Reformed Epistemology

A common theme in Christian school literature is the search for and/or description of the distinctiveness of the Christian school and the Christian school movement.  There is general recognition that the Christian school exists as an alternative to public schools and even non-religious private schools for a variety of historical, philosophical, and practical reasons.  Faith-based schools, that is, religious schools in general, and Christian schools in particular, have a unique place in the United States and Canada, in particular, but even more broadly in Europe.

The evil-god challenge is a challenge for theists to show that belief in God is more reasonable than belief in evil-god. In this article, I show that whether or not evil-god exists, belief in evil-god is unjustified. But this isn’t the case for belief in God: belief in God is probably justified if theism is true. And hence belief in God is (significantly) more reasonable than belief in evil-god, and the evil-god challenge has been answered.

In the preface, the author clearly articulates both what motivated this project, which began as his PhD dissertation, and his purpose in writing the book. With respect to the former, Waymeyer observes that concomitant to “the remarkable resurgence of reformed theology” within evangelicalism over the past few decades—which he regards as a very positive development—has been a trend toward an adoption of either eschatological agnosticism or amillennialism (vii). In response to the eschatological agnostic, Waymeyer rightly asserts, “Scripture reveals too much about the subject of eschatology for Christians to be content in the dark, especially those who preach the Word and shepherd the flock” (vii). In regard to amillennialism, Waymeyer observes that while those joining the ranks of reformed theology often spend several years studying the scriptural doctrine of predestination prior to self-identifying as Calvinists, they far too quickly embrace amillennialism without much study of the pertinent biblical texts “simply because they see it as an indispensable part of the reformed system” (vii). In response to such trends, Waymeyer calls for careful consideration of his “premillennial response to the most compelling arguments for amillennialism” (viii). He aims “not only to clarify the key differences between these two competing millennial views, but also to provide an exegetical critique of the two-age model of amillennialism” (viii).

The efforts in the Christian school to effectively integrate faith and learning lead one to consider foundational theories of knowledge. Defining knowledge raises questions about the knower and the known, the relationship between experience and knowledge, and the certainty of knowledge. The purpose of this paper is to examine the literature as it relates to theistic (specifically Christian) and non-theistic epistemologies and their impact on the integration of faith and learning. Kant, Pearson, Russell, and Dewey presented theories that attempted to ensure objective knowledge. Polanyi, Gill, and Palmer supported the view that knowing is always personal. Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowing was especially important. The modern debate has roots in ancient theological formulas regarding the relationship between faith and reason. Kuyper, Bavinck, and Van Til presented a revelational epistemology founded in the Dutch Reformed tradition. Finally, the author examined a model of integration based on these ideas and discussed the implications.

This is an analysis of the argument and sources of Herman Bavinck's (1854-1921) discussion of the principia of science in his Reformed Dogmatics. Bavinck draws heavily on Aquinas's treatment of the powers of the soul as he argues for a realist via media in contrast to modern trends of rationalism and empiricism.

"This important new book by Thomas K. Johnson casts new light on the
meaning of Romans 1. By treating the passage as a missions training manual, he draws out surprising new interpretations for evangelism and apologetics. Johnson shows how we can join Paul in being proud (‘not
ashamed’) of the gospel, full of confidence that it continues to speak to the human condition even in a postmodern age.” Nancy Pearcey

Few issues have been as divisive for the contemporary church as the doctrine of irre- sistible grace. In the debates surrounding this doctrine, there has been an overwhelm- ing tendency for theologies of grace to focus on the effects that grace has on particular human beings. Alongside this tendency, there has arisen a danger that we forget that God’s grace is God’s grace; that it is God’s free, personal, and beneficent disposition and action. In this article, I turn to Karl Barth to consider a way forward for interpreting the irresistible nature of grace that does not focus on its effectuality but on its theocentric, participative, and covenantal character.

