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Technology and Evil
Brian Martin, University of Wollongong
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Martin, Brian. “Technology and Evil.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 8, no. 2
(2019): 1-14.
Short url: https://wp.me/p1Bfg0-466 (provided by WordPress)
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Humans cause immense damage to each other and to the environment. Steven James
Bartlett argues that humans have an inbuilt pathology that leads to violence and ecosystem
destruction that can be called evil, in a clinical rather than a religious sense. Given that
technologies are human constructions, it follows that technologies can embody the same
pathologies as humans. An important implication of Bartlett’s ideas is that studies of
technology should be normative in opposing destructive technologies.
Introduction
Humans, individually and collectively, do a lot of terrible things to each other and to the
environment. Some obvious examples are murder, torture, war, genocide and massive
environmental destruction. From the perspective of an ecologist from another solar system,
humans are the world’s major pestilence, spreading everywhere, enslaving and experimenting
on a few species for their own ends, causing extinctions of numerous other species and
destroying the environment that supports them all.
These thoughts suggest that humans, as a species, have been causing some serious problems.
Of course there are many individuals and groups trying to make the world a better place, for
example campaigning against war and environmental degradation, and fostering harmony
and sustainability. But is it possible that by focusing on what needs to be done and on the
positives in human nature, the seriousness of the dark side of human behaviour is being
neglected?
Here, I address these issues by looking at studies of human evil, with a focus on a book by
Steven Bartlett. With this foundation, it is possible to look at technology with a new
awareness of its deep problems. This will not provide easy solutions but may give a better
appreciation of the task ahead.
Background
For decades, I have been studying war, ways to challenge war, and alternatives to military
systems (e.g. Martin, 1984). My special interest has been in nonviolent action as a means for
addressing social problems. Along the way, this led me to read about genocide and other
forms of violence. Some writing in the area refers to evil, addressed from a secular, scientific
and non-moralistic perspective.
Roy Baumeister (1997), a prominent psychologist, wrote a book titled Evil: Inside Human
Violence and Cruelty, that I found highly insightful. Studying the psychology of perpetrators,
ranging from murderers and terrorists to killers in genocide, Baumeister concluded that most
commonly they feel justified in their actions and see themselves as victims. Often they think
what they’ve done is not that important. Baumeister’s sophisticated analysis aims to counter
the popular perception of evil-doers as malevolent or uncaring.
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Baumeister is one of a number of psychologists willing to talk about good and evil. If the
word evil feels uncomfortable, then substitute “violence and cruelty,” as in the subtitle of
Baumeister’s book, and the meaning is much the same. It’s also possible to approach evil
from the viewpoint of brain function, as in Simon Baron-Cohen’s (2011) The Science of Evil:
On Empathy and the Origins of Cruelty. There are also studies that combine psychiatric and
religious perspectives, such as M. Scott Peck’s (1988) People of the Lie: The Hope for Healing
Human Evil.
Another part of my background is technology studies, including being involved in the
nuclear power debate, studying technological vulnerability, communication technology, and
technology and euthanasia, among other topics. I married my interests in nonviolence and in
technology by studying how technology could be designed and used for nonviolent struggle
(Martin, 2001).
It was with this background that I encountered Steven James Bartlett’s (2005) massive book
The Pathology of Man: A Study of Human Evil. Many of the issues it addresses, for example
genocide and war, were familiar to me, but his perspective offered new and disturbing
insights. The Pathology of Man is more in-depth and far-reaching than other studies I had
encountered, and is worth bringing to wider attention.
Here, I offer an abbreviated account of Bartlett’s analysis of human evil. Then I spell out
ways of applying his ideas to technology and conclude with some possible implications.
Bartlett on Evil
Steven James Bartlett is a philosopher and psychologist who for decades studied problems in
human thinking. The Pathology of Man was published in 2005 but received little attention. This
may partly be due to the challenge of reading an erudite 200,000-word treatise but also partly
due to people being resistant to Bartlett’s message, for the very reasons expounded in his
book.
In reviewing the history of disease theories, Bartlett points out that in previous eras a wide
range of conditions were considered to be diseases, ranging from “Negro consumption” to
anti-Semitism. This observation is part of his assessment of various conceptions of disease,
relying on standard views about what counts as disease, while emphasising that judgements
made are always relative to a framework that is value-laden.
