Regulation of financial markets

Blockchain and other business disruption technologies have created a buzz in the last few years and have become an inevitable discussions topic in the financial circles. It will have game-changing impact on businesses, particularly on the banking and financial services. Consortium or Enterprise Blockchain is the latest technological evolution allowing us to build hybrid blockchains (public and private) using features such as permission restriction and multiple controlling authorities. These hybrid features allow easy yet controlled information sharing between various stakeholders. After getting acceptance in areas such as remittance & supply chain financing, blockchain is now making inroads into sub-sectors such as asset and wealth management. This article demystifies blockchain concepts and demonstrates an implementation for the mutual fund (MF) industry. MF industry is plagued by slow processing. For example, it takes days together to onboarding a new investor, transactions take a date to appear on statements while NAV computations takes hours to compute and show up for registrars to process transactions. We explore how smart contracts can help cut the transaction processing but will blockchain provide high speed and latency necessary? Can investor statements be accessed dynamically? Will distributed information sharing and decentralization system save costs and time for the stakeholders, particularly in client onboarding, NAV dissemination? How can blockchain help in KYC and other compliance related activities? Can mf scheme portfolios and factsheets get constructed automatically and available with real time updates? How can regulators and auditors have easy access to information as and when they want? Finally, we will examine some of the challenges or hurdles that come in way towards the implementation.

This essay addresses the topic of directors' liability from both the corporate law and public policy perspectives. The paper comments how laws other than core  company law impose obligations and liabilities on directors for public interest reasons . The essay proposes that in examining what the responsibilities of directors are, and ought to be, we must do so through the wider lens of public policy rather than the narrow lens of company law alone.  As companies are virtual entities which can only act through humans, the key question is when should humans be liable for the acts of a company. "Limited liability" is the limitation of a shareholder's liability (qua shareholder) to the value of their shares in the company. It is not some type of 'force shield' for a company's officers. The paper identifies some factors relevant to addressing what liabilities and accountabilities should directors be under.

This article analyses the regulation of market manipulation in South Africa under the Securities Services Act 36 of 2004. The rationale for regulating market manipulation is canvassed, as well as the regulation of market manipulation under the common law. In addition the trading practices prohibited by the Securities Services Act as well as the deemed prohibited trading practices are examined and analysed.

The European Supervisory Authorities (the ‘ESAs’) form part of a large network of EU agencies and are classified as regulatory agencies, their principal tasks being the development and completion of the ‘single rulebook’ for the EU financial system. The ESAs also promote supervisory convergence in order to create a level-playing field in financial supervision and supervisory practices in the EU. In the absence of an explicit legal basis in the TFEU for the allocation of competence to EU agencies, their powers are delimited, shaped and amenable to judicial review in light of relevant CJEU jurisprudence, most importantly, the Meroni doctrine, laying down the core principles governing relations between EU institutions and EU agencies. In this study, we look into the gradually emerging (and increasing) asymmetry in supervisory terms between the ESMA, on the one hand, and the EBA and the EIOPA, on the other. The former’s direct supervisory powers have been progressively expanding and technocratic influence widening, accentuated by recent relevant case-law modernising the Meroni doctrine and the recent amendment of the ESAs’ founding Regulations mirroring the ambition to move towards further centralisation of supervision of EU capital markets. The aim of this paper is to contribute to the ongoing debate arising from the ESAs’ developing role and position within the EU financial system.

The recent dispersion of algorithms throughout a large part of social life makes them valid analytical objects for sociology in the twenty-first century. The ubiquity of algorithms has led to increased public attention, scrutiny and, consequently, regulation. That is the focus of this paper. I will show that such regulatory processes are not just aimed at preventing certain algorithmic activities, but that they are also co-producing algorithms. They determine, in specific settings, what an algorithm is and what it ought to do. I will illustrate this by comparing two different European regulations aimed at algorithmic practices: the regulation of trading algorithms in the German High Frequency Trading Act and in the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID II), and the regulation of personal data processing in the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).

