Alfred Schutz (Sociology)

Enzo Paci has played a crucial role in the spread of the phenomenological thought in Italy, developing its themes in a constant dialogue with other fields of knowledge. The present article intends to explore the comparison that the Italian philosopher has initiated with the social sciences, with the aim of investigating affinities and divergences that characterize different but complementary ways of questioning the intersubjective dimension. To this purpose, the text will proceed by reconstructing, first, the points of Paci's thought in which such a comparison is, more or less explicitly, articulated. Then the links that connect the phenomenological perspectives to the sociological ones will be deepened through the comparison of Paci's positions with Alfred Schütz's phenomenologically oriented sociology. This will open the field to a reflection on the theme of empathy which, being located at the crossroads of sociology and phenomenology, allows us to pursue the path of the interdisciplinary dialogue traced by Paci.

The talk outlines my framework of Inverted Lifeworld Phenomenology, which starts with disruption rather than stability. It introduces the figure of the Stayer – someone who remains in place while their world collapses – to explore collective estrangement as a shared and lived horizon of experience.

This presentation at the Center for Subjectivity Research’s Winter School devoted to Alfred Schutz’s legacy (where I was happy to be one of six speakers), was motivated by a curious observation: while Schutz’s texts, especially later ones, are full of references to ‘normal,’ (his ‘everyday life’ is ‘normal life of a normal adult,’ all in all) he almost never problematizes this notion. Just a handful of essays do this – one addresses ‘normativity’ in law and two other small essays discuss ‘normality’ and ‘normalcy’ in response to Husserl’s models of normality. He might also have intended to discuss it later, as hinted by his draft outline for SLW Vol. II. This may be the reason his perspective remains almost untouched in rapidly growing discussions on phenomenology of normality and normativity.
In my talk, I offered a lexicographical analysis of all published Schutz’s texts, tracing how terms like normal, normality, normalcy, and anomaly appear and function.
Of course, this is just the first step: this is definitely the case when conceptual analysis is needed. Although Schutz doesn’t address it explicitly, all his phenomenology is indeed a phenomenology of ‘normal.’ I hope to have a chance to investigate his manuscripts in the Konstanz archive shortly and then move to a conceptual reconstruction of what a Schutzian approach to normality might look like.
My ultimate ambition is to do what Steinbock has done with Husserl’s writings on normality and normativity (and his genetic phenomenology in general): to bring Schutzian perspective into current phenomenology of normality and normativity. Fingers crossed for an interesting paper being published soon :)

This essay focuses on the commonly used term 'business as usual' and theorizes the change it entails. Business as usual refers to the continuation ad infinitum of established social practices, the current socio-material structures, whatever they might be. Yet, business as usual also entails change. It refers to a general type of social change; cumulative socio-material change inherently linked to the reproduction of established practices. Cumulative change should be seen as distinct from both evolutionary and revolutionary types of change. Uneventfully unfolding cumulative processes have significant impacts on our societies and their 'built' and 'natural' environments. They are typically nondisruptive, but they ordinarily exhibit nonlinearities and sometimes disruptions. Transforming business-as-usual changes from an ordinary 'state of affairs' to pressing political-economic problems may be see as general and global grand challenge that requires transformative agency targeting apex social practices, such as neoliberalism, that define the framework of action for most life-worlds. KEYWORDS Everyday; materiality; depragmatized knowledge; environmental crisis; institutional change; money 'business as usual will mean that we will not be able to feed the world, business as usual means to continue to degrade the environment, business as usual means that we will not ever solve the problems of poverty and hunger',

FIGURAÇÃO IDIOTA, mas apenas trazer para junto de nós, fazendo-os sentar nesta sala, três excêntricos idiotas. Sabendo embora que nenhum deles se sentirá confortável neste espaço universitário simbolicamente associado ao conhecimento e, em particular, ao conhecimento científico, que todos eles se obstinarão em manter um silêncio heterodoxo e que muito provavelmente irão encontrar formas de ignorar, de se alhear da reflexão gerada à sua volta. A um idiota (a estes idiotas, em particular) tudo se perdoa. Em todo o caso, já terá valido a pena trazê-los se, com a sua presença, na sua impassibilidade e opacidade esfíngicas, eles tiverem conseguido desafiar o nosso olhar, inquietar o nosso pensamento, provocar a nossa lógica científico-numérica da "tudometria" e peer-pressure académica. Passo a apresentar-vos Bartleby, o estranho escrivão de um escritório de advogados de Nova Iorque que se recusa a fazer o trabalho para o qual fora contratado, barricando-se num silêncio enigmático. Manuel, um desconhecido, anónimo e in-significante boémio vagabundo atingido pela loucura que obstinadamente se recusa a viver ou a si mesmo se mata como forma de silenciar o escritor de génio obscuro que existe dentro de si; Bernardo Soares, ajudante de guarda-livros de um escritório

Beginning with a discussion of Gadamer on science considered via
the 19th century tradition of classical philology including Nietzsche,
this essay reviews the question of science and mathematics and the
‘crisis’ for Husserl and Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology.
At stake is Galileo’s invention of the object in the new science and
thereby the transformation of science and knowing along with the
role of mathematics and the ‘scientific method.’ Crucial throughout
is the role of questioning.

