proving” (¢pode‹xai).
In order to persuade the interlocutors into accepting his paradoxical ethical
intellectualism, Platonic Socrates also employs a rhetorical strategy which consists in fabricating all dramatis personae of the dialogue in such a manner that
they are supposed to propagate consensus with regard to Socrates’ paradoxical
life-view. This may seem prima facie rather farfetched, but if one considers this
carefully, one is bound to reach the following conclusion: just as there reigns
general consent with regard to the fact that the Socrates which is to be found in
Plato’s dialogues is – at least to some extent – a creation of Plato, so all other
characters of the Gorgias should also be perceived as concocted by Plato. Let us
begin with Gorgias.
It is common knowledge that in his treaty On What is Not, or About Nature,
Gorgias repudiated any concept of truth whatsoever. Now, when the sophist in
PLATO’S AMBIVALENCE ABOUT RHETORIC IN THE GORGIAS
27
Plato’s dialogue eagerly accepts Socrates’ distinction between “persuasion from
which conviction comes without knowing” and “persuasion from which knowing
comes”, one is tempted to say that this Gorgias is simply a Platonic mystiication,
for the “genuine” Gorgias, for whom there was no knowing at all, would never
have accepted such a dubious distinction. The “authentic” Gorgias repudiated
any cognition in Plato’s sense of the word, as for him no legitimate rational
knowledge could ever be obtained in the ist place. The sophist questioned the
possibility of any rational, disinterested and objective knowing, as for him no
knowledge could be anything more than just an opinion (dÒxa). Philosophy and
rhetoric did not differ that much from his perspective (let alone be opposite), as
they both presuppose conviction and faith with regard to the values that underlie
every worldview and every discourse. While the Gorgias in his treaty rejected
any attempts to deine Truth or Being, the Gorgias in the dialogue is a construct
of Plato and for this reason he becomes easily “defeated” by Platonic Socrates. It
has to be emphasized here that by creating – or fabricating – such Gorgias, Plato
seems to be resorting through his Socrates to some sort of rhetorical subterfuge.
If the Gorgias concocted in the dialogue is a product of Plato’s rhetorical strategy, then just as we speak of Platonic Socrates we should also speak of Platonic
Gorgias, since both are Plato’s rhetorical mystiications, produced with a view to
persuading the reader into accepting a given axiology.
If by constructing his protagonists (Socrates) and antagonists (Gorgias et al.),
Plato proves to be not only a dramaturge but a rhetorician as well, then he actually applies the very sophist strategy against the sophists, for by concocting his
Gorgias Plato combats rhetoric by means of rhetoric. Let us remind it here that
rhetoric that is “lattery” and “shameful oratory” is to be superseded by another,
“noble” one, which is “to perfect the souls of the citizens”. This lofty objective
helps to explain why the fabricated Gorgias falls into some glaring contradictions
during his debate with Socrates. Whenever this happens it has to be borne in
mind that it is always Platonic Gorgias that falls into contradictions that are deliberately created by Plato. Let us consider the following charge that the Platonic
Socrates levels (459d) against the rhetorician who:
doesn’t know the things themselves, what is good or bad, what is ine or shameful or
just or unjust, but he has devised persuasion about them so that though he doesn’t know
among those who don’t know he appears to know, rather than the man who knows8.
aÙt¦ mn oÙk e„dèj, t… ¢gaqÕn À t… kakÒn ™stin À t… kalÕn À t… a„scrÕn À d…kaion À ¥dikon, peiqë d perˆ aÙtîn memhcanhmšnoj éste doke‹n e„dšnai oÙk e„dëj
™n oÙk e„dÒsin m©llon toà e„dÒtoj.
8
Quoted after T. Irwin’s translation.
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MIKOŁAJ DOMARADZKI
Platonic Socrates assumes here that unlike the rational dialectic (and the
aforementioned “reined” variety of rhetoric), the rhetoric that is tantamount
to “pandering” appeals (like poetry) exclusively to the emotions of the listeners and, therefore, exempts from the obligation to possess any genuine learning whatsoever. It is for this reason that Platonic Socrates states (502b) that
“composing tragedies” (¹ tÁj tragJd…aj po…hsij), being also oriented “solely
toward pleasing the audience” (car…zesqai to‹j qeata‹j mÒnon) can be identiied
(502c) with “lattery” or “pandering” (kolake…a), while both poetry and rhetoric
deserve (502d) to be named as a sort of “popular oratory” – or in modern term:
“demagoguery” (dhmhgor…a). Naturally, it is only the adulatory and demagogical rhetoric that becomes equated with poetry, while its noble and ancillary to
dialectic variety remains the constant element of Socrates’ discourse.
