Luck

A bulk of research states that witchcraft is an antithesis to development. This thesis finds that that is an assumption, which cannot explain the case of the Giriama. The results of this thesis has the implications that witchcraft may indeed exist in a modern developed setting, that people in the West/North could have witchcraft beliefs as well, and that witchcraft does not have to be valued negatively. To arrive at this conclusion, witchcraft as a personal and social phenomenon was plucked apart, and then juxtaposed against different concepts of development. Combining Lucien Levy-Bruhl’s theory of Mystical Participation with Mary Douglas’ theories on Grid and Group, witchcraft rationality is stated to be indicative of a category of worldview. This categorisation helps the reader to better recognise cultures with this particular rationality, and to understand the nature and consequences of the rationality. Throughout the text, the witchcraft rationality worldview is contrasted with ...

Glücksgöttin Fortuna, wird stets beim Drehen eines Großen Rades dargestellt. Oben und unten dieses Rades, überall befinden sich Menschen die um Hilfe hoffen. Diese Menschen werden als „Esel“ dargestellt.
Fortuna bringt die Menschen mit dem Rad erst mal nach oben, danach degradiert sie diese Menschen, dies ist das Verständnis von dem Begriff „çark-ı felek“, welches im klassischen Türkischen Gedicht identisch ist. Die Welt ist niederträchtig, verrucht, auf ihr findet man keinen Frieden. Die Hindernisse und die daraus folgenden seelischen Verengungen in der Mitte des Lebens bringen uns auf den Begriff Schicksal. Fortuna und wo sie am besten dargestellt wird in  ‘‘O Fortuna’’ dem berühmtesten Teil von Carmina Burana wurde erklärt, dass die Klarstellung der Haltung identisch wie im Divan Gedicht ist. Die allgemeine Tendenz ist die Klage des Schicksals.
Durch diesen Anlass können wir die Breite des Begriffs "Schicksal" im Islam sehen. ‘‘Das Schicksal ist unheilvoll. Keiner, der geboren wurde, entrinnt ihm. ” sagt Homer wie die Cebriyye. Wie die Wissenschaftler des Mutezile, zieht Nietzsche die Menschen in die Hauptrolle: ‘‘Verwandlung durch hundert Seelen, das sei dein Leben, dein Schicksal!” Kierkegaard sagte ‘‘Wer das Schicksal erklären soll, der muß ebenso zweideutig wie das Schicksal sein.’’, wenn er Miriam 2-9 durchgelesen hätte, wäre er wahrscheinlich mit seinen Gedanken gleich geblieben. Newton wählt wie Eşari einen mittleren Weg: “Schicksal ist nie eine Frage der Chance, sondern eine Frage der Wahl.”
      Für den Menschen der im Schicksalsrad ganz oben angekommen ist, ist es auch für ihn unvermeidlich das Schicksal der Königin Hecubas zu teilen.

There has been a great deal of interest in the concept of luck in the recent psychological and philosophical literature. In philosophy, this interest has tended to focus not upon luck simpliciter but rather upon the role that luck plays in ethical and epistemological debates concerning (respectively) moral and epistemic luck. In psychology, in contrast, a number of studies have explicitly examined our everyday conceptions of luck and the manner in which these conceptions influence our lives. This article surveys both the recent psychological and philosophical literature on this topic and argues that (to different degrees) the work of both disciplines in this area has been hampered by a failure to be clearer about what luck involves. Accordingly, this article offers a specification of what is core to the notion of luck and highlights how this analysis can aid further research in this area by both psychologists and philosophers.

Unter dem Dach der Philosophie gingen empirische Forschung und normative Theorie lange Zeit Hand in Hand, bis sie spätestens um die Zeit der Emanzipation der Einzelwissenschaften in eine schwierige, nicht immer eindeutig bestimmbare Beziehung zueinander traten; dieses unterbestimmte Verhältnis tritt uns vor dem Hintergrund aktueller Debatten wieder entgegen. Das zeigt sich zum Beispiel auch bei Fragen der Ethik: In den letzten Jahrzehnten zeigten verschiedene wissenschaftliche Disziplinen verstärktes Interesse an empirischen Bemühungen um ein deskriptives Verständnis von Moral. Hier gibt es nach wie vor eine starke Trennung zwischen den Bereichen der normativen Theorie einerseits und der empirischen Forschung andererseits, wobei in beiden Bereichen dazu tendiert wird, die jeweils anderen Diskurse zu vernachlässigen, wobei Unklarheit über die Möglichkeiten und Grenzen einer fruchtbaren Integration herrscht. Auf der anderen Seite gibt es jüngst auch verschiedene Versuche einer Integration beider Domänen. – Dies macht einen Diskurs über die Bestimmung des Verhältnisses von empirischer Forschung und normativer Theorie nötig, was in diesem Band aus verschiedenen historischen sowie systematischen Perspektiven geleistet wird.

