Pali literature & language

This article urges scholars to look beyond the Vinaya Piṭaka when thinking about the regulation of Buddhist monastic life. It makes this case by examining an understudied genre of vernacular legal texts that has influenced the regulation of monks in Sri Lanka for more than a millennium. Monastic constitutions, or katikāvatas, affirm the Vinaya’s authority in principle, while functioning in practice as stand-alone administrative codes. Promulgated by kings and monastic leaders, these constitutions aim to bring unity, discipline, and organization to particular communities of monks by consolidating and updating monastic legal principles “in accordance with the times.” Despite their historical and contemporary importance, monastic constitutions have not been studied comprehensively beyond the eighteenth century. This article fills that gap, charting transformations in katikāvatas from the late 1700s to the early 1900s, a period that saw the end of Laṅkan monarchy and the spread of British colonial control. Following a review of existing scholarship, this article demonstrates that during the nineteenth century a new type of monastic constitution gained prominence, which I call group katikāvatas. Through analyzing group katikāvatas, this article not only provides new insights into the practical adaptation of monastic law in Sri Lankan history, it also calls attention to the importance of Buddhist law-making more generally as a strategic activity undertaken by monastic collectives and their patrons in order to enhance and protect their reputation, independence, and material interests in changing social and political contexts. URL: https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/713588

The Indakasutta, its commentary (aṭṭhakathā), and sub-commentary (purāṇa-ṭīkā) describe and discuss the phases of intrauterine development. By adopting a terminology remarkably comparable to that of other Buddhist and non-Buddhist texts, they illustrate fundamental Buddhist teachings like the non-self (anattā) view and the dependent arising (paṭiccasamuppāda). I here offer a translation of these three texts, preceded by an introductory outline of their contents.

A good deal of important scholarship on early Indian Mah ay ana Buddhism has been done in recent years. Well established theories, such as the theory that the Mah ay ana arose as a lay reaction to the arhat ideal and the theory that it arose from the Mah as a _ mghika monastic lineage, have been rejected, and a number of new theories, perhaps most notably theories linking Mah ay ana to forest ascetics and to a 'cult of the book,' have been put forward. Part 1 of this article surveys and evaluates these recent developments. Part 2 will present a number of new perspectives for future scholarship.

For over a century many Buddhist texts in Pali have been translated into English, the four main Nikāyas at least twice. Significant improvements have been made in regard to English translations of Pali texts. This paper provides five case studies that illustrate the problems and complexities involved in translating Pali texts. Examples are taken from four suttas of the Aṅguttara Nikāya. Various issues are addressed using textual and contextualised analyses. I attempt to offer solutions to some problems related to translating the Pali through different approaches, including style, philology, history, Buddhist thought and inter-religious relation.

This article will analyse in detail some features of a passage which describes the creation of a mind-made body (manomaya-kāya) within the Sāmaññaphala-sutta. The study starts from the translation of the term 'manomaya', which could have more than one grammatical interpretation. The point at issue is that both the commentarial tradition and a scholar who discussed this problem (Sue Hamilton) understand the compound with the first term (mano/manas) inflected in the instrumental case. I will argue that an interpretation, according to the genitive case, cannot be completely disregarded. Subsequently, the translation of a couple of terms (muñja and isīkā) will be discussed, having a look to modern translation, to the Buddhist world view, and to the use of these terms within some Vedic texts. Finally, an odd wording of a passage will be analysed, and the comparison with the use of the same passage in a later exegetic text will highlight the conservative feature of the tradition of Pāli texts.

The Pāli expression khaggavisāṇakappo may either mean ‘like the rhinoceros’ or ‘like the horn of the rhinoceros’. It occurs in the refrain eko care khaggavisāṇakappo at the end of each stanza of the Khaggavisāṇasutta and its parallels, and the refrain has been translated by some as ‘one should wander alone like the rhinoceros’ but by some, including K.R. Norman, as ‘one should wander alone like the horn of the rhinoceros’. K.R. Norman has however set out his reasons for regarding ‘like the rhinoceros horn’ as the correct translation, and ‘like the rhinoceros’ as wrong. The present article critically discusses Norman’s reasons, concluding that the expression khaggavisāṇa may be regarded as a deliberately ambiguous compound meaning both the rhinoceros and its horn, or perhaps as a single expression meaning ‘rhinoceros’. The zoological facts are considered, as well as the difficult etymology of khaggavisāṇa, its contextual meaning, its meaning in Jain parallels, and its discussion in Pāli commentaries. The article concludes that ‘like the rhinoceros’ is in fact a correct translation.

