Pessimism

In this text, we are trying to highlight the relevant meanings of the use
of the word pessimism, and then delineate the important dimensions of the
corresponding notion itself, and this in the context of the reconstruction of
the history of the relationship between pessimism and optimism, which in
real spiritual history is shaped as the prehistory of the modern version of this
pair. For conceptual analysis it is important to bear in mind the key differenće
between the psychic, state, and the typical moment of existence as an epoch
recognizable state of metaphysical despair. These two concepts make up one
kind of “twin pair”, although optimism first appeared, and then pessimism, as
a kind of failed optimism. Thanks to the change in the epochal constellation,
this distinction in modernity has become commonplace, which has helped her
stabilize as a self-explanatory framework of almost everyone’s pre-theoretical
conceptualization both of the epoch and stated of people’s mind, regardless of
the susceptibility to a serious critique of this quasi-conceptual dichotomy

Realizou-se, na Universidade Federal do ABC (UFABC), em 27 de novembro deste ano de 2019, a Jornada Acadêmica-70 anos do Précis de Décomposition (1949-2019), um mini-colóquio dedicado a debates em torno deste que é o primeiro livro escrito por Cioran em francês, e um divisor de águas no conjunto da sua obra. No âmbito da recepção lusófona, e mais especificamente brasileira, da obra de Cioran, o aniversário dos 70 anos do Précis de Décomposition, na França, coincide com o aniversário de 30 anos da primeira edição (brasileira) do livro em língua portuguesa, pelas mãos do filósofo, tradutor e amigo de Cioran: José Thomaz Brum, convidado de honra do evento...

Explanatory style is a cognitive personality variable that reflects the tendency to explain bad events involving the self with causes that are internal to the self, stable across time, and global in effect. The attribution reformulation of helplessness theory predicts that stress coupled with a pessimistic explanatory style leads to negative outcomes, including physical illness, among at-risk individuals. This longitudinal

David Benatar claims that even for the merely possible people with heavenly good lives marred by a single minor harm (however minor), it is better never to come into existence.  So much the more, he claims, it would have been better for actual people. In this article, I firstly try but ultimately fail to make a coherent sense of that claim. I call that claim the Betterness Thesis (BT) – for each human person, it would have been better had she never come into existence. Based on his own hints, I propose to replace BT, whenever needed, with the Regret Thesis (RT) – for each human person, it would be rational to be sorry for herself because of her coming into existence. Subsequently, I lay open and agree with Benatar’s four claims constituting that which he calls the basic asymmetry between harms and benefits. But in his transition from the asymmetry to BT, I find some dubious assumptions. I find them dubious regardless of whether BT is replaced with RT. I conclude by recapitulating why RT is probably false and so does not follow from the asymme-try. I cannot say that about BT as I do not quite know what BT means.

The concept of mental toughness is widely used, but empirical evidence is required to fully understand this construct and its related variables. The purpose of this paper was to explore the relationship between: (a) mental toughness and coping, (b) mental toughness and optimism, and (c) coping and optimism. Participants were 677 athletes (male 454; female 223) aged between 15 and 58 years (M age = 22.66 years, SD = 7.20). Mental toughness correlated significantly with 8 of the 10 coping subscales and optimism. In particular, higher levels of mental toughness were associated with more problem or approach coping strategies (mental imagery, effort expenditure, thought control, and logical analysis) but less use of avoidance coping strategies (distancing, mental distraction, and resignation). Eight coping subscales were significantly correlated with optimism and pessimism. In conclusion, the relationships observed in this study emphasize the need for the inclusion of coping and optimism training in mental toughness interventions.

El presente artículo se propone analizar el concepto de utopía en Arthur Schopenhauer y en Max Horkheimer, comparando algunas de sus tesis en orden a plantear una utopía pesimista. Esta utopía pesimista es la base de la posible creación de aquello que hemos denominado “pesimismo utópico”. Así, si es posible encontrar rasgos o impulsos utópicos en algunos pensadores pesimistas o cercanos al pesimismo (como en el caso de Horkheimer), entonces es válida la hipótesis de un “pesimismo utópico”. Con vistas a esto, comenzaremos por definir, en el primer capítulo, lo que puede ser la utopía, para luego intentar aplicar y desarrollar este marco conceptual en nuestros dos filósofos. Por último, como conclusión, nos aproximaremos a una predefinición de la utopía pesimista, que sirva como antecedente de todo pesimismo utópico.

