Hybrid Governance

Today, the global education market is one of the faster growing sectors,
and it has attracted several new actors or what we call educational
brokers who are now responsible for shaping national agendas. The
newer actors in education are vastly different for the former players in
that whereas previous actors engrossed national educational systems
through the provision of technical assistance to meet international standards,
best practices, and benchmarks, these newer players are for-profit
entities that emphasize austerity, leanness, human resource maximization,
performance targets, and competition. Therefore, in this new educational
landscape, national governments are seen as “clients” who receive
“expert” advice from “external consultants” that have an assortment of
experiences across different sectors. Education governance is no longer a statist endowed but one that incubates in laborites of best practices resonates
with existing case studies and results driven based on Big Date collected.
We argue that educational brokers are responsible for the
emergence of a hybrid form of education governance that use business
and market techniques to reform strategies within the education sector.
We conclude by suggesting that collectively educational brokers are
using what we call “educational sub-prime mechanisms” -higher interest
rates, reduced quality collateral, and less advantageous terms to
counterweight higher credit risk - to manage educational portfolios and
newer forms of educational risk.

The rise of non-state (international, private, and transnational) actors in global politics has far-reaching consequences for foreign policy theory and practice. In order to remain able to explain foreign policy also in the 21 st century, foreign policy research needs to take into account the growing importance of nonstate actorss. A good way to do this would be to engage the literature on globalization and global governance. Both fields would benefit from such an exchange of ideas because their respective strengths could cancel out each other's weaknesses. Foreign policy research on one hand has a strong track record explaining foreign policy outcomes, using a broad range of theoretical concepts but almost completely ignores non-state actors. This is highly problematic for at least two reasons: Firstly, foreign policy is increasingly made in international organizations and intergovernmental and transnational governance networks instead of national institutions like foreign ministries. Secondly, also the latter increasingly open up to, and involve, non-state actors in their policymaking procedures. Thus, if foreign policy research wants to avoid becoming marginalized in the future, it needs to take into account this change. However, especially systemic approaches like neorealism or constructivism have difficulties adapting to the new reality of foreign policy. Not only do they explicitly stress the importance of states at the expense of non-state actors, which are only of marginal interest to them, as is global governance. Moreover, they also conceptualize states unitary actors which forecloses the possibility of examining the involvement of non-state actors in states' decision-making processes. Agency-based approaches such as Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) fare much better, at least in principle. FPA scholars stress the improtance of disaggregating the state and looking at the individuals and group dynamics that influence their decision making. However, while this commitment to opening up the state allows fro a great deal more flexibility vis-à-vis different types of actors, FPA research has so far remained state-centric and only very recently turned to non-state actors. On the other hand, non-state actors' involvement in policymaking is the strongsuit of the literature on globalization and global governance, which has spent a lot time and effort analyzing various forms of " hybrid " governance. At the same time, however, this literature has been rather descriptive, so far mainly systematizing different governance arrangements and the conditions under which non-state actors are included in governance arrangements. This literature could profit from foreign policy research's rich theoretical knowledge in explaining policy outcomes in hybrid governance networks and IOs. Foreign policy researchers should take non-state actors seriously. In this regard three avenues in particular are relevant for future research : (1) comparative empirical research to establish the extent of non-state actors' participation in foreign policymaking across different countried and governance arrangements (2) explanatory studies that analyze the conditions under which non-2 state actors are involved in states' foreign policymaking processes and (3) the normative implications of increased hybrid foreign policymaking for democratic legitimacy.

In the context of the widespread ‘resurgence’ of traditional authorities in Africa, increasing attention has been devoted to the manner in which the institutions of the state combine with those of non-state authorities. While much of the debate has been focused on the implications for democracy, this paper addresses the relationship between traditional resurgence and violent conflict. An analytical framework that distinguishes between ‘institutional hybridity’ and different forms of ‘institutional multiplicity’ is presented. This is then explored through a case study of the Buganda Kingdom in Uganda, where institutional disputes over land and decentralisation can be linked to the violence between state forces and Kingdom supporters that erupted in 2009. The analysis underscores the importance of careful institutional analysis in cases of traditional resurgence in order to mitigate violent conflict outcomes.

This article examines how hybrid environmental governance produces, maintains, and reconfigures common
property across transboundary geographies of resource access, use, and ownership. Transboundary commons are
a category of environmental goods that traverse jurisdictions and property regimes within as well as between
nation-states. They are forged through collaborative partnerships between spatially dispersed state, privatesector, and societal institutions and actors. This article disaggregates these transboundary commoning
arrangements into two geographically discrete yet conceptually intertwined categories of governance: mobile
commons and in situ commons. We ground our enquiry in Southeast Asia, a resource-rich region where diverse
formal and informal practices of resource organization blur the boundaries of environmental governance.
Whereas environmental commons are often analyzed in terms of resource rights and entitlements, this article
argues that a focus on power relations offers a more productive analytical lens through which to understand the
dynamic and networked ways in which transboundary common property is continually being (re)made through
processes of hybrid governance in response to changing ecological systems and shifting social realities.

