The Decalogue as the Prohibition of Theft

The Decalogue as the Prohibition of Theft David J.A. Clines University of Sheffield 1. The Thesis My thesis is a simple one: it is that all the Ten Commandments are, in one way or another, commandments against theft. The apparently wide‐ranging set of ethical principles we find in the Decalogue can be shown to have an inner coherence when it is recognized that they are all dealing with a single ethical issue: the wrongful appropriation of the property of another person. If this claim is correct, the character of the Decalogue is different from what it has always been taken to be: namely, a more or less random collection of ethical principles covering subjects as diverse as murder, adultery and sabbath observance. It can now be seen as a set of exemplifications of one underlying principle, the avoidance of theft. The one great sin, in its perspective, is the infringement of the property and rights of others; such infringement can take many forms. I am not suggesting that the framers of the Decalogue had this single principle in mind as they brought together the various clauses that constitute the Decalogue. But the end‐result of the composition of the Decalogue was a consistent collection of requirements and prohibitions addressing the single issue of theft. 2. The Commandments a. The Tenth Commandment (Coveting) It is agreed on all sides that the Tenth Commandment is something of an anomaly in the Decalogue, in that unlike all the other items this one appears to deal not with an observable action but with an inner disposition. It has indeed been much disputed whether the Hebrew term dmj “covet” refers exclusively to disposition or whether it also includes a consequent action. J. Herrmann began a trend in favour of the latter view,1 adducing a number of texts such as Deut. 7:25, Josh. 7:21, and Prov. 6:25 where it is followed by words for taking. These examples, however, are by no means probative for the meaning of dmj, since it is natural for desire to lead to action, and thus for a term for desire to be followed by one for an action.2 1 J. Herrmann, “Das zehnte Gebot”, in Beiträge zur Religionsgeschichte und Archäologie Palästinas: Ernst Sellin zum 60. Geburtstage dargebracht (ed. Anton Jirku; Leipzig: A. Deichert, 1927), pp. 37‐42. On the question, see recently Alexander Rofé, “The Tenth Commandment in the Light of Four Deuteronomic Laws”, in his Deuteronomy: Issues and Interpretation (Edinburgh T. & T. Clark, 2002), pp. 79‐86. 2 As shown by W.L. Moran, “The Conclusion of the Decalogue (Ex 20, 17 = Dt 5, 21)”, CBQ 29 (1967), pp. 543‐54; see also Brevard S. Childs, Exodus: A Commentary (OTL; London: SCM Press, 1974), pp. 425‐27; G. Wallis, “dm'j; chāmadh”, TDOT, IV, pp. 452‐61 (457‐58). Decalogue as the Prohibition of Theft, p. 2 If dmj does mean “acquire” in the Commandment, that would make it equivalent to stealing in the Eighth Commandment, and no one believes there could be two commandments about the same subject. Many consequently have followed A. Alt in regarding bng “steal” in the Eighth Commandment as properly (or originally) referring to stealing a person, kidnapping.3 The verb never means that elsewhere, however, and the proposal, despite its multitude of supporters, is weak. Since it is hard to sustain the view that dmj does indeed refer to action, we are compelled to accept the traditional view that the last Commandment is indeed about desire, not about action, and to the question of the appropriateness of such a commandment within the Decalogue. My proposal is that the Tenth Commandment forms the climax of the Decalogue, and is, properly speaking, not only the last but also the greatest of the Commandments, reaching beyond the encouragement or the prohibition of external acts to the realm of motivation. 4 Do not commit what is forbidden, says the Decalogue; don’t even think about it!, says the tenth commandment. What coveting leads to is always theft, since the object of coveting is always what belongs to someone else. Every other commandment has proscribed theft, the last proscribes the contemplation of theft.5 This proposal also explains why it is only with coveting what belongs to someone else that the impulse and not just the action is forbidden: it is because coveting lies behind every one of the Commandments since every one of them is about theft. There is no need to forbid an impulse to commit murder or to neglect the sabbath, for example, since those actions are, equally with stealing, the outcome of coveting—as I will go on to show. b. The Eighth Commandment (Stealing) Little needs to be said about this Commandment, since it is unquestionably a prohibition of theft. The term “steal” (bng) in the Hebrew Bible can have as its grammatical object either a physical object, such as a domestic animal (as in Exod. 21:37 [ET 22:1]), or a person (as in Exod. 21:6). Appearing without a 3 A. Alt, “Das Verbot des Diebstahls im Dekalog”, in his Kleine Schriften zur Geschichte des Volkes Israel, I (ed. M. Noth; Munich: Beck, 1953), pp. 333‐40. 