The main purpose of this study involves investigating whether or not any empirical relationship prevails amongst ownership forms and banks’ financial outcomes. Utilizing archival data from 8 listed banks from 2014 to 2018, this study implemented a panel regression method of random effect with the aid of Hausman test to facilitate answering the research questions. The study finds that managerial ownership engenders significant parallel associationship with performance measured with profit before interest and taxation and return on shareholders’ funds. Second, the study learns that banks owned partially by the government and foreign investors suffer substantially from achieving performance with respect to profit before interest and taxation, and return on assets. Lastly, the study makes it known that banks owned by institutions can perform creditably well but the findings lack strong statistical backing. The study recommends that owners of banking institutions should practice a managerial system of ownership, linking compensation to performance, through offering incentive contracts in the form of profit sharing, stock options and performance bonuses. Banks owned by government, institutions and foreign investors are advised to strengthen and implement robust auditing and corporate governance systems so that managerial actions can be supervised and monitored effectively.

Bitcoin, also known as a decentralized virtual currency (DVC), is regulated differently in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Canada, and the United States, and represents a vastly underdeveloped area of the law. No country has currently backed Bitcoin. Launched in 2009, and founded by Satoshi Nakamoto,  Bitcoin is a “decentralized peer-to-peer virtual currency.” Other virtual currencies include Litecoin, Namecoin, Auroracoin, Peercoin, and Dogecoin – about 500 varieties in total – but research here primarily focuses on Bitcoin. A comparative analysis helps discern how these respective countries classify Bitcoin (e.g., a virtual object, currency, or potential security), and how these jurisdictions regulate, or intend to regulate, DVCs. Bitcoin is identified as a “currency,” throughout the paper, but the classification is heavily contested. Questions for analyses include: are there appropriate existing legal frameworks to regulate Bitcoin? What securities regulation challenges does Bitcoin pose? What are the consumer and investor protection concerns associated with Bitcoin compared to traditional financial exchanges? What are the cross-jurisdictional challenges of virtual currency transactions that operate over the Internet (e.g., money laundering, or fraudulent activities)? Research incorporates securities commission reports, social and political commentary from secondary sources, and relevant jurisprudence and legislation. Findings help situate the current climate of Bitcoin globally, and assess how its regulation differs relative to technological, economic, social, financial, and political forces.

The study addresses the beneficial ownership concept in the OECD ModelTax Convention as an economic and legal instrument of granting tax benefits. Elements of a potencial authorised OECD approach on beneficial ownership are introduced in this research.

This contribution takes its starting point from the assumption held by a theory of differentiation that the political shaping of society is challenged by anincreasing desynchronization of distinct social sub-areas. Drawing upon the example of financial market regulation, we demonstrate how this political shaping capability is to a great extent successfully sustained or retrieved through the employment ofhybrid organizations such as the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin), of which we undertake an in-depth analysis in this paper. However, thiscomes at the prize of another (vertical) desynchronization at the intersection of well-established political institutions and the elementary processes of the formation of a democratic will. As a consequence, we develop an interpretation of post-democratic tendencies that exceeds common diagnoses of post-democracy and populism by offering a structural-temporal explanation of the perception that the formation of a democratic will and the political establishment are drifting apart.

This entry explains the rising popularity of the concept of financialization, despite it being considered a vague and chaotic concept. It also summarizes the wide-ranging multidisciplinary literature on financialization and makes a distinction between seven dimensions, or elements, of financialization, upon which a new definition of financialization is put forward that suggests that the power of the financialization literature lies in how it tries to understand the increasing dominance of financial actors, markets, practices, measurements, and narratives at various scales, resulting in a structural transformation of economies, firms (including financial institutions), states, and households. In discussing the different elements of financialization, the entry focuses on the financialization of the economy, nonfinancial firms, the state and households, but also on the processes of banking disintermediation and assetization. Finally, some avenues for future research are suggested.   
   
Keywords: assets, contemporary capitalism, corporate financialization, economic geography, financial geography, financial markets, global financial crisis, housing, globalization, lobbying, neoliberalism, political economy, real estate, state   
   
Definition of financialization: the increasing dominance of financial actors, markets, practices, measurements and narratives, at various scales, resulting in a structural transformation of economies, firms (including financial institutions), states and
households.

