Alfred Schutz (Sociology)

Tercera entrega que trata sobre el desarrollo del tema que venimos desarrollando: la racionalización weberiana.
En esta publicación, abordamos los conceptos de acción social y de legitimidad, los cuales poseen una relación intrínseca con el concepto de racionalización en tanto que el interés fundamental es la racionalidad que se vincula a la acción humana. Dicha relación debe enmarcarse dentro del modelo de acción social y que, a su vez, encuentre cabida dentro de unproceso de legitimidad.

This article presents some considerations about the sociological perspective of Alfred Schütz. To this end, weaved brief considerations on Phenomenology, in particular from contributions of Husserl. It's therefore an effort to understand its importance for the social sciences. First, we present the constitutive influences of the thought of Schütz, as well as its main analytical tools. Then thinking "do science", we proceed to analytical musings of an Interpretative Sociology proposal.

Resumo:

O presente artigo apresenta algumas considerações sobre a perspectiva sociológica de Alfred Schütz. Para tal, tecemos breves considerações sobre a fenomenologia, em especial a partir das contribuições de Husserl. Trata-se, portanto, de um esforço para o entendimento de sua importância para as Ciências Sociais. Primeiramente, apresentamos as influências constitutivas do pensamento de Schütz, bem como suas principais ferramentas analíticas. Em seguida, pensando no “fazer ciência”, procedemos para reflexões analíticas da proposta de uma Sociologia Interpretativa.

A biographical summary plus a presentation of his basic philosophy focused on the application of phenomenology to the human sciences, especially Communicology and the political/sociological condition of the the ordinary citizen, the "forgotten man". Many summary Tables of key concepts.

Alfred Schutz’s sociology has the potential to capture the complex interplay of familiarity and strangeness in the everyday life of contemporary societies. However, his analyses of the arrival of a stranger in a group, put together in his well-known essay “The Stranger”, run into difficulties calling for a critical reconstruction. A reading of his background theses on social typification and knowledge by acquaintance brings to light limitations to the ideal type of the migrant, which expresses a primacy of the external relation to strangeness. This approach to the problem of belonging overstates the conformity of practices and routines in the group receiving the stranger on his territory. An awareness of internal alterity opens the discussion to the latent strangeness within the We and the Ego through a fresh take on tools provided by social phenomenology.

ABSTRACT: This article aims to present research questions and theoretical assumptions that underlie Bernard  Charlot's  theory  of  the  relationship  with knowledge  and  Christine  Delory-Momberger's biographical research in education. To do so, it resorts to documentary analysis of books and articles by the authors.  The  configuration  of  theoretical  and  methodological  fields  of  research  with  their  specificities  is identified,  but  also  the  points  of  dialogue  concerning  their  research  questions  and,  in  particular  by  the reciprocal theoretical and epistemological interest in studying the construction of individuals as singular and social, from socio-anthropological approaches.

took his position in the Methodenstreit of his day largely in a polemic against what he regarded as invalid methodologies of psychological reductionism, social organizism, evolutionism, and both idealist and materialist teleologies. Because he was far more interested in empirical studies, Weber never developed his own position in any comprehensive and formal treatment. It was Alfred Schutz who sought to provide this "underlaborer" philosophy for verstehende Soziologie, grounding an examination of subjective meaning in the lifeworld?the world of everyday activity?and in the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl. Yet Schutz never really used his methodological critique as a basis of substantive investigation. Thus, there has been a hiatus between the interpretive sociology of Weber and the sociological implications of the analysis of the lifeworld developed by Schutz.

Este proyecto de tesis tiene como objeto principal hacer una descripción fenomenológica del proceso de institucionalización de la Comunicación pública, entendiendo a ésta como el conjunto de procesos de producción, tratamiento, difusión y retroacción de la información que se hace pública en una sociedad y está relacionada con los temas, debates y problemas que conciernen y afectan a dicha sociedad. Como delimitación, la investigación se centrará en una de las cuatro actividades profesionales inherentes a la Comunicación pública (Demers y Lavigne, 2007: 70), el periodismo, que es una práctica altamente institucionalizada en la sociedad contemporánea.

El concepto de institucionalización que se adopta en la investigación, y que será el eje del marco teórico, está fundamentado en la Sociología Fenomenológica desarrollada por Alfred Schutz y posteriormente continuada y expandida por Thomas Luckmann y Peter Berger.

