Chantal Mouffe's Radical Democratic Approach to Equality

CHANTAL MOUFFE’S RADICAL DEMOCRATIC APPROACH TO EQUALITY Leah Skrzypiec Department of Politics, University of Adelaide Adelaide, Australia leah.skrzypiec@adelaide.edu.au INTRODUCTION Chantal Mouffe is often cited as one of the preeminent authors in discussions about radical democracy (Little and Lloyd and 2009, 2; Norval 2001, 590), and Wenman even quotes Laclau as saying that in their co-authored book Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (Laclau and Mouffe 1985), radical democracy was “basically her contribution” (Laclau in Wenman 2003, 583). However, despite decades of work within this field, there are elements within Mouffe’s work that expose important theoretical lacunae. As an example, in this paper Mouffe’s failure to outline a radical democratic interpretation of liberty and equality will be examined. It will be argued that, despite her insistence on the importance of these principles, and of the fact that, according to Mouffe, they are understood differently according to each different discourse (Mouffe 2005a, 84), Mouffe fails to address her radical democratic interpretation of them. It will be shown that such a gap contributes to the failure of Mouffe to achieve the objectives that she herself sets out. The ensuing discussion will show that Mouffe fails to capitalise on the most radical elements of her approach and limits the potential for the project of radical democracy. In order to establish the importance of the principles of liberty and equality to Mouffe’s work, this paper first looks at Mouffe’s conception of citizenship. By examining her comments on citizenship and her adoption of Michael Oakeshott’s concept of the respublica, it will become clear that the principles of liberty and equality form part of the foundation for Mouffe’s whole approach. Quoting Aristotle who says that “participation in a common understanding of justice makes a polis” (Aristotle in Mouffe 2005a, 57), it is evident that for Mouffe these principles are not idle values. Therefore, for Mouffe these principles inform the practices which define the demos – a key element in any democratic theory. In the second part of this paper, I will look at the goals of radical democracy as set out by Mouffe. The first example looks at Mouffe’s objective of making radical democracy a political project. As much of Mouffe’s work is focused on re-theorising, there is a danger that it could be read as simply providing abstract ideas. However, Mouffe clearly articulates that this is not where she wants her work to be left. Instead she is adamant that this theorisation can be used to inform an actual and practical project (Mouffe 2001, 11). Mouffe’s second, and related, goal is to ensure that radical democracy is seen as providing a left alternative model. For Mouffe the current neoliberal paradigm presents a major inhibitor to democracy and thus she wants radical democracy to provide the alternative. The last intention explored in this paper is that of providing a different alternative to the current models – a goal that is less clear in Mouffe’s work because she also advocates working within liberalism in order to achieve her project. Such a position, I will argue, not only diminishes the radicalness of her approach, but points to the many contradictions between the two models, which may result in preventing Mouffe from facilitating radical democratic ends. By examining the goals that Mouffe sets for herself, this paper concludes that they are severely hindered by the failure of Mouffe to address the democratic principles. This lacuna is an important aspect that hinders the “radicalness” of Mouffe’s approach and prevents it from being considered a viable alternative. THE PRINCIPLES OF RADICAL DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP In Mouffe’s work, citizenship becomes the key element in determining the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion within a demos. However, under Mouffe’s approach, citizenship does not rely simply on legal classifications or territorial bounds; instead the conception is based on an allegiance to ethico-political values. For Mouffe these values are the principles of liberty and equality as determined by what Michael Oakeshott describes as the respublica. Despite his conservative leanings, the use of Oakeshott is worthwhile for Mouffe as, she argues, his work provides a middle ground that allows her to incorporate elements of both the communitarian and liberal approaches to citizenship (Mouffe 2005a, 69). In outlining a radical democratic notion of citizenship, Mouffe firstly distinguishes between two different conceptions of society formulated by Oakeshott. The first is called a universitas whereby citizens are connected by a common purpose or outcome, much like the communitarian notion of the public good or the Marxist notion of socialist revolution. In the second version called a societas, participants ‘are linked by the authority of the conditions specifying their common or “public” concern’ (Mouffe 2005a, 67). Basically, says Oakeshott, citizens are connected simply through their “loyalty to one another” (Oakeshott in Mouffe 2005a, 66). For Mouffe, this second term is far more useful for her reconstruction of citizenship. She argues that a universitas is, in a similar fashion to the public good, far too concerned with trying to achieve a universal outcome, the absence of which is what she takes to be the defining characteristic of modern democracy (Mouffe 2005a, 64). From the concept of societas Oakeshott draws out a theory defined as respublica whereby the moral “rules of the game” become the unifying characteristics for citizens. It is, according to him, ‘the articulation of a common concern that the pursuit of all purposes and the promotion of all interests, the satisfaction of all wants and the propagation of all beliefs shall be in subscription to conditions formulated in rules indifferent to the merits of any interest or the truth or error of any belief and consequentially not itself a substantive interest or doctrine’ (Oakeshott in Mouffe 2005a, 68). However, in using the concept of the respublica, it is not a prescriptive set of procedures that Mouffe is outlining, as say in a Habermasian, deliberative model. Instead, the respublica offers the “moral considerations specifying conditions to be subscribed to in choosing performances” (Oakeshott in Mouffe 2005a, 67). For Mouffe, these considerations are informed by a loyalty to the principles of liberty and equality because, according to Mouffe, ‘it is not possible to find more radical principles for organizing society’ (1992, 1). Mouffe is consistent in her claims to the necessity of liberty and equality. However I argue that such appeals are not enough to inform the respublica and guarantee the success of (radical) democracy because an interpretation of the principles is also a fundamental element – an element drastically overlooked by Mouffe. By not distinguishing what a radical democratic understanding of these principles would be, Mouffe not only fails to capitalise on the radical potential of her approach, but she also creates inadvertent but important consequences for her project. The first issue relates to the establishment of the discourse radical democracy. In order to secure the hegemony of the radical democratic position for a model of citizenship, a clarification of the principles is key. Mouffe notes that the claims of social movements illustrate the weaknesses of the other political alternatives, like liberalism and socialism (Laclau and Mouffe 2001, 1), but the radical democratic approach needs to address how its interpretation of the principles can better provide for these needs. The struggle for hegemony is the struggle to make the radical democratic position, the ‘common sense’ position, but this cannot begin without the definition of the principles (Mouffe 2005a, 57). For Mouffe, her aim is to establish a “chain of equivalence” between the new social movements, under the banner of radical democratic citizenship (Mouffe 2005a, 60). Mouffe argues that these movements highlight where the principles of liberty and equality need to be expanded and thus they help to establish the radical democratic discourse regarding these principles. However, they do so while maintaining their differences. Instead of homogenising (and possibly compromising) difference in order to secure a new political position, Mouffe believes that alterity can be maintained and maximised through an allegiance to principles, rather than identity (Mouffe 2005a, 84). Furthermore, for Mouffe these principles maintain a reflexive characteristic in the sense that the radical democratic position is not trying to uncover the “true” or “essential” meaning behind the principles. This is important to ensure so that they are able to respond to claims made by various subject positions. As Smith writes, ‘[t]he rules and norms that lay the foundations for radical democracy will always have to be re-examined in the light of new conditions and struggles’ (1998, 23). However, it is also vital to outline where this reflexivity ends. Mouffe herself has noted that pluralism cannot be absolute and rather limits must be imposed, arguing that there must be limits to pluralism (Mouffe 1996b, 135-6). However, these limits will be difficult to determine without the radical ethos to inform such decisions. Establishing the ‘grammar of conduct’ (Mouffe 2005a, 85) is also important for the radical democratic discourse because it helps to establish the boundaries of exclusion and inclusion (who are enemies and who are merely adversaries in a Schmittian sense) – a fundamental element of all political processes according to Mouffe (Mouffe 2000, 43). Following Mouffe’s analysis, ‘there will always be competing interpretations of the shared principles of equality and liberty’ (Mouffe 1992, 14), and this forms part of the agonistic debate. She writes, for example, that [t]he adversary – with whom one has an agonistic relationship – is someone with whom one agrees about the principles