Comenzando con una discusión sobre Gadamer en torno a la ciencia considerada a través de la tradición de la filología clásica del siglo XIX, incluyendo a Nietzsche, este ensayo revisa la cuestión de la ciencia y las matemáticas y la "crisis" para la fenomenología hermenéutica de Husserl y Heidegger. Lo que está en juego es la invención galileana del objeto en la nueva ciencia y, por ende, la transformación de la ciencia y el conocimiento junto con el rol de las matemáticas y el "método científico". A lo largo del texto resulta crucial el papel del preguntar.

Chi è davvero lo straniero? Quali sfide affronta nel cercare di integrarsi in una società che non gli appartiene?
In questo saggio propongo una lettura critica e attuale de Lo Straniero di Alfred Schütz, un testo fondamentale della sociologia che analizza il rapporto tra individuo e gruppo, identità e appartenenza. Attraverso un linguaggio chiaro e riflessioni personali, esploro le difficoltà vissute dallo straniero e le profonde implicazioni sociali e culturali del suo percorso.

Particolare attenzione viene data anche alla figura del reduce, un’altra forma di "straniero", tornato a casa ma incapace di riconoscerla. Questo confronto apre a nuove interpretazioni del concetto di identità, memoria e reinserimento sociale.

Un contributo utile per chi si occupa di sociologia, psicologia sociale, studi sull'identità, fenomeni migratori e integrazione culturale, ma anche per chi vuole capire meglio le dinamiche umane in contesti di cambiamento.

Procuramos, nesta proposta, pensar os termos de uma tensão entre aquilo que, por um lado, a partir do modelo capitalista de produção em massa, banalizou, mercantilizou e reificou os objectos e, por outro, justamente pela constituição desse mundo saturado de coisas, foi exposto como o carácter estranho, enigmático ou incompreensível dos objectos, carácter que, por via de uma experiência de transfiguração, pode ser revelador dessas próprias condições de produção. Os termos desta tensão podem ser reconhecidos na ideia de uma reificação redentora, a qual nos surge particularmente sintomática na teoria dos objectos de Walter Benjamin e na ficção-científica de Philip K. Dick que aqui nos servirão como casos de estudo.

В рамках этой статьи проделывается попытка прояснить возможные
способы обращения к прошлому и как оно может стать частью освобо-
дительной политики. В процессе выявляется три возможных варианта
обращения к прошлому — ностальгический, ресентиментный и разза-
бывающий. Первый способ — это использование прошлого как сеттинга,
второй – исправление прошлого, поскольку настоящее не может быть
исправлено, третий способ — это процедура раззабывания. Опираясь на
Фишера, Бадью и Блоха, в статье предлагается способ взаимодействия с
прошлым функционирующий за счет постулирования гипотезы/утопии,
которая будучи опрокинута в прошлое, создает возможность призвать
к жизни освободительный потенциал прошлых эпох. Нужда в подобной
процедуре возникает, поскольку в настоящем события прошлого уже
оказываются апроприированы господствующей идеологией. Для того,
чтобы появилась возможная инстанция обращения и оценки прошлого
нужен определенный образ будущего (утопия), через который оно будет
рассмотрено. Тем самым, в прошлом могут быть выявлены освободитель-
ные тенденции, которые оказались забыты, но до сих пор релевантны
для современных проблем.

Entonces, Nietzsche fue un interrogador de sistemas. Un filósofo que con altas dosis de voluntad desbordó los límites y muros entre campos del conocimiento. Su primer desborde público fue con el Origen de la Tragedia, obra que lo expulsó de la carrera docente en Basilea. Él desdibujó esas fronteras a través de la literatura, usó aforismos y metáforas. Esta dolorosa ruptura le otorgó la libertad de errar, y ser un errante fuera del sistema.

Dieser Beitrag untersucht die Kategorie des Vergleichs in Simmels Essayistik
aus drei Perspektiven: Zunächst als grundlegende Kategorie in der Simmel’schen Theorie der Moderne, anschließend als impliziten Faktor in zwei erkenntnistheoretischen Konzepten – der Verteidigung des provisorischen Denkens und der Typisierung des »Fremden« – und schließlich als kritische Operation in seinen intellektuellen Analysen. Dabei
wird argumentiert, dass diese drei Ebenen – Theorie der modernen Objektivität, Erkenntnistheorie und konkrete kritische Praxis – im Hinblick auf den Vergleich bei Simmel formell analog sind. Damit bietet Simmels Vergleichsbegriff Impulse für die aktuelle Theoriebildung zu Praktiken des Vergleichens.

This essay reconstructs the German philosopher and cultural sociologist Helmuth Plessner's reading of Germany's fall into the catastrophe of National Socialism. The conceptual foundations for his reading were developed in The Limits of Community (1924). There he argued that post-WWI political extremism was characterized by the anti-modernist concept of "community." In The Belated Nation (1935/59), he went on to identify the Lutheran Reformation as the determining turning point in German history. The Lutheran type of consciousness stands at the origin of a self-destructive hermeneutics of suspicion that finally resulted in völkisch thinking. Second, unlike the formation of a democratic spirit in the Calvinist middle classes in Holland and England, in Prussia the Lutheran alliance of throne and altar led to the exclusion of the middle classes from politics, relegating them to the liberal professions of science and art. Finally, I argue that Plessner's own theoretical model of a political anthropology was developed in opposition to the German intellectual classes' failure to prevent or oppose Hitler's rise to power, including his plea for Germany to align with Western European nations shaped by the Calvinist version of the Reformation.