La prison de Makala dans la ville de Kinshasa au Congo est confrontée depuis plus de trente ans à une contraction de ses ressources et à une quasi-inexistence des subsides provenant de l’État. La faible présence des agents et des ressources étatiques est compensée par une organisation informelle – localement appelée « système des gouverneurs » et constituée autour d’un chef des prisonniers appelé « gouverneur général » – qui organise et régule la vie quotidienne des détenus. Il existe ainsi une « double gouvernance » à Makala : l’une officielle et l’autre informelle. Cet article analyse les modalités de la gouvernance informelle en la considérant comme celle qui permet de gérer réellement la prison au quotidien. Il examine ses caractéristiques ainsi que la relation inédite qu’elle entretient avec la gouvernance officielle. Il montre ainsi que ce système de gouverneurs, structuré par des normes informelles souvent implicites, parfois explicites, est le produit relativement stable d’un « arrangement » entre les autorités officielles de la prison et les prisonniers-gestionnaires. Il met en lumière la structure hiérarchique et autoritaire de l’organisation informelle et la régulation de l’économie de rente mise en place pour financer le fonctionnement de la prison au quotidien. La relation singulière entre ces deux gouvernances permet à la prison de Makala de demeurer un pénitencier appartenant à l’État, mais dont les ressources financières et matérielles proviennent de ressources privées extérieures. Ce mode de financement et de gestion de la prison apparaît comme une sorte de partenariat public-privé informel, une forme inédite et très originale de « gouvernance hybride ».

Recently, the concept of liberal peace-building has been heavily contested with regards to its rather imperfect record in terms of achieving sustained peace in post-conflict environments, with even its advocates conceding that its repercussions have been disappointing (Paris, 2010). Whereas the 1990’s first saw a rapid increase for the approval of the liberal state concept culminating in a ‘unipolar‘ world — with limited fear of international conflict (Fukuyama, 1992), this exuberance has recently been followed by a wave of stark criticism over the liberal mechanisms and instruments that are being deployed in practice. The US-led interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan are often mentioned as a turning point in the debate where an effort by the ‘coalition of the willing and able‘, was perceived as a means to introduce neoliberal norms and values. This ’coalition‘ still resembles the leading donors behind peace-building missions around the world (De Coning, 2018).
In the Agenda for Peace (UN: 1992) Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali termed the concept of peace-building as an ‘action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict‘, with the aim of transforming the causes of conflict into foundations of sustainable peace (Campell and Peterson in McGinty, 2013). The reasons for conflict and fragility was not seldom brought in conjunction with poor governance, weak institutions, lack of accountability, and ineffective political processes (Menocal, 2009). Thus, peace-building missions consequently focused more on the aim of liberating and emancipating citizens from oppressive states and societies (Campell and Peterson in McGinty, 2013). As the debate unfolded, a liberal-lead consensus emerged that a minimally functioning state is indispensable to maintain peace, while acknowledging that there are no viable alternatives than institutionalise peace through functioning institutions, if it was to be sustained in the way the UN had envisioned (Paris, 2010; Menocal, 2009).
Hence, the prevailing Zeitgeist of the 1990’s and early 2000’s reflected a strategy of pursuing peace through economic and political liberalisation of the host state and consolidating such reforms institutionally (Paris, 2010). The 2001 UN report ‘No Exit without Strategy‘, subsequently came up with three main objectives to address former deficiencies of peace missions in Rwanda, Liberia and Cambodia. One of them, namely the ‚strengthening of political institutions‘ became known under the term of ’state-building‘ (UN Document S/2001/394) and lead the UNDP to develop an approach called ’state-building for peace‘ which came about with plenty of criticism in the field (Menocal, 2010). Even though both concepts have a similar aim as to strengthen the relationship between state and society, as well as to make state institutions more inclusive and responsive to societies’ needs for building peace, there are potential tensions and contradictions between the two, which will not necessarily reinforce each other (Haider and Strachan, 2014).
These contradictions and tensions can consequently lead to unanticipated dilemmas and paradoxes, that impede the efforts of the international donor community and shall be the subject of this analysis. These paradoxes will be examined and, if at all, they can be overcome for a more legitimate outcome as to make peace-building endeavours more sustainable over the long-run. Thereupon, it is investigated whether alternative approaches such as informal or parallel structures of governance can inform the debate. In particular, it will examined whether such informal
2
structures can make more convincing claims to the different perceptions of legitimacy bestowed by citizens and international donors, as informal institutions and practices can often prove to be remarkably resilient in post-conflict settings (Menocal, 2010). Here, the term of hybrid systems of governance is introduced and how such rather informal modes of governance may allow for more a organic process of building up state-society relations. To this end, Somaliland shall serve as an exemplary case that has successfully maintained relative order and stability with hybrid governance systems. This analysis shall be guided by the following research question: How can a hybrid form of governance inform the daunting concept of liberal state-building and more specifically the question of legitimacy?
The data used for the analytical part of the paper relies mainly on primary and secondary sources for qualitative research. Primary sources such as UN or OECD documents are used to curtail the objectives of liberal peace building. Secondary sources are taken for the assessment of contradictions and tensions within the concept of liberal peace.

