Guilt/shame (Psychology)

In this article, we present, assess and give reasons to reject the popular claim that shame is essentially social. We start by presenting several theses which the social claim has motivated in the philosophical literature. All of them, in their own way, regard shame as displaying a structure in which ‘others’ play an essential role. We argue that while all these theses are true of some important families of shame episodes, none of them generalize so as to motivate the conclusion that shame is an essentially social emotion. We consider each thesis in turn, explaining in the process their connections with one another as well as the constraints on a theory of shame they help uncover. Finally, we show how a non-social picture of shame is not only capable of meeting these constraints, but has the further virtue of shedding light on those situations in which others seem to play no role in why we feel shame.

Shame has typically been understood as a negative emotion, a view which is prevalent in individualist, psychologising discourses about human experience. Elspeth Probyn’s approach to shame departs significantly from these tropes. As interviewers, we share a common interest in feminist ethics and productive affects in teaching and scholarship. Hence, our specific interest in Probyn’s Blush: Faces of Shame. Blush is an excellent
example of viewing the politics of shame as a productive and relational process. Probyn proposes that shame comes about through an interest in and a connection with another. This connection can result in building care for the other and community through re-evaluations of the self. In this way, shame can be a productive force in postcoloniality, in the feminist political ethics of care and in attempts at reconciliation. This view corresponds with the focus of this Special Issue – an affirmative and relational but political view of shame. The interview provides an illuminative account of the
author’s thoughts behind the writing of the book Blush, historical, theoretical and personal influences which impacted on the ideas expressed in the book, and how the book relates to past and future ideas and practices.

Worry and rumination are maladaptive cognitive strategies with the purpose to manage
negative emotions and threatening events (Wells & Matthews, 1994), and studies have
shown that they are associated with an increasing of anxiety and depression (Fresco
et al., 2002; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000). Although the relationship between guilt and
shame with depression and anxiety is well documented (Cândea & Szentagotai-Tătar,
2018; Thibodeau, & Jorgensen, 2011), only few studies (Orth et al., 2006; Mor
& Winquist, 2002; Spasojevic & Alloy, 2001) investigated the mediational role of
worry and rumination in the relationship between guilt and shame and depression
and anxiety. We hypothesized that worry and rumination correlate with all types of
interpersonal guilt and with shame and that they mediate the effects of these moral
emotions on depression and anxiety disorders.
Methods. We recruited a sample of 343 subjects, to whom we administered the
Interpersonal Guilt Rating Scale-15s (IGRS-15s; Gazzillo et al. 2018), The Other as
Shamer Scale (OAS; Goss, Gilbert, & Allan, 1994), The State-Trait Anxiety Inventory
(STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983), The Beck Depression
Inventory II, The Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer, Miller, Metzger,
& Borkovec, 1990) and The Ruminative Response Scale (RRS; Nolen-Hoeksema
& Morrow, 1991; Treynor et al., 2003) and an ad hoc form for assessing sociodemographic
and anamnestic information.
Results. In line with our hypotheses (Gazzillo, Leonardi, Bush, 2020), worry
and rumination correlated with all types of interpersonal guilt. Moreover, worry
and rumination were positively correlated with depression and anxiety disorders;
specifically, rumination emerged as a mediating factor between self-hate and depression,
while worry was a mediating factor in the relationship between omnipotence and
trait anxiety. Finally, our hypothesis that, in worrying and ruminating, shame had a
relevant impact, was also confirmed.
Conclusions. This study suggests that guilt and shame may be a powerful
component of mental health problems and that worry and rumination represent risk
factors for the maintenance and exacerbation of these disorders.

This book provides new ideas on how to work with and constructively transform shame on a theoretical and practical level, and in various socio-cultural contexts and professions. It provides practical guidelines on dealing with shame on the basis of reflection, counselling models, exercises, simulations, specific psychotherapeutic approaches, and auto-didactical learning material, so as to transform shame from a negatively experienced emotion into a mental health resource. The book challenges theorists to adopt an interdisciplinary stance and to think “outside the box.” Further, it provides practitioners, such as coaches, counsellors, therapists, trainers and medical personnel, with practical tools for transforming negative experiences and emotions. In brief, the book shows practitioners how to unlock the growth potential of individuals, teams, and organisations, allowing them to develop constructively and positively.

Research has shown that people can respond
both self-defensively and pro-socially when they experience
shame. We address this paradox by differentiating
among specific appraisals (of specific self-defect and concern
for condemnation) and feelings (of shame, inferiority,
and rejection) often reported as part of shame. In two
Experiments (Study 1: N = 85; Study 2: N = 112),
manipulations that put participants’ social-image at risk
increased their appraisal of concern for condemnation. In
Study 2, a manipulation of moral failure increased participants’
appraisal that they suffered a specific self-defect. In
both studies, mediation analyses showed that effects of the
social-image at risk manipulation on self-defensive motivation
were explained by appraisal of concern for condemnation
and felt rejection. In contrast, the effect of the
moral failure manipulation on pro-social motivation in
Study 2 was explained by appraisal of a specific self-defect
and felt shame. Thus, distinguishing among the appraisals
and feelings tied to shame enabled clearer prediction of
pro-social and self-defensive responses to moral failure
with and without risk to social-image.

Существует класс эмоций, имеющих особенно тесные отношения с чувством собственного
«я» индивида. В научной литературе этот класс эмоций получил название «эмоции самосознавания». Сегодня из всех эмоций самосознавания стыд чаще всего привлекает внимание исследователей. Стыд зарождается в контексте ранних отношений и опирается на сложную способность
человека осознавать то, как он «существует» для других людей. Стыд выполняет адаптивную функцию, способствуя развитию нормативного поведения и поддержанию системы социальных взаимодействий, и в то же время является болезненно переживаемой эмоцией и может
способствовать развитию психологических проблем. Современные исследования в области
клинической психологии говорят о том, что стыд часто является частью клинической картины
психологических расстройств, а люди, склонные испытывать стыд, более уязвимы к развитию
психопатологической симптоматики. В данной статье рассматривается связь между неблагоприятным детским опытом, субъективными характеристиками переживания стыда и стресс-реактивностью в ответ на стимул, связанный со стыдом, в экспериментальной ситуации.