The Idea of Moral Standing PDF

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The Idea of Moral Standing

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Subscriber: London School of Economics and Political Science; date: 25 January 2013
The Oxford Handbook of Animal Ethics
Tom L. Beauchamp and R. G. Frey
Print publication date: 2011
Print ISBN-13: 9780195371963
Published to Oxford Handbooks Online: May-12
DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195371963.001.0001
Christopher W. Morris
DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195371963.013.0010
Abstract and Keywords
This article investigates the idea of moral status for nonhuman animals and
how that status compares to the moral status of most humans. It considers
whether some artifacts and natural objects have a significant moral status. It
finds much of the philosophical literature confusing, so it offers an innovative
distinction between the notion of status and that of standing. It regards
standing as a special status that humans and perhaps a limited number of
other beings have. It takes the idea of duties to other beings as critical for
an account of moral status. It suggests that something has moral standing if
it is owed any moral consideration or duty whatever.
moral status, nonhuman animals, humans, moral standing
What is the moral status of nonhuman animals?
1
How does that status
compare to that of most humans, to human fetuses, or to valuable artifacts
or natural objects of different kinds? These questions are familiar ones in
ethics and related fields. It is often thought that humans or human persons
have a special status, that of moral standing, and the question is then
whether some nonhumans also share it.
In much of the literature, the concept of moral standing is not as clear or
as well characterized as it might be, and there seems to be considerable
disagreement about how to understand it. Some even counsel that we
dispense with it. In this chapter, I shall examine the idea of moral standing
and look at what many contemporary thinkers have said about it. I shall offer
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an interpretation that I have developed in other writings and that captures
important elements common to many accounts. I shall also discuss a way in
which moral standing, as I have interpreted it, could be extended to animals
in a conventionalist or constructivist account of justice, which is usually
thought to be unlikely to extend moral standing to animals. But I have come
to think that this understanding of moral standing does not tell us everything
that we need to know about the status of animals, and that we need to
broaden our understanding of the kinds of status beings can have. I argue
that there may be two statuses that merit to be called moral standing. In
this respect, I have come to agree with some thinkers who do not share the
analysis of moral standing that I have until now adopted.
1. Moral Standing
There are differences of terminology in the literature. Many writers talk only
of moral status, using it narrowly, to mean the special status that some
beings such as ourselves might have. Others distinguish between broad
and narrow kinds of moral status. And others use moral status and moral
standing interchangeably. One author even claims that Standing is an
anachronistic way of saying status.
2
These terminological differences
may be confusing, but they are not as troublesome as the different
characterizations of the notions in question.
In this chapter, I distinguish between moral status and moral standing.
I regard the latter as being the special status that we and perhaps other
beings have, a status that remains to be explicated. I shall think of moral
status as whatever status something might have morally. In this broad
sense, we could sensibly ask about the moral status of a speck of dust and
presume that the answer would be that it is insignificant.
3
This particular
use of the terms should not distort the discussion, but it is different from
that of many contemporary writers, and it will help to remember that in my
usage, everything will have moral status but only some things will have
moral standing.
Moral standing is a kind of moral status. There are other kinds. In our
lives, we make many distinctions between the kinds of things or creatures
protected by our moral norms and practices, as well as the ways they are
protected. Our concerns range widely over different kinds of object. Consider
a story that illustrates the variety of things that may concern us, as well as
introducing many of the concepts that well need in this chapter.
The protagonist of this tale is a villain who goes on a rampage.
His motives are not important; our attention is on the status
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of the objects he trashes. He is evidently in a foul mood. As
he walks down the street, he kicks a garbage can, denting it
and spreading its contents all over the sidewalk. He picks up a
discarded metal rod and strikes a small tree, breaking its trunk.
He spots an American and a Canadian flag nearby and shreds
them. He comes across a group of ladybugs, presumably
just hatched, and stomps on them, killing large numbers.
Nearby are some pigeons, and he throws some stones at them,
injuring one of them quite badly so that it cannot fly. A dog
wanders by, and our villain gives it a big kick, also injuring it
severely. Next he runs into a young man and punches him,
breaking some ribs. He does the same to some small children
nearby.
