Journal of Reformed
Theology 12 (2018) 3–21
brill.com/jrt
Reformation and Secularity
Jason Goroncy
Whitley College, University of Divinity, Parkville, Australia
jgoroncy@whitley.edu.au
Abstract
Among a growing body of recent scholarship that has shown interest in the geneses, definitions, and assessments of secularism is Brad Gregory’s book The Unintended
Reformation. This essay begins with a brief assessment of Gregory’s thesis. By way of
response, it then offers four reflections on what are live challenges for those Christian
communities committed to a refusal to withdraw from sharing and creating common
life with others, and for whom the various reformations of the sixteenth century remain
critical for the formation of their identities. The reflections concern (1) the character
and conditions of belief; (2) the existence of the church in late Christendom; (3) the
church’s worldliness; and (4) the character of faithful public life. Each of these themes
has pressing implications for the ongoing life of the reformed project.
Keywords
Reformation – secularity – belief – church and state – public theology
Taking Some Bearings
Debates about personal and religious liberties can get ugly, even in so-called liberal democracies. They can also be instructive. For some, such debates expose
the lamentable erosion of a grander and shared communal story—an account
of how we came to be where and who we are, and so a way to answer the question, “How then shall we live?” For some others, such debates expose the myth
that such a story ever existed, and that adjectives like ‘traditional’ are considerably more novel than their Galahads would have us believe.
Religious communities are neither disinterested bystanders nor newcomers
to such debates. (By comparison, liberal democracy has only just turned up.)
© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2018 | doi: 10.1163/15697312-01201001
4
goroncy
God-botherers of various stripes and creeds have been actively engaged in such
for a very long time. In fact, they even wrote many of the rules. In this essay,
I wish to offer four brief reflections on what I judge to be live challenges for
those Christian communities committed to a refusal to withdraw from sharing
and creating common life with others, and for whom the various reformations
of the sixteenth century remain critical for the formation of their identities.
One particular misjudgment I have in my scope is that social vision that
places the church at the center of things, a misjudgment that sponsors modes of
being in the world that are at odds with some of Protestantism’s most remarkable instincts. Not everyone shares my enthusiasm for such instincts.
Brad Gregory’s The Unintended Reformation
Brad Gregory’s ambitious, provocative, and polemical book The Unintended
Reformation: How a Religious Revolution Secularized Society (2012) sits among
a growing body of scholarship concerned with the geneses, definitions, and
assessments of what many God-botherers often erroneously refer to as ‘secularism.’ Epigrammatically, his thesis is that liberal modernity is the progeny
of the Protestant reformations of the sixteenth century. These religious and
intellectual upheavals, he argues, are to be lamented because they are unwittingly responsible for ending over a millennia of Christianity as “a framework
for shared intellectual life in the Latin West,”1 and because they created the
conditions out of which grew some of the greatest maladies of the modern
world, among which Gregory names individualism, pluralism, skepticism, capitalism, secularism, and consumerism—a smorgasbord of ‘isms’ that have, he
believes, left the world disenchanted.2 The Protestant response to “the failure
of medieval Christendom”3 was, in Gregory’s assessment, to squeeze transcendence out of intellectual and public discourse, and, consequently, to discard
1 Brad S. Gregory, The Unintended Reformation: How a Religious Revolution Secularized Society
(Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2012), 45.
2 For Gregory, Modernity is that reality in which we endure “the liquefying effects of capitalism and consumerism on the politically protected individuals within liberal states, as men
and women in larger numbers prioritize the fulfillment of their self-chosen, acquisitive, individual desires above any social (including familial) solidarities except those they also happen
to choose, and only for as long as they happen to choose them.” Gregory, The Unintended Reformation, 378.
3 Gregory, The Unintended Reformation, 366.
Journal of Reformed Theology 12 (2018) 3–21
reformation and secularity
5
any meaning from the world that cannot be justified by an insipid and existentially disquiet form of revisionism.
I am not entirely unsympathetic to the charge of disenchantment that Gregory lays at Protestantism’s door, especially because behind that door lies a
musty room filled with very sober second- and third-generation Calvinists in
whose work certain “metaphysical assumptions … probably did contribute to
an eventual conception of a disenchanted natural world.”4 But there remain
some pitfalls in Gregory’s account, at least two of which share a common problem; namely, the gremlin of an ecclesiocentric vision of human society and of
the natural world.
Reading History
The first misjudgment finds expression in Gregory’s too-thin reading of the historical data. His casting blame upon Duns Scotus and William of Ockham is an
example of such.5 Just how two philosopher-theologians from the thirteenth
and fourteenth centuries can be made so directly responsible for what happened in the sixteenth is a difficult, if not entirely new, thesis to defend.6 To be
fair, Gregory is not naïve to the bumps and broken lines in the trajectory, but
his polemical tone does not lend itself to the kind of thickly textured account
required to flesh these out adequately.
More substantively, countless accounts of violence and hostile polemics
notwithstanding, Gregory underplays the intra-Catholic divisions, and overplays the fixed distinction between medieval Roman Catholicism and Reformation Protestantism. Here he is at odds with evidence that suggests the existence
of a more porous and sometimes mutually informative relationship, especially
4 Gregory, The Unintended Reformation, 41.
5 Scotus scholars have long argued that the thesis that Gregory (and before him John Milbank
and others) repeats is an untenable and oversimplified reading of the historical data vis-àvis the work of Duns Scotus and William of Ockham. See, for example, Richard Cross, “Duns
Scotus and Suárez at the Origins of Modernity,” in Deconstructing Radical Orthodoxy: Postmodern Theology, Rhetoric and Truth, ed. Wayne J. Hankey and Douglas Hedley (Aldershot:
Ashgate, 2005), 65–80; Daniel P. Horan, Postmodernity and Univocity: A Critical Account of
Radical Orthodoxy and John Duns Scotus (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2014), 83–89; cf.