4 David Noel Freedman, The Nine Commandments: Uncovering a Hidden Pattern of Crime and Punishment in the Hebrew Bible (New York: Doubleday, 2000), speaks of the tenth commandment as a supplement to the others (hence his title The Nine Commandments): “The tenth commandment is a supplement to the previous commandments. It presents the motivations behind the crimes, especially for violations of commandments six through nine” (p. 155). But he does not apply the concept of coveting to the earlier commandments, and he is not saying that the commandments depict various types of theft. 5 A somewhat similar position, though without the present emphasis on theft as the common thread throughout the Decalogue, is taken by John I. Durham, remarking: “The tenth commandment … functions as a kind of summary commandment, the violation of which is a first step that can lead to the violation of any one or all the rest of the commandments. As such, it is necessarily all‐embracing and descriptive of an attitude rather than a deed” (Exodus [Word Biblical Commentary, 3; Waco, TX: Word Books, 1987], p. 298). Decalogue as the Prohibition of Theft, p. 3 grammatical object here in the Commandment, the verb would apparently cover both types of theft, though they are very different in character. Theft of goods can be compensated for by a monetary payment, as in Exod. 22:3, 6, 8 (ET 4, 7, 9) (strangely, the restitution of the property is never explicitly envisaged). Theft of a person (kidnapping), however, presumably in order to sell into slavery, is punishable by death (Exod. 21:16). It is not very easy to see how kidnapping of a free person can be regarded as theft (as with the case of Joseph, for example, in Gen. 40:15); a free person could hardly be regarded as the owner of himself or herself, though a child like Joseph could well be regarded as the property of his father. The stealing of a slave, however, is obviously a case of theft, since the slave is the property of his or her owner. The idea that the commandment refers properly to kidnapping (see §1 above) is purely speculative. J.P. Hyatt rightly observed that the rarity of such an occurrence in ancient Israel would hardly justify the existence of a commandment against it in such a collection as the Decalogue.6 Theft, we may add, is perhaps to be understood as more than a violation of a person’s property or wealth; it may be regarded in Israel, where it is arguable that property was thought of as an extension of the self (vpn),7 as also a violation of one’s person.8 c. The Seventh Commandment (Adultery) Adultery in Israel was not viewed as “a violation of the sanctity of the marriage bond”,9 or as a breach of sexual loyalty,10 or as an assault on the solidarity of the family,11 or still less a breach of the integrity of Israelite relationship with Yhwh,12 but properly as “an offence against the husband, who was entitled to exclusive sexual possession of his wife”.13 The commandment is therefore not concerned with sexual ethics or social stability or anything other than the threat of theft to a man and his property. d. The Ninth Commandment (False Witness) 6 J. Philip Hyatt, Commentary on Exodus (New Century Bible; London: Oliphants, 1971), p. 215; similarly, Childs, Exodus, p. 422. 7 See Johannes Pedersen, Israel: Its Life and Culture (London: Oxford University Press, 1926), pp. 170, 229 (“Property is imbued with the essence of the owner”), 250. 8 So Terence Fretheim, Exodus (Interpretation, a Bible Commentary for Teaching and Preaching; Louisville, KY: John Knox Press, 1991), p. 235. 9 Hyatt, Exodus, p. 214. 10 So Frank Michaeli, Le livre d’Exode (Commentaire de l’Ancien Testament, 2; Neuchâtel: Delachaux & Niestlé, 1974), p. 186, though he notes that “Le commandement se rapportait plus à une sorte de droit de propriété qu’à une inconduite morale”. 11 James D. Newsome, Exodus (Interpretation Bible Studies; Louisville, KY: Geneva Press, 1998), p. 90. 