Introspection

Hume famously denied that he could experience the self. Most subsequent philosophers have concurred with this finding. I argue that if the subject is to function as a bearer of experience it must (1) lack sensory qualities in itself to be compatible with bearing sensory qualities and (2) be single so that it can unify experience. I use Douglas Harding's first-person experiments to investigate the visual gap where one cannot see one's own head. I argue that this open space conforms to the above criteria and hence is consistent with being the subject. I respond to the objection that this location is merely a lack of visual experience. I argue that this space also encompasses sound and touch properties and hence functions as a bearer for other sensory modalities. These first-person findings provide prima facie support for the view that the subject is a thin bearer of experience.

I argue for the legitimacy of an approach to the philosophy of consciousness I call "analytic phenomenology," by contrasting it with  other views with respect to what I see as a basic issue—namely, the use of first-person reflection. Specifically, I take as foils Daniel Dennett’s self-styled “hetero”-phenomenology and Eric Schwitzgebel’s skepticism about introspection.

Two brief Late Antique religious texts, respectively by the monk Theophanis and by Monoimus the Arab, present an interesting problem of whether they embody the authors' experience, or whether they are merely literary constructs. Rather than approaching this issue through the lens of theory, the article shows how phenomenological analysis and studies of living subjectivity can be engaged with the text in order to clarify the contents of introspective experience and the genesis of its religious connotations. The analysis uncovers a previously unnoticed form of embodied introspective religious experience which is structured as a ladder with a distinct internal structure with the high degree of synchronic and diachronic stability. This approach also helps one identify the specific introspective techniques in the canonical and non-canonical literature of early Christian tradition, as related to the concepts of " theosis " and " kenosys " , as well as to suggest some neurological correspondents of religious cognition. In this paper, we will explore two brief Late Antique religious texts, respectively by the monk Theophanis and by Monoimus the Arab. These texts present an interesting problem of whether they embody the authors' experience, or whether they are merely literary constructs. Rather than theorizing around this issue, I shall show how phenomenological analysis and studies of living subjectivity can be engaged with the text in order to clarify the contents of introspective experience and the genesis of its religious connotations1. This approach also helps one identify the specific introspective techniques in the canonical and non-canonical literature of early Christian tradition, as well as to suggest some neurological correspondents of religious cognition. To illustrate the problem, here I cite a quotation from Theophanis's poem in the Philokalia, a compilation of Patristic sources written in Greek during the period from the 4 th to 15 th century. Philokalia was put together by St. Nikodemos of the Holy Mountain (1749-1809) and St. Makarios of Corinth (1731-1805)2 as a reference manual for Orthodox monastics. The poem entitled " The Ladder of Divine Graces which experience has made known to those inspired by God " begins as follows:

When I first began working in research (1970), the limits I came across while studying cognitive functions led me, initially, to favour the video recordings of finalised behaviours so
that I could enrich the data collection. Then, faced with new limits due to the exclusion of everything that was not visible and recordable, I was led to remobilise the “guided introspection” in order to gain access to the subject’s perspective. After having explored all the bibliography on the benefits and critics of introspection (end of 19th, first part of 20th), I came to realise, after a few others1, that there were no decisive critics against using retrospective introspection2 but that, on the other hand, there were no other expert systematic techniques for recording and generating these verbalisations. So I created a specific interview technique to guide the introspections of lived experiences: the explicitation interview, followed by the self-explicitation technique, in which the researcher takes himself as the subject of his study and produces written descriptions of his own experience.

I am planning a history of the notion of philosophical nonsense and naturally difficult historical and exegetical questions have come up.  Charles Pigden has argued that the notion goes back at least as far as Hobbes and that Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Kant (on some interpretations) and pragmatists such as William James, as well as numerous Twentieth-Century philosophers make use of it.  In this ‘paper’ I put forward for general discussion such questions as whether Hobbes was the first 'nonsensicalist', whether Kant was a 'nonsensicalist' at all, which philosophers if any have considered contradictions to be meaningless and whether Wittgenstein thought that his concept of criterion could legitimately be used verificationistically.  I shall continue to add further questions as they occur to me.

