No. 114
Ab
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March 2020
azi
a
South
Ossetia
Adjara
caucasus
analytical
digest
or no
Nag bakh
Kara
www.laender-analysen.de/cad
www.css.ethz.ch/en/publications/cad.html
FORMAL AND INFORMAL POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
Special Editors: Farid Guliyev and Lusine Badalyan (Justus Liebig University Giessen)
■ Introduction by the Special Editors
The Interplay of Formal and Informal Institutions in the South Caucasus
2
■ Post-Velvet Transformations in Armenia: Fighting an Oligarchic Regime
By Nona Shahnazarian (Institute for Archaeology and Ethnography at the Armenian
National Academy of Sciences, Yerevan)
3
■ Formal-Informal Relations in Azerbaijan
By Farid Guliyev (Justus Liebig University Giessen)
7
■ From a Presidential to a Parliamentary Government in Georgia
By Levan Kakhishvili (Bamberg Graduate School of Social Sciences, Germany)
German Association for
East European Studies
Research Centre
for East European Studies
University of Bremen
Center
for Security Studies
ETH Zurich
CRRC-Georgia
11
Center for Eastern European
Studies
University of Zurich
CAUCASUS ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 114, March 2020
Introduction by the Special Editors
The Interplay of Formal and Informal Institutions in the South Caucasus
Over the past decade, the three republics of the South Caucasus made changes to their constitutions. Georgia shifted
from presidentialism to a dual executive system in 2012 and then, in 2017, amended its constitution to transform into
a European-style parliamentary democracy.
In Armenia, faced with the presidential term limit, the former President Sargsyan initiated constitutional reforms
in 2013, which in 2015 resulted in Armenia’s moving from a semipresidential system to a parliamentary system. While
this allowed the incumbent party to gain the majority of seats in the April 2017 parliamentary election and enabled
Sargsyan to continue as a prime minister, the shift eventually backfired, spilling into a mass protest, the ousting of
Sargsyan from office, and the victory of Nikol Pashinyan’s bloc in a snap parliamentary election in December 2018.
In Azerbaijan, which has preserved the formally presidentialist constitution, the referendum in 2016 approved constitutional amendments that extended the presidential term from 5 to 7 years and created new posts of vice-presidents.
In the following year, the president appointed the first lady, who is also believed to be a leading figure in a powerful
informal network, as the first vice president.
How can these constitutional-institutional changes be explained? Two influential political science approaches provide different sets of explanations for these changes. First, a neopatrimonial perspective supporting the primacy of
informal patron-clientelist networks holds that formal institutions are epiphenomenal and merely reflect the underlying competition between the various informal networks that dominate politics in poorly institutionalized Eurasian
countries (Fisun 2012). Second, a patronal politics perspective inspired by the neopatrimonialist view maintains that
formal institutions do matter, especially in structuring informal elite actors’ views and expectations about relevant
centres of power (Hale 2011).
The contributions to this special issue address these issues by looking at the interplay between informal and formal
institutions in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. In Armenia, Nona Shahnazarian looks at the deep-seated cultural
roots of clientelism in post-Soviet societies and discusses the efforts by the government of Prime Minister Pashinyan
to eradicate the power of oligarchs that persists to date. In Azerbaijan, Farid Guliyev looks at how formal institutions
are largely a façade, although one that can be used and instrumentalized by the ruling elite to package ex ante informal power arrangements and thus maintain autocratic rule. Finally, examining the shift from the presidential to parliamentary system and the electoral system reform in Georgia, Levan Kakhishvili shows how formal and informal
institutions constitute each other in this arguably most advanced reformer in the Caucasus region: formal institutions
shape informal actions, while informal rules, in turn, influence which formal rules are adopted.
Farid Guliyev and Lusine Badalyan
(Justus Liebig University Giessen)
References:
• Fisun, Oleksandr. “Rethinking Post-Soviet Politics from a Neopatrimonial Perspective.” Demokratizatsiya. The
Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization 20: 2 (2012): 87–96.
• Hale, Henry E. “Formal Constitutions in Informal Politics: Institutions and Democratization in Post-Soviet Eurasia.” World Politics 63:4 (2011): 581–617.
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Post-Velvet Transformations in Armenia: Fighting an Oligarchic Regime
By Nona Shahnazarian (Institute for Archaeology and Ethnography at the Armenian National Academy of Sciences,
Yerevan)
DOI: 10.3929/ethz-b-000400500
Abstract
Nikol Pashinyan’s rise to power was fuelled by resentment over cronyism, corruption, and poor governance
by the ruling elite. The April 2018 revolution that happened in Armenia has garnered many names—the
velvet revolution, the white revolution, the revolution of smiles –all of which serve to highlight its non-violent nature. In June 2018, Pashinyan’s new team initiated a thorough audit of corrupt former officials and
some of the country’s oligarchs. This study examines informal economic practices and anti-corruption measures in Armenia through a methodology based on interviews and media analysis.
From a Planned to a ‘Moral’ Economy
In modern money-based societies, a distinction is commonly made between the formal and the informal economy. Of course, the line between the two can be hard
to draw in practice. To put the distinction more simply,
the formal economy is the sum of economic exchanges
that are regulated by the law and the state, whereas the
informal economy exists beyond the control of the state
and is regulated by social norms and practices. In the
Soviet era, the black-market economy (referred to in
Soviet parlance as the “shadow economy”) facilitated the
existence of the Soviet state by complementing its official economy. The distribution of goods was promoted
by informal social networks, referred to by the Russian
word blat (Ledeneva, 1998). Strong Soviet power pushed
informal institutions out of the public sphere, but these
practices continued to dominate in private. In the postSoviet era, given the “logic” of self-perpetuation, such
practices, in particular, institutions of kinship and personal networks, continue to play a vitally important role
with only one difference: if in Soviet times they supplemented the economic order, in the post-Soviet period,
there was almost a complete substitution of formal interactions with informal ones. Now that the totalitarian
regime has fallen, “the panoptical control of the authoritarian state transforms into the individual responsibility of community members” (Хестанов, 2003). The
patrimonial order provides a unit of social organization in a “weak” state. Informal economic activities in
the post-Soviet period thus gain utmost importance
for daily survival. The economic vacuum that was created by the weakening and ultimate collapse of old state
institutions, together with destructive wars and conflicts, has given new impulse to “rooted” social relations
and personal support networks. In this dubious context,
another main characteristic of economic reality is that
aspiration to political activity and to power appears in
Armenia (and other regional communities) as more of
a means of legitimate access to social goods rather than
an opportunity to change society for the better. In this
context, power is the effort to legitimize one’s advantages within the social structure. The inseparability of
the public-political and private spheres in the communities under study has produced new forms of patrimonialism, and as a result, the state is governed like a private possession of the ruling elites (Fisun, 2012).
Corruption and Dysfunctional Markets
There are some cultural dimensions of corruption and
informality. In some cases, shadow (informal) economic
(re)distribution and clientelism at the most minimalist level function as the last refuge of democratic relations (Mars and Altman, 1983), namely, the so-called
moral economy, or peasant communism (Scott, 2003,
p. 541–544). However, corrupt state institutions and
law enforcement significantly increase social cynicism.
