Science, hegemony and action-Governmentality and Populism.docx

Werner Bonefeld

Science, hegemony and action-Governmentality and Populism.docx

Werner Bonefeld

2019, Contemporary Left-Wing Activism, vol. 2

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Final version published in Contemporary Left-Wing Activism, vol 2, edited by Joseph Ibrahim and John Michael Roberts, Routledge, 2019, pp. 174-190.

<BOOK-PART><LRH>Werner Bonefeld</LRH> <RRH>Science, hegemony and action</RRH> <BOOK-PART-META><LBL>10</LBL> <TITLE>Science, hegemony and action</TITLE> <SUBTITLE>On the elements of governmentality</SUBTITLE></BOOK-PART-META> <OPENER><CONTRIBS><AU><GNM>Werner</GNM> <SNM>Bonefeld</SNM></AU></CONTRIBS></OPENER> <BODY><HEAD1><TITLE>Introduction</TITLE></HEAD1> There is only one reality. The world as it exists is not true. It is false. It is false because the satisfaction of human needs is not at all what capitalism is about. What counts is the profitable accumulation of some abstract form of wealth, of money that yields more money. Failure to make a profit entails great danger. To the vanishing point of death, the life of the class tied to work hangs by the success of turning her labour into profit as the fundamental condition of achieving and sustaining wage-based employment. The alternatives are bleak. The struggle to sustain access to the means of subsistence and maintain labour conditions is relentless. Yesterday’s profitable appropriation of some other person’s labour buys another Man today, the buyer for the sake of making a profit, on the pain of ruin; the seller in order to live. What can the seller of redundant labour power trade in its stead – body and body substances: how many for pornography, how many for prostitution, how many for drug mules, how many for kidney sales? The critical theory tradition of Marxist critique holds that the macro-economic calculation of the unemployed as economic zeros is not untrue. It makes clear that the life of the sellers of labour power really ‘hangs by’ the profitability extraction of surplus value (Adorno 1990: 320). Labouring for the sake of a surplus in value is innate to the concept of the worker. She belongs to a system of wealth in which her labour has utility as a means of profit. Sensuous activity not only vanishes in the supersensible world of economic things, of cash, price, and profit. It also appears in it – as struggle for access to the means of subsistence. The ‘movement of society’ is not only ‘antagonistic from the outset’ (p. 304). It also ‘maintains itself only through antagonism’ (p. 311). That is, class struggle is the objective necessity of the false society. It belongs to its concept. Class struggle, and class consciousness too, is a constitutive element of the governmentality of the false society. The critique of political economy as a critical social theory emerged in opposition to the traditional Marxist insistence about the proletariat as an ontologically privileged class of historical transformation (Lukacs 1971). According to Lukacs, the proletariat is both beset by false consciousness – it struggles to secure its economic interests – and free from it. He says that the proletariats’ humanity and soul have not been crippled by the society in which they, as dispossessed producers of surplus value, struggle to make ends meet. For Lukacs, the (Leninist) party is the organizational form of the soul of the worker. It represents its true consciousness based on scientific insight. For a critique of Lukacs along these lines, see Grollios (2014; Adorno 1980). In contemporary analysis, the traditional certainty about unfolding processes of socialist transformation has given way to arguments about capitalism as manifesting either a capitalist hegemony, which is referred to as neoliberal capitalism, or a working-class hegemony, which is referred to as either planned economy, welfare capitalism, or simply anti-austerity (see Panitch et al. 2011; Callinicos 2012; Blyth 2013). In this argument, the interests served by capitalist society are determined by the balance of social forces that govern through the state. In contrast to the critical tradition, which argues that capitalism establishes a definite mode of social labour and that the ‘abolition of hunger’ requires therefore a ‘change in the relations of production’ (Adorno 1976a: 62), the traditional approach argues for counter-hegemonic struggles to secure the interests of workers in capitalist development. In Habermasian critical theory the struggle for counter-hegemony is to achieve the promises of reason through communicate action – parliamentary speeches and public speech acts. See also Honneth (2010: 10) for an argument that bourgeois society contains within itself the ‘promise of freedom’ from want. In the order of presentation, the traditional Marxist account comes first. It is followed by an argument about hegemony. The first section focusses on the Althusserian account. It is the theoretical foundation of the contemporary ideas about counter-hegemonic struggle. The conclusion summarises the argument with reference to governmentality as a critical concept. <HEAD1><TITLE>Practical humanism and activism: Althusserian notions and beyond</TITLE></HEAD1> Louis Althusser famously declared that Marx’s critique of political economy is a work of theoretical anti-humanism and proclaimed for a politics of practical humanism to set things right (Althusser 1996: Chap. 7). In his Introduction to the French edition of Capital, he made two important observations that focus his anti-humanist stance succinctly (Althusser 1971). First, he argued that the philosophical idea of alienation of the Marx of the Paris Manuscripts of 1844 does not have anything to do with the ‘economic’ Marx as the founder of scientific socialism. He therefore rejected the ‘theory of reification’ as a projection of the theory of alienation of the early Marx onto the ‘analysis of commodity fetishism’ ostensibly at the expense of the scientific character of Marx’s account (Althusser 1996: 230). Second, he