This paper examines themes in Charles Peirce that contribute insights to the contemporary field of somaesthetics. Beyond a survey of themes in aesthetics and semiotics that contribute to somaesthetics, the paper focuses especially on Peirce's theories of consciousness, his explanation of different levels of conscious and the ways one can sharpen awareness to sensory differentiations involving the somatic senses.

This dissertation attempts to explain the nature and limits of first-person authority—the thesis that our first-person ascriptions about what mental states we are in are more likely to be true, compared to the ascriptions that others make about our mental states. My central claim is that the limits of first-person authority are the limits of introspection. After offering a general theory-neutral account of what it takes for a process to be introspective I address the question: ‘What mental states can be introspected?’  In so doing I first argue against sceptical accounts of self-knowledge which claim that we cannot introspect our propositional attitudes. I then defend a positive account of introspection for propositional attitudes, a view of self-knowledge called the Transparency Method.

When one is conscious of something, one is also conscious that one is conscious. Higher-Order Thought Theory [Rosenthal, D. (1997). A theory of consciousness. In N. Block, O. Flanagan, & G. Güzeldere (Eds.), The nature of consciousness: Philosophical debates. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press] takes it that it is in virtue of the fact that one is conscious of being conscious, that one is conscious. Here, we ask what the computational mechanisms may be that implement this intuition. Our starting point is Clark and Karmiloff-Smith’s [Clark, A., & Karmiloff-Smith, A. (1993). The cognizer’s innards: A psychological and philosophical perspective on the development of thought. Mind and Language, 8, 487–519] point that knowledge acquired by a connectionist network always remains “knowledge in the network rather than knowledge for the network”. That is, while connectionist networks may become exquisitely sensitive to regularities contained in their input–output environment, they never exhibit the ability to access and manipulate this knowledge as knowledge: The knowledge can only be expressed through performing the task upon which the network was trained; it remains forever embedded in the causal pathways that developed as a result of training. To address this issue, we present simulations in which two networks interact. The states of a first-order network trained to perform a simple categorization task become input to a second-order network trained either as an encoder or on another categorization task. Thus, the second-order network “observes” the states of the first-order network and has, in the first case, to reproduce these states on its output units, and in the second case, to use the states as cues in order to solve the secondary task. This implements a limited form of metarepresentation, to the extent that the second-order network’s internal representations become re-representations of the first-order network’s internal states. We conclude that this mechanism provides the beginnings of a computational mechanism to account for mental attitudes, that is, an understanding by a cognitive system of the manner in which its first-order knowledge is held (belief, hope, fear, etc.). Consciousness, in this light, thus involves knowledge of the geography of one own’s internal representations — a geography that is itself learned over time as a result of an agent’s attributing value to the various experiences it enjoys through interaction with itself, the world, and others.

Consciousness seems pervasive in my waking life, but how pervasive is it really? Answering this question raises a philosophical chestnut called the “Refrigerator Light Problem”. Having set up the problem, I explore two possible answers: the thick view and the thin view. The thick view says consciousness seems pervasive because it is pervasive, whereas the thin view says the pervasiveness of consciousness is an illusion. I argue that not only is introspection useless for settling the debate between thick and thin views, but that there is also a general worry of circularity that prevents empirical evidence from settling the issue as well. Having surveyed our options, I conclude with some general methodological lessons for the study of consciousness.

"This paper examines the applicability of the combination of data types in a study of German idioms of life with the tools of cognitive metaphor theory. The data sources for conceptual metaphors were mainly metaphors found in the relevant literature. These metaphors are of introspective nature to a great extent. The primary data sources for metaphorical expressions were dictionaries that represent introspective data, too. These data have been complemented by corpus data. The paper discusses
the problems of introspective and corpus data raised by the study of German idioms of life. Two case studies demonstrate the advantages of the combination of data and methods."

