Missile defence

The Azerbaijani military portal Azerideffence.com recently published information about Baku acquiring French ASTER 30-SAMP/T and VL MICA air-defense missile systems. A representative of the company producing these missile systems—MBDA—confirmed the information. Several days later, the Russian newspaper Kommersant informed that Moscow had refused to sell Baku the Bal-E coastal missile system despite Azerbaijan’s huge interest in purchasing it.

Artificial intelligence and the future of warfare sketches a clear picture of the potential impact of artificial intelligence (AI) on the digitized battlefield, broadening our understanding of critical questions facing decision-makers. This book demystifies the hype surrounding AI in the context of nuclear weapons and, more broadly, future warfare. Specifically, it highlights the potential, multifaceted intersections of this disruptive technology with nuclear stability. The inherently destabilizing effects of AI in the military sphere may exacerbate tension between nuclear-armed great powers - especially China and the United States - but not for the reasons you may think.

Over the last three decades, the Israeli missile defense concept has evolved significantly along with the emerging threats. As a result of the long-term strategy implemented in the 1990s, contemporary missile defense of Israel has been developed into a complex, multi-tiered system aimed to match the country's unique security needs. The purpose of this study is to determine the main directions in the development of the Israeli missile defense concept that have led to its current form. The study identifies key elements of the multi-layered missile defense architecture, as well as their role in Israel's overall defense strategy. With the use of theoretical research methods, the period of 1991-2020 was examined in order to trace the development of new missile defense systems and the evolution of Israel's position on the subject in relation to the changing international situation. The author concludes that the comprehensive anti-missile shield, consisting of the Arrow-3, Arrow-2, David's Sling and Iron Dome systems, provides Israel with solid defense against short, medium and long range missile threats, and presents potential to be developed into one of the most advanced missile defense systems in the world.

More than 50 years ago, pioneering scientists and engineers in the Soviet Union and the United States searched for a technical means of defense against deadly ballistic missiles. In Intercept 1961 Mike Gruntman tells the story, little-known even to experts, of the earliest breakthroughs which paved the way for the emergence of a powerful missile defense complex in the Soviet Union, a major factor in the Cold War. On March 4, 1961, a Soviet guided missile performed the first nonnuclear intercept of an intermediate range ballistic missile at the Saryshagan test site in the Kazakhstan desert when it destroyed an approaching warhead. This spectacular achievement followed earlier intercepts by the United States Army of several shorter range missiles. Mike Gruntman describes the birth of Soviet air and missile defense systems and their technical challenges. The new field also led to the emergence of monitoring space objects in orbit, ballistic missile early warning, and antisatellite weapons. Ten years later, the first operational missile defense system was deployed to protect Moscow, its successor system remaining active today. Intercept 1961 is especially relevant today as the United States and other countries continue facing the eternal protect-or-avenge dilemma when balancing offensive capabilities against defensive protection. In an age of unstable governments, spreading weapons of mass destruction, and radical ideologies and terrorism, this historical background is critical for informed policy formulation, threat evaluation, defense planning, and counteracting the proliferation of weapons and sensitive technologies. It is a must read for students of history, scientists and engineers, analysts, and specialists in international relations and national security.

In 2009, after US president Barack Obama received the Nobel Peace Prize for, amongst others, his commitment to long-term nuclear disarmament (BBC,2009), Time Magazine published an article titled “Want Peace? Give the Nuke a Nobel”. This reflects the long-standing claim that, far from a threat to world peace, nuclear weapons--or the fear of them--can actually be instrumental in reducing the incidence of violent conflict, by deterring not merely their own use, but also any conventional war that could trigger a nuclear exchange. Though the fear of 'Mutually Assured Destruction' has long been a well-established concept in (nuclear) deterrence theory, few have taken this argument to its logical conclusion--the idea, developed most famously by Kenneth N. Waltz in his controversial ‘The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May be Better’ (1981), that if the mutual fear of nuclear war can deter states from conventional war, and if such deterrence is stable, then perhaps measured nuclear proliferation to other countries could be the best stabilizer of regional and global conflict, ultimately creating zones of 'Nuclear Peace'.

The suggestions that nuclear weapons might be ‘the best [and] only peacekeeping weapon that the world has ever known’ [Sagan & Waltz,2010: 92], and that their ‘horizontal’ proliferation to other states might constitute ‘an international good’ [Waltz, 2009, 431], are remarkable and highly controversial, as they fly in the face of both the Non-Proliferation Treaty (‘NPT’), as well as dominant attitudes in the West towards many nuclear-threshold states, such as Iran and North Korea.

Driven by the question "would the world be safer if more nations had nuclear weapons?", this article examines the chief arguments presented against and in favor of broad nuclear proliferation, and their counterarguments. To answer this question, I briefly theorize the positive or negative impact, on deterrence
stability and military-organizational safety, of conditions such as asymmetrical strategic force strengths or -postures (counterforce / countervalue); novel technologies (cost-effective missile shields), operational protocols
(‘launch-on-warning’) and finally several ‘deterrence-breaking’ strategies ('Hamburg grab'; 'madman strategy').

In terms of structure, this essay will present the general architecture of deterrence theory; common arguments against Waltz's 'laissez-faire' nuclear proliferation--and their validity. It will be considered if the ‘nuclear peace’-model, even if valid for the Cold War, is sufficiently applicable and transposable to other contexts to warrant Waltz’ advocacy of ‘total proliferation’—or whether proliferation should be ‘limited’ because the safety and stability of nuclear deterrence are not assured, either because its strategic logic can be subverted in ‘rogue states’ who lack rationality and restraint, or because the 'vulnerability' of 'poor’ nations small arsenals invites a decapitation strike. I will argue that this is not the case, and that Waltz’s ‘total’ form of proliferation optimism is indeed the most, or even the only legitimate ‘pro-proliferation’—or indeed, non-disarmament—argument.

