Karl Pearson

For many astronomers, the progressive development of life has been seen as a natural occurrence given proper environmental conditions on a planet: even though such beings would not be identical to humans, there would be significant parallels. A striking contrast is seen in writings of nonphysical scientists, who have held more widely differing views. But within this diversity, reasons for differences become more apparent when we see how views about extraterrestrials can be related to the differential emphasis placed on modern evolutionary theory by scientists of various disciplines. One clue to understanding the differences between the biologists, paleontologists, and anthropologists who speculated on extraterrestrials is suggested by noting who wrote on the subject. Given the relatively small number of commentators on the topic, it seems more than coincidental that four of the major contributors to the evolutionary synthesis in the 1930s and 1940s are among them. Upon closer examination it is evident that the exobiological arguments of Theodosius Dobzhansky and George Gaylord Simpson and, less directly, of H. J. Muller and Ernst Mayr are all related to their earlier work in formulating synthetic evolution. By examining the variety of views held by nonphysical scientists, we can see that there were significant disagreements between them about evolution into the 1960s. By the mid-1980s, many believed that “higher” life, particularly intelligent life, probably occurs quite infrequently in the universe; nevertheless, some held out the possibility that convergence of intelligence could occur across worlds. Regardless of the final conclusions these scientists reached about the likely prevalence of extraterrestrial intelligence, the use of evolutionary arguments to support their positions became increasingly common.

Many modern scholars think that the term " histogram " is related to the word " history ". Recent work in the field of the history of statistics has only increased this misunderstanding. The etymology is incorrect for several reasons: first, the word " histogram " does not share a stem with " history " ; second, we show that Karl Pearson, who coined the term, used a clearly defined method to designate recently devised graphs. His method, inspired by Levasseur's work, excludes any relation to the word " history " and confirms the link to the Greek ἱστός (mast). Some clarifications of Pearson's use of the term are given in the paper.

The efforts in the Christian school to effectively integrate faith and learning lead one to consider foundational theories of knowledge. Defining knowledge raises questions about the knower and the known, the relationship between experience and knowledge, and the certainty of knowledge. The purpose of this paper is to examine the literature as it relates to theistic (specifically Christian) and non-theistic epistemologies and their impact on the integration of faith and learning. Kant, Pearson, Russell, and Dewey presented theories that attempted to ensure objective knowledge. Polanyi, Gill, and Palmer supported the view that knowing is always personal. Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowing was especially important. The modern debate has roots in ancient theological formulas regarding the relationship between faith and reason. Kuyper, Bavinck, and Van Til presented a revelational epistemology founded in the Dutch Reformed tradition. Finally, the author examined a model of integration based on these ideas and discussed the implications.

This paper chronicles the surprisingly central role of certain conversations about the role of religion in the discussion of the nature of society in Britain from the reception of Saint-Simonianism to the founding of the welfare state. Christian socialism, in various forms, and its rivals, were part of this discussion, which includes such major figures as Spencer, Pearson, Balfour, and a slew of Bishops as well as minor figures, including the early participants in the Sociological Society. The theme of admiration for late Medieval society runs through all of these discussions.

Most historians explains changes in conceptions of the epistemic virtues and vices in terms of social and historical developments. I argue that such approaches, valuable as they are, neglect the fact that certain changes also reflect changes in metaphysical sensibilities. Certain epistemic virtues and vices are defined relative to an estimate of our epistemic situation that is, in turn, defined by a broader vision or picture of the nature of reality. I defend this claim by charting changing conceptions of the virtue of epistemic humility in 19th century intellectual culture, focusing on claims about the humility or hubris of the Victorian scientific naturalists.

In October 2014, I proposed to UCL’s Estates Management Board that my university change the name of a lecture theatre named for Francis Galton. Some people have asked about this. Below is what I wrote. The letter is here. I came to my personal views in this letter after reflecting on Galton’s letter to the Editor of The Times, June 5 1873 titled “Africa for the Chinese.” [here, with a rejoinder from Gilbert Malcolm Sproat.] The opinion he expressed, and the underlying representation of Africans as “lazy, palavering savages” who don’t deserve the land of their birth, is indefensible. Full stop. It alone is enough, for me, to disqualify a person from honoured status. I’m very well aware of arguments about historical empathy and needing to understand people “within the context of their time”. I’m also very well aware of arguments about needing to take a person’s views as a totality: see the whole. As a professional historian, I agree, and I demand we respect these rules in the arena of academic history. But this is misplaced concern that distracts from the point I wanted to make.

In this paper I argue that statistical inferences are deductive ones. Thus I reject Ronald Fisher's inductive view of theoretical statistics and I adhere to Jerzy Neyman's deductive approach. Moreover I assert that both Neyman-Pearson's testing theory and Fisher's tests of significance properly belong to decision theory.
Furthermore I disagree with Ian Hacking's evidentialist criticisms of Neyman-Pearson's theory of statistics and with Deborah Mayo's interpretation of Neyman-Pearson testing theory as a model of learning from experience.

This essay critically examines one of the dominant tendencies in
recent theoretical discussions of anarchism, postanarchism, and argues that this
tradition fails to engage sufficiently with anarchism’s history. Through an examination
of late 19th-century anarchist political thought—as represented by one
of its foremost exponents, Peter Kropotkin—we demonstrate the extent to which
postanarchism has tended to oversimplify and misrepresent the historical tradition
of anarchism. The article concludes by arguing that all political-theoretical
discussions of anarchism going forward should begin with a fresh appraisal of the
actual content of anarchist political thought, based on a rigorous analysis of its
political, social, and cultural history.