Knowing oneself well is a basic skill for psychotherapists and other experts who work intensively with people (Leitner, et al., 2014). Even experienced art therapists are in danger of overestimating their own self rather than self- criticising. The aims of introspection and self-reflection, which are the aims of psychotherapy training, are often lost sight of later in everyday working life. (Leitner, et al., 2014). The ability to perceive oneself examined in this work is the basis for constructive self-criticism and the most important basis for art therapy. Those who try to suppress questions, doubts, fears or strong emotions in their work with people become blind to themselves and others. This makes it clear that the ability to perceive oneself is an indispensable basic condition for the
special requirements of art therapy work.

I am planning a history of the concept of philosophical nonsense and naturally difficult historical and exegetical questions have come up.  Charles Pigden has argued that it goes back at least as far as Hobbes and that Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Kant (on some interpretations) and pragmatists such as William James, as well as numerous Twentieth-Century philosophers make use of it.  In this ‘paper’ I put forward for general discussion such questions as whether Hobbes was the first nonsensicalist, whether Kant was a nonsensicalist at all, which philosophers if any have considered contradictions to be meaningless and whether Wittgenstein thought that his concept of criterion could legitimately be used verificationistically.  I shall continue to add further questions as they occur to me.

While McEnery and Wilson (1996: 16) argue for a combination of introspection and corpus data, many linguists still only draw on either of the two data sources. In this article I will show that treating the two types of data as corroborating evidence allows a far more detailed analysis of the categorical and variable constraints governing syntactic variation than the two types of data would have allowed individually. To illustrate this point, I will present the results of a case study on preposition placement in English relative clauses which combines a statistical corpus analysis and a magnitude estimation grammaticality judgement experiment.

A pre-publication draft of this paper can be downloaded from this site.

Brentano's Psychology constantly refers to mental phenomena as "mental acts," yet there has been surprisingly little effort devoted to discerning the significance of the term "act" in this context. A widespread implicit view is (1) that it is merely a technical term, and does not literally invoke any connotations of action at all. But since many regard the Psychology as riddled with Aristotelian assumptions, some also suggest (2) that Brentano's talk of "mental acts" is a significant holdover from his Aristotelian pedigree. Here I argue, negatively, that both claims are deeply problematic. First, traditional readings of Brentano (by, e.g., Oskar Kraus) in terms of (1) are incapable of supporting some of Brentano's most central commitments regarding inner perception and the method of psychology. Second, Brentano's own conception of Aristotelianism is such that if (2) were true, (1) would be false. Finally, if (2) were true in any significant sense, then Brentano would simply fail to do what he sets out to do in his empirical psychology. I thus call for renewed attention to Brentano's conception of "mental acts."

We seem to have private privileged access to our own minds through introspection, but what exactly does this involve? Do we somehow literally perceive our own minds, as the common idea of a 'mind's eye' suggests, or are there other processes at work in our ability to know our own minds? Rethinking Introspection offers a new pluralist framework for understanding the nature, scope, and limits of introspection. The book argues that, contrary to common misconceptions, introspection does not consist of a single mechanism but rather a diverse range of mental states and cognitive processes with a broad spectrum of epistemic properties. Building upon this revised conception of introspection, the book illustrates and analyzes the variety of ways in which we introspectively grasp the contents of our own minds, from the immediate phenomenal knowledge generated by conscious experience to the self-deceptive possibilities enabled by certain kinds of inner speech.