Walking by a hospital, our villain goes in and stumbles on the
room in the basement where the bodies of deceased patients
are kept; he mutilates some of them. He finds a permanently
comatose patient and detaches her from life-support. Our
villain then walks into the art museum where he hopes to
have a good lunch at the restaurant. His strength restored by
a quick but satisfying meal, he goes to the room where the
museum's sole Vermeer is displayed. After the guard steps out
of the room, he mutilates the masterpiece irreparably with a
sharp knife.
Our villain now turns his thoughts to more grandiose projects.
He remembers Hitler's wish to destroy Paris in the summer
of 1944 (Is Paris burning?) and starts plotting to destroy
the City of Lights. It takes him many months of planning. His
aim is to destroy the city, but not to injure the inhabitants.
He manages to contrive a means of evacuating them as the
city is burning. Succeeding in his mission of the destruction of
Paris, he wonders what projects to take on nextperhaps the
destruction of the Grand Canyon.
The details of our tale do not matter much; I will not be interested very much
in the villain's motives; it is the objects of his rampage that concern me. They
are: a trash can, a small tree, the flags, some ladybugs, a pigeon, a dog, a
young man, some small children, some corpses and a permanently comatose
woman, a Vermeer, and Paris. I have arranged the story and the objects
so that the man's greatest crimes appear to involve valuable objects that
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presumably lack moral standing, in particular the Vermeer painting and the
city of Paris. He did not kill the children and the young man, but the painting
and the city he destroyed. I expect that the destruction of the painting and
the city will seem to many of us a more serious crime than the injury to the
young man or children.
No one should deny that the young man and children in this story have
moral standing; many think that the dog does too and perhaps the pigeons.
Virtually no one thinks that the garbage can, the tree, the ladybugs, the
painting, and Paris have moral standing, however great their value may be.
This is compatible with thinking that the villain's denting of the garbage can
and destruction of the Vermeer and Paris are wrongs, indeed, in the last two
cases, very serious wrongs. Importantly, these objects are not themselves
wronged; no wrong is done to them. Our duties not to harm these objects
are not duties to them. We would be concerned if we saw a small child
kicking over the garbage can or killing the ladybugs; we would not want our
children to do either. Our concern about the second act would be about the
malevolence revealed by the destruction of the insects, even if we thought
they lacked moral standing. I trust these judgments are familiar and not
controversial.
What is to be learned about the status of nonhuman animals? The examples
collected in this section are meant to illustrate the variety of things that may
be wrongfully harmed and to introduce some of the concepts and distinctions
we shall use. It is also to lay out some of the judgments or evaluations we
make of acts of this kind, and in particular to point to the ways it can be
wrong to harm something lacking moral standing. There is, needless to say,
controversy about the status of nonhuman animals. A good number of people
think the higher animals have moral standing, much like the small children
and the adults in our story. Others deny this assessment. They think the
status of animals is more like that of the ladybugs, the garbage can, the
flag, the body on life-support, or a valuable artifact. We need to clarify the
different types of moral status that entities can have.
2. Who or What Counts?
Most people think that humans or human persons count in a way that
ladybugs and lobsters dont, that inanimate objects are to be protected only
insofar as they are valued by us or have certain relations to us. Dirt and
bugs usually matter not at all (except extrinsically). Extraordinary works of
art, cities like Paris, and natural wonders like the Grand Canyon are to be
appreciated and protected. But they dont matter in the way that people
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do, even if we think them more valuable in some ways. These reactions are
commonplace, and I intentionally express them imprecisely. The question
is how exactly to express and to understand them. Having moral standing
makes a difference. What is that difference?
One finds many different characterizations of moral standing in the literature,
some more helpful than others. The most general interpretations sometimes
have the virtue of being employable by a number of different moral
traditions; the more specific and detailed ones often seem to be unavailable
to at least some moral theories. I shall review a number of common
characterizations, explaining my own conception later in the section. In
many places, where an author eschews the term moral standing and talks
exclusively of moral status I usually signal, as I do in the quotation that
immediately follows, that I understand him or her to be talking about what
others, such as myself, think of as moral standing.