Por que reunir-se em torno do Précis de décomposition-e celebrá-lo? Alguns diriam que não há nada aí a ser celebrado, muito pelo contrário. Cioran: pró e contra... Qual a importância do Breviário de decomposição, conforme o temos, desde 1989, traduzido ao português pelo professor José Thomaz Brum? Qual sua importância hoje, para além de um mero gosto pessoal, partilhado talvez por um punhado de leitores? Qual seria o seu valor de facto (filosófico, poético, espiritual)? Há muitas maneiras de enxergar o livro em questão, e de responder a estas questões...

Contemporary political science has fetishized a product of its own invention: the elite theory of democracy. American political science’s understanding of “democratic elitism” is founded on a fundamental misreading of the Italian School of Elitism and Joseph Schumpeter’s political thought. This essay historicizes the early phases of the interpretive tradition known as democratic elitism, represented by the following authors: 1) Gaetano Mosca, Vilfredo Pareto, Robert Michels, 2) Joseph Schumpeter, and 3) Robert Dahl. I not only track how the Italian School’s concern over the threat of plutocracy was suppressed, and their aspirations for political transparency discounted by American political science, but also trace the shift, over time, in the literary dispositions that undergird what we now call “elite” or “minimal” theories of democracy. I argue that in contrast to the Italian theorists’ and Schumpeter’s pessimism, Dahl infused optimism into his understanding of representative government with pernicious consequences for democratic theory.

https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/701636

The usage of superstitious behavior in relation to personal control and optimism and pessimism was examined among 208 National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) Division I athletes. Questionnaires were administered to determine if personal control or optimism and pessimism was associated with the use of superstitious behaviors in Division I athletes. Previous research regarding locus of control (LOC) and the use of superstitions by athletes was equivocal. The Superstitious Ritual Questionnaire (Bleak & Frederick, 1998), Life Orientation Test-Revised (Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994), and Belief in Personal Control Scale (Berrenberg, 1987) were the instruments used to assess the variables of interest. Findings supported previous research (Bleak & Frederick, 1998; Todd & Brown, 2001) that LOC does not effect superstitious behavior in Division I athletes. Optimism and Pessimism did not affect athletes’ overall practice of superstitious behaviors. Athletes who had lesser beliefs in God-mediated control were less likely to be optimistic. A lesser belief in God-mediated control emerged as a slight predictor of less belief in the effectiveness of superstitions and therefore, less usage of superstitious behaviors. Individual athletes were found to exhibit a higher internal LOC compared to team athletes. Contrary to previous research, female athletes subscribed to different ritual habits than male athletes (Buhrmann, Brown, & Zaugg, 1982; Gregory & Petrie, 1975).

Esta investigación se propone indagar críticamente en la noción de muerte trabajada desde el pesimismo de Arthur Schopenhauer y Philipp Mainländer. Ambos sistemas filosóficos de la voluntad serán abordados de manera individual y separada, profundizando en el puesto e importancia de la muerte dentro del entramado interno de cada propuesta. Así, en última instancia se conseguirá entablar un análisis comparativo entre ambos pesimismos en torno a la noción de muerte, identificando sus similitudes y contrastes. Asimismo, se compararán las propuestas de ambas filosofías sobre la afirmación y la negación de la voluntad, analizando el rol humano frente al nóumeno volente y su relación con la muerte.
Los principales resultados de esta investigación comparativa son que, en ambas filosofías pesimistas de la voluntad, la muerte tiene una preponderancia fundamental, al punto de constituirse como un principio explicativo esencial, que, de estar ausente, tornaría insostenible cada sistema. La muerte se revelará como un principio motor del pesimismo de Schopenhauer y Mainländer. Para el primer autor, la muerte se presenta como un elemento que mantiene el equilibrio y el movimiento circular de la voluntad de vivir, en un eterno retorno de lo igual, merced a su doctrina de la palingenesia. Para el segundo pensador, la muerte se manifiesta como causa final de las múltiples voluntades de morir, lo que produce y mantiene un movimiento cósmico en espiral hacia la nada.

Lightly edited partial and anonymous translation of the final six pages of Albert Caraco's "Bréviaire du chaos,"  including an introductory essay by Phillipe Billé (written and translated circa 2005-2009).

Translation dates to 2011, existing only as an archived copy of a defunct blog.

This will serve as the point du départ for my own translation of the balance of Caraco's text (108/114 pages).