This dissertation contends that over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives play a central role within contemporary capitalism. Performing a number of valuable functions, these instruments facilitate the accumulation of capital, deriving new value from existing through the assumption of risk.

Given the significance of OTC derivatives, an exploration of the regulatory framework surrounding these markets provides a valuable means of shedding light on the relationship between economic structures (market) and political authority (state).

Orthodox IPE interpretations have tended to see the market and state as separate and homogenous entities that are connected by a relationship of mutual antagonism. Through an exploration of the regulatory framework prior to and following the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), this dissertation offers a critique of this frame. I argue that the inter-relationship between state and market is more complex than simply being demonstrative of regulatory capture by the largest and most sophisticated private market institutions. Instead, drawing on the importance of both economic ideas and elite narrative, I argue that the pre-crisis regulatory framework, with its emphasis on self-regulation, was shaped by a public / private elite who operated within a dominant free-market intellectual frame and whose governance strategies operated in the context of stable narratives of beneficial financial innovation and of the ʻgreat moderation.ʼ Thus, I argue that the pre-GFC regulation can be characterised more by consensus than capture.

The view that the post-crisis regulatory framework, with financial regulation being brought back under the control of national states, represents a ʻparadigm shiftʼ from what had come before is also challenged. I underline the continuity with the pre-GFC regime and argue that, despite increasing tensions appearing between elites as they seek to create new and stable post-crisis narratives, they have retained considerable influence over the shaping of regulation. Thus the impact of new regulation has been watered down and little attempt has been made to introduce democratic accountability into the system.

I conclude by arguing that the regulation of OTC derivative markets demonstrates the complexity of the state market relationship and that this relationship is better theorized as an ensemble of governance than as an antagonistic relationship between two separate entities.

This study examines the influence of corporate tax planning and market value of oil and gas companies in Nigeria. The data was collected from annual reports and accounts of the sampled companies for the period of ten years from 2005 to 2014. Data is analyzed by means of descriptive statistics and Pearson correlation technique was used to determine the relationship between the dependent and explanatory variables. Panel data regression technique was used to analyze the data using STATA software version 12.00. The results found that effective tax rate and tax saving have significant negative effects on the market value of listed oil and gas Companies. The study also found return on equity and leverage have significant effect on market value of listed oil and gas companies in Nigeria. Companies in the oil and gas sector did not tab the benefit of various inceptive obtainable through tax planning activities. Hence, the needs for tax consultant to actually educate companies on the benefit of effective tax planning activity that could influence the shareholders wealth.

A new industry called FinTech has emerged within the financial system as of 2008. FinTech promotes a paradigm shift which does not rest as much on products or services being provided as on who provides them, and how are they provided. It is not by chance that such developments, which encompass both new services (i.e. BlockChain, cryptocurrencies or smart contracts) and new players, is taking place in parallel with Internet and mobile devices developments. There is a factor that is common to all such developments: the intensive use of computer technology and the speed and security of information flows. It is somehow ironic that when dealing with financial and technological globalisation, both national lawmakers and the international financial institution framework have so far failed to regulate emerging technologies and commercial issues. The goal of this paper is to provide a reflection on the new digital technologies that are changing the financial system, and to critically examine any feasible approaches to regulatory policies that are able to comprehend and supervise such developments.
, Fourth Industrial Revolution, FinTech, RegTech, Financial Markets, Electronic Finance, BlockChain