The central goal of traditional mindfulness practice is bodhi, often translated as "awakening." A critical examination of arguments proposed by Bhikkhu Bodhi in support of the alternative rendering as "enlightenment" confirms the preferability of understanding bodhi to refer indeed to a form of "awakening" as a way of conveying that the chief purpose of Buddhist mindfulness practice is to lead to realizing a liberating form of insight.

This article approaches the subject of doctrinal difference in early Buddhism from a new and potentially transformative, perspective. It argues that the discrepancy between calm and insight is of secondary importance. What preceded this 'schism' in thought and practice is far more important: the gradual obscuration, by a non-Buddhist intrusion into the early Saṅgha, of an original philosophy of mind and meditation. There is certainly a real and important distinction between calm and insight; but we will argue that all calm-insight soteriologies are philosophically similar, since they are based on the same model of mind, derived from the early Upaniṣads, which was not found in the earliest phase of Buddhist activity. The apparent ubiquity of calm and insight in early Buddhist discourses is an illusion; it is an impression created by a very small number of teachings repeated again and again in the canonical Suttas (both in Pali and in parallel collections).

We released analysis tools that were created in Java for analyzing texts in Sanskrit, Pāli and Ardha- Māgadhī in 2005. Then we revised them many times, aiming for easy use, correcting some errors, and adding other useful tools, etc. In this paper we will summarize how to use our tools.

This article begins with a brief introductory account of the vicissitudes of the academic studies on extraordinary capacities. Thereafter, the stereotyped passages in which iddhi and abhiññā occur as a meditative attainment achieved within a Buddhist path of liberation are presented and the interpretation of these two terms is discussed. After these preparatory opening remarks, the Vedic background of iddhi and abhiññā is treated with regards to three aspects. First, the speculative idea sustained by some scholars that would see the body made of mind (manomaya-kāya) as the base and tool to perform iddhis and abhiññās is discussed on the basis of the Vedic evidence. Secondly, the term 'divine' (dibba) that occurs in the description of some abhiññās is compared with the use of the corresponding Vedic terms and with the Vedic idea of a divine power behind the functioning of the faculties. Finally, the abhiññā called 'the knowledge of degeneration and ascent of beings' (cutūpapātañāṇa) is compared with a couple of narratives involving the oneiric state within the Upaniṣads, showing some similarities between the two accounts.

Extreme scepticism about the study of early Buddhism is common in Buddhist Studies. Sometimes it is even claimed that the Buddha never existed; myth is all we have. Going against this view, this paper shows that early Buddhist discourses are largely authentic, and can be regarded as a reasonably accurate historical witness. Special attention is paid to the personality of the Buddha, and the way in which his idiosyncrasies flow into the teachings. The resulting 'Dharma' has a very particular character, and should be regarded as a singular creation which could not have been invented by a committee.

BUDDHIST STUDIES REVIEW
volume 22 ! part 2 ! 2005

The aim of this article is to compare two different readings of canonical teachings which are connected to the core teaching of rebirth. In this way, I shall investigate how the
‘timeless truths’ of the ancient canonical texts can respond to modern beliefs and context. By comparing the interpretations of Buddhadåsa with those of Phra Payutto, it will be argued that the latter’s way of teaching canonical Buddhism can be characterized as inclusive and comprehensive and as an attempt to demonstrate the coherence, doctrinal richness and flexibility of canonical and post-canonical texts.

the article is available here:

https://ia700700.us.archive.org/6/items/BackCopiesOfBuddhistStudiesReview/Bsr22.22005.pdf

Paṭicca Samuppāda is described in the suttas as, basically, the equivalent of the dhamma -- understand it, understand the dhamma. Yet the current interpretations leave gaps in our understanding. This paper suggests that the key to Dependent Arising can be found in the rituals that were believed to perfect the atman, and in the Prajapati myth that underlay those rituals. Once this is understood, all the suttas on this core teaching fit together perfectly.

