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In 2012, the politician Todd Akin caused a firestorm by suggesting, in the context of an argument about the moral permissibility of abortion, that some forms of rape were “legitimate” (i.e., carried out with great force or violence). This seemed to imply that other forms of rape must be “illegitimate” (i.e., carried out with less force or violence). In response, several commentators emphasized that rape is a “heinous crime” and that there are “no varying degrees of rape.” While the intention of these commentators was clear, I argue that they may—inadvertently—have played into the very stereotype of rape (implicitly) endorsed by Akin. Such a response, I claim, actually obscures a range of sexual harms, including some that may not rise to the level of being a crime. I also offer some thoughts on the moral psychology behind anti-abortion arguments of the kind advanced by Akin.
1999
Standards of reasonability play an important role in some of the most difficult cases of rape. In recent years, the notion of the "reasonable person" has supplanted the historical concept of the "reasonable man" as the test of reasonability. Contemporary feminist critics like Catharine MacKinnon and Kim Lane Scheppele have challenged the notion of the reasonable person on the grounds that reasonability standards are "gendered to the ground" and so, in practice, the reasonable person is just the reasonable man in a gender neutral guise. These critics call for the explicit employment of a "reasonable woman" standard for application to the actions of female victims of rape. But the arguments for abandoning a gender-neutral standard are double-edged and the employment of gendered standards of reasonability is likely to have implications that are neither foreseen by, nor acceptable to, advocates of such standards. Reasonable agent standards can be dropped, in favor of appeals to the notion of a "reasonable demand (or expectation)" by the law. However, if reasonable agent standards are to be retained, gendered versions of such standards are not preferable to gender-neutral ones. The essential difference between rape and ordinary sexual intercourse, we believe, is the presence of consent: the latter is consented to, the former not. This view is not uncontroversial; not all states define 'rape' in terms of non-consensual sexual contact and not all commentators agree that they should. 1 In what follows, we will assume, rather than argue for, the view that rape is to be defined in terms of non-consensual sexual intercourse. 2 For purposes of this paper, then, it is definitionally true that rape requires non-For very helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper, we are grateful to
The Philosophical Quarterly, 2007
If rape is evaluated as a serious wrong, can it also be defined as non-consensual sex (NCS)? Many do not see all instances of NCS as seriously wrongful. I argue that rape is both properly defined as NCS and properly evaluated as a serious wrong. First, I distinguish the ...
In November 2017, “Girls” writer Murray Miller was accused of rape. The co-creators of “Girls,” Lena Dunham and Jenni Konner, quickly issued a statement defending Miller, asserting that, “having worked closely with him for more than half a decade,” they reached the conclusion that the accusations against Mr. Miller were an example of the 3% of rape cases misreported annually.1 Dunham and Konner’s joint statement was met with surprise and condemnation online, as both had frequently and enthusiastically endorsed the idea that women should always be believed in cases of sexual assault accusations in the past. A number of commentators also drew attention to the fact that Miller is a white man while his accuser is a woman of color. Dunham and Konner’s statement is emblematic of a discursive trend in third-party defenses of men accused of sexual assault in that it ascribes the moral incapacity to rape to the accused individual. As defined by Bernard Williams in Making Sense of Humanity, “moral incapacity” refers to those incapacities to commit a particular act which are “expressive of, or grounded in, the agent’s character and personal dispositions.”2 When an individual learns that a friend, colleague, or celebrity that they admire has been accused of sexual misconduct and responds with phrases such as “he could never do that;” “that’s now what he’s like;” etc, they are operating on the assumption that their personal history with the individual has given them unique insight into the character and personal dispositions--and therefore the capacity or incapacity to rape--of the accused individual. In this paper, I am interested in what criteria go into the judgement of whether or not another individual is morally capable or incapable of rape, and how those criteria are informed by hegemonic understandings of race. In order to address this question, I will begin with an overview of Williams’ concept of moral incapacity and demonstrate the deployment of this concept in third-party defenses of celebrities accused of sexual misconduct. I will then contrast hegemonic constructions of the sexual characteristics of black and white masculinity. Next, I will use Linda Alcoff’s Visible Identities and Charles Taylor’s The Ethics of Authenticity to argue that individual “horizons of racial meaning” are informed by hegemonic understandings of race. Finally, I utilize Judith Butler’s discussion of grievable and ungrievable lives from Frames of War to examine the intersection between racialized reactions to allegations of sexual assault and the homogenization and de-individualization of marginalized identities. My ultimate argument is that third-party ascriptions of the moral capacity or incapacity to rape are best understood as deeply situated within both hegemonic understandings of black and white masculinity and how these understandings have come to inform individual “horizons of racial meaning.”
Columbia Law Review
Professor Dripps's provocative proposal, as I understand it, is that we think of sex as a commodity and rape as the theft of that commodity. Understood as such, the theft of sex accomplished through violence or the threat of violence is a twofold wrong: it violates our "negative" right to refuse to have sex with anyone for any or no reason, and violence or the threat of violence infringes our right to personal, physical security. Therefore, the violent expropriation of sex should be punished as a major felony, as is violent rape, at least in theory.Furthermore, according to Dripps, the expropriation of sex through nonviolent means may also be wrong, and even criminally so, depending upon the means used. It is much more difficult, however, to distinguish those sexual transactions that result from impermissible, albeit nonviolent, pressures from those that result from pressures that, although perhaps not commendable, are not sufficiently egregious to be made the target o...