Nevertheless, I conclude that even Waltz's cogent formulation fails to make the case for a ‘nuclear world’ being meaningfully safer, as it does not come to terms with how instability, irrationality, and most importantly organizational accidents are not mere imperfections of nuclear deterrence, but rather irreducible, essential, and inevitable to it, making systemic breakdown inevitable, cataclysmic, and in the long-term terminal.

Pivdenmash (Yuzhmash), the Ukrainian Dnipropetrovsk industrial giant, one of the World leaders in space and missile industry during Soviet times is on the verge of bankruptcy. In August 2015, all accounts of Pivdenmash could be frozen. If this happens, this means no orders or contracts, not a single hope for survival

1.1 Hypersonic missiles are a new type of missile which possesses speed and manoeuvring capabilities that make them a game-changer in nuclear (and conventional) interstate competition1. They are much faster than existing cruise missiles and much more manoeuvrable than existing ballistic missile re-entry vehicles (RVs). They can reach and maintain hypersonic speeds, i.e. speeds exceeding Mach 52. However, this characteristic is not unique to them: ICBM RVs also travel at hypersonic speeds3. Hypersonic missiles follow a non-ballistic trajectory, flying between 18 miles and 60 miles in altitude. Their manoeuvrability allows them to change course up to the last minutes of flight4 and achieve a high degree of targeting precision. These characteristics have implications for detection. The unusual altitude and flight path of hypersonic missiles can result in their being invisible to existing missile early-warning radars for much of their trajectory. Some varieties5 will be will be detected by satellites during their boost-phase. HCMs are a two-stage weapon system, the first-stage is a small rocket booster that will accelerate the missile at the right supersonic speed needed for properly starting the second stage. During the firing of the first-stage there could be the possibility for a boost-phase detection. It is still not certain if the infrared signature of the first stage of HCM could be detected by infrared satellites used for missile warning. See JAMES ACTON (n.2), p. 68.

Shortly before a test launch of the first Russian R-16 intercontinental rocket at the Baikonur Cosmodrome on October 24, 1960; a terrible accident – the deadliest in the history of the space industry – claimed an estimated 126 lives, although some sources contend the actual number of deaths may be as high as 500. This paper describes that while on the launch stand undergoing last-minute repairs and preparations, a major malfunction in an electrical circuit caused a premature ignition of the second stage engines – detonating the fully loaded first stage fuel tanks. Also discussed are historical accounts of the decisions by Marshal Mitrofan Nedelin to shortcut safety procedures and continue with the test launch to meet arbitrary schedule demands from Moscow, resulting in a significant number of deaths, including that of Marshal Nedelin, and a total loss of the rocket and test stand. The paper provides historical context to explain the unrelenting schedule pressure. In addition, the paper describes the context of the Soviet space program at the time of the accident and provides a chronological outline of the events surrounding the failed test launch. Translating several sources from their original Russian, we present much of the story of the Nedelin Disaster through first-hand accounts and memoirs of eyewitnesses to the catastrophe, their survivors and other Soviet rocket and military officials. We present the mistakes, poor decisions and incredible lack of site planning that directly contributed to both the cause and the severity of the disaster. Throughout the paper, authoritative historical sources, many of them translated from Russian into English for what we believe is the first time, describe the events leading up to the accident, the devastation of the event, and the decades of duplicitous deception perpetuated by the Soviet government to hide the true story from the families of the victims, the Soviet people and the rest of the world. The paper's conclusion presents several lessons learned from this incident.

On October 5, 2019, as a part of the High-definition Earth Observation project, the 314th flight mission of Long March has successfully placed Gao Fen-10 in its planned orbit. Previously, Gao Fen-10 was launched on 31 August 2016 on a CZ-4C rocket from China’s Taiyuan space center but it didn’t succeed to orbit. Thus, it was relaunched after three years from the same space center.

In 2010, the Chinese government initiated the High-Definition Earth Observation Satellite (HDEOS) program. The main objective of the program is to utilize sufficient Near-Real-Time (NRT) observation data for city planning, intelligent transportation, geographical mapping, resource surveillance, precision agriculture, disaster management, environment surveying, and climate change monitoring. Later, to improve the comprehensive capability of its Earth observation system, the HDEOS project has extended to CHEOS (China’s High-Resolution Earth Observation System). EOSDC-CNSA (Earth Observation System and Data Center – China National Space Administration) monitors the construction and maintenance of the CHEOS program. China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) is the prime contractor for building space segments of CHEOS and ground segment is operated by the Centre for Resources Satellite Data and Application (CRESDA). The project focused to build the meteorological, marine, resource, environmental and, high definition satellites. Thus, it successfully inducted GaoFen – High Definition Earth Observation Satellites, Feng Yun – weather satellites, Hai Yang- Ocean observation satellites, Zi Yuan -resource Satellites, Yaogan – remote sensing satellites and Tian Hui – Topographic Mapping -Satellite in its planned orbit. Thus, on completion of CHEOS program, it can meet the strategic demands of the national economic development and social progress as well as it will have a clearer view of the planet.

Effects of aerodynamic coefficient uncertainties on trajectory simulation were investigated for a short-range solid propellant free rocket. Aerodynamic and physical data were obtained from published experimental data and used as nominal values. A 6-DOF rigid body model was employed to simulation rocket trajectory. The output parameters evaluated in this study were maximum acceleration, spin rate, total angle of attack, and impact point. The effect of individual aerodynamic coefficient was evaluated by performing trajectory simulation with variation in each coefficient then observed change in the output parameters. The coefficients that significantly affect the output parameters were indentified. In addition, a Monte Carlo analysis was performed to assess the effects of uncertainties in multiple coefficients. Totally, 4000 trajectory simulation runs were carried out and distributions of the output parameters were presented.