underpinning the organization of society, but with whom one disagrees about their interpretation. The enemy is the person who disagrees with the principles (2001, 12). So, following Mouffe’s use of Schmitt, the liberals, deliberative democrats, and socialists, for example, are adversaries, rather than enemies, of radical democrats, because they share an adherence (at least) to the principles of liberty and equality. The debate between them is about securing their own interpretation as the hegemonic one. However, for Mouffe, despite the prevalence of agonistic debate, there can only ever be one hegemonic discourse established at any one time because ‘[a]ntagonistic principles of legitimacy cannot coexist within one single political association’ (Mouffe 1992, 11). Therefore, in order to provide for a radical democratic citizenship, and the necessary ‘consensus on ethical-political principles’ (Mouffe 1996b, 135), the radical interpretation of the principles of liberty and equality needs to be specified. THE GOALS OF MOUFFE’S APPROACH A Political Project As a necessary component of the respublica and thus citizenship, a starting point for a radical democratic interpretation of the principles of liberty and equality is vital; it is also very possible. By drawing out the claims made by the new social movements, for example, Mouffe acknowledged that the socialist understanding of equality (through economic redistribution), while a necessary condition for her approach, was not sufficient. For Mouffe, the new social movements of the 1980s helped to clarify the radical democratic interpretation of the political principles of the liberal democratic regime [because] [s]uch an interpretation emphasizes the numerous social relations where subordination exists and must be challenged if the principles of equality and liberty are to apply (Mouffe 1996a, 24). However Mouffe never specifies this interpretation. It is therefore difficult to utilise Mouffe’s work in future projects and this diminishes the potential of the radical democratic approach. After all, how does one apply the radical democratic principles if one does not know what this actually means or entails? Although, at times, Mouffe has said that her approach should not be conceived as providing a model on which to base a new society (Mouffe 1996a, 20; Mouffe 2000, 61), she nevertheless specifies that the project of radical democracy is still an important objective (Mouffe 2001, 11). (It is also important to note that the final, absolute implementation of a radical democracy can never be reached because conceiving it as an endpoint contradicts all that it stands for – political reflexivity and fluidity as well as constant re-negotiation through sub-hegemonic challenges. However, this simply requires a shift in perspective to what Derrida calls ‘democracy “to come”’ (Mouffe 2005a, 8).) It is therefore clear that Mouffe does want her work on radical democracy to provide more than abstract theorising. Mouffe has made some comments regarding the type of equality and liberty she wants for her project, saying, for example, that [a] radical democratic interpretation will emphasize the numerous social relations in which situations of domination exist that must be challenged if the principles of liberty and equality are to apply (2005a, 84), but very little time has been spent fleshing out what the implications are for such understandings. In the new preface in the second edition of Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, Mouffe and Laclau write that [i]f one is to build a chain of equivalences among democratic struggles, one needs to establish a frontier and define an adversary, but this is not enough. One also needs to know for what one is fighting, what kind of society one wants to establish (2001, xix, emphasis added). However, the vision for this society is never articulated by Mouffe and I argue that this is because there is not a substantial interpretation of the principles that could inform this project. Mouffe makes claims about the project of radical democracy being anti-capitalist and also maintaining certain liberal institutions. However, as I will show in the following sections, the implementation of such goals is again hindered by Mouffe’s lack of detail on the principles. A Left Alternative As part of her political project, Mouffe wants radical democracy to be able to provide for a new ‘socialist strategy’ (Laclau and Mouffe 1985) that can challenge the dominance of the neoliberal hegemony. In terms of the alternatives offered by other “left” models, Mouffe argues that they fail to deliver a democratic and economic alternative. Of Anthony Giddens’s Third Way approach Mouffe writes that his position ‘resign[s] itself to accepting the present stage of capitalism…degree[ing] that there is no alternative’ (2005b, 60). For Mouffe, such ‘post-political’ positions are “shallow” (Mouffe 2005b, 64) and she blames these centrist positions for causing the rise in right-wing parties across Europe (Mouffe 2005b, 66-72). However, when it comes to