EDITORIAL: The renaissance in Post-Reformation Reformed Scholasticism continues apace in Jae-Eun Park’s study of the Puritan Stephen Charnock’s Christological basis of our knowledge of God. While Charnock was accused by an earlier generation of scholars of being rationalistic, dry, arid, and abstract, Park demonstrates that this theologian’s understanding of human knowledge of the divine has been misunderstood because assessments have been based upon only one of his works, to the exclusion of another that elaborates on a Christological epistemology. Specifically, Park elucidates Charnock’s three-tiered epistemology with its natural, legal, and evangelical bases for human knowledge of God. God is ultimately and most fully revealed (à la Hebrews 1) in Christ Jesus. Additionally, Christ’s actual work of redemption plays a significant role in how we understand who God is; and finally, one who is familiar with and senses the importance of Christ’s work of redemption (with all its epistemological implications) will appropriately love, honor, cherish, and worship the Triune God. What we discover is that once again there is a wealth of theological treasure in the Reformed Scholastic troves of yore.

The broad scope of apologetical models that exist today can take the novice by surprise if he is not careful. The differences between apologetical methodologies can be overwhelming, even for that seminary student who is eager to learn all of it. Who knew about all of the different approaches to defending the Christian faith? Christian apologists throughout the history of the church have been faithful to rise to the challenges of their day and show that Christianity is compatible with reality. But the challenges have varied and thus, so have the methods. This has led to a considerable amount of disagreement over metapologetical issues. Issues such as epistemology, the value of theistic proofs, degree of certainty, the relationship between faith and reason, the role of evidence, and the existence and nature of common ground between believers and non-believers have been main topics of discussion and disagreement among apologists (Boa and Bowman 33).

In reference to the philosophical theology of medieval Islamic theologian Ibn Taymiyya, this paper outlines a parallel between Taymiyyan thought and Alvin Plantinga’s thesis of ‘Reformed Epistemology’. In critiquing a previous attempt to build an account of ‘Islamic externalism’, the Taymiyyan model offers an account that can be seen as wholly ‘Plantingan’.

‘Van Til’s apologetic is thoroughly determined by his theological commitments. Indeed, he believed that the most important and distinctive aspect of his apologetics was its consistency with Reformed theology.’ Everyone proceeds on the basis of certain presuppositions. Inevitably, these devolve into two fundamental approaches to understanding reality, viewing things from the standpoint of human reason and experience or of God and his Word. The only one who can choose his approach is the Christian, since the unregenerate naturally assume their own ultimacy and neutrality, neither of which is, in fact, the case. The Christian cannot by his method deny what God’s Word has made clear to him, that he is dependent on God for all truth, meaning, and coherence.

The presuppositional approach of Cornelius Van Til draws on the epistemological ideas found in Herman Bavinck and Abraham Kuyper to bring Reformed epistemology and its application to apologetics into line with its Calvinist foundations. This transcendental approach accents the ultimacy of God for all knowledge over against the Kantian transcendental critique which, with its accent on autonomy, forms the basis for all approaches to knowledge that do not start with the necessity of the revelation of God in creation and Scripture. The
Christian cannot by his method deny what God’s Word has made clear to him, that he is dependent on God for all truth, meaning, and coherence.

This is is a working bibliography of primary and secondary sources on reason and philosophy in the Reformed tradition. The sources are primarily (1) theological evaluations of the nature and use of reason, or (2) theologians writing directly on philosophy. I have generally avoided the inclusion of primary sources on philosophy by Reformed philosophers. Updates to this file will be posted periodically.

Religious epistemology is the study of how subjects' religious beliefs might have, or fail to have, some form of positive epistemic status (such as knowledge, justification, warrant, rationality, etc.). The current debate is focused upon the kind of basis upon which a religious believer might rationally hold certain beliefs about God (whether God exists, what attributes God has, what God is doing, etc.). Engaging this issue are three groups of people who call themselves "fideists," "reformed epistemologists," and "evidentialists." Each group has a position, but the positions are not mutually exclusive in every case, and in the debate, the names better describe the groups' emphases rather than mutually exclusive positions in the debate. In this article, we will first give a brief historical survey of evidentialism, fideism, and reformed epistemology. Second, we will give the fideist's position. Third, we will give the evidentialist's position. Fourth, we will give the reformed epistemologist's position, and last, we will include some comments on the current state of the debate, where we will show that the groups' positions are not mutually exclusive.