La no-indiferencia ante nuestra responsabilidad por el otro, al extremo de sustituirnos por él, es el origen de la compasión. Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence (166) Debo dirigirme hacia el rostro del otro. El verdadero campo del cine es el primer plano… La lupa del cinematógrafo nos acerca a las células de la vida, nos permite sentir la textura y la substancia de la vida en su más concreto detalle… permite ver… los diminutos átomos de la vida… ya que se goza al detener la mirada en lo que se ama y se conoce verdaderamente bien.

The paper scrutinize the source material of the Eidgenössische Sängerverein (Federal Singing Association), with an emphasis on visual sources; the focus of the paper is how visual sources communicate meaning and what they tell about the promotion and support of nation-building processes and the formation of a nation-state’s collective identity within the framework of the Federal Singing Association.

In the context of reading Kant on chemistry as a science, this essay reviews Kant and the history of chemistry. Kant's general history and theory of the heavens is read in terms of contemporary axiomatic systems via the cosmologist Rudolf Kurth as well as with reference to Nietzsche who cites Kant in connection with his reading of Anaxagoras' cosmology. Along with these reflections on alchemy, the history/historiography of chemistry is considered. Where conventional history of science is inclined to bracket alchemy ('chymistry'), hermeneutic history and philosophy of science can be useful both for an understanding of Kant's understanding of chemistry as a science as for his invocation of Stahl's spagyric 'art' and for the sake of illuminating his example of the mutable properties of a specific ore of mercury, Zinnober, cinnabar (HgS).

Autor sin sucesores, Simmel fue uno de los más activos y lúcidos exponentes de la primera generación de sociólogos alemanes. Debido, tal vez, a la amplitud de temas, métodos y estructuras para sus escritos, las formas de leer su obra han sido tan múltiples como sus objetos y puntos de vista. Hoy, en vísperas de cumplirse un siglo de su muerte, y en un mundo signado por la individualidad, la diferenciación social, la economía monetaria, el retorno de lo religioso y la estetización de la vida, este libro se interroga por la actualidad del pensamiento simmeliano, por los significados que perduran y mantienen viva su teoría. ¿Cómo nos siguen interpelando sus textos? ¿Qué nos dice ese voluminoso cuerpo, por momentos enigmático, de escrituras sobre arte, filosofía, cultura, moral, economía y sociedad? En definitiva, ¿cuál es el peso de las ideas simmelianas ante la pregunta por el mundo socio-histórico de hoy? Compuesto por textos de autores de distintos países que tomaron para sí partes ...

ella sua formulazione più semplice, il panpsichismo è [1] l'idea che tutto -l'intera realtà concreta -è mente o coscienza (pan significa tutto e psiche significa mente o coscienza). * Traduzione in italiano, con il permesso dell'autore, di Enrico Volpe. Nota redazionale sui criteri di traduzione: Stuff significa "sostanza, materia, materiale, contenuto". Poiché il termine "sostanza" è impregnato di risonanze di filosofie precedenti e il termine è volutamente quotidiano, abbiamo usato "stampo" o "unico stampo" in linea di massima e "materiale" quando era necessario per la comprensione del testo. What-it's-likeness: l'inglese what it's like ha un senso più ampio dell'italiano a che cosa somiglia, perché copre anche l'area semantica dei nostri che cosa si prova, che effetto fa. Il lettore italiano ricorderà il precedente della traduzione italiana del famoso saggio What is it like to be a bat? di Thomas Nagel con Che effetto fa essere un pipistrello? (in Questioni mortali, tr. it. di A. Besussi, a cura di S. Veca, Il Saggiatore, Milano 1986, pp. 162-175). Abbiamo qui preferito "che cosa si prova" perché concorda fortemente con ciò che viene successivamente affermato sulla conoscenza per acquaintance. La parola acquaintance è un'altra parola della filosofia anglosassone di cui non esiste una traduzione standard. La traduzione più suggestiva è quella proposta nella tr. it. di B. RUSSELL, Theory of Knowledge. The 1913 Manuscript (Teoria della conoscenza, a cura di D. Marconi con introduzione di M. Di Francesco, che è "familiarità", p. 106 e passim). Dato il carattere dinamico della acquaintance, forse si dovrebbe tradurre con "familiarizzazione". Abbiamo preferito tuttavia, in quanto più ovvia per il lettore, la circonlocuzione "conoscenza per esperienza diretta", usato da Elena Spagnol nella traduzione di Bertrand Russell, Problemi della filosofia, Feltrinelli, Milano 1959, pur segnalando al lettore questa altra possibile resa del termine. N 10 10.5281/zenodo.14493833

Rozdział skupia się na roli odgrywanej przez ekspertów i wiedzy eksperckiej w innowacjach demokratycznych. Autor wskazuje na główne kontrowersje związane z włączaniem ekspertów w procedury demokratyczne oraz wątpliwości i zagrożenia nieodłączne komunikacji między ekspertami i zwykłymi obywatelami. Analizowane są główne strategie doboru ekspertów do innowacji demokratycznych oraz możliwe formy wspierania przez nich demokratycznych procedur decyzyjnych.