Still, it is evident that from the “authentic” Gorgias’ perspective such a differentiation together with Socrates’ censure could be dismissed as preposterous.
When Socrates distinguishes between a “noble” and a “vile” rhetoric or when he
castigates the rhetorician who has “devised” (memhcanhmšnoj) persuasion, the
philosopher suggests that there is another way to make somebody accept a set of
values, yet, in fact, there is not9. There is no knowing when it comes to axiology
and morality is not an epistemological issue, for no value can be classiied as
“true” or “false”. The hackneyed de gustibus non est disputandum is valid with
regard to every axiology: not only aesthetics but ethics, too. Surely, Gorgiass acaccepts all of Platonic Socrates’ dubious presuppositions, but – as already noted
– it is a rhetorical mystiication on Plato’s side, for if we agree that it is actually
Platonic Gorgias that heartily accepts the premises of Socrates’ intellectualism
and is easily defeated by it, then we must also agree that we do not encounter
here an “authentic” Gorgias, but rather a fabricated one. Consequently, as it is
Platonic Gorgias that is “vanquished” by equally Platonic Socrates, one might
argue that ultimately it is Plato that defeats Plato10.
Similar rhetorical manoeuvres are employed by Platonic Socrates during his
discussion with the remaining sophists: just as in the case of Gorgias, Socrates’
ethical intellectualism serves very often as an instrument of rhetorical persuasion,
so in the case of Polus and Callicles appropriate means of rhetorical persuasion
9
Let us note again that Platonic Socrates does realize this when he enquires: whether it is not
so that “whoever teaches anything, persuades about what he teaches” and when he frankly confesses
that he endeavours to “make” Polus “say the same things that he says”. Both quotations conirm his
consciousness that it is not feasible to persuade to a given axiological option, unless a certain art of
persuasion and appropriate rhetorical stratagems are employed.
10
Incidentally, there is even a testimony that corroborates the assumption that we are dealing
here with Platonic fabrication of Gorgias and not the “genuine” sophist. According to Athenaeus (XI
505d–e [A 15a DK]), Gorgias, having read Plato’s dialogue, was supposed to have said that Plato
could “deride” („amb…zein) magniicently and added that he neither said nor heard any of those things
that are to be found in Plato’s dialogue.
PLATO’S AMBIVALENCE ABOUT RHETORIC IN THE GORGIAS
29
are also applied. For our considerations, it is of minor importance whether Polus
and Callicles existed or whether they are ictitious characters, created for the
purpose of Plato’s drama and with a view to advancing Socrates’ stance. What
is of major importance is the manner in which they were presented by Plato:
even though we know for a fact that Polus existed, whereas Callicles’ existence
remains only probable, it seems advisable to focus on the reasonable premise
that neither Polus nor Callicles can be described as entirely “genuine” and “authentic”, for they, too, must have been – at least to some extent – concocted by
Plato. Unfortunately, a thorough presentation of the whole of the discussion is
impossible due to the necessary limitations of the present article. Hence, we
cannot enumerate all the ambiguities and equivocations which Platonic Socrates
produces in order to ensnare his interlocutors. Sufice it to say that what has
been said about Plato’s fabricating Gorgias seems also valid with regard to the
remaining sophists: they, too, are Plato’s rhetorical mystiications, designed to
persuade the reader into accepting Socrates’ ethical intellectualism. We have
concentrated on Gorgias, but – needless to say – Polus and Callicles are equally
signiicant. Altogether, the thinkers, as they appear, relect not only an escalation
of the conlict between philosophy and rhetoric, but also a subtle coalescence
of the two.
Finally, we wish to draw attention to a striking inconsistency in Platonic
Socrates, which, in our opinion, illustrates perfectly the thesis about the rhetorical
mystiication on Plato’s part. The Greek philosopher claims (515d–517c) that great
men such as Pericles, Cimon, Miltiades, Themistocles did deserve the treatment
they received from the people they had ruled over “for not a single leader of
a city can ever be destroyed unjustly by the very city he leads” (prost£thj g¦r
pÒlewj oÙd’ ¨n eŒj pote ¢d…kwj ¢pÒloito Øp’ aÙtÁj tÁj pÒlewj Âj prostate‹)
(519c). Likewise, Socrates maintains (ibid.) that the sophists make themselves
ridiculous when “they claim to be teachers of virtue” (¢retÁj did£skaloi) and at
the same time often accuse their pupils of “doing injustice” (¢dikoàsi) to them.