This article seeks to outline how a Muslim believer can deflect a defeater for Islamic belief put forward by Erik Baldwin and Tyler McNabb. In doing so, it aims to reject the suggestion that an Islamic religious epistemology is somehow antithetical to a model of Reformed epistemology (RE) which is not fully compatible with Plantingian. Taken together with previous work on Islam and RE, the article not only aims to provide reason to think that Baldwin and McNabb's proposed epistemic defeater for Islamic belief isn't problematic, it also seeks to show how the concerns raised by Baldwin and McNabb over a Plantingian model of RE in Islamic milieu, are no longer tenable.

Reformed epistemology, roughly, is the thesis that religious belief can be rational without argument. After providing some background, I present Plantinga's defense of reformed epistemology and its influence on religious debunking arguments. I then discuss three objections to Plantinga's arguments that arise from the following topics: skeptical theism, cognitive science of religion, and basicality. I then show how reformed epistemology has recently been undergirded by a number of epistemological theories, including phenomenal conservatism and virtue epistemology. I end by noting that a good objection to reformed epistemology must criticize either a substantive epistemological theory or the application of that theory to religious belief; I also show that the famous Great Pumpkin Objection is an example of the former. [Word Count: 118]

Inspired by Alvin Plantinga, many philosophers of religion accept the existence of a sensus divinitatis, a cognitive mechanism that produces religious beliefs. In this paper I will argue that there are no good reasons to accept the existence of a sensus divinitatis and hence its existence should not be affirmed. Plantinga gives two arguments for its existence, one empirical and one from the nature of God. I will argue that the first argument fails because God’s nature makes it more likely that he lets himself be known through other means. In order to criticize the second argument I rely on recent empirical data on religious cognition and argue that it does not lend support to accepting the existence of a sensus divinitatis or a similar cognitive mechanism.

This article develops a non-linear model of the ordo salutis with Christ at the centre. It shows that each individual event is a manifestation of what Christ has done and a call to faith in him. Faith is shown to comprise of consensus (agreement) and fiducia (trust). Through this model, the creative tension between the objective (indicative) and the subjective (imperative) dimensions of the gospel as well as the tension between God’s eschatological time and our unfulfilled time are maintained in such a way that they both complement and limit each other. This tension, it is argued, is intrinsically linked to the way in which Christ continues to be present within our world as both Lord and Spirit. As Lord, Jesus is proclaimed as the One who has already overcome our broken reality; as the Spirit, Christ continues to be vulnerable to be resisted and rejected by us. As the Spirit of the risen Lord, he is nevertheless able to perform miracles and overcome our broken reality as the gospel is proclaimed. A short analysis of the way in which the Bible refers to some of the events in the ordo salutis confirms the legitimacy of this model.  Intradisciplinary and/or interdisciplinary implications:  It is argued that this model overcomes many objections against the traditional understanding of the ordo salutis. By challenging the underlying presuppositions of both Arminiaism and Calvinism, this article provides a unique alternative which does justice to key insights from both traditions and adds a new voice to the ongoing debate between Arian, Pelagian and semi-pelagian theologians, on the one side, and Reformed theologians, on the other side. It thus makes a significant intradisciplinary contribution to systematic theology. It also aligns the universality of salvation in Christ as the second Adam to the continuing need for a personal faith response to Christ.

In this paper I introduce the transcendental argument for Christian theism in the context of Reformed theologian and philosopher Cornelius Van Til’s thought. I then present the critique proffered by Barry Stroud against ambitious transcendental arguments, and survey various formulations of transcendental arguments in the literature, seeking how the objection bears upon them. I argue that Adrian Bardon’s (2005) interpretation is the most helpful in understanding the Stroudian objection. From this interpretation, two types of possible rebuttals are deduced. Proceeding to survey the responses offered by Van Tillians to this objection in the recent literature, I discern two general strategies pursued in these responses, which map onto the previously deduced types of rebuttals: the Biblical justification strategy and the objection-undermining strategy. I argue that all the specific attempts to answer Stroud which I examine here (those of Butler, Bosserman, and Fluhrer) are inadequate and that these two strategies, in general, face serious problems. I conclude with considering the options before the proponent of the transcendental argument for Christian theism and with offering a new objection to the argument, which focuses on its inconsistency with the implications of Christian theism itself.