Introduction: Space launch vehicles and military missiles- function, types, role, mission, mission profile, thrust profile, propulsion system, payload, staging, control and guidance requirements, performance measures, design, construction, operation- similarities and differences.  Materials used for launch vehicles & missiles and their selection criteria.

This book, produced within the framework of the Carnegie Moscow Center’s Nonproliferation Program, has been written by leading Russian and foreign experts in the field of missile defense. In examining this complex issue, the authors address its historical evolution and its military technical, strategic, political, and legal aspects. The book will be of interest to experts in international relations and security, as will as to a broader readership.
The fifteenth chapter (Natalia Romashkina and Petr Topychkanov) analyzes regional missile defense programs in third countries (the Middle East and Asia-Pacific region).

The order of this article is as follows. Firstly, we will address the issue of the ballistic missiles because their properties obviously reflect on the missile defence – thus we will define and describe the threat. Secondly, we will discuss the missile defence as such – specifically pointing out at its inherent limitations. And finally, we will shortly present the missile defence arsenals of the world with particular reference to the United States.

Over the last years, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) recognized nuclear powers (P5) have substantially invested in modernizing their nuclear arsenals. Even considering the need for replacement of some of the nuclear platforms, analysis demonstrates that the development and deployment of new military systems – like the missile shield or hypersonic systems – has created a strategic domino effect on other nuclear powers, namely Russia and China. This article intends not only to describe some of the nuclear modernizations programs currently being implemented by the P5 but also the strategic
motivations behind the latter.

Uncertainty about the future strategic environment is a rational impetus for cooperation. Despite a joint reiteration, by the US and Canada, of cooperation’s importance in managing and responding to future threats, interrogations about NORAD’s potential for future contributions in the North American defense landscape are relevant as it marks six decades of operation in 2018. Is NORAD, in its present configuration, sufficient for managing future threats to North America as well as strategic defense? Should NORAD be adapted to meet expected defense challenges? Or, alternatively, should it be replaced with a different structure; and at what risks? This chapter examines those questions through a discussion the importance of cooperation for uncertainty management, the challenges to cooperation as well as the role and limits of NORAD. It continues with a presentation of the possibilities for adapting the command arrangement relative to replacement employing arguments drawn from rational institutionalism. Finally, an exploration of the centrality of NORAD for North American defense cooperation and strategic defense is provided based on a comparison of the risks of adaptation versus replacement. Should the partners decide to participate in strategic defense, a pragmatic adaptation of the NORAD command arrangement is recommended through a use of the institutional provisions denoting flexibility. The chances for a successful mandate adaptation of the existing command are increased if stakeholders manage information transparently and effectively to minimize the risks of politicization.

While this monograph was being researched
and written, Russian actions in Crimea and eastern
Ukraine brought U.S.-Russian relations to a new
low in the post-Cold War era. Normal relations and
conversations between the United States and Russia
were apparently on hold during an unprecedented,
and apparently intractable, crisis of European security.
But the longer view of relations between the two former
superpowers shows precedents that suggest relations
stand a strong chance of early recovery, despite
Russia’s hard line and unpalatable actions. With or
without this recovery, some persistent challenges to
the relationship will remain; the state of relations will
affect how these challenges are presented, rather than
the underlying contradictions themselves.
One of these challenges is ballistic missile defense
(BMD), and its implications for nuclear deterrence.
For the past 7 years, plans for BMD capability in
Europe have been a consistent sticking point in
relations between the United States and Russia. In
brief, Russia’s strenuous opposition to these plans is
based on claims, not all of them disingenuous, that
this capability is intended to compromise Russia’s
nuclear deterrent capability. Yet all discussion of
the subject highlights the U.S. current and proposed
deployments and entirely ignores Russia’s own
missile interception systems, which are claimed to
have comparable capability. While Moscow continues
to strengthen its armed forces and seeks to reduce the
capability gap with the United States, the perception
of vulnerability leads Russia to invest heavily in
strategic weapons and aerospace defense, including
both defense against nuclear missiles and precision
guided munitions. Russia protests that U.S. SM-3
missiles pose a potential threat to strategic stability,
and has made belligerent threats of direct military
action to prevent their deployment. But no mention
at all is made of the strategic implications of Russia’s
own S-400 and S-500 systems, despite the fact that,
if the performance and capabilities claimed for them
by Russian sources are accurate, they pose at least as
great a threat to deterrence as do SM-3s.
This monograph therefore aims to describe
Russia’s claims for its missile defense systems and,
where possible, to assess the likelihood that these
claims are true. This will form a basis for considering
whether discussion of Russian capabilities should be
an integral part of future conversations with Russia on
the deployment of U.S. and allied BMD assets.
An assessment of this kind requires an essential
caveat. Research for this monograph has been
conducted from open sources in Russian and English,
and unclassified discussion with knowledgeable
individuals on both sides of the debate. As such, it
has obvious limitations, especially in a field where the
fine detail of capabilities and deployments is highly
classified. In addition, the proliferation of designations
used by Russia for systems still in development,
and the confused and contradictory reporting of
them in open source media, adds a further layer of
obfuscation. In the words of one assessment—tellingly
entitled, “Experts Baffled by Profusion of Russian
Missile Projects”—the resulting linguistic labyrinth
has been further confused, perhaps deliberately, by a
proliferation of new names in Russian reports.
The descriptions in this monograph of specific
Russian projects are therefore a synthesis of public
declarations by Russia as carried in open sources,
Executive Summary
Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press
rather than an authoritative and verified systems
handbook. Nonetheless, they have value since
responses to Russian claims for their missile
defense systems must necessarily rely on public
pronouncements.

