Chance and Indeterminacy

For many astronomers, the progressive development of life has been seen as a natural occurrence given proper environmental conditions on a planet: even though such beings would not be identical to humans, there would be significant parallels. A striking contrast is seen in writings of nonphysical scientists, who have held more widely differing views. But within this diversity, reasons for differences become more apparent when we see how views about extraterrestrials can be related to the differential emphasis placed on modern evolutionary theory by scientists of various disciplines. One clue to understanding the differences between the biologists, paleontologists, and anthropologists who speculated on extraterrestrials is suggested by noting who wrote on the subject. Given the relatively small number of commentators on the topic, it seems more than coincidental that four of the major contributors to the evolutionary synthesis in the 1930s and 1940s are among them. Upon closer examination it is evident that the exobiological arguments of Theodosius Dobzhansky and George Gaylord Simpson and, less directly, of H. J. Muller and Ernst Mayr are all related to their earlier work in formulating synthetic evolution. By examining the variety of views held by nonphysical scientists, we can see that there were significant disagreements between them about evolution into the 1960s. By the mid-1980s, many believed that “higher” life, particularly intelligent life, probably occurs quite infrequently in the universe; nevertheless, some held out the possibility that convergence of intelligence could occur across worlds. Regardless of the final conclusions these scientists reached about the likely prevalence of extraterrestrial intelligence, the use of evolutionary arguments to support their positions became increasingly common.

In this work we look at one special case to provide a rational basis for the following assertion known as Statistical Law of Large Numbers:
If an event E has a constant probability p of occurrence on any one trial, and has occurred m times in n trials, then, if the relative frequency of E, m/n, approaches the value of a limit point l and the accuracy of the approximation increases as the number of trials increases, we have l = p.
The argument we propose is based on the concepts of "event" and "trial", formulated in a recent paper by the author himself, and their direct implications.

There is stock argument against libertarianism: that the indeterminism it postulates makes human choice a matter of chance and this is no better as a basis for practical rationality and moral responsibility than the most rigid determinism.  I suggest that a similar problem arises on deterministic assumptions: although human choice is no longer a matter of mere chance, it remains arbitrary since whatever explains a person’s choice to act on the reasons for an action rather than those against, it is not a matter of reasons that were reasons FOR THAT PERSON.  The explanatory gap is closed in the wrong way for the impression of sheer arbitrariness to be cancelled.  I discuss (via a digression on F. H. Bradley) whether Davidson’s ‘anomalous monism’ would, if correct, necessitate any modification to this conclusion.  I also ask how the problem addressed in this paper relates to Galen Strawson’s rejection of the possibility of complete autonomy or self-determination.

1) Welche Rolle spielt Intuition im Entwicklungsgang der einzelnen Wissenschaften,  was kann aus wissenschaftshistorischer und epistemologischer, also gewissermaßen externer Perspektive zur Intuition in den Wissenschaften gesagt werden?

2)   Was haben einzelne Wissensfelder und Wissenschaftsdisziplinen zur Intuition zu sagen? Welche Definitionen  bieten sie an? Wie sieht die sozusagen interne Perspektive aus, gibt es so etwas wie „angewandte Intuition“ in den Wissenschaften?

3) Kann Intuition eine Rolle als Bindeglied zwischen wissenschaftlichen und außerwissenschaftlichen Erkenntnisformen und Vorstellungswelten spielen?

This is the outline:
I. Remarques introductives sur l'émergence.
1 Le problème de l'émergence.
2. L'émergence en acte.
a) En physique.
b) Dans les sciences naturelles.
II. Ruyer et la critique de l'émergentisme.
III. Le dilemme épistémologique que pose l'émergence.
IV. La présence du propos de Meyerson derrière celui de Ruyer.
Pour conclure.

John Cage’s spoken-text compositions synthesize writing, composition, and visual elements to produce texts that function as musical scores for speakers. Other works employ speech as indeterminate compositional material. From the structured syntactic spoken-text compositions of the early 1950’s to the anarchic, non intentional works from 1970 to 1992 Cage invented a multitude of compositional techniques to accomplish his goal of “having nothing to say and saying  it.” This paper offers a comprehensive overview of spoken-text compositions and other speech-based works by John Cage, including several late unpublished works, to provide a full view of his works with text and speech.  Over twenty individual pieces from the period 1950 to 1992 are extensively analyzed, focusing on compositional techniques and methodologies in the context of Cage’s changing aesthetic and philosophical outlook, and in relation to his compositional developments in other genres.

The first part of the paper discusses works from three successive compositional phases from 1950 to 1965: composition based on proportional rhythmic structure, composition using chance techniques, and indeterminacy in composition and performance. The second part examines works from 1970 to 1992 when Cage abandoned syntax and developed new means of composing with text and speech: linguistic fragmentation and the mesostic poetic form. Both parts endeavor to establish the compositional basis and character of Cage’s texts and to view his works from speakers as performance pieces.