La crisi del verificazionismo ha messo in movimento l’intero quadro epistemologico. Né le esplorazioni di Wittgenstein né le soluzioni di Plantinga vogliono essere tentativi di arrestare quel movimento. Quasi gli si potrebbe imputare l’obiettivo opposto: favorire certi processi disgreganti dell’eredità post-cartesiana. Il vecchio assetto teorico è percepito come costrittivo contro certe regioni linguistico-filosofiche; bisogna creare un’apertura. Per quel che riguarda la filosofia della religione, le conseguenze profonde del lavoro di wittgensteiniani e riformati sono ancora da sviluppare. Mancano ancora di una stabilizzazione; il cantiera è tutt’ora aperto. Per gli epistemologi riformati, il compito fondamentale sembra l’individuazione di criteri induttivi per stabilire l’adeguatezza del teismo. Per i wittgensteiniani, occorre invece stabilire cosa vuol dire che credere in Dio è stabilire un sistema di riferimento esistenziale, non solo noetico. L’affermazione della realtà divina non sopporta l’isolamento epistemico. Anche una volta che si è ottenuta la percezione chiara che una proposizione teistica non è una linea in più nell’inventario ontologico, occorre ricordare che che non è possibile trattare la religione come un set di credenze isolate (Dio connette con ogni dato di realtà e non solo con ciò che consideriamo essere il contenuto di una proposizione religiosa). Per entrambi, resta poi il nodo delle implicazioni metafisiche. C’è spazio per renderne conto? C’è spazio nella filosofia analitica per parlare di metafisica, senza nulla togliere allo stile concettuale tipico (preminenza dell’analisi e della chiarificazione concettuale, accertamento della coerenza interna, controllo della compatibilità logica…)? La strada è aperta...

Resumo: O nosso objetivo principal neste texto é argumentar que uma das respostas mais plausíveis para o problema do mal, a teoria do Teísmo Cético, entra em conflito com a resposta da Epistemologia Reformada a propósito da basicidade apropriada da crença teísta. Defendemos que o Teísmo Cético dá-nos boas razões para bloquear o argumento central a favor da tese da Epistemologia Reformada.

Abstract: Our main aim in this paper is to argue that one of the most plausible answers to the problem of evil, the theory of Skeptical Theism, conflicts with the response of Reformed Epistemology about the proper basicity of theistic belief. We argue that Skeptical Theism gives us good reasons to block the central argument in favor of Reformed Epistemology thesis.

This paper explores religious belief in connection with epistemological disjunctivism. It applies recent advances in epistemological disjunctivism to the religious case for displaying an attractive model of specifically Christian religious belief. What results is a heretofore unoccupied position in religious epistemology—a view I call 'religious epistemological disjunctivism' (RED). My general argument is that RED furnishes superior explanations for the sort of 'grasp of the truth' which should undergird 'matured Christian conviction' of religious propositions. To this end I first display the more familiar perceptual epistemological disjunctivism (PED), contrasting it with both externalist and classically internalist views. This prepares the way for introducing RED with its own distinctive factive mental state operator—pneuming that p. In this second section I present the RED model, not failing to address a potential problem concerning religious disagreement. I also clarify RED's distinctive internalist aspect, describing how it comports with contemporary internalist thinking in epistemology. I then move in section three to criticize externalist and classical internalist views, showing where they fail to make proper sense of the sort of knowing which should ground mature Christian conviction. Specifically, I highlight three intuitions which I think any theory of religious belief should capture: what I call the case-closed intuition, the good believer intuition, and the Plantingian platitude. This is all to set up for the final section where I argue that RED is superior for understanding proper religious believing— capturing the aforementioned intuitions.

Alvin Plantinga notes that if Christians believe is true, then their beliefs are warranted. On the basis of this insight, he argues that the only decisive objection to Christian belief is a de facto one: an argument that shows that what Christians believe is false. We disagree. A critic does not need to argue that what Christians believe is false. She could mount a direct attack on the Christian’s claim to warrant, by offering a more plausible account of the causal mechanism giving rise to belief, one that is either indifferent with regard to the truth and falsity of the beliefs it produces or more likely to produce false beliefs than true ones. This would represent a powerful de jure argument against Christian belief.

Religious diversity is a key topic in contemporary philosophy of religion. One way religious diversity has been of interest to philosophers is in the epistemological questions it gives rise to. In other words, religious diversity has been seen to pose a challenge for religious belief. In this study four approaches to dealing with this challenge are discussed. These approaches correspond to four well-known philosophers of religion, namely, Richard Swinburne, Alvin Plantinga, William Alston, and John Hick. The study is concluded by suggesting four factors which shape one’s response to the challenge religious diversity poses to religious belief.