La coopération internationale des autorités de régulation du secteur financier s’est développée en réponse à une internationalisation croissante et insuffisamment encadrée des activités financières. Dans la mesure où elle se réalise en dehors des canaux diplomatiques traditionnels, ce processus semble s’accomplir en marge du droit international et a ainsi peu retenu l’attention des internationalistes publicistes. Son étude approfondie que propose cet ouvrage atteste cependant de la pertinence de cette perspective. Sous un angle institutionnel, la coopération des autorités de régulation constitue en effet un authentique phénomène interétatique. L’activité de ces autorités se rattache à l’action souveraine de leur État d’origine et les accords conclus entre elles constituent potentiellement des traités en droit international. Elles ont aussi établi des instances originales au sein desquelles elles coopèrent de façon permanente, comme le Comité de Bâle sur le Contrôle Bancaire (C.B.C.B.), l’Organisation Internationale des Commission de Valeurs (O.I.C.V.) et l’Association Internationale des Contrôleurs d’Assurance (A.I.C.A.), qui ont un fonctionnement et un régime juridique similaires à ceux des organisations internationales classiques. La coopération des autorités de régulation au sein de ces institutions d’un nouveau type comprend également un volet normatif qui se manifeste par une action normalisatrice spontanée. Elle aboutit à l’adoption de règles communes – les standards financiers internationaux – ayant vocation à être transposées dans les droits internes. Alors qu’ils ne constituent pas à l’origine des règles de droit international, un processus multidimensionnel de juridisation de ces standards s’est enclenché, à l’insu même de leurs auteurs, et témoigne du développement de nouvelles formes de normativité à l’échelle internationale. En filigrane, cet ouvrage démontre que cette coopération s’avère aussi féconde en problèmes juridiques inédits résultant de l’impact, au niveau international, d’une séparation des pouvoirs mal maîtrisée dans les ordres juridiques nationaux par le développement d’autorités de régulation indépendantes.

This report discusses the overall instabilities inherent in the current global financial system in general, and the system’s performance in reaction to the COVID-19 pandemic in particular. It explains why the financial crisis induced by the COVID-19 outbreak was not an unpredictable black swan event in an otherwise stable system, and demonstrates that where the financial system is concerned, instability is the rule rather than the exception. The report holds that the financial system was already in crisis mode when the pandemic hit. For the past 20 years, the shadow banking system has been growing at a steady pace. Short-term repo market funding has been greatly accelerating. The crisis susceptibility of today’s financial system can mainly be explained by the fact that the stability of this financial system is strongly grafted on the stabilization of the shadow banking system, and that although the shadow banking system is inherently prone to crisis, it nevertheless remains largely unregulated. Moreover, since the last global financial crisis, new unsecure credit and debt structures have been building up. Private debt burdens have been soaring. High-frequency trading and algorithmic trading have become increasingly important. Exchange traded funds (ETFs) and portfolio trading have experienced rapid growth. The eurocrisis remains unsolved and the structural and politico-economic problems within the eurozone persist. Hence, downside risks to financial stability were already prevalent and conducive to further instability before the crisis began. In a crisis situation, existing risks tend to become even more pronounced. The COVID-19 crisis has once again demonstrated that financial markets in their current form do not act as a firewall to avert economic downturns. Central banks have had to step in to prevent large-scale insolvency by providing credit directly to large employers as well as to small and medium-sized businesses to enable them to maintain their business operations and retain their employees. More than ever before, the demand and supply of credit, and thus the functioning of financial markets as a whole, are determined by central bank monetary policy. However, even if central bank intervention does manage to stabilize financial markets, that stability will remain highly precarious unless strong and appropriate rules for financial markets are in place and governments complement monetary policy with forceful and comprehensive fiscal policies.

In response to the global financial crisis, fundamental changes have been made at the European level to the legal framework of single financial market reg ulation and super vision. One of the significant legal steps was the establishment of a common system of recovery and resolution of failing banks. Within the framework of a systemic approach to the EU financial market, the article illustrates the steps taken towards the implementation of the resolution framework into domestic financial markets of Poland and the Czech Republic. The core content of the article is comparison of the role and location of the Polish and Czech resolution authorities in the architecture of the national safety net. The main aim of the contribution is to confirm or disprove a hypothesis that the legal framework of the resolution is a complementary element of financial safety net at the financial market, making it necessary to redefine the role of individual institutions that form the current system of ensur...