In Cambodia, rural citizens embroiled in protracted land grabbing cases with the state and private companies are turning increasingly to international accountability mechanisms for resolutions. This article applies the interlinked concepts of hybrid governance and legal pluralism to understand the prospects and limitations of “forum shopping” through appeals to international mechanisms for rural communities affected by land grabs. Drawing on interviews and using process tracing, it examines the outcomes of a mediation case filed with the International Finance Corporation’s Compliance Advisor/ Ombudsman (CAO) involving indigenous groups and a Vietnamese rubber company in northeast Cambodia. It argues that while international accountability mechanisms yield platforms for dispossessed groups to assert claims, they also reify choices between entitlements and attainability without circumventing the problems associated with justice-delivery under Cambodia’s authoritarian regime. Overall, this study highlights the interaction, competition and collaboration between distinct forms of regulatory authority exercised by national and transnational actors involved in land grabbing cases in Cambodia, demonstrating their role in “negotiating statehood” by governing local claims to land.

This article examines how hybrid environmental governance produces, maintains, and reconfigures common property across transboundary geographies of resource access, use, and ownership. Transboundary commons are a category of environmental goods that traverse jurisdictions and property regimes within as well as between nation-states. They are forged through collaborative partnerships between spatially dispersed state, private-sector, and societal institutions and actors. This article disaggregates these transboundary commoning arrangements into two geographically discrete yet conceptually intertwined categories of governance: mobile commons and in situ commons. We ground our enquiry in Southeast Asia, a resource-rich region where diverse formal and informal practices of resource organization blur the boundaries of environmental governance. Whereas environmental commons are often analyzed in terms of resource rights and entitlements, this article argues that a focus on power relations offers a more productive analytical lens through which to understand the dynamic and networked ways in which transboundary common property is continually being (re)made through processes of hybrid governance in response to changing ecological systems and shifting social realities.

In several Latin American countries, social violence has risen to warlike levels. Nevertheless, little attention has been paid to the extent of social violence and the new (informal) forms of governance generated by the so-called violent nonstate actors (VNSAs). Where a state's forces fail to provide for the physical protection and social security of its citizens, some areas are governed by a mix of formal (vertical) and informal (horizontal) forms of governance, mixing state and nonstate actors. In these socially bounded spaces, nonstate actors produce and distribute public goods similarly as the state does. In this article, we explore how hybrid governance has appeared in the South American region, considering the operation of two regional VNSAs, the Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) in Brazil and the Bandas Criminales (BACRIM) in Colombia. We show that such VNSAs are significant agents for security governance, as they challenge preconceived notions of state authority (legitimacy).

Em várias nações latino-americanas, a violência social atingiu níveis semelhantes aos da guerra. No entanto, pouca atenção tem sido dada à extensão da violência social e às novas formas (informais) de governança geradas pelos chamados atores não-estatais violentos (VNSAs). Onde os estados falham em prover a proteção física e a segurança social de seus cidadãos algumas áreas são governadas por uma mistura de formas de governança formal (vertical) e informal (horizontal), misturando atores estatais e não estatais. Nesses espaços socialmente delimitados, atores não-estatais produzem e distribuem bens públicos de forma semelhante ao Estado. Neste artigo, propomos explorar como a governança híbrida apareceu na região da América do Sul, considerando as operações de dois VNSAs regionais, o Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) no Brasil e as Bandas Criminais (BACRIM) na Colômbia. Mostramos que tais VNSAs são agentes significativos para compreender a governança securitária na região, visto que desafiam noções preconcebidas sobre a autoridade estatal (legitimidade).

Despite the end of the civil war in 2005, many people in South Sudan continued to experience a deep sense of insecurity due to the many different types of violent conflict in the country. This sense of insecurity is exacerbated by the lack of protection from the state and the perceived injustice in how power is distributed at the national level. Based on a study carried out in 2013, prior to the country's relapse into large-scale violence, this article discusses gendered insecurity and agency among the Latuko in Imatong state. In response to their sense of insecurity, the Latuko have developed security arrangements that represent forms of hybrid security governance. Using a notion of masculinity, the article will reflect on the gender dynamics in these local security arrangements. This shows that the social order that customary institutions create can contribute to an increase in violence against women at the domestic level. However, although women are excluded from the decision-making institutions that govern the security arrangements, they exercise subtle forms of agency to influence them.