Τμήματος Ψηφιακών Συστημάτων Παν.Πειραιά και Μεταπτυχιακού Διπλώματος Διπλωματικών και Γεωπολιτικών Σπουδών CEDES Τα τελευταία χρόνια το Ελληνικό Πολεμικό Ναυτικό (ΠΝ) έχει εκφράσει την επιθυμία να αποκτήσει κατευθυνόμενα βλήματα (κ/β) Cruise τα οποία θα του προσδώσουν πρωτόγνωρες επιχειρησιακές δυνατότητες. Παράλληλα, η ανάπτυξη από την γείτονα Τουρκία ενός αντίστοιχου βλήματος, με όλα τα αρνητικά αλλά και τα θετικά σημεία που συνοδεύει μια τέτοια προσπάθεια, κάνει την ανάγκη απόκτησης πιο επιτακτική. Σκοπός του παρόντος άρθρου είναι να παρουσιάσει δύο αντιπροσωπευτικά δείγματα αυτής της κατηγορίας οπλικών συστημάτων, το κ/β Scalp Naval για το ΠΝ και το SOM για το Τουρκικό Πολεμικό Ναυτικό (ΤΠΝ) καθώς και ορισμένα βασικά συμπεράσματα ως προς τις επιχειρησιακές/στρατηγικές προεκτάσεις από την απόκτηση και χρήση αυτών. Βασικά σημεία των κ/β Cruise Σε γενικές γραμμές ένα κ/β αυτού του τύπου αποτελείται από το σύστημα κατεύθυνσης, το σύστημα προώθησης (turbofan 1 ή turbojet 2), την κεφαλή (συμβατική ή πυρηνική) και το τμήμα των ηλεκτρονικών. Ανάλογα με την χρήση του κ/β, η διαμόρφωση αυτή μπορεί να αλλάξει. Η ανάπτυξη των κ/β Cruise ξεκίνησε από το 1950 από τις ΗΠΑ και την ΕΣΣΔ. Πρόκειται για κ/β εναντίον πρωτίστως στόχων ξηράς και δευτερευόντως εναντίον στόχων θαλάσσης, τα οποίο εκτοξεύονται από μεγάλες αποστάσεις και με μεγάλη ακρίβεια. Η τροχιά που 1 Παραλλαγή του απλού στροβιλωθητή. Η βασική διαφορά είναι ότι στον άξονα της μηχανής προσαρμόζεται ανεμιστήρας στο εμπρόσθιο τμήμα, ο οποίος συνεισφέρει στην ώθηση μεγάλων ποσοτήτων αέρα λειτουργώντας ως έλικα. 2 Ένα μέρος από τα καυσαέρια της εξόδου, χρησιμοποιούνται για να κινήσουν ένα στρόβιλο (turbine). Ο στρόβιλος με την σειρά του παρασύρει με μηχανική σύνδεση, τον συμπιεστή, για την συμπίεση του εισερχόμενου αέρα από τον αεραγωγό στην είσοδο.

The essential parts a guided missile need stopper form properly are: 1. Air frame and control surfaces. 2. Propulsion system. 3. War head system. 4. Guidance and control system. In addition in this article the basic fire control problem, how some of the forces of nature affect the trajectory of a guided missile as it flies to its intended target. How wings and finssteera missile and keep it pointed along its flight path.The use of interior control devices by missiles without exterior control surfaces (or limited ones) was described briefly. The different types of guidance systems used in missiles are inertial, command, beam-rider, and homing guidance. In this article the basic functional components of a guidance system.Some of the mare with in the missile, and some are on the launching ship. Then we will discuss briefly some of the parts in the missile's guidance and control equipment and how they work.Finally, we will cover the way specific missiles (the ones you will Work with) are divided into sections or compartments. INTRODUCTION GUIDANCE AND CONTROL Before we go on to discuss any particular type of guidance system, it is necessary to consider first the overall operation of an entire missile guidance and control system; to divide it into convenient groups of units; and to indicate the general function of each major group so that the operation of the particular units may be understood in relation to the operation of the guidance and control system as a whole.Also, in the interest of terminology standardization and to assist common understanding, we shall call the complete system with in a missile that steers and stabilizes it a guidance and control system. Depending on your experience with missiles, you may take exception to this designation.And if you do,there is good reason for it.Thereas on is shown in figure4-1.For example, if you have worked on the Tartaror Terrier missiles you will consider the system that guides and controls a missile to be its steering system.On the other hand, aTalosGMM would call it a guidance and control system.We will stick with the latter designation –not because we favor Talos but because most manuals,and many Navy publications, use this term.