G-20 faaliyetleri kapsamında, BDDK, TMSF, HM ve TCMB’nin iştirakiyle oluşturulan bir çalışma grubu tarafından hazırlanan ve ilk baskısı 02.04.2009 tarihinde yapılan bu Çalışma Tebliği, BDDK, TMSF ve TCMB’nin katkılarıyla güncellenerek üçüncü baskısı yapılmıştır. [Bölüm 1 ve Bölüm 2 Burçhan SAKARYA]

«Il Crowdfunding - come autorevolmente asserito dall’ESMA - è divenuto una questione primaria nell’agenda della regolamentazione della maggior parte dei Paesi sviluppati, che hanno tentato di colmare il gap tra il crescente progredire economico e l’assenza di un idoneo quadro normativo».
Le istanze poste da tale tecnica di finanziamento non possono prescindere da una attenta considerazione dei granitici pilastri della regolamentazione dei mercati finanziari, cui eminenti autori si sono dedicati per decenni, suggerendo un approccio proattivo alla creazione di regole di condotta comuni derivate dalla direttiva MiFID, al fine di porre rimedio alle distorsioni verificatesi nel contesto dei mercati globali.
L’argomento - affrontato mediante un metodo analitico, dogmatico, tradizionale, focalizzato su direttive, consultazioni ed autorevoli contributi dottrinali - evolve dal profondo rispetto per i requisiti di adeguatezza ed appropriatezza, giungendo a considerare il loro riverbero nell’intera regolamentazione dell’Equity Crowdfunding e nella prossima MiFID II, per approdare alla prospettata applicabilità alle operazioni di aumento di capitale.
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«[C]rowdfunding has become a hot issue in the regulatory agenda in most developed countries, trying to close the gap between a fast growing activity and the lack of an appropriate regulatory framework.»
As recently suggested by ESMA, issues regarding this cooperative fund-raising technique can not be analyzed without taking into account the pillars of financial markets’ regulation, on which leading scholars focused for decades, suggesting a proactive approach to common standards in terms of the MiFID-derived business conduct rules, due to redress global market’s failures.
The topic - adopting an analytical traditional legal dogmatic method, focusing on Directives, as well as relevant discussion papers and eminent scholars’ opinion - will evolve from the truest regard for suitability and appropriateness requirements and their in-depth implications within the entire Equity Crowdfunding Regulation, that is also tackled in the light of the upcoming MiFID II, to the hypothesized applicability of that technique to capital increase operations.

Comment l’identification de l’étendue, des dysfonctionnements et de l’intérêt du shadow banking doit-elle guider sa régulation ? En quoi la notion de risque, intrinsèque et systémique, constitue-t-elle le point central de compréhension et de circonscription de la définition de ces trois aspects ?

Από το πλήθος των υποχρεώσεων που υπέχουν τα πιστωτικά ιδρύματα κατά τη διάθεση σύνθετων ομολογιών, σύμφωνα με τη νέα ενωσιακή νομοθεσία για το δίκαιο των επενδυτικών υπηρεσιών (Οδηγία 2014/65/ΕΕ (MiFID II) και Κανονισμός 600/2014 (MiFIR), με τα εφαρμοστικά αυτών νομοθετήματα), όπως αυτή μεταφέρθηκε στην εσωτερική έννομη τάξη με τον Ν. 4514/2018 και (ως προς τα πιστωτικά ιδρύματα) την ΠΕΕ ΤτΕ 147/27.7.2018, στην παρούσα μελέτη εξετάζονται εκείνες οι υποχρεώσεις, οι οποίες στοχεύουν στην αποτροπή της διάθεσης σύνθετων ομολογιών σε πελάτες των οποίων το επενδυτικό προφίλ δεν είναι συμβατό με πολύπλοκα στη σύλληψή τους επενδυτικά προϊόντα (mis-selling).

There has been adverse attention reserved for bail outs of large financial institutions during the Financial Crisis of 2008-09. To avoid taxpayer funded bail outs in future, other policy proposals have been floated. This paper discusses Bail Outs, Bail Ins and related regulatory concerns.