Para responder las interrogantes y desarrollar el trabajo descriptivo, se proyecta el uso de las técnicas de la etnografía y la entrevista a profundidad, aplicadas al estudio de caso del periodismo realizado en la televisión pública, caso que además ha sido poco profundizado en los estudios de periodismo en el país; geográficamente, se limitará a la ciudad de Guadalajara.

El objetivo del presente artículo es explicitar y discutir la relación entre el análisis fenomenológico del mundo de la vida desarrollado por Alfred Schutz y la metodología de las ciencias sociales. En primer lugar, se bosqueja el proyecto schutziano de fundamentar las ciencias sociales en una teoría del mundo de la vida. En segundo término, se presentan los postulados schutzianos referidos a las construcciones modélicas de las científico-sociales. Luego, se coloca el foco en el modo en que Max Weber y Schutz conciben el denominado postulado de adecuación. Finalmente, se pasa revista a intentos actuales de aplicar el análisis del mundo de la vida en la investigación social empírica.

El lenguaje y la construcción de la realidad social han llegado a consolidarse como un tema de interés de un extenso debate dentro de dicha disciplina. Son varios los autores que han tratado la cuestión, pero en el presente texto se tratarán los enfoques de cinco de ellos: Michel Foucault, Alfred Schütz, John R. Searle, John Peter Berger y Thomas Luckmann. De este modo, se pretende exponer los argumentos a los que estos autores recurren para explicar cómo es posible la comunicación, así como analizar los puntos en común y las diferencias que existen entre unos y otros en determinados aspectos.

El juego se ha establecido como un principio pedagógico para el logro del aprendizaje en el nivel educativo de preescolar. Sin embargo, parecen ser escasos los trabajos que se han ocupado por estudiarlo desde un enfoque fenomenológico. En el presente escrito me propongo ofrecer algunas reflexiones que invitan a concebir a la fenomenología de Alfred Schutz como una perspectiva viable para indagar en este tema, concibiendo el juego como una experiencia que sucede en el mundo social. Argumento que los postulados de este autor permiten generar un análisis minucioso sobre el sentido del juego para el niño, lo cual se enlaza estrechamente a estructuras que operan en la conciencia e intervienen en procesos de aprehensión y comprensión.

The play has been established as a pedagogical principle to achieve learning at the preschool educational level. However, there seem to be few works that have been concerned with studying it from a phenomenological approach. This paper aims to offer some reflections that conceive Alfred Schutz’s phenomenology as a viable perspective to investigate this issue and the play as an experience within the social world. It argues that this author's postulates allow a meticulous analysis of the meaning of the play for the child to be generated, which is closely linked to structures that operate in consciousness and are involved in processes of apprehension and comprehension.

Gary Con is a role-playing game convention held in honor of Gary Gygax, co-creator of the first role-playing game, Dungeons & Dragons. This article reflects on four years of fieldwork at Gary Con and explores interactions between commemoration, nostalgia, and play encountered there. Phenomenological analysis of a game session suggests that commemoration involves synchronization of participants’ time-perspectives through a rhythmic alteration of time scales, creating a sense of carrying the past forward into the present.

This review explores the most significant dimensions and findings of phenomenological approaches in anthropology. We spell out the motives and implications inherent in such approaches, chronicle their historical dimensions and precursors, and address the ways in which they have contributed to analytic perspectives employed in anthropology. This article canvasses phenomenologically oriented research in anthropology on a number of topics, including political relations and violence; language and discourse; neurophenomenology; emotion; embodiment and bodiliness; illness and healing; pain and suffering; aging, dying, and death; sensory perception and experience; subjectivity; intersubjectivity and sociality; empathy; morality; religious experience; art, aesthetics, and creativity; narrative and storytelling; time and temporality; and senses of place. We examine, and propose salient responses to, the main critiques of phenomenological approaches in anthropology, and we also take note of some of the most pressing and generative avenues of research and thought in phenomenologically oriented anthropology.

One of the still unsolved problems in liberal anarchism is a definition of social constituency in positive terms. Partially, this had been solved by the advancements of liberal discourse ethics. These approaches, built on praxeology as a universal framework for social formation, are detached from the need of any previous or external authority or rule for the discursive partners. However, the relationship between action, personal identity, and liberty within the process of a community becoming solely generated from the praxeological a priori remains largely disputed. In order to develop a testable constitutional model, this study revises how the “ontological turn” was introduced into liberal theories and redefines the concept of liberty. Liberty is usually understood as a moral goal or measurement for just actions, as the generative principle of all social existence - individual and interpersonal. For this purpose, the function of performative contradiction within the mechanism of interpersonal “encounter”, as part of the co-generative process of the individual becoming and social formation was explored through the production of a game-based narrative historiography grounded on 19th century life writings. This narrative historiography was developed in the context of Swiss history, with a “design-based” research approach, and resulted in a prototype for networked storytelling through which the transformative learning process could be visible and the negotiation of competing individual visions of the future could be re-enacted.

