Aristotelian Ethics

Many scholars have argued that the Protestant Reformation generally departed from virtue ethics, and this claim is often accepted by Protestant ethicists. This essay argues against such discontinuity by demonstrating John Calvin’s reception of ethical concepts from Augustine and Aristotle. Calvin drew on Augustine’s concept of eudaimonia and many aspects of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics , including concepts of choice, habit, virtue as a mean, and the specific virtues of justice and prudence. Calvin also evaluated the problem of pagan virtue in light of traditional Augustinian texts discussed in the medieval period. He interpreted the Decalogue as teaching virtue, including the cardinal virtues of justice and temperance. Calvin was not the harbinger of an entirely new ethical paradigm, but rather a participant in the mainstream of Christian thinkers who maintained a dual interest in Aristotelian and Augustinian eudaimonist virtue ethics.

This study is an attempt to make the strongest possible case for the Meinecke-Diels hypothesis that there was a doxographer named “Arius Didymus,” who compiled the three ethical doxographies in Stobaeus 2.7, and also a physical doxography. It offers an analysis of the historiographical, exegetical and logical issues undergirding the Meinecke-Diels hypothesis. For the current state of the question 25 years later and a critical evaluation of the hypothesis and its components see D. E. Hahm, “The Quest for an Author” in W. W. Fortenbaugh, ed., Arius Didymus On Peripatetic Ethics, Household Management and Politics, Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities vol. 20  (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2017) 69-74.

John Burnet’s thesis about the dialectical character of Aristotelian ethics seems nowadays to have become a common view, held by most if not all interpreters. In addition, the dialectical method is now considered Aristotle’s primary method of philosophical investigation: not only his ethics, but also his physics and its branches, and even his theology are taken to be fundamentally dialectical. The sole exceptions recognized are mathematics and logic. This expansion has been made at times with certain restrictions on the sort of dialectic considered, but it has at other times been adopted without restriction. I think that there are good reasons to resist such an expansion, particularly regarding physics, although in the present study I want to examine the dialectical thesis at its core, that is to say, in ethics. My thesis is that Aristotelian ethics was initially dialectical in its method: EE systematically held that dialectic is the appropriate means of proof for morals. However, Aristotle himself abandoned such a view, and in NE the kind of proof required was no longer dialectical. This does not mean that, once abandoned in ethics, dialectic could not still find a place in other domains, such as physics, even if I think that unlikely. Nevertheless, I intend to show here only what happened with the method in ethics, from EE to NE, without regarding what might have happened in other domains.

Shakespeare's Titus Andronicus examines through its sensational horrors and multiple acts of vengeance how designations of moderation and excess may be constituted, unsettled, and reconstituted in a polity destabilized by shifting ethical referents. By examining Shakespeare's engagement with the Aristotelian ethical mean—the point of moral equilibrium between two diametrically opposed, immoral extremes—this article explains how the construal of ethical value in Elizabethan England invited contest. Titus Andronicus exhibits a preoccupation with fixing moderation, both in the sense of locating but also repairing it as well, to imagine a world in which immoderation threatens to become the norm. By treating the contextual determination of moderation and the mean's ontological fixity as compatible, Titus Andronicus creates a flexible rigidity that positions Titus as both horrible and sympathetic in his revenge, as he negotiates the shifting terms of Rome's civic contract. The play's apparent dislocation of victim and villain derives from the theatrical possibilities inherent in the mean's fluidity, yet the ethical mean paradoxically provides a readable matrix of heroism and villainy. Resituated in a world grown uncontrollably immoderate, Titus acts in direct proportion to his surrounding context, his grotesque revenge functioning, remarkably, as a brutal but necessary type of moderation-in-extremity.

Keywords: Shakespeare, Titus Andronicus, violence, extremes, moderation, Aristotle, ethics, tragedy, revenge

In what precedes, I have argued that Aristotle does not, in his ethics, commit three metaphysical errors sometimes imputed to him: he does not define the good as a fact; he does not claim that human beings move by nature towards their telos; he does not claim, in the ergon argument, that human beings are fixed rather than versatile. Instead, I have shown, he does the opposite in each case: he argues that the good cannot be defined as a fact; he claims that human beings move towards their telos only if they have virtue and virtue is not by nature; he locates, in the human ergon, that which is responsible for human versatility. Finally, I have shown by example that the metaphysical commitments of Aristotle's account of human happiness are not as controversial as they seem. If all of this is true, then perhaps the disorder that has existed in ethics since the enlightenment has been misdiagnosed. Perhaps it is not due to an unhappy choice between end-neutral emotivism on the one hand and Aristotle's bad metaphysics on the other. Perhaps instead it is due, at least in part, to a too hasty rejection of Aristotle's ethics on the grounds of a rejection of his biology.