John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason, 2nd ed. (Malden: Blackwell, 2006), xxv–xxvi, 15, 135, 305–306; Gillian Rose, Dialectics of Nihilism: Post-Structuralism
and Law (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984), 104–108. Also Richard Cross, “ ‘Where angels fear to tread’:
Duns Scotus and Radical Orthodoxy,” Antonianum 76, no. 1 (2001): 7–41.
6 The argument was made some years earlier by Amos Funkenstein in Theology and the Scientific Imagination from the Middle Ages to the Seventeenth Century (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1986).
Journal of Reformed Theology 12 (2018) 3–21
6
goroncy
at grassroots levels. History is simply never as tidy as Gregory’s eristics propose.
The realities within and the relationships between medieval and renaissance
religions are characterized by what Peter Schäfer, in an unrelated conversation,
refers to as “the fluidity of boundaries”—“identities that are less stable and
boundaries that are more permeable than has been previously thought and yet
increasingly demarcated in order to occupy territories.”7
In truth, I struggle to fully recognize Gregory’s portrait of the Reformation.
It strikes me as a long witty threnody placed in the service of an argument that
insists that any and every piece of available data be read back into some towering Manichaean saga that blames Protestants for dismantling some imagined
and monolithic medieval synthesis. It represents a classic case of drawing up
an indictment against the past, and then refusing to let it testify on its own
behalf. “Such attention as we give to it is usually vindictive and incurious and
therefore,” as Marilynne Robinson has argued, “incompetent.”8
Paganizing Secularity
This relates to a second charge: that Gregory’s thesis is intellectually biased
because it neglects offering a positive assessment of the liberalizing consequences of the reformers’ intentional efforts that made those who welcomed
them to be more at ease with secularity not in spite of their theological convictions but precisely because of them. Here, I share the Australian Catholic theologian Robert Gascoigne’s assessment of Gregory’s reading of liberal modernity
as one-sided. Liberal societies can and do tell two stories: “a positive story of
freedom of conscience and the development of unconstrained community, as
well as a negative story of self-centeredness, vacuity, and the commodification of human values.”9 While those who hanker for some near-Edenic past
in medieval Christendom will lament that the genie has gotten out of the
bottle, those who take their energies from the spirit of the reformations—
and particularly those sections of the reformed movements most animated by
eschatology—will not grieve that there is no way of getting him back in.
Protestant commitments to the doctrine of providence, expressed, for example, in Calvin’s positive assessment of creation as God’s “dazzling theater,”10
7
8
9
10
Peter Schäfer, The Jewish Jesus: How Judaism and Christianity Shaped Each Other (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), 1.
Marilynne Robinson, The Death of Adam: Essays on Modern Thought (Boston: Mariner
Books, 1998), 182.
Robert Gascoigne, The Church and Secularity: Two Stories of Liberal Society (Washington:
Georgetown University Press, 2009), 2.
John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, ed. John T. McNeill, trans. Ford Lewis
Journal of Reformed Theology 12 (2018) 3–21
reformation and secularity
7
or as “a sort of mirror in which we can contemplate God, who is otherwise
invisible,”11 and in Luther’s and Calvin’s enthusiastic appraisal of nonecclesial
vocations, undermine the old dualisms between so-called ‘secular’ and ‘sacred’
space. Both quoted fondly the psalmist’s words: “The earth is the Lord’s and
the fullness thereof.”12 Luther’s political theology therefore has little qualms
about stripping the church of jurisdiction and property, and about empowering worldly rulers to exercise their vocation of caritas toward the state’s citizens,
and beyond. That creation is God’s and that its flourishing at every level is God’s
will means, for the magisterial reformers, that human societies ought to be shot
through with deep reverence and thanksgiving for the profound interrelatedness of all aspects of life, and that all of our relationships ought to embody
God’s justice, freedom, and enduring commitment to the affirmation of creation’s dignity. They did not, in other words, ever cast the world to the dogs.
(Unless, of course, you happened to be an Anabaptist, or some German peasant
demanding agrarian rights and freedom from oppression by wealthy aristocrats.)
Of course, the modes of secularity with which the magisterial reformers
made their home also assumed the kind of Constantinian arrangements that
made their programs of reform possible in the first place and that kept the
church at or near the centers of power. While Protestants have not let such
arrangements go entirely unchallenged,13 there remains a pressing summons
to reassess them rigorously.14 Any tradition that finds itself in a situation in
which many of the underlying commitments and assumptions upon which its
identity was forged are now crumbling has to do some hard thinking about
its ongoing character. It is to this matter, therefore, that I now turn by way
of a reflection on four areas that arise for me from Gregory’s work, each of
11
12
13
14
Battles, 2 vols., The Library of Christian Classics (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1977),
1.5.8.
Calvin, Institutes, 1.5.1.
Ps. 24:1. See, for example, Martin Luther, Selected Psalms 2, ed. J.J. Pelikan, H.C. Oswald,
and H.T. Lehmann, Luther’s Works 13 (Saint Louis: Concordia, 1999), 46–47; John Calvin,
The First Epistle of Paul to the Corinthians, ed. David W. Torrance and Thomas F. Torrance,
trans. John W. Fraser, Calvin’s New Testament Commentaries 9 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,
1989), 222–223.
For example, during the seventeenth century the Covenanters in Scotland, and Baptists
in England (John Smyth) and the United States (Roger Williams), championed a less cosy
relationship between church, magistrate, and state.
See Jason A. Goroncy, “Church and Civil Society in the Reformed Tradition: An Old Relationship and a New Communion,” Reformed World 61, no. 3 (2011): 195–210.