Nikāyas, this article focuses on the dyad saddhā-nekkhamma. Through a semantic investigation, it is possible to see that the quality of saddhā, being strongly related to wisdom and mindfulness, is considered in the Pāli formulas as a support of the whole meditative path. It is not a matter of belief in a dogma, but indeed an ability to recognize the dangers of defilements and the opportunity to overcome them through the development of the mind. Nekkhamma is the active side of saddhā. By trusting the wider perspective taught by the Buddha, the individual can let go of the fetters that condition the mind: nekkhamma is renunciation of the habitual structure of self.

This article claims that Pāli canon, transmitted to Sri Lanka in in the first century BCE, was based on a manuscript tradition from South India. It also argues that this textual transmission occurred within a Vibhajjavādin network, the language of the texts being a sort of ‘proto-Pāli’ close to the Standard Epigraphical Prakrit of the first century BCE.

The Theravada tradition claims that the Buddha taught in Pali. This
conflicts with most current scholarship. Yet insights from linguistics and
close reading of sources suggest that the Theravada account has not been disproved, that it could be correct, and that it even represents a stronger hypothesis than the current consensus. Instead of authorising translation of his teaching into dialects, the Buddha promoted a fixed transmission and the use of standard language. That the Buddha spoke Māgadhī is a late tradition; Tipiṭaka commentaries instead defined Māgadhabhāsā, ‘Magadha language’, as Ariyaka, ‘Aryan’, the canonical term for the Indo-Aryan language. Pali has the expected features of a natural standard language and can be seen as a precursor of Epigraphic Prakrit. This working hypothesis suggests a bolder stance for Pali studies of claiming that Pali is in all probability the formal language of the Buddha.

“Ajita and Maitreya: More evidence of the early Mahāyāna scriptures’ origins from the Mahāsāṃghikas and a clue as to the school-affiliation of the Kanaganahalli-stūpa”, in: ARIRIAB (Annual Report of The International Research Institute for Advanced Buddhology at Soka University), vol. 21 (2018): 181~196.

In an article published earlier in this journal (vol. 17), I argued that the first three objects of the four satipa hānas correspond to rūpa, vedanā and viññāöa among the five khandhas, but saññā is not involved in the four satipa hānas because a liberated person has no saññā. While quoting two canonical passages to support that a liberated person is devoid of saññā, I also indicated that Sue Hamilton (1996: 60) had disagreed with me and contended that " saññā not only apperceives and conceives all our saµsāric experiences, sensory and abstract, but is also instrumental in identifying the liberating experience " on account of a canonical passage which describes the experience of liberation as being the highest activity of saññā. After more investigations, I have found that my argument that a liberated person has no saññā was wrong. Here I would like to show that those passages that criticise saññā and dissociate it from liberation only disapprove of unwholesome types of saññā, and that the practice of sati consists in the

The uraga (‘serpent’) verses are some early Buddhist stanzas, preserved in different versions, each with the refrain (in Pāli at Sn vv.1–17) so bhikkhu jahāti orapāraṃ, urago jiṇṇam iva tacaṃ purāṇaṃ, ‘That bhikkhu lets go both the near and far shores, like a serpent its worn-out old skin’. The meaning of orapāra, ‘near and far shores’, has posed a problem for ancient and modern commentators, because according to the usual metaphor of ‘crossing the  ood’ the bhikkhu lets go the ‘near shore’, which is saṃsāra, to reach the safety of the ‘far shore’, which is nirvāṇa. I discuss some commentarial and recent discussions of the refrain, before presenting two possible solutions to this problem:  rst in terms of the old binary cosmology, whereby the bhikkhu lets go the ‘near shore’ of this world and the ‘far shore’ of the other, and second in terms of the ‘stream of the Dharma’ metaphor, in which the bhikkhu lets go the ‘near shore’ of the subjective sense spheres and the ‘far shore’ of the objective sense spheres. I conclude with a consideration of metaphor in the uraga verses refrain, and how the refrain may be an example of early Buddhist non-dualism.