This essay explores the theme of individuation in existential phenomenology, focusing on the contributions of Alfred Schutz and Maurice Natanson, one of Schutz's students during his tenure at the New School for Social Research in New York. To mark the fiftieth anniversary of the Social Science Archive in Konstanz, I reflect on the theory of multiple realities and its application to issues of mobility and isolation. Following a lead given by Natanson in his critique of "life-world optimism" sketched in a letter to Schutz, I delve into Natanson's theory of individuation and his use of the phenomenological method by emphasizing his critical elaboration of Sartre's non-egological conception of consciousness and theory of the other. I demonstrate how the existential dimensions of anguish, aloneness, and loneliness, as raised by Natanson, restate the theory of multiple realities, in part through his engagement with phenomenological psychiatry.

Alfred Schütz, who joined the Austrian army at 17 years old as a lieutenant in 1917, faced traumatic experiences during the First World War that deeply influenced his later intellectual pursuits. This article examines how Schütz's wartime and postwar experiences shaped his intellectual and political contribution to sociology. The trauma Schütz faced during and after the war profoundly influenced his views on the ethical competence and integrative capacities of common sense, particularly in his applied theory essays of the 1940s. Highlighting the modern crisis of alienation, Schütz's works such as "The Stranger" and "The Homecomer" reflect his commitment to understanding and overcoming the estrangement and confusion that arise from social and spatial displacement and the ideology of irreconcilable alienness. Rather than treat what is missing from the biographical archive as an irretrievable loss or absence, the article reads parts of Schütz's later writings for traces they bear of his unrepresented wartime and postwar experiences, and argues that his applied theory essays partly serve as a delayed response to his youthful traumas. Ultimately, Schütz's insights into foreignness offer profound reflections on the interplay between historical events, personal experiences, and social theory.

Testo completo su richiesta.

Questa ricerca si propone di analizzare criticamente il concetto di simbolo attraverso un confronto tra le prospettive filosofiche di Paul Ricœur ed Ernst Cassirer. Il titolo, *Potenziale simbolico*, allude alla duplice accezione di "potenziale" sia nel senso aristotelico di *dynamis*, cioè di ciò che è in potenza rispetto all'atto, sia nel senso logico di apertura del simbolico a una pluralità di mondi possibili. Tale scelta terminologica riflette la natura inesauribile del simbolo, che si configura come un dispositivo semantico dinamico e in continua trasformazione. L'analisi critica viene condotta secondo un metodo che riprende la nozione kantiana di critica, intesa come interrogazione programmatica sulla possibilità, validità e limiti del concetto di simbolo.

La struttura della ricerca si articola in tre capitoli principali. Il primo capitolo introduce il progetto teorico di Paul Ricœur, che si sviluppa a partire dagli anni Sessanta con gli studi ermeneutici e fenomenologici, per giungere fino agli anni Novanta con *Sé come un altro*. Viene evidenziata l'importanza del metodo fenomenologico, in particolare attraverso il confronto critico con Husserl e Heidegger. Ricœur, pur recuperando il metodo husserliano, ne individua aporie e debolezze, introducendo l'ermeneutica come strumento correttivo e innovativo. L'ermeneutica ricœuriana non si limita all'esegesi di testi sacri, ma si estende all'interpretazione di tutte le forme e modalità di espressione dell'umano. Fondamentale in questo processo è il recupero della questione ontologica heideggeriana, che Ricœur riformula ponendo l'alterità al centro della riflessione sul Sé. Il soggetto non è più un cogito solipsistico, ma si definisce attraverso il riconoscimento dell'altro, dell'inconscio e della coscienza morale. La coscienza stessa viene riconsiderata alla luce delle filosofie del sospetto di Marx, Nietzsche e Freud, che ne rivelano la struttura menzognera e frammentaria.

Il secondo capitolo approfondisce la teoria ricœuriana del simbolo, tracciandone le radici etimologiche e storiche. Il simbolo, derivato dal greco *sýbolon*, è inteso come segno di una totalità originaria perduta, concetto che attraversa le opere di Eliade, Freud, Jung e Bachelard. Per Eliade, il simbolo è luogo di espressione del sacro, mentre Freud e Jung lo interpretano come accesso all'inconscio collettivo e all'archeologia delle civiltà. Bachelard, invece, sottolinea il legame tra simbolo e immaginazione poetica, distinguendo il problema dell'immaginazione da quello dell'immagine.

Successivamente, il simbolo viene definito per differenza rispetto a concetti affini come segno, allegoria e mito. A differenza del segno, che designa qualcosa di esterno, il simbolo è segno di un segno, ossia un'entità dotata di un duplice livello di significato. Rispetto all'allegoria, il simbolo mantiene un valore euristico che non si esaurisce nel semplice uso retorico. Il confronto con il mito rivela la natura narrativa del simbolo mitico e permette di distinguere la concezione ricœuriana del simbolo da quella della logica simbolica formale. Un'ulteriore tappa di approfondimento riguarda il debito di Ricœur nei confronti di Kant, in particolare attraverso la rilettura del paragrafo 59 della *Critica della capacità di giudizio*, che pone le basi per un dialogo teorico con Cassirer.