12 John I. Durham, Exodus (Word Biblical Commentary, 3; Waco, TX: Word Books, 1987), p. 294, adding “Everywhere in the ANE … adultery was a crime against persons; but in Israel it was first of all and even more a crime against Yahweh”. This cannot possibly be true. 13 Hyatt, Exodus, p. 214. This view is resisted by A.C.J. Phillips, Ancient Israel’s Criminal Law, p. 117; see also his “Another Look at Adultery”, JSOT 20 (1981), pp.. 3‐25 (7). Decalogue as the Prohibition of Theft, p. 4 There is a verbal difference between Exodus and Deuteronomy over this commandment. Exodus 20:16 has: “You shall not testify (lit. answer, hn[) against your neighbour as a witness of falsehood (rqv)”, whereas Deut. 5:20 has for the final words “as a witness of vanity, worthlessness (awv)”. It would seem that Exodus has in mind a lying testimony, whereas Deuteronomy envisages a insubstantial testimony. In what respect could a testimony in a law court amount to theft? What is always at stake in such a setting is the honour (dwbk) or reputation (µv) of the neighbour, whether as plaintiff or defendant. If the truth is not told by the witness, damage to the neighbour ensues. The neighbour is robbed of his innocence or integrity by the falsehood. The witness has stolen, if not his property, a valuable possession of the neighbour. We notice that what is at issue here is a testimony against (b) the neighbour, that is to say, against his interests. The commandment is not a general prohibition of lying, and even allows a false testimony on the neighbour’s behalf, that is, in favour of the neighbour. It is not a general moral principle, as might appear, but rather a prohibition of damaging the neighbour’s interests, of stealing from him what he has a right to. We may notice also that the commandment does not concern giving false testimony in general, but of giving it against a neighbour. Those who are not neighbours have no rights, it would appear; if they have no rights they cannot be robbed of them. It would then not be theft, by the standards of the Decalogue, to give false testimony against an enemy, for example. e. Sixth Commandment (Murder) It is perhaps a little counterintuitive to suggest that murder may be an example of theft, since it is evidently a crime that is much more serious than theft. However, I would suggest that it is rewarding to consider murder in this connection, for it helps to establish why murder is being prohibited here; it is obviously a shocking crime, but why does it find a place in the Decalogue? In other words, we can of course content ourselves with the thought, which everyone will readily subscribe to, that murder should be prohibited, and that it therefore forms one of the Commandments. But we can equally well ask why murder is prohibited, why in fact we recoil against it. Its place in the Decalogue encourages us, I am arguing, to see it as yet another exemplification of theft. There can be no doubt that taking a life is a signal case of taking, that taking the life of another is a paramount example of taking what does not belong to oneself. It differs from stealing, for example, for if it is a life that one takes, one does not come into possession of what one has taken. But what the murderer wants is not to acquire the life of another, but simply to deprive the other of what the other has. The stealing of a life has no benefit to the thief apart from the loss it causes to the victim. But to a murderer that is a real benefit, so great a benefit that it justifies murder. My programme in this paper now compels me to ask: From whom does the murderer steal? The apparently obvious answer may not be the best. The victim loses his life, so obviously he has been robbed. But to whom does a life belong, in ancient Israel? Is it perhaps not rather to God? As G.A. Piper has said, Decalogue as the Prohibition of Theft, p. 5 in the Hebrew Bible “Life is not regarded as an immanent creative principle in all that is … The individual’s life is God’s property. Hence the individual has no right to destroy his own life or wantonly to kill other life.”14 Reprehensible in the extreme as robbing someone of their life is, perhaps even more disgraceful is stealing the property of the deity. I should add that there is nothing here about a supposed “sanctity of life”, which even Brevard Childs invokes15—unless we understand “sanctity” in the sense I adopt below in reference to “holiness”, that it refers to nothing more transcendental than ownership by the deity. Life would then be sacred, not in itself, or as a general principle, but precisely because a human life is the property of God, and the taking of a life is a theft from him. f. Fifth Commandment (Honouring Parents) What is involved in “honouring” someone (the verb is dbk piel16)? We can disregard one possible situation, in which a person has an honour bestowed, a title or a position perhaps, for a son is hardly likely to be able to bestow honour upon a parent. A typical form of honouring that will no doubt be envisaged in this commandment is the recognizing and respectful acknowledging of the honour the other person already has. A son will honour his father by treating him with respect and upholding his honour in public. It is in the public sphere, of course, that honour is created and has to be maintained. Another way in which a son can honour parents is by not bringing shame upon them. A person’s honour depends to some extent on one’s ability to control one’s family; a disobedient son causes a loss of honour to the parents, as Deut. 21:18‐21 shows.17 To strike