Many contemporary epistemologists hold that a subject S’s true belief that p counts as knowledge only if S’s belief that p is also, in some important sense, safe. I describe accounts of this safety condition from John Hawthorne, Duncan Pritchard, and Ernest Sosa. There have been three counterexamples to safety proposed in the recent literature, from Comesaña, Neta and Rohrbaugh, and Kelp. I explain why all three proposals fail: each moves fallaciously from the fact that S was at epistemic risk just before forming her belief to the conclusion that S’s belief was formed unsafely. In light of lessons from their failure, I provide a new and successful counterexample to the safety condition on knowledge. It follows, then, that knowledge need not be safe. Safety at a time depends counterfactually on what would likely happen at that time or soon after in a way that knowledge does not. I close by considering one objection concerning higher-order safety.

It is very widely held that Frankfurt-style cases—in which a counterfactual intervener stands by to bring it about that an agent performs an action but never actually acts because the agent performs that action on her own—show that free will does not require alternative possibilities. This essay argues that that conclusion is unjustified, because merely counterfactual interveners may make a difference to normative properties. It presents a modified version of a fake barn case to show how a counterfactual intervener can make the difference between an agent knowing a fact or merely truly believing that fact, by eliminating veretic epistemic luck. If counterfactual interveners can make this kind of difference to the epistemic status of agents, the essay argues, there is no reason why they can’t make an analogous difference to agents’ moral responsibility. It concludes that reflection on these cases reveals that despite the mountains of words spilled on the topic, we still don’t fully understand what role access to alternative possibilities plays in whether or not agents are morally responsible for their actions.

Reductive intellectualists about knowledge-how (e.g., Stanley & Williamson 2001; Stanley 2011a, 2011b; Brogaard 2008a, 2008b, 2009, 2011) hold, contra Ryle (1946, 1949), that knowing how to do something is just a kind of propositional knowledge. In a similar vein, traditional reductivists about understanding-why (e.g., Salmon 1984; Lipton 2004; Woodward 2003; Grimm 2006; Greco 2009; Kelp 2014) insist, in accordance with a tradition beginning with Aristotle, that the epistemic standing one attains when one understands why something is so is itself just a kind of propositional knowledge—viz., propositional knowledge of causes. A point that has been granted on both sides of these debates is that if these reductive proposals are right, then knowledge-how and understanding-why should be susceptible to the same extent as knowledge-that is to being undermined by epistemic luck. This paper reports experimental results that test these luck-based predictions. Interestingly, these results suggest a striking (albeit, imperfect) positive correlation between self-reported philosophical expertise and attributions of knowledge-how, understanding-why and knowledge-that which run contrary to reductive proposals. We contextualize these results by showing how they align very well with a particular kind of overarching non-reductive proposal, one that two of the authors have defended elsewhere (e.g., Carter and Pritchard 2015a; 2015b; Pritchard 2010) according to which knowledge-how and understanding-why, but not knowledge-that, essentially involve cognitive achievement (i.e., cognitive success that is primarily creditable to cognitive ability). We conclude by situating the interpretive narrative advanced within contemporary discussions about the role of expertise in philosophical judgment.

Luck egalitarianism’s commitment to neutralizing brute luck inequalities is thought to imply that the elimination of disabilities is an appropriate way to eliminate the unchosen disadvantage that often accompanies disabilities. This implication is not only intuitively objectionable to some, especially those concerned with disability justice, but is subject to objections from relational egalitarians that should be taken seriously. This paper defends the claim that disability elimination is not a natural implication of luck egalitarian theories of justice and that luck egalitarians can avoid the related relational egalitarian objections. I take this to be the case because luck egalitarians can consistently endorse three commitments that, together, take disability elimination off the menu of possible ways to redress the disadvantage of persons with disabilities. These three commitments are: i) the rejection of the view that disability intrinsically makes a person worse off; ii) the endorsement of the fundamental equality of all persons; and iii) the view that luck egalitarianism advances a theory about the arrangement of social institutions.

This paper advances new theses about the relationship between luck and risk, using recent work by Duncan Pritchard (2014, 2015, 2016) as its foil. Once Pritchard's views are introduced in section 1, the rest of the paper completes two different tasks, one critical and one constructive. By focussing on some epistemological cases that Pritchard's model would fail to identify, section 2 shows that it relies on a difference that is in fact inessential: the one between the occurrence and the non-occurrence of an event. Section 3 sketches and defends an alternative account of the luck/risk distinction, based on the consideration of situations (instead of events) from different temporal perspectives: luck assessments track a situation's past, considering it as the actual outcome of some previous event, whereas risk assessments look at the situation's future, regarding it as the initial condition of some unsettled event.