Resumen Lo que propongo es que pesimismo y nihilismo no son lo mismo desde que encontraron su formulación filosófica en Arthur Schopenhauer y Friedrich Nietzsche. El primero, siguiendo a Dühring, sitúa el pesimismo en el valor de la vida y en la preponderancia del no ser frente al ser. Mientras que el segundo pone el nihilismo en la pregunta por el sentido de la vida y en la afirmación de la vida. Claro, sin omitir una serie de consecuencias y puntos de partida importantes, como que el nihilismo es entendido como un proceso histórico, y toda filosofía es entendida bajo este proceso, incluyendo al pesimismo, mientras que este pone el mal en el fundamento del mundo mismo y no se asume como parte de dicho proceso. De ahí que mi propuesta sea el que no confundamos ambos términos, pues nos alejarían de comprender el punto de partida de cada corriente filosófica.

ABSTRACT: This work addresses the controversial issue of the utopian nature of Plato's Republic. The thesis is that it is legitimate to consider the Republic as the first utopia in the history of Western literature only if it is considered, simultaneously, as the first critique of utopia in the history of  Western literature. The core of the argument is that the twofold paradigm (psychological and political) present in the book is counteracted by a pessimistic philosophical position, and that this is the reason why the utopian nature of the Republic is problematic. The first chapter concentrates on the use of mockery and ridicule as strategies to refrain a set of naïve and optimistic positions suggested by Socrates about human motivation. These dramatic gestures constitute, even if implicit, are a good ground for pessimism. The second chapter focuses on how, in crucial moments of the dialogue – namely: the allegory of the Cave, the theory of the tripartite soul and the simile of the Divided Line - Socrates himself advances philosophical theories with an explicit pessimistic content. The third chapter concentrates on philosophical pessimism as such, trying to expound its roots and its connection with Plato´s Republic. The conclusion will be that, far from constituting a paradox or a contradiction, the concomitancy of utopia and pessimism in the Republic constitutes a valid philosophical argument or, better, a coherent philosophical exercise, which is in no way conclusive, but intentionally open towards further, and perhaps conciliating, interpretations: the main message lies rather in a methodological recommendation regarding the search for a better psychological and political state than in definitive prescriptions in relation to those subjects or an equally consolidated path for their realization. Plato embarks on the construction of the ideal, but invites the reader to perform a serious critique of that very ideal, a critique based on an exhaustive consideration of the limitations of human condition and experience.

This paper explores Walter Benjamin’s relationship with French Surrealism from sources rarely studied or practically unknown until now. First, I will set out the direct link between the theses on “profane illumination” and the “organization of pessimism” in Der Sürrealismus. Die letzte Momentaufnahme der europäischen Intelligenz, and various texts by Pierre Naville, one of the most active figures in the Surrealist movement between 1925 and 1929. Second, I will consider Benjamin’s commentaries in Pariser Passagen <I> and convolute “S” of the Passagen-Werk about Surrealist writings and Martin Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit, flagging up the implications of this confrontation for Benjamin’s ideas of secularization of mysticism and messianism. Lastly, I will seek to refine the meaning of Benjamin’s “anthropological materialism” and its relevance to those sections of the Passagenarbeit that are dedicated to the evolution of social movements since the French Revolution.

Nietzsche’s view of suicide is a topic which in the last years has been the focus of works such as Julian Young’s and Paul S. Loeb’s. Within this context, this paper seeks to add new elements to the discussion. To this purpose, Nietzsche’s attitude to suicide will be explored from two different points of view. The first part of the paper focuses on the distinction between voluntary (free) and involuntary (natural) death. Nietzsche’s appraisal of both will be scrutinized. In particular, through the comparison with the Classical and, especially, Stoic philosophy and through the critique of the religious (particularly Christian) conception of death, it will be shown, among other things, that Nietzsche defends the rationality of suicide, presents a view of voluntary death as emptied of morality and fights against the Christian denaturalization of suicide. In the second part of the paper, suicide will be considered from a philosophical-existentialist viewpoint, that is, as a possible consequence of the meaninglessness of human existence. The problem is to judge whether life is or is not worth living in a world devoid of meaning and purpose. Nietzsche’s attitude to suicide will be analyzed in a chronological way (early, middle and late Nietzsche). Special attention will be given to the role played by art. The relevant conclusion is that, although in different ways, Nietzsche gives an affirmative answer to the question whether life is worth living in a world devoid of meaning and purpose.