a parent or to insult them (Exod. 21:15, 17) would equally affect their honour. The question arises how a mother may be honoured, for women, who do not move in the public sphere, are not usually the possessors of honour. In fact, there is only one place in the Hebrew Bible where honour (dwbk) is attributed to a woman: Isa. 66.11, where Jerusalem is represented as a woman. Those who mourn for her are to suck and be satisfied with her breasts of consolation; they should drain them out and delight themselves “in the nipple(s) of her glory” (hdwbk zyzm). The honour or glory of the woman is full breasts. That is nothing like the honour a man can have, and we should conclude that, poetic language apart, women in ancient Israel were not regarded as possessing honour. They could however have less than zero honour: they could be dishonoured, especially by the sexual misbehaviour either of men of their family or indeed of themselves. The commandment thus should probably be read as saying, for all intents and purposes, “You shall honour your father and not dishonour your mother”. So in what respect would not honouring parents be an act of theft? Honour is probably the most precious possession a person can have, worth more 14 G.A. Piper, “Life”, in IDB, III, pp. 124‐30 (124). Childs, Exodus, p. 419. 16 It is doubtful whether a speaker of ancient Hebrew made any connection with the other sense “make heavy”, as Westermann and many others have thought (cf. C. Westermann, “dbk kbd to be heavy”, TLOT, II, pp. 590‐602 [591]). 17 See Anselm C. Hagedorn, “Guarding the Parents’ Honour—Deuteronomy 21.8‐21”, JSOT 88 (2000), pp. 101‐21. 15 Decalogue as the Prohibition of Theft, p. 6 than property or wealth. Any assault on the honour of a person is thus a theft of what is theirs. In diminishing their public standing, dishonouring them would feel like a literal theft of their goods. g. Fourth Commandment (Sabbath) The key to understanding a breach of the Sabbath commandment as theft lies, not in the term “remember” (rkz, Exod. 20:8) nor in the term “observe” (rmv, Deut. 5:12), but in the term “sanctify” (vdq piel). The verb can mean “make holy”, as in does in Exod. 20:11 (a factitive sense), where Yhwh blessed the sabbath and made it holy, or “regard as holy” as it does in v. 8 (a declarative‐estimative sense18), where the addressee of the commandment is told to regard or treat the sabbath day as holy. The holy is quite simply that which belongs to the realm of the divine.19 The term v/dq implies nothing about any person or object other than its ownership by the deity. Thus God, his words, his temple, his city and its mountain, his feasts, his priests are all holy.20 They belong to him, they are within his own sphere. It is not only objects like the temple and the cult vessels that are holy; it is also portions of time that he has designated holy. The Sabbath, along with festival times, is a time that is declared holy. The Israelite therefore cannot work at his occupation in order to gain benefit for himself on such days, for he has no ownership of those times. If he does not desist from work (tbv, we recall, does not mean “rest” but “desist”), he encroaches on holy time, he is a thief of time that has been laid claim to by the deity. As v. 10 says explicitly, the seventh day is “a sabbath belonging to Yhwh your God”. It should be added that the set of over‐determined reasons offered in the Decalogue for the sabbath commandment are not very persuasive. The first is 18 Using the terminology of Paul Joüon and T. Muraoka, A Grammar of Biblical Hebrew (Subsidia biblica, 14; Rome: Pontifical Biblical Institute, 1991), I, p. 155 (§52d). 19 This claim cannot be justified here. Our standard handbooks are surprisingly weak on this matter of the meaning of “holiness”: W. Kornfeld and H. Ringgren, “vdq qdš”, in TDOT, XII, pp. 521‐45, are unable to offer any synthetic statement about the meaning of the term. H.‐P. Müller, “vdq qdš holy”, in TLOT, III, pp. 1103‐18 (1107), thinks that qdš is “primarily associated with the concept of might” (which seems implausible). David P. Wright defines holiness in the Hebrew Bible as “a positive cultic or moral condition of God, people, things, places, and time … It is defined on the one hand to that with is consistent with God and his character, and on the other as that which is threatened by impurity” (“Holiness”, in ABD, pp. 237‐49 [237] (I would dispute that holiness has a moral dimension, and I don’t see how there can be a cultic condition of God). Even J. Muilenburg wrote, tautologously, that “‘holiness’ gives expression to the essential nature of the ‘sacred’” (“Holiness”, IDB, II, pp. 616‐25 [616]). 