Un aspetto cruciale del secondo capitolo è l'analisi della teoria della metafora in Ricœur. Attraverso *La metafora viva* e il saggio *Parola e simbolo*, vengono messi in evidenza i punti di contatto tra metafora e simbolo, in particolare la loro funzione euristica. Tuttavia, mentre la metafora opera attraverso la tensione semantica tra significati letterali e figurati, il simbolo mantiene una struttura di riferimento più stabile e stratificata. L'ultima sezione del capitolo reintroduce il simbolo nel contesto più ampio della filosofia di Ricœur, attraversando le tre fasi della sua elaborazione: fenomenologica, ermeneutica e riflessiva. La conclusione porta a riconoscere il simbolo come "organo necessario ed essenziale del pensiero".

Il terzo capitolo è dedicato all'analisi della concezione cassireriana del simbolo. Ernst Cassirer, con la sua *Filosofia delle forme simboliche*, conferisce al simbolo un significato straordinariamente ampio, considerandolo il principale mezzo di espressione dello spirito umano. La sua analisi parte dall'estensione del trascendentale kantiano a tutte le attività simboliche, radicando la conoscenza nel mondo della vita. Il simbolo, per Cassirer, è una forma di obiettivazione dello spirito, un ponte tra il contenuto della coscienza e la realtà sensibile. In questo senso, il simbolo non è un semplice strumento comunicativo, ma una condizione essenziale della conoscenza e dell'esperienza umana.

Un aspetto centrale dell'analisi cassireriana riguarda il linguaggio, tema del primo volume della *Filosofia delle forme simboliche*. Cassirer distingue tre fasi di sviluppo del linguaggio: mimica, analogica e simbolica, evidenziando il ruolo delle forme simboliche nello strutturare il mondo oggettivo attraverso categorie spazio-temporali e numeriche. Questo approccio consente di vedere il simbolo non solo come strumento di rappresentazione, ma come elemento costitutivo della realtà fenomenica stessa.

L'ultima sezione del lavoro confronta le prospettive di Ricœur e Cassirer sul simbolo. Se Ricœur si concentra sul valore ermeneutico e interpretativo del simbolo, Cassirer ne sottolinea la funzione epistemologica e trascendentale. Il confronto rivela elementi di convergenza tra i due autori, ma anche profonde divergenze. In particolare, Ricœur propone una delimitazione critica del concetto cassireriano di simbolo, mostrando come il simbolico non sia una forma astratta e autonoma, bensì un dispositivo che assume valore solo nel contesto interpretativo in cui è inserito. Cassirer, al contrario, attribuisce al simbolo una funzione primaria nella costituzione della conoscenza umana, considerandolo un elemento strutturante della realtà. La tensione tra queste due prospettive si risolve in un'interrogazione radicale sulla natura del simbolo: è il simbolo a fare l'uomo o è l'uomo a fare il simbolo?

L'étude de phénomènes particulièrement gênants dans le management utilisant le débat comme mode de créativité et de prise de décisions, nous ont conduit à interroger la certitude que « toute connaissance humaine dépend du point de vue de son auteur ». En effet, sur cette affirmation reposent toutes les justifications de l'utilisation des échanges d'opinions et de points de vue pour prétendre à une plus grande objectivité. Cet essai met en évidence la contradiction interne de cette conjecture. La démonstration conduit à ébranler des croyances fortement ancrées dans les sciences humaines. Le but est d'ouvrir à d'autres pratiques de communication en identifiant des lois de communication non assujetties à la subjectivité des communicants.

This book discusses the ethics of engaging with the paradigm of lived experience, particularly through an interest in the spatiotemporal constructs of such experiences via a comparative conceptual map across Husserlian phenomenology and Nishida’s moral philosophy. The overall commitment of the book is towards the vision of a ‘better life’ through insights into two themes, that of time and intimacy.

Генезис времени трактуется авторами в духе конструктивизма в сочетании с деятельностным подходом к познанию. Базовые временны́е категории настоящего,  прошлого и будущего рассматриваются как система мыследействий — элементарных
единиц деятельности, — структура которой обусловлена языковым семиозисом. Модель феноменологии времени Гуссерля применяется к анализу переживания субъектом собственных действий. Показано, что если переживаемое настоящее основано на совершаемых действиях, то прошлое и будущее конструируются рефлексивными мыследействиями в когнитивной сфере языка. Подчеркивается, что организация временнóго ряда, связывающего то, что есть, с тем, чего уже нет или еще нет, возможна лишь в языковом семиозисе. Аналогия с гуссерлевской трехчастной структурой потока сознания-времени помогает понять триаду «настоящее — прошлое — будущее» как пример эпистемологической ловушки языка: прошлое и будущее — это мысленные конструкты, так же принадлежащие настоящему, как и любые другие акты мысли.