Journal of Reformed Theology 12 (2018) 3–21
8
goroncy
which relate to the ecclesiocentricity with which he appraises things, and each
of which have pressing implications for the ongoing viability of the reformed
project.
Four Constructive Implications for the Reformed Project
1
Belief beyond Medievalism
Whatever adjectives one employs to appraise Gregory’s thesis, ‘novel’ ought
not to be among them. Indeed, his argument has a long lineage stretching
back through Jaime Balmes’s work in the mid-nineteenth century; to JacquesBénigne Bossuet’s The History of the Variations of the Protestant Churches, first
published in 1688; to early sixteenth-century anti-Protestant polemic, the most
entertaining of which was expressed in woodcuts, the kind of propaganda in
which Protestants proved themselves to be opponents of equal offense and
creativity. It was Balmes, a Spanish Catholic priest, who argued that “if there
be any thing [sic] constant in Protestantism, it is undoubtedly the substitution of private judgment for public and lawful authority.”15 To be fair, Balmes at
least conceded that it was not the intention of the early Reformers—“fanatical,”
“infidel,” and “mad”16 though they were—to encourage the rejection of authority. But “against their express wishes,”17 their insistence on the responsibility of
believers to interpret the Word of God for themselves led to a disintegration of
the power of the magisterium, and so, he argued, to the subversion of morality,
the undermining of cohesive political communities, and the triumph of commerce over a truly humanizing civilization. This is the thesis Gregory revives.18
15
16
17
18
Jaime Luciano Balmes, European Civilisation: Protestantism and Catholicity Compared, 2nd
ed. (London: Burns and Lambert, 1855), 2. The first edition of this work was published in
1851 with the title Protestantism and Catholicity Compared in Their Effects on the Civilization
of Europe. Bossuet was similarly uncompromising: “private judgement … distinguishes the
Catholic from the Heretic.” Jacques Bénigne Bossuet, History of the Variations of the Protestant Churches (New York: D. & J. Sadlier, 1845), 17.
Balmes, European Civilisation, 2, 197, 204.
Balmes, European Civilisation, 2.
Gregory is rightly concerned that history not be construed along what he calls “supersessionist” lines that celebrate so-called “modernity,” “sophistication,” and “enlightenment”
as the liberators from the cultural bondages of medieval assumptions (see Gregory, The
Unintended Reformation, 9–10, 13–15, 29, 53, passim), but his assessment that such a move
is accompanied by the onset of disenchantment and the abandonment of any kind of
“sacramental worldview” (p. 56) is misjudged.
Journal of Reformed Theology 12 (2018) 3–21
reformation and secularity
9
A more compelling account of the story of Western modernity than that
offered by Gregory is that made by another Roman Catholic, the Canadian
philosopher Charles Taylor. In his essays Sources of the Self and A Secular Age,
Taylor is concerned with what he calls “the conditions of belief.” “How,” he
writes, “did we move from a condition where, in Christendom, people lived
naïvely within a theistic construal, to one in which we all shunt between two
stances …; and in which … unbelief has become for many the major default
option?”19 Taylor tells the story of why in a so-called post-secular age “the hegemony of the mainstream master narrative of secularisation” is increasingly
being challenged, and of how in our ‘secular’ age, transcendence and immanence coalesce into one disconnected whole in which “believers are beset by
doubt and doubters, every once in a while, find themselves tempted by belief.”20
The work of many of our best novelists, musicians, poets, filmmakers, artists,
and other endangered species attests to the belief that our age is haunted. We
no longer need the church to perform this role for us. Jamie Smith describes
it well: “On the one hand, … we live in the twilight of both gods and idols.
But their ghosts have refused to depart, and every once in a while we might
be surprised to find ourselves tempted by belief, by intimations of transcendence. Even what Taylor calls the ‘immanent frame’ is haunted. On the other
hand, even as faith endures in our secular age, believing doesn’t come easy.
Faith is fraught; confession is haunted by an inescapable sense of its contestability. We don’t believe instead of doubting; we believe while doubting. We’re
all Thomas now.”21 Reflecting on the work of one of Catholicism’s most gifted
writers, Flannery O’Connor, Paul Elie also describes well the character of belief
in our time:
We are all skeptics now, believer and unbeliever alike. There is no one true
faith, evident at all times and places. Every religion is one among many.
The clear lines of any orthodoxy are made crooked by our experience, are
complicated by our lives. Believer and unbeliever are in the same predicament, thrown back onto themselves in complex circumstances, looking
for a sign. As ever, religious belief makes its claim somewhere between
revelation and projection, between holiness and human frailty; but the
19
20
21
Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2007), 14. See also Taylor, A Secular Age, 530–535.
James K.A. Smith, How (Not) to be Secular: Reading Charles Taylor (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2014), 3.
Smith, How (Not) to be Secular, 3–4.
Journal of Reformed Theology 12 (2018) 3–21
10
goroncy
burden of proof, indeed the burden of belief, for so long upheld by society, is now back on the believer, where it belongs.22
This makes religious belief less stable than those who confuse faith with certainties condone. I am not suggesting for a moment that sixteenth-century
Europeans could have imagined the world that Taylor is seeking to understand
and to map. They couldn’t have. But some of the instincts they fostered, birthed
against the background of their own turbulent time, remain serviceable for
us today. The Reformed project’s instincts, if rarely its practice, have been to
appraise belief in terms unconstrained by the “protective guardianship”23 of
the status quo. Its instinct, if rarely its routine, has been to lose faith in settled
arrangements, and to learn instead the habits “of dispossession, the constant
rediscovery and critique of the myth of the self [or of the institution] as owner
of its perceptions and positions.” This is the kind of thinking that “unsettles all
claims to a final resolution of how we define and speak of our interest,” and of
belief.24 Its instinct, at its best, has been to relinquish the institutional lust for
power, self-mastery, and security. In the sixteenth century, ecclesial movements
of reform were able to achieve this, Taylor argues, because they expressed “a
profound dissatisfaction with the hierarchical equilibrium between lay life and
the renunciative vocations.”25 The buffering of the self and the disenchantment
of the world that unintentionally made both the perfectionism after which
puritanism longed and the unhinged imagination called ‘the 1960s’ possible is,
according to Taylor, a progeny of the tendency toward antisacramentalism in
the reformers and their “rejection of the church’s good magic.”26 This move,
it is argued, effectively evacuated the presence of the sacred from the world
and its social orders. We are no longer haunted by the threats of evil spirits
and cosmic forces. In the words of Pablo Neruda, “The world has changed”;27
not in the sense of Neruda’s loss of faith in the collective communist vision,
but in the sense that when it comes to believing—or to not believing—in any22
23
24
25
26
27
Paul Elie, The Life You Save May Be Your Own: An American Pilgrimage (New York: Farrar,
Straus and Giroux, 2003), 471–472.
