Utilitarian Deontic Logic

Normative Multi-agent …, 2007

Introduction to Formal Philosophy, 2018

Journal of Philosophical Logic, 1990

1981

Abstract The paper presents a new consequentialist deontic logic in which the relation of preference over sets of possible worlds and the relation of conditional dominance are both transitive. This logic validates the principle that absolute ought can be derived from conditional ought in case the conditional statement is the agent's absolute ought. Ought about conditionals is not implied by conditional ought in this logic.

Ratio Juris, 2002

A recent series of papers, sparked off by a note by Robert Walter (1996), has rekindled the debate over the possibility of creating a logic of normative concepts. The debate correctly centres on ways in which Jørgensen’s dilemma might be resolved (Jørgensen 1937–8), since a means of resolving that dilemma is the only apparently available way in which to establish that a logic of norms is possible. Two separate questions require answers: (i) what is the correct way in which to regard Jørgensen’s dilemma; and (ii) how should one face that dilemma? I shall argue that traditional responses to the first question are inadequate, and I shall then try to expose as flawed two recent attempts to resolve the dilemma. Finally, I shall relate my conclusions in the earlier part of the paper to the wider question of whether a logic of normative concepts is, after all, a possibility.

Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence, 1993

Artificial Intelligence and Law, 2003

Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2009