This is a sample portion of Bartlett’s carefully laid out chain of logic and evidence for
making a case that the human species is pathological, namely characteristic of a disease. In
making this case, he is not speaking metaphorically but clinically. The fact that the human
species has seldom been seen as pathological is due to humans adopting a framework that
exempts themselves from this diagnosis, which would be embarrassing to accept, at least for
those inclined to think of humans as the apotheosis of evolution.
Next stop: the concept of evil. Bartlett examines a wide range of perspectives, noting that
most of them are religious in origin. In contrast, he prefers a more scientific view: “Human
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evil, in the restricted and specific sense in which I will use it, refers to apparently voluntary
destructive behavior and attitudes that result in the general negation of health, happiness,
and ultimately of life.” (p. 65) In referring to “general negation,” Bartlett is not thinking of a
poor diet or personal nastiness but of bigger matters such as war, genocide and
overpopulation.
Bartlett is especially interested in the psychology of evil, and canvasses the ideas of classic
thinkers who have addressed this issue, including Sigmund Freud, Carl Jung, Karl
Menninger, Erich Fromm and Scott Peck. This detailed survey has only a limited return:
these leading thinkers have little to say about the origins of evil and what psychological
needs it may serve.
So Bartlett turns to other angles, including Lewis Fry Richardson’s classic work quantifying
evidence of human violence, and research on aggression by ethologists, notably Konrad
Lorenz. Some insights come from this examination, including Richardson’s goal of
examining human destructiveness without emotionality and Lorenz’s point that humans,
unlike most other animals, have no inbuilt barriers to killing members of their own species.
Bartlett on the Psychology of Genocide
To stare the potential for human evil in the face, Bartlett undertakes a thorough assessment
of evidence about genocide, seeking to find the psychological underpinning of systematic
mass killings of other humans. He notes one important factor, a factor not widely discussed
or even admitted: many humans gain pleasure from killing others. Two other relevant
psychological processes are projection and splitting. Projection involves denying negative
elements of oneself and attributing them to others, for example seeing others as dangerous,
thereby providing a reason for attacking them: one’s own aggression is attributed to others.
Splitting involves dividing one’s own grandiose self-conception from the way others are
thought of. “By belonging to the herd, the individual gains an inflated sense of power,
emotional support, and connection. With the feeling of group-exaggerated power and puffed
up personal importance comes a new awareness of one’s own identity, which is projected
into the individual’s conception” of the individual’s favoured group (p. 157). As a member
of a group, there are several factors that enable genocide: stereotyping, dehumanisation,
euphemistic language and psychic numbing.
To provide a more vivid picture of the capacity for human evil, Bartlett examines the
Holocaust, noting that it was not the only or most deadly genocide but one, partly due to
extensive documentation, that provides plenty of evidence of the psychology of mass killing.
Anti-Semitism was not the preserve of the Nazis, but existed for centuries in numerous parts
of the world, and indeed continues today. The long history of persistent anti-Semitism is,
according to Bartlett, evidence that humans need to feel prejudice and to persecute others.
But at this point there is an uncomfortable finding: most people who are anti-Semitic are
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psychologically normal, suggesting the possibility that what is normal can be pathological.
This key point recurs in Bartlett’s forensic examination.
Prejudice and persecution do not usually bring sadness and remorse to the
victimizers, but rather a sense of strengthened identity, pleasure, self-satisfaction,
superiority, and power. Prejudice and persecution are Siamese twins: Together they
generate a heightened and invigorated belief in the victimizers’ supremacy. The fact
that prejudice and persecution benefit bigots and persecutors is often overlooked or
denied. (p. 167)
Bartlett examines evidence about the psychology of several groups involved in the
Holocaust: Nazi leaders, Nazi doctors, bystanders, refusers and resisters. Nazi leaders and
doctors were, for the most part, normal and well-adjusted men (nearly all were men). Most
of the leaders were above average intelligence, and some had very high IQs, and many of
them were well educated and culturally sophisticated. Cognitively they were superior, but
their moral intelligence was low.