Sarah Coakley, God, Sexuality, and the Self: An Essay “On the Trinity” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 13.
Rowan Williams, “Between Politics and Metaphysics: Reflections in the Wake of Gillian
Rose,” Modern Theology 11, no. 1 (1995), 17.
Taylor, A Secular Age, 61.
Taylor, A Secular Age, 72.
Cited in René de Costa, The Poetry of Pablo Neruda (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1982), 89.
Journal of Reformed Theology 12 (2018) 3–21
reformation and secularity
11
thing we are now on our own, and responsible for ourselves. “Belief in God is
no longer axiomatic. There are alternatives.”28 The medieval social space and
intellectual imaginary after which Gregory hankers no longer exists, if it ever
quite did. Instead, believers and unbelievers alike must now “learn to navigate
between two standpoints: an ‘engaged’ one in which we live as best we can the
reality our standpoint opens us to; and a ‘disengaged’ one in which we are able
to see ourselves as occupying one standpoint among a range of possible ones,
with which we have in various ways to coexist.”29
Taylor is right to observe that the social imaginary in which moderns live
is one in which “the fate of belief depends much more than before on [the]
powerful intuitions of individuals, radiating out to others”30 than it does on
the unchallengeable status that a single and common orthodoxy once enjoyed
and that Gregory argues is a precondition for making the world intelligible. In
my judgment, the modern social imaginary vis-à-vis belief involves both loss
and gain. On the one hand, it requires a more deliberate effort for belief to find
the requisite shape in communal life, a subject to which I will return. On the
other hand, as Taylor observes, “other facets of our predicament in relation to
God come to the fore; for instance what Isaiah meant when he talked of a ‘hidden God.’ In the seventeenth century, you had to be a Pascal to appreciate that.
Now we live it daily.”31 There is cause, therefore, to celebrate the situation Abraham Heschel once described thus: “While stripped of pretension and conceit
we sense the tragic insufficiency of human faith.”32
Into such spaces, Christian communities can recover the shared vocation of
being unstable and vulnerable bearers of the live question that brought them to
birth in the first place: “Who do you say that I am?” To so proceed is to welcome
one of the genius insights of that first generation of Protestants regarding the
freedom of the Word unharnessed from but at home among the particularities
of any one culture or form, including ecclesial ones, a subject to which we now
turn.
2
Church beyond Christendom
For most of its life, Western forms of Christianity have not heeded the words
of the Hebrew prophets to be a sanctuary unescorted by borders or bullets.
28
29
30
31
32
Taylor, A Secular Age, 3; see also 309.
Taylor, A Secular Age, 12.
Taylor, A Secular Age, 531.
Taylor, A Secular Age, 531–532.
Abraham Joshua Heschel, “No Religion Is an Island,” Union Seminary Quarterly Review 21,
no. 2 (1966): 122.
Journal of Reformed Theology 12 (2018) 3–21
12
goroncy
Nor have they placed much store in the warning carried in the words “crucified under Pontius Pilate.” Instead, they have been made inebriated by drinking
from the same wells of imperialism that created the empires of Egypt, Assyria,
and the United States.33 In 1648, for example, the Protestant Westphalia agreements suppressed the universalist aspirations of empire in favour of national
ones, even while reinforcing the old alliances between throne (or parliament)
and altar, albeit now along more local lines. Signs that the keg may be running a
little low occasion another opportunity for Protestant communions to dissent
from all “stupid allegiance to political authority as if that were service to the
church and, a fortiori, to God,”34 and to embrace instead what the Australian
theologian Davis McCaughey called a “transitory character.”35 Here arises the
question about the fallenness of principalities and powers that are conjunctive
with but not dependent upon or derivative of humanity’s renunciation of life in
the sheer gift of God’s Word unbound to any ‘system’ and who acts to undo the
scandal that recalcitrance has fashioned, announcing his sole lordship over all
things uninitiated by the threat of death, and renewing creation’s vocation in
freedom and service. Without minimizing Christendom’s remarkable achievements, it seems judicious, imperative, and overdue for those traditions forged
under its assumptions, atmosphere, and protection to undergo appraisal. This,
as John de Gruchy rightly reminds us, does not mean “adopting a politically
neutral stance or eschewing the responsible use of power.” Indeed, a project
like the Reformed project is, after all, essentially public and acutely concerned
for the public commons. “The question is not,” therefore, “whether the church
is going to use political influence, but how, on behalf of whom, and from what
perspective it is going to do so. Is [such influence] going to be used ‘to preserve
the social prestige which comes from its ties to the groups in power or to free
itself from the prestige with a break from these groups and with genuine service
to the oppressed’?”36
33
34
35
36
See Richard H. Immerman, Empire for Liberty: A History of American Imperialism from Benjamin Franklin to Paul Wolfowitz (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).