During the post-Soviet transition to a market economy,
in the face of weak state institutions and the failure of
the Soviet-style welfare state, claims of representatives of
state agencies (law enforcement, judges, and academics)
to informal incomes become an indisputable norm in
Armenia. The moral economy of corruption places these
relations in the wider context of the “corruption complex” and emphasizes their everyday nature and a certain legitimacy recognized by the victims of extortion.
This set of complex relations is insensitive to the type
of political regime.
Everyday discourses on bribery and evaluations of
the phenomenon are contradictory and inconsistent and
refer to moral categories: while cruel bribes imposed by
regular citizens are condemned, stealing from the state
is considered not only irreprehensible but also heroic
(this value is certainly inherited from the Soviet era). The
metaphors of “nobody’s property (nicheinoe),” “governmental pie” (kazyonnyi pirog), and “feeder” (kormushka)
have remained current even after the collapse of the
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CAUCASUS ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 114, March 2020
USSR (Голосенко, 1999). The Soviet jail subculture
reflected a certain social reasoning and built a specific
hierarchy of crimes: the most honourable prisoners were
those sentenced for “stealing Socialist property.” This
factor would make it easy for them to become “big shots”
in structures much larger than a single common cell. In
Soviet times, this was one of the ways of overcoming
the strong ideological domination by developing alternative thinking. This subculture was immensely popular
among common people. It is symbolic that the names of
Armenian business magnates, oligarchs, although they
had already become members of parliament, were more
like prison nicknames: examples of this are the Armenian magnates “Dodi” Gago, “Grzo”, “Tzaghik” Rubo,
“Lyfik” Samo, and “Nemets (German)” Rubo.1
In this context, exchanges that are illegitimate from
a legal standpoint are quite legitimate from the viewpoint of customary law. The discourses about corruption
and stealing are therefore dualized or even multiplied.
Usually, authority as a resource (as a way to pseudolegitimate corruption) is not questioned in the internal discourse at all. In such a semantic space, officials’
crimes of different degrees tend to become a norm of
the state routine.
At the same time, in nation states that are not isolated from the democratic world and, moreover, have
officially claimed to be democratic, the formal language
of the political culture is liberal-democratic. It is possible to observe the distinct dividing line between legal
and moral normativity, which leads to constant conflicts in the process of the liberalization of the economic
structure. This often engenders ideological and bureaucratic chaos and creates a fertile ground for manipulative approaches equally towards both traditional rules
and liberal values. This kind of manipulation coupled
with extreme, systematic corruption transformed the
previous Armenian political regimes into a mere imitation of democracy.
Oligarchic Structure and Political
Clientelism
Business integrity is a critical challenge in Armenia, as
Christoph Stefes (2006, p. 29) has detailed. As in many
post-Soviet states, the merger of political and economic
elites interferes with equal opportunity, fair play, and
anti-corruption programmes. As in Russia, the formation of oligarchic structures in Armenia and the CIS
countries was facilitated by certain triggers: 1) the lack
of a legal framework for new capitalist-style economic
1
activity and 2) the so-called “voucher privatization”,
implemented according to IMF directives (Петросян,
2019). Because Armenia was involved in the processing industry and technology in the USSR, the oligarchic groups in Armenia structurally formed around siloviki (primarily defence ministers and representatives of
internal affairs, as well as managers of transport communications, including at Zvartnots airport). Initially,
the emerging oligarchic structures in economic terms
were focused on export-import operations, food industry products, and humanitarian aid. One politician—
Vano Siradeghyan—was central to prosecuting postcommunist criminals in Armenia. By the mid-1990s,
some entrenched politicians (some of them with a Soviet
SPSU nomenclature background, who promptly camouflaged themselves as national actors) and local governors had developed several overlapping strategies to
circumvent the competition originated by the free market. In Armenia, multiple blockades from neighbouring countries aggravated this process, which resulted
in neo-patrimonial political capitalism of a protectionist nature. The merging of the business and political
spheres engendered patron-clientelism in the polity. On
a regular basis, Samvel Alexanyan and other oligarchs,
such as Gagik Tsarukyan and SAS supermarket chain
owner Artak Sargsyan, used their influence over their
employees to help former government candidates get
votes during elections.
However, things changed after the 2018 Velvet Revolution in the country. Kinship networks are one of the
many bases of bribery and corruption, among other
types of informal exchanges. These are types of strong
ties (Granovetter, 1983), and among them, along with
kinship, is friendship. Friendship acts in a way as a quasifamilial structure to form a loyalist’s network, a circle of
trust. For instance, ex-president Serj Sargsyan’s (as well
as other officials’) classmates and friends receive exorbitant privileges.
Before Pashinyan became prime minister, a group
of businesspeople and authorities fled the country, presumably out of fear of being investigated. One of those
individuals was the ex-president’s brother Alexander
Sargsyan, whose reputation was that “everyone who had
‘business’ with him knows that he always demands his
50 percent without investing even a penny.” His nickname in Armenian is Hisun-Hisun (“50/50”), leading
to his moniker of “Sashik-50 percent.” Sashik’s justification for demanding a large share of business profits
was the classic post-Soviet offering of “protection” (kry-
In some cases, there are various explanations for the origins of the nicknames. “Dod” in Armenian slang is “stupid”. Perhaps, in this case,
this word has a positive connotation, in the same way that Ivan the Fool is a key positive hero in the Russian fairy tale. Khachatur Sukiasyan is called “Grzo” by association with a fellow villager. “Tzaghik” (“flower”) Rubo has a network of flower shops named “Brabion”. “Lyfik”
Samo’s nickname comes from the Russian word lifchik (“bra”): In Soviet times, he used to have a shadow workshop for the production of
bras.
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CAUCASUS ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 114, March 2020
sha) for that business. In short, he exploited his close
connections to the inner sanctum of the ruling clan to
embezzle national and private resources. He was reviled
in Armenia.
Tycoons and “Heroes”—Veterans of
Karabakh War
Immediately after the Velvet Revolution, the National
Security Service (NSS) targeted the large supermarket
sector. Masked NSS officials stormed the “Yerevan City”
supermarket conglomerate, owned by oligarch and MP
Samvel Alexanyan, who had made a significant financial
electoral contribution to former president Serzh Sargsyan and the RPA [Republican Party of Armenia]. It surfaced that “Yerevan City” as well as eleven other major
retail chains were committing fraud in their accounting and avoiding paying taxes. In Armenia, for a small
business with a turnover that does not exceed 240,000
drams, there is a simplified taxation scheme: instead of
paying a certain VAT, they pay a turnover tax of two
percent. The supermarket and retail owners took advantage of this and had registered hundreds of fake individual “entrepreneurs” to make it seem that their enterprise was a set of small businesses to pay low taxes. This
scheme had been in use for years and had caused millions
of dollars in losses to the Armenian state. The previous
heads of law enforcement and the tax authority, Vladimir Gasparyan and Vardan Haruthunyan, certainly
knew about this arrangement and most likely supported
it. The NSS called in for questioning practically all of
the officials who had any associations with retail conglomerates. In the end, Alexanyan left the RPA parliamentary faction, and his case was resolved by his willingness to cooperate with the investigation and provide
reimbursements. There have been hundreds of scandals
in a similar vein since the 2018 revolution.