“Sustainability” surely figures amongst the most discussed themes by corporate lawyers and policy makers at the global level in the last years. In particular, much attention has been devoted to the performance of firms managed in a “sustainable” way and on how to design an ESG (environmental, social, governance) factors disclosure framework that provides meaningful information to investors. At the same time, policy makers around the world believe that non-financial factors disclosure would foster a reallocation of capital to “sustainable” firms, contributing to the solution of some of the most pressing issues of our time. However, what should be measured and how to measure it is not a merely technical issue, but depends on political choices. In order to assess the concept of sustainability embedded into indicators it is necessary to understand the institutional structures and dynamics of the single reporting frameworks, and which issues they purport to disclose. This paper tackles these issues providing the first academic analysis of the ESG factors disclosure framework elaborated by the Sustainable Stock Exchanges Initiative – a project developed since 2009 under the aegis of the United Nations – and the World Federation of Exchanges – the stock exchanges and clearing houses trade association. This framework is interesting because it represents a public-private partnership, expressly aimed since its inception to tackle deep political issues. Moreover, recent reports suggest that stock exchanges around the world are taking a prominent role in fostering ESG issues disclosure.
In order to understand how and why the analyzed disclosure framework was produced, the paper develops an original conceptual framework that takes into account the nature of indicators as technologies of global governance, the “four actors” model advanced by Büthe and the role of transnational financial associations in the production of global governance rules. Using this theoretical framework, three distinct contributions are made. First, the paper provides a historical and political analysis of this new framework that is able to explain its adoption and implementation, disentangling ESG factors disclosure from corporate social responsibility and socially responsible investment. Second, it analyzes how the articulated structure of the actors involved in the production of the framework determined its content and the underlying concept of sustainability. Finally, it analyses why the structure of the actors involved and the specific conception of ESG factors disclosure hinder full and accurate information disclosure and narrow down the concept of sustainability embedded into the indicators. While the analysis is specific to the Sustainable Stock Exchange Initiative and the World Federation of Exchanges indicators, the theoretical model can be deployed to approach other sustainability frameworks as well.

This policy brief discusses the implications of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) both for investment firms and for investors. The author warns that while the suitability and the appropriateness assessments may share the same goal of enhancing investor protection, they are subject to two different regimes. And, particularly when seen from the investment services providers' standpoint, she emphasizes need for them to be kept separate and to be approached with their clear-cut distinctions in mind.

This lecture is a tour d’horizon of the financial crisis aimed at extracting lessons for future financial regulation. It combines normative recommendations based on conventional welfare
economics with positive assessments of the kind of measures likely to be adopted based on political economy considerations.

“Blockchain” is the word on the street these days, with every significant financial institution, from Goldman Sachs to Nasdaq, experimenting with this new technology.  Many say that this remarkable innovation could radically transform our financial system, eliminating the costs and inefficiencies that plague our existing financial infrastructures, such as payment, settlement, and clearing systems.  Venture capital investments are pouring into blockchain startups, which are scrambling to disrupt the “quadrillion” dollar markets represented by existing financial market infrastructures.  A debate rages over whether public, “permissionless” blockchains (like Bitcoin’s) or private, “permissioned” blockchains (like those being designed at many large banks) are more desirable.

Amidst this flurry of innovation and investment, this paper inquires into the suitability of the Bitcoin blockchain to serve as the backbone of financial market infrastructure, and evaluates whether it is robust enough to serve as the foundation of major payment, settlement, clearing, or trading systems. 

Positing a scenario in which the Bitcoin blockchain does serve as the technology enabling significant financial market infrastructures, this paper highlights the vital importance of functioning financial market infrastructure to global financial stability, and describes relevant principles that global financial regulators have adopted to help maintain this stability, focusing particularly on governance, risk management, and operational risk.

The paper then moves to explicate the operational risks generated by the most fundamental features of Bitcoin: its status as decentralized, open-source software.  Illuminating the inevitable operational risks of software, such as its vulnerability to bugs and hacking (as well as Bitcoin’s unique 51% Attack vulnerability), uneven adoption of new releases, and its opaque nature to all except coders, the paper argues that these technology risks are exacerbated by the governance risks generated by Bitcoin’s ambiguous governance structure.  The paper then teases out the operational risks spawned by decentralized, open-source governance, including that no one is responsible for resolving a crisis with the software; no one can legitimately serve as “the voice” of the software; code maintenance and repair may be delayed or imperfect because not enough time is devoted to the code by volunteer software developers (or, if the coders are paid by private companies, the code development may be influenced by conflicts of interest); consensus on important changes to the code may be difficult or impossible to achieve, leading to splits in the blockchain; and the software developers who “run” the Bitcoin blockchain seem to have backgrounds in software coding rather than in policy-making or risk-management for financial market infrastructure.