Commonly exploited by such organizations as casinos and lotteries, the concept of chance has always been an exceedingly marketable phenomenon. Now owned by the toy conglomerate Hasbro, Wizards of the Coast, a once small company just swerving to avoid bankruptcy, sky-rocketed its product of Magic: The Gathering cards to the top of the sales charts with superb mathematical design and an intriguing storyline based around the cards. It goes without saying that such a successful phenomenon would accrue an incredibly diverse fan base, and a large one at that. Every Friday and Saturday around the country, fantasy-game enthusiasts gather at their local comic and board game shops to partake in ritualistic tournaments of skill and luck. Through observations of these groups, henceforth known as pods, unique and recurring behaviors centered on the concept of chance present themselves to possess common methods of transference across the boundaries of singular pods. Although perhaps perpetuated by the internet and other forms of media, much of the meta-folklore in the Magic community seems to cross the boundaries of a single pod, and can be largely accessible to anyone acquainted with a single pod's traits. While a certain amount of disassociation between accepted members of the group and outsiders can be attributed to one's lack of familiarity with the game's tropes, a certain type of social slang is displayed abundantly which both simplifies and widens the distance of Magic players and non-players. This isolationistic divide largely serves as a protective bonding

Résumé Cette étude propose une analyse des arguments de causalité et de conséquence employés dans le discours politique afin d’en clarifier quelques dimensions pragmatiques, syntaxiques et sémantiques, en prenant pour objet le débat télévisé des chefs, en français, tenu lors des élections fédérales canadiennes d’octobre 1993. Quatre types d’arguments de causalité sont explorés : l’argument du mérite, l’argument de justification, l'argument de chance et l'argument de responsabilité. Les six arguments de conséquence analysés sont ceux de l’effet pervers, de l’inanité, de la mise en péril, de l’engagement fatal, de la prédiction autocréatrice et de l’excès de volonté. Les auteurs proposent une formalisation de ces deux catégories d’arguments et une application qui en montre la fécondité théorique.

In this article I provide and defend a solution to the problem of moral luck. The problem of moral luck is that there is a set of three theses about luck and moral blameworthiness each of which is at least prima facie plausible, but that, it seems, cannot all be true. The theses are that (1) one cannot be blamed for what happens beyond one’s control, (2) that which is due to luck is beyond one’s control, and (3) we rightly blame each other for events that are due to luck. I suggest that the response which distinguishes between degree and scope of blameworthiness is promising. The main objection that one might level against this approach is that it seems to lead to the absurd conclusion that we, in the actual world, are as blameworthy as the person we could have been and who performs all sorts of heinous acts in a far away possible world. For, we in the actual world and our counterpart in a far away possible world are both such that we would perform certain heinous acts in particular circumstances. I argue that this objection can be met, namely by paying attention to the nature of luck. By using the insights into the nature of luck that have been gained by epistemologists, we can solve the problem of luck as it has been formulated by ethicists. For, epistemologists have argued that some event is due to luck only if it fails to occur in a substantial number of nearby possible worlds. I defend this account of luck and argue that the problem of moral luck can be solved if we pay attention to the nature of luck. I, therefore, call my solution to the problem of moral luck a modal solution.

PurposeStrategic management scholars seek to link strategic factors to performance. When specific causal links cannot be identified, however, other potential explanations should be considered, including the notion of luck. This paper aims to introduce a distinction between scholarly and practitioner perspectives of luck and identifies why this distinction is critical to both scholars and practitioners.Design/methodology/approachThis paper proposes a framework linking luck and competitive advantage. It also reports the results of an exploratory empirical investigation on the perceived role of luck in firm performance.FindingsScholars and practitioners have different views of luck's role in organizational performance. Managers are more likely to assign luck for bad outcomes rather than good. In addition, the more quantitative a manager's work function, the less likely he or she is to perceive a luck‐performance linkage, and the higher the manager is in the organization, the mo...

PurposeStrategic management scholars seek to link strategic factors to performance. When specific causal links cannot be identified, however, other potential explanations should be considered, including the notion of luck. This paper aims to introduce a distinction between scholarly and practitioner perspectives of luck and identifies why this distinction is critical to both scholars and practitioners.Design/methodology/approachThis paper proposes a framework linking luck and competitive advantage. It also reports the results of an exploratory empirical investigation on the perceived role of luck in firm performance.FindingsScholars and practitioners have different views of luck's role in organizational performance. Managers are more likely to assign luck for bad outcomes rather than good. In addition, the more quantitative a manager's work function, the less likely he or she is to perceive a luck‐performance linkage, and the higher the manager is in the organization, the mo...

