Fuel Tank Safety Enhancements of

Large Transport Airplanes

Federal Aviation
Administration

57th Annual International Air Safety

Seminar
November 15-18, 2004
Shanghai, China

Daniel I. Cheney
Mgr, Safety Programs
Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA

Overview
Brief

History
SFAR 88 Ignition Prevention
Flammability Reduction
Balanced Approach
Summary
Implementation

Plan
1

Brief History
Despite

various efforts to reduce the

risk of fuel tank explosions through
other means, the fundamental safety
approach remains preventing the
presence of ignition

Brief History
Since

the 1960s, there have been FIVE

key accidents involving fuel tank
explosions which we now believe call
into question this fundamental safety
strategy applied to fuel systems of large
commercial airplanes

Lightning Strikes 2 Key Accidents

(B707 1963, B747 1976)

Commercial Airplane Lightning Strike During

Takeoff from an Airport in Japan
4

707 Elkton MD (1963)

Pan Am B707-100; N709PA

5

707 Elkton MD (December 8, 1963)

While

holding at 5,000 feet, left wing

struck by lightning
Left wing exploded
In-flight break-up, 81 killed

Airplane

fueled with mixture of Jet A

and JP-4 fuels

707 Elkton MD (1963)

Portion of fuselage of Pan Am Flight #214

in cornfield near Elkton, MD
7

747 Madrid (May 9, 1976)

Airplanes

left wing was struck by

lightning while descending to 5000 ft
Left wing exploded
In-flight break-up, 17 killed

Airplane

fueled with JP-4 fuel

747 Madrid (May 9, 1976)

Madrid, B-747, 5-8104

Left Wing Reconstruction
9

Non-Lightning Caused Tank

Explosions 3 Key Accidents
B737 1090, B747 1996, B737 - 2001

Frayed In-Tank Wire

10

737 Manila (May 11, 1990)

While

pushing back from gate, empty

center fuel tank exploded
Airplane destroyed by fire
8 killed

Airplane

had been fueled with Jet A fuel

11

737 Manila (1990)

Philippine Air Lines, B737-300; EI-BZG

12

747 New York (July 17, 1996)

While

climbing through 13,000 feet,

empty center tank exploded
In-flight break-up of airplane
230 killed

Airplane

had been fueled with Jet A

13

747 New York (1996)

TWA (Flight 800), B747-100; N93119

14

737 Bangkok (March 3, 2001)

While

parked at gate, empty center

tank exploded
Airplane destroyed by fire
1 flight attendant killed

Airplane

had been fueled with Jet A fuel

15

737 Bangkok (2001)

Thai Airways, B737-400; HS-TDC

16

Ignition Sources for Key Accidents

Never Identified

Massive resources expended during Five

investigations

Elkton 707 - 1963

Madrid 747 - 1976
Manila 737 - 1990
New York 747 - 1996
Bangkok 737 - 2001

Exact source of ignition never determined

Corrective actions based on most likely scenarios

17

Ignition Sources for Key Accidents

Never Identified

All FIVE accidents involved explosions of what

are now being referred to as High Flammability
fuel tanks

>7% flammability exposure on a worldwide basis

Highlights uncertain nature of ignition source

prevention strategy

Emphasizes need for an independent layer of

protection
Balanced Approach needed

18

Fuel Tank Flammability Exposure

Typical
Main Tanks 2-4%

Tail Tanks 2-4%

Body Tanks
Pressurized <5%
Un-pressurized

>20%

Center Wing Tank with Adjacent Pack Bays 15-30%,

(Boeing, Airbus)
Center Wing Tanks without Pack Bays 4-7%

19

Fuel Types and Tank Locations have

Very Different Service Histories

A wing tank fueled with JP-4 has

approximately the same world wide exposure
to flammability as an empty heated center
tank with Jet A.
In general, wing tanks and unheated center
wing tanks fueled with Jet A have exhibited
an acceptable service history.
Wing tanks fueled with JP-4 and empty
heated center tanks fueled with Jet A have
not had an acceptable service history.
20

Comparison of Flammability
Envelopes JP 4 and Jet A

21

Flammability Envelope
1 Joule Spark, Conventional Aluminum Transport, Air Conditioning
Systems Located Underneath Center Wing Tank (CWT)

Flammability Envelope

50

Altitude 1000's ft.