Revolutionary prime minister Nikol Pashinyan
ordered a series of raids and arrests that predominantly
targeted members of the RPA. Although it is not especially constructive for society at large when a new administration uses its new powers to comprehensively attack
a former administration, the Armenian government in
this case needed a clean sweep. For example, on June
14, 2018, the NSS arrested General Manvel Grigoryan,
a senior official in the Yerevan city government, which
was then controlled by the RPA. Grigoryan was a Karabakh fighter and the head of Erkrapah, Armenia’s largest
organization of war veterans. Prosecutors stated that Grigoryan misappropriated state goods and donations for the
army. He was arrested after the NSS released footage of
the raid on his home where large quantities of weapons,
food, and ammunition were found and confiscated. Items
discovered on his property included vehicles meant for
the military and, rather astoundingly, donated food items
for troops that he was apparently feeding to animals in
his private zoo. For decades, the Grigoryan “clan” had
served as a symbol of ubiquitous corruption, lawlessness,
and systemic violence. They used to rule the city of Etchmiadzin as a private neo-patrimonial fiefdom. While representatives of the former authorities have accused the
new government of a political vendetta, affiliation with
a certain political party was actually a key mechanism
of that kind of state-sponsored theft and plunder.
Conclusion
Corruption was one of the critical reasons for the recent
revolution in Armenia. The country is now fighting corruption with a case-by-case formula with all the investigative bodies at its disposal. The Ministry of Justice has
an anti-corruption strategic plan for 2019–2022. The
main directions are the prevention of corruption, investigations of corruption, and anti-corruption education
and awareness. However, Pashinyan’s administration
has been criticized for not implementing institutional
changes in the fight against corruption. In November
2019, the highly ineffective ethics committee was
replaced with a new committee for corruption prevention. The decision to create the committee was made
in 2017 but was delayed because of the revolution. The
candidates were proposed by the government, parliament and supreme judicial council. On November 26,
2019, Haykuhi Harutyunyan, suggested by the opposition party “Bright Armenia”, was elected as head of the
committee. This committee has no legal authority and
will not be able to prosecute; instead, it will examine
declarations from high-ranking officials and establish
conflicts of interest. The anti-corruption body that will
have legal authority will be set up only in 2021 with
a separate corruption court.
The reduction of informal exchanges and the fight
against corruption and crime, as the Georgian case
clearly showed, is directly related to national security.
Steps have been taken in the right direction over the
past year: abuses of office by high-level officials have
been publicly revealed, and major criminal cases have
been brought to court. However, some parliamentarians,
institutions, and, without a doubt, some oligarchs persist as obstacles to Armenia’s genuine democratic reform.
Nevertheless, the new rules of the economic game—in
particular, the strong call for more transparency by the
new Armenian government—have resulted in a reduction of the shadow economy to the benefit of the treasury. The process is underway.
See overleaf for information about the author and bibliography
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CAUCASUS ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 114, March 2020
About the Author
Nona Shahnazarian is a social anthropologist who is a Senior Research Fellow at The Institute of Archeology and
Ethnography, National Academy of Sciences, Yerevan, Armenia. She is also affiliated with the Center for Independent Social Research, St. Petersburg, Russia. In 2017, she was a Visiting Carnegie Fellow at Stanford University. She
has published extensively on the issues of gender, war, migration, economic anthropology, memory and diaspora in
the Caucasus, including a book chapter National Ideologies, Survival Strategies and Gender Identity in the Political and
Symbolic Contexts of Karabakh War (2010), as well as a monograph in Russian “In the Tight Embrace of Tradition: War
and Patriarchy” (2011). Her most recent publications include The Republic of Armenia (with Kristin Cavoukian), which
appeared in The Palgrave Handbook of Women’s Political Rights (2018), and “Goodbye ‘Sashik-Fifty Percent’: Anti-Corruption Trends in the New Armenia,” PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo 611, 2019, http://www.ponarseurasia.org/memo/
goodbye-sashik-fifty-percent-anti-corruption-trends-new-armenia
Bibliography
• Fisun, Oleksandr. 2012. “Rethinking Post-Soviet Politics from a Neopatrimonial Perspective.” Demokratizatsiya
20:2: 87–96.
• Granovetter, Mark. 1983. “The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revisited”. Sociological Theory 1: 201–233.
• Ledeneva, Alena. 1998. Russia’s Economy of Favors: Blat, Networking, and Informal Exchange, Cambridge University Press.
• Mars, Gerald and Yochanan Altman. 1983. “The Cultural Bases of Soviet Georgia’s Second Economy,” Soviet
Studies 35: 4: 546–60.
• Scott James. 2003. The Moral Economy of the Village. Informal Economics. Russia and the World. Ed. T. Shanin. M.: Logos. pp. 541–544.
• Stefes H. C. 2006. Understanding Post-Soviet Transitions. Corruption, Collusion and Clientelism. Palgrave Macmilan, p.29.
• Голосенко, И.А. 1999. Феномен “русской взятки”: очерк истории отечественной социологии чиновничества.
Журнал социологии и социальной антропологии 2(3): 101–116.
• Петросян Д., независимый журналист Некоторые аспекты накопления богатства: опыт предыдущих лет
Лекция, презентированная в ереванском офисе “Россотрудничества”, 5 июля 2019 г.
• Хестанов, Руслан. 2003. Эссе о времени, труде и капитале. Отечественные записки 3. http://magazines.russ.
ru/oz/2003/3/2003_3_13.html
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Formal-Informal Relations in Azerbaijan
By Farid Guliyev (Justus Liebig University Giessen)
DOI: 10.3929/ethz-b-000400500
Abstract
In the neopatrimonial context, formal institutions cohabit the governance space with informal institutions.
Azerbaijan is a good example of how formal institutions such as referendums, elections and the judiciary are
used as window dressing behind which patrimonial relationships thrive and proliferate. While written rules
act as a façade, they perform useful functions for the regime, allowing the ruler to create the appearance of
legality and maintain autocratic control of the system. However, the patrimonial informality (or informalities) that underpin the neopatrimonial system and govern actual behaviour ultimately undermine the formal
‘institutions as constraints’ basis, which is necessary for democracy and the impartial rule of law to take root.
Formal-Informal Dichotomy
Nearly three decades after the breakup of the Soviet
Union, scholars still debate the relative weight of formal
vs. informal institutions in post-communist societies.
While many post-Soviet states have adopted the formal
trappings of Western-style democracy and liberal constitutionalism, there appears to be a discrepancy between
formal (written) laws and informal rules that guide the
behaviour of actors in practice.
Informal rules seem to be more pronounced in those
post-Soviet states where patrimonial-communist legacies
have left a deeper imprint on their society. Patrimonial
communism denotes the model of a communist oneparty regime in Russia and other Soviet republics with
a prevalence of pre-communist authoritarian-institutional legacies of personalistic rule and patron-clientelist practices without a well-developed and professional bureaucratic administration (Kitschelt et al. 1999,
52). Patrimonial communism is contrasted with the
bureaucratic-authoritarian type of communist rule in
the Czech Republic and in former East Germany (GDR),
where the establishment of the [Weberian-style] legalrational bureaucratic apparatus predated the instalment
of communism.