William Stringfellow, Conscience and Obedience: The Politics of Romans 13 and Revelation
13 in Light of the Second Coming (Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2004), 49.
J. Davis McCaughey, Tradition and Dissent (Carlton South: Melbourne University Press,
1997), 33.
John W. de Gruchy, “Toward a Reformed Theology of Liberation: A Retrieval of Reformed
Symbols in the Struggle for Justice,” in Toward the Future of Reformed Theology: Tasks,
Topics, Traditions, ed. David Willis and Michael Welker (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999),
107–108. Here de Gruchy cites from Gustavo Gutiérrez, A Theology of Liberation: History,
Politics, and Salvation (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1973), 266–267.
Journal of Reformed Theology 12 (2018) 3–21
reformation and secularity
13
For those who hanker after a secure life, a kind of invulnerable area in the
world, whatever its form, the Word of God holds out no promise, no escape,
no counterfeit security, no withdrawal from the actualities, ambiguities, uncertainties, and instabilities of human life.37 The idolatry of certainty—whether
cultural, political, or intellectual—signals “a withdrawal from accepting the
peril and the promise of the Incarnation”: namely, the call to live “an exposed
life” before God, one “stripped of the kind of security that tradition, whether
ecclesiological or institutional, easily bestows.”38 This is the church’s atypical
and baffling existence. It also goes by another word: ‘discipleship.’ It was this
direction toward which a young Dietrich Bonhoeffer was looking when in London in the early 1930s he preached that
Christianity stands or falls with its revolutionary protest against violence,
arbitrariness and pride of power and with its apologia for the weak …
Christendom has adjusted itself much too easily to the worship of power.
It should give much more offence, more shock to the world, than it is
doing. Christianity should … take a stronger much more definite stand
for the weak than to consider the potential moral right of the strong.39
3
The Worldliness of the Church
During his first American tour, Bonhoeffer spoke also of a church “beyond religion.”40 While his now famous wrestlings with the question of a “religionless
37
38
39
40
See Donald M. MacKinnon, The Stripping of the Altars: The Gore Memorial Lecture Delivered on 5 November 1968 in Westminster Abbey, and Other Papers and Essays on Related
Topics (London/Glasgow: Collins, 1969), 26, 28.
MacKinnon, Stripping of the Altars, 33, 34.
Dietrich Bonhoeffer, London: 1933–1935, trans. Isabel Best (Minneapolis: Fortress Press,
2007), 402–403.
Bonhoeffer’s language of “beyond religion” appears also in Dietrich Bonhoeffer, No Rusty
Swords: Letters, Lectures and Notes 1928–1936 From the Collected Works, vol. 1, trans. John
Bowden and Eberhard Bethge (London: Collins, 1970), 113. The idea has three interrelated features. The first is discipleship—the response to Christ’s call to follow in such a
way that all idolatries and fundamentalisms, especially religious ones, are abandoned as
one risks walking into an entirely unknown future. The second is community. Whereas
in 1939 Bonhoeffer was still envisaging the possibility of Christians living in intentional
communities (see Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Life Together and Prayerbook of the Bible, ed. Geoffrey B. Kelly, trans. Daniel W. Bloesch and James H. Burtness, vol. 5, Dietrich Bonhoeffer
Works (Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 1996)), his prison theology grappled with the
implications of following and meeting Christ in the world. This development is a direct
implication of Bonhoeffer’s christology, arising from his conviction that Christ is the end
Journal of Reformed Theology 12 (2018) 3–21
14
goroncy
Christianity”41 and of “interpreting biblical concepts nonreligiously”42 seem to
have had their main geneses in Karl Barth’s theological critique of religion,43 it
is clear that Bonhoeffer was pressing beyond Barth toward something more asyet unknown.44 Neither an “extra” to the normalities of human existence nor a
“stopgap” for when we have reached “the limits of our possibilities,” Bonhoeffer’s God is fully present in all of life’s “polyphonic” dimensions.45 “We cannot,
like the Roman Catholics,” Bonhoeffer said, “simply identify ourselves with the
church.”46 For “Jesus calls not to a new religion but to life,” the content of which
is a participation in God’s powerlessness in and suffering at “the hands of a godless world.”47
Bonhoeffer’s is a call to reject the claim that ecclesiocentricity and the
church’s institutional permanence are necessary in order to make the world
coherent. He rejects, in other words, the myth that the church is the telos of
world history wherein, as another has put it, “the whole space at one’s disposal is filled with ecclesiology,” where “the world has disappeared from the
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
of all meaningful speech vis-à-vis any distinction between the “sacred” and the “secular.”
Third, such communities are characterized by fervent abandonment of efforts toward selfpreservation, by an acute loss of power, and by a deep-rooted commitment to prayer and to
justice. (In words addressed to Dietrich Bethge on the occasion of his baptism in May 1944,
Bonhoeffer noted that “we can be Christians today in only two ways, through prayer and in
doing justice among human beings. All Christian thinking, talking, and organizing must
be born anew, out of that prayer and action.” Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from
Prison, ed. John W. de Gruchy, trans. Isabel Best et al., vol. 8, Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2010), 389. Dietrich Bethge was the son of his dear friends
Eberhard and Renate Bethge.) Such a community is wholly a verb given unreservedly for
the world and having, as Bonhoeffer put it, “an unconditional obligation to the victims of
any ordering of society—even if they do not belong to the Christian community.” Dietrich
Bonhoeffer, No Rusty Swords: Letters, Lectures and Notes 1928–1936, trans. Edwin H. Robertson and John Bowden, vol. 1, The Collected Works of Dietrich Bonhoeffer (London: Collins,
1965), 225.
Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers, 363.
Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers, 455.
See, for example, Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics I.2, ed. Geoffrey W. Bromiley and Thomas
F. Torrance, trans. George T. Thompson and Thomas F. Torrance (Edinburgh: T&T Clark,
2000), §17.