To have moral status [i.e., moral standing] is to be the sort of being
whose interests must be considered from the moral point of view.
4
Characterizations like this one by Bonnie Steinbock are not uncommon. It
has two central elements. The first is the familiar metaphor of the moral
point of view, the second the notion of interests. Insofar as the metaphor
has significant contentthere are competing points of view and morality
has onethis characterization will be unavailable to moralists who eschew
notions of points of view. If it does not have much content, there may be
better ways of expressing the main thought. The second element is that
of interests. Many explicate moral standing in terms of interests, and this
seems a natural way to go for many contemporary moral thinkers. It is worth
remembering, however, that some moral traditions such as Kantianism do
not focus on interests, at least at this level of theorizing.
Often the metaphor of counting is employed: if something has moral
standing then it counts morally. This formulation is too broad, so it is
usually supplemented: something must count in its own right. Wayne Sumner
says that Let us say that a creature has moral standing if, for the purpose of
moral decisionmaking, it must be counted for something in its own right.
5
Allen Buchanan says that a being has moral standing if it counts morally, in
its own right.
6
And Francis Kamm introduces the idea of Counting morally
in their own right early in her interesting discussion of moral status.
7
It
seems clear that some things count morally in their own right whereas
others do not. But the way in which the former are to count or to matter
must be made clear.
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The language of intrinsic value is often used here as a way of clarifying or
specifying the meaning of counting.
8
This familiar if not altogether clear
notion is usually explained by contrast with its pair, instrumental value.
Something has instrumental or extrinsic value if it is valuable as a means
to something else; something has intrinsic value if it is valuable in itself.
Many things have both intrinsic and instrumental value (e.g., a good meal,
the company of a friend). It may be that humans or persons have moral
standing by virtue of their intrinsic value. But it's not clear that intrinsic value
simpliciter will explain the notion of moral standing. Vermeer's paintings
and Paris certainly are valuable intrinsically, and much that has intrinsic
value is not very valuable (e.g., a small pleasure). Francis Kamm notes
Christine Korsgaard's claim that the contrast to mere instrumental value
is not intrinsic value but having value as an end. Kamm says that being an
end in this sense means that the thing's condition can provide a reason
(even if an overridable one) for attitudes or actions independently of other
considerations.
9
Perhaps the notion that is needed here is that of an end in
this sense.
Many thinkers, including Kamm, use the notion of something mattering for
its own sake. Claire Andre and Manuel Velasquez express the idea thus:
What is moral standing? An individual has moral standing for
us if we believe that it makes a difference, morally, how that
individual is treated, apart from the effects it has on others.
That is, an individual has moral standing for us if, when making
moral decisions, we feel we ought to take that individual's
welfare into account for the individual's own sake and not
merely for our benefit or someone else's benefit.
10
There is something right about this idea of for something's own sake. It is
similar to in its own right, introduced above. Kamm argues that counting
in its own right may not be the notion needed to explicate the kind of moral
status we are concerned with in these contexts. I claimed above that great
works of art or cities have intrinsic value, but most people do not think they
have moral standing, even if destroying them is a great or serious wrong.
Kamm also thinks that counting in its own right may apply to works of art
or natural objects. The distinctions she makes are important:
A work of art or a tree may count in its own right in the sense
that it gives us reason to constrain our behavior toward it (for
example, not destroy it) just because that would preserve
the entity. That is, independently of valuing and seeking the
pleasure or enlightenment it can cause in people, a thing of
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aesthetic value gives us (I think) reason not to destroy it. In
that sense, it counts morally. But this is still to be distinguished
from constraining ourselves for the sake of the work or art
or the tree. I do not act for its sake when I save a work of
art, because I do not think of its good and how continuing
existence would be good for it when I save it. (Nor do I think of
its exercising its capacities or performing its duties. Acting for
the sake of these might also involve acting for an entity's sake,
though it need not involve seeking what is good for it.) Rather,
I think of the good of the work of art, its worth as an art object,
when I save it for no other reason than that it will continue to
exist.