Bystanders tend to do nothing due to conformity, lack of empathy and low moral sensibility.
Most Germans were bystanders to Nazi atrocities, not participating but doing nothing to
oppose them.
Next are refusers, those who declined to be involved in atrocities. Contrary to usual
assumptions, in Nazi Germany there were few penalties for refusing to join killings; it was
just a matter of asking for a different assignment. Despite this, of those men called up to join
killing brigades, very few took advantage of this option. Refusers had to take some initiative,
to think for themselves and resist the need to conform.
Finally, there were resisters, those who actively opposed the genocide, but even here Bartlett
raises a concern, saying that in many cases resisters were driven more by anger at offenders
than empathy with victims. In any case, in terms of psychology, resisters were the odd ones
out, being disengaged with the dominant ideas and values in their society and being able to
be emotionally alone, without peer group support. Bartlett’s concern here meshes with
research on why people join contemporary social movements: most first become involved
via personal connections with current members, not because of moral outrage about the
issue (Jasper, 1997).
The implication of Bartlett’s analysis of the Holocaust is that there is something wrong with
humans who are psychologically normal (see also Bartlett, 2011, 2013). When those who
actively resist genocide are unusual psychologically, this points to problems with the way
most humans think and feel.
Another one of Bartlett’s conclusions is that most solutions that have been proposed to the
problem of genocide — such as moral education, cultivating acceptance and respect, and
reducing psychological projection — are vague, simplistic and impractical. They do not
measure up to the challenge posed by the observed psychology of genocide.
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Bartlett’s assessment of the Holocaust did not surprise me because, for one of my studies of
tactics against injustice (Martin, 2007), I read a dozen books and many articles about the
1994 Rwandan genocide, in which between half a million and a million people were killed in
the space of a few months. The physical differences between the Tutsi and Hutu are slight;
the Hutu killers targeted both Tutsi and “moderate” Hutu. It is not widely known that
Rwanda is the most Christian country in Africa, yet many of the killings occurred in
churches where Tutsi had gone for protection. In many cases, people killed neighbours they
had lived next to for years, or even family members. The Rwandan genocide had always
sounded horrific; reading detailed accounts to obtain examples for my article, I discovered it
was far worse than I had imagined (Martin, 2009).
After investigating evidence about genocide and its implications about human psychology,
Bartlett turns to terrorism. Many of his assessments accord with critical terrorism studies, for
example that there is no standard definition of terrorism, the fear of terrorism is
disproportionate to the threat, and terrorism is “framework-relative” in the sense that calling
someone a terrorist puts you in opposition to them.
Bartlett’s interest is in the psychology of terrorists. He is sceptical of the widespread
assumption that there must be something wrong with them psychologically, and cites
evidence that terrorists are psychologically normal. Interestingly, he notes that there are no
studies comparing the psychologies of terrorists and soldiers, two groups that each use
violence to serve a cause. He also notes a striking absence: in counterterrorism writing, no
one has studied the sorts of people who refuse to be involved in cruelty and violence and
who are resistant to appeals to in-group prejudice, which is usually called loyalty or
patriotism. By assuming there is something wrong with terrorists, counterterrorism
specialists are missing the possibility of learning how to deal with the problem.
Bartlett on War Psychology
Relatively few people are involved in genocide or terrorism except by learning about them
via media stories. It is another matter when it comes to war, because many people have lived
through a time when their country has been at war. In this century, just think of Afghanistan,
Iraq and Syria, where numerous governments have sent troops or provided military
assistance.
Bartlett says there is plenty of evidence that war evokes powerful emotions among both
soldiers and civilians. For some, it is the time of life when they feel most alive, whereas
peacetime can seem boring and meaningless. Although killing other humans is proscribed by
most moral systems, war is treated as an exception. There are psychological preconditions
for organised killing, including manufacturing differences, dehumanising the enemy,
nationalism, group identity and various forms of projection. Bartlett says it is also important
to look at psychological factors that prevent people from trying to end wars.
