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South American Journal of Logic
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23 pages
1 file
Dialetheism is the view according to which some contradictions are true. The main motivation for such a view comes from the well-known Liar paradox. The dialetheist simply takes the Liar argument as legitimate; by embracing a true contradiction as acceptable, the problem is thought to be solved. We shall argue that there are difficulties in explaining what dialetheism really amounts to. The first main obstacle comes from the fact that there are distinct versions of the Liar. According to the dialetheist, they do not mean the same thing, and as we shall argue, there is no unified dialetheist treatment for them. The second main problem comes from the very idea of true contradictions and truth value gluts. There are two distinct possible understanding for those concepts, and they do point to conflicting understandings of dialetheism. It is not even clear how to conciliate the dialetheists' guiding intuitions with those problems, so that after all, it seems that dialetheism may end up being incoherent.
Logical studies, 2020
Dialetheism is the view that some (and not all) contradictions are true. Since in classical logic the principle of impossibility of contradiction (the Law of Non-Contradiction, i.e., LNC) is widely accepted, the challenge between dialetheism and classical logic surely occurs. In this paper we have tried to explain the main problem of dialetheim and also examined Graham Priest’s arguments against LNC and his advocating to paraconsistent logic. Accordingly, Priest’s examples of dialetheic propositions in some systems such as Law, Natual and Formal Languages and Actual world are examined and criticized. The result is that if Priest’s argument be sound dialetheism may be acceptable. Dialetheism is the view that some (and not all) contradictions are true. Since in classical logic the principle of impossibility of contradiction (the Law of Non-Contradiction, i.e., LNC) is widely accepted, the challenge between dialetheism and classical logic surely occurs. In this paper we have tried to explain the main problem of dialetheim and also examined Graham Priest’s arguments against LNC and his advocating to paraconsistent logic. Accordingly, Priest’s examples of dialetheic propositions in some systems such as Law, Natual and Formal Languages and Actual world are examined and criticized. The result is that if Priest’s argument be sound dialetheism may be acceptable.
Dialetheism isn't a formal logic. Thus, it that respect, this piece may well be barking up the wrong tree most of the time. Dialetheism, instead, “is a thesis about truth”. It's this emphasis which leads dialetheists to construct a logic which deals with truth. (Or, at the least, with truth as it's thrown up primarily by various paradoxes in set theory and elsewhere.) Indeed Graham Priest himself said that "the whole point of the dialetheic solution to the semantic paradoxes is to get rid of the distinction between object language and meta-language". (Clearly, this is a Tarskian focus on the nature of truth.) Nonetheless, in what follows I question what amounts to the truth-for-dialetheism problem by asking questions about dialetheism's relation to the world (or Priest's “reality”). There's also a problem with the Liar Paradox as it's expressed by some dialetheists. Such formulations of the Liar Paradox are used to justify dialetheism; or, at the least, to justify a dialetheic logic.
In recent editions of this journal, Jean-Yves Beziau [8] and Marcin Tkaczyk [42] have criticised a prominent dialetheic logic and common arguments for dialetheism, respectively. While Beziau argues that Priest's logic LP commits the dialetheist to trivialism, the thesis that all propositions are true, Tkaczyk maintains that the arguments traditionally proposed for dialetheism are faulty and ultimately that dialetheism should be rejected as self-refuting. This paper shows that both are mistaken in their contentions. Beziau's argument conflates truth-in-an-interpretation with truth simpliciter and Tkaczyk misconstrues the substance of dialetheic arguments. In the process of identifying these weaknesses of both arguments , the paper clarifies elements of both dialetheic logics and dialethe-ism which these discussions demonstrate are still misunderstood within the literature.
Northern European Journal of Philosophy , 2018
During the past few decades, Graham Priest has advocated for Dialetheism, the controversial position that some contradictions are true. Dialetheism entails that the Law of Non-Contradiction fails. In recent decades the philosophical community has begun to recognize the significant challenge posed by Priest's arguments. Priest has primarily appealed to paradoxes of self-reference, such as the Liar Paradox, to support his position. Following Priest's approach, I offer another argument for Dialetheism, which appeals to a self-referential paradox that has been more or less ignored in the philosophical literature on the subject: the paradox of the missing difference. When we reflect on the question 'what is a concept?' from the perspective of a classical model of conceptual analysis, we arrive at the paradox of the missing difference. Although contradictions may be improbable, when we reflect on the question 'how is the domain of concepts possible?' we are led to a startling principle: without dialetheia any theory concerning concept formation (from a classical perspective on concepts) would be impossible. Dialetheism is a necessary condition for the existence of a domain of concepts in general. As a result, Dialetheism may even be more central to philosophical reflection than even dialetheists themselves have recognized.