Starting in the 1970s, the Arab states and Iran embarked on ballistic missile programs aimed at overcoming the Israeli military superiority gained through the past decades. At first, Israel kept relying on its traditional offensive doctrines that enabled the launching of preemptive campaigns that would swiftly move the battles to the territory its enemies. The country did start cooperating with the U.S. administration in the early-1980s as part of President Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative, but it was a decision based on opportunism rather than on a sense of urgency. The real trigger for Israel’s missile defense efforts was Saddam Hussein’s use of ballistic missiles first against Iran (1985-88) and then against the Hebrew State itself (1991). This led to the building of Arrow, a highly sophisticated system aimed at intercepting ballistic missiles.
But soon another type of threat emerged: in the 1990s and the following decade, nonstate actors such as Hezbollah and Hamas rapidly acquired rockets and short-range missiles that changed the equation with the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). In particular, Hezbollah’s performance during the 2006 war called for a new response. In addition to Arrow, Israel then developed Iron Dome. This new system would soon become the most iconic system of Israel’s military power as evidenced during Operation PILLARS OF DEFENSE (2012) and Operation PROTECTIVE EDGE (2014).
After having been looked at with scepticism, missile defense was now the object of political passion. This trend transcended Israel as the successes of Iron Dome were used by proponents of missile defense in the United States and in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries. However, this passion frequently misreads the strategic meaning of Israel’s enterprise. First, its military never conceived these systems as substitutes to its past offensive posture. Iron Dome or Arrow are mere complementary assets to the IDF. Moreover, there remain significant unknowns on topics such as the effectiveness of the systems in intercepting rockets and missiles or the extent to which they deter neighboring states and nonstates from investing in new arsenals. As a consequence, this calls for a cautious assessment of the Israeli experience and its potential lessons for U.S. and NATO’s own efforts.

This article discusses the myths surrounding Russia's A2/AD capabilities and the risks associated with the current counter A2/AD efforts among NATO countries. It offers recommendations for investing in a stronger defense of the Baltic states and Eastern Europe.

“‘In 2012, the unequal relationship between India and Pakistan is spinning sharply out of control. Terrorists attack the Indian parliament and kill two ministers and 12 MPs. There is no doubt that Pakistan had a hand in this, and in a month India goes to war. Pakistan threatens to use nuclear weapons if India does not stop the invasion. Indian troops close in on Lahore, and Pakistan launches Ghauri missiles with nuclear warheads aimed at Delhi... A long-range radar for missile defense detects the Ghauri missiles 30 seconds after their launch. Five minutes later... the missile defense system launches interceptor missiles. Four Pakistani Ghauri missiles explode in the sky and fall harmlessly to the ground in pieces... The city of Delhi is saved. India carries out a nuclear counterattack that, in the words of one military officer, ‘will put an end to Pakistan once and for all.’ Science fiction? Not entirely.” This text was published by Raj Chengappa, a columnist for the Indian magazine India Today, in the official publication of the Indian Embassy in Moscow in 2008.
Setting aside for the moment an analysis of India’s possible use of a missile defense system, it is necessary to note that the initial stage of the author’s fictitious conflict repeats the course of many Pakistani-Indian conflicts. Among the most serious of these were the crises of 2001-2002 and 2008, which were characterized by a common development: an act of terrorism in India, followed by a reciprocal show of strength and a growth of mutual tensions in India and Pakistan. Further escalation has so far been avoided, in no small measure thanks to active steps taken by other states.
Raj Chengappa’s text demonstrates the consequences that could result from further escalation, including large-scale military operations with the use of conventional—and possibly nuclear—forces. For many specialists in India and Pakistan, it is clear that in the event of nuclear war between two powers of such territorial proximity, there cannot be a winner. Significant areas of the South Asian region would be rendered uninhabitable. The entire ecological system of the region would change. The consequences of a nuclear exchange would be felt far beyond South Asia.
According to Raj Chengappa’s scenario, Indian missile defense could save Delhi from a nuclear attack, but it could not prevent a nuclear catastrophe. In fact, for the moment, it is difficult not only to consider Indian missile defense effective, but to see it as a system that really exists. India has not completed a missile defense system by 2012, in part due to its limited resources, scientific and technical difficulties, and obstacles encountered while obtaining the necessary technologies on the international market.
However, an important role was also played by the deficit of expert consensus in India in regard to the expediency of the substantial costs associated with developing missile defense, which, as it seems at the moment, cannot guarantee the country’s protection from missile and nuclear threats. Moreover, it is expected that India’s success in this area will provoke responses on the part of its potential rivals, Pakistan and China, that will require additional spending.
Despite the deficit of consensus, India continues development in the area of missile defense. Prospects for its success are actively discussed in India and abroad. Concerns about the reaction from Pakistan and China are beginning to be substantiated. The persistent uncertainty regarding Indian missile defense continues to adversely affect regional security. As a result, the assessments of missile and nuclear threats in South Asia, the prospects for missile defense in India, and the reactions on the part of its potential adversaries all remain relevant.

L`Harmattan - Paris  ; Questions contemporaines , "Cet ouvrage étudie l’évolution récente de la politique étrangère et de défense de l’Union européenne dans sa complexité historique. Peut-elle jouer un rôle important ou reste ballotée entre les acteurs. La construction européenne a garanti, soixante années durant, la paix et la stabilité sur notre continent. Cette situation a permis à l’Europe de renaître des cendres et de construire une zone de prospérité et de bien-être, avec un modèle social unique.
L’Europe n’est pas une forteresse et ne saurait se satisfaire d’un monde où subsistent tant de déséquilibres. L’objectif de l’Union est de donner aux pays et populations défavorisés les moyens de se développer, autrement dit s’attaquer aux sources mêmes de la pauvreté et de la vulnérabilité. Cette action suppose la mise en œuvre de politiques qui permettent de contribuer à consolider la démocratie, l’État de droit, la bonne gestion des affaires publiques et le respect des droits de l’homme. Car le développement ne va pas sans la démocratie et cet ouvrage montre que les droits de l’homme restent une exigence majeure pour l’Union qui joue un rôle moteur dans ce domaine.
La question principale à laquelle l‘auteur cherche la réponse, c’est dans quelle mesure l’Union peut-elle devenir un acteur international. Comment l’Union peut-elle transformer sa puissance économique en une puissance politique dans le système international du XXIème siècle. Comment concevons nous la coopération entre les institutions de l’Union européenne et celles de l’OTAN ?

