On the Self-Organizing of Reality-Totality as Living Knowledge

First published 2019 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2019 selection and editorial matter, Alfredo Pereira Jr., William Alfred Pickering, and Ricardo Ribeiro Gudwin; individual chapters, the contributors The right of Alfredo Pereira Jr., William Alfred Pickering, and Ricardo Ribeiro Gudwin to be identified as the editors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Pereira, Alfredo, Jr., editor. | Pickering, William A., editor. | Gudwin, Ricardo, 1967– editor. Title: Systems, self-organization and information: an interdisciplinary perspective / edited by Alfredo Pereira Jr., William A. Pickering, and Ricardo Gudwin. Description: Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge, 2019. Identifiers: LCCN 2018030300 | ISBN 9781138609921 (hardback) | ISBN 9781138609938 (pbk.) | ISBN 9780429465949 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Self-organizing systems. | System theory. | Information theory. Classification: LCC Q325 .S944 2019 | DDC 003/.7—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2018030300 ISBN: 978-1-138-60992-1 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-138-60993-8 (pbk) ISBN: 978-0-429-46594-9 (ebk) Typeset in Bembo by codeMantra 5 ON THE SELF-ORGANIZING OF REALITY-TOTALITY AS LIVING KNOWLEDGE Ricardo Pereira Tassinari Introduction How is it possible to introduce a notion of Reality as Totality that is consonant with the continuous development of contemporary science? To answer this question, we introduce in this chapter the notion of Reality-Totality. We argue in favor of the view that Reality as a Totality may be conceived as active and living Knowledge: the self-exposing Idea that self-exposes itself to us by a selforganizing process of which our knowledge process itself is part. The view we argue for is of a metaphysical nature, and it elaborates on the methodological character of the study of the Self-Organization. We show that this philosophical view emerges from some general reflections on the constitution of scientific knowledge, providing elements that make possible the structuring and coordination of various scientific contents and methods. Our exposition begins with a discussion of the epistemological analysis of Gilles-Gaston Granger (1920–2016), and the genetic epistemology and psychology of Jean Piaget (1896–1980) and his coworkers. We then proceed to an analysis that leads us to the notion of Reality-Totality and its properties. At the conclusion of the chapter, it will be seen that the view presented here is a new form of absolute speculative idealism, close to the philosophical view of Georg W. F. Hegel (1770–1831). Scientific and philosophical knowledge according to Gilles-Gaston Granger We will begin by assuming with Granger that scientific knowledge of the empirical world is mainly characterized by the construction of models, and that there are limitations on these kinds of constructions when they are related to human facts 76 Ricardo Pereira Tassinari (Granger, 1988, p. 12; 1992, p. 14; e 1994, p. 245; 1995, p. 70). The main limitation is related to the singularity and multiplicity of the significations existent in human facts. These singularities and multiplicities form a limit to the construction of models in the following sense: when we construct such models, we necessarily abstract from certain aspects and qualities of the human facts that in other contexts influence human behavior; thus, in these other contexts, the constructed model does not completely explain behavior; models of this kind are, therefore, necessarily incomplete with regard to all possible kinds of human behavior. It is true that a new model can be constructed to explain some aspect or property that the earlier model did not explain; but in the construction of this new model, we will again make abstractions of aspects and qualities that in other contexts will influence behavior, and the new model will end up not being complete. The limit of this process of construction of models of human behavior is the world as it is lived singularly by us here and now; thus, for all proposed models there is a meaning for human beings that is not included in the explanations these models provide. As Granger (1995, pp. 85–86; my translation) points out: The unique but radical obstacle [to scientific knowledge] seems to me to be the individual reality of events and beings. Scientific knowledge is fully exercised when it can neutralize this individuation without seriously altering its object, as usually happens in the natural sciences. The fundamental obstacle is evidently in the nature of the phenomena of human behavior, which carry a load of significations that resist their simple transformation into objects [models], that is to say into abstract schemas that are logically and mathematically manipulable. A feeling, a collective reaction or a fact of language seems hardly to be reduced to such abstract schemas. The solution to the limitation on the knowledge of human facts by models is to consider the model as a partial representation of a limit never attained. As