The world, as Schopenhauer would say, has not been the work of an all loving Being, but rather that of a devil. In this world, creatures are brought up in order to suffer. He, being the Philosopher of Pessimism, claims that the inner nature of the world is an aimless blind striving. For the will itself has no goal, therefore impossible to satisfy. With it not being satisfied it continues to struggle, to be in conflict, to be dissatisfied. Thus the title, " Existence as Suffering and Dissatisfaction ". In doing so, first, this paper will briefly discuss Schopenhauer's life. Next, further discussions on his notion of suffering and Will-to-live will be shown. In relation to this, Schopenhauer's notion of love in which supports the Will-to-live by the means of striving – constantly needing to renew one's self thus produce an offspring, is the next to be shone light upon. After discussing and strengthening his idea that life is suffering, I would explicit the two solutions he gave in order to escape from this " suffering " life and become truly happy in the end. That even in the midst of all these sufferings, there is still hope for humankind, there is still a way towards satisfaction.

What kind of stories are most effective for envisioning a hopeful future when alternatives to the status quo are sorely needed? Few would turn to dystopian fiction for this specific purpose. Despite their current resurgence across different media, dystopias are often suspected of undermining progressive action, due to their militant pessimism and their all-too frequent succumbing to despair. In this paper, I respond to this charge by focusing on a type of dystopia that productively negotiates the tension between hope and despair: critical dystopias. Originating as a genre in the 1980s, critical dystopias leave space for the cultivation of utopian desires – so long as the hope for a better future is tempered by the memory of past and present suffering. To flesh out the implications of this nuanced view, I embark on a reading of Colson Whitehead’s novel The Underground Railroad, whose alternative history of emancipation from slavery epitomizes the power of critical utopias to stir the imagination. To put it metaphorically, critical dystopias contain bleak dreams of violence, but they differ from nightmares. Upon imaginatively visiting a critical dystopia, the reader is summoned to feel empowered, rather than deflated, by the dark visions enclosed in these stories.

Schopenhauer claims that all life is wretched and that we are all destined to suffer. Faced with such a grim view of life, some scholars hold that Schopenhauer's philosophy should allow for suicide. However, he does not think that suicide is a solution and he does not think that suicide has a place in his overall philosophy. Specifically, he holds that suicide is always a mistake. Given everything Schopenhauer says about life, some scholars think his opposition to suicide is not warranted, that there appears to be some inconsistency between on hand sustaining that life is a torment and, on the other hand, claiming that suicide is no solution. In this paper I defend Schopenhauer's view of suicide against these criticisms and explain why his position is coherent and follows from his overall view of existence.

The present chapter deals with hope in the nineteenth century by focusing on Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860), Søren Kierkegaard (1813-1855), and Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900). In different ways, these three thinkers discuss the rationality and value of hope. Schopenhauer and Nietzsche both criticize hopes for being false or irrational. Kierkegaard, by contrast, sees hope as necessary for wholehearted selfhood, ethics, and religion. Despite these differences there is some surprising similarities and overlap between these three thinkers. Specifically, the experience of hopelessness plays a decisive and positive role particularly for Schopenhauer and Kierkegaard (and to a lesser extent for Nietzsche, who hopes to overcome hope).

En El Nacimiento de la Tragedia Nietzsche indica que en el pensamiento socrático están presentes tres axiomas del  espíritu  optimista:  “la  sabiduría  es  la  virtud;  se  peca  solo  por  ignorancia; el  hombre  virtuoso  es  el  hombre feliz”. Existe  una  difundida  valoración  según la cual  la  filosofía  platónica constituye también un “ejemplo de optimismo difícilmente  superado  históricamente,  ni  incluso  por  las  interpretaciones  más  favorables  de  la  teología  cristiana”.  Sin  embargo, existen múltiples dimensiones en las que la postura platónica se inclina al pesimismo. Pretendemos mostrar  que, mientras  en  diálogos  como  la  República Platón entiende que la razón  es  lo  más  noble  del  alma,  que  la  virtud  está  relacionada al conocimiento y que solo a partir de éste es posible una vida feliz, al mismo tiempo, en notable contraste con su maestro, adjudica  importantes  limitaciones a la parte racional y no parece creer en su capacidad de alterar el fondo moral del individuo. Con fundamento en esta  “desconfianza”,  defenderemos  que  Platón  pregona  una  posición  que, si  no  merece  ser  denominada  pesimista,  por  lo  menos  es  digna de ser excluida del ámbito del optimismo ingenuo.