Mouffe detailing her economic alternative, or even critique of capitalism, there is once again a substantial gap. In terms of one theorist providing all of the elements for an alternative model, this is perhaps an unfair expectation. However, in the case of Mouffe, she outlines that this is one of her goals. She says things like: ‘can one imagine a noncapitalist liberal democracy? This is the most pressing question for the left today’ (1996a, 19); ‘The most important task for the left today is to find alternatives to neoliberalism’ (Mouffe in Castle 1998); and the problem today is not so much around the question of class but around a critique of the capitalist system. And I think that is where the analysis has to be done. One of the reasons why I think there is no hope today for future possibility is precisely because people feel there is no alternative to the capitalist system, and even more to the neo-liberal form of capitalism which is dominant today. And the Left is in great part responsible for that, because they seem to have capitulated to this dominance of capitalism and they are not thinking of another alternative. What I think is really missing is an analysis of the problem caused by capitalism and the neo-liberal form of globalization (Mouffe in Zournazi 2002, 135, emphasis added). While there are some examples of Mouffe discussing the problems with capitalism (Mouffe 1998; Mouffe in Castle 1998; Mouffe 2000, 15-17; Mouffe 2009a), these are few and far between. These analyses also fail to provide the necessary detail to inform another, proper alternative to neoliberalism. The objective of asserting an alternative to capitalism and neoliberalism is certainly a difficult task for any theorist, but particularly for Mouffe after her deconstruction of the class essentialism in Marxism. Although, in her critique, she concludes that post-Marxist analyses can still provide useful tools for challenging capitalism, her main argument is that a focus only on class misses other important dimensions (Mouffe 1988). With this critique, together with her formation of discourse analysis, Mouffe illustrates that the ‘economy’ is not a separate field but is rather always interwoven into other realms of life. Therefore, a critique of, and alternatives to, capitalism, for example, can no longer simply address issues of labour and production; there are far more issues involved and a new, radical democratic hegemony would have to highlight inequalities in spheres traditionally considered separate to the economic. This makes the creation of a substitutive and equivalent alternative difficult. Instead, Mouffe talks about redefining socialist goals in order to challenge neoliberalism and drop the illusion of a completely new economic system (Mouffe 2000, 15). But the hegemony of neoliberalism continues to contribute to real and experienced inequalities and is thus an area that needs to be addressed by Mouffe when discussing the effects of capitalism. In order to address this lacuna, I propose that a radical democratic interpretation of equality, particularly, could provide the foundation for such discussion on the economic alternatives. By highlighting the way that subject positions are perpetually subordinated by the affects of neoliberalism, radical democracy could be put up as an alternative. For instance, if Mouffe adopted the challenges of the environmentalists, she could illustrate that (under radical democracy) addressing economic equality would not simply be about a redistribution of funds. Instead, a radical democratic approach would incorporate issues regarding equal access to the world’s resources and address concerns regarding never-ending production with finite means. Alternatives that propose to simply give a monetary value to natural resources could also be challenged by showing that they do nothing to alter the paradigm of monetary profit and growth. In these simple examples we can see that instead of merely addressing the subject position of the worker (a problem Mouffe associates with socialism), radical democracy can aim to provide for future generations as well as the sustainability of the planet. While this is just one possible dimension of a radical interpretation of equality, it is an example that finds no parallel in Mouffe’s work. A possible reason for Mouffe not addressing such issues is that she is at pains not to fall back into the socialist paradigm of economism or class essentialism, arguing that the socialist dimension is a necessary but not sufficient element (Laclau and Mouffe 2001, 178). However, the prohibitive anxieties surrounding the taboo of economism can function as a way of not engaging with economic reality and as a way of implicitly accepting the latter as a basic horizon of existence. In an ironic Freudian-Lacanian twist, the fear of economism can end up reinforcing a de facto economic necessity in respect of contemporary capitalism (Žižek and Daly 2004, 15). Therefore, without adequate address, Mouffe’s aim to utilise radical democracy as a left alternative is severely