Política y Sociedad., 43-3, 67-85, 2006 (ISSN: 1130-8001) | El propósito del artículo es efectuar una aproximación general al tipo de relación que se establece entre ética y estética de la conducta tal y como ésta ha sido planteada en los diferentes manuales de buenas
maneras que se han publicado en España desde la Baja Edad Media hasta nuestros días. Se proponen, a partir de esos mismos manuales, dos modelos comprensivos de las relaciones entre ética y estética del
comportamiento aquí denominados aristotélico y kantiano respectivamente. Por último, se presentan diversas propuestas explicativas en torno a la disolución del contenido moral de las buenas maneras en tales manuales.

This paper concerns both Aristotle's notion of right feelings and Husserl's account of intentional feelings and emotions as developed in their ethical writings and it discusses these approaches in relation to each other. It addresses the question of motivation and justifcation or evidence for moral feelings and actions. In particular, it focuses on the emotional states of philia and love as well as the inherent relationship between afectivity and reason. The paper concludes with some refections on the requirements for the constitution of a moral self.

Die aristotelische Bestimmung des Menschen ist ein Rätsel. Daher soll sie im Folgenden auch als ein Rätsel behandelt werden. Ziel ist es, hier nicht das bei Aristoteles finden zu wollen, was wir heute ohnehin schon über den Menschen als ein Lebewesen wissen oder zu wissen glauben, sondern es gilt im Folgenden von Aristoteles ahnen zu lernen, was wir noch nicht wissen, wofür wir heute, in unserer technisierten, wissenschaftsorientierten und digitalisierten Blickbahn vielleicht noch gar nicht gerüstet sind.

RESUMEN: La ética aristotélica gozó de una consciente reactivación a partir de los años 70 y su influencia se prolonga hasta el debate contemporáneo. En los últimos años numerosos estudiosos han sabido capitalizar el rendimiento moral de la filosofía de Aristóteles atendiendo, precisamente, a la singular relevancia que en su propuesta ética adquieren las pasiones. Creemos que muchas de las aparentes aporías de sus planteamientos (tales como la caracterización cognitivo-conductual de la incontinencia o el propio estatuto del silogismo práctico) pueden resolverse a partir del análisis del vínculo epistemológico y motivacional que se establece entre el conocimiento, las pasiones y la acción moral. Para ello, en este artículo, en línea con propuestas ya clásicas como las de M.C. Nussbaum o más recientes como las de D. Achtenberg, trataremos de articular con precisión el modo en que la captación o estimación que ejercen las pasiones es determinante para el conjunto de su ética circuns-cribiéndonos, específicamente, a la captación de la propia idea del bien. ABSTRACT: Aristotelian Ethics enjoyed a conscious revival from the 70's and its influence extends to the contemporary debate. In recent years, many scholars have been able to capitalize on the moral performance of Aristotle's philosophy, precisely because of the unique relevance that passions have in their ethical proposal. Many of the apparent aporias of his approaches (such as the cognitive-behavioral characterization of incontinence or the practical syllogism status itself) can be solved by analyzing the epistemological and motivational link between knowledge, passions, and moral action. To this end in this article (being in line with proposals already classic like those of M.C. Nussbaum, or more recent ones such as those of D. Achtenberg) we may try to articulate precisely the way in which the capture or estimation that the passions exert is determinant for the whole of Aristotelian ethics circumscribing us, specifically, to the capture of the idea of the Good.

Questo saggio  ha come oggetto l’analisi specifica della mancanza di controllo del desiderio impulsivo (thumos) che Aristotele introduce in VII 7 per completare la dottrina dell’akrasia. Dagli argomenti di Aristotele  emergono due importanti elementi del «materiale di costruzione» dell’etica aristotelica: la componente giuridica e il complesso rapporto di continuità edi distacco con Platone.