Granger (1995, p. 117) emphasizes, in the case of human facts, science strives to increasingly encompass the individual in networks of concepts, without ever hoping to attain this. Therefore, the question is not to reduce them but to represent them, albeit partially, in systems of concepts. Here it is important to highlight Granger’s distinction between scientific knowledge and philosophical knowledge. According to Granger, philosophical knowledge is relative to what he calls metaconcepts “that do not apply directly to experiences, but to the representations of experience” (Granger, 1995, p. 46), and depends on a set of interpretative rules of the lived Reality established from the originative decisions of each philosopher. Such metaconcepts and interpretative rules define what Granger calls factum (in opposition to facts represented by models and subject to verification).1 In this regard, Granger states: “We meet then [in the philosophical metatheory] originative decisions that it [the philosophical metatheory] proposes to orient in the organization of the senses of the living” (Granger, 1988, p. 259). Self-organizing of Reality-Totality 77 In this chapter, we explain some of our originative decisions related to scientific knowledge and its development, and introduce a notion of Reality as Totality as living and active Knowledge, and as the Idea that self-exposes to us by a selforganizing process. One of these originative decisions is that the consequences of the principles (interpretative rules in Granger’s language) of our interpretation should not be in contradiction with established facts of the special sciences, and, in particular, with facts about the process of knowledge established by genetic psychology.2 From this, it follows that a complete overview of Reality as Totality cannot be constructed by a single model without the expectation that this conception will be refuted or contested by a model that is more explanatory, or by the possibility of the adoption of other metaconcepts and interpretative rules for the philosophical interpretation of Reality. Note that, here, we admit the existence of various forms of interpretation of Reality (and Reality-Totality) on account of the various possibilities for the adoption of principles by originative decisions. Thus, we consider our proposal here merely one among various possible interpretations. Ours, however, is an interpretation that allows coordination with all others, since, for us, all interpretations aim to expose Reality-Totality for themselves, even if they don’t admit it. The capacity of representing according to genetic epistemology and psychology In the construction of the necessary structures for knowledge, Piaget and Inhelder (1966a) identify the appearance of the semiotic function that consists of being able to represent something (any signified: an object, event, conceptual schema, etc.) by means of a differentiated signifier, and serving only for that representation. Piaget, in accordance with Saussure (1966), makes a distinction between two (non-exclusive) groups of signifiers that are distinguished by how they signify: the symbol and the sign. The symbol is motivated (in the sense that it in some way resembles its signifier) and individual (in the sense that its resemblance is established by the subject itself in his or her action and is not just received from others). Examples of symbols are imitation, design, and mental imagery, which according to Piaget and his coworkers consist of the internalization of imitations (such as a mental image of one’s backyard or of childhood schoolyards that today seem to us smaller than before 3). The sign, of which words are the most characteristic example, is collective and arbitrary (e.g., the English word water differs from água in Portuguese or Wasser in German, etc.), in contrast to the symbol’s characteristics of individuality and motivation. As Piaget states: The symbol and the sign are the signifiers of abstract meanings, such as those which involve representation. A symbol is an image evoked mentally or a 78 Ricardo Pereira Tassinari material object intentionally chosen to designate a class of actions or objects. So it is that the mental image of a tree symbolizes in the mind trees in general, a particular tree which the individual remembers, or a certain action pertaining to trees, etc. (Piaget, 1952, p. 191) The sign, moreover, is a collective symbol, and consequently arbitrary. It also makes its appearance in the second year, with the beginning of language and doubtless in synchrony with the formation of the symbol. Symbol and sign are the two poles, individual and social, of the same elaboration of meanings. Piaget considers another type of signifier in which the signifier is not differentiated from its signified: the index (or indication; see Piaget, 1952, pp. 191–196, and Piaget and Inhelder, 1966a, p. 42). He calls signals the indices that are part of an artificial situation (as, for example, the experiment by Pavlov in which the salivation of a dog was associated with a sound of a bell; in this case, the sound of the bell was a signal of food). Among