Ancien visiting fellow de l’EUISS et de la Commission de Défense de l’Assemblée de l’UEO, András István Türke est docteur de Paris III-Sorbonne Nouvelle. Il a effectué sa thèse sur l’évolution de la défense européenne et travaille aujourd’hui comme consultant pour les questions internationales et de défense. Il est chercheur associé de plusieurs instituts de recherche en France et en Hongrie.

296 p.



TABLES DES MATIERES

INTRODUCTION

PREMIERE PARTIE – L’EMERGENCE D’UNE POLITIQUE EUROPEENNE COMMUNE EN MATIERE DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES, DE SECURITE ET DE DEFENSE (1947-1998)

CHAPITRE I. L’architecture européenne de sécurité et le développement de l’idée d’une défense commune dans l’espace transatlantique
/Du traité de Dunkerque en 1947 jusqu’à la mise en place de l’Union de l’Europe occidentale en 1954/

CHAPITRE II. La défense européenne entre l’architecture européenne de sécurité et le développement de l’idée d’une défense commune
/Du traité de Rome en 1957 jusqu’à l’Acte final d’Helsinki en 1975/

CHAPITRE III. La sécurité et la défense européenne de la réactivation de l’Union de l’Europe occidentale jusqu'à la mise en place de l’EUROCORPS (1979-1991)

CHAPITRE IV. La mise en place de la politique étrangère et de sécurité, et la défense européenne (1991-1998)
/Le deuxième pilier de l’Union européenne ou le pilier européen de l’Organisation de traité de l’Atlantique Nord?/

CHAPITRE V. L’élargissement de l’espace de sécurité vers l’Europe orientale
/Études de cas : La Hongrie, la Pologne et la République tchèque/ 7

DEUXIEME PARTIE – L’EVOLUTION INSTITUTIONNELLE JURIDIQUE ET STRATEGIQUE DE LA POLITIQUE EUROPEENNE DE SECURITE ET DE DEFENSE (1999-2009)

CHAPITRE I. Les grands débats autour du développement de la PESD

CHAPITRE II. L’évolution institutionnelle et juridique

CHAPITRE III. Capacités, armements, financement

Conclusion générale

Bibliographie

Europa Varietas Institute - http://www.europavarietas.org
András István Türke - http://andrasistvanturke.blogspot.ch

This work aimed to do a preliminary assessment about the weight of Europe as being a determinant to Russian's Foreign and Security Policy, with emphasis on the role played by the missile shield (NMD) in Europe. Therefore, we tried to do a briefly review of Russia's relations with Europe in the post-Cold War: the Kosovo's War (1999), the Georgia's War (2008) and the situation in Ukraine and the Black Sea Region (2011). In turn, the cooperation projects between European countries and Russia are examined more carefully. And, on the other hand, we analyze the missile shield in its current state and its implementation schedule pursuant announced in 2012. It has been found that in fact Europe has considerable weight in the development of Russia's foreign policy as a whole, that the critical aspect of the relationship with Europe is the missile defense, that the main point of cooperation beyond energy infrastructure is the Skolkovo's Center of Innovation and Technology. We conclude that the general lines of external politics in the pre-revolutionary Russia and the USSR are followed in the post-Cold War, which is described as the landmark-Reactive-Defensive Utility (RDU) In addition, the main priority of the Russia's Foreign and Security Policy is the maintenance of it's great power status (hence the importance of retaining nuclear second strike capability); prioritize multilateral forums and be engage in building a multipolar balance. These findings served to validate the perception about the role of Europe as a condition of Russia's foreign policy: whether to maintain itself as a great power, to take the weight of the decisions multilateral forums, or to consolidate multipolarity, it matters to Russia an Europe free from extra continental interference.

Ballistic missiles pose increasing threat worldwide. They are powerful means of warfare, but can also be used as an instrument of deterrence, political blackmail and coercion. The United States sustain strong commitment to the development of the missile defense to limit the effect of expanding, more and more sophisticated missile arsenals. This is considered very important if the United States are to maintain political and military freedom of action, especially in troubled regions. The European countries of NATO perceive the missile threat somewhat differently. Most of them agree that it exist but, as they do not conduct intensive policies in troubled regions, they do not believe the threat is imminent. That is why, on the one hand NATO has embraced missile defense as one of the most important goals, but on the other European members are not eager to pay huge cost of robust defensive effort. Thus, the US will bear lion’s share of European missile defense burden,
making Europe’s security more and more tied to American strategic goals and depended on US military capabilities. This is surely augmenting factor, as far as transatlantic security ties are concerned.

Over the last 15 years, the US ballistic missile defense system (US BMDS) has developed into a cornerstone of US alliance policies in the Asia-Pacific. However, given the long-term budgetary horizon and fiscal constraints resulting from sequestration, the Department of Defense was tasked to conduct a comprehensive review of US missile defense programs and capabilities, in an effort to develop a more cost-effective and sustainable ballistic missile defense strategy.
This study aims to contribute to the DoD’s review with particular focus on the challenges, opportunities, and recommendations for the Asia-Pacific theater. In specific the study is geared to answer four distinct questions:

(1) What are the strategic and tactical objectives of the US BMDS in the Asia-Pacific?
(2) How does BMDS fit into the Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) 2020 vision?
(3) What role can regional US allies play in the context of IAMD?
(4) How will IAMD influence the strategic balance in the Asia-Pacific?