40

Flammable Zones

Jet A

LFL

Jet A

UFL

JP4

30

Heated CWT
Profile

Wing

20

Unheated
Wing Tank
Profile

CWT

10
0
-50

50

100

150

200

Temperature Deg F

22

Brief History - Summary

TWA 800 brought a realization that some

tanks could be flammable for a large portion
of their operational time.
U.S. NTSB Most Wanted List: Flammability
Reduction

preclude the operation of transport category

airplanes with explosive fuel-air mixtures in the
fuel tank
TWA 800 recommendation

23

SFAR 88 Ignition Prevention

Efforts to resolve TWA 800 led the FAA

to conclude that:
1.

2.

Many current airplanes had similar short

comings in their ignition prevention
approaches
An additional independent layer of
protection is needed to Back-Up the
ignition prevention strategy

24

SFAR 88 Ignition Prevention

In response to these findings, the FAA

issued Special Federal Aviation
Regulation No. 88 in June of 2001.

Re-examine existing commercial fleet

related to ignition prevention
Implement safety enhancements related
to the findings of these examinations

25

Fuel Tank Safety History

(FIVE Key Accidents)
5 Key Accidents

1960s-1990

707 Elkton MD
747 Madrid

737 Manila
747 New York

(Lighting)

(Not Lighting)

Safety Approach:

Prevent ignition
sources

Ignition Sources
Ignition

(improvements to
affected model
after accident)

Fuel

Air
Flammability

1990-1999

Some R&D. Not

found to be
practical. No
requirements
established.

Re-examine design
and maintenance
to better prevent
ignition sources
(SFAR 88)
Whole Fleet
Solution
FAA research led
to inerting
developments.
Industry (ARAC)
deemed it
impractical.

2000-Present
737 Bangkok
(Not Lighting)

Recognition that
our best efforts
may not be
adequate to
prevent all
explosions

FAA Simplified
system developed.
Recognized that
inerting is practical,
and may be needed
to achieve balanced
solution

26

SFAR 88 Lessons Learned

Goal of SFAR 88 was to preclude ignition sources

Revealed unexpected ignition sources

Difficulty in identifying all ignition sources

Safety Assessments were very valuable

Number of previously unknown failures found

Continuing threat from still unknown failures

Unrealistic to expect we can eliminate all ignition

sources
Must consider flammability reduction of high
flammability tanks as an integral part of system
safety
27

The Fire Triangle

Ignition
Ignition Prevention

Oxygen

Fuel Vapor
Flammability Reduction
28

SFAR 88 Findings
Lightning
External & Internal
Wiring
Motor Operated Valves

Fuel Pumps

Recurring
Maintenance

Flight Manual
Procedures

FQIS

29

Service Experience

ARC TO LOWER WING SKIN

ARC THROUGH CONDUIT

ARC THROUGH PUMP HOUSING

Fuel Pump Internal

Damage/Overheat

30

Flammability Reduction
In

1998 and again in 2001, the FAA

tasked the U.S. Aviation Rulemaking
and Advisory Committee (ARAC) to
explore ways to reduce flammability in
fuel tank systems

Direct response to TWA 800

31

Flammability Reduction
While

both ARAC committees concluded

that flammability reduction efforts
would be valuableexisting technology
was considered not practical for
commercial aviation
Weight too heavy
Cost too expensive
Reliability too low

FAA

continued technology R&D

32

Fuel Tank Safety Recent History

Inerting
ARAC Studies
Started
1

ARAC
2

FRS
Implementation

FAA FRS
Demonstrator

Flammability Reduction

1996

TWA 800
NTSB
TWA 800
Hearing

Ignition Prevention

THAI
737
SFAR 88
Rule

Today

SFAR 88
Reviews

2004 +

Ignition
Changes
Available
First ADs
released 33

Flammability Reduction

Main Enablers which made

technology Breakthrough possible :
1.

Membrane performance at lower P

2.

O2 Concentration (9% vs. 12%)

3.

Use of simple system OK (single string)

FAA focused testing in these areas

34

Breakthrough - Performance

at lower P

Performance analysis and subsequent testing showed

Air Separation Module technology would work at low
pressures, 10 to 40 psig versus 50 to 100 psig used
commercially

35

Breakthrough - O2 Concentration
Testing

demonstrated that higher O2

levels provided adequate protection

Adequate inerting obtained on the ground

with approximately 12% O2

Previous 9% O2 levels linked to military

combat threats

Less Nitrogen needed at altitude

15.5% Oxygen adequate at 40000ft

36

Nitrogen Inerting Test Results

Peak Explosion Pressure (psig)