Dialetheism, 2018
A dialetheia is a sentence, A, such that both it and its negation, ¬A, are true (we shall talk of sentences throughout this entry; but one could run the definition in terms of propositions, statements, or whatever one takes as her favourite truth-bearer: this would make little difference in the context). Assuming the fairly uncontroversial view that falsity just is the truth of negation, it can equally be claimed that a dialetheia is a sentence which is both true and false...
We cast doubts on the suggestion, recently made by Graham Priest, that glut theorists may express disagreement with the assertion of A by denying A. We show that, if denial is to serve as a means to express disagreement, it must be exclusive, in the sense of being correct only if what is denied is false only. Hence, it can't be expressed in the glut theorist's language, essentially for the same reasons why Boolean negation can't be expressed in such a language either. We then turn to an alternative proposal, recently defended by Jc Beall (2013, 2014), for expressing truth and falsity only, and hence disagreement. According to this, the exclusive semantic status of A, that A is either true or false only, can be conveyed by adding to one's theory a shrieking rule of the form A & ~A |- ♯, where ♯ entails triviality. We argue, however, that the proposal doesn't work either. The upshot is that glut theorists face a dilemma: they can either express denial, or disagreement, but not both. Along the way, we offer a bilateral logic of exclusive denial for glut theorists---an extension of the logic commonly called LP.
Special issue on Logic: Consistency, Contradiction, and Consequence. Principia 22(1), pp. 59 - 85. , 2018
Liar-like paradoxes are typically arguments that, by using very intuitive resources of natural language, end up in contradiction. Consistent solutions to those paradoxes usually have difficulties either because they restrict the expressive power of the language, or else because they fall prey to extended versions of the paradox. Dialetheists, like Graham Priest, propose that we should take the Liar at face value and accept the contradictory conclusion as true. A logical treatment of such contradictions is also put forward, with the Logic of Paradox (LP), which should account for the manifestations of the Liar. In this paper we shall argue that such a formal approach, as advanced by Priest, is unsatisfactory. In order to make contradictions acceptable, Priest has to distinguish between two kinds of contradictions, internal and external, corresponding, respectively, to the conclusions of the simple and of the extended Liar. Given that, we argue that while the natural interpretation of LP was intended to account for true and false sentences, dealing with internal contradictions, it lacks the resources to tame external contradictions. Also, the negation sign of LP is unable to represent internal contradictions adequately, precisely because of its allowance of sentences that may be true and false. As a result, the formal account suffers from severe limitations, which make it unable to represent the contradiction obtained in the conclusion of each of the paradoxes. _____________________________________________________________________________ A final version of this paper is published in a special issue ("Logic: Consistency, Contradiction, and Consequence") of Principia 22(1), pp. 59 - 85, 2018. https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2018v22n1p59
Studia philosophica Estonica, 2008
In the rst part the paper rehearses the main arguments why to be a dialetheist (i.e. why to assume that some contradictions are true). Dialetheism, however, has been criticised as irrational or self-refutating. erefore the second part of the paper outlines one way to make dialetheism rational assertable. True contradictions turn out to be both believable and assertable. e argument proceeds by setting out basic principles of assertion and denial, and employing bivalent truth value operators.
Logica Yearbook 2010, 2010
TOPOI, 2019
According to Fogelin’s account of deep disagreements, disputes caused by a clash in framework propositions are necessarily rationally irresolvable. Fogelin’s thesis is a claim about real-life, and not purely hypothetical, arguments: there are such disagreements, and they are incapable of rational resolution. Surprisingly then, few attempts have been made to find such disputes in order to test Fogelin’s thesis. This paper aims to rectify that failure. Firstly, it clarifies Fogelin’s concept of deep disagreement and shows there are several different breeds of such disagreements. Thus, to fully assess Fogelin’s thesis, it will be necessary to seek out cases of each breed to evaluate their rational irresolvability. Secondly, it begins this task by looking at a significant debate within the logical literature over the truth of contradictions. We demonstrate that, while the debate exemplifies a breed of deep disagreement, the parties involved can supply one another with rationally compelling reasons.
Nicholas C. Barberis
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