This thesis examines emotional self-knowledge, its place as well as its participation in self-knowledge, the value it has for ordinary individuals and how ordinary individuals can obtain it.
The examination of the nature of the emotions and the value that individuals place on the knowledge of their emotions, which is carried out in this thesis, highlights the importance of the acquisition of emotional self-knowledge, as well as the link that the latter is commonly heard to maintain with happiness. If the acquisition of this knowledge appears to be essential, it is not easy. It requires the unfurling of a number of cognitive abilities, as well as a significant cognitive effort, especially during the use of introspection. Indeed, this thesis exclusively discusses introspective access to emotional self-knowledge, and set aside other forms of access to self-knowledge. In in this work, I therefore question the practical but also moral scope of the use of introspection with regard to emotions, proposing a defense of the introspective process as a process capable of allowing an ordinary individual to detect, to identify and interpret one's own emotions.
This thesis is therefore organized around two main arguments. The first of these arguments gives emotional self-knowledge a fundamental place in the form of self-knowledge that matters to ordinary people. The second defends the idea that introspection offers access to this emotional knowledge, notably through the apprehension that it allows of the phenomenology of emotions, and that this access has a minimum reliability and therefore an epistemic value - even a weak one - as well as a moral and intrinsic value.

Confessions X & XI: Knowing God, Human Memoria, Eternity, Time and Recognizing Revelation.
Book X opens with Augustine asking to know God:  “May I know you, who know me. May I ‘know as I also am known’.” Confessiones, 10.1.1: “Cognoscam te, cognitor meus, cognoscam, sicut et cognitus sum.”
This requires what he prays for: “Power of my soul, enter into it and fit it for yourself  virtus animae meae, intra in eam et coapta tibi, so that you (God) may have and hold it without blemish ut habeas et possideas sine macula”, that is, another level of himself, which is also God outside him, must enter him. This assumes spatial and time differences with soul as quantitative place and God as outside and able to come and dwell inside at some future time. All this will be overthrown.
This power, which right from the beginning, is both his and beyond him, enables the repentance, the cleansing of his house, his soul, by which God can dwell there. Here we get confession (in confessione), in the sense of  self-examination and repentant exposure of sin.
The overthrowing begins. This repentance, however, requires that he already knows God. The God he asks to know is already present and known. To be effective self-examination must be undertaken relative to the Divine Law and the repentance must be performed in the presence of the Divine Judge. Indeed, Augustine demands that he judge himself by the divine standard.  He is to judge himself by God or, put from the other side, God is his judge: “‘But I do not sit in judgement on myself’ ... You, Lord are my judge.” Confessiones, 10.4.6 to 10.5.7: “neque me ipsum diiudico … Tu enim, domine, diiudicas me.” This is the realized escatology we considered last week. He knows himself by the knowledge in which he is known. So the presence of God is the requirement of the beginning in which he goes in search of God. This is also his conclusion.

How do we know when we have imagined something?  How do we distinguish our imaginings from other kinds of mental states we might have?  These questions present serious, if often overlooked, challenges for theories of introspection and self-knowledge.  This paper looks specifically at the difficulties imagination creates for Neo-Expressivist (Bar-On 2004), outward looking (Byrne 2005, 2011, 2012b), and inner sense (Goldman 2006, Nichols and Stich 2003) theories of self-knowledge.  A path forward is then charted, by considering the connection between the kinds of situations in which we can reliably say that another person is imagining, and those in which we can say the same about ourselves.  This view is a variation on the outward-looking approach, and preserves much of the spirit of Neo-Expressivism.

L’entretien d’explicitation se rapporte toujours à un vécu passé, c’est un entretien mené a posteriori. De ce fait, un élément essentiel de sa technique est … l’accès à la mémoire du vécu. La possibilité de parler d’un vécu passé, de le décrire finement à chacun de ses moments et dans ses différentes étapes, est donc fondée sur une activité de rappel, sur un mode de rappel spécifique que j’ai nommé “évocation”. Mais être devant la tâche de se rappeler ce que l’on a vécu peut être source d’inquiétude : vais-je me souvenir ? Il me semble bien même que je ne me souviens pas … Or …

I am planning a history of the notion of philosophical nonsense and naturally difficult historical and exegetical questions have come up.  Charles Pigden has argued that the notion goes back at least as far as Hobbes and that Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Kant (on some interpretations) and pragmatists such as William James, as well as numerous Twentieth-Century philosophers make use of it.  In this ‘paper’ I put forward for general discussion such questions as whether Hobbes was the first 'nonsensicalist', whether Kant was a 'nonsensicalist' at all, which philosophers if any have considered contradictions to be meaningless and whether Wittgenstein thought that his concept of criterion could legitimately be used verificationistically.  I shall continue to add further questions as they occur to me.