20 What belongs to a male deity, incidentally, is, not surprisingly, male, as I have elsewhere noted: “[N]othing female, nothing domestic, nothing from the realm of the moral, nothing outside the sphere of the male God himself and the objects and practices of his cult” belong to the realm of the holy (“He‐Prophets: Masculinity as a Problem for the Hebrew Prophets and their Interpreters”, in Sense and Sensitivity: Essays on Biblical Prophecy, Ideology and Reception in Tribute to Robert Carroll [ed. Philip R. Davies and Alastair G. Hunter; JSOTSup, 348; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 2002], pp. 311‐28 [318]). Decalogue as the Prohibition of Theft, p. 7 that in six days Yhwh made the universe, and desisted on the seventh (Exod. 20:11). It is not explained why what Yhwh did in the week of creation (there is no suggestion that he continues to observe weekly sabbaths) should have anything to do with what humans are to do every week. There may of course be a hint that Israelites should be imitators of God, but not a word is said about that. The second reason is that Israel was once a slave in Egypt and was brought out by Yhwh (Deut. 5:15). The connection between that event and the observance of the sabbath is even harder to discern than in the case of the week of creation.21 Perhaps the implication is that in Egypt the Israelites never had a day off work, whereas under the sabbath commandment they are freed from work every seventh day (though the connection is not drawn explicitly); but that would not be a reason for being commanded to observe the sabbath, though it would be a happy thought to have on sabbaths. Whether one is obligated to work on the sabbath or obligated not to work on the sabbath, it is still an obligation.22 The one reason that really makes sense as a justification for the sabbath commandment is that the period of time known as the sabbath is God’s property, “holy” in the sense of belonging to the deity, and that therefore any human activity that benefits oneself on that day is an infringement of his rights. He claims the right to tell Israelites what they are to do on that day, and what they are to do is: nothing. There are no rituals, no sacrifices, no worship, prescribed for the sabbath. It is an interesting thought that if one of the days of the week is holy, i.e. belongs to the deity, the others are not.23 It would therefore be wrong, from the standpoint of the Decalogue, to claim that time in general belongs to God.24 (It is often said, for example, that in Israelite thought the world belongs to God, and that people or nations own land only if it has been given to them by the deity.) But if time in general belongs to humans, what right or reason has the deity to claim even a seventh of time as his own? To “sanctify” it, i.e. to claim it as holy, is 21 Childs, Exodus, p. 417, thinks that “Israel is commanded to observe the sabbath in order to remember its slavery and deliverance … The festival arouses and excites the memory.” But he does not say how or why observance of the sabbath would conjure up that particular memory. 22 The third reason given is not offered as a justification for keeping the Sabbath, but as an explanation for why servants are included among those who must observe it: “so that your male and female slaves may rest as you do” (Deut. 5:14). This reason does not however explain why the resident alien should observe the sabbath (and such an explanation is sorely lacking, for the other two reasons for the sabbath are not applicable to resident aliens either: they cannot be expected to attempt to imitate the Hebrew deity, nor to remember that they were slaves in Egypt, which they were not). Nor does it explain why the farm animals should keep the sabbath. 23 Hyatt, Exodus, p. 212, is one of the few commentators who acknowledge that six days of the week are “profane or secular”; similarly M. Noth, Exodus: A Commentary (trans. J.S. Bowden; London: SCM Press, 1970), p. 164. 24 In a rather fine article, Ernst Jenni admits that the Old Testament “has no theological dogmas on time and its relation to God”, though he does want to speak of “God’s dominion over time … most clearly revealed by the fact that he created time along with the universe” (“Time”, IDB, IV, pp. 642‐49 [647]). It may questioned, however, whether Genesis 1 represents God as creating time; he creates the heavenly bodies that demarcate days and years (Gen. 1:14), but he does not create days and years; it is almost as if they exist of their own accord. Decalogue as the Prohibition of Theft, p. 8 no more than an annexation of property that belongs to others. The deity’s claim to the sabbath might then, surprisingly, be seen as a form of theft, at the same time as the Decalogue is portraying a breach of the sabbath as a theft. h. Third Commandment (Using Yhwh’s Name) There are some interpretational problems with this commandment, lit. “you shall not lift up the name of Yhwh your God to futility (awv)” (Exod. 20:7; Deut. 5:11). Some think it refers to swearing