argued that Capital develops the conceptual system of scientific Marxism, not as a critique of capitalism as an existing reality, but as a means of comprehending history in its entirety (Althusser 1971: 71–2). According to Althusser, Marx’s study of capitalism led him to the discovery of the general economic laws of historical development that manifest themselves in the structure of the capitalist economic relations. Marx’s Capital is thus seen to present the general economic laws of the forces of production in the historically specific modality of the capitalist social relations. See also Alfred Schmidt (1969). For Schmidt, too, the Marx of 1844 does not illuminate the Marx of Capital. However, the Marx of Capital illuminates the Marx of 1844. Althusser’s valid critique of the ‘abstract humanism’ of the early Marx does not imply that the Marx of the critique of political economy is anti-humanistic. Rather, the ‘economic’ Marx is the humanist Marx because his critique of capitalist society seeks to decipher the actual relations of life in their inverted form of a relationship between economic things. The critique of political economy does not reveal transhistorical economic laws of nature nor does it argue on the basis of some abstract human essence that in capitalism exists in alienated form. The humanism of the late Marx lies in the conception of capitalism as comprising a definite form of social relations. On this point, see also Bonefeld (2014) and Schmidt (1983). In distinction to the critical tradition, which recognises capitalist society as a historically specific mode of a social reproduction, Althusser identifies society as a social relationship founded on natural laws of economic necessity. He thus conceives of science as a discourse without a subject and sees the late Marx as a scientist who analyses the manner in which the transhistorical forces of economic nature make themselves manifest in capitalist economy (Althusser 1971: 160). He thus argued that one can recognise Man only on the condition that the ‘philosophical myth of Man is reduced to ashes’ (Althusser 1996: 229). Nicos Poulantzas reinforced this view when he conceived of scientific Marxism as a radical break from the ‘historical problematic of the subject’ (Poulantzas 1969: 65). Clearly, the presumption that transhistorically active forces of production manifest themselves in historically concrete social relations calls for analysis of the socially specific modality of transhistorical matter. In this view, the human subject really is a mere metaphysical distraction to the scientific discovery of the general economic laws in the historically overdetermined structures of capitalist society. In Adorno’s judgement, dialectical materialism is a ‘perverter of Marxian motives’. He criticises it as a ‘metaphysics’. It denies, he says, the ‘spontaneity of the subject, a movens of the objective dialectics of the forces and relations of production’ (Adorno 1990: 355, 205). The most fundamental economic law is the inescapable necessity of labour. Labour as a force of trans-historical necessity is defined by its metabolism with nature. Capitalism is therefore viewed as a historically specific modality of this necessity of labour and criticised as an anarchic, haphazard and entirely disorganised manifestation of transhistorical necessity. In this tradition, there can thus neither be a critique of production nor a critique of labour. Instead, it offers a ‘theory of production’ defined by technical relations combining factors in material production, and it offers a theory of labour defined by its enduring quality as the labour of social reproduction in general and by its specifically capitalist modality. For a succinct critique, see Postone (1993). In the traditional Marxist view, the critique of the capitalist modality of labour entails the demand for its socialist substantiation through economic planning by central political authority. ‘Freedom’, as Engels (1983: 106) put it, ‘is recognition of necessity’. In the Althusserian account the capitalist modality of labour is characterised by the law of private property. Private individuals possess a legal title to factors of production. In the words of Étienne Balibar (1970: 233), ‘the economic relations of production appear … as a relation between three functionally defined terms: owner class/means of production/class of exploited producers’. As argued previously, the transhistorical forces of production are seen to manifest themselves in the form of historically specific social relations, which, as Clarke (1980: 60) points out critically, are ‘mapped on to production by the legal connection of ownership of means of production’. As an account of political economy, it defines the class character of society on the basis of the legal title to the factors of production, from which the classes derive their revenues – rent for the owners of land, profit for the owners of the means of production, and wages for the seller of labour power. As Clarke (1980, 1992) and Schmidt (1983) have shown, the tradition of Althusserian Marxism derives from classical political economy. Capitalism is seen as a fundamentally private organisation of labour based on the legal title of the owners of the means of production to the product of labour. At the same time, this private character of labour organisation is fundamentally social in character since everybody is in fact working for each other. The connection between the private organisation of labour and its social character is established by the market, which brings the many private labours into contact with each other on the basis of price competitiveness, establishing points of sale and purchase that involve interaction between multiple social forces, which are co-existing and interpenetrating in a tangled and confused manner, and which are thus anarchic, uncontrolled, unplanned and crisis-ridden. This is how Bob Jessop sees it in his neo-Poulantzarian account of state power (Jessop 2008: 178). Whereas social laws can be changed, the