90
AFFDL-TR-78-66 Spark

80
70

JTCG/AS-90-T-004 19J
Igniter at -2000ft

60
50

JTCG/AS-90-T-004 19J
Igniter at SL

40
30

AFFDL-TR-78-66 Table
1 23mm HEI

20
10

AFFDL-TR-78-66 Table
1 Spark

0
9

10

11

12

13

14
15
16
17
%Oxygen in Ullage

18

19

20

21

Sea-Level
InertingTest
TestResults
Results
Sea-Level Nitrogen
Nitrogen Inerting
Source:Boeing Literature Review, References quoted on Chart

37

Breakthrough - Simple System

Check/Shutoff Valve

Existing Cooling Inlet

Center
Wing
Tank

Cooling Air,
Flow reverses on Ground

Shut Off Valve

Temp control valve

Filter

NEA Flow

Heater

High and Low

Flow Orifices
(In common valve)

ASM
Heat
Exchanger
Waste Flow (O2 rich)

Existing Bleed Line

Low flow, High Purity NEA for Ground,

Climb and Cruise,
High Flow, Low Purity NEA for Descent

Overboard Exit

FAA Simple Inerting System

38

FAA Inerting System on 747 SP

39

FAA Inerting Installation on A320

40

Flight Testing Accomplished

FAA

R&D Testing (747SP, 737)

Boeing 747-400 Flight Test

Engineering and Certification Data

FAA/Airbus

A320 Flight Test

FAA concept inerting system installed in A320

cargo compartment
Airbus gained familiarity with design concept and
system performance

Boeing

737 & 747 Certification Testing

FAA/NASA 747 Flight Test

Initial flights performed in December 2003

41

Balanced Approach
to Fuel Tank Safety

FAA R&D has shown that Inerting is practical

SFAR 88 addressed ignition prevention only

Inerting was not seen as practical at the time SFAR 88 was

issued

Balanced Approach - Now Possible

Combine ignition prevention & flammability reduction into a

single solution

42

Ignition Prevention Alone

(Not Balanced Approach)

Attempting to plug all the holes in one layer exceeds

what is realistically possible.
For over 40 years, we have been trying to
prevent tank explosions by plugging all the
holes in this layer, which is nearly
impossible.
HAZARD

Ignition Prevention Layer

Holes due to:
- Design issues
- Aging systems
- Improper Maintenance,
Rework, modifications, etc
-Unknown unknowns

Flammability Layer
(High Flam Tank shown)
Hole due to:
- High exposure to flammable
vapors

ACCIDENT
43

Fault Tree: Current Fuel Tank System

Unbalanced Fault Tree

Tank Explosion

AND Gate

Ignition Source

Ullage Flammable

OR Gate
FQIS
shorts

Pump
Arc

Pump
FOD

Pump
Level
Burn thru
Sensors
Lightning (many)

Densitometer

Valves Electrostatic

etc.

44

Balanced Approach with

Flammability Reduction
Flammability Reduction significantly reduces hole size in
flammability layer, virtually eliminating future accidents.
SFAR 88
HAZARD

Ignition Prevention Layer

- Some holes eliminated (e.g.
design changes to preclude
single failures)
- Other holes reduced in size
(human factors/ maintenance
issues, unknowns, etc.)

Flammability Reduction / Low Flammability

Flammability Layer
-Reducing flammability
exposure significantly reduces
holes (flammability reduction)
-Small holes remain due to
system performance, dispatch
relief, system reliability, etc.

ACCIDENT

ACCIDENT
PREVENTED!
45

Reduced Flammability NPRM

On

Feb 17th 2004,

The FAA Administrator, Marion C.Blakey,

announced that the FAA was proceeding with
a Notice of Proposed Rule Making (NPRM) to
require reduction of flammability in high
flammability tanks of U.S. commercial jet
transports

46

Summary

Flammability exposure is a major factor in

fuel tank explosion risk

Simple Inerting System is now practical

Ignition Prevention still major protection

strategy
Balanced Approach of Ignition Prevention and
Reduced Flammability can provide a
substantial improvement in fuel tank safety
FAA is moving forward to implement a
reduced flammability strategy to complement
the ignition prevention strategy
47

Implementation Plans

Propose production cut-in of flammability

reduction means (FRM) on high flammability
tanks (Boeing & Airbus CWTs)
Propose retrofit of FRM on existing fleet with
high flammability tanks (Boeing and Airbus
CWTs)
Propose revision to FAR 25 to include
flammability limits
48

Federal Aviation
Administration

Thank You for

Your Attention