falsely,25 others to using the name of Yhwh for any valueless purpose,26 others to using the name for mischief,27 others to using the name specifically for evil magical purposes.28 We can leave aside here the exact reference of the commandment, for on any interpretation of its wording this is another evident case of a theft that is prohibited: it is the misuse of the name of the deity, which is his property. The idea is that “the name is a part of the being who bears it … Anyone who knows a divine name can make use of the divine power present in the name to effect blessings and curses, adjurations and bewitching and all kinds of magical undertakings.”29 It does not seem that swearing of legitimate oaths is here being addressed, or prohibited. Invoking the name of the deity in the ordinary business of life as a witness or guarantor of one’s fidelity is no theft of the deity’s dignity. But if a person appropriates the name of the deity to oneself for nefarious purposes, or simply frivolously, that is a theft. Though the term theft is not used, the distinction between proper use and misuse of the divine name must hang on whether the use is “fair use” and whether therefore there has or has not been a theft. i. Second Commandment (Images) Since the first Commandment deals with the prohibition of deities other than Yahweh, it seems unlikely that this second commandment also should have them in view. Rather, it is against the representation of Yahweh by means of a carved or cast image (the term lsp could apparently refer to either30). As Noth rightly says, “We should hardly look for the reason for the prohibition of images in a “spiritual” conception of God which forbade the introduction of any creaturely being from the sphere of the “world” … The basis for it lies rather in the idea … that an image had a firm connection with the being it portrayed, and that with 25 So, for example, NJPS; Childs, Exodus, p. 412: “to support a false oath which had the intent of inflicting evil upon another”. 26 U. Cassuto, A Commentary on the Book of Exodus (trans. Israel Abrahams; Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1967), p. 243; similarly Durham, Exodus, p. 286 “to empty purpose”. 27 So Walter Harrelson, The Ten Commandments and Human Rights (Overtures to Biblical Theology; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1980), p. 73: “Using Yahweh’s name for mischief means misusing the power inherent in the personal name for God to do harm against others”. 28 S. Mowinckel, Psalmenstudien, I (Kristiania: J. Dybwad, 1921), pp. 50ff. 29 Noth, Exodus, p. 163. 30 It is a cast image in Isa. 44:10. Decalogue as the Prohibition of Theft, p. 9 the help of an image a man [sic] might gain power over the being represented in the image.”31 This would appear to be a more convincing explanation of the rejection of images of Yahweh than the argument that it arises from a concern to protect Yahweh’s transcendence, or even to protect the manner of his relatedness to humans, as the following statement suggests: “Unlike plastic images, which are static and immobile, deaf and dumb, unfeeling and unthinking, and fix God at a point in time, Israel’s God is one who can speak and feel and act in both nature and history”.32 Yahweh does not always images of himself because he does not want to run the risk of anyone gaining power over him. Even if it is only a little of his power that would be usurped by manipulation of an image of him, it would still be an infringement of his personal authority and status, a theft in short. It would be very like the human use of his name for personal gain in the third commandment. j. First Commandment (No Other Gods) Here too there is an interpretational problem, the exact sense of “before me” (ynpl). Does it mean “beside me”, “over against me”, “in defiance of me”, or even “as long as I exist” (Rashi)?33 As with the Third Commandment, the issue is of little moment for the present purpose. What is being is demanded by this commandment, as most agree, is monolatry, a “dynamic monolatry which had the seeds of monotheism within it”, as J.J. Stamm puts it.34 There is no denial of the existence of other gods; indeed, the formulation effectively presupposes it. Yet all worship carried out by Israelites must be worship of Yahweh; if they also worship other deities, their worship of Yahweh will be the less. They will be withholding from him the worship that he demands as his due, and in that respect they will be robbing him of his rights.35 3. Some Conclusions a. From beginning to end, the Decalogue contains prohibitions against theft. In five cases it is theft of the property or reputation of the neighbour, in one case theft of what is due to parents, and in four cases theft of what belongs to the 31 Noth, Exodus, pp. 162‐63. Similarly J.J. Stamm with M.E. Andrew, The Ten Commandments in Recent Research (Studies in Biblical Theology, 2/2; London: SCM Press, 1967), pp. 85, 88‐89. 