Even though relatively few people are involved in war as combat troops or even as part of
the systems that support war-fighting, an even smaller number devote serious effort to trying
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to end wars. Governments collectively spend hundreds of billions of dollars on their
militaries but only a minuscule amount on furthering the causes of peace. This applies as
well to research: there is a vastly more military-sponsored or military-inspired research than
peace-related research. Bartlett concludes that, “war is a pathology which the great majority
of human beings do not want to cure” (p. 211).
Thinking back over the major wars in the past century, in most countries it has been far
easier to support war than to oppose it. Enlisting in the military is seen as patriotic whereas
refusing military service, or deserting the army, is seen as treasonous. For civilians, defeating
the enemy is seen as a cause for rejoicing, whereas advocating an end to war — except via
victory — is a minority position.
There have been thousands of war movies: people flock to see killing on the screen, and the
bad guys nearly always lose, especially in Hollywood. In contrast, the number of major films
about nonviolent struggles is tiny — what else besides the 1982 film Gandhi? — and seldom
do they attract a wide audience. Bartlett sums up the implications of war for human
psychology:
By legitimating the moral atrocity of mass murder, war, clothed as it is in the
psychologically attractive trappings of patriotism, heroism, and the ultimately good
cause, is one of the main components of human evil. War, because it causes
incalculable harm, because it gives men and women justification to kill and injure one
another without remorse, because it suspends conscience and neutralizes
compassion, because it takes the form of psychological epidemics in which
dehumanization, cruelty, and hatred are given unrestrained freedom, and because it is
a source of profound human gratification and meaning—because of these things,
war is not only a pathology, but is one of the most evident expressions of human
evil. (p. 225)
The Obedient Parasite
Bartlett next turns to obedience studies, discussing the famous research by Stanley Milgram
(1974). However, he notes that such studies shouldn’t even be needed: the evidence of
human behaviour during war and genocide should be enough to show that most human are
obedient to authority, even when the authority is instructing them to harm others.
Another relevant emotion is hatred. Although hating is a widespread phenomenon — most
recently evident in the phenomenon of online harassment (Citron, 2014) — Bartlett notes
that psychologists and psychiatrists have given this emotion little attention. Hatred serves
several functions, including providing a cause, overcoming the fear of death, and, in groups,
helping build a sense of community.
Many people recognise that humans are destroying the ecological web that supports their
own lives and those of numerous other species. Bartlett goes one step further, exploring the
field of parasitology. Examining definitions and features of parasites, he concludes that,
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according to a broad definition, humans are parasites on the environment and other species,
and are destroying the host at a record rate. He sees human parasitism as being reflected in
social belief systems including the “cult of motherhood,” infatuation with children, and the
belief that other species exist to serve humans, a longstanding attitude enshrined in some
religions.
Reading The Pathology of Man, I was tempted to counter Bartlett’s arguments by pointing to
the good things that so many humans have done and are doing, such as everyday politeness,
altruism, caring for the disadvantaged, and the animal liberation movement. Bartlett could
counter by noting it would be unwise to pay no attention to disease symptoms just because
your body has many healthy parts. If there is a pathology inherent in the human species, it
should not be ignored, but instead addressed face to face.
Technologies of Political Control
Bartlett’s analysis of human evil, including that violence and cruelty are perpetrated mostly
by people who are psychologically normal and that many humans obtain pleasure out of
violence against other humans, can be applied to technology. The aim in doing this is not to
demonise particular types or uses of technology but to explore technological systems from a
different angle in the hope of providing insights that are less salient from other perspectives.
Consider “technologies of political control,” most commonly used by governments against
their own people (Ackroyd et al., 1974; Wright, 1998). These technologies include tools of
torture and execution including electroshock batons, thumb cuffs, restraint chairs, leg
shackles, stun grenades and gallows. They include technologies used against crowds such as
convulsants and infrasound weapons (Omega Foundation, 2000). They include specially
designed surveillance equipment.
In this discussion, “technology” refers not just to artefacts but also to the social
arrangements surrounding these artefacts, including design, manufacture, and contexts of
use. To refer to “technologies of political control” is to invoke this wider context: an artefact
on its own may seem innocuous but still be implicated in systems of repression. Repression
here refers to force used against humans for the purposes of harm, punishment or social
control.
Torture has a long history. It must be considered a prime example of human evil. Few
species intentionally inflict pain and suffering on other members of their own species.