The study is organized into three chapters, each with its own policy recommendations. Chapter one sets the overall context for ballistic missile defense (BMD) in the Asia-Pacific by synthesizing the BMD capabilities of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Australia, with a specific focus on the tactical objectives of forward-based US BMD elements. Chapter two assesses the strategic goals of the US BMDS in the Asia-Pacific, in relation to: (1) alliance reassurance, (2) strategic and regional stability, (3) deterrence, and (4) left- and right-of-launch missile defense options. Chapter three shifts to the concept of IAMD by focusing on defensive counter-air operations that are not part of the BMD threat portfolio, such as cruise missile defense (CMD), counter-unmanned aerial systems (CUAS), and counter-rockets, artillery, and mortar (C-RAM). The study concludes with final thoughts and summarizes answers to the four overarching questions.

Relations between Russia and NATO develop according to a familiar and predictable cycle. High hopes and ambitious declarations are followed by a plateau of expectations; a period of stagnation follows, as cooperation founders on incompatible strategic priorities; Russia becomes increasingly frustrated and alarmed at NATO behaviour; a crisis emerges, the relationship is set back; and then after a decent interval a “reset” takes place, partnership is declared anew, and the cycle begins again.

The most recent low point involved arguably the most dramatic crisis to date: armed conflict in Georgia in 2008. At the time of writing NATO is maintaining high hopes for renewed partnership following the optimistic Lisbon Summit in November 2010, but Russia is already entering the “frustration and alarm” phase – frustration over inability to influence plans for missile defence in Europe, and alarm at NATO’s readiness to intervene in internal conflict in Libya.

This paper considers the nature of the relationship between Russia and NATO with particular reference to the view from Moscow, and assesses key areas where the two sides have failed to establish meaningful dialogue on significant challenges – in particular, plans for European missile defence, and NATO operations in Libya. Its aim is to assist in comprehension of the Russian view of NATO and its relationship with Russia, with the ultimate hope that the familiar cycle might at some point be broken. NATO can take steps to avoid repeating the cycle of a thaw with Russia followed by a new confrontation; but if there is an opportunity to do so, it may be brief.

As tensions rise over Ukraine, NATO is making preparations for the deployments of a ballistic missile defense (BMD) system in Romania in 2015 and in Poland in 2018. The United States and NATO claim that the missile defense shield is not directed at Russia, but is designed to deal with the dual threat of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction emanating from the Middle East. Russia, on the other hand, has consistently maintained that the anti-missile shield is directed at its own strategic nuclear forces, as NATO’s planned deployments in Eastern Europe reinforce the Kremlin’s resentment over what it perceives as Western penetration into its “near abroad.” The monograph provides an in-depth exploration of the ongoing controversy over the NATO BMD system in Europe and argues that the very high cost of maintaining the system is justified in terms of its ability to mitigate damage, provide greater flexibility for national leaders, strengthen the morale of vulnerable populations, and devalue the threats posed by revisionist states.

My contribution to the nuclear debate presents 3 possible concepts for complexity evolution, which make understood that what is at a stake right now is the evolution of complexity. The use of missiles in any war scenario has very little, and if any very bad effects on reality, which I strongly recommend to not to look for.

The official results of the conference were published under the following document, which you can find at the ETH Zürich file archive: https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/154318/MD_Draft%20Report_16102012.pdf

The official report does not resolve the dilemma that was discussed in Brussels. It reveals a one-sided and partial perspective and does not uncover the risks at which Europe was. The debate was stronger than the report tells and the report fails to describe the Russian position adequately as well as the reality of the debate. The US-American assurance, that the missile defense shield set up by NATO is not offensive and does not mean a threat to Russia  is a discussable statement. Quoting Vershbow as main speaker is nice, but the way this report puts facts and presents opinions is debatable.

A report about the real terms of discussion cannot be published.