By contrast, when I save a bird, I can do it for its sake,
because it will get something out of continuing to exist, and it
could be a harm not to continue.
11
Kamm makes an interesting distinction between something counting in its
own right (e.g., a work of art, a tree) and acting for the sake of something
(e.g., a bird, a person). In both cases, we have reasons, she thinks, to act
in certain ways, for instance, not to destroy the thing. But only the second
notion brings out what is distinctive about what she calls the narrower sense
of moral status (i.e., moral standing). She says:
So, we see that within the class of entities that count in their
own right, there are those entities that in their own right and
for their own sake could give us reason so act. I think that it
is this that people have in mind when they ordinarily attribute
moral status [i.e., moral standing] to an entity . I shall say
that an entity has moral status when, in its own right and for
its own sake, it can give us reason to do things such as not
destroy it or help it.
12
This is a helpful characterization of moral standing. It is not mine, but it
may be better in some important respects than the one I have previously
developed, as I shall argue in the last section of this chapter.
Kamm goes on to say that we can have duties to behave in certain ways
toward entities that count in their own right and, as a subset, to entities that
have moral status [i.e., moral standing]. But this still does not imply that
all of these are entities to which we owe it to behave in certain ways.
13
A
duty owed to a being is a directed dutywhat I call a direct dutyand it
typically is correlative to a claim-right held by the being. Importantly, there
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is a difference between doing the wrong thing and wronging some entity
in failing to perform the duty owed to her. There is a distinction thus to be
made within the category of beings that have moral status in Kamm's narrow
sense (which I have been interpreting as moral standing) between those who
are benefited or protected by duties and those to whom duties are owed.
So just as only some entities that count in their own right are entities which
have moral status (as I defined it) [i.e., moral standing], so it may be that
only entities that have moral status are owed things and have rights against
us. This too seems right, and I shall return to the point in the last section.
The distinction between duties and duties to will figure centrally in my
interpretation of moral standing. Many explications do not privilege the
concept of a duty, as we saw, and some that do still dont distinguish
between duties and duties to. A good example of the latter is David
DeGrazia's characterization of moral status (i.e., moral standing): To say
that X has moral status is to say that (1) moral agents have obligations
regarding X, (2) X has interests, and (3) the obligations are based on X's
interests.
14
This formulation may express how many moral thinkers wish to
understand moral standing. But I think it is important to distinguish between
duties and duties to, as this distinction may be central to understanding the
status that many animals have.
Duties To and Moral Standing
The idea of considerations or duties owed to someone has figured centrally
in many accounts of moral standing, including my own. And it is to this
kind of account that I turn now. In a famous early essay on abortion, Mary
Ann Warren says that the question which we must answer to produce a
satisfactory solution to the problem of the moral status of abortion is: How
are we define the moral community ? She immediately adds the set
of beings with full and equal moral rights.
15
The idea or metaphor that
interests me is that of the moral community, one she seems to abandon
in her later work.
16
We can take it as an interpretation of moral standing:
something has moral standing if it is a member of the moral community.
This is the interpretation many have given of this notion,
17
and Warren's
explication of the ideathe set of beings with full and equal moral rights
begs too many questions to be the right one. It equates moral standing with
the status that persons have, and more controversially, it assumes that this
status gives all its bearers a set of several important rights, including the
inalienable rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. A weaker and
less-question-begging interpretation is that a creature with moral standing is
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owed some types of moral duties or obligations. In her later work on moral
status, Warren says that to have moral status is to be morally considerable,
or to have moral standing. It is to be an entity towards which moral agents
have, or can have, moral obligations.
18
The thought here is that something
is owed to another. This has long seemed to me a useful way of expressing
what it is to count in the contexts where the question of moral standing
is central. When raising certain questions about animals or about human
fetuses, the brain dead, the irreversibly comatose, and so on, we often wish
to know what we owe them, if anything.