See Tom Greggs, Theology against Religion: Constructive Dialogues with Bonhoeffer and
Barth (London: T&T Clark, 2011).
Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers, 405, 406.
Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers, 503.
Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers, 480, 482.
Journal of Reformed Theology 12 (2018) 3–21
reformation and secularity
15
horizon,”48 and where mission is thereby reduced to proselytism into particular cultural forms, often involving “a painful cultural circumcision.”49 Where
such a myth persists, the church revolves around what the Dutch missiologist
Johannes Christiaan Hoekendijk famously called “an illegitimate center” and
takes itself “too seriously.”50 In such a myth, mission means “churchification”51
and is reduced to being “the fundamental refusal to participate in a common
history,”52 that is, a history authorized by a “sacralised and theologically codified culture”53 called “the church” but which is, in fact, an “ecclesia in se incurvata,”54 a church turned in upon itself.
Here we come to modern Protestantism’s failure to know why it exists anymore. As Stanley Hauerwas recently noted, “Protestantism has become an end
in itself … The result is denominationalism in which each Protestant church
tries to be just different enough from other Protestant churches to attract
an increasingly diminishing market share.”55 Bonhoeffer did not make this
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
Johannes Christiaan Hoekendijk, “Die Welt als Horizont,”Evangelische Theologie 25 (1965):
79.
Johannes Christiaan Hoekendijk, “Notes on the Meaning of Mission(-ary),” in Planning for
Mission: Working Papers on the New Quest for Missionary Communities, ed. Thomas Wieser
(New York: U.S. Conference for the WCC, 1966), 46. Here I think that Paul Tillich’s description of the distinct Protestant character is particularly helpful: “What makes Protestantism Protestant is the fact that it transcends its own religious and confessional character, that it cannot be identified wholly with any of its particular historical forms.” Paul
Tillich, The Protestant Era, trans. James Luther Adams (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1948), 162.
Johannes Christiaan Hoekendijk, The Church Inside Out, trans. Isaac C. Rottenberg (London: SCM Press, 1967), 38. Elsewhere, Hoekendijk warns that “[W]e should be aware of a
temptation to take the Church itself too seriously, to invite the Church to see itself as wellestablished, as God’s secure bridgehead in the world, to think of itself as a beatus possidens
[a blessed possessor] which, having what others do not have, distributes its possession to
others, until a new company of possidentes is formed.” Johannes Christiaan Hoekendijk,
“The Call to Evangelism,” The International Review of Missions 39, no. 154 (1950): 170.
Hoekendijk, “The Call to Evangelism,” 171.
Johannes Christiaan Hoekendijk, Kirche und Volk in der deutschen Missionswissenschaft
(Munich: Kaiser Verlag, 1967), 348.
John G. Flett, Apostolicity: The Ecumenical Question in World Christian Perspective (Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2016), 202.
Hoekendijk, “Die Welt als Horizont,” 84.
Stanley Hauerwas, “The Reformation is Over. Protestants Won. So why are we still here?”
The Washington Post (27 October 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/the
‑reformation‑is‑over‑protestants‑won‑so‑why‑are‑we‑still‑here/2017/10/26/71a2ad02
‑b831‑11e7‑be94‑fabb0f1e9ffb_story.html.
Journal of Reformed Theology 12 (2018) 3–21
16
goroncy
misjudgment—first, because he had no problem with saying the third article of any ecumenical creed. He refused, in other words, to not hope for and
work toward the genuine and international unity of the one, holy, catholic, and
apostolic church.56 And second, because in his terms, “The church is church
only when it is there for others.” “The church,” therefore, “must participate in
the worldly tasks of life in the community—not dominating but helping and
serving.”57 This refrain found echo in the World Council of Churches’ report
published in 1967 as The Church for Others and the Church for the World. The
report grappled with the perception of a growing secularization in the West,
pleading that the church not discern in its “change of social function” a “loss
or emigration from society” lest it understand mission to be “a counter-attack
to restore” Christendom.58 It argued also that we might be wisest to consider
the possibility that secularization might in fact be “a fruit of the gospel,”59 and a
much welcomed invitation to seek traces of Christ’s transforming work “outside
the walls of the Church” and among those “who may have little or no connexion
with the churches as they are today.”60
Gregory’s lament that the collapse of “major features of the Western world
today” owe their origin to a Protestant rejection of medieval Christianity61
masks an unwillingness to consider that, however unintended they may have
been, the liberalizing consequences of the reformers’ congeniality with what
we today might call ‘secularity’ was a deliberate theological move. It was a move
birthed not only from the confession noted earlier that all creation is God’s, but
also from the instinct that the hegemony of the ecclesia meets its counter story
in the truly catholic authority of the free and freeing Word who “came to what
was his own, and his own people did not accept him.”62
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
On Bonhoeffer’s ecumenical work, see Keith Clements, Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s Ecumenical
Quest (Geneva: World Council of Churches, 2015).
Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers, 503. See also Michael Weinrich, “The Openness and Worldliness of the Church,” in Reformed and Ecumenical: On Being Reformed in Ecumenical
Encounters, ed. Christine Lienemann-Perrin, Hendrik M. Vroom, and Michael Weinrich,
Currents of Encounter (Amsterdam/Atlanta: Rodopi, 2000), 1–23.
World Council of Churches Department on Studies in Evangelism, The Church for Others
and The Church for the World: A Quest for Structures for Missionary Congregations (Geneva:
World Council of Churches, 1967), 10.
World Council of Churches Department on Studies in Evangelism, The Church for Others,
10–11.
World Council of Churches Department on Studies in Evangelism, The Church for Others,
11; see also 12–15.
Gregory, The Unintended Reformation, 24.
John 1:13.