Kitap Başlığı: Fenomenoloji ve Toplumsal İlişkiler
Original Başlık: On Phenomenology and Social Relations
Kitabın Yazarı: Alfred Schütz

Türkçe Söyleyen: Adnan Akan, Seyda Kesikoğlu

Editör: Levent Ünsaldı
Redaksiyon: Levent Ünsaldı
Kapak: Ali İmren
Dizgi: İsmet Erdoğan
Yayım Tarihi: Ocak 2018
ISBN Numarası
978-605-9436-33-5
Dizi
Heretik: 68, Sosyoloji Dizisi: 25

Few contemporary sociologists are as creative as Erving Goffman. One product of this creativity is frame analysis (Goffman, 1974), a method that is both admired and neglected. Comparing Goffman's approach to other paradigms seems not only to be a negation of the creativity of this writer, but is strongly disliked by Goffman (1981b)
when such comparisons have nothing but labelling as their purpose.
It is not the function of this paper to place frame analysis in one or another theoretical pigeon-hole. Frame analysis is a sociological approach in its own right. Nevertheless, Goffman accepts different standpoints of symbolic interaction (G.H. Mead), ethnomethodology
and phenomenological sociology (A. Schutz) even when he
denies others. I intend here to present the differences and similarities between Goffman's frame analysis on the one hand, and Blumer's symbolic interaction, Schutz's phenomenological sociology,and Garfinkel' s ethnomethodology on the other hand in function of three questions. (1) What are the presuppositions in
relation to reality, knowledge, man and society used in the four paradigms? (2) What is the object of sociology? (3) What are the methodological principles? Moreover, I want to show that in spite of different accents, the frame analysis approach can already be found in the earlier work of Goffman.

Recently, multiple participatory music-based projects have found their way into major contemporary art venues. This research has set out to explore how the relations between artist and participants and between the participants themselves are shaped and represented by musical procedures in these projects. Focusing on five case studies from recent years (by artists Ari Benjamin Meyers, Saâdane Afif, Peter Liversidge and Xavier Veilhan), the thesis provides a detailed analysis of the social interactions produced in each project, and conceptualizes the kind of notions and ideals of “the social” these musical art projects foster.
The thesis argues that while music possesses a deeply social and interactional character, its sociability could be put to very different, often contrasting, effects: namely, critical and uncritical ones. It can be self-reflexive, questioning its own underlying structures and those of its institutional contexts, but it can also replicate and consolidate problematic institutional agendas and values; it can expose the uneven and antagonistic qualities of the participatory act, but is can also naively idealize this act as inherently harmonious and positive; it can form a polyphonic collective of individuals, but it can also shape a collective that is monotonous, homogeneous and reductive; it can deconstruct social constructs and categories, but it can also perpetuate cultural stereotypes.
By carfeully analyzing the multitude of variables that form any musical event—from the procedures of composing and the arrangement of the musical score, to the choreography of the performers and their level of competence, to the forms of dissemination and the criteria for selecting the participants—with the problems developed in participatory art criticism in mind, and with insights provided by sociologists and philosophers of music at hand, some preliminary tools for the analysis of music-based participatory projects have emerged—tools that will hopefully be used and further enriched by other scholars from the fields of art history and musicology alike.

When surveying recent philosophical work on the nature
and status of collective intentionality and we-intentions, it is striking how much effort is spent on analysing the structure of joint action and on establishing whether or not the intention to, say, go for a walk or paint a house together is reducible to some form of I-intentionality. Much less work has been devoted to an analysis of shared affects and
emotions. This is regrettable, not only because emotional sharing in all likelihood is developmentally prior to and logically more basic than joint action, but also because it might constitute a way of being together with others, which we need to study if we wish to better understand the nature of the we. In the present contribution, my primary
aim will be to offer an answer to the following question: does the we-experience, the experience of being part of a we, presuppose, precede, preserve, or abolish the difference between self- and other-experience? In pursuing this task, I will take a closer look at emotional sharing and draw on resources that are too frequently ignored in current
social ontology, namely insights found in classical phenomenology and in contemporary research on social cognition.