Stuart Hampshire in his review of Gilbert Ryle’s 'Concept of Mind' draws a distinction between two ways of using psychological terms.  The simple ‘He doesn’t believe in life after death (or the coming revolution)’ has a different use and different implications from ‘He doesn’t REALLY believe in life after death (or the coming revolution)’.  I ask whether there is any similar distinction with regard to meaning:  ‘He didn’t mean anything by what he said’ as against ‘He didn’t REALLY mean anything by what he said’.

The published literature suggests that systematic self- observation may be a suitable method for clarifying the nature and correlates of hypnagogic imagery and thus a useful adjunct to psychophysiological and cognitive studies of sleep onset. The potential applicability of one recently proposed self-observation procedure (Nielsen, 1992) to such studies is demonstrated in the present work. The procedure permits numerous hypnagogic images to be collected during spontaneous drowsy periods occurring during the day. The observer sits in an upright, head-unsupported position, fixes an observational intent, and pays attention to internal events; images are observed, transcribed and then assessed for their likely memory sources. The procedure has been pilot-tested by the author in four exploratory studies comprising over 250 hypnagogic images. Neuromuscular events accompanying these images (e.g., head nods, leg jerks) and EEG correlates of the images are described. Certain distinctions among imagery types are suggested, e.g., fleeting vs. fully-formed, images with self movement vs. images with non-self movement. Silberer's conclusions regarding the 'autosymbolic' function of hypnagogic images are supported and extended by the results. Four types of memory element (immediate, short-, medium-, and long-term) appear to have contributed causally to the formation of these hypnagogic images and are illustrated. To demonstrate how the self- observational method may be used to model the formation of hypnagogic imagery from such memory sources, a single sample image and its multiple memory sources are described and analyzed in detail.

Illusionism about consciousness is the thesis that phenomenal consciousness does not exist, but merely seems to exist. Embracing illusionism presents the theoretical advantage that one does not need to explain how consciousness arises from purely physical brains anymore, but only to explain why consciousness seems to exist while it does not.
As Keith Frankish puts it, illusionism replaces the “hard problem of consciousness” with the “illusion problem”. However, a satisfying version of illusionism has not only to explain why the illusion of consciousness arises, but also why it arises with its particular strength: notably, why we are so deeply reluctant to recognize the illusory nature of consciousness. Explaining our strong intuitive resistance to illusionism means solving what I call the “illusion meta-problem”, which I think is a part of the illusion problem.
In this paper, I argue that current versions of illusionism are unable to solve the illusion meta-problem. I focus on two of the most promising recent illusionist theories of consciousness, and I show why they fail to explain the peculiar reluctance we encounter whenever we try to accept that consciousness is an illusion.

As psychophysical experiments have shown, human beings are not really good at making absolute judgements, e.g. saying whether a line is 10 or 15 cm long. Instead, in Magnitude Estimation studies subjects are asked to judge stimuli relatively to a reference item. Thus subjects judge whether a given line is longer or shorter than a reference line and try to express this difference in numerical terms (saying e.g. that a stimulus is half as long as the reference line). Since such relative judgements seem easier for humans to make, this approach allows gathering far more reliable results. Recently, several studies (e.g. Bard et al. 1996; Featherston 2004, 2005, Keller 2000; Keller and Alexopoulou 2005) have applied this methodology to sentence judgement experiments. Thus they asked subjects to give numerical judgement on sentences proportional to a constant reference sentence. The results from these Magnitude Estimation studies indicate that eliciting linguistic judgements via this method allows "reliable and fine-grained measurements of linguistic intuitions" (Keller and Alexopoulou 2005: 1120).
In this chapter I will illustrate how Magnitude Estimation can be used by investigating a complex syntactic phenomenon such as preposition placement in English relative clauses (cf. Hoffmann 2006).