all of Piaget’s types of signifiers, we are most directly interested in the sign, whose uses (combined with symbols, indexes, signals, and schemes of action) make us capable of elaborating the knowledge expressed in theories and models. The principle of designation of Reality-Totality and the Idea Based on genetic epistemology and psychology, we can very generally say that when we have sufficient detailed knowledge about the possible actions of the objects of our Reality, we proceed naturally to the construction of models and theories. In this context, we agree with Granger (1988, p. 13; 1992, p. 14; 1994, p. 245) that a model is a system of signs and operations4 on them, that we use to represent the objects of our Reality and our actions on it. Hence, operating on signs attached to possible actions, we can predict new experimental possible facts (directly related to virtual facts; see Granger, 1992; 1995, p. 49). In addition, we can explain them by showing how the objects of the domain of study are related between them. Furthermore, we can explain, based on these relations, we can deduce particular relations that occur in a particular experiment, which leads to the process of verification, as explained by Granger (1992). Thus, we have the following schema: Model Objects (in our Reality) ↔ ↕ Actions on objects Signs ↕ ↔ Operations on signs Self-organizing of Reality-Totality 79 For example, we can consider here a simple model of distances in space: the Pythagorean Theorem. According to the theorem, in a right triangle we have the relation a² = b² + c², in which a is the measure of the hypotenuse and b and c are the measures of the catheti. If the theorem is considered a property of physical space, then it is a relation between the results of the lengths of the hypotenuse and the catheti. Note that the arithmetical operations expressed in it also indicate possible operations on signs attached to the actions of measurements; we can, therefore, admit that models and theories express Reality. In response to the initial and central question of this chapter (about the possibility of a notion of Reality as Totality that is consonant with the continuous development of contemporary science), insofar as access to Reality is through signs (of a model or of natural language), we can conceive the Totality as: all that we can in principle designate by signs. This notion of Totality can be considered here as methodological, in the sense that it is homogeneous with the construction of models and with knowledge by signs, inasmuch as it is defined on the basis of sign designations and the structures formed by them. The following principle introduces the notion of Reality-Totality and summarizes this conception: Principle of Designation of Reality-Totality: What the sign Reality-Totality designates is the system of all that we can in principle designate by signs. If, following German idealism, we consider the sign Idea to designate the system of all our comprehensions of Reality-Totality, then we can introduce in this context the following operational definition of Idea: Operational definition of Idea: Idea is the system of the totality of all things we can designate by signs. We, thus, assume here, by the Principle of Designation of Reality-Totality, the following equality: Reality-Totality = Idea. Notice that what is designated by symbols and indexes can also in principle be designated by signs. Therefore, what is designated by symbols and indexes is also part of the Idea. All that can be known is within the scope of Idea, including what is possible to be known by scientific means. But it is not possible to expose immediately and completely for us what Reality-Totality or the Idea is; what the sign Reality-Totality designates can only be exposed partially and gradually. Therefore, Reality-Totality or the Idea will be considered simultaneously as the partially exposed result of the gradual process that exposes it, and also as the process itself. In the following section, we will see how this leads to a selforganizing process. 80 Ricardo Pereira Tassinari Principle of conceptual characterization of Reality (and Reality-Totality) If we now assume the Principle of Designation of Reality-Totality, and along with it the idea that contemporary science is a model-maker necessary for our comprehension of Reality (and Reality-Totality5), then we can also assume the following principle: Principle of Conceptual Characterization of Reality (and Reality-Totality): What the sign Reality (and Reality-Totality) expresses depends on the construction of models. Notice that the signifieds and the significations of some signs of scientific models or theories are not restricted to the operational significations inside them, but overflow them and are evidently anchored in our here and now daily life, which, as noted earlier, is a limit never attained by the construction of models. Recalling Granger, we can say that here it is about representing the facts in conceptual schemas and models and not reducing the facts to models. Adopting then the Principle of Designation of Reality-Totality and the Principle of