Journal of Reformed Theology 12 (2018) 3–21
reformation and secularity
17
4
Faithful Secularity and the Humanizing of the Public Commons
The one thing that is certain in our current cultural and political climate is that
things are “deeply uncertain and fluid.” “There is,” as Rowan Williams has noted,
“widespread impatience with transnational institutions, from the EU to the UN,
yet equally widespread anxiety about the dominance of a single power. We are
increasingly aware of the issues that cannot be solved by single sovereign states
on their own—ecological crisis, terrorism, migrancy—yet are uncomfortable
with any notion of global jurisdictions.”63 In addition, there is the profound
“discontent of the disenfranchised and insecure.”64 The global north is increasingly conscious of facing a highly critical, if internally diverse, Islamic world
and is struggling to know how best to respond to its presence both within and
outside its borders. “Enlightenment liberalism, the self-evident creed of reasonable people, now appears as simply one cultural and historical phenomenon
among others. Its supposed right to set the agenda for the rest of the world is
no longer beyond question.”65 Things once seemingly reliable now feel fragile
and endangered.
At the same time, how we appraise and navigate secularity itself is also
undergoing significant revision. A growing number of historians, sociologists,
political theorists, cultural anthropologists, and theologians are debunking the
so-called secularization thesis and are proposing alternative accounts of secularity in which “religious and nonreligious commitments and practices interact
over time.”66 Among these is the theological ethicist Luke Bretherton. Rather
than Gregory’s nostalgic lament for a return to the ecclesiocentricity of preReformation Christendom, Bretherton offers another vision, a more ‘Protestant’ vision, if you like. Drawing upon insights from Aristotle, Hannah Arendt,
Saul Alinsky, and others, and from his own experience with grassroots democracy in the work of Citizens UK, Bretherton’s is a vision of democratic politics
and of vibrant civil society expressed in what he calls “broad-based community organizing.” He promotes a vision in which those who carry myriad obligations, commitments, identities, and practices—those representing varying
economic, political, kinship, intellectual, and religious concerns67—learn to
63
64
65
66
67
Rowan Williams, Faith in the Public Square (London: Bloomsbury, 2012), 75.
Rowan Williams, “Mass democracy has failed—it’s time to seek a humane alternative,”
The New Statesman, accessed 20 November, 2016, http://www.newstatesman.com/world/
2016/11/mass‑democracy‑has‑failed‑its‑time‑seek‑humane‑alternative.
Williams, Faith in the Public Square, 75.
Luke Bretherton, Resurrecting Democracy: Faith, Citizenship, and the Politics of a Common
Life (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 7.
See Bretherton, Resurrecting Democracy, 205–206.
Journal of Reformed Theology 12 (2018) 3–21
18
goroncy
coordinate, converge, communicate, debate, clarify, negotiate, and seek to forge
a common life,68 a life that will inevitably call into question the kind of arrangements orchestrated to leave economic, political, and religious elites immune
from accountability and from responsible participation in a common social,
economic, legal, and political space. Bretherton recognizes that “whereas the
medieval city offered one set of political opportunities and challenges, the
modern and now world city offers an assemblage of material and social conditions for a different set.”69 Rather than shy away from or rail against this reality,
however, Bretherton leans into its opportunities. He writes:
What community organizing represents is a means of reconstituting,
from the ground up, a sensus communis, which can then form the basis
of a practical rationality on which shared judgments can be made. It does
this through assembling a “middle ground” out of the existing traditions,
customs, and habits that have poured into the city. The practices of community organizing create the conditions through which a shared world of
meaning and action can emerge—albeit one often based on partial misunderstandings and misconceptions.70
Bretherton’s is a call to the virtuous pursuit of a shared polis formed “through
particular kinds of democratic practices rather than a single tradition, neutral
procedure, or agonistic relation.”71 It is life that presupposes a space wherein
active citizenship is organized and exercised through voluntary associations
around common interests, goals, and commitments to life’s flourishing. Such a
commitment need not, of course, be grounded in any consensus about what
constitutes ultimate truth, or even agreement that such an oddity may exist. It
requires only that citizens be dedicated to meet in such a space, and a just state
that will normalize liberal democracy’s chaotically pluralist character.72 Here,
Bretherton seems to have in mind something like Nicholas Wolterstorff’s talk
68
69
70
71
72
Bretherton, Resurrecting Democracy, 8. See also John W. de Gruchy, Christianity and Democracy: A Theology for a Just World Order, Cambridge Studies in Ideology and Religion
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 7.
Bretherton, Resurrecting Democracy, 189.
Bretherton, Resurrecting Democracy, 190.
Bretherton, Resurrecting Democracy, 192.
On which, see Luke Bretherton, Christianity and Contemporary Politics: The Conditions and
Possibilities of Faithful Witness (Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 32; Bretherton, Resurrecting Democracy, 190; Williams, Faith in the Public Square, 80; Williams, “Mass democracy
has failed;” Taylor, A Secular Age, 532.
Journal of Reformed Theology 12 (2018) 3–21
reformation and secularity
19
of “integrated existence”73—the integration that makes the public square to be
truly the square of the public.
The plea for better knowledge of and investment in local civic activism
echoes that of a growing number of voices concerned to counter the bastardization of democracy as what the Italian social scientist Vilfredo Pareto refers to
as “the circulation of elites,” those who have detached themselves from, and
become disdainfully imperious toward, those they rule. In the US, for example, Richard Falk has for over two decades now championed the idea of what
he calls “globalization from below.” This deeply Protestant-like vision rejects
the homogeneity and unity that globalization from above seeks, for a vision
instead that “tends towards heterogeneity and diversity, even tension and contradiction.”74 Much of this tension and contradiction is, as the Belgian sociologist Geoffrey Pleyers has suggested, the fruit of the fact that broad-based
community organizing is characterized by both “elite cosmopolitan activists”
who “share a top-down conception of social change” and grassroots activists
who reject such approaches as too approximating of the very social machinery
they are determined to overthrow.75 And yet, as has been the case with many
ecclesial reform movements, “the core of the alter-globalisation movement and
of its innovative potential lies in these conflictive but productive debates and
interactions between activists that defend distinct conceptions of the movement process and of the strategies that lead to social transformation.”76 One
recalls here a most attractive and serviceable feature of the Protestant Reformations; namely, that despite the rapid internationalization of the movement,
and however disparate in form, its productive energy, like its confessions of
faith, was always expressed locally,77 with voices both from above and from
below.