32 Fretheim, Exodus, p. 226. 33 See, for example, the discussion in Stamm and Andrew, The Ten Commandments in Recent Research, p. 79. 34 Stamm and Andrew, The Ten Commandments in Recent Research, p. 81. 35 It is another matter whether the best method of ensuring the worship of one’s devotees is to demand it, upon pain of punishment, and not rather to earn it in an open market in which various deities might compete for worship. Decalogue as the Prohibition of Theft, p. 10 deity. As I suggested at the beginning, the tenth commandment is an appropriate climax to the set of commandments, in that it pinpoints covetousness as the underlying cause of theft, and proscribes the mental act that invariably precedes the diverse actions outlawed in the other nine commandments. b. One result of recognizing the coherence of the Decalogue is that its somewhat strange combination of positive and negative elements can then be easily explained: if the avoidance of theft is the underlying issue, that project can as well be accomplished by prohibitions of theft as by encouragements to engage in behaviour that respects the rights and property of others. So long as the Decalogue is seen as essentially a collection of ethical principles, it is hard to see why some should be couched as positive commandments and others as negative. c. A set of commandments against theft must reflect a society where private property is recognized, and recognized as an important good. This is no communitarian society, where all have access to the assets of the community. As in the Covenant Code, it is a society of neighbours,36 who are practised in being helpful to one another, but have a strong sense of their individual rights. d. Theft is an especially, perhaps even exclusively, male concern. For it is males that own property and possess honour and so have something to lose from theft. It is unsurprising that the males who are (exclusively) addressed in the Decalogue are the same males that feel under a obligation to avoid theft, for theft of their property and rights is what they most fear. e. The deity is conceived of along much the same lines as the men of the Decalogue: he too has his rights and his property and he fiercely protects them, being sensitive to infringements on what is his and what he claims as his. f. So long as the Decalogue is viewed as a comprehensive statement of ethical principles, it is evidently lacking in important respects. It has regard principally to the rights and property of the individual (whether human or divine) and displays a weak sense of the community, or of responsibilities to other members of the community. There is no altruism in the Decalogue, no concern for the positive advancement of others.37 It is self‐regarding. There is no feeling in the Decalogue: apart from the desire to possess what belongs to others, it is emotion‐free, and blind to the springs of action. But if it is no more than an elaboration of the principle of the avoidance of theft, such omissions do not matter, for they were not within its scope. g. Recognizing the Decalogue as directed as a whole and in its parts toward one particular issue, the avoidance of theft, has a profound effect on how 36 See my profile of the society implied by the Covenant Code in “Being a Man in the Book of the Covenant”, in Reading the Law: Studies in Honour of Gordon J. Wenham (ed. J.G. McConville and Karl Möller; LHB/OTS, 461; London: T. & T. Clark International, 2007), pp. 3‐9. See also my “The Ten Commandments, Reading from Left to Right”, in Words Remembered, Texts Renewed: Essays in Honour of John F.A. Sawyer (ed. Jon Davies, Graham Harvey and Wilfred G.E. Watson; JSOTSup, 195; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1995), pp. 97‐112; a revised version was published in my Interested Parties: The Ideology of Writers and Readers of the Hebrew Bible (JSOTSup, 205; Gender, Culture, Theory, 1; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1995), pp. 26‐45. 37 The exemption of various members of one’s household, and of one’s farm animals, from labour on the sabbath does not derive from a humanitarian impulse: it simply makes the male householder, who is the addressee of the commandments, responsible for the adherence to the commandments by all those over whom he has power. Decalogue as the Prohibition of Theft, p. 11 the Decalogue should be understood. It can no longer be regarded as a comprehensive rule for life, or as a statement of universal ethical principles, or as fundamental guidance for a just society. It addresses only one element in a scheme of justice, that is, not robbing others of what is due to them. It completely ignores the issue of how giving to others what is due to them may be achieved. And it leaves entirely out of