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Abstract: In The birth of Tragedy Nietzsche indicates that in Socrates´ thought we can find three basic axioms of the optimistic spirit: that knowledge is virtue, that no one does wrong willingly and that the virtuous man is the happy man. There is a common interpretation according to which Plato´s philosophy adhere to these maxims, constituting  “a system of optimism which has hardly been surpassed - even by the most favourable interpretations of Christian theology”. However, there are multiple dimensions in which the platonic position inclines to pessimism. We intend to show that even if we accept that in dialogs like Republic Plato understands, like Socrates, that reason is the noblest element in the soul, that virtue is intrinsically related to knowledge and that it´s only due to knowledge that a happy life is possible to human being, we will have to accept, as well, that in great contrast to his master he points out several limitations to the rational capacity and doesn´t seem to believe in its capability to change the moral background of individuals. We will state that this “mistrust” is enough to exclude Plato´s position from the field of ingenuous optimism.

Este es el prólogo (escrito por Maximiliano Figueroa) y el capítulo I de mi libro <<Pesimismo Profundo>>.
El libro salió en Julio, 2018, editado por Librosdementira, Santiago de Chile. Está disponible en librerías y a través del sitio de la editorial, aquí:
http://librosdementira.cl/producto/pesimismo-profundo/

In reading E.M. Cioran’s œuvre, one is faced with an immediate and unremitting abrasiveness that has its roots with our being born into time. Indeed, the author of The Fall into Time and The Trouble with Being Born thought that it is precisely this accidental and unredeemable temporality, an original sin that results in a life forever situated in cycles of striving and becoming, which is to be exhuastingly apprehended in the experience of boredom: ‘Life is more and less than boredom, though it is in boredom and by boredom that we discern what life is worth.’ Cioran’s pessimism never relents; even his lugubrious friend Samuel Beckett had to keep his distance after finding him ‘too pessimistic’—who else but Cioran could write that ‘leukemia is the garden where God blooms’? Despite this, in Cioran’s often autobiographical, aphoristic and essayistic writings, we find a richly-timbred boredom (ironically so) which gives us incisive observations into a multitude of related concepts and realities. Nothingness, God, silence, mysticism, suffering, and quietism (among others) all feature in Cioran’s writings on boredom, as well as in this paper’s attempt to better situate Cioran’s work with respect to his more famous pessimistic and existentialist relations’s take on the subject, namely Arthur Schopenhauer and Martin Heidegger. In exploring his work on boredom vis-à-vis specific writings on mysticism, Taoism, nothingness, time and insomnia, this paper aims to show how the failure to attain what Cioran called ‘a grain of ataraxy’, necessarily presupposes a limited set of ‘possibilities’ and ‘prospects’ when faced with the experience of ‘the sensation of the emptiness of existence’ that is boredom (Schopenhauer).

Pessimism holds a significant place in human lives. In our day to day life we come across various situations which make us pessimistic or feel sad. We cannot separate ourselves from it. In other words we can say pessimism is an aspect of life which we cannot detach fully. By and large it is there with human being all through the life. It is an aspect which changes the life and the destinies of human beings. Pessimism manifests itself through the means of chance, coincidence , fate, nature, circumstances. Life is not the same in all time, but it changes time to time. Sometimes it passes in harmony and tranquility but many a times it turns cruel and shows negative aspects. In Thomas Hardy " s novel entitled, Tess of the d'Urbervilles, pessimism is brought out in a different way. Pessimism is a prime theme of this novel. Pessimism in this novel shows the helplessness and tragedies of human beings. In the present novel, Hardy has portrayed pessimistic conditions of the protagonist more clearly than any other author. Ha has represented his lead characters powerless but yet very powerful as they reach to the reader " s mind as well as to their heart.

The World as Will and Representation is the major achievement of Schopenhauer’s life, and the backbone of his intellectual career. In 1844 he published a revised and extended edition of it, and now added a whole second volume of ‘supplementary’ essays. It is this second volume, even longer than the first, that we have here in translation. In 1859, the year before he died, Schopenhauer revised both volumes for a final time, making many further additions.

In this paper, I argue that Marxism is inherently transhumanist because it entails a drive to de-reify nature, including the human being. I argue that the logic of Marxism also requires the temporal inversion of historical materialism, and its projection into the future. This is the transhumanism of Marxism. It is predominantly latent today. Marxists have largely been reluctant to conduct the temporal inversion of their historical materialist perspective, and in doing so have accepted an arbitrarily reified notion of the human. Transhumanists have not. I link Marxism and transhumanism through an ontological concept of suffering. Suffering encapsulates the materialist ontological relation between nature and the human. By tracing how suffering is articulated in both Marxism and transhumanism, I argue that we can get an idea of how to fully work out Marxism's temporal inversion and revive its latent transhumanism.