Alfred Schutz's dimensions of the social world was a key component of his phenomenology of the life-world. As Schutz saw it the life-world is arranged around us as its zero-point determined by the "Here and Now" we occupy. From there the lifeworld extends into various zones determined by their relation to our "Here and Now" in terms of space and time. The dimensions of the social world built up the sort of werelationship that was possible with the Other depending on the zone they occupied within the life-world. Due to the time of his writing, Schutz's dimensions could not have factored in the internet and a recent article by Shangyang Zhao (2004) has attempted to extend the dimensions in relation to internet interaction. Building of this, it is the purpose of this paper to extend Schutz's dimensions by looking at First Person Shooters. By looking at game-worlds it is possible to highlight two types of we-relationship missing in the current dimensions: the andsociate relation and the consociated contemporary relation.

The debate over the contribution of the Internet to democracy is far from settled. Some point to the empowering effects of online discussion and fund raising on recent electoral campaigns in the US to argue that the Internet will restore the public sphere. Others claim that the Internet is just a virtual mall, a final extension of global capitalism into every corner of our lives. This paper argues for the democratic thesis with some qualifications. The most important contribution of the Internet to democracy is not necessarily its effects on the electoral process but rather its ability to assemble a public around technical networks that enroll individuals scattered over wide geographical areas. Medical patients, video game players, musical performers, and many other publics have emerged on the Internet with surprising consequences.

En este artículo pretendo responder a la crítica elaborada por Alfred Schutz, en The Problem of Transcendental Intersubjectivity in Husserl, a la teoría husserliana de la intersubjetividad. La crítica consiste en tres objeciones puntuales: i) que Husserl no explica con claridad y suficiencia cómo es posible la constitución del Otro a partir del cuerpo propio y cómo es posible la constitución de un mundo circundante común; ii) que las relaciones sociales no pueden constituirse a partir de la comunicación y consecuentemente iii) que el concepto de persona de orden suprior está injustificado.

Pane profesore, začněme rovnou otázkou, která je úzce spojena s tímto číslem časopisu Sociální studia. Je pro Vás zajímavý sociální konstruktivismus, tak jak se vyvíjel po vydání knihy P. L. Bergera a T. Luckmanna Sociální konstrukce reality v roce 1966?

In this paper, I explore the bodily constitution of violence from a phenomenological perspective, contrasting the directly lived experience of violence with imagistic violence. The analysis involves examining one’s own embodiment from the first-person perspective in two distinct situations: as the agent of violence, anchored in one’s own “I can”, and as a passive victim, marked by vulnerability and helplessness. Each situation reveals specific particularities of the other’s adversity. The final section transitions to the imagistic experience of violence, discussing how bodily markers are modified in this context. Using Kubrick’s iconic film A Clockwork Orange as an example, I illustrate the shift in bodily structures and the implications of imagistic violence.

In this paper we will at-tempt to outline a phenomenology of attention centered around the concepts of interest and selection. We will start with an analysis of Husserl’s notion of attention, then turn to the reflections of William James, Alfred Schutz and Erving Goffman, all of whom recognized the fundamental role attention plays in the processes by which social actors frame and define reality. Finally, we will consider Bernhard Waldenfles’ ethics of attention. He offers an ethics based on openness to and recognition of the other that, above all, offers both a response and an antidote to xenology and xenopolitics.

This article of reflection on knowledge arises from the academic experience acquired in the subjects of Research I and II, taught in the Sociology programme at the Universidad Popular del Cesar. This work synthesises and analyses the learning obtained in these subjects, with the aim of deepening the understanding of the various typologies and approaches to knowledge, as well as its role within the social and academic context. Objectives: To analyse the historical evolution of knowledge, its various typologies and its social construction, with special emphasis on the theory of the social construction of reality proposed by Berger and Luckmann. Method: The methodology used in this text falls within the parameters of the interpretative paradigm and resorts to the hermeneutic method to understand and interpret the arguments presented by various authors in relation to the category of knowledge. Results: The analysis of the typologies of knowledge shows an evolution deeply influenced by the interaction between social needs and historical contexts. From empirical knowledge in ancient societies to the consolidation of scientific knowledge in modernity, each type has responded to the specific demands and priorities of its time. In the current context, we observe an even greater diversification of knowledge, driven by factors such as technology and globalisation, which have given rise to new forms of knowledge and different criteria for validation. According to Berger and Luckmann's (1986) theory of the social construction of reality, knowledge in all its dimensions is a construction that can only occur in a social context. Conclusions: The historical evolution of knowledge reveals that its different typologies have emerged in response to the specific demands and contexts of each era, reflecting the adaptability of knowledge to social priorities. According to Berger and Luckmann's (1986) theory of the social construction of reality, knowledge acquires meaning as a function of collective interactions and agreements, making it an intrinsically social phenomenon. Thus, types of knowledge such as empirical, scientific or philosophical knowledge not only fulfil particular functions within society, but are also legitimised and transmitted on the basis of shared practices and consensus, consolidating themselves as essential tools for interpreting reality and guiding human behaviour in different communities and generations.