consideration social values outside the realm of justice, such as friendship, kindness, solidarity, and the communal experience of joy and sorrow. Bibliography Alt, A., “Das Verbot des Diebstahls im Dekalog”, in his Kleine Schriften zur Geschichte des Volkes Israel, I (ed. M. Noth; Munich: Beck, 1953), pp. 333‐40. Cassuto, U., A Commentary on the Book of Exodus (trans. Israel Abrahams; Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1967). Childs, Brevard S., Exodus: A Commentary (OTL; London: SCM Press, 1974), pp. 425‐27. Clines, David J.A., “Being a Man in the Book of the Covenant”, in Reading the Law: Studies in Honour of Gordon J. Wenham (ed. J.G. McConville and Karl Möller; LHB/OTS, 461; London: T. & T. Clark International, 2007), pp. 3‐9. Clines, David J.A., “He‐Prophets: Masculinity as a Problem for the Hebrew Prophets and their Interpreters”, in Sense and Sensitivity: Essays on Biblical Prophecy, Ideology and Reception in Tribute to Robert Carroll (ed. Philip R. Davies and Alastair G. Hunter; JSOTSup, 348; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 2002), pp. 311‐28. Clines, David J.A., “The Ten Commandments, Reading from Left to Right”, in Words Remembered, Texts Renewed: Essays in Honour of John F.A. Sawyer (ed. Jon Davies, Graham Harvey and Wilfred G.E. Watson; JSOTSup, 195; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1995), pp. 97‐112; a revised version in Interested Parties: The Ideology of Writers and Readers of the Hebrew Bible (JSOTSup, 205; Gender, Culture, Theory, 1; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1995), pp. 26‐45. Durham, John I., Exodus (Word Biblical Commentary, 3; Waco, TX: Word Books, 1987). Freedman, David Noel, The Nine Commandments: Uncovering a Hidden Pattern of Crime and Punishment in the Hebrew Bible (New York: Doubleday, 2000). Fretheim, Terence, Exodus (Interpretation, a Bible Commentary for Teaching and Preaching; Louisville, KY: John Knox Press, 1991). Hagedorn, Anselm C., “Guarding the Parents’ Honour—Deuteronomy 21.8‐21”, JSOT 88 (2000), pp. 101‐21. Harrelson, Walter, The Ten Commandments and Human Rights (Overtures to Biblical Theology; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1980). Herrmann, J., “Das zehnte Gebot”, in Beiträge zur Religionsgeschichte und Archäologie Palästinas: Ernst Sellin zum 60. Geburtstage dargebracht (ed. Anton Jirku; Leipzig: A. Deichert, 1927), pp. 37‐42. Hyatt, J. Philip, Commentary on Exodus (New Century Bible; London: Oliphants, 1971). Jenni, Ernst, “Time”, in IDB, IV, pp. 642‐49. Joüon, Paul, and T. Muraoka, A Grammar of Biblical Hebrew (Subsidia biblica, 14; Rome: Pontifical Biblical Institute, 1991), I. Kornfeld, W., and H. Ringgren, “vdq qdš”, in TDOT, XII (2003), pp. 521‐45. Michaeli, Frank, Le livre d’Exode (Commentaire de l’Ancien Testament, 2; Neuchâtel: Delachaux & Niestlé, 1974). Moran, W.L., “The Conclusion of the Decalogue (Ex 20, 17 = Dt 5, 21)”, CBQ 29 (1967), pp. 543‐54. Mowinckel, S., Psalmenstudien, I (Kristiania: J. Dybwad, 1921). Decalogue as the Prohibition of Theft, p. 12 Muilenburg, J., “Holiness”, in IDB, II, pp. 616‐25. Müller, H.‐P., “vdq qdš holy”, in TLOT, III, pp. 1103‐18. Newsome, James D., Exodus (Interpretation Bible Studies; Louisville, KY: Geneva Press, 1998). Noth, M., Exodus: A Commentary (trans. J.S. Bowden; London: SCM Press, 1970). Pedersen, Johannes, Israel: Its Life and Culture (London: Oxford University Press, 1926). Phillips, A.C.J., “Another Look at Adultery”, JSOT 20 (1981), pp.. 3‐25. Phillips, A.C.J., Ancient Israel’s Criminal Law (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,, 1970). Piper, G.A., “Life”, in IDB, III, pp. 124‐30. Rofé, Alexander, “The Tenth Commandment in the Light of Four Deuteronomic Laws”, in his Deuteronomy: Issues and Interpretation (Edinburgh T. & T. Clark, 2002), pp. 79‐ 86. Wallis, G., “dm'j; chāmadh”, in TDOT, IV, pp. 452‐61 (457‐58). Westermann, C., “dbk kbd to be heavy”, in TLOT, II, pp. 590‐602. Wright, David P., “Holiness”, in ABD, III, pp. 237‐49. Abbreviations ABD CBQ IDB JSOT JSOTSup LHB/OTS NJPS OTL TDOT TLOT Anchor Bible Dictionary (ed. David Noel Freedman; New York: Doubleday, 1992) Catholic Biblical Quarterly Interpreter’s Dictionary of the Bible (ed. George Arthur Buttrick; Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1962) Journal for the Study of the Old Testament Journal for the Study of the Old Testament, Supplements Library of Hebrew Bible/Old Testament Studies New Jewish Publication Society Version Old Testament Library Theological Dictionary of the Old Testament (ed. G. Johannes Botterweck, Helmer Ringgren and Heinz‐Josef Fabry; trans. Douglas W. Stott; Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1974–2006) Theological Lexicon of the Old Testament (ed. Ernst Jenni and Claus Westermann; trans. Mark E. Biddle; Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 1997)