In this paper I evaluate the relevant contribution which the
philosophical picture of practical thought articulated by Thompson could offer to contemporary social philosophy. First, Thompson’s overall strategy furnishes us with a conceptual framework to argue
against bald anti-naturalism in social philosophy.Furthermore, A second relevant contribution of Thompson’s work to the field of social philosophy  consists in extending the notion of agency beyond the limits of contemporary action theory. A third relevant contribution concerns the fact that
Thompson’s framework could help us to gain some distance from the obsession of ‘normativism’ which is dominant in current political philosophy and social ontology. Finally, I
criticize Thompson’s overextension of an anti-individualist approach to life and action, which
leads him to underestimate the role that individuality plays in human practice.
The thread of individuality leads me to criticize Thompson’s  identification of disposition and practice.

Foot argues that there are certain things that all human beings - perhaps all rational agents - need.  This gives a sense in which certain values and disvalues can be called 'objective'.  I suggest that, with certain relatively minor adjustments, her argument can be made cogent but that it cannot be used to show that there are objective answers to questions about what one should do when values conflict.  If Foot's own virtue ethics, utilitarianism, Kantian ethics or any other first-order moral system were to be established as objectively valid, this would require some completely different form of argumentation. 


Almost sixty years ago Philippa Foot published an article that began: To many people it seems that the most notable advance in moral philosophy during the past fifty years or so has been the refutation of naturalism; and they are a little shocked that at this late date such an issue should be reopened. It is easy to understand their attitude: given certain apparently unquestionable assumptions, it would be about as sensible to try to reintroduce naturalism as to try to square the circle. Those who see it like this have satisfied themselves that they know in advance that any naturalistic theory must have a catch in it somewhere, and are put out at having to waste more time exposing an old fallacy. This paper is an attempt to persuade them to look critically at the premises on which their arguments are based. 1 The paper in question was one of a number written by Foot around the time that were highly successful in reopening the issue of naturalism in ethics. Nowadays no one can just take it for granted that naturalism has been refuted, that there is a sharp distinction (or indeed any clear distinction) between fact and value or that it is impossible to derive an 'ought' from an 'is'. This is not to say that the naturalists have been completely victorious, of course; only that naturalism is today a live option. I shall argue that Foot's paper contains an important insight and an equally important mistake; and that the insight and the mistake are linked. I believe that the thinking behind it has influenced the subsequent course of moral philosophy to a quite remarkable extent and that this has been in some ways beneficial and in some ways harmful – not surprisingly, if I am right in seeing it as containing both truth and error. I do not want to exaggerate the influence of this one paper 2 but I do not know of any other that so neatly encapsulates the coupled insight and mistake. The anti-naturalism that Foot is attacking she characterises as follows: It would not be an exaggeration to say that the whole of moral philosophy, as it is now widely taught, rests on a contrast between statements of fact and evaluations, which runs something like this: The truth or falsity of statements of fact is shewn by means of evidence; and what counts as evidence is laid down in the meaning of the expressions occurring in the statement of fact … It follows that no two people can make the same statement and count completely different things as evidence; in the end one at least of them could be convicted of linguistic ignorance. It also follows that if a man is given good evidence for a factual conclusion he cannot just refuse to accept the conclusion on the ground that in his scheme of things this evidence is not evidence at all. 3 But, on the view she is criticising, [w]ith evaluations, however, it is different. An evaluation is not connected logically with the factual statements on which it is based. One man may say that a thing is good because of some fact about it, and another may refuse to take that fact as any evidence, for nothing is laid down in the meaning of 'good' which connects it with one piece of 'evidence' rather than another. It follows that a moral eccentric could argue to moral conclusions from quite idiosyncratic premises; he could say, for instance, that a man was a good man because he clasped and unclasped his hands and never turned NNE after

Myofascial Pain Syndrome (MFPS) is somatic pain due to muscular tension associated with muscular-skeletal imbalance. The pain and discomfort of the patient is not simply due to some isolated tension, but in the dynamic relationships between related structures. As the body adjusts to reestablish balance and symmetry, the tension and pain in one area " diagonalizes, " creating a tense correlate along a diagonal axis. This diagonalization of tension exacerbates and perpetuates the initial condition of pain and dysfunction. The purpose of this paper is to argue that there are moral and social analogues to MFPS with their own forms of diagonalized asymmetry. Following the Aristotelian model of virtue and vice, whereby moral traits and dispositions become vice as a result of a loss of balance in conduct, and George Herbert Mead's social psychology, which describes the self in terms of dynamic interrelation and cooperation of multiple sub-selves, I maintain that otherwise positive strengths in personal character, when overemphasized or exaggerated, can be juxtaposed to analogous weaknesses in related areas of personal health and conduct. I will argue that the descriptive analogy of MFPS has a corollary set of prescriptions for restoring balance in a moral subject.