Azerbaijan exhibits the extreme form of the (neo)
patrimonial ideal type. Patrimonial and patron-clientelist relations with roots in both the communist era and
pre-communist past permeate all capillaries of political life. Here, the formal bureaucratic structure modelled after the Western-style rule-of-law system and professionalized bureaucratic apparatus from where it was
borrowed co-exist with (and possibly complement) the
patrimonial rules of the game that prevail. Based on
personal authority, rather than legal rationality and
the supremacy of impersonal laws, patrimonial rule
rests on the ruler’s maintenance of personal loyalty in
exchange for particularistic favours to his clients, lieutenants and supporters.
Under (neo)patrimonialism, the formal structure is
officially grounded in the principles of rational bureaucracy and legal authority. Legal-rational authority, according to Weber, implies that
“the legitimacy of the power holder to give commands rests upon rules that are rationally established by enactment… Orders are given in the
name of the impersonal norm, rather than in the
name of a personal authority; and even the giving of a command constitutes obedience toward
a norm rather than an arbitrary freedom, favor,
or privilege. The ‘official’ is the holder of the
power to command; he never exercises this power
in his own right; he holds it as a trustee of the
impersonal and ‘compulsory institution’” (Weber
1946, 294–295).
However, under neopatrimonialism, legal-rational rule
is adhered to only nominally, as in practice, patrimonial logic dominates and supersedes the legal-rational
bureaucratic authority structure. Patrimonial relationships are regulated “through individual privileges and
bestowals of favor” (Weber 1946, 198). While the neopatrimonial system is constituted by these two domains,
the formal constitutional-legal order serves largely as
a façade that conceals and embellishes patrimonial
relationships that undermine formal institutional constraints and thus are inimical to democratization and
judicial independence.
In this respect, neopatrimonialism is akin to the
Potemkin village model (Pisano 2018), wherein formal
rules and procedures are used ex post to confirm and codify informal decisions and agreements made within the
elite network ex ante.
“A Potemkin village is a simulation: a facade
meant to fool the viewer into thinking that he
or she is seeing the real thing… [to] describe
gaps between external appearances and underlying realities. In the Russian language, the genus
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includes species such as pokazukha (windowdressing), imitatsiia (mimicry…), feik (doctored
news images or reports)…” (Pisano 2018, 278).
Evidence
Below, I use constitutional referendums, parliamentary
elections and judicial independence (or the lack thereof)
from Azerbaijan’s recent past to illustrate the interplay
of formal-informal institutions in the country. It seems
that Azerbaijani leaders appear to value formal institutions for their property to create a sense of conformity
with constitutionalism, yet they in fact violate the impersonal nature of formal ‘institutions as constraints’. Rules
are amended or circumvented by the incumbent leader
in pursuit of his interests in preservation and the concentration of power as well as the succession of the presidential office within the ruling family. However, formal
institutions are not mere window dressing or a showy
façade to disguise the realities of patrimonial relationships; they perform important instrumental functions
for the regime. Constitutions that bestow most powers
upon the presidency define the locus of the ruler on the
institutional map and the degree of power concentration in the executive; they enable the ruler to exercise
autocratic control of the state apparatus and legitimize
his and his elite network’s grip on power.
Referendums
A referendum held in September 2016 approved the
amendment to the 1995 constitution that extended the
president’s term of office from 5 to 7 years and created new posts of vice-presidents. In the following year,
President Ilham Aliyev appointed his wife, Mehriban
Aliyeva, a leading figure from the powerful Pashayev
group, as First Vice-President. Another approved constitutional amendment granted the president the right
to dissolve parliament.
The rivalry between the well-established group led
by presidential chief-of-staff Ramiz Mehdiyev (the “old
guard”) and the Pashayev group and centred around
First Lady Mehriban Aliyeva (née Pashayeva) has been
a mainstay of Azerbaijani political life in recent years
(Adilgizi 2019). Over the years, the Pashayevs created
and expanded a business empire and accumulated power
by appointing their own cadres to ministerial positions,
where they clashed with Mehdiyev’s “old guard”. The “old
guard” comprises senior figures from the 1990s, many
hailing from the Nakhchivan province, who were loyal
allies of ex-president Heydar Aliyev. When Ilham Aliyev
succeeded his father in 2003, he kept these influential
politicians from his father’s era to prevent the elite from
potentially conspiring against him as he consolidated
his personal power. However, although there were no
visible disputes, the loyalty of the old guard members to
the president (and especially First Lady Mehriban Aliyeva with her presidential power ambitions) was arguably under suspicion (Safarova 2020).
In October 2019, President Aliyev began a major
reshuffling of his government and presidential administration, purging officials and public managers from the
older generation. In fact, the reshuffling commenced last
summer with the dismissal of the Minister of Internal
Affairs, Ramil Usubov, who was an influential figure in
the ‘old guard’ group. As a result, a number of prominent figures were demoted from their senior-level posts,
notably, Ramiz Mehdiyev, Novruz Mammadov (Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor and former Prime Minister) and Ali Hasanov (Presidential Assistant for Public
and Political Affairs). Mehdiyev, a communist-era apparatchik and the ‘grey cardinal’ of Azerbaijani domestic political affairs, commanded considerable political power and had extensive business interests. Purges
seem to have disproportionately targeted political heavyweights from the Mehdiyev-led ‘old guard’, following
the logic of inter-elite rivalry described above.
Speculations abound that the real cause behind the
government reshuffling has been economic, as the Azerbaijani economy was hard hit by the oil price slump starting circa 2014. As the size of oil revenues has shrunk, it
has become more difficult to accommodate the growing appetites of various rent-seeking groups. Resource
rent scarcity has animated and intensified competition
between rival ‘klanlar’ (the Azerbaijani word for ‘clans’),
the term used by media outlets and the public to refer
to influential elite networks led by a powerful individual politician or businessperson (an ‘oligarch’), often
cemented by family ties, regional affiliations or shared
business interests (Guliyev 2012). According to popular rumours, the demotion of the once-powerful ‘old
guard’ group (Mehdiyev-Usubov-Hasanov) from the
elite network signified the strengthening of the position
of the first lady’s Pashayev group and her personal power
ambitions to serve as the country’s first female president.
In fact, the use of referendums has become an almost
routine practice to bend rules-as-constraints in furthering the ruling elite’s informal power-transfer designs.
There have been two other referendums since the adoption of the constitution in 1995, each held in anticipation of a power succession.
In late August 2002, a referendum approved amendments including the elimination of the proportional representation (PR) component of the electoral system (25
deputies were elected through party lists and 100 in
single-member constituencies). However, most importantly, the constitutional amendment changed the order
of succession in the case of a president’s incapacitation.
According to the new rule, if the president resigned
before finishing his term, the prime minister would
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take over the president’s office. [In 2016, the Constitution was amended to put the First Vice President as
first in the line of presidential succession.]. It was clear
at that time that the constitutional change was motivated by President Heydar Aliyev, whose health deteriorated, to transfer power to his son, Ilham. Ilham Aliyev had already been appointed Prime Minster before
the president called for a referendum. The referendum
served to clear the way for the dynastic transfer of power
(Eurasianet 2003).