1993
Professor Dripps\u27s provocative proposal, as I understand it, is that we think of sex as a commodity and rape as the theft of that commodity. Understood as such, the theft of sex accomplished through violence or the threat of violence is a twofold wrong: it violates our negative right to refuse to have sex with anyone for any or no reason, and violence or the threat of violence infringes our right to personal, physical security. Therefore, the violent expropriation of sex should be punished as a major felony, as is violent rape, at least in theory. Furthermore, according to Dripps, the expropriation of sex through nonviolent means may also be wrong, and even criminally so, depending upon the means used. It is much more difficult, however, to distinguish those sexual transactions that result from impermissible, albeit nonviolent, pressures from those that result from pressures that, although perhaps not commendable, are not sufficiently egregious to be made the target of the crimin...
Journal of Social …, 1992
Definitions set the parameters of research and influence the results and conclusions. It is thus crucial that researchers critically examine definitions and terms, particularly infields that use popular terms likely to be influenced by the unacknowledged biases and political concerns of the dominant group. The study of sexual assault is such a field, and therefore this article examines researchers' definitions of sexual assault, rape, and related terms. Definitions vary along several dimensions, including (a) the sexual behaviors specified, (6) the criteria for establishing nonconsent, (c) the individuals specified, and (d) the perspective specified-that is, who decides whether sexual assault has occurred. For each dimension, the article discusses implications for researchers' results and conclusions, underlying assumptions, and political ramifications. Language is an important resource. Once a term is accepted, it constrains our communication of ideas to others; in fact, it constrains the very generation of ideas. "Meaning making and control over language are important resources held by those in power" (Hare-Mustin & Maracek, 1990, p. 25). Language is used by dominant groups to define, label, and rank (Hare-Mustin & Maracek, 1990; Tiefer, 1990; Unger, 1990). In patriarchal social systems, men have controlled oral and written production of language. This "man-made language" (Spender, 1980) reflects and reifies the experiences of men. To the extent that this language does describe the experiences of women, it does so from the perspective of men.
https://institutoracionalidades.com.br/noticias-e-textos/o-ensino-de-historia-e-educacao-patrimonial-usos-do-passado-e-lugares-de-memoria-na-construcao-de-identidades/
Modern Hadith Studies. Continued Debates and New Approaches. Edited by Belal Abu-Alabbas, Michael Dann, and Christopher Melchert. Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2020
NB: A number of errors in the text have been updated in the consequent publication, which can be accessed by clicking the links in the 'Files' icon, above. Although ʿAbbasid society in the ninth and tenth centuries witnessed significant sectarian conflict, inter-group relations were not always defined by “negative loyalties” (Mottahedeh 2001). This chapter examines cooperative activity between hadith scholars and Sufis during this period as exhibited by five early “traditionist Sufis” (Karamustafa 2007): figures who were acclaimed by both later Sufi historians and hadith critics. Previous studies have both overstated evidence of conflict between the Sufi and hadith movements and ignored evidence of a shared epistemological orientation in the form of traditionist Sufis' (recently published) minor hadith works and documentation of their participation in pairwise relationships with élite hadith scholars (ḥuffāẓ) in prosopographical works. A statistical analysis of these latter records as a network—a collective of agents connected by ties of meaningful exchange—demonstrates that early traditionist Sufis significantly impacted the structure of the élite hadith scholarship network over the course of the tenth century. Despite their small numbers, this small cadre succeeded in creating a niche of cooperation between the Sufis and hadith scholars which endured for centuries. I regret that I did not refer to the following works, which also discuss the relation between hadith-scholarship and Sufism: Jean-Jacques Thibon, "Transmission du hadith et modèle prophétique chez les premiers soufis," Archives de Sciences Sociales des Religions 178(2) (2017): 71-88. Available at: https://www.cairn.info/journal-archives-de-sciences-sociales-des-religions-2017-2-page-71.htm Aiyub Palmer, "Chapter 13: Sufism," in The Wiley Blackwell Concise Companion to the Hadith, ed. Daniel W Brown (Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley Blackwell, 2020), 265-79. Available at: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/9781118638477.ch13 Hikmet Yaman, "A Muḥaddith Sūfī or a Sūfī Muḥaddith? An Evaluation of General Characteristics of the Sūfī Approaches to Ḥadīths [Muhaddis bir Sufi mi yoksa Sufi bir Muhaddis mi? Sufilerin Hadislere Yaklaşımlarının Genel Özelliklerine Dair Bir Deǧerlendirme]," Sufiyye 15 (2023):1–22. doi:https://doi.org/31.12.2023.
Emergence, 1999
1 Managers now find themselves in qualitatively different world. It is more uncertain, turbulent, complex, nonlinear, unpre-dictable, fast-paced, dynamic, and even postmodern. 2 The old or traditional models employed by managers, founded as they ...
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