The Majjhe sutta, which comes in The Book of the Sixes
(chakka nipāta) of the Aṅguttara-nikāya, incorporates
six interpretations (by six different elder monks) of the
Buddha’s phrase ‘the middle’. Later, they await the verdict
of the Buddha to make it clear whose understanding was
the most reliable. After hearing a report of their discussion,
the Buddha consented to all six definitions and further
drove away their doubts by explicitly confirming the first
monk’s version. The term ‘majjhena’, which means ‘the middle’
or ‘Central Philosophy’, occasionally appears in the Nikāya
texts and is similar to the term ‘majjhe’ ([in] the middle).
Furthermore, while the term ‘majjhimā’ symbolizes ‘the
middle path’, the ‘majjhe’ of the Majjhe sutta stands for
neither of these two meanings. However, by using the term
‘majjhe’, the sutta does present expositions akin to ‘majjhena’
as ‘Central Philosophy’. Thus, this paper proposes to
compare the similarities and dissimilarities between ‘the
middle’ (majjhe) and ‘Central Philosophy’ (majjhena). In
addition, it aims to question the possibility of the setting
up of a different middle teaching in the Majjhe sutta, one which differs from the Kaccāyanagotta sutta. The scope
of this paper addresses the “philosophical” aspect of
‘the middle’ in Buddhism.

This article argues that the search for a metaphysical foundation to early Buddhist thought is futile. For if the world of experience is a cognitive construction, as implied in a number of early discourses, it follows that thought cannot transcend its limits, and cannot attain an objective picture of reality. Despite this sceptical anti-realism, the Buddha's focus on the causes of suffering also suggests that phenomena -although constructed and ultimately unreal -follow a regular order, and so are in some sense objectively real. Two orientations to the Buddha's Dhamma can thus be identified, 'anti-realism' and 'constructed realism', which are roughly equivalent to what the canonical teachings term 'no view' and 'correct view'.

Dasakathāvatthu (ten subjects of discourse) appears to be a unique, but less known course of training in the Buddhist spiritual practice of the Theravāda tradition. Though the importance of the practice is highlighted, it is discussed with very little information in the Pāli Nikāya literature. But a well-informed discussion of the practice is found in the commentarial texts. One specific feature of the practice is that the path factors are defined as kathā (talk) suggesting that the practice is dialogical. This is in connection with the Buddha's advice that monks should spend their time either in dhamma-discussion or in noble silence. The dasakathāvatthu is an illustration of the kind of practice and talks that qualify for dhamma-discussion. The commentarial literature points out that the Buddha highly appreciates the one who, after being skilled in these talks, acts as a kalyānamitta (good friend) and discusses them with others. The stress seems to be that the conversation one has with fellow practitioners is vital in one's spiritual journey. In other words, the spiritual journey should consist in not walking alone but walking together. For my study of the subject, I used primarily the Pāli Nikāya texts and their commentaries as source materials.

This article compares the Buddhapādamaṅgala, a Pāli work written in the Ayutthaya kingdom probably in the sixteenth century, with the canonical sources (mainly from the Suttapiṭaka and the Abhidhammapiṭaka) that inspired the symbology adopted by the text. The analysis indicates that this symbology, which permeates Buddhist tradition in Thailand, was developed through several stages under the influence of Pāli commentarial literature and of paracanonical texts such as the Milindapañha.

This paper reconsiders the last meal of the Buddha from the little studied perspective of 'kammic fluff' (kammapilotika). Although marginal in the Nikāyas, this idea is more prominent in the commentarial accounts of the Buddha's death, and suggests that the Buddha's final meal aided the Buddha, rather than directly caused his death. Additionally, we examine other evidence from some Theravāda traditions of mainland South East Asia: modern mural paintings from Cambodia and Thailand which indicate that the Buddha's death possibly resulted from a complication of a chronic peptic ulcer involving the vomiting of blood, and a little known Pali text of 'Indo-Chinese' origin, which supports this interpretation, and assumes that the Buddha's final illness was caused by the remnants of his former kamma.