Somewhat similarly, another referendum in 2009
approved the abolition of term limits, which allowed Aliyev to run for presidency in 2013. The decision to eliminate term limits aimed to dissuade other elite groups
from plotting against the incumbent president, as “it
sent an unambiguous signal about regime and elite continuity”, while reappointments of most senior minister
and officials bolstered their pro-regime loyalty (Ahmadov 2011).
Parliamentary Elections
On December 5, 2019, President Aliyev decreed the dissolution of the parliament and set a snap election date
for February 9, 2020. In a mockery of checks and balances, it was the parliamentary majority that asked the
president to dissolve the parliament citing the incompatibility of the current parliamentary composition to
the president’s ambitious plans to “speed the course of
economic reform” (RFE/RL Azerbaijani Service 2019).
Azerbaijan’s rubber stamp parliament is dominated
by members of the ruling party and their proxies. The
decision to hold an early election took everyone by surprise and paved the way for speculations about the implementation of another elite-orchestrated scheme of the
dynastic transfer of power, this time from the president
to the first lady as discussed above. According to this
view, a snap parliamentary vote will cleanse the parliament of ‘old guard’ holdovers and replace them with
MPs who will be loyal to the now omnipotent Pashayev
network (BBC Azeri 2019). According to an opposition
leader Ali Karimli, the move to dissolve the parliament
“is not about any reforms at all, and seeks [instead] to
concentrate all power and resources in the hands of the
Pashayevs by extending their influence in the legislature” (Agayev 2019).
It is an open secret that there exists a certain informal practice of ‘shortlisting’ candidates approved by
the presidential apparatus. Until recently, it was popularly believed that Ramiz Mehtiyev himself would personally check and pre-select each individual candidate
before compiling a list of suitable candidates whose victory would be subsequently confirmed by what would
appear to be ‘free and fair’ parliamentary ‘election’. In
an authoritarian context, elections are largely a pro forma
show to legitimize and cover up what has already been
decided before the election takes place. In 1995, during
the first parliamentary election campaign, the opposition camp claimed that the list of winning candidates
was allegedly predetermined (OSCE/UN 1996). In the
November 2015 parliamentary elections, the results were
predictable to such an extent that the leader of an opposition bloc, Jamil Hasanli, was able to accurately predict
the identity of all but 5 (out of 125) MPs that matched
the list of candidates he posted one month prior to election day (BBC Azeri 2015).
Judicial Independence
In discussing different models of courts in authoritarian contexts, Solomon (2015) distinguishes a hybrid
model that fits Russia and other post-Soviet states.
In these countries, courts are established and appear
formally independent, but informal practices ensure
that court decisions favour the interests of the governing regime. In post-Soviet authoritarian regimes,
courts perform crucial functions of political control
and legitimacy. They allow authoritarian leaders to
secure legitimacy, to appear to have a normal democratic constitutional system, and “to cultivate good
reputations and public relations while retaining control over the administration of justice when needed”
(Solomon 2015, 433).
In Azerbaijan, executive interference in court rulings
is pervasive; courts generally lack independence and are
prone to corruption. According to one assessment, Azerbaijan’s criminal justice system “exhibits a high degree
of external influence on the judiciary, a certain degree
of corruption and an informal policy of punitiveness
in relation to dealing with people accused of offences”
(Shahbazov and Muradov 2019, 2). The Azerbaijani Bar
Association, controlled by the president, disbars arbitrarily independent members—most recently a lawyer
named Shahla Humbatova—who are brave enough to
defend sensitive cases involving the arrests of human
rights activists and political prisoners (CRD 2019).
Conclusion
In this Potemkin village hybrid of formal and informal
institutions, informal patrimonial relationships take
precedence over formal ones. Formal institutions are
largely window dressing, but they are not irrelevant. Formal legality provides a modicum of constitutional legality and democratic legitimacy. They serve the instrumental value for the regime of signalling its conformity with
accepted norms of good behaviour and package informal deals and intra-elite power arrangements. The case
of Azerbaijan demonstrates how formal institutions are
used to confirm informal backstage arrangements post
factum. Formal compliance with the letter of constitu-
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CAUCASUS ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 114, March 2020
tional order and other formal legal norms acts to cement
informal power constellations.
Moreover, informal practices are ubiquitous, and it
would be faulty to assume that a dearth or weakness of
formal institutions translates into some sort of institutional emptiness or institutional void. In contrast, much
of the actual workings of the system are done through
informal rules, norms and practices that are recognized,
accepted and practised. They structure the actual relations and expectations of actors, but further research is
needed to better understand the multiplicity, structure
and mechanics of operation of various informal institutions and practices.
About the Author
Farid Guliyev is a Postdoctoral Fellow at Justus Liebig University Giessen in Germany. His current research focuses
on energy policy, politics and the political economy of development in post-Soviet countries.
References
• Adilgizi, Lamiya. 2019. “Aliyev’s shakeup prompts speculation on political reforms”. Meydan TV, November 18,
http://mtv.re/8q8jts
• Agayev, Zulfugar. 2019. “Azerbaijan’s Ruling Party Urges President to Dissolve Parliament”, Bloomberg, November
28, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-11-28/azerbaijan-s-ruling-party-urges-president-to-dissolveparliament
• Ahmadov, Anar. 2011. “A Conditional Theory of the ‘Political Resource Curse:’ Oil, Autocrats, and Strategic
Contexts”. PhD Diss. London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/618/1/
Aahmadov_Conditional_Theory_Political_Resource_Curse.pdf
• BBC Azeri. 2015. “Cəmil Həsənlinin deputat siyahısı dübbədüz çıxdı” [Hasanli’s list of deputies turned out to be
accurate], November 2, https://www.bbc.com/azeri/azerbaijan/2015/11/151102_media_review_11_02
• BBC Azeri. 2019. “Parlamentin buraxılması Mehriban Əliyevanın prezidentliyə yolunun başlanğıcıdırmı?” [Is the
dissolution of parliament the beginning of Mehriban Aliyeva’s path to presidency?], November 28, https://www.
bbc.com/azeri/azerbaijan-50585069
• Civil Rights Defenders (CRD). 2019. “Open Letter to the Presidium of the Azerbaijani Bar Association”, December 4,
https://crd.org/2019/12/04/open-letter-to-the-presidium-of-the-azerbaijani-bar-association/
• Eurasianet. 2003. “Ilham Aliyev’s Appointment as Azerbaijan’s PM Sets Stage for Dynamic Transition”, August 4.
https://eurasianet.org/ilham-aliyevs-appointment-as-azerbaijans-pm-sets-stage-for-dynamic-transition
• Guliyev, Farid. 2012. “Political Elites in Azerbaijan”. In A. Heinrich and H. Pleines, eds. Challenges of the Caspian
Resource Boom. Domestic Elites and Policy-Making. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 117–130.
• Kitschelt, Herbert, et al. 1999. Post-Communist Party Systems: Competition, Representation, and Inter-Party Cooperation. Cambridge University Press.