diminished. Mouffe is right to conclude that the anti-capitalist facet is but one feature of her radical democratic approach. However, it is a fundamental element and thus its erasure spells acute consequences for her left project. In regards to the Third Way models Mouffe writes that ‘[i]t is the current unchallenged hegemony of the neo-liberal discourse which explains why the left is without any credible project’ (2000, 118), and yet her work contains the same gap. While not completely solving the issue of a capitalist critique and alternative, a radical democratic interpretation of the principles (or even the beginning of this conversation) could provide a muchneeded boost towards this direction. A Different Alternative Mouffe has always been adamant that liberalism is an essential element in the radical democratic approach, arguing that ‘political liberalism must be a central component of a project of radical and plural democracy’ (Mouffe 1996a, 21) and that radical democracy ‘is not an alternative to liberal democracy’ because ‘[a] radical democratic society will still be a liberal democratic society’ (Mouffe 1996b, 145). Therefore, despite claims of “radicalness” (read as different and challenging) one of Mouffe’s objectives is to work within liberalism. In this section I will argue however, that this goal is misplaced. In fact, by following the implicit consequences of her work, I argue that the aim of Mouffe’s approach should be to provide a different model, outside of the liberal paradigm. Mouffe’s work is already vastly at odds with the presumptions of liberalism, particularly in regards to the understanding of the subject. Where liberalism theorises that individuals exist a priori, and that their identities are essential, Mouffe argues along poststructuralist lines to say that subjects are in fact constructed by discourse. Mouffe states that [p]sychoanalysis has shown that, far form being organized around the transparency of an ego, personality is structured in a number of levels which lie outside the consciousness and rationality of the agents. It has therefore discredited the idea of the necessarily unified character of the subject (2009b, 333, emphasis in original). Therefore Mouffe adopts a poststructuralist approach in which the subject cannot be seen as whole and unified because it is always only precariously grounded, with the constitutive outside always capable of (agonistic) disruption. This understanding therefore has major consequences for Mouffe’s aim of working within liberalism. To begin with, what are we to make of a discourse of human rights that puts an Enlightenment understanding of the subject at its centre? Mouffe has said that, in addition to institutions like parliament and the judiciary (which have their own contradictions with radical democracy – power structures and dealing with difference), human rights would be an important (liberal) element within her approach (Mouffe 1992, 2). However, I argue that this overlooks the important tensions between the two theories and may impinge on the overall potential of radical democracy. Mouffe does recognise the tensions with liberalism, but she sees them as being in relation to democracy in general, not just her approach. For Mouffe, the principles of liberty and equality stem from the traditions of liberalism and democracy, respectively, and their differences can never be resolved (Mouffe 2000). She says that ‘the tension between equality and liberty cannot be reconciled and…there can only be contingent hegemonic forms of stabilization of their conflict’ (2000, 5). For Mouffe this forms the paradox of democracy and is a source of constant renegotiation as, in one instance, liberty will take priority while in another, equality comes to the fore. The recognition of this paradox is important because it highlights that no political decision can provide comprehensively for both principles all of the time. A redistribution of resources through progressive tax schemes in order to provide for equality, for example, can be viewed as impinging on the liberty of workers’ earning rights or, at the same time, the interference of the state might be viewed as impinging on the sovereignty of people. (In either case this highlights the importance of determining what is meant by “liberty” and “equality”.) However, Mouffe’s conclusion regarding the tradition of the principles, I argue, needs to be inverted. Mouffe argues that liberty comes from liberalism, but it would be more accurate to conclude that it is liberty that informs liberalism while equality is the basis of democracy – the principles come first. This is because, while the principles may be necessary for these models, they are certainly not sufficient. Each political model will understand and prioritise the principles differently, according to the interpretation, and the other elements/values that it deems important. This is a seemingly small alteration to Mouffe’s argument, but it can have profound implications, as will be discussed below. According to Mouffe, liberalism