This study takes up the first occurrence in Buddhist literature of an illustrative simile comparing the five aggregates (Sanskrit skandhas/Pali khandhas) to a chariot (ratha), found in an early discourse attested in different parallel versions (SN 5.10, SĀ 1202, SĀ2 218, Up 9014). It introduces and translates the version extant in the Abhidharmakośopāyikā-ṭīkā (Up 9014), and then comments on this initial formulation of the chariot simile in light of the ancient Indian background against which the early Buddhist texts and teachings emerged. The implications of the distinctive Buddhist use of the chariot imagery in this context appears to be less to the forefront in subsequent uses of the simile in later Buddhist tradition, which tend to shift focus on intra-Buddhist scholastic preoccupations and debates concerning the ontological standing of the person or sentient beings in general. These later developments will be discussed in a follow-up article.

The Qur'an frequently abhors blind faith based on tradition in its arguments against non-believers. Nonetheless, the Qur'an repeatedly asks people to believe in its message. How does the Qur'an distinguish between both kinds of faith? This article investigates the type of epistemology the Qur'an expects from its audience. Linguistically, the Qur'anic concept of "īmān" may be compared to taking refuge in Buddhism, in that it is through experience and insight (prajñā), as portrayed in the Kālāma Sutta, and not zeal. The Qur'an differentiates between two types of conviction, that which is received through discernment and understanding, and that which is blind. The Qur'an shows cues of an attempt to harmonise faith and reason. It does not entertain non-believers in their request to have supernatural physical proofs, but frequently reminds them to use their reason and observation. This opens further avenues of interfaith dialogue between Buddhism and Islam.

The Verañja-kaṇḍa, which introduces the Pali Vinaya, is a
veiled reference to Buddhist debates of the mid 4th century BC. Part of a
major restructuring of the Vinaya around the time of the Second Council,
the Verañja-kaṇḍa helped distinguish ‘Pātimokkha Buddhism’ from the
looser, more ascetic movement of Gotama.

In both the Aṅguttara Nikāya in Pali and the Ekottarika Āgama in Chinese translation, the suttas are grouped into eleven nipātas (‘books’), from the Ekaka-nipāta/Eka-nipāta (Book of Ones) to the Ekādasaka-nipāta (Book of Elevens) – though in the Ekottarika Āgama the nipātas are not labelled as such. This grouping into nipātas is based on the number of doctrinal items dealt with in the component suttas. In the Ones and Twos, it is often the case that a single original sutta has been subdivided so that its component sections become a series of similarly structured derivative suttas superficially appropriate for inclusion in the Ones or Twos. Moreover, material for this process of subdividing has sometimes been provided by multiplying doctrinal sets with formulaic statements. In most of the remaining nipātas the phenomena noted in the Ones and Twos are also present, but on a much smaller scale. In view of their Chinese counterparts in the Saṃyukta Ᾱgama, some groups of suttas in the Aṅguttara Nikāya with saṃyutta-like nature were probably moved from the Saṃyutta Nikāya to the Aṅguttara Nikāya within the Pali tradition. Evidence of a comparable movement into the Ekottarika Āgama is also available. The artificial suttas created by subdivision and the original numerical suttas shared by the Ekottarika Āgama and the Aṅguttara Nikāya largely retained their original places at the beginning of each nipāta, while some genuine suttas probably earlier located in the Saṃyukta Ᾱgama and Madhyama Āgama were added progressively at the end of the growing nipāta.

This paper examines contemporary dissent from orthodox Theravāda Buddhism. It presents four modern Buddhist thinkers who hold the fifth-century commentator Buddhaghosa responsible for a drastic change in Buddhist doctrine. Several reasons are proposed to explain this ‘distortion’: it may be attributed to an excess of literalism (Shravasti Dhammika) or to the introduction of foreign ideas, drawn from other Buddhist schools (David J. Kalupahana) or from Brahmanism (Buddhadāsa Bhikkhu, Sue Hamilton). It will be argued that, in such cases, the figure of Buddhaghosa is linked to a particular reconstruction of ‘the Buddha’s Buddhism’, of which he is presented as a semi-legendary antagonist.

This is a brief introduction to my recently published book ‘Prachin Bharatiya Samskruti: Mooladharanchya Shodhat’ (In Search of  the Roots of Ancient Indian culture)—Gopal Chippalkatti

References to the West Asian and European contacts galore in the in the wake of Indo-European language and Aryan race studies in the histories books on ancient India. The East and China are seldom mentioned. Rare references to
contacts-relations-influences  between pre- Buddhist Magadh in Eastern India and Sichuan and Yunnan, the western provinces of China are somewhere mentioned in margins. However, in the eyes of this author these links point towards possibilities and for altering altogether our understanding of ancient Indian history, culture, religion, language and race. Connecting these links and destroying the myth of singular culture presuppositions of the ancient India it attempts to draw an altogether new picture. A new fountainhead of our cultural past emerges. It postulates an entirely new way of thinking and a new direction.