laws of nature cannot. The question of socialism thus becomes a question of the rational organisation of the natural necessity of labour, from the capitalist anarchy of the ‘uncontrolled, unplanned, and crisis-ridden’ market relations to its socialist rationalisation. The socialist task is to revolutionise the rule of private property, which accords legal entitlements to the product of labour to identifiable individuals, transforming the social modality of the natural necessity of labour from the private ownership of the means of labour into public ownership, securing collective goals and achieving the satisfaction of needs by means of central planning by public authority. In contemporary socialist argument, the struggle for hegemony is about the restructuring of the economy ‘in the interest of labour’, for the sake of ‘employment’, and in the interest of ‘better conditions’ for workers, including the ‘distribution’ of wealth, the achievement of ‘economic growth, and employment in the longer term’. The struggle for counter-hegemony is to overcome ‘wage restrain’, gain ‘control of the financial system’, ‘rebalance core economies’, ‘nationalise banks’, ‘recapture [national] command over monetary policy’, ‘facilitate workers participation in confronting the problem of debt’, ‘impose capital controls’, ‘regain [national] control over monetary policy’, pursue an ‘industrial policy’ to ‘restore productive capacity’, etc. (Lapavitsas, 2011: 295–296). Saad Filho (2010: 255) summarises central planks of this argument well when he identifies socialism as a system that, instead of capitalist investment into money for the sake of more money, invests in the working class. That is, the ‘abolition of capitalism’ (Saad Filho 2010) entails its replacement by a system of a centrally planned labour economy (Panitch, Albo and Chibber 2011; Panitch and Gintin 2015). For critique, see Bonefeld (2012a). See also Rogers (2014). Althusser’s view that Capital is not a critique of capitalism as a living process but rather a scientific study of the capitalist anatomy of general economic laws is therefore apt – as a succinct characterisation of the traditional view that the capitalist social forms have a basis in nature and express thus a natural quality (see Althusser 1971: 71–2). The idea that society is in the last instance determined by historically active general economic laws is in its entirety tied to existing conditions. This point is most strongly made by Horkheimer (1992: 246). Instead of the critical notion that ‘concepts are moments of the reality that requires their formation’ (Adorno 1990: 11), the Althusserian notion of the natural necessity of labour holds that concepts are generally applicable scientific instruments, which are capable to dissect and analyse every society at all times and places as distinct manifestations of abstract economic laws. Historical materialism conceived dogmatically as a science of some general economy laws reflects existing society under the spell of identification, which includes the idea that the specific manifestation of the economic laws depends on the power of the social forces that act upon them. This view suggests a radical separation between thought and reality. Callinicos (2005) offers a cogent articulation of this separation. He advocates that the Marxist method of analysis amounts to a sophisticated version of the science of knowledge, which hypothesises society as an ‘as if’ of theoretical construction. For a critique, see Arthur (1986: chap. 10) and Bonefeld (2012b). Theoretical knowledge appears as an hypothetical figure of speech, an ‘as if’, which is corroborated by empirical analysis that falsifies or verifies the proposed theory of society. This appearance is, however, deceitful in that the real world is mirrored in its theoretical hypothesis. That is, the science of knowledge posits the idea that the real world is, say, regulated by a competitive market structure and then applies this idea to capitalist markets, with conclusive effect, though questions remain as to whether the freedom of competition has in reality not trans-morphed into a freedom of monopolies. The supposition of thought as an independent instrument of knowledge about natural economic necessities releases society from critical scrutiny. Rather than asking about the conceptuality of capitalist wealth, it not only reads capitalist social nature back into history but, also, conceives of the social laws of capitalist economy as historically overdetermined modalities of natural economic forces. The social nature of the capitalist relations is thus naturalised. On the conceptuality of capitalist wealth as critique of definite social relations, see Holloway (2015). On the distinction between natural nature and social nature, see Schmidt (1971). That is, the Althusserian school understands the economic laws of capitalist society as historically overdetermined derivatives of natural laws, and then analyses the manner of their mediation in the social world of inter-subjective actions, comprising class-relevant and other social interests, and finally it examines what it calls the hegemonic strategies of the competing social interests to ascertain emergent political opportunity structures for the conduct of hegemonic strategies that act through the state to achieve their specific objectives. This further development of the idea of hegemony belongs to Bob Jessop (1985). The scientistic supposition of society does not comprehend society. It merely describes it abstractly as an hypothesised unit of analysis; depending on the balance of the social forces that act through the state it can be either this economy of labour or that economy of labour. The scientific statement that capitalism is, in the last instance, determined by the general economic laws of development, is as hypothetical in its view of society as the statement that their specific modality is contingent upon the power of the social forces that act through the state. Marx’s critique of Proudhon focussed on this simple