Warren's metaphor of the moral community is an interesting one. It makes
possession of moral standing analogous to the political status of citizenship.
Like membership in the political community, membership in the moral
community gives one a particular status that non-members lack, in
particular a set of rights. This understanding of moral standing connects
it with the notion of legal standing, which may well have been the source
of the notion of moral standing in philosophy.
19
Legal standing is normally
understood as the status needed to be entitled to have a matter settled by
courts of law. It is the idea of a status which entitles the holder to something.
Thus someone who was not a member of the legal community, that is,
was not a citizen, would not normally have legal standing. In his book on
moral considerability, Mark Bernstein introduces the concept of moral
enfranchisement, which nicely extends this political analogy.
20
These
political notions are helpful for making central the duties that are owed to
others. They are also helpful for conceptualizing the complex relations of
moral standing in theories that relativize moral norms to social communities
smaller than the set of persons or humans.
21
I have for some time thought of moral standing in this way, as involving
considerations owed to other beings in the form of obligations, duties, and
the like. It is not an uncommon understanding, I think. I shall now briefly
describe this understanding of moral standing.
The basic idea is simple: something has moral standing if it is owed duties.
22
This understanding of moral standing connects it with the notion of legal
standing; both are conceptions of a status that entitles the holder to
something. The distinction between duties and duties to is helpful, and I shall
now bring in the well-known distinction between duties to a being and duties
regarding a being. In the case of duties regarding a being, the latter being
is the beneficiary of a direct duty owed not to it, but rather owed to another
being. Kant uses one form of this distinction to express his view of the ethics
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of animals: we can have only duties to humans, and protections for animals
are always duties regarding them, owed to humans (for instance, oneself).
23
I can now construct an important distinction between direct and indirect
moral objects. If something itself has moral standing and consequently is
owed duties, it is a direct moral object. By contrast, if something is protected
solely by considerations owed to others, then it is a mere indirect moral
object. We are both direct and indirect moral objects most of the time. But
some thingspresumably artifacts and possibly some or all animalsmay
only be indirect moral objects. Mere indirect moral objects might have great
value, even moral value. Vermeer's paintings, Paris, and the Grand Canyon
have great value, and arguably some of it is moral. I do not wish to make
much of this last claim, as I am not entirely clear what distinguishes moral
value from other kinds of value. But it is clear that someone who destroyed
these structures would be committing wrongs. Our villain's destruction of
Paris would be recorded among the great crimes of history.
An important feature of the debate about the moral status of animals, on the
interpretation of moral standing I have offered, seems to focus on whether
some of them are direct or mere indirect moral objects. If their status is the
latter, that of a mere indirect moral object, then we have duties regarding
them and no duties to them. This was Kant's view, as well as that of St.
Thomas.
24
An indirect moral object is not wronged by someone who fails
to observe a duty regarding it. For St. Thomas and Kant, we cannot wrong
animals. They lack moral standing.
Very few people doubt that we have some duties regarding nonhuman
animals, but there is a major controversy as to whether we have any direct
duties to any animals. Many, like St. Thomas and Kant, conclude that these
animals are merely indirect moral objects. In the last section I shall argue
that the distinction between direct and indirect moral objects is misleading
and not exhaustive.
3. What Has Moral Standing?
Many controversies about the ethical treatment of animals concern the
matter of moral standing, in particular, the status of different species of
animals. As we have just seen, some writers think that no nonhuman animal
has moral standing; others think that many do, especially those that are
sentient and minimally rational. Different moral traditions or thinkers point to
different attributes or properties as giving their possessors moral standing.
Adult humans typically are sentient, rational, self-conscious agents, and
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these properties figure in many accounts of moral standing. Many animals
are sentient and exhibit some elements of rationality, consciousness, and
agency, though not all of those possessed by most adult humans. While
many animals have sophisticated means of communication, they seem
to lack what we think of as the ability to use a language, which includes
the capacity to combine words to form an infinite number of grammatical
sentences. So it is natural for many to think that the chief property that gives
them moral standing is their sentience.