Zhang Quian, who  reached from China to Bactria via the trans Himalayan Silk Road  in 2nd century BCE, mentioned that  Sichuan cloth and Quian staves were transported directly to Magadh in Eastern India on ardourous routes for centuries together.  The book lists such references and expects thorough investigation using such scarce references,  both in Chinese and Indian sources, for detailed studies with all the concomitant cultural linkages. Though on a smaller scale and with limited resources, it begins to and expands the probing horizons into religion, language, philosophy and other spheres of culture.

Contents of the book are spread over eight chapters. In the first two chapters It lays threadbare the  linkages of varied relations between North East India, Bengal and Magadh with Sichuan and Yunnan with references to paths, trading commodities etc. in ancient and medieval times. It contains references from the  Indian scholars like Harprasad Ray, P.C. Bagchi, Sharat and Supriti Phukan, Arvind Jamkhedkar, Amalendu Guha,  Shridhar Vyankatesh Ketkar, Sunitikumar Chatterjee. It quotes from western  and Chinese scholars like Joseph Needham and Bin Yang. Giving a brief history of China it juxtaposes varied cultural contexts. It discusses the walls of China, Southwestern independent cultures in Sichuan and Yunnan,  use of bronze couldrauns and weapons, horses and chariots and things like bamboo, silk, rice and cowrees to weave a tapestry of an alternate coexistence of Eastern neighborhood cultures equally thick when compared with the western Aryans. It compares the philosophies, religions, social formations of the two landscapes of Eastern India and western China.

An archaeological and historical review of the Steppe Scythians- Shakas is attempted in Chapter III. It shows the advent of Scythian Northerners in early China and their possible connections with Shakys and Lichhavis of Magadh.
Chapter IV specifies the differences between Vedic and Shraman cultures and shows the eastern Shraman tradition as the foundation of earliest history and culture of India.  Chapter V brings forth Parshvanath as the founder of Shraman philosophy and shows Jain ethos in relief and it's connections with the aboriginals in central and eastern India. Buddhism- it's tradition, philosophy and religion- is portrayed in relation to the main thesis of the book and its spread across nations is shown in Chapter VI.  Languages in Assam Bengal and their connect with Sino-Tibetan-Burman languages is sketched in Chapter VII. A brief update on ancient Indian languages is attempted in Chapter VIII. The author has written a prologue to make his value premises clear. The book contains a considerably exhaustive bibliography.

This article further articulates Sponberg’s (1992) seminal identification of four distinct attitudes toward women and the feminine in Buddhism, by including a sub-typology of ‘essentialist misogyny’. Textual and institutional voices in the Buddhist traditions are traced that testify to a process of essentialization of the female sex or gender that is first constructed as an entity, ‘womanhood’, and then devalued. This trend is already documented in the early Buddhist texts, where it stands in contrast to the soteriologically normative non-essentialized view of femininity. The discourse develops with misogynist positions taken in medieval Theravāda works. It is further continued, albeit under an opposite agenda, that of the ‘sacred feminine’, in contemporary Western Buddhism. Such contemporary instances of an essentialized feminine exemplify how doctrinal and religio-historical tensions are renegotiated leading to the emergence of new incarnations of the Theravāda, and Buddhist in general, scriptural canon, which in turn overwrite previously emerged ‘practical canons’.

This work will argue that Mahāyāna philosophy need not result in endorsement of some cosmic Absolute in the vein of the Advaitin ātman-Brahman.  Scholars such as Bhattacharya, Albahari and Murti argue that the Buddha at no point denied the existence of a cosmic ātman, and instead only denied a localised, individual ātman (what amounts to a jīva).  The idea behind this, then, is that the Buddha was in effect an Advaitin, analysing experience and advocating liberation in an Advaitin sense: through a rejection of the individual ātman and knowledge (jñāna) of and immersion into the universal ātman-Brahman. 