point. Proudhon substituted the critique of capitalism for a critique of the capitalist, seeking to free capital from the capitalist so as to utilise the power of capital for the benefit of a just and fair society, investing in society. In its practical dimension, scientific socialism is on the lookout for opportunity structures for the establishment of a socialist hegemony. It views miserable conditions as contingent upon the hegemony of the capitalist interests and battles for the establishment of a counter-hegemony, tilting the balance of class forces in favour of the perceived interests of labour. The critique of the existent society as a manifestation of capitalist hegemony leaves the category of capital not only entirely untouched, it also elevates ‘capital’ as a thing beyond critique. Indeed, capital appears to be no more than an economic mechanism that can be made to work for this social interest or that social interest – in the end, it is the balance of the class forces that decides for which social interests capital functions! Rather than touching the category of capital by thought, it identifies social misery as a contingent outcome of an unfavourable balance of class forces and calls for sustained social struggle to shift the balance in favour of the class tied to work, securing the class interests of workers in labour economy. Social misery is thus understood as an entirely avoidable occurrence. Misery and dispossession do not therefore belong to the conceptuality of capitalist wealth. They are the social consequence of hard-nosed class politics, and can thus be overcome by a determined effort of counter-hegemonic struggle(s). Scientific Marxism does not think out of society. Instead, it thinks about society with an analytical grasp that, akin to a photographic representation of reality, identifies the capitalist social relations with their appearance. Its grasp of society is thus entirely faithful to the observable empirical facts that posit society in its immediate being, which ‘is pure appearance … of a process running behind its back’ (Marx 1981: 64). As a science of economic processes without subject, it dissolves Man as the subject of her own social world into the ‘substance’ of her economic inversion. ‘The illusions of such a consciousness turn into dogmatic immediacies’ (Adorno 1990: 205). That is, its critique of bourgeois society naturalises capitalist society as an historically over-determined manifestation of some trans-historical materiality of labour, implicates the capitalists for the defects of the established system of labour, and proclaims to know ‘what needs to be done’ to achieve a progressive labour economy. Whilst Althusser’s theoretical anti-humanism leaves society untouched by thought, his practical humanism proclaims for progressive ends in abstraction from society, rejecting ‘all discrimination, be it racial, political, religious’. It ‘is the rejection of all economic exploitation and political domination. It is the rejection of war’ (Althusser 1996: 237). With Althusser, the humanisation of social relations is the purpose and end of the critique of political economy. However, and in distinction to Althusser, the effort of humanising is confronted by the paradox that it presupposes the existence of inhuman condition. Inhuman conditions are not just an impediment to humanisation but a premise of its concept. Althusser’s practical humanism manifests therefore the illusion of his science of society without a subject. It posits society as an ‘as if’ of civilised social relations, against which it measures the irrational, exploitative, discriminative relations of a bloodied world. Devoid of a conception of the actual relations of life, his practical humanism belongs to a tradition of normative order thinking that does ‘not talk about the devil’. Instead it ‘looks on the bright site’ (Adorno 1978: 114). In our time, the bright site view condemns contemporary capitalism abstractly as neoliberalism and demands the establishment of a non-neoliberal capitalism that is about the achievement of egalitarian socio-economic objectives (see, for example, Brown 2015). In distinction neoliberalism does not corrupt capitalism. It rather articulates it in theological terms (see Bonefeld 2017). See also note 8. As argued by Horkheimer (1985b: 84), the blind spot of dogmatic thought is predicated on the idea that society is a process without a subject. It thereby accommodates its thought to those same ‘objective conditions’ that render the social individuals mere personifications of those same economic categories that its practical humanism denounces as ‘exploitative’, ‘discriminative’, ‘violent’, ‘unfair’ and ‘irrational’. The dogma of the false society is that there is no alternative to it, that is, its falsehood is righteous. The ‘practical humanist’ endeavour to create a just and fair capitalism belongs to the concept of the false society. It proclaims that the false society can be righted by counter-hegemonic action for the benefit of the producers of surplus value, and it is because of this that it too becomes righteous. It denounces capitalist society abstractly and without further ado looks on the bright site, depicting counter-hegemonic normative orders with, at best, moralising fervour or, at worst, political ambitions for the exercise of political power. Activist endeavour to make capitalism work for the workers is entirely conventional in its strategic calculation of the electoral market place and dogmatic in its righteous condemnations of the existing state of affairs. Indeed, the theory of hegemony belongs to the governmentality of capitalist society, which works on the principle that conditions ought to be better and will be better if government were to intervene into labour economy for the sake of practical humanist ends. In the meantime, right-wing populism has come to the fore as an electorally viable nativist critique of so-called neoliberal globalisation. It articulates the idea of a national economy as a perverted alternative to the