Plantinga’s God and Other Minds, Reformed Epistemology articles, and Warrant Trilogy are all part of the same epistemological project.  Although the project develops in phases focusing progressively on anti-theism, evidentialism, and internalism, the epistemology is consistently a Reidian particularism.  It follows Roderick Chisholm’s famous particularist strategy for finding an epistemic criterion, uses principles of common sense from Thomas Reid as clear cases of beliefs satisfying that criterion, and applies that criterion to belief in God in order to show that this belief is epistemically respectable. Understanding this will help to clarify Plantinga’s philosophical contributions to our understanding of religious belief.

In my article I introduce Plantinga’s epistemological sources, explain the structure of his project, overview its development in these three phases, and correct some misunderstandings of Plantinga that arise from inattention to his Reidian particularism. I also show how Reidian particularism itself suggests an improvement to Plantinga’s epistemology which his critics often recommend: that we recognize that evidence for the existence of God, even if it is not necessary for theistic belief to be warranted, may yet be valuable.

THE DOCUMENT HERE DOES NOT HAVE THE SAME PAGINATION AS THE PUBLISHED VERSION.

This is my first conference presentation from 1995.  I defend Merold Westphal, my mentor at Fordham University, who has developed a hermeneutics of suspicion the purpose of which was to try to bring the noetic effect of the fall  to bear on our epistemology (knowing abilities). 
"In a 1991 article, Alvin Plantinga mentioned that the effect of sin upon the cognitive faculties is a curious but important question for epistemology.  Coincidentally, that same year, Merold Westphal's essay, "Taking St. Paul Seriously: Sin as an Epistemic Category" appeared.  Westphal's article dealt with the noetic effects of sin upon our cognitive faculties,  just what Plantinga had ordered.  Since then, Westphal has written other pieces, including his book, Suspicion and Faith, trying to demonstrate the similarities between Marx, Nietzsche and Freud's hermeneutics of suspicion and Paul's suspicion of sin.  However, Westphal's work has received little notice from the Reformed Epistemology camp, and William Hasker rejected Westphal's project as fiedeistic and destructive.
  Westphal's project deserves a better hearing than it has received.  His work provides helpful bridges of thought between Christian and atheist philosophers, social and epistemological philosophers, and analytic and continental, (even postmodern) philosophers.  The purpose of this essay is to promote Westphal's central claim in the above-mentioned articles, namely, that "for the Christian philosopher, sin should be an essential epistemological category..."  First, I will lay out Westphal's project.  Second, I will respond to William Hasker's objections (which I take to be typical objections) to Westphal's project.  And Third, I will conclude with a few comments about skepticism and the doing of epistemology.

In the first part of WCB, Alvin Plantinga suggests a realist interpretation of Christian belief and defends the possibility to think about and linguistically refer to an infinite being such as God. I embrace most of what Plantinga argues on that topic in the first two chapters of WCB, in particular his critique of the Kantian, Kaufmanian and Hickian ways of endorsing versions of the thesis of conceptual agnosticism, i.e., the thesis that our concepts (at least the substantial ones) do not apply to the being to which religious speech acts and acts of worship are
directed.
Besides pointing to the slightly artificial flavor of the alleged absurdity of
predicating “being the creator of heavens and earth” of a mental construct, I have proposed in this paper, relative to Plantinga’s view, a more constructive way to read Kaufman’s (short-coming) reinterpretation of Christian belief, a stronger reading of Hick’s conceptual emptification of the Real as a Problem of coherence, an assessment of the range of logical arguments against a being
with no properties, and a reconstruction of Plantinga’s interesting ways of discussing divine infinity.

Is it possible to prepare oneself to become a Christian? For Kierkegaard, there is no straightforward answer to this question, especially since such a transition depends upon a divine activity that is outside the realm of human control. Despite the challenge that this question poses, Kierkegaard’s writings do provide us with a way to respond, and this response will be the subject matter of this article. Following an analysis of his position, this article will conclude that, although Kierkegaard recognizes that there are precedent ways of existing that are more conducive to becoming a Christian, it is not helpful to describe them as preparatory.