The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate how the criminalization of immigration and poverty interacts with community engagement and service provision in the lives of Somali refugees in a Midwestern town. Fortunately, we find that most refugees’ concerns were echoed by public and private service providers, and support for cultural competency training was widespread. On the other hand, respondents are highly vulnerable to administrative, logistical and legal challenges that they are underprepared to address. First, we argue that efforts to comply with regulations regarding housing, employment, food, health, and childcare services criminalize vulnerable refugees by placing users at constant risk for accusations of non-compliance and fraud. Second, the obligation of service providers to investigate and prevent fraud is compounded by frequent misunderstandings regarding social as well as administrative rules and expectations. Unfortunately, these tensions are exacerbated by a narrative of suspicion surrounding Somali social networks, such that even sharing food or helping a distant relative can be seen as fraudulent. We argue that the lives of refugee women are marginalized and often criminalized by their obligation to fulfill contradictory moral, legal and gendered norms.

This article analyses the relationships between legitimacy, leadership and stability of hybrid orders in spaces of contested state authority. Complementing studies on public authority, the analysis builds on the observation that hybrid orders are often violent and unstable. The article goes beyond the one-sided views of legitimacy that focus on the legitimating registers of non-state governing authorities and which ignore for the most part the perceptions and evaluations of such strategies by the governed. It does so by conceptualizing legitimacy as a relational property, which emerges between governing authorities and the governed. Drawing on a case study from Dar-jeeling in West Bengal, India (where hybrid order appears in the domains of development and security), this article finds that non-state leaders tend to withdraw from hybrid agreements in order to regain legitimacy and trust when confronted with threats to their regional dominance. The stability of hybrid orders is not only dependent on the abilities of competing authorities to adapt to changing and conflicting normative and factual demands of their constituents, but is also an outcome of the struggle over the normative and moral bases of such evaluations.

Viewing the Salween River as a transboundary commons, this paper illustrates how diverse state and non-state actors and institutions in hybrid and multi-scaled networks have influenced water governance in general , and large dam decision-making processes in particular. Putting power relations at the centre of this analysis and drawing on the conceptual lenses of hybrid governance and critical institutionalism, we show the complexity of the fragmented processes through which decisions have been arrived at, and their implications. In the context of highly asymmetrical power relations throughout the basin, and the absence of an intergovernmental agreement to date, we argue that hybrid networks of state and non-state actors could be strategically engaged to connect parallel and fragmented decision-making landscapes with a goal of inclusively institutionalising the transboundary commons and maintaining connected local commons throughout the basin, foregrounding a concern for ecological and social justice.

Artikkeli käsittelee Kremlin luomaa Yleisvenäläiseksi kansanrintamaksi kutsuttua poliittista liikettä osana niin kutsuttua hybridin hallitsemisen dilemmaa, joka on ollut leimallista Putinin hallinnolle. Hybridin hallitsemisen dilemma viittaa demokraattisten raamien käyttöön autoritäärisen hallinnon legitimoinnissa ja siitä juontuviin ongelmiin. Ensisijaisena aineistona on 45 Yleisvenäläisen kansanrintaman ja sen alkuperäisen emo-organisaation Yhtenäinen Venäjä -puolueen internet-sivuilla olevaa tekstiä vuosilta 2011 -14. Analyysissa tarkastellaan yhtäältä sitä, miten Kansanrintaman demokratia-diskurssi suhteutuu järjestön institutionaaliseen asemaan ja kehitykseen. Toisaalta pureudutaan siihen, miten Kansanrintaman kehitys Yhtenäisen Venäjän vaaliorganisaatiosta profiililtaan itsenäiseksi liikkeeksi suhteutuu poliittiseen todellisuuteen, joka Venäjällä muotoutui vuosien 2011 - 12 protestien myötä. Kansanrintaman uskottavuuspyrkimyksien vaikeuksien valossa mistään Kremlin diskursiivisen vallan hegemoniasta ei voida puhua. Päinvastoin, rintaman taipumus mukautua ulkoiseen kritiikkiin ja tässä suhteessa aitoon poliittiseen kilpailuun on yllättävää. Hybridinä toimijana Yleisvenäläinen kansanrintama pitää yllä – omien tarkoitusperiensä vastaisesti – poliittisen moniarvoisuuden ja itsestään riippumattoman kritiikin olemassaoloa.

Avainsanat: Yleisvenäläinen kansanrintama, hybridi hallitseminen, Putin, diskursiivinen institutionalismi