world market society of capital. Nativism does not admit of knowledge, only of acknowledgment. Since the early 1990s, state-centric critiques of globalisation helped to revive nationalist perspectives as allegedly progressive in character. For critics, see Radice (2000) and Bonefeld (2006). <HEAD1><TITLE>On hegemony The proper title of this section is ‘From Adorno’s negative ontology of capitalist social nature towards the apologetic ontology of capitalism as a dynamic structure of competing hegemonic strategies’. </TITLE></HEAD1> For a hegemonic theory of society the notion of socio-economic necessity is an affront. It smacks of economic determinism, excludes the ideas of contingency and construction, creation and effort, and suggests dogmatic reduction of society to economic effect. Yet, the theory of hegemony is entirely founded on the presumption that the economic structure of society is a natural phenomenon. It does not question the necessity of an economy of labour. It rather argues for a differently configured mode of economic organisation. As a natural phenomenon, economy is identified by its structural properties, the study of which characterises the domain of system theory. Complementing the system theory, a theory of social action accounts for the behaviours and conflicts that characterise the subjective properties of human agency in the life-world. On system and life world in Habermas’ social theory see Reichelt (2000). In traditional Marxism, these Habermasian terms are called structure and struggle. In traditional social theory, society is seen either as a system of (invisible) structural properties or as a world of social action, and the perennial question is therefore whether society as an economic system is dominant or whether society as an action is decisive. However, the idea that society exists twice, once as (economic) nature/structure and then as (acting) subject, reproduces in thought the appearance of society as a split reality of structure and struggle. The so-called dialectics of structure and struggle is not helpful. It explains neither structure nor struggle. In fact, it moves in vicious circles as it hops from structure to struggle, and back again, from struggle to structure; and instead of comprehending what they are, each is presupposed in a tautological movement of thought; neither is explained. On this, see Bonefeld (2012a). The dualism of thought is however more apparent than real. Given the choice between society as economic structure and society as action, social theory unerringly sides with the mischief of society as a naturally structured thing, as system. However, society as a natural system that is independent from the human subjects who comprise society, cannot be comprehended as such; at best its effects can be analysed as instances of social contingency, which establish opportunity structures for the pursuit of distinct hegemonic strategies. On this in relation to structuralist tradition, see Bonefeld (1993). Hegemony is not a critical concept. Its grasp of society is traditional: it views society as a condensation of natural necessity in historically specific social modalities. Hegemonic theory is characterised by the attempt at constructing a connection between society as (economic) system and action. It argues that the modality of the systemic forces is contingent upon a balance of social power between distinct social groups that battle for hegemony to secure their economic interests. The theory of hegemony is a stand-point theory – it looks at and judges society from a specific world-view, be it the view of the ecologist, humanist, labourer or indeed the capitalist. See Heinrich (2012) and Bonefeld (2014) for a critique of stand-point theory. It is usually associated with the progressive left, which made the theory of hegemony its own. Crudely put, it rejects the hegemony of the capitalist interests, demands the hegemony of the Many and identifies the Many with the Party as the organisational form of a political practice for humanist ends. It posits its political demands as universal-human in character, argues for social struggle as the means of shifting the balance of class forces in favour of the supposedly universal interests of the Many, and leaves the category of ‘capital’ entirely untouched by thought. What really does it mean to say that the class tied to work has to become hegemonic in capitalism? Is capital really an economic means that is corrupted by the capitalist interests? In its practical dimension, I hold that the struggle for hegemony amounts to ‘ticket thinking’. It views society as divided into competing social interests and undertakes to build up the capacity of its ‘ticket’ to articulate and present its particular ‘group’ interests as the general interest of society. The ticket requires brand recognition to bolster its claim that it represents the rightful demands of the social majority. Instead of concrete demands that derive from the specific ‘group interests’, the universal appeal of the brand depends on the articulation of powerful idealities that signify the purposefulness and righteousness of its course as incarnation of the general interest. Fundamentally, the group comprises an ideality of social friends and presents a coalition of interests. It requires leadership to achieve cohesion, constant contestation with the declared social foe to establish purposefulness, and construction of a unifying theme of articulation to sustain its voice and make itself heard. The politics of hegemony is as much about mobilisation as it is about demobilisation, representation and leadership. Akin to the idea of a plebiscitarian leadership democracy, it sets out to capture the ‘masses’ by projecting virtuous claims about the moral integrity and universality of their supposed interests, proclaiming that the coming of the ‘democracy’ of counter-hegemonic friends will make things good for them as the true national being. Innate to the politics of hegemony is the identification of an ideality of friends, which as such do