As I will show, carefully constructed Magnitude Estimation experiments can help to distinguish semantic from syntactic violations, separate more prototypical grammatical constructions from less prototypical ones and uncover significant differences between L1 first- (British English) and L2 foreign-language (the English of advanced German learners) varieties.

Please find a pre-publication draft of the paper below.

Seventeen years ago Francisco Varela introduced neurophenomenology. He proposed the integrationof phenomenological approaches to first-person experience – in the tradition of Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty – with a neuro-dynamical, scientific approach to the study of the situated brain and body. It is time for a re-appraisal of this field. Has neurophenomenology already contributed to the sciences of the mind? If so, how? How should it best do so in future? Additionally, can neurophenomenology really help to resolve or dis-solve the “hard problem” of the relation between mind and body, as Varela claimed? The papers in this special issue arose out of a conference organised by the Consciousness and Experiential Psychology Section of theBritish Psychological Society in Bristol, UK, in September 2012. We have invited a representative sample of the speakers at that conference to present their work here. Various papers argue that the first-person methodsvof phenomenology are distinct from, and more robust than, the failed “introspectionist” methods of early modern psychology. The “elicitation interview” emerges as a successful and widely adopted method to have emerged from this field. Phenomenological techniques are already being successfully applied to neuroscientific problems. Various specific proposals for new techniques and applications are made.
It is time to take neurophenomenology seriously. It has proven its worth, and it is ripe with the potential for further immediate, successful applications.
Varela’s key aim was to develop a non-dualising approach to the science of consciousness. The papers in this special issue look at the philosophical and practical details of successfully putting such an approach
into practice.

In " Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness " , Keith Frankish argues for illusionism: the thesis that phenomenal consciousness does not exist, but merely seems to exist. Illusionism, he says, " replaces the hard problem with the illusion problem – the problem of explaining how the illusion of phenomenality arises and why it is so powerful ". The illusion of phenomenality is indeed quite powerful. In fact, it is much more powerful than any other illusion, in the sense that we face a very special and unique intuitive resistance when trying to accept that phenomenality is an illusion. This is bad news for illusionists, because this means that they cannot entirely model their explanation of the illusion of consciousness on the explanation of other illusions. Explaining this unique intuitive resistance to illusionism may therefore constitute the hardest aspect of the illusion problem. However, I think that this aspect of the problem is solvable. I will outline a possible solution, which is based on the hypothesis that our (illusory) introspective representations of phenomenal states characterize them as having unique epistemological properties and as playing a special epistemological role.

In defence of naïve realism, Fish has advocated an eliminativist view of hallucination, according to which hallucinations lack visual phe-nomenology. Logue, and Dokic and Martin, respectively, have developed the eliminativist view in different manners. Logue claims that hallucination is a non-phenomenal, perceptual representational state. Dokic and Martin maintain that hallucinations consist in the confusion of monitoring mechanisms, which generates an affective feeling in the hallucinating subject. This paper aims to critically examine these views of hallucination. By doing so, I shall point out what theoretical requirements are imposed on naïve realists who characterize hallucinations as non-visual-sensory phenomena.

The Ubiquity of Inner Awareness thesis (UIA) states that all conscious states of normal adult humans are characterised by an inner awareness of that very state. UIA-Backers support this thesis while UIA-Skeptics reject it. At the heart of their dispute is a recalcitrant phenomenological disagreement. UIA-Backers claim that phenomenological investigation reveals ‘peripheral inner awareness’ (or ‘pre-reflective self-consciousness’) to be a constant presence in their non-introspective experiences. UIA-Skeptics deny that their non-introspective experiences are characterised by inner awareness, and maintain that inner awareness is only gained when they explicitly introspect. Each camp has put forward a range of arguments designed to resolve this dispute, but I argue that none of these arguments has genuine dialectical purchase. This leads me to develop a compromise position that trades on the contribution that affordances can make to our phenomenology. According to the Affordance Model of inner awareness, all conscious states of normal adult humans are characterised by an affordance of introspectability.