This is what Jeremy Bentham, perhaps the founder of the modern animal
liberation movement, thought:
The day may come when the rest of the animal creation may
acquire those rights which never could have been witholden
from them but by the hand of tyranny. The French have already
discovered that the blackness of the skin is no reason a
human being should be abandoned without redress to the
caprice of a tormentor. It may one day come to be recognised
that the number of the legs, the villosity of the skin, or the
termination of the os sacrum are reasons equally insufficient
for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate. What else
is it that should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of
reason or perhaps the faculty of discourse? But a full-grown
horse or dog, is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as
a more conversable animal, than an infant of a day or a week
or even a month, old. But suppose the case were otherwise,
what would it avail? the question is not, Can they reason? nor,
Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?
25
To this day, sentience is the natural and the central criterion for those who
think that (some) animals are direct moral objects. Utilitarians in particular
favor this criterion,
26
but the claim is one that some non-consequentialists
also make. Many thinkers, however, reject sentience as a criterion of moral
standing, and they have formulated different criteria. I shall review a number
of criteria now in order to display the range of positions commonly held on
the question of who or what has moral standing. A basic criterion of moral
standing looks something like this:
Something has moral standing if (and only if?) it _____.
Two things distinguish different theories and their criteria: what is placed in
the blank space (e.g., is sentient; is rational; knows a language; is an agent),
and whether possession of the attribute is sufficient for moral standing
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or both necessary and sufficient. A weaker formulation would assert that
the property put in the blank space is merely sufficient for moral standing:
something has moral standing if it _____. The stronger formulation would say:
something has moral standing if and only if it _____.
Here are three widely invoked criteria, familiar to many readers of this
volume:
(1) Something has moral standing if it is sentient.
(2) Something has moral standing if it is rational.
(3) Something has moral standing if it is an agent.
The stronger versions of these criteria would be:
(1) Something has moral standing if and only if it is sentient.
(2) Something has moral standing if and only if it is rational.
(3) Something has moral standing if and only if it is an agent.
Stronger still is use of these criteria to create the following account:
Something has moral standing if and only if it is (1) sentient,
(2) rational, and (3) an agent. All seven versions constitute
substantially different accounts of moral standing, and no one
of these accounts can be reduced to any one of the other six.
Degrees of Moral Standing
These criteria could each be formulated so that moral standing is a matter
of degree, in which case we might want to say that something has moral
standing insofar as or to the extent that it is _____ (e.g., sentient, rational, or
an agent). My interpretation of moral standing considers something to have
moral standing if it is owed any moral consideration or duty whatsoever; so
I have not thought it necessary to interpret criteria as allowing of degrees.
However, there are two ways in which we might want to take into account
degrees of moral standing. The first would be to construct the very notion
of moral standing to allow for degrees. Two beings, for instance, might
have different degrees of moral standing insofar as one is owed many more
duties (and as having many more correlative rights) than the other. This is a
common way of talking about moral standing; humans might be said to have
full moral standing and some animals something less. My formulation of
moral standing does not allow of degrees in this way; if something is owed at
least one duty, it has moral standing. This has the virtue of simplicity, as well
as that of distinguishing moral standing from the matter of how many duties
something is owed and the difference this makes.
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Another matter of degree is harder to know how to factor into an account
of moral standing. The concepts of sentience, rationality, consciousness,
language, and agency are complex and allow of degrees. Consider that the
rationality or agency of a normal adult human is more developed than that
of a child; the rational capacities of some animals are more advanced than
others; the rational capacities of some exceed those of some humans.
27
How to take into account the differences between beings who possess the
requisite property or properties (e.g., sentience, rationality) but to different
degrees? This is a difficult question, and I do not wish to take it up here. I
think it best, at least initially, to keep the notion of moral standing simple. It
is not clear that the notion needs to do more than one job at a time, the job
here being to designate the set of beings to whom some duties are owed. I
suggest we assume there is a threshold level of sentience, rationality, and
so on that is sufficient to give its bearer moral standing and not bring in this
second kind of matter of degrees, though I recognize that it is not clear how
to do this.