Conceptual Characterization of Reality, some consequences may be derived: a b c Experiments (and the possible actions that are necessary for them) are interpreted inside a model or theory, always leading to theoretically charged interpretations. The objects in the experiments (on which we perform actions) are, therefore, defined by models or theories, and by their structures and their relations with experimental methods. In this sense, the structures expressed by the models and theories constitute part of the structure of Reality-Totality. Notice that the Principle of Designation of Reality-Totality and the Principle of Conceptual Characterization of Reality-Totality imply that it makes no sense to talk about things that are outside of what we designate by the sign Reality-Totality, and that, therefore, there is no sense in the idea of a thing-in-itself that is not in relation to the process of knowing. Also note that, in this case, the general process of knowledge has its contents (and also its form, as we will see in the next section) related to the logical and ontological Idea, which precedes any process of knowledge of a particular subject. The principle of the Ideality of Reality-Totality We will then assume the following principle that is made up of the conjunction of three assertions. Self-organizing of Reality-Totality 81 Principle of the Ideality of Reality-Totality: The Principle of Conceptual Characterization of Reality-Totality; It is impossible to construct a unique complete model of Reality-Totality; An uninterrupted construction of models is therefore necessary in order to know what Reality-Totality is. This is called Principle of Ideality of Reality-Totality because it asserts that Reality-Totality depends on a conceptual characterization that exists for itself as a limit of our knowledge of it. Insofar as this totality closes on itself, we must admit that the process of knowledge carried out here is also in Reality-Totality, since there are beings (us) that belong to it and carry out this process. Therefore, Reality-Totality exposes itself for us by this very process, and what Reality-Totality is must be identified simultaneously with the result of this process and with this process itself. In this sense, the sign Reality-Totality designates: a b c d e f g Something in which there is a proper process of knowing itself and the exposition of itself, or better, the self-exposition of itself; Something that is identified by each subject in each moment with the product of its process of knowledge of Reality-Totality; Something that is made more complex in each moment by this process that is exposed of itself; Something under the Principle of Ideality of Reality-Totality; and, therefore, also Something under the Principle of Conceptual Characterization of Reality-Totality; Something for which there is no unique complete model to express; Something for which there is the necessity of an uninterrupted construction of models. These characteristics allow us to see the process of the self-exposition of RealityTotality as a self-organizing process, as we will see in the next section. The self-organizing of Reality-Totality From the qualities listed in the last section, we can characterize this process of knowledge and self-exposition of Reality-Totality as a self-organizing, as defined by Michel Debrun (Chapter 1, this volume). Note first, however, that the selforganizing process of self-exposition of Reality-Totality is the general process that involves all self-organizing processes of knowledge about Reality-Totality on the part of the subjects. In this context, it is possible to apply to these process Debrun’s general definition of Self- Organization, “an organization or ‘form’ that is self-organized when it produces itself ” (Debrun, Chapter 1, this volume). According to these principles, the form of the knowledge process is part of the form 82 Ricardo Pereira Tassinari of the process of Reality-Totality and it self-exposes itself. In this case, there is a self-constituted system, and so it is, in fact, a secondary form of Self-Organization, according to Debrun’s classification: When there is an external plurality – which goes from dissociated elements to the constitution of a form – we can say that we are dealing with primary Self-Organization… When, on the other hand, it is a matter of the self-complexification of a self-constituted organism (or, more generally, of a system), we are dealing with secondary Self-Organization. (Debrun, Chapter 2, this volume) Lastly, we can apply Debrun’s definition of secondary self-organizing process. According to Debrun (Chapter 1, this volume): “Secondary SelfOrganization occurs when, in a learning process (corporal, intellectual, existential, or other), the interaction occurs between the parts (‘mental parts’ and/or ‘corporal parts’) of an organism… under the hegemonic, but not dominative, guidance of this organism’s ‘subject-face’”. Clearly, the process analyzed here is a case of intellectual and corporal learning, since it expresses itself by the increased complexity of the subject’s knowledge. The subject is the subject-face