Grounded in the philosophies of experience of Martin Heidegger, George Herbert Mead, and Alfred Schutz, this paper presents and emerging concept called the interactional self to illustrate how there are no clear phenomenological distinctions between the so-called “virtual world” and the dichotomously positioned “real world.” Instead, after presenting the two most predominant narrative trajectories that looked at Internet-mediated communication from this real/virtual split, the paper then explores how social interactional and phenomenological approaches can help the Internet researcher come to understand that a more nuanced reality is present in online social settings. Ultimately, the paper shows how the philosophies of experience of Heidegger, Mead, and Schutz can help the Internet researcher better conceptualize the tight intermingling of the online with the offline in Internet-mediated social settings. Such philosophies allow the communication researcher to delve more deeply into users’ phenomenologically-rooted use-contexts, performative practices, and intersubjective life-world experiences in Internet-mediated sociability.

Unpublished English version of my communication at the Ateliers Villa Vigoni, « Pourquoi le pragmatisme ? L’intérêt du pragmatisme pour les sciences humaines et sociales », Italie, 15-18 juillet 2012.
The communication tells the story of the encounter with American pragmatism by some scholars of the French pragmatic sociology.

Sempre que tive de participar de algo em comum, qualquer acontecimento humano, me senti como um homem que sai do teatro antes do último ato para respirar por um momento, vê o grande vazio das trevas cheias de estrelas, e deixa o chapéu, casaco, espetáculo e parte." Robert Musil 3 Nada parece ser mais universal do que o sentimento de solidão que, em maior ou menor grau, todos conhecemos. Não apenas nos sentimos em alguns momentos solitários, como também sabemos da existência de indivíduos para os quais, imaginamos, a solidão é algo permanente, um dado constitutivo de suas individualidades. Sem dúvida, em todas as sociedades humanas há momentos nos quais o indivíduo está só, no sentido de estar isolado, apartado de seus semelhantes. Nas sociedades primitivas, por exemplo, muitas vezes os ritos de passagem que marcam a transição entre etapas da vida de um indivíduo envolvem uma situação de liminaridade, quando ele é colocado além das margens da sociedade por um tempo determinado. Mas nesse caso a solidão é não só prevista como passageira, e termina sempre com a reintegração do indivíduo à comunidade da qual se afastou. Não é dessa experiência que estamos falando. Nossa idéia moderna de solidão envolve a possibilidade de que, mesmo no decorrer normal da vida cotidiana a interação com outros indivíduos seja suspensa ou ocorra de forma intermitente, pouco densa. Para alguns, a ausência de interações com um razoável grau de intimidade parece ser crônica, permanente. Esse é o indivíduo solitário por excelência, aquele que, disso gostando ou não, sente-se como o solitário Ulrich, personagem criado por Robert Musil e cujo pensamento vemos na epígrafe.

Few contemporary sociologists are as creative as Erving Goffman.  One product of this creativity is frame analysis (Goffman, 1974), a  method that is both admired and neglected. Comparing Goffman's  approach to other paradigms seems not only to be a negation of the  creativity of this writer, but is strongly disliked by Goffman (1981b)  when such comparisons have nothing but labelling as their purpose.
It is not the function of this paper to place frame analysis in one or  another theoretical pigeon-hole. Frame analysis is a sociological  approach in its own right. Nevertheless, Goffman accepts different  standpoints of symbolic interaction (G.H. Mead), ethnomethodology  and phenomenological sociology (A. Schutz) even when he  denies others. I intend here to present the differences and  similarities between Goffman's frame analysis on the one hand, and  Blumer's symbolic interaction, Schutz's phenomenological sociology,
and Garfinkel' s ethnomethodology on the other hand in
function of three questions. (1) What are the presuppositions in  relation to reality, knowledge, man and society used in the four  paradigms? (2) What is the object of sociology? (3) What are the  methodological principles? Moreover, I want to show that in spite  of different accents, the frame-analysis approach can already be  found in the earlier work of Goffman.

This article investigates the relationship between for-me-ness and sociality. I start by pointing out some ambiguities in claims pursued by critics that have recently pressed on the relationship between the two notions. I next articulate a question concerning for-me-ness and sociality that builds on the idea that, occasionally at least, there is something it is like ‘for us’ to have an experience. This idea has been explored in recent literature on shared experiences and collective intentionality, and it gestures towards the question of the extent to which some social interactions make a difference in the phenomenal character of their participants’ experiences. Finally, I present a construal of for-us-ness that complements the received understanding of for-me-ness, by drawing on Alfred Schutz’ concept of the we-relationship, and on the idea of second-personal awareness, i.e. awareness of a ‘you’ (as distinguished from awareness of a ‘she’ or ‘he’). The current proposal provides a suitable account of some basic forms of phenomenally manifest social connectedness, in a way that is cognitively undemanding and without incurring the costs of a sui generis plural pre-reflective self-awareness.