28
Some thinkers prefer to deploy a cluster concept such as person, instead of
using criterion 2 or 3. Persons are usually thought to be complex rational,
self-conscious, language-speaking agents like us. The notion is hard to
characterize except in terms of a cluster of attributes.
29
So we might have a
personhood criterion:
(4) Something has moral standing if it is a person.
(4) Something has moral standing if and only if it is a person.
Kant may be interpreted as holding (4), as did Mary Ann Warren in her early
essay on abortion.
All of these criteria make possession of moral standing depend on possession
of certain properties or attributes. Creatures who merely potentially possess
these attributesthat is, they will come to possess them fully in the normal
course of biological developmentwill lack moral standing according to
criteria 14. Consequently, some favor a criterion of moral standing that
will allow potential as well as actual persons to have moral standing:
(5) Something has moral standing if it is an actual or potential
person.
(5) Something has moral standing if and only if it is an actual or
potential person.
Potentiality is usually connected to personhood (or humanity in a sense
different from species membership discussed below). But conceptually, it
is open to someone to favor a criterion of potential sentience or something
Page 14 of 29
else. Potentiality criteria are important mainly for the abortion debate, so I
will not dwell on them.
30
Others point instead to the importance of being a member of a kind of being
such as the human species. Our moral debates and quarrels frequently
make reference to the importance of humanityfor example, the abolitionist
pointing to the humanity of the slave. So some favor a humanity criterion of
moral standing, where species membership is central:
(6) Something has moral standing if it is human (i.e., a member of
the species homo sapiens).
(6) Something has moral standing if and only if it is human (i.e., a
member of the species homo sapiens).
The humanity criterion is often criticized by pointing to humans who are not
rational, self-conscious agents of the familiar sort, not even potentially. So
some are tempted to modify it or to adopt another, which we may call the
natural kind criterion:
(7) Something has moral standing if it is a member of a natural
kind, whose mature members are normally persons.
(7) Something has moral standing if and only if it is a member of a
natural kind, whose mature members are normally persons.
31
The thought here is that members of our species are special because they
characteristically become persons and that persons have special value or
significance. Even if particular humans are not and will never be persons,
they have moral standing as members of this kind of being. The extension
of this criterion, as far as we know, is the set of humans. One day other
creatures may be added.
Agents and Cooperators
Many of these criteria will generally be familiar to readers of this volume.
I now return to the criterion of personhood, and specifically to the matter
of agency, which thus far has received scant attention. Why might agency
be important for moral standing? In many familiar accounts, agents are
owed a particular kind of respect, and in some accounts, agency is important
because only agents can reciprocate. Why might reciprocation be important?
There are a number of views, and I wish to mention one that gives rise to an
interesting conception of moral standing.
On some views of morality, moral constraints do not make sense unless
they are likely to be reciprocated in some way. This is not an unusual
Page 15 of 29
view of many legal constraints, and some theorists think it true of moral
constraints as well. Suppose we think of large parts of morality as a
cooperative venture for mutual advantage, to adapt Rawls famous
phrase.
32
Cooperative ventures here are to be understood as mutually
beneficial arrangements or practices requiring that participants share in the
burdens of the endeavor. Hume's conventionalist account of justice is a good
model of this position. In this view, agents are not constrained by justice
toward others unwilling to reciprocate or cooperate. As Hume put it, suppose
that it should be a virtuous man's fate to fall into the society of ruffians,
remote from the protection of laws and government . His particular regard
to justice being no longer of use to his own safety or that of others, he must
consult the dictates of self-preservation alone, without concern for those who
no longer merit his care and attention.
33
Assuming my conception of moral
standinga being has moral standing if it is owed dutiesthen an account of
justice like this one would endorse another criterion of moral standing:
(8) Something has moral standing if and only if it is an agent and
willing to cooperate.
This criterion is not going to grant moral standing to animals, not even
to young children. These implications are often cited by critics of the
conventionalist or contractarian ethical tradition, and they seem to them
sufficient to condemn this type of account.