Chung-Chi Yu's book is divided into 14 Chapters, centred on the thoughts of the authors whose names appear in the title (the last one, Bernhard Waldenfels, still an active German philosopher), but with several references to other authors belonging to the phenomenological tradition, such as Jean-Paul Sartre and Aron Gurwitch, and important authors in the field of the social sciences such as Max Weber. Most of the Chapters are devoted to a discussion of various aspects of Alfred Schutz's thought (Chapters 6 to 12); Chapters 1 to 4 are especially devoted to the thought of Edmund Husserl and the last two, 13 and 14, focus on Bernhard Waldenfels. However, Husserl is present in all of them, thanks, above all, to Chung-Chi Yu's use of the concept of "Life-World". This is probably the most popular Husserlian concept-despite the difficulties in defining it accurately, which has already given rise to several interpretations of its meaning-, especially because of the possibilities it offers of application in areas outside philosophy, namely, but not exclusively, in the social sciences. Life-World, however, is not the only phenomenological concept that is addressed and discussed in this book by Chung-Chi Yu. We could, among some others, mention the concept of "phenomenological reduction", particularly important if we want to establish the scientificity, in the Husserlian meaning of this term, of the concept of Life-World; that of "intersubjectivity", especially in the version of it presented by Husserl in the famous 5 th Cartesian Meditation, where he

Con los materiales de Lukács a los que estamos accediendo en el idioma español, una tarea de nuestro tiempo es realizar una nueva y diferente elaboración crítica de la herencia de la obra intelectual de Georg Lukács. Planteo algunos criterios para esta empresa, los cuales podrían discutirse si tienen pertinencia. Primero, reevaluar y en su caso distanciarnos de las lecturas parciales de los años setenta, sobre todo occidentales, que se realizaron sobre la obra del filósofo húngaro. Segundo, poner a prueba, aquellas lecturas que le otorgan “valor intelectual” al joven Lukács hasta 1919 pero despotrican contra el marxismo de Lukács iniciado en 1919. Tercero, realizar una relectura de la obra de Lukács, enmarcada en la actual situación del mundo y desde la historia de América Latina. Cuarto, reavivar la cuestión de que nos encontramos frente a un problema éticopolítico al reconocer, conscientemente, que en las condiciones en que nos hallamos se nos exige un compromiso y responsabilidad frente a la destrucción de todas las formas de vida humanas y no humanas. En este ensayo elaboro un ejercicio sobre el primer y segundo criterio antes mencionado con la finalidad de establecer algunas orientaciones para la elaboración crítica de una nueva y diferente recepción de la obra intelectual de Georg Lukács, en el contexto de los problemas del mundo y situados desde América Latina.

Resumen El artículo se propone analizar el diálogo intelectual entre Alfred Schutz y Talcott Parsons recuperando como tema central de la correspondencia la relación entre filosofía y ciencias sociales. Fundamentalmente interesa revisitar, desde bases fenomenológicas, la distinción entre filosofía "ingenua" y filosofía "crítica" con relación a la teoría del conocimiento. Partiendo de esa distinción Schutz considera necesario superar la "ingenuidad" de la ciencia empírica abogando por una filosofía crítica que ilumine las condiciones de posibilidad del conocimiento. La propuesta schutziana de una reivindicación epistémica del mundo de la vida se orienta hacia ese proyecto de fundamentación al plantear una articulación o una "complementariedad" entre las categorías parsonianas-el marco de referencia de la acción-y una ontología del mundo de la vida que incorpore la reflexión en torno al tiempo y a la intersubjetividad. Sin embargo, como muestra la correspondencia, el rechazo de Parsons a estos problemas es categórico. El autor rechaza tanto la reflexión filosófica como la necesidad de indagar en los rasgos del mundo de la vida, de modo que el proyecto integrador de Schutz y su intención de complementariedad quedan descartados enfáticamente desde un principio. Esta respuesta condujo a reflexionar acerca de las características del diálogo intelectual que se entabló entre los autores. Valiéndose de la hermenéutica de Hans-Georg Gadamer se sostiene que la correspondencia puede interpretarse como un caso de lo que el autor denomina la creciente "monologización" del pensamiento filosófico, la que consiste en la imposibilidad de encontrar un lenguaje común, lo que dificulta el entendimiento y la comprensión mutua.

The essay is an attempt at studying the concept of technology. It seeks to understand how technology has unfolded itself in theory across time using the theoretical standpoints of Martin Heidegger, Marshall McLuhan and Michel Foucault. The 1950s have been instrumental in bringing forth a discourse on technology, specifically concerning the future of humanity and nature. The present essay primarily studies the concept of technology in the Heideggerian sense

Interpretatywizm jako stanowisko w filozofii poznania stał się podstawą badań w ramach współczesnych stosunków międzynarodowych, metodologicznie opartych na hermeneutyce, fenomenologii, dyskursywizmie itp. Wprowadzenie zróżnicowanych metod poznawczych w SM stanowiło odpowiedź na wyzwania społeczno-polityczne i naukowe, dla których pozytywistyczny wzorzec uprawiania nauki nie był  wystarczający. Rosnące przekonanie, że dostęp do rzeczywistości uzyskiwany jest przez konstrukcje społeczne, takie jak język, wartości,
normy itp., umożliwiło wprowadzenie metod i technik interpretatywnych do głównego nurtu SM. Zwiększyło to świadomość, że tworzenie wiedzy to intersubiektywne, skoncentrowane na znaczeniach procesy, z którymi podmioty badające wchodzą w interakcje i potencjalnie je kształtują. Odrzucenie dualistycznych koncepcji poznawczych i ułudy neutralności wobec kształtowanych reprezentacji świata umożliwiło pokazanie, jak wszystko jest ze sobą połączone, co uwydatniło sens badań interdyscyplinarnych i włączania odmiennych perspektyw. Zarzut relatywizmu badawczego jest chybiony, ponieważ różnorodność
metodologiczna nie oznacza odejścia od standaryzacji badań, a uwolnienie od jednej perspektywy nie jest brakiem naukowego charakteru rozważań, tylko pokazaniem złożoności badanej materii.