Advertimos que não temos como propósito a releitura de algum ponto específico de alguma parte da obra de Aristóteles ou uma nova interpretação acerca de alguma passagem, conceito ou ‘doutrina’ do corpus. Pretendemos tão somente estabelecer certo percurso de análise de um dos importantes conceitos da sua filosofia, a saber, o lógos, a partir da investigação de outro conceito de fundamental importância nos seus textos, a potência, percurso esse que conduz a um aparente paradoxo (o qual constituir-se-á no objeto norteador da nossa pesquisa), qual seja, por um lado, de uma perspectiva física, o lógos confere potencialidade para o homem não ficar totalmente sujeito à necessidade do mundo sublunar, permitindo-lhe agir na contingência que este comporta; por outro, de um ponto de vista prático, esse mesmo lógos tende a encerrar o homem em certa necessidade.

The anonymous Compendium philosophie was composed when the Aristotelianism was widespread at the University and is a witness of the changes in European culture in the middle of the XIIIth century. The aim of this article is twofold: first to summarize the current research dedicated to the text since Valentine Rose's article of 1871. Second to propose some considerations about the corpus aristotelicum as used by the author, together with some notes about the reception of the Compendium between the end of XIIIth century and the beginnings of the XIVth.

The Summa Alexandrinorum is an epitome of the Nicomachean Ethics, probably composed in the philosophical context of the Late Antiquity, translated into Arabic and then in Latin by Hermannus Alemannus (XIIIth century). Considering the results of the studies dedicated to this text the first part of the article reconstructs its history and its circulation in the Arabic and Latin world. The second part develops an analysis of the philosophical grounds of the Summa in which are clear the influences of peripatetic and Neoplatonic philosophy. An appendix offers an edition of a significant part of the Summa, the so-called “seventh book”, based on the most important manuscripts.

Scholarship is that process of becoming familiar with, ordering, and acknowledging the thinking of earlier workers in a particular line of inquiry. It can easily become a lifetime task. The process is obviously valuable. Subduing the arrogance of an ignorant mind (especially one's own) is very healthy. Scholarship not only helps to avoid past mistakes and save the waste of "reinventing the wheel", but can also be a stimulus for new and more sophisticated ideas about a topic. However, the largest body of scholarship always remains inert, not only failing to stimulate new ideas, but actually forming a bulwark against the intrusion of fresh thinking...

Paper presented in the 2009 IVR Beijing Congress, Beijing, China, 2009. Co-authored with GONTIJO, Lucas de Alvarenga.
The purpose of the present text is to analyze the juridical phenomenon through the perspective of its rhetorical practice and to discuss whether such posture is by itself censorable from the ethical point of view. In order to achieve our purpose in this text, we have chosen to study, within the broad oeuvre of Aristotle, parts of the Organon collection, namely: Analytics, Topics, Sophistical Refutations, and also Rhetoric and Poetics, with an emphasis on the Art of Rhetoric. The aim that governs this entire demarche is to understand the Aristotelian proposals to a theory of rationality, which is to be investigated through the discursive practices applied to the juridical phenomenon. The utility of rhetoric is thus emphasized to what concerns it as a technique of discourse analysis, not its power to dominate minds. The function of rhetoric is not only to persuade, but also to find the persuasion means that fit better each case, to recognize what seems to convince and what convinces indeed. Even though it may be dishonestly used, that does not diminish its value. Aristotle has freed rhetoric from the burden of moral. It is necessary to be capable of defending the pro as well as the contra, not to make them equivalent, but in order to understand the adversary mechanism of argumentation and, thus, refute it. Aristotle believes that the true and the just are by nature stronger than their contraries. This is also how juridical praxis works.