73
74
75
76
77
Nicholas Wolterstorff, “The Role of Religion in Decision and Discussion of Political Issues,”
in Religion in the Public Square: The Place of Religious Convictions in Political Debate, ed.
Robert Audi and Nicholas Wolterstorff (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1997),
116. Bretherton’s position is closer to that of Wolterstorff than it is to, say, that of John
Rawls’s “overlapping consensus.” John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, rev. ed. (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1999), 340.
Richard Falk, “Resisting ‘globalisation-from-above’ through ‘globalisation-from-below,’”
New Political Economy 2, no. 1 (1997): 24.
Geoffrey Pleyers, “The World Social Forum, a Globalisation from Below?” Societies Without
Borders 3 (2008), 79. See also Geoffrey Pleyers, Alter-Globalization: Becoming Actors in the
Global Age (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010).
Pleyers, “The World Social Forum,” 87.
See Jason A. Goroncy, “Semper Reformanda as a Confession of Crisis,” in Always Being
Journal of Reformed Theology 12 (2018) 3–21
20
goroncy
Lest the liberal state lose its essential liberalism, it must be marked too by a
continuing dialogue with religious communities, and those with each other.78
Viable civil societies in religiously plural contexts presuppose viable interreligious and extra-religious relations, with high priority given to efforts at the
local level where the freedom to engage in “convivial and cooperative relations,”
however difficult and unstable, and to do so in ways that avoid “religious vandalism,”79 yields—dare I say it?—signs of the Spirit’s work on the earth.
Traversing Boundaries
The realities with which I have been concerned in this essay offer both challenges to and opportunities for theologians. We are increasingly working within
a reenchanted world whose imagination is being fed from a smorgasbord larger
than any single religious or cultural tradition can offer. Such a world moves
theology from nearer the center of things (where Gregory and many others
would like it to be) toward the discursive borderlands where interdisciplinary
conversations and collaborations become normative. If theological faculties
have frequently forgotten this habit, let me offer assurance that mine is not
a call to novelty (Aquinas, for example, worked in such a way) but to renewed
commitment to boundary-traversing discourse undertaken under new conditions of enchanted metaphysics. It is a call also to receive with gratitude what
Marilynne Robinson names simply “the givenness of things.”80 The future of
theology means making our way across boundaries, like a small cloud rising
over the sea’s horizon, bearing hobbit-like witness to promised rains for a famished land.81
When assumptions are challenged, when faith is stirred, when things once
familiar become the new unknown, when we find ourselves travelling “too near
the mountains” in unguarded territory seldom traversed by ecclesial wayfarers,
78
79
80
81
Reformed: Challenges and Prospects for the Future of Reformed Theology, ed. David H.
Jensen (Eugene: Pickwick Publications, 2016), 43–73.
See Jonathan Sacks, The Dignity of Difference: How to Avoid the Clash of Civilizations, rev.
ed. (London: Continuum, 2003).
Luke Bretherton, “Religious Vandalism or Interfaith Hospitality? Reflections on the NonProclamation of the ‘Adhan’ from Duke Chapel,” ABC Religion and Ethics, accessed 17 January 2015, http://www.abc.net.au/religion/articles/2015/01/17/4163809.htm.
Marilynne Robinson, The Givenness of Things: Essays (London: Virago Press, 2015).
Graham Ward, Theology and Contemporary Critical Theory, ed. David Jasper, 2nd ed., Studies in Literature and Religion (Houndmills: Macmillan, 2000), 171.
Journal of Reformed Theology 12 (2018) 3–21
reformation and secularity
21
and when all we have in our kit are “old maps” which are of “no use” in this
new terrain, it may be that at that point we have just begun, like Abraham and
Sarah and J.R.R. Tolkien’s Frodo Baggins, on a quest that will leave us, and the
future, different. My reference here to Mr Baggins is wholly intentional: colourful, noisy, and undersized hobbits enter the quest, as Tolkien reminds us, not
to preserve “this or that polity, such as the half republic half aristocracy of the
Shire,” but rather to engage in “liberation from … evil tyranny.”82 Such words
serve as a reminder of the Christian calling too, that this wandering people of
God are called not to preserve that familiar life that they had known in the Shire
but rather to imagine a future in which all of life’s enemies have been overcome,
and to direct all their embodied efforts toward such an end. Along the way, they
not only lose their reputation, but they also carry many unanswered questions,
all the while knowing that there can be no going back. (Nor, as Frodo was to
discover, can there be anything to be gained by going sideways.) But it is precisely in both the refusal to abandon questions and the determination to move
forward nonetheless that Frodo and his strange company of friends discover
that prudence is not about worldly cleverness but is rather about uncomplicated minds and wills conformed to a life of virtue, of boundless mercy, and
of unbending devotion to the destruction of that which would undo their very
being. In Protestant parlance, it is a simply that life which is lived under and by
and toward the Word alone.
82
J.R.R. Tolkien, “Notes on W.H. Auden’s review of The Return of the King,” in The Letters of
J.R.R. Tolkien, ed. Humphrey Carpenter (London: HarperCollins, 1999), 241.
Journal of Reformed Theology 12 (2018) 3–21