Philo 101 Chuchland

Eliminative Materialism
Paul M. Churchland
In this selection, Paul M. Churchland
outlines and defends Eliminative
Materialism view.
Patricia Churchland on Eliminative Materialism:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vzT0jHJdq7Q
First of all
Eliminative materialism is a
form of materialism.
Materialism: only material

objects exists
It is in direct opposition to
dualism.
Eliminative Materialism (Summary)
Eliminative materialism is the view that our

commonsense psychological framework is false and
misleading and thus should be dropped.
Other materialist theories of the mind, such as the

identity theory or behaviorism, attempt a reduction of
folk psychology to neuroscience, but eliminative
materialism asserts that no such reduction is possible
because our folk concepts are hopelessly confused.
Churchland begins by pointing out that such a

radical view is not altogether unprecedented
in the history of ideas.
Folk Psychology
Phlogiston
To take just one example, in the past many

thought that there was a mysterious
substance called phlogiston that was
involved when something burned. But
advances in science showed us that this idea
was confused, and eventually everyone
agreed that phlogiston does not exist.
Stephen Granade
Phlogiston - Ever
Wonder Why?
Why do things burn? Because
phlogiston, that's why.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DZTD-vYhwj4
Thesis
What eliminativism claims is that the intentional states and

processes that are alluded to in our everyday descriptions and
explanations of peoples mental lives and their actions are myths.
Like the gods that Homer invoked to explain the outcome of battles,
or the witches that Inquisitors invoked to explain local catastrophes,
they do not exist. According to eliminativists, there are no such
things as beliefs or desires or hopes or fears or thoughts.
These supposed states and processes are the badly misguided posits
of a seriously mistaken theory, just like phlogiston and caloric fluid
and the luminiferous ether.
What is Folk
Psychology?
In philosophy of mind or cognitive

science, folk-psychology, the human
capacity to explain and predict
human behavior with reference to
common linguistic terms as
opposed to technical jargon.
Replacing Folk Psychology
Belief, desire and other familiar intentional state expressions are among
the theoretical terms of a commonsense theory of the mind. This theory is
often called folk psychology.
Folk psychology is a seriously mistaken theory. Many of the claims it makes

about the states and processes that give rise to behavior, and many of the
presuppositions of those claims, are false.
A mature science that explains how the mind/brain works and how it
produces the behavior we observe will not refer to the commonsense
intentional states and processes invoked by folk psychology. Beliefs, desires
and the rest will not be part of the ontology of a mature scientific psychology.
The intentional states of commonsense psychology do not exist.
Identity Theory and Eliminativism
Identity Theory: Mental processes can simply be taken

as brain processes. Hence, we can identify sensations
and other mental phenomena with (physical) brain
processes
Eliminativism: Mental states and processes do not exist.

Neuroscience will not illuminate our mental categories
but replace them. As a consequence, there are no
mental causes, only physical causes.
He provides three arguments in

favor of eliminative materialism.
First, Churchland points to the widespread explanatory failures of

folk psychology in support of the view that it is hopelessly confused.
So much of what is central and familiar to us

remains a complete mystery from within folk
psychology.
We do not know what sleep is, or why we have to

have it, despite spending a full third of our lives in
that condition.
We do not understand how learning transforms

each of us from a gaping infant to a cunning adult,
or how differences in intelligence are grounded.
We have not the slightest idea how memory

works, or how we manage to retrieve relevant bits
of information instantly from the awesome mass
we have stored.
We do not know what mental illness is, nor how to

cure it.
Second, he argues via a sort of induction that most of our other

folk theories about scientific phenomena have been eliminated
Our early folk theories of the

structure and activity of the heavens
were wildly off the mark, and
survive only as historical lessons in
how wrong we can be.
Our folk theories of the nature of
fire, and the nature of life, were
similarly absurd.
And one could go on, since the vast

majority of our past folk conceptions
have been similarly exploded.
All except folk psychology, which

survives to this day and has only
recently begun to feel pressure.
But the phenomenon of

conscious intelligence is surely
a more complex and difficult
phenomenon than any of those
just listed.
So far as accurate
understanding is concerned, it
would be a miracle if we had
got that one right the very first
time, when we fell down so
badly on all the others.
Third, he points out that eliminative materialism seems more

likely to be true than either the identity theory or behaviorism
The focus again is on whether

the concepts of folk psychology
will find vindicating matchups in a matured neuroscience.
The eliminativist bets no.
Churchland concludes by considering and

responding to three arguments against his
view.
The first is that ones introspection reveals the existence of pains

and beliefs and other folk psychological items.
Churchland replies by pointing out that all observation

occurs within a conceptual framework.
Part of his position is that we need to get rid of our

whole conceptual framework.
Second, someone might argue that the eliminative materialist cannot

coherently assert his theory, because to assert it meaningfully would be to
have a belief that causes him to assert it.
But Churchland replies that this objection relies on a

contentious view about what makes assertions
meaningful
Finally, someone might object that at the very least, the

eliminative materialist is exaggerating things.
Churchland concedes that this may be true and that we

should certainly leave room for the possibility that some
folk concepts will be reduced and some will be
eliminated.
However, he at least wants to make the point that we

should take the possibility of elimination very seriously.

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Eliminative Materialism

Patricia Churchland on Eliminative Materialism:

Materialism: only material

Eliminative Materialism (Summary)

Eliminative materialism is the view that our

Other materialist theories of the mind, such as the

Churchland begins by pointing out that such a

To take just one example, in the past many

What eliminativism claims is that the intentional states and

In philosophy of mind or cognitive

Replacing Folk Psychology

Folk psychology is a seriously mistaken theory. Many of the claims it makes

The intentional states of commonsense psychology do not exist.

Identity Theory and Eliminativism

Identity Theory: Mental processes can simply be taken

Eliminativism: Mental states and processes do not exist.

He provides three arguments in

First, Churchland points to the widespread explanatory failures of

So much of what is central and familiar to us

We do not know what sleep is, or why we have to

We do not understand how learning transforms

We have not the slightest idea how memory

We do not know what mental illness is, nor how to

Second, he argues via a sort of induction that most of our other

Our early folk theories of the

And one could go on, since the vast

All except folk psychology, which

But the phenomenon of

Third, he points out that eliminative materialism seems more

The focus again is on whether

The eliminativist bets no.

Churchland concludes by considering and

The first is that ones introspection reveals the existence of pains

Churchland replies by pointing out that all observation

Part of his position is that we need to get rid of our

Second, someone might argue that the eliminative materialist cannot

But Churchland replies that this objection relies on a

Finally, someone might object that at the very least, the

Churchland concedes that this may be true and that we

However, he at least wants to make the point that we

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