This thesis presents an emerging concept called the interactional self to illustrate how, contrary to theories of “cyberspace” and “cyberselves,” there tend not to be sharp socio-phenomenological distinctions between “virtual” and offline sociability within one’s life-world. As such, using aspects of the philosophies of experience of Heidegger, Mead, Schutz, and Husserl as foundations, this thesis argues that social interactions online, for most, are extensions of and not apart from their everyday, situated life-worlds.
After briefly introducing the path towards our contemporary “will-to-virtuality” and various utopian and dystopian visions of “cyberspace,” an alternative conceptual picture of the interactional self is gradually revealed using the metaphor of a portrait painted on a “social-world canvas.” In this painting, the ontology of Heidegger’s Dasein supplies the first brushes for outlining the early sketches of the interactional self, showing that online, as in offline settings, we encounter the world and others from the position of beings deeply engaged in practical daily acts and “interpretative understandings.” These brushes are then dipped into Mead’s intertactionist colours and Schutz’s socio-phenomenological textures, eventually filling in the portrait. Illustrated via a case study of blogging practices, Mead’s theory of the “generalized other” highlights the notion that the interactional self does not concretely distinguish between offline and online social settings but instead, as in more traditional “off the network” situations, uses Internet-mediated communication for performative practices that afford self-expression and maintain social cohesion. Schutz’s phenomenology of the life-world gives further perspective to the interactional self, showing that online sociability should not be viewed as being apart from the “intersubjective” intersection of life-worlds rooted in everyday life. With some help from Husserl’s phenomenology, Schutz is subsequently relied on for understanding online textual embodiment, spatial extensions, community, role-playing, and fantasy, adding yet more socio-historical shadings to interactions online.
Ultimately, the picture that emerges is framed within the following four concluding hypotheses: 1) The interactional self encounters social acts, online and off, as part of its greater life-world, practicing performative and group-enforcing self-management through 2) varying and interlinked dimensions of sociability and 3) pragmatic yet meaningful uses of the communicational tools at hand in 4) contextually relevant degrees of self-disclosure.

This paper brings together critical theory and general praxeology while pushing the limits of institutional economics. Drawing on the work of Jürgen Habermas and Friedrich Hayek, the paper differentiates three forms of social-systemic, spontaneous order: the (1) instinctual (2) traditional, and (3) societal. Together, they constitute the structural background for deliberate human action, yet deliberate action has instinctual, cultural-traditional, and societal effects. Focusing on this reciprocal dynamic, the analysis suggests the interplay between micro and macro dimensions of institutional-economic evolution; in the process, it reveals how the three forms of spontaneous order correspond to what Habermas has proposed as the three functions of the socio-cultural lifeworld: (i) the socialization of succeeding generations, (ii) the propagation of cultural traditions, and (iii) the integration of groups via preferences, rules, or norms. The wider ramifications--via the work of Alfred Schutz--synthesize the critical theory of Jürgen Habermas with the Hayekian, praxeological tradition, by proposing how general social-systemic coordination emerges--via rule-based behavior--from concretely embodied instances of consensus formation in language.

From Erik Davis: "Here's an article that provides some insight into my overall perspective on critical theory and classical liberalism. My view has certainly evolved more since then. I tried to approach interdisciplinary social science by pushing the limits of institutional economics. I now approach it from the philosophy of the social sciences--and more generally through political and social philosophy. Where I now disagree with the article, I mainly think the conclusion was too critical of Habermas and unemphasized my indebtedness and incorporation of his work. Where I do still agree with the article, I would no longer necessarily articulate much of it in the way I did. . . However, the article still brings up and addresses issues key to the overall project of collective individuation and the Marx:Freud::Hayek:Jung quartet."

Intersubjektivität bei Schütz -oder: Ist die Frage nach dem Anderen aus der Phänomenologie entlassen? Erschienen in: Raab, J.; Pfadenhauer, M.; Stegmaier, P.; Dreher, J.; Schnettler, B. (Hg.), Phänomenologie und Soziologie. Theoretische Positionen, aktuelle Problemfelder und empirische