34
But more needs to be said here.
Of the criteria previously mentioned, only the first, the sentience criterion,
promises to give a clear and unrestricted moral standing to sentient,
nonhuman animals. Defenders of other criteria usually conclude that animals
dont have moral standing and are protected only by being indirect moral
objects. Sometimes they try to show that some animals have enough of
the relevant properties to have moral standing, and this may require the
introduction of degrees of moral standing. Interestingly, there is a way for
defenders of conventionalist accounts of justice such as Hume's to extend
moral standing to some animals. They will need first to relax 8, as follows:
(8) Something has moral standing if it is an agent and willing to
cooperate.
The second step will then be to show how other beings can acquire moral
standing.
Suppose that norms of justice are mutually beneficial conventions. This is,
broadly speaking, a Hobbist and Humean idea, and it has been developed
in contemporary moral theory in different ways.
35
Versions of the argument
to follow can, I believe, be given for Rawls or Scanlon's contractualist
Page 16 of 29
theories.
36
Now, given characteristic human attachments, it will be the case
that few adult agents will cooperate with others unless their children or
those to whom they are personally close are accorded some protections.
In particular, agents may insist that others accord their children and some
others moral standing and not merely the status of an indirect moral
object.
37
Elsewhere I call this secondary moral standing, an unfortunately
misleading label insofar as it suggests that the children are indirect moral
objects. What is meant by the expression is a second way of acquiring moral
standing in this conventionalist framework. The idea is that something (e.g.,
children) can acquire (genuine) moral standing by being favored by other
agents with moral standing.
38
In principle many nonhuman animals could acquire moral standing in this
way.
39
Domestic animals like dogs might so acquire moral standing. With the
development of human attachments, other animals might be included. The
argument sketched here and developed elsewhere challenges an element
of Peter Carruthers contractualist account of the reasons why animals lack
moral standing.
40
4. Two Kinds of Moral Standing?
My account of moral standing focuses on obligations owed to a being, such
that it is wronged when these obligations are disregarded. We might call
this and accounts like it the juridical interpretation of moral standing, not
because it makes reference to law, but because it privileges the virtue of
justice. This is justice in the broad sense, having to do with what is owed to
others, that to which they have a right. In this broad sense, justice covers
all those things owed to other people: it is under injustice that murder, theft
and lying come, as well as the withholding of what is owed for instance by
parents to children and by children to parents, as well as the dealings which
would be called unjust in everyday speech.
41
Justice in this sense, concerning that which is owed to others, is a central
moral virtue, if not the principal one. Creatures that are protected in this
direct way by justice do have a status different from other things. One
might still worry that something is missing from the juridical interpretation
of moral standing. One need only to remember the virtue of charity or
benevolence, the other central interpersonal virtue. This virtue attaches
itself not to what others have a right to, but to their good. We act charitably
or beneficently when we help someone in need when this is not required
by justice. The same act may be contrary to both virtues, to justice and to
benevolence, as when someone is deprived of what is his due and what
Page 17 of 29
he desperately needs.
42
Normally the question of charity or benevolence
arises only when there is a question of helping someone in ways not required
by justice. It might be that charity or benevolence is shown in our kind or
considerate treatment of animals when this is not required by justice. If
charity or benevolence is an important virtue, as important as many moral
thinkers hold it to be (e.g., Aquinas, Hutcheson, Hume), then my juridical
account of moral standing seems to leave something out.
My thought is that there are two important kinds of moral standing and
that the juridical account must be supplemented by a second one. I shall
motivate this second kind of moral standing by first examining Francis
Kamm's account, then by looking at a feature of Hume's moral theory, and
lastly with some remarks about duties of charity or benevolence.
I turn first to Kamm's discussion of moral status in the narrow sense, which
I have interpreted as moral standing. She argues that within the class of
entities that count in their own right, there are those entities that in their
own right and for their own sake could give us reasons to act. I think that it
is this that people have in mind when they ordinarily attribute moral status
[i.e., moral standing] to an entity.
43
She notes that moral status in this
sense does not entail