The paper concludes that these operational risks, generated by Bitcoin’s most fundamental, presumably inalterable, structures, significantly undermine the Bitcoin blockchain’s suitability to serve as financial market infrastructure.

Die globalen Finanzmärkte und ihre Handelsplattformen
sind in den vergangenen Jahren einem durch den
technischen Fortschritt geprägten Strukturwandel ausgesetzt
gewesen. Den Anspruch vor Augen, Aufträge zu
günstigen Preisen auszuführen (best execution), etablierten
sich neben den traditionellen Börsen vermehrt Handelssysteme, die Finanzintermediäre auch dazu nutzen,
Transaktionskosten zu minimieren. Im der Finanzkrise
folgenden regulatorischen Wetteifern blieb auch der Bereich
Trading and Clearing nicht verschont. Die technische
Komplexität – sowohl auf der Handelsebene als
auch betreffend IT-Infrastruktur – gepaart mit den potentiellen
Trade-offs stellt dabei eine grosse Herausforderung
für den Regulator dar. In den USA und in Kanada sind solche nicht nur bilateral
operierende Plattformen als alternative Handelssysteme
(alternative trading systems, ATS) bekannt,
während in Europa insbesondere den multilateralen
Handelssystemen (multilateral trading facilities, MTF)
grosse Bedeutung zukommt. Dabei werden diejenigen
alternativen Handelsplätze als Dark Pools bezeichnet,
die vorwiegend institutionellen Anlegern (aber nicht nur
diesen) eine Plattform bieten, ausserhalb des organisierten
Börsenhandels in grossen Volumina Finanzinstrumente
zu handeln, diese blockweise zu platzieren oder ein Matching mit entsprechenden gegenläufigen Orders
zu suchen.

European Union financial legislation has evolved from liberalization and deregulation to the harmonization of law, uniform rulebooks and supervisory practices, the establishment of new regulatory agencies, and the federalization of financial market law. In response to the global financial crisis, fundamental changes have been made at the European level to the legal framework of single financial market regulation and supervision. The new regulatory and supervisory developments transfer more powers to the EU and enhance the process of the federalization of financial market law. This alters the paradigm in the functioning of the financial safety net. In which there is significant strengthening of the positions of the new regulatory and supervisory authorities, chich are given binding powers in the sphere of law In action, thus ensuring the effectiveness of norms established at the European level.

Within the framework of a systemic approach to the EU financial market, this book Illustrates the steps taken towards the Integration of the legal and Institutional structures of the financial safety net. The core content of this book addresses the legal foundations of the new supervisory and regulatory architecture that were introduced In European directives and regulations in the aftermath of the global financial crisis.

A complex global financial industry, operating under the canons and acme of capitalism in a democratic environment, will almost always gravitate towards crisis as the results, and quantitative easing as the most likely prescribed remedy. This study focuses on events surrounding the 1987 stock market crash through to the 2007/8 economic depression. Scholarly investigations into the causes of the financial meltdowns that permeated the global financial industry for this period have attributed to factors such as; speculations, greed in seeking profit, creative accounting, over-exuberance, herd mentalities, and lax regulatory enforcement. By reviewing literature and introducing the Hoover Module, it is clear that politicians with the fear of losing power, will 'hoover' away all onerous regulations meant to strengthen the economy after any financial crisis and introduce measures that will immediately bring relief to the people (quantitative easing). The above measure leads to a puzzling loop with the following coordinates; Capitalism, democracy, quantitative easing, and financial crises. The paper concludes that earlier experiences were blatantly ignored and rendered irrelevant in preventing the 2007/8 depression, and will most likely not stop any crises in 2019 and beyond, as suggested by Brown (2008). On the contrary, employing the Mandala module, the paper strongly asserts that it is possible to make some gains, even during the worst of financial crises (Brady Report 1988, Study III, p. 12).