Από την εποχή του Θουκυδίδη έχει διατυπωθεί η άποψη ότι τα Μικρά Κράτη στις
διεθνείς σχέσεις αντιμετωπίζουν σημαντικούς περιορισμούς στην προσπάθεια για
κατοχύρωση της ασφάλειας τους. Οι περιορισμοί αυτοί απορρέουν από ένα
συνδυασμό παραγόντων που αφορούν την έκταση της επικράτειας των κρατών
αυτών, το μέγεθος του πληθυσμού τους, την οικονομία και την στρατιωτική τους
ισχύ, την γεωγραφική τους θέση και τον τύπο του περιφερειακού συστήματος εντός
του οποίου λειτουργούν. Το κυριότερο ωστόσο χαρακτηριστικό αυτών των κρατών
είναι ότι διαθέτουν μέσα που τους επιτρέπουν να υπερασπίζονται περιορισμένα μόνο συμφέροντα.
Στην κατηγορία αυτή εντάσσεται και το κράτος της Κύπρου. Έχοντας τα
χαρακτηριστικά ενός πολύ μικρού κράτους (με πληθυσμό κάτω του ενός
εκατομμυρίου) σε συνδυασμό με την γεωστρατηγική της ιδιαιτερότητα
(τοποθετημένη ανάμεσα σε τρεις ηπείρους), η Κύπρος αντιμετωπίζει τους
περιορισμούς που περιγράφει η θεωρία των διεθνών σχέσεων. Επιπλέον
αντιμετωπίζει ένα σοβαρότατο πρόβλημα ασφάλειας εξαιτίας της τουρκικής κατοχής και παρουσίας τουρκικών στρατευμάτων στο βόρειο μέρος του νησιού.
Στην προσπάθειά της να ξεπεράσει, σε ένα βαθμό, αυτούς τους περιορισμούς και
να ενισχύσει την άμυνά της απέναντι στην διαρκή τουρκική απειλή, η Κυπριακή
Δημοκρατία ανακοίνωσε τον Ιανουάριο του 1997 την απόφασή της να προχωρήσει
στην ενίσχυση της αμυντικής της ικανότητας με την προμήθεια του ρωσικού
αντιαεροπορικού πυραυλικού συστήματος S-300. Οι αντιδράσεις της Τουρκίας, από
τις πρώτες κιόλας μέρες της σχετικής ανακοίνωσης, ήταν πολύ αρνητικές. Στις
δηλώσεις των τούρκων κυβερνητικών και στρατιωτικών αξιωματούχων επί του
θέματος, γίνεται λόγος για ισχυρή αντίδραση χωρίς να αποκλείεται το ενδεχόμενο της χρήσης στρατιωτικής ισχύος.
Δεν είναι όμως η Τουρκία η μόνη χώρα που αντιτάχθηκε στην προμήθεια από την
Κύπρο αυτού του αντιαεροπορικού οπλικού συστήματος. Το σύνολο σχεδόν της
διεθνούς κοινότητας με εξαίρεση την προμηθεύτρια χώρα του συστήματος, την
Ρωσία, εξέφρασε αντίθετη άποψη. Χαρακτηριστικές είναι οι τοποθετήσεις των ΗΠΑ,
της Βρετανίας αλλά και των λιπών ευρωπαϊκών χωρών, οι οποίες κατά βάση
επεδίωξαν να αποτρέψουν την εγκατάσταση των S-300 στην Κύπρο. Υπό το βάρος
αυτών των αντιδράσεων κυρίως και όχι μόνο των τουρκικών, δύο χρόνια περίπου
αργότερα, η Κυπριακή Δημοκρατία αποφάσισε την ακύρωση της έλευσης του
πυραυλικού συστήματος αεράμυνας στο νησί.
Καθώς η σχετική απόφαση για την εγκατάσταση των S-300 στην Κύπρο, είχε
ληφθεί στο πλαίσιο του Δόγματος του Ενιαίου Αμυντικού Χώρου (ΕΑΧ),
δημιουργήθηκε η εντύπωση ότι οι πιέσεις της Τουρκίας, των ΗΠΑ αλλά και της
Βρετανίας θέτουν ανυπέρβλητα εμπόδια για την ενίσχυση της άμυνας της Κύπρου
μέσω της αμυντικής συνεργασίας με την Ελλάδα. Από την ανάλυση ωστόσο των
τοποθετήσεων τόσο των ΗΠΑ όσο και της Βρετανίας συνάγεται ότι οι απόψεις τους
στο θέμα δεν ταυτίζονται με αυτή της Τουρκίας. Βασική επιδίωξη της τελευταίας δεν ήταν μόνο η ακύρωση της έλευσης των S-300 αλλά κυρίως η ματαίωση της
αμυντικής συνεργασίας Ελλάδας - Κύπρου και η εγκατάλειψη του δόγματος του
ΕΑΧ. Αντίθετα ούτε οι ΗΠΑ, ούτε η Βρετανία αλλά και καμία τρίτη χώρα, κατά την
διάρκεια της κρίσης των πυραύλων δεν ταύτισε τους S-300 με το δόγμα του ΕΑΧ.
Μέσα από την περιπτωσιολογική ανάλυση του ζητήματος των S-300,
συνάγεται ότι το διεθνές περιβάλλον αν και δεν είναι απόλυτα ευνοϊκό παρέχει
δυνατότητες για την προώθηση από την Ελλάδα και την Κύπρο μιας αμυντικής
αποτρεπτικής στρατηγικής όπως είναι το δόγμα του ΕΑΧ. Επιπλέον όπως προτείνει
και η θεωρία των διεθνών σχέσεων, ένα μικρό κράτος παρά τους περιορισμούς που εκ των πραγμάτων αντιμετωπίζει προκειμένου να προστατέψει την ασφάλειά του,
διατηρεί την ευχέρεια διαφορετικών επιλογών στο πλαίσιο των ορίων που θέτουν
αυτοί οι περιορισμοί.

In quest'ultimo ventennio la diffusione di tecnologie su larga scala ha favorito la continua proliferazione delle capacità missilistiche. L'ammodernamento dei sistemi di attacco, caratterizzati da sempre maggiore imprevedibilità e disponibilità, ha investito sia attori statali che non, stimolando così il dibattito sulla necessità di dotarsi di adeguate capacità di contrasto. L'aggiornamento dei sistemi difensivi è, quindi, essenziale quanto complesso, specie considerando la rapidità dell'evoluzione tecnologica. In questo contesto la peculiare posizione geografica dell'Italia, facilmente raggiungibile dalle varie sponde del Mediterraneo, la rende un bersaglio alla portata di attori regionali aventi capacità missilistiche. Lo sviluppo di efficienti sistemi di neutralizzazione della minaccia deve però essere concepito in maniera estensiva, abbracciando tutti gli obiettivi potenziali. Garantire la sicurezza dei cittadini sul proprio territorio non è infatti sufficiente dal momento che bisogna disporre di un'adeguata deterrenza anche per assicurare l'incolumità del personale impiegato in operazioni internazionali e delle aree interessate. In questo senso, è necessario fare una serie di valutazioni di carattere strategico, operativo e tattico per definire il futuro della nostra difesa anti-missile di concerto con gli alleati e i partner, evitando costose duplicazioni. Da qui deve partire una ripresa degli investimenti volti ad assicurare un'effettiva capacità nel campo della difesa missilistica.

Our analysis shows that regardless of how the test results are tabulated, they do not indicate anything meaningful about the technical feasibility of the missile defense systems under development. The MDA analysis that Kadish presented to Congress is based on misrepresenting the results of past tests, and its conclusions are wrong and misleading. This raises serious questions about the recent MDA decision to classify information about its future intercept tests, since this will make it nearly impossible to check its claims. It also indicates how important it is that MDA programs be subject to continuing and increased Congressional and independent oversight.