The charge is obvious: both politicians and rhetoricians aspire to certain authority
and, consequently, must bear responsibility for the actions of people they want to
guide. Immoral actions of the guided testify to the worthlessness of the guidance.
Nevertheless, Socrates is supposed to be some curious exception to the rule, as
he boldly asserts (521d) that if he is ever brought to court, his prosecutor will be
a “base man” (ponhrÒj). The assertion that anyone who tries to indict Socrates
will be ignoble raises the obvious question why Socrates should be exempt from
the very responsibility that politicians and rhetoricians must shoulder. Callicles
could have answered that Socrates’ death would only testify to the poverty of
his teaching. We discover here a glaring discrepancy between the sweeping
condemnation of the politicians or rhetoricians, on the one hand, and the touching
eulogy of Socrates, on the other. As it is scarcely possible that Plato would have
failed to see this inconsistency, we must ask what its purpose is.
30
MIKOŁAJ DOMARADZKI
One of the possible answers could be that such inconsistencies, contradictions
and paradoxes, as the one delivered above, serve a very speciic purpose in Plato:
they are certain rhetorical devices whose function is to stimulate to relection and
very often to persuade the reader into accepting the view that Platonic Socrates
advocates. Plato makes use of various contradictions and paradoxes for purposes
that could be labeled as “therapeutic”: in the spirit of his moral teacher, Plato
expects philosophy to bring about a certain ethical revival and the “therapy” of
his literal production aims to cure both the individual and the entire community
of the ancient πόλις. That is why Plato portrays in his dialogues characters that
represent so diverse life-views. By depicting various axiologies, frequently mutually exclusive, Plato seeks to convince the reader that he should follow the path
of Socrates rather than of the sophists.
All in all, the clash between rhetoric and dialectic philosophy in the Gorgias
is a clash of not only two different discourse strategies, but also of two different
worldviews. Inasmuch as Plato realized that the normative postulate that one
ought to lead a moral life cannot be proved in a rational and logical manner, he
deliberately illed the dialogue with paradoxes, myths and appeals to emotions so
as to encourage his readers to abide the universal morality that Socrates gave his
life for. With the situation being as it is, one should not be surprised that Platonic
Socrates repudiates rhetoric only on the surface, while beneath the philosophical
veneer, he proves to be a rhetorician – so to say – kat’ ™xoc»n, who combats the
sophists by means of their own strategies. By using the “reined” and “noble”
rhetoric against the teachers of a “shameful” and “demagogical” one, Platonic
Socrates appears to transcend the limited view that rationality is the sole legitimate discourse strategy. If we agree that some of those strategies employed
by Platonic Socrates can reasonably be characterized as substantially rhetorical,
than the Gorgias transpires to be of paramount importance, since when read between the lines, the dialogue can be perceived as Plato’s challenge to the view
that dialectic is the only justiiable philosophical strategy.
In conclusion, this has to be accentuated: whenever Plato resorts to myths,
whenever he “fabricates” his protagonists and antagonists, whenever he presents
us with various inconsistencies and contradictions, he does, in the inal analysis,
have recourse to rhetoric (albeit ancillary to dialectic), because he is perfectly
aware of the fact that it is simply impossible to teach and communicate with man
only in a rational way, let alone prove rationally the value of moral life. That is
why Plato does use some “irrational” – or even better: “para-rational” – strategies, proving thereby to be not only one of the greatest philosophers of all times,
but also one of the greatest rhetoricians.
Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań
PLATO’S AMBIVALENCE ABOUT RHETORIC IN THE GORGIAS
31
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Fie ld 1969: G.C. Field, The Philosophy of Plato, Oxford 1969.
G u th rie 1975: W.K.C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, vol. IV: Plato, the Man and His
Dialogues: Earlier Period, Cambridge 1975.
H a re 1982: R.M. Hare, Plato, Oxford 1982.
Irw in 1989: T. Irwin, Classical Thought, Oxford 1989 (= A History of Western Philosophy, vol. I).
Sa n ta s 1979: G.X. Santas, Socrates: Philosophy in Plato’s Early Dialogues, London 1979.
V la s to s 1991: G. Vlastos, Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher, Cambridge 1991.