provides the protection of individual’s rights against the tyranny of the majority or the domination of the totalitarian party or state [and that] [t]his is why political liberalism must be a central component of a radical and plural democracy (Mouffe 1996a, 21). However, this does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that an adherence to liberalism is the only way to provide for this. Instead, it would be more accurate to say that it is the prioritisation of individual liberty that ensures this protection, and other political models may incorporate this value. It is not solely limited to liberalism because other theories may incorporate the use of liberty (to varying degrees). Mouffe’s loyalty to liberalism is understandable and it stems from her analysis of socialism – which she believes failed due to its inability to provide for difference (Mouffe in Castle 1998). For Mouffe these versions of socialism were far too homogenised and power too centralised. Therefore her conclusion is that ‘socialist goals can only be achieved in any acceptable way within a liberal democratic regime’ (Mouffe 1992, 2, emphasis added). However, while Mouffe’s aim of providing for liberty is admirable and worthwhile, her conclusion that liberalism is necessary to provide for this is not so straightforward; there are many inconsistencies that need to firstly be addressed. As an example, Mouffe argues that she does not adopt all facets of liberalism and rather she separates political liberalism from economic liberalism in order to only utilise the former (Mouffe 2005a, 104-5). Detailing the process of how this differentiation is defined, however, is never addressed by Mouffe, adding to the lacunae in her work. As another example, Mouffe notes that a liberal conception of equality reduces everything to rights, but that this is unsatisfactory for her approach. She writes that we need a new ideology that defines equality in a different way, not just on the basis of rights. In a sense, we need the elaboration of a postindividualistic liberalism in which rights are defined not as a personal possession but as a form of solidarity among all oppressed groups (1988, 103). Yet this is an area void of much attention. By arguing for liberal elements (despite their inconsistency with her approach), but by failing to outline a radical democratic interpretation of liberty and equality, Mouffe leaves an important aspect under-theorised. These problems, together with the issues associated with a completely different conception of the subject, and Mouffe’s critique of liberalism being unable to deal sufficiently with the political (Mouffe 1996a, 22), mean that it is curious that Mouffe continues her steadfast support of the theory of liberalism. In reformulating the analysis about the principles however, the contradictions between liberalism and radical democracy are more workable. This is because the reliance on liberalism is lessened. Reconfiguring Mouffe’s position so that the argument becomes that it is liberty, not liberalism, that is the useful element is important. It can be shown that liberalism may in fact provide an application for the protection of rights in a way that is at odds with a radical democratic approach. For example, in protecting against the interference of the state, liberals may declare that the collection of taxes infringes on liberty. However, this is at odds with the redistributive socialist goals of radical democracy. Therefore, in providing a radicalisation of liberty and equality, the radical democratic approach can set out its own interpretation and application of both these principles, without the limitations of the liberal model. By reformulating the argument so that it is the principles that are seen as providing value, rather than liberalism, Mouffe would be able to capitalise on the most radical aspects of her work. As it stands, Mouffe’s approach presents fundamental challenges to conceptions of power, the construction of the subject, and ways to accommodate difference and the political – all of which are in tension with the liberal approach. Therefore, by maintaining that the liberal paradigm is an essential element for radical democracy to maintain, these challenges are left unfulfilled. By not moving beyond the field of liberalism, Mouffe’s approach begins to look like a centre position for democracy – somewhere between liberalism and socialism, a position that she attacks the Third Way theorists for taking up. This is clearly not a position that Mouffe intends to advocate, despite the fact that she says of herself that ‘I have become much more of a liberal than I used to be’ (2001, 12). However, if this is indeed the case, then the fact remains that this radical approach is not so radical after all. A reconstruction, indeed a radicalisation, of the principles of liberty and equality could provide the dimensions necessary for Mouffe’s approach, without the problems associated with liberalism. In doing so, the goals of providing a left political project can also be accommodated. Without