I will explore how different religious traditions define and shape the Absolute according to their own religious convictions, illustrating a divergence in conception from the very start, before exploring key differences between the Advaitin conception of the Absolute as put forth by Śaṅkara and as defended by Bhattacharya in The Ātman-Brahman in Ancient Buddhism.  I then challenge Bhattacharya’s claims that prajñāpāramitā literature necessarily endorses the ātman-Brahman and that Mahāyāna philosophies reorientate Buddhists towards the truth of the ātman-Brahman.

I do this by arguing that there are viable interpretations of Vasubandhu’s Yogācāra and Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka that do not advocate such a belief, that prajñāpāramitā literature can be viewed as a project in episteme rather than ontology, and that we need not find a ground of the same sort as the ātman-Brahman in the Buddhist flux of experience.  I conclude by showing that whilst Absolutism is a theme in some schools of Buddhism, it need not be – contra Bhattacharya – the conclusion of two major Mahāyāna philosophies.

The suicide accounts of three bhikkhus in sutta literature probably inspired the formulation of a particular type of person who attains Arahantship at death, later designated as an ‘equal-headed’ (samasīsin) person in the Abhidhamma. It is inconceivable for an Arahant to break the precepts. Regarding suicide as an offence, the Theravāda tends to depict those bhikkhus as non-Arahants before suicide. The Pali commentary explains that they did not attain Arahantship until their deaths and refers to two of them as each being an ‘equal-header’ (samasīsī). By contrast, the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda sūtras and Abhidharma portray them as Arahants during their lifetimes, a stance compatible with the Sarvāstivādin view that suicide is not an offence. The Sarvāstivādins deny the concept of samasīsin proposed by the Vibhājyavādins, which include the Theravāda and Dharmaguptaka schools. The Pali commentaries provide various explanations and classifications of samasīsin, which have one idea in common: the term signifies the concurrence of two events, and it denotes at least a person who only becomes an Arahant at death, and sometimes someone who becomes an Arahant at the same time as a certain kind of event occurs. The Paṭisambhidāmagga, a quasi-Abhidhamma text, has a chapter that expounds ‘equal-head’ (samasīsa) in an oblique way by enumerating various kinds of sama and of sīsa separately. The Paṭisambhidāmagga commentary tries to make sense of the term samasīsa by associating this textual exposition of sama and sīsa with the more commonly found term samasīsin.

The aim of this article is to reveal some languages with wan or *ban or *va (final n-deletion compared with wan) ‘ten’:
wan ‘ten’ in Ainu;
juwan ‘ten’ in Manchu, where *ju ‘hand’, *wan < *ban ‘ten’;
arwan ‘ten’ in Mongolian, where arwan < harwan in 『the Secret History of the Mongols』 in 1240 CE, *har < Gar ‘hand’;
harban ‘ten’ in Dagur, where *har < gar ‘hand’, *ban ‘ten’;
nava ‘nine’ in Pāli or náva ‘nine’ in Sanskrit of *va ‘ten’ with final n-deletion compared with wan ‘ten’ in Ainu.

This article consists of a study of two commentaries to the Nakulapitāsutta, a Buddhist text from the Pali Khandhasaṃyutta. This sutta addresses the key concept of liberation from the perspective of illness, decay and death, and offers an incisive description of the five aggregates of personality. The two commentaries present variegate exegetical approaches to the root-text, mostly based upon a sophisticated system of cross-references wisely intertwined with a bulk of original elucidations. This combination illustrates some prominent aspects of Pali Buddhist philosophy and provides a precious series of lexicographical interpretations that surely deserve further studies.

In the Pali canon Tathāgata has been used by Bhagavā (bhagavā), the historical Buddha, to refer to himself. The meaning of Tathāgata (tathāgato) and its origin are not known; only contradictory interpretations of the word exist. This paper traces the first instance in the Pali canon where Bhagavā referred to himself as Tathāgata with a view to determine the origin and meaning of Tathāgata.1

“The Questions of Nālaka / Nālada in the Mahāvastu, Suttanipāta and the Fobenxingji jing”, by Seishi Karashima and Katarzyna Marciniak, in: ARIRIAB (Annual Report of The International Research Institute for Advanced Buddhology at Soka University), vol. 21 (2018): 147~166.