not exist. They come together as friends by contesting the projected ideality of some supposed common foe – the capitalist, the banker, the speculator, the imperialist. Critique of economic categories is suspended and frowned upon. What is needed is counter-hegemonic economic regulation to secure the interests of the dispossessed traders in labour power in national economic development. Indeed, the argument that in this society the employment of dispossessed producers of surplus value depends on the sustained profitability of their labour is anathema. It smacks of capitulation to the capitalist economic interests. Elements of the argument about the populism of the new left (in Spain) draw on Seguin (2015). On the populism of the new right, see Müller (2016). Counter-hegemonic thought posits the people as righteous, demands government in the interest of the nation, requires the investment of money into the productive activity of the nation to secure the employment, welfare and prospects of a national labour force within the boundaries of a national economy as the foundation of a system of inter-national relations between independent national states. By putting forth a programme of social transformation without thought about the conceptuality of capitalist wealth, of money that yields more money, ticket thinking ‘looks on the bright side’ and proclaims falseness. Its falsehood is not untrue. It identifies the existing conditions of misery and makes it seem as if they present a mere pathology of capitalist wealth. Its appeal is ideological; ticket thinking projects the idea that misery is an entirely avoidable capitalist situation, which can be overcome by courageous politicians who oppose the interests of the ‘self-interested elites’ and govern for the benefit of the national social majority. For the sake of electoral success, it discounts the critical insight that the dispossessed labourer is the essential precondition of the capitalist social relations (Bonefeld 2011). Instead, it supposes that all would be well if only government were to stand up to the capitalist interests and their imperialist backers. This stance articulates an objective illusion. The illusion says that the profitable accumulation of money that yields more money does not really count; what counts is the satisfaction of human needs. It says that the failure to make a profit entails no threat to social reproduction; what counts is not profit but human beings. It suggests that the life of the class tied to work does not hang by the success of turning her labour into profit as the fundamental condition of achieving wage-based access to the means of life; what counts is goodness. It says that debt is not a mortgage on future surplus value; what counts is consumption. It rejects as absurd that useful things that cannot be turned into profits are burned; what counts is use-value production. It rejects as unfounded the insight that in the capitalistically organised social relations of production, ‘the needs of human beings, the satisfaction of human beings, is never more than a sideshow’ (Adorno 2008: 51). It opposes capital as money, M…M’. Instead it considers money as means of purchasing commodities (C…C) and demands that money be put into the pockets of workers to strengthen their purchasing power, connecting them more firmly to the means of subsistence. The exchange of labour power (C) for money (M) that is then exchanged for means of subsistence (C), C…M…C, is, however, a function of M…P…M’. Profitable employers purchase labour power. Unprofitable employers do not. Profit is a means of avoiding bankruptcy. The illusion of the epoch suggests that profits do not matter. What matters is the well-being of workers. The politics of counter-hegemony condemns the capitalist form of wealth, money that yields more money, and demands that government should intervene to transform the dynamic of capitalist reproduction for the benefit of workers. The illusion of the epoch confuses the reality of capitalism with its (illusionary) promise of a freedom from want. The illusion of the epoch identifies what really counts and, yet, does not recognize the very society that it rejects abstractly. The reality of its illusion is the perpetuation of myth – that resolution to misery is imminent if only reason were to prevail over self-interest; and then ‘a storm is blowing from Paradise’ and the hope in the rescue of humanity from economic compulsion is seemingly blown away. In fact, its promise has been illusionary all along – it belongs to a politics from which, ostensibly, it was to move away from. In reality, it trained the working class to ‘forget both its hatred and its spirit of sacrifice’. In Benjamin’s language, the proponents of counter-hegemony are ‘soothsayers’ (Benjamin 1999: 249, 252, 255). Only a reified consciousness can declare that it is in possession of the requisite knowledge, political capacity, and technical expertise not only for resolving capitalist crises but, also, to do so in the interests of the dispossessed. For the sake of progress, it barks in perpetuity and without bite. Instead, it sniffs out the miserable world, from the outside as it were, and puts itself forward as having the capacity, ability, insight and means for securing conditions. The politics of hegemony describes the theology of anti-capitalism. Theologically conceived, it is devoid of Now-Time. Instead, it views the present as transition towards its own progressive future, promising deliverance from misery amidst ‘a pile of debris’ that ‘grows skyward’ (Benjamin 1999: 249). Now-time is Benjamin’s conception of a time at which the progress of the muck of ages comes to standstill. Now-time rejects the present time, which heralds the future as the being of its own becoming. At best, it transforms the protest against capitalism into electoral gain. At worst, it radicalises its stance into a moral crusade against the identified wrongdoers, with potentially deafening consequences. The theory of hegemony does not recognise the conditions (Zustände) of misery. It identifies deplorable situations (Mißstände). Deplorable situations call for resolution by means of a social activism that challenges This misery and That outrage, seeking to alleviate and rectify This and That. What, however, are the social preconditions that constitute the necessity of This poverty and That misery? Adorno (1972) rejects activism for this and that as a pseudo-praxis that struggles against this and that but leaves the conditions that render this and that entirely untouched. In this way, ‘activism’ is not only affirmative of existing society. It also deceives itself that, however bad the situation, something can be done by this or that policy and by this or that technical means. Counter-hegemonic thought does not recognise capitalist conditions. It only identifies malevolent situations. The activism against this or that situation is delusional in its view of society. It demands that capitalist society should not care for profit. It should instead care for the dispossessed. In its essence, activism for this cause or that cause is a political advertisement for some alternative party of government. It transforms the protest against a really existing misery that blights the life of a whole class of individuals into a selling point for political gain. Ticket thinking feels the pain of the world and offers solutions. Ticket thinking feeds on what it condemns. It condemns this miserable situation and that shortcoming with righteous indignation and an eye for power. <HEAD1><TITLE>Conclusion: on governmentality The term governmentality was coined by Foucault (1991). It describes the function of government as a political practice of conducting the conduct of the governed. In the Marxist literature, Lenin offered perhaps the most decisive account of ‘governmentability’ when he argues that the post-revolutionary state will wither away ‘owing to the simple fact’ that socialist Man ‘will become accustomed to observing [the elementary rules of social intercourse] without force, without coercion, without subordination, without the special apparatus for coercion called the state’ (Lenin 1918/1999: 51). The state, thus, withers away on the conditions that socialist Man has internationalised the conduct of government. For a critique, see the contributions to Bonefeld and Tischler (2002). </TITLE></HEAD1> Neither the capitalist nor the banker, nor indeed the worker, can extricate themselves from the reality in which they live and which asserts itself not only over them but also through them, and by means of them. Society as economic subject prevails through the individuals. Money does not only make the world go round; its possession establishes the connection to the means of life. The struggle for access to the means of life is a struggle for money – it governs the mentality of bourgeois society. What a misery! In the face of great social wealth, the dispossessed producers of surplus value struggle for fleeting amounts of money to sustain themselves through the sale of their labour power. Indeed, making ends meet is the ‘real life-activity’ of ‘living labour activity’ (see Marx and Engels 1978: 154). Therefore, ‘to be a productive labourer is ... not a piece of luck’ (Marx 1990: 644). Nor is it an ontological privilege that is accorded to workers as the living promise of a post-capitalist civilisation. The struggle for money (as more money) governs the mentality of bourgeois society as, seemingly, a thing in-itself. Money is time and time is life. ‘Illusion dominates reality’ (Adorno 1976b: 80) and it does so because ‘[e]xchange value … dominates human needs and replaces them’ (ibid.). The individuals carry the bond with society in their pockets. The contemporary opposition to austerity opposes the manner in which the economic surplus is distributed and is strenuous in its demand that capitalist wealth should not be sustained by taking money out of the pockets of workers. Instead, wealth should be redistributed from capital and labour and, one might add, this redistribution is good for the economy too – commodity markets depend on sustained consumer demand. Instead of sustaining financial capitalism, money is to be invested in the productive activity of the many; it has to employ workers and create employment opportunities, making work pay. Anti-austerity struggle is the said means of shifting the balance of class forces to secure the ‘institutional transformation’ that will make money the servant of the working class (Callinicos 2012; Panitch and Gintin 2015; Mason 2016). In this argument, class struggle is invoked not as a struggle to abolish the class society – but rather as a means towards the further development of a labour economy that satisfies the class interests of its workers. It envisages socialism as a social factory. Whichever way one looks at it, to be a member of the working class is a great ‘misfortune’ (Marx 1990: 644). Even its proponents demand that it works! In distinction to the counter-hegemonic for the further development of the productive forces, there really is ‘tenderness only in the coarsest demand: that no-one should go hungry any more’ (Adorno 1978: 156). In order to unlock the governmentality of money, the critique of the relations of production is key. For the buyer of labour power, profitability is a means of avoiding bankruptcy. For the producer of surplus value, the sale of her labour power is the condition of access to the means of subsistence. The profitable extraction of surplus value is a condition of future employment. For the sake of making a living the producers of surplus value are under the compulsion to achieve a contract of employment, which entails not only daily struggle for securing the means of subsistence by means of wage income. It entails also competition amongst the sellers of labour power to achieve and maintain that income. For the seller of labour power, competition is not some abstract economic law. Rather, it is experienced in the form of precarious labour markets and pressure to secure the