of the organism and guides the process in a hegemonic form (but not in a dominant form, inasmuch as it depends on Reality-Totality). Conversely, Reality-Totality doesn’t dominate the process by itself: its self-exposition constitutes itself in the process of knowledge of the subjects, which is an active construction realized by the subjects in Reality-Totality, including the construction of models and theories. The principle of absolute Speculative Ideality of Reality-Totality and Reality-Totality as living Knowledge In light of the above, we now introduce the notion of total knowledge of Reality-Totality (the expression of the limit), that we call simply Knowledge: Principle of Absolute Speculative Ideality of Reality-Totality: RealityTotality is identical to Knowledge, or shortly, Reality-Totality = Knowledge. If we assume the Principle of Absolute Speculative Ideality of Reality-Totality, we can say that the Knowledge self-exposes itself by an immanent self- organizing form of the subjects. So we have: Reality-Totality is living Knowledge! And us, we are the self-organizing parts of it! As we saw before, we can identify Reality-Totality with the Idea. Therefore, this living and active Knowledge (i.e., Reality-Totality) can also be identified with the Idea and we can denominate the view discussed in this chapter as an absolute speculative idealism. Therefore, as discussed previously, the Idea self- exposes itself Self-organizing of Reality-Totality 83 to us by a self-organizing process of which our proper process of knowledge of it is part. Notice that this characterization of Reality-Totality as Knowledge implies that it can be (partially) understood, and thus, there will always be reasons, or better, explanations, including those by models and theories, that reveal it. In this sense, it is in consonance with the continuous development of contemporary science and with the possibility of the permanent construction of models. Final remarks: a possible absolute speculative idealism We presented here the general philosophical view: Reality-Totality is living and active Knowledge, and we are (active) parts of the self-manifesting Idea, the Idea which manifests itself in a self-organizing process of which our proper process of knowledge of is part. In our view, this conception of Reality-Totality is interpreted as an absolute speculative idealism. As pointed out previously, we admit various forms of interpretation of Reality (and Reality-Totality), in the sense that people can make use of various principles to interpret Reality by certain originative decisions. This leads us to consider our propose here as merely one of various possible interpretations. However, as stated earlier, it is an interpretation that allows for the coordination of all others, since, as noted earlier, for it, all interpretations aim to expose Reality-Totality for themselves, even if they don’t admit it. In closing, we can say that, at its limit, the view presented here leads us to a viewpoint close to Hegel’s absolute speculative idealism; the development of this idea, however, is a theme for another work. Notes 1 For more details about the difference between scientific knowledge and philosophical knowledge, see Granger (1998); for the notion of factum, see Granger (1988), p. 249; on the analysis of the process of verification, see Granger (1992). 2 Before elaborating on genetic epistemology, Piaget developed genetic psychology in order to test questions about facts related to epistemology. We maintain here the same spirit of submitting questions of fact to the appropriate sciences. 3 On the notion of mental imagery, see Piaget (1964) and Piaget and Inhelder (1966b). 4 The term operation, in this chapter, means a mathematical partial function, i.e., a function f that associates to each element x (or list of x elements) of a domain D (in which f is defined) one element y of D; f does not necessarily have to be defined for all elements (or lists of elements) of D. 5 Although Reality-Totality and Idea are equivalent, we will here use the sign Reality-Totality, because this evokes more easily what is signified. We will return to the denomination Idea when we characterize our perspective as a speculative absolute idealism. References Granger, G-G. (1988). Pour la Connaissance Philosophique. Paris: Editions Odile Jacob. ——— (1992). La Vérification. Paris: Editions Odile Jacob. ——— (1994). Formes, Opérations, Objets. Paris: J. Vrin. ——— (1995). La Science et les Sciences. 2éme ed. Paris: P.U.F. 84 Ricardo Pereira Tassinari Piaget, J. (1964). La Formation du Symbole chez l’Enfant: Imitation, Jeu et Rêve; Image et Représentation. Neuchâtel: Delachaux et Niestlé S.A. ——— (1952). The Origins of Intelligence in Children. New York: International University Press. Translation of La Naissance de l’Intelligence chez l’Enfant. Neuchâtel: Delachaux et Niestlé S.A. Piaget, J., and Inhelder, B. (1966a). La Psychologie de l’Enfant. Paris: P.U.F. ——— (1966b). L’Image Mentale chez l’Enfant: Étude sur le Développement des Représentations Imagées. Paris: P.U.F. Saussure, F. (1966). Cours de Linguistique Générale. Paris: Payot.