Luck egalitarian theories of justice are frequently criticised for being unduly harsh on people who experience disadvantage as a result of their responsible choices. According to the ‘abandonment objection’, luck egalitarians are committed to abandoning even very severely disadvantaged persons as long as responsibility figures in the right way in the genesis of their disadvantage. This article makes a distinction between two views that are insufficiently distinguished in the literature. Weak luck egalitarianism is the view that justice requires us to cater to the claims of victims of bad brute luck before there is an obligation to assist responsible victims. Strong luck egalitarianism is the view that responsibility robustly determines the requirements of justice. The abandonment objection presumably targets the less plausible strong view. It does not seem to touch the more plausible weak view. The article consequently argues that the abandonment objection is either trivial or wrong.

Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Stein’s We all lost the Cold War remains a decisive contribution twenty years after its publication and its limitations a powerful invitation to develop what it suggests. First, it offered new evidence based on oral interviews and the publication of the English version of the telegram of Anatoly Dobrynin, which was sent on October 27, 1962 and had only recently been declassified. Second, it proposed an in depth psychological critique of rational deterrence theory and of what it called the “strategy of deterrence”. Third, it questioned the mainstream assessment of the outcome of the crisis as a U.S. victory, which has persisted to this day. This essay reassesses those contributions in depth and argues that they would have been served even better by an engagement with the notion of luck and by an even broader perspective including not only the Soviet voice but also that of other players in the crisis. In that respect, the limitations of this important book suggest a research program for today which is sketched out in the final part of this essay.

As corridas de cavalo, denominadas de turfe, se apresentaram como um objeto expoente para observar e analisar questões referentes aos jogos de apostas praticados na cidade do Rio de Janeiro. A comunhão entre um espetáculo esportivo e um mercado de jogos de azar produz nas corridas do turfe possibilidades de os jogadores participarem das corridas de forma ativa, mediante a constante produção de apostas. As denominadas casas de apostas se estabelecem como espaços
estratégicos que possibilitam um acompanhamento cotidiano dessa atividade. Os
apostadores do turfe utilizam diversos saberes num intricado e complexo processo classificatório, com elementos ditos “intuitivos” ou “racionais”. Para um apostador experiente, a utilização de informações, conhecimentos e saberes referentes a técnicas específicas é essencial para a produção de um bom jogo; as suas avaliações envolvem tensões permanentes entre disputas e colaborações, obrigações e deveres,
armadilhas e solidariedades. Em conjunto, esses fatores podem ser representados como gradações de uma “ciência”. Esta parece pretender deixar pouca margem para o acaso, mas também se deixa cercar por “magia”, uma vez que há sempre uma variável, um aspecto ou dimensão que se admite deixar escapar no processo de conjunção entre dados e intuições.

(forthcoming in the The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck) The aim of this paper is to explore the hypothesis that luck is a risk-involving phenomenon. I start by explaining why this hypothesis is prima facie plausible in view of the parallelisms between luck and risk. I then distinguish three ways to spell it out: in probabilistic terms, in modal terms, and in terms of lack of control. Before evaluating the resulting accounts, I explain how the idea that luck involves risk is compatible with the fact that risk concerns unwanted events whereas luck can concern both wanted and unwanted events. I turn to evaluating the modal and probabilistic views and argue, firstly, that they fail to account for the connection between risk and bad luck; secondly, that they also fail to account for the connection between risk and good luck. Finally, I defend the lack of control view. In particular, I argue that it can handle the objections to the probabilistic and modal accounts and that it can explain how degrees of luck and risk covary. 4th of July of 1943, 11:07 pm. A Consolidated B-24 Liberator takes off from Gibraltar Airport. It carries Władysław Sikorski, the commander-in-chief of the Polish Army and the Prime Minister of the Polish government-in-exile. Sixteen seconds after takeoff the aircraft crashes into the sea. Sikorski dies along with ten other people. The pilot, Flight Lieutenant Eduard Prchal, survives. Later investigations of this World War II event failed to pin down the specific cause of the accident, but it is believed that the elevator system of the aircraft was jammed. Prchal's efforts to move the stick of the steering mechanism were all in vain. He could not pull up and the plane lost height quickly. Inevitably, it ended in the waters of the Strait of Gibraltar. Prchal's lucky survival and events alike suggest that there is a close connection between luck and risk. For a lot of risk is involved in taking off in an aircraft whose elevator system is jammed, and a lot of luck is involved if that risk is materialized, the aircraft crashes and yet one survives against all odds. Indeed, cases of this sort give prima facie reason to think that luck is a risk-involving phenomenon. In this paper, I aim to explore this hypothesis. Here is the plan. In §1, I will take a closer look at the luck as risk hypothesis in the light of the parallelisms between both phenomena and introduce three ways to spell it out: in probabilistic terms, in modal terms, and in terms of lack of control. In §2, I will explain how luck can be naturally understood as a risk-involving phenomenon even if luck and risk are different—especially in view of the fact that risk concerns unwanted events, whereas luck can concern both wanted and unwanted 1