This article offers an ethnography of a tree walk ritual of  the Belgian Greencraft Wicca movement. The description  is employed to discuss the notions of reflexivity, reactivity,  and the double hermeneutic. By interpreting the data, the  author concludes that the double hermeneutic is a problem  of different contexts rather than between different groups.  Attunement and suspension of disbelief are singled out as  means to overcome misunderstandings between the scholar  and the researched.

[Excerpts from the penultimate draft. Includes the front matter, the first section of the preamble, and chapter 1.] *Self-Reflection for the Opaque Mind* attempts to solve a grave problem about critical self-reflection. The worry is that we critical thinkers are all in “epistemic bad faith” in light of what psychology tells us. For the research shows not merely that we are bad at detecting “ego-threatening” thoughts à la Freud. It also indicates that we are ignorant of even our ordinary thoughts—e.g., reasons for our moral judgments of others (Haidt 2001), and even mundane reasons for buying one pair of stockings over another! (Nisbett & Wilson 1977) However: Self-reflection presupposes an ability to know what one thinks in the first place. So if ignorance is the norm, why attempt self-reflection? The activity would just show naivety about psychology. Yet while respecting all the data, this book argues that, remarkably, we are infallible in a (limited) range self-discerning judgments. Even so, infallibility does not imply indubitability, and there is no Cartesian ambition to provide a “foundation” for empirical knowledge. The point is rather to explain how self-reflection as a rational activity is possible.

The method of phenomenal contrast aims to shed light on the phenomenal character of perceptual and cognitive experiences. Within the debate about cognitive phenomenology, phenomenal contrast arguments can be divided into two kinds. First, arguments based on actual cases that aim to provide the reader with a first person experience of phenomenal contrast. Second, arguments that involve hypothetical cases and focus on the conceivability of contrast scenarios. Notably, in the light of these contrast cases, proponents and skeptics of cognitive phenomenology remain steadfast in their views. I provide an explanation for the method´s dialectical ineffectiveness by focusing on the first-person performances of the phenomenal contrast tasks. In particular, I argue that the introspective judgments about phenomenology are regimented by the view initially held. Understanding the underlying mechanisms responsible for the dialectical stand-off in the face of phenomenal contrast cases casts light on introspection-based arguments for phenomenology in general.

The principle of transcendence, implicit in any consciousness, sets the stage for a variety of psychological experiences indispensable to being human. Can we fully claim the knowledge of all forms of psychological self-transcendence? I will present the findings concerning the robust introspective self-experience in Christian prayer, whereby transcendence is internal, and is realized as an embodied stratified self-constitution engaging the internal I-Thou. Two different forms of experience, egological and non-egological, contribute to shaping the important religious concepts of the Ladder and of the Ascent of the Soul. This experience leads to self-knowledge, and to positive characterological transformation, which in turn heals the traces of prior traumas and integrate the " shadow ". Using the example of this experience, I will show how the psychology of transcendence pushes the boundaries of neuroscience by challenging the latter to expand its old theories and generate new ones, such as non-linear dynamics or neuroquantology. I will begin with reflection on the foundational role of transcendence in human experience. Experience equals consciousness, and consciousness amounts to self-transcendence. In fact, empirical consciousness is self-transcendence: while the contents of consciousness consists of one's self and the world, consciousness is implicitly subjective. Insofar as this subjective consciousness is intertwined the world, the subject matter of psychology is the self's responses to the world. These responses were researched to a great extent, both by psychology and natural science; by contrast, the responses of consciousness to itself, which is its introspective self-knowledge, are much less researched; next to nothing has been done in terms of thematization of introspection necessary to conduct such research.