profitability of her employer as the basis of achieving sustained employment. The effective exploitation of her labour power is the most fundamental guarantee of sustaining her labour market position. Competition is not a category of social unity. It is a category of social disunity. Class society exists in the form of individualised commodity owners, each seeking to maintain themselves in competitive, gendered and racialised, and also nationalised labour markets where the term cutthroat competition is experienced in various forms, from arson attack to class solidarity, and from destitution to collective bargaining, from gangland thuggery to communal forms of organising subsistence-support, from strike-breaking to collective action. Innate to the existence of a class of dispossessed sellers of labour power is the struggle, collectively and against each other, or both, for access to the means of subsistence to satisfy basic needs. The struggle of the working class is one for wages and conditions; it is a struggle for access to the means of life and for life. They struggle against capital’s ‘were-wolf’s hunger for surplus labour’ and its destructive conquest for additional atoms of unpaid labour time, and thus against the reduction of their life to a mere time’s carcase – and they struggle for security of employment. They struggle against a life constituting solely of labour-time and thus against a reduction of human life to a mere economic resource – and they labour for the profitability of their employer as the best possible guarantee of sustained employment. They struggle for respect, education and recognition of human significance, and above all for food, shelter, clothing, warmth, love, affection, knowledge, time for enjoyment and dignity. Their struggle as a class ‘in-itself’ really is a struggle ‘for-itself’: for life, human distinction, life-time and, above all, satisfaction of basic human needs. The working class does not struggle for socialism. It struggles to make ends meet, for subsistence and comfort. It does all of this in conditions in which the increase in material wealth that it has produced pushes beyond the limits of its capitalist form. Every so-called trickle-down effect that capitalist accumulation might bring forth presupposes a prior and sustained trickle up in the capitalist accumulation of wealth. And then society ‘suddenly finds itself put back into a state of momentary barbarism; it appears as if famine, a universal war of devastation had cut off the supply of every means of subsistence’ (Marx and Engels 1997: 18). For the sellers of labour power, economic consciousness is an unhappy consciousness. This is the unhappy consciousness of the struggle for the means of subsistence. It is this struggle for subsistence that makes the working class the depository of historical knowledge. Instead of thinking about society with a claim to power, one needs instead to think out of society, out of the daily struggle to make ends meet, insurrections, revolts, strikes, riots and revolutions, to recognise the smell of danger and the stench of death, gain a sense of the courage and cunning of struggle, grasp the spirit of sacrifice, comprehend, however fleetingly, the density of a time at which the progress of the muck of ages almost came to a standstill. The notion of thinking out of history, rather than about history, derives from Adorno’s negative dialectics, which argues that for thought to comprehend society, it needs to think out of society. For him, thinking about society, or about history, amounts to an argument based on hypothetical judgements that treats society as an ‘as if’, leading to dogmatic claims about its natural character. On this, see Bonefeld (2014). The idea of history as a standstill of progress is Benjamin’s (1999). Class struggle ‘supplies a unique experience with the past’ (Benjamin 1999: 254). Whether this experience turns concrete in the changing forms of repression as resistance to repression or whether it turns concrete in forms of repression, is a matter of experienced history. There is as much experience of history as there is struggle to stop its further progress. The dispossessed do not struggle for abstract ideas. They struggle to make a living. ‘Proletarian language is dictated by hunger. The poor chew words to fill their bellies’ (Adorno 1978: 102). Class struggle is therefore not a positive category. Rather, it belongs to a world that is ‘hostile to the subject’ (Adorno 1990: 167). For the dispossessed traders of labour power, society really is a struggle for access to ‘crude and material things’ (Benjamin 1999: 246). The critique of class society finds its positive resolution only in the classless society, not in a ‘fairer’ class society. Adorno’s dictum that ‘society remains class struggle’ (1989: 272) does not express something positive or desirable. Rather, it amounts to a judgement on the existent conditions of misery. Paraphrasing Marcuse (1967: 61), workers ‘have to be free for their liberation so that they are able to become free’. What really would it mean to establish a society in which wealth is not money as more money but, rather, freely disposable time, and in which the introduction of a labour-saving machinery neither makes the labour of some redundant nor intensifies the work of others but, rather, reduces the social labour time required to satisfy individual human needs? The contemporary debate about communising is about the establishment of a society in which wealth is freely disposable time. There is as much communising as there are individuals who struggle for it in freedom from a governmentality that recognises the labourer as an economic necessity. </BODY> <BACK><TITLE>Acknowledgements</TITLE> This chapter derives from a lecture at the seminar ‘Teoria Critica y Politica’, held at the Centro de Ciencias Humanas y Sociales (Madrid). The lecture appeared in Spanish in 2016 (Bonefeld 2016). I am grateful to all participants for their helpful comments and advice. 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