• OSCE/UN. 1996. Joint Electoral Observation Mission in Azerbaijan, 12 November 1995 Parliamentary Election,
January, https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/azerbaijan/14291?download=true
• Pisano, Jessica. 2018. “Potemkin Village”, in A. Ledeneva, ed. Global Encyclopaedia of Informality. Vol. 2. UCL
Press, pp. 278–280. http://www.in-formality.com/wiki/index.php?title=Potemkin_village_(Russia)
• RFE/RL Azerbaijani Service. 2019. “Azerbaijan’s Ruling Party Calls for Dissolution of Parliament”. https://www.
rferl.org/a/azerbaijan-ruling-party-calls-for-dissolution-of-parliament/30296827.html
• RFE/RL. 2016. “Azerbaijan Holds Controversial Constitutional Referendum”, April 26. https://www.rferl.org/a/
azerbaijan-referendums-constitutional-changes-aliyev/28012681.html
• Safarova, Durna. 2020. “Azerbaijan’s Notorious Ideologue Suffers Precipitous Fall”. Eurasianet. January 17, https://
eurasianet.org/azerbaijans-notorious-ideologue-suffers-precipitous-fall
• Shahbazov, Inqilab, and Elsever Muradov. 2019. “Excessive use of pre-trial detention in Azerbaijan: Examination
of the causes.” International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice 57: 1–12. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijlcj.2019.01.001
• Solomon, Peter H. 2015. “Law and Courts in Authoritarian States.” International Encyclopedia of the Social &
Behavioral Sciences 2: 427–34. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-08-097086-8.86160-7
• Weber, Max. 1946. In: H. H. Gerth, and C. W. Mills (ed. and trans.). From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. New
York: Oxford University Press.
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From a Presidential to a Parliamentary Government in Georgia
By Levan Kakhishvili (Bamberg Graduate School of Social Sciences, Germany)
DOI: 10.3929/ethz-b-000400500
Abstract
Georgia has been undergoing the process of democratization for several decades now. In this process, an important but often overlooked factor is the interplay between formal and informal institutions. The pessimistic
view believes that informal institutions are the key to understanding Georgian politics, whereas a more optimistic view focuses on formal institutions and disregards the former’s significance. This article juxtaposes
both phenomena and analyses how incumbent regimes in Georgia have tried to reform the political system.
It is argued in this analysis that one has to consider the incumbent’s goal to maintain political power. Consequently, the analysis of two illustrative cases, i.e., moving from a presidential to a parliamentary system
and reforming the electoral system, suggests that formal institutions shape the informal practices of political
actors and that these informal practices influence what formal rules get adopted or how they are interpreted.
Introduction
Students of democratization have long hypothesized
that constitutions can be either perilous for the transition process from authoritarian rule to democracy or
conducive to this transformation. Often, parliamentary
systems are considered as more favourable for the process of democratization than a presidential government
system (Linz, 1990). Therefore, when countries such as
Georgia change their constitution and move to a parliamentary government, hopes for democratic consolidation are naturally raised among observers. However,
one cannot overlook the context in which such changes
occur. In post-Soviet countries, including Georgia, there
is always an interplay between formal rules and informal politics, and which one of these two prevails is not
always clear. Consequently, constitutional changes cannot be interpreted only as positive steps towards democracy. Rather, the role of new sets of formal rules should
be understood within the juxtaposition of formality
and informality.
This article explores Georgia’s experience of constitutional changes and provides supporting evidence
for how informality leads to institutional reforms and
how these reforms, in turn, influence the behaviour of
actors. For this purpose, two illustrative cases are analysed: Georgia’s transition from a presidential system to
a parliamentary government—a reform that was initiated under the rule of President Mikheil Saakashvili in
2012—and their electoral system reform, which also
requires constitutional amendments, as it is a transition
from a mixed electoral system to a fully proportional
vote made possible by abolishing the single-mandate
majoritarian vote. The Georgian political elite has been
discussing the latter reform for the last two decades, but
the actual changes have been inhibited due to incumbent regimes’ considerations on how to maintain power.
The following sections argue that these considerations
are the key to understanding constitutional changes in
Georgia. When the formal rules are too rigid to prevent power maintenance, they are loosened, whereas
when the rules are favourable for power maintenance,
the incumbent ensures avoiding formal changes even if
the short-term costs are high.
From Presidents to Parliaments: Why and
How the Constitution Matters in Georgia
The power dynamics between the parliament and president in Georgia have been similar to a roller coaster. Following the 2003 Rose Revolution led by Mikheil Saakashvili, the constitutional changes were mostly oriented
at consolidating the political power in the hands of the
president. For this, President Saakashvili was often criticized and accused of “creating a constitution for himself” (Kuprashvili 2010). However, such changes could
not overcome the rigid rule preventing a single person
from being elected as a president more than twice. This
formal rule is simply so strong and widely upheld that
even a charismatic leader such as Saakashvili could not
reasonably justify his staying in power after the second
term. On the one hand, this indicates that at least some
formal rules are untouchable and that they do influence
the course of action of the incumbent. However, in the
push-and-pull between formality and informality, rules
can change to reflect the interests of the powerful. For
Saakashvili, such a change would have been to remain
in power after his second presidential term by assuming
the office of prime minister, made possible by changing
the constitution and introducing a dual executive system with the increased power of both the prime minister and the parliament at the expense of the president.
Consequently, critics of Saakashvili feared that, similar to Vladimir Putin in Russia, he would still remain
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in power after his second presidential term (Kuprashvili 2010). Of course, these fears assumed that he did
intend to stay in power, and this assumption was not
ungrounded. Even though Saakashvili did not manage to take up the role of prime minister, his political
ambitions have not disappeared: he became a politician
in Ukraine and to this day remains the chairman of his
party, the United National Movement (UNM).
Unfortunately for Saakashvili, the constitutional
changes turned out to be insufficient for him to maintain the political steering wheel of Georgia’s political system. However, these changes paved the way to another
person’s informal influence. In 2012, the UNM was
defeated by a newly established political party, the Georgian Dream (GD) party, founded and led by Georgia’s
wealthiest person, billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, whose
fortune at the time was equal in value to roughly onethird of the country’s annual GDP (Forbes 2020).
The way in which the power dynamics unfolded in
Georgia after the 2012 parliamentary elections is, in fact,
more interesting than Saakashvili’s failed attempt at
retaining political power. The increased political weight
of the prime minister’s institution led to an unexpected
development in terms of what some authors call the
oligarchic system (Kononczuk, Cenusa and Kakachia
2017). Ivanishvili only served as the prime minister for
approximately 13 months in 2012–2013 and eventually
resigned without retaining any formal political or party
functions. However, he was still “widely perceived as the
most influential political actor in Georgia” (Kononczuk, Cenusa and Kakachia 2017), essentially controlling
Georgian politics. His informal method of governance
included dictating major political decisions, as well as,
in essence, appointing and firing prime ministers. The
2016 elections further increased his influence, as the GD
party managed to obtain a supermajority in the parliament, which is necessary for adopting constitutional
changes. Although in May 2018, Ivanishvili assumed
the formal position of the chairman of the GD party
(Agenda.ge 2018), this move should not be seen as formal rules prevailing informal practices. Instead, this
development is better understood as a signal for voters
that he is not abandoning politics or his own party, even
if few would doubt it. With this new position, there is
now a stronger link between his figure as an influential
and wealthy businessman and the GD party.