This collective volume fills an important scholarly gap against the widespread, mainstream take on the philosophy of law and the sphere of social acts and social realities. It revisits and reinvigorates the phenomenological account of some of the major questions and themes of jurisprudence such as the nature and structure of social acts and social realities, the texture of the sphere of praxis, the foundations of law, ethics, and economics, and the fundamental issue of the normativity of positive law.
This volume argues that wherever there is a demand for grounding law and aspects of its context, the phenomenological method can provide a priori—albeit corrigible in their application—access to essential truths about the corresponding elements of interest. The present work reflects upon the place
in and potential impact on the theory of law and its context of the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl—largely overlooked by legal philosophers and legal theorists. Further coverage contains those
who have built upon these ideas of Husserl, such as Alfred Schutz, Edith Stein, Emmanuel Levinas, and Adolf Reinach. The contributions address new issues and questions from the general perspective of the phenomenology of law, of normativity, and of the sphere of social acts and social realities. It is a
response to the received view of legal positivism by presenting informed arguments in support of the view that phenomenology has the potential to achieve a deeper grasp of legal normative concepts such as rights, claims, obligations, promises, and apologies. Boundaries between law and morality as well as legal and social ontologies are also approached from a phenomenological perspective. The present volume appeals to students, researchers, and professionals working in phenomenology,
ethics, legal philosophy, and human rights theory and practice.

This research explores how existential threats are politically constructed and socially experienced in the context of Russia’s war against Ukraine. Bridging phenomenological sociology, securitization theory, and the state of exception framework, it investigates discursive framings by state actors and intersubjective meaning-making across Ukraine, Russia, Germany, and the USA.

The concept of lived experience plays a significant role in the social sciences in general and in philosophy in particular. The idea of lived experience as a social reality has been philosophized and given prime importance in the phenomenological tradition of philosophy. However, the work of Alfred Schutz, one of the phenomenologists on lived experience, has not been given adequate attention by either sociologists or philosophers. This paper attempts to understand how lived experiences are not merely individual or subjective experiences but are also collective or social. Firstly, it suggests that lived experiences need to be understood in a broader context, namely that of the social and inter-subjectivity, which can be found in the Philosophy of Alfred Schutz. Thus, there is an attempt to show how Schutz's philosophy broadly helps us understand lived experience as a social reality. Secondly, to justify how lived experiences are social and collective experiences, illustrations of the studies related to race, gender, and caste are given as a marker for lived experiences throughout the paper. So far, lived experience has been understood within the domain of individual or the subjective or merely in the first-person perspective. Hence, this paper provides some insights into investigating lived experience from the third-person perspective.

En este trabajo se analizan una serie de debates sobre la relación entre la teoría de la  práctica de Bourdieu y la tradición fenomenológica. Se comienza revisando la crítica de Throop & Murphy a la lectura realizada por Bourdieu de Husserl y Schutz y la respuesta del sociólogo francés. Luego se propone un análisis crítico de este debate, mostrando aciertos y desaciertos de cada posición. A continuación, se retoman los trabajos de Haber y Bimbenet, que evidencian la fundamentación de la perspectiva de Bourdieu en Merleau-Ponty –subestimada por Throop & Murphy– sin dejar de señalar una crí-tica a los límites de la teoría de la práctica. Se concluye que sus principales objeciones a Bourdieu giran en torno al “determinismo” y a su poca atención a las “prácticas reflexi-vas”. Se responde a esas críticas mediante una reelaboración de la antropología de Bourdieu a partir de la integración profunda de la fenomenología de Merleau-Ponty, centrada en la dialéctica entre cuerpo habitual y actual, reflexividad y contradiestra-miento corporal.

The paper investigates meditation as a state of consciousness that isolates
an individual from the attitude of everyday life and the perspective of practical actions. It is an “ethnography of the mind” instead of the place. The paper analyses self-reports from meditators’ self-observations as part of hatha yoga practice and data from semi-structured interviews with hatha yoga teachers. Elements that distract or help people meditate were analysed and interpreted. The features of the meditative state during the practice of sitting meditation are also reconstructed. Attention is paid to three essential aspects that are related to each other when entering the meditative state: emerging thoughts, body sensations, and emotions. The analysis focuses on how practitioners deal with these obstacles; what tactics do they employ to eliminate barriers or redirect attention and include them in the background of the concentration point? What is the role of teaching meditation? What are the effects of meditation from a practitioner’s point of view?Empirical materials obtained from the first-person perspective of the researcher, the author of this article, and his collaborators in the study were also analysed.