this theoretical reworking, however, Mouffe’s approach is far too centrist and, by Mouffe’s own judgement, ‘[r]adical politics cannot be located at the centre because to be radical…is to aim at a profound transformation of power relations’ (2000, 121). Unfortunately, with the current theoretical lacunae, this potential is unrealised. CONCLUSION While this paper has not been able to draw out what a radicalised version of liberty and equality would look like, it has asserted the importance of this work. It has also argued that this dimension is missing in Mouffe’s work to date. Mouffe acknowledges that [t]he form in which liberty, equality, democracy and justice are defined at the level of political philosophy may have important consequences at a variety of other levels of discourse, and contribute decisively to shaping the common sense of the masses (Laclau and Mouffe 2001, 174). Therefore it is curious that she devotes almost no time in detailing and mapping what a radical democratic interpretation of these principles would be. The consequence being that she is unable to fully achieve the goals that she sets for her radical democratic approach. In terms of what it can potentially achieve, Mouffe’s work has the ability to provide for a new understanding of democracy through a reformulating of citizenship, but this entails an interpretation of the principles of liberty and equality in order to inform the respublica. Likewise, it is possible to use radical democracy as a project to provide for a new left alternative, but this also requires the interpretation of the principles. Lastly, although Mouffe is content to stay within the liberal paradigm, I argue that this diminishes the most radical elements of her approach and prevents her from capitalising on the most radical aspects of her work. Similarly, as was argued, the necessity of maintaining the adherence to the liberal paradigm is misplaced and, instead, the principles should be the focus. This would help to prevent the many complications arising from the fundamental contradictions between the liberal and radical democratic positions, and allow her to capitalise on the radical aspects of her work. REFERENCES Castle, D. (1998) ‘Hearts, Minds and Radical Democracy’ (interview with Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe), Red Pepper, June 1, URL: <http://www.redpepper.org.uk/article563.html>, consulted March 2008. Laclau, E. and Mouffe, C. (1985) Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, Verso: London. Laclau, E. and Mouffe, C. (2001) Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, Second Edition, Verso: London. Lloyd, M. and Little, A. (2009) ‘Introduction’, in A. Little and M. Lloyd (eds.), The Politics of Radical Democracy, Edinburgh University Press: Edinburgh, 1-11. Mouffe, C. (1988) ‘New Political Subjects: Toward a new concept of democracy’ (translated by Stanley Gray), in C. Nelson and L. Grossberg (eds.), Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, University of Illinois Press: Urbana, 89-104. Mouffe, C. (1992) ‘Preface: Democratic Politics Today’, in C. Mouffe (ed.), Dimensions of Radical Democracy: Pluralism, Citizenship, Community, Verso: London, 1-14. Mouffe, C. (1996a) ‘Radical Democracy or Liberal Democracy’, in D. Trend (ed.), Radical Democracy: Identity, Citizenship, and the State, Routledge: New York, 19-26. Mouffe, C. (1996b) interviewed by C. Bayard, S. Isajiw and G. Madison (for PLURALT) ‘On the Itineraries of Democracy: An Interview with Chantal Mouffe’, Studies in Political Economy, 49, Spring, 131-147. Mouffe, C. (2000) The Democratic Paradox, Verso: London. Mouffe, C. (2001) ‘Interview: Democracy – Radical and Plural’, CSDBulletin, (Centre for the Study of Democracy, University of Westminster), 9(1), Winter, 10-13, URL: <http://www.wmin.ac.uk/sshl/pdf/CSDB91.pdf>, consulted January 2005. Mouffe, C. [1993] (2005a) The Return of the Political, Verso: London. Mouffe, C. (2005b) On the Political, Verso: London. Mouffe, C. (2009a) ‘Democratic politics in the age of post-Fordism’, in J. Seijdel and L. Melis (eds.), The Art Biennial as a Global Phenomenon: Strategies in Neo-Political Times, NAI: Rotterdam, 32-40. Mouffe, C. (2009b) ‘Post-Marxism: Democracy and Identity’, in G. Henderson and M. Waterstone (eds.), Geographic Thought: A Praxis Perspective, Routledge: London, 332-337. Norval, A (2001) ‘Radical Democracy’, in P.B. Clarke and J. Foweraker (eds.), Encyclopedia of Democratic Thought, Routledge: London, 587-594. Smith, A. M. (1998) Laclau and Mouffe: The Radical Democratic Imaginary, Routledge: London. Wenman, M. A. (2003) ‘Laclau or Mouffe? Splitting the difference’, Philosophy & Social Criticism, 29(5), 581-606. Žižek, S. and Daly, G. (2004) ‘Introduction: Risking the impossible’, in S. Žižek and G. Daly (eds.), Conversations with Žižek, Polity Press: Cambridge, 1-22. Zournazi, M. (2002) ‘Hope, passion, politics: a conversation with Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau’, in M. Zournazi (ed.), Hope: New Philosophies for Change, Pluto Press: Annandale, 122-148.