What Ivanishvili’s experience demonstrates is that
in a formal system where the prime minister’s institution represents the locus of power, the behind-the-curtain rule is possible. This rule is sufficient to informally
control the political party that holds the majority in
the parliament and to appoint or remove prime ministers. Had Georgia been a presidential system, it would
not have been as easy or, perhaps, even possible to exert
a similar amount of influence over a popularly elected
president. The example of President Giorgi Margvelashvili supports this argument. Even though he was picked
by Ivanishvili as a candidate, and even if as president he
did not have much formal power, Margvelashvili would
often find himself in conflict with parliament and, by
extension, with Ivanishvili. For example, Margvelashvili would use his veto power to promote public discussions of certain legislative changes, although the parliament could easily overrule them. One such case occurred
in 2016, when the president rejected a referendum to
define marriage within the constitution as the union of
a man and a woman (Agenda.ge 2016). Eventually, the
change was adopted by the parliament as part of a package of amendments.
Furthermore, the GD party introduced constitutional amendments in 2017–2018, according to which,
from 2024, the general electorate will no longer directly
elect the president. Instead, an electoral college of 300
members was set up, including “all members of the Parliament of Georgia and of the supreme representative
bodies of the Autonomous Republics of Abkhazia and
Ajara,” as well as “the representative bodies of local selfgovernments” nominated by their respective political
parties (Constitution of Georgia 2018). As a result, controlling the largest political party by virtue of “the circular flow of power”—a term associated with Stalin’s rise
to power in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
(Daniels 2007)—implies controlling who will be the
president in addition to who will be the prime minister.
Voting Rules: Formal and Informal Bases
for Success in Elections
The importance of voting procedures cannot be underestimated even in the debates of presidentialism versus
parliamentarism (see Horowitz 1990). How voters elect
representatives to the legislature is important even in
a setting where informal rules have high significance.
In this sense, informality also pervades political party
competition. Although normatively, there is no single
best electoral system, some voting rules might facilitate
informal practices. This is clearly visible in how Georgian voters elect their parliament. The current system
includes 77 MPs who are elected through proportional
party lists and 73 MPs who are elected in single-mandate constituencies with a majoritarian vote. Similar to
Saakashvili, Ivanishvili also seems to operate with the
intent of preserving political power by tampering with
formal rules.
There is a widespread understanding in Georgia that
majoritarian voting in single-mandate districts increases
the chances of the incumbent party maintaining power.
There are two reasons for this belief. First, this system
can lead to a situation where a party that does not have
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the support of the majority of voters (in the proportional
voting) may nonetheless win a majority in the parliament. In fact, this is exactly what happened in the 2016
parliamentary elections; the GD party received 48.7% of
the popular vote, but because their candidates won in 71
out of 73 majoritarian districts (and the two other candidates openly supported the GD party), the GD party
gained a supermajority of 115 parliamentary mandates
out of 150 total seats. The second reason, however, is
arguably more important and intertwined with informal practices. On the one hand, those MPs who gain
their mandate through such a vote tend to be less active
than those who reach parliament via party lists. On the
other hand, all too often, directly elected MPs seek a parliamentary mandate to ensure that their business interests are protected. Furthermore, it appears that they are
repeatedly successful, not because of their personal popularity and integrity, but because of their ability to control power networks in their districts. Indeed, they often
switch parties, depending on who is in the government,
to ensure that their influence is maintained. Such clientelistic practices coupled with personalization of politics are perilous for democracy and inhibit healthy and
programmatic party competition (see Kitschelt 1995).
As a result, no political party in power has ever been
partial to changing the electoral system and adopting
a fully proportional vote. In fact, Saakashvili’s UNM,
for example, decreased the number of seats in the Georgian parliament from 225 to 150 at the expense of seats
allocated to proportional representation. However, following the 2017–2018 constitutional amendments, the
GD party agreed that from 2024 onwards, all Georgian
MPs will be elected in a single multimember constituency based on party lists. Nevertheless, the opposition
and part of the voters would like to see these changes
occur earlier in the October 2020 elections. This was
one of the main demands of the large-scale protest rallies
in June 2019.1 It seemed that the GD party conceded
and promised to amend the constitution again, ensuring that the 2020 elections would also be fully proportional. However, in November 2019, the bill did not
receive the necessary two-thirds majority of the MPs.
Interestingly, some of the GD party MPs, who had originally supported and even co-initiated the bill, did not
vote for it. Consequently, this is where the juxtaposition of formal and informal politics should be considered against the background of the GD party’s willingness to hold on its grip on power.
It can be assumed that if the elections were conducted in a single multimember constituency through
proportional party lists, it would be highly unlikely for
1
any single political party to gain a majority in the parliament. Most likely, a coalition would be necessary to
form a government, which has never happened in Georgia’s political history (Agenda.ge 2019a). Consequently,
it is likely that the GD party made the promise of abolishing the majoritarian vote in midst of the political turmoil but then realized that such changes would lead to
its loss of power. In this situation, the GD party used formal and informal practices to break out of the deadlock.
Three MPs voted against the bill on constitutional
amendments, and all of them are majoritarian MPs.
A total of 37 MPs abstained from voting, and 31 of
them are majoritarian MPs. Finally, seven MPs were not
present, and five of them are majoritarian MPs. All 47
of these MPs are GD party members. The day after the
vote, the speaker of the parliament advised the opposition to prepare for the elections, emphasizing, “Public
trust and not an election system wins the race” (Agenda.
ge 2019b). Downplaying the importance of the electoral reform was only one part of the GD party’s strategy
in legitimizing the decisive vote against the promised
electoral reform. A more important part was utilizing
the formal rules; the GD party claimed that their party
has a high degree of internal democracy, and thus, some
majoritarian MPs did not feel that the reform was justified. Consequently, although Ivanishvili “tried his best”
to convince them, apparently, he was not sufficiently
convincing. By emphasizing how widespread majoritarian voting in single-mandate districts is in Western
democracies, the GD representatives tried to legitimize
such voting procedures and appeal to the closer linkage
between voters and their direct representatives.
Furthermore, the GD party has claimed that the
solutions with which the opposition parties came up,
e.g., a German-style electoral system but with a fixed
total number of seats in the parliament, are against the
constitution of Georgia. Since the Georgian constitution
guarantees the mixed system for 2020, the GD party has
drawn heavily on these formal rules and on how constitutional amendments work. However, the GD party’s interpretation of the formal rules is undermined by
their own proposal to drop the number of majoritarian
MPs down to 50 to make the rules fairer, as this proposal is no less contradictory regarding the constitution.
All this resembles a carefully elaborated scheme. No
independent observer of Georgian politics would believe
the GD party’s narrative that Ivanishvili did not manage
to convince some of the majoritarian MPs. As a result,
the most realistic interpretation of events is that Ivanishvili informally pulled the strings to vote down the bill
on the amendments even if this meant a great political
The protests erupted after the unexpected event of a Russian MP from the Communist Party, Sergei Gavrilov, addressing the delegates of
the Inter-parliamentary Assembly on Orthodoxy (IAO) in Russian from the seat of the speaker of the Georgian parliament.
