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Joseph Margolis

2014

Abstract

Margolis’s methodology is best located in the pragmatic tradition, broadly construed. His pragmatism lies in his commitment to understanding the world as part of collective and consensual human practice and situated interaction; his embracing of the changing nature of history and science; and his approach to human knowledge as constructed. In particular this pragmatic bent is evidenced by his affinity for Charles Sanders Peirce’s semeiotics, by which thought shows us the real world through the interpretation of signs and symbols, the existence of mind legitimated as “objective” and “real.” Margolis also uses Peirce’s theory of predicative generals (as constructed but existent place-holders that focus discourse) in place of universals (as metaphysically fixed and existent types) as a way to discuss the discursive and indeterminate natures of what he considers to be inherently interpretable and significant properties of cultural artifacts (to be described more fully as Intentional pro...

Selves or

The Work of Art. On Margolis' view a work of art is something that is brought into being by a human self or person, who is him-or herself a culturally emergent entity in the sense described earlier. A work of art, like a self, is typically embodied in some material entity or event, which is not reducible to the physical but that is accessible via our concepts, discernible and real in some communicative form that is subject to interpretation and reinterpretation by the appreciators of that artwork. It is that material form that may be classified and individuated as a work of art for purposes of numerical (which is determinate) rather than for metaphysical (which for Margolis can never be determinate as to "nature") identity. Even a conceptual work of art like one of the interpretive judgment as to what the discernible properties of the work refer. If they refer to something imaginary or real or an artistic idea of some sort that gives the work meaning in any of the ways that the culture ascribes artistic meaning to works of art (via expressivity, representation, and the like) then those can be conceived as Intentional properties of the work with a capital "I" (more on Intentional properties below). In kind, an artwork is no different than any other inherently interpretable cultural artifact. What makes it "art" rather than a postage stamp, for example, just lies in the collective practices of the culture by which it is identified.

This means that distinctions can made between the practice of art and the practice of shipbuilding or of medicine or of chemistry in terms of the typical functions, contents or subject matter of the practices involvedcertain practices of art may aim at expression of emotion, or to transgress cultural norms in a way that makes the viewer have to contemplate those norms, whereas work in science may involve understanding the processes by which a gene mutates for theoretical and/or practical reasons. However, there is no fixed "essence," function, content or form that makes an artwork "art" for all time and therefore there is no hard-and-fast line that can be drawn between works of art and non-art objects. When we engage in discourse about "art,"

then, we are using that term as a façon de parler in order to organize the works we plan to discuss according their socio-cultural and historical context as entities situated within the cultural practice of what has been called "art." We are not identifying a type of object separable from other culturally emergent entities in any way that goes deeper than the cultural history of this practice rather than another. Artworks, like human selves, are thus better conceived as "careers" rather than "natures," with the possibility existing that changes in culture can and do change the Intentional properties, and thus the meaning, of a work of art, including even its status qua art.

Intentional Properties. "Intentional properties" is a term of art that Margolis uses to include and go beyond both the intentional thought (lower-case "i") of Edmund Husserl and Franz Brentano as the content of thought that is directed outwards towards an external referent and the intensional attributes (with an "s" rather than a "t" following the initial "t") of meanings that are definitionally internal and thus non-extensional, as when the meaning of a horse as a quadruped is applied to the term "horse" (see Margolis,Historied Text,Constructed World,. In keeping with the rest of Margolis' metaphysics of culture, Intentional properties are incarnate in discernible artworks; the art is existent and "in" the work rather than transparent (this forms the gist of Margolis' complaint against Danto and other philosophers of art) and yet they are not tethered to the materiality of the work and thus can change with new interpretations and reinterpretations. If the "red" property of a red-square painting for example, were to change in cultural meaning to no longer signify "communist" but to signify "carnivorous," for example, the non-false interpretations of that painting could be expanded to include carnivorousness. Thus the metaphysics of an artwork, the art-significant part of which resides in its culturally-tethered Intentional properties, cannot include any fixed "essence" or "nature." Margolis' view also allows for the possibility that the redness of the red-square painting's meaning, even housed in the same material painting over time, might lose the meaning of "red-as-communist" altogether if this meaning goes out of the stable of cultural meanings for "red." Thus Margolis holds that the meaning of an artwork is not, contrary to many theories of art, tied to the intention of the artist, its provenance, or the cultural meaning of the work at any particular time in history. (For more on this see the sub-headings on Interpretation and on History, below.) to follow Peircean metaphysics in this way (see Margolis,Selves and Other Texts,112,127,. Thus Margolis' view is that Intentional properties cannot ever be made "determinate" in any sense that would make them determinate for all time. The "determinable" part of the phrase exists just to show that interpretations, while they last, can be made and that at the socio-historical moment at which they are made they can be "true" subject to all the caveats acknowledging the cultural construction and understanding of the word "true" and on a sense of "true" that means something more like "apt" than a sense of the word "true" that requires a fixed referent.