Among humans, torture is now officially renounced by every government in the world, but it
still takes place in many countries, for example in China, Egypt and Afghanistan, as
documented by Amnesty International. Torture also takes place in many conventional
prisons, for example via solitary confinement.
To support torture and repression, there is an associated industry. Scientists design new ways
to inflict pain and suffering, using drugs, loud noises, disorienting lights, sensory deprivation
and other means. The tools for delivering these methods are constructed in factories and the
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products marketed around the world, especially to buyers seeking means to control and
harm others. Periodically, “security fairs” are held in which companies selling repression
technologies tout their products to potential buyers.
The technology of repression does not have a high profile, but it is a significant industry,
involving tens of billions of dollars in annual sales. It is a prime cause of human suffering. So
what are people doing about it?
Those directly involved seem to have few moral objections. Scientists use their skills to
design more sophisticated ways of interrogating, incarcerating and torturing people.
Engineers design the manufacturing processes and numerous workers maintain production.
Sales agents tout the technologies to purchasers. Governments facilitate this operation,
making extraordinary efforts to get around attempts to control the repression trade. So here
is an entire industry built around technologies that serve to control and harm defenceless
humans, and it seems to be no problem to find people who are willing to participate and
indeed to tenaciously defend the continuation of the industry.
In this, most of the world’s population are bystanders. Mass media pay little attention.
Indeed, there are fictional dramas that legitimise torture and, more generally, the use of
violence against the bad guys. Most people remain ignorant of the trade in repression
technologies. For those who learn about it, few make any attempt to do something about it,
for example by joining a campaign.
Finally there are a few resisters. There are groups like the Omega Research Foundation that
collect information about the repression trade and organisations like Amnesty International
and Campaign Against Arms Trade that campaign against it. Journalists have played an
important role in exposing the trade (Gregory, 1995).
The production, trade and use of technologies of repression, especially torture technologies,
provide a prime example of how technologies can be implicated in human evil. They
illustrate quite a few of the features noted by Bartlett. There is no evidence that the
scientists, engineers, production workers, sales agents and politician allies of the industry are
anything other than psychologically normal. Indeed, it is an industry organised much like any
other, except devoted to producing objects used to harm humans.
Nearly all of those involved in the industry are simply operating as cogs in a large enterprise.
They have abdicated responsibility for causing harm, a reflection of humans’ tendency to
obey authorities. As for members of the public, the psychological process of projection
provides a reassuring message: torture is only used as a last result against enemies such as
terrorists. “We” are good and “they” are bad, so what is done to them is justified.
Weapons and Tobacco
Along with the technology of repression, weapons of war are prime candidates for being
understood as implicated in evil. If war is an expression of the human potential for violence,
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then weapons are a part of that expression. Indeed, increasing the capacity of weapons to
maim, kill and destroy has long been a prime aim of militaries. So-called conventional
weapons include everything from bullets and bayonets to bombs and ballistic missiles, and
then there are biological, chemical and nuclear weapons.
Studying weaponry is a way of learning about the willingness of humans to use their
ingenuity to harm other humans. Dum-dum bullets were designed to tumble in flight so as
to cause more horrendous injuries on exiting a body. Brightly coloured land mines can be
attractive to young children. Some of these weapons have been banned, while others take
their place. In any case, it is reasonable to ask, what was going through the minds of those
who conceived, designed, manufactured, sold and deployed such weapons?
The answer is straightforward, yet disturbing. Along the chain, individuals may have thought
they were serving their country’s cause, helping defeat an enemy, or just doing their job and
following orders. Indeed, it can be argued that scientific training and enculturation serve to
develop scientists willing to work on assigned tasks without questioning their rationale
(Schmidt, 2000).
Nuclear weapons, due to their capacity for mass destruction, have long been seen as
especially bad, and there have been significant mass movements against these weapons
(Wittner, 1993–2003). However, the opposition has not been all that successful, because
there continue to be thousands of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of eight or so militaries,
and most people seldom think about it. Nuclear weapons exemplify Bartlett’s contention
that most people do not do much to oppose war — even a war that would devastate the
earth.
Consider something a bit different: cigarettes. Smoking brings pleasure, or at least relief from
craving, to hundreds of millions of people daily, at the expense of a massive death toll
(Proctor, 2011). By current projections, hundreds of millions of people will die this century
from smoking-related diseases.
Today, tobacco companies are stigmatised and smoking is becoming unfashionable — but
only in some countries. Globally, there are ever more smokers and ever more victims of
smoking-related illnesses. Cigarettes are part of a technological system of design, production,
distribution, sales and use. Though the cigarette itself is less complex than many military
weapons, the same questions can be asked of everyone involved in the tobacco industry:
how can they continue when the evidence of harm is so overwhelming? How could industry
leaders spend decades covering up their own evidence of harm while seeking to discredit
scientists and public health officials whose efforts threatened their profits?
The answers draw on the same psychological processes involved in the perpetuation of
violence and cruelty in more obvious cases such as genocide, including projection and
obedience. The ideology of the capitalist system plays a role too, with the legitimating myths
of the beneficial effects of markets and the virtue of satisfying consumer demand.
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For examining the role of technology in evil, weapons and cigarettes are easy targets for
condemnation. A more challenging case is the wide variety of technologies that contribute to
greenhouse gas emissions and hence to climate change, with potentially catastrophic effects
for future generations and for the biosphere. The technologies involved include motor
vehicles (at least those with internal combustion engines), steel and aluminum production,
home heating and cooling, and the consumption of consumer goods. The energy system is
implicated, at least the part of it predicated on carbon-based fuels, and there are other
contributors as well such as fertilisers and clearing of forests.
Most of these technologies were not designed to cause harm, and those involved as
producers and consumers may not have thought of their culpability for contributing to
future damage to the environment and human life. Nevertheless, some individuals have
greater roles and responsibilities. For example, many executives in fossil fuel companies and
politicians with the power to reset energy priorities have done everything possible to restrain
shifting to a sustainable energy economy.
Conceptualising the Technology of Evil
If technologies are implicated in evil, what is the best way to understand the connection? It
could be said that an object designed and used for torture embodies evil. Embodiment seems
appropriate if the primary purpose is for harm and the main use is for harm, but seldom is
this sort of connection exclusive of other uses. A nuclear weapon, for example, might be
used as an artwork, a museum exhibit, or a tool to thwart a giant asteroid hurtling towards
earth.
Another option is to say that some technologies are “selectively useful” for harming others:
they can potentially be useful for a variety of purposes but, for example, easier to use for
torture than for brain surgery or keeping babies warm. To talk of selective usefulness instead
of embodiment seems less essentialist, more open to multiple interpretations and uses.
Other terms are “abuse” and “misuse.” Think of a cloth covering a person’s face over which
water is poured to give a simulation of drowning, used as a method of torture called
waterboarding. It seems peculiar to say that the wet cloth embodies evil given that it is only
the particular use that makes it a tool to cause harm to humans. “Abuse” and “misuse” have
an ignominious history in the study of technology because they are often based on the
assumption that technologies are inherently neutral. Nevertheless, these terms might be
resurrected in speaking of the connection between technology and evil when referring to
technologies that were not designed to cause harm and are seldom used for that purpose.
Consider next the role of technologies in contributing to climate change. For this, it is useful
to note that most technologies have multiple uses and consequences. Oil production, for
example, has various immediate environmental and health impacts. Oil, as a product, has
multitudinous uses, such as heating houses, manufacturing plastics and fuelling military
aircraft. The focus here is on a more general impact via the waste product carbon dioxide
that contributes to global warming. In this role, it makes little sense to call oil evil in itself.
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Instead, it is simply one player in a vast network of human activities that collectively are
spoiling the environment and endangering future life on earth. The facilitators of evil in this
case are the social and economic systems that maintain dependence on greenhouse gas
sources and the psychological processes that enable groups and individuals to resist a shift to
sustainable energy systems or to remain indifferent to the issue.
For climate change, and sustainability issues more generally, technologies are implicated as
part of entrenched social institutions, practices and beliefs that have the potential to radically
alter or destroy the conditions for human and non-human life. One way to speak of
technologies in this circumstance is as partners. Another is to refer to them as actors or
actants, along the lines of actor-network theory (Latour, 1987), though this gives insufficient
salience to the psychological dimensions involved.
Another approach is to refer to technologies as extensions of humans. Marshall McLuhan
(1964) famously described media as “extensions of man.” This description points to the way
technologies expand human capabilities. Vehicles expand human capacities for movement,
otherwise limited to walking and running. Information and communication technologies
expand human senses of sight, hearing and speaking. Most relevantly here, weapons expand
human capacities for violence, in particular killing and destruction. From this perspective,
humans have developed technologies to extend a whole range of capacities, some of them
immediately or indirectly harmful.
In social studies of technology, various frameworks have been used, including political
economy, innovation, social shaping, cost-benefit analysis and actor-network theory. Each
has advantages and disadvantages, but none of the commonly used frameworks emphasises
moral evaluation or focuses on the way some technologies are designed or used for the
purpose of harming humans and the environment.
Implications
The Pathology of Man is a deeply pessimistic and potentially disturbing book. Probing into the
psychological foundations of violence and cruelty shows a side of human behaviour and
thinking that is normally avoided. Most commentators prefer to look for signs of hope, and
would finish a book such as this with suggestions for creating a better world. Bartlett,
though, does not want to offer facile solutions.
Throughout the book, he notes that most people prefer not to examine the sources of
human evil, and so he says that hope is actually part of the problem. By continually being
hopeful and looking for happy endings, it becomes too easy to avoid looking at the diseased
state of the human mind and the systems it has created.
Setting aside hope, nevertheless there are implications that can be derived from Bartlett’s
analysis. Here I offer three possible messages regarding technology.
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Firstly, if it makes sense to talk about human evil in a non-metaphorical sense, and to trace
the origins of evil to features of human psychology, then technologies, as human creations,
are necessarily implicated in evil. The implication is that a normative analysis is imperative. If
evil is seen as something to be avoided or opposed, then likewise those technologies most
closely embodying evil are likewise to be avoided or opposed. This implies making
judgements about technologies. In technologies studies, this already occurs to some extent.
However, common frameworks, such as political economy, innovation and actor-network
theory, do not highlight moral evaluation.
Medical researchers do not hesitate to openly oppose disease, and in fact the overcoming of
disease is an implicit foundation of research. Technology studies could more openly
condemn certain technologies.
Secondly, if technology is implicated in evil, and if one of the psychological processes
perpetuating evil is a lack of recognition of it and concern about it, there is a case for
undertaking research that provides insights and tools for challenging the technology of evil.
This has not been a theme in technology studies. Activists against torture technologies and
military weaponry would be hard pressed to find useful studies or frameworks in the
scholarship about technology.
One approach to the technology of evil is action research (McIntyre 2008; Touraine 1981),
which involves combining learning with efforts towards social change. For example, research
on the torture technology trade could involve trying various techniques to expose the trade,
seeing which ones are most fruitful. This would provide insights about torture technologies
not available via conventional research techniques.
Thirdly, education could usefully incorporate learning about the moral evaluation of
technologies. Bartlett argues that one of the factors facilitating evil is the low moral
development of most people, as revealed in the widespread complicity in or complacency
about war preparation and wars, and about numerous other damaging activities.
One approach to challenging evil is to increase people’s moral capacities to recognise and act
against evil. Technologies provide a convenient means to do this, because human-created
objects abound in everyday life, so it can be an intriguing and informative exercise to figure
out how a given object relates to killing, hatred, psychological projection and various other
actions and ways of thinking involved in violence, cruelty and the destruction of the
foundations of life.
No doubt there are many other ways to learn from the analysis of human evil. The most
fundamental step is not to turn away but to face the possibility that there may be something
deeply wrong with humans as a species, something that has made the species toxic to itself
and other life forms. While it is valuable to focus on what is good about humans, to promote
good it is also vital to fully grasp the size and depth of the dark side.
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Vol. 8, no. 2 (2019): 1-14
https://wp.me/p1Bfg0-466
Acknowledgements
Thanks to Steven Bartlett, Lyn Carson, Kurtis Hagen, Kelly Moore and Steve Wright for
valuable comments on drafts.
Contact details: bmartin@uow.edu.au
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