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cost (over a dozen GD party MPs have quit their factions in the parliament since the vote). Later, however,
the formal rules were used to justify why and how further action on ensuring fully proportional elections in
2020 would not be possible.
Conclusion
Overall, Georgia’s experience of constitutional changes
has focused on the shift to a parliamentarian government, and the way that the primary representative
body should be elected suggests that the interaction
between formal rules and informal practices can be seen
as a vicious circle. In this context, it becomes apparent that political actors consider both formal rules and
informal practices in their strive to maintain or gain
access to power. Therefore, with this goal in mind, political actors try to modify the formal rules to their own
advantage and thus avoid any changes that would pose
a threat to their goals. Consequently, the initiation of
constitutional amendments to increase the parliamentary and prime-ministerial powers was highly likely to
be driven by the considerations of President Saakashvili. Although this plan did not work out, the changes
were continued by Ivanishvili’s GD party government.
In this case, Ivanishvili bent the existing rules and introduced new rules to best guarantee his informal rule
from behind the curtain. However, the fact that formal institutions do matter is demonstrated by the fact
that these actors cannot completely disregard them in
the first place, which was clearly shown in the context
of the ongoing electoral reform. For the GD party, the
switch to a fully proportional electoral system means
losing, if not all, at least a significant portion of their
power. Therefore, even though the decision to backtrack
on their own promise was a highly unpopular step, they
nevertheless had to discard the proposed changes that
would have threatened their firm grip on power in the
future. As a result, while analysing Georgian politics,
neither formal nor informal institutions can be disregarded. Formality and informality are mutually constitutive; formal rules influence how political actors design
their strategies to maintain power, while these strategies
simultaneously involve the modification of formal rules
as well, i.e., what rules could be perilous or conducive
to achieving the ultimate goal.
About the Author
Levan Kakhishvili is a doctoral fellow in political science at Bamberg Graduate School of Social Sciences (BAGSS),
Bamberg, Germany, and a policy analyst at the Georgian Institute of Politics (GIP), Tbilisi, Georgia.
References
• Agenda.ge. (2016). President rejects referendum on defining marriage, August 10, https://agenda.ge/en/
news/2016/1912.
• Agenda.ge. (2018). Ex-PM Ivanishvili unanimously elected as a head of ruling party political council, May 1, https://
agenda.ge/en/news/2018/930.
• Agenda.ge. (2019a). PM Bakhtadze says Georgia may have a coalition gov’t after 2020 elections, June 25, https://
agenda.ge/en/news/2019/1693.
• Agenda.ge. (2019b). Ruling party after rejection of bill: Public support wins elections not an electoral system,
November 15, https://agenda.ge/en/news/2019/3094.
• Constitution of Georgia. (2018). April 2, http://www.parliament.ge/en/ajax/downloadFile/131642/
constitution-of-georgia.
• Daniels, R. (2007). The rise and fall of communism in Russia. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
• Forbes. 2020. Bidzina Ivanishvili, January 18, https://www.forbes.com/profile/bidzina-ivanishvili/#522c516b4598.
• Horowitz, D. (1990). Presidents vs. Parliaments: Comparing Democratic Systems, Journal of Democracy, 1(4): 73–79.
• Kitschelt, H. (1995). Formation of party cleavages in post-communist democracies, Party Politics, 1(4): 447–472.
• Kononczuk, W., Cenusa, D. and Kakachia, K. (2017). Oligarchs in Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia as key obstacles
to reforms, 3DCFTAs.eu, http://gip.ge/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Oligarchs_14-June_FINAL_0.pdf.
• Kuprashvili, N. (2010). Saakashvili Accused of Plotting to Retain Power, IWPR, May 24, https://iwpr.net/
global-voices/saakashvili-accused-plotting-retain-power.
• Linz, J. (1990). The perils of presidentialism, Journal of Democracy, 1(1): 51–69.
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CAUCASUS ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 114, March 2020
ABOUT THE CAUCASUS ANALY TICAL DIGEST
Editors
Lusine Badalyan (Giessen University), Bruno De Cordier (Ghent University), Farid Guliyev (Giessen University), Diana Lezhava (Center
for Social Sciences, Tbilisi), Lili Di Puppo (National Research University – Higher School of Economics, Moscow), Jeronim Perović
(University of Zurich), Heiko Pleines (University of Bremen), Abel Polese (Dublin City University and Tallinn University of Technology), Licínia Simão (University of Coimbra), Koba Turmanidze (CRRC-Georgia, Tbilisi)
Corresponding Editor
Heiko Pleines, Research Centre for East European Studies at the University of Bremen, pleines@uni-bremen.de
Layout
Matthias Neumann, Research Centre for East European Studies at the University of Bremen, fsopr@uni-bremen.de
About the Caucasus Analytical Digest
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Participating Institutions
Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich
The Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich is a center of competence for Swiss and international security policy. It offers security policy expertise in research, teaching, and consultancy. The CSS promotes understanding of security policy challenges as a contribution to a more peaceful world. Its work is independent, practice-relevant, and based on a sound academic footing.
The CSS combines research and policy consultancy and, as such, functions as a bridge between academia and practice. It trains highly
qualified junior researchers and serves as a point of contact and information for the interested public.
Research Centre for East European Studies at the University of Bremen
Founded in 1982, the Research Centre for East European Studies (Forschungsstelle Osteuropa) at the University of Bremen is dedicated
to the interdisciplinary analysis of socialist and post-socialist developments in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The major
focus is on the role of dissent, opposition and civil society in their historic, political, sociological and cultural dimensions.
With a unique archive on dissident culture under socialism and with an extensive collection of publications on Central and Eastern
Europe, the Research Centre regularly hosts visiting scholars from all over the world.
One of the core missions of the institute is the dissemination of academic knowledge to the interested public. This includes regular e-mail
newsletters covering current developments in Central and Eastern Europe.
CRRC-Georgia
CRRC-Georgia is a non-governmental, non-profit research organization, which collects, analyzes and publishes policy relevant data on
social, economic and political trends in Georgia. CRRC-Georgia, together with CRRC-Armenia and CRRC-Azerbaijan, constitutes a network of research centers with the common goal of strengthening social science research and public policy analysis in the South Caucasus.
Center for Eastern European Studies (CEES) at the University of Zurich
The Center for Eastern European Studies (CEES) at the University of Zurich is a center of excellence for Russian, Eastern European
and Eurasian studies. It offers expertise in research, teaching and consultancy. The CEES is the University’s hub for interdisciplinary
and contemporary studies of a vast region, comprising the former socialist states of Eastern Europe and the countries of the post-Soviet
space. As an independent academic institution, the CEES provides expertise for decision makers in politics and in the field of the economy. It serves as a link between academia and practitioners and as a point of contact and reference for the media and the wider public.
Any opinions expressed in the Caucasus Analytical Digest are exclusively those of the authors.
Reprint possible with permission by the editors.
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ISSN 1867 9323 © 2020 by Forschungsstelle Osteuropa, Bremen and Center for Security Studies, Zürich
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Phone: +49 421-218-69600 • Telefax: +49 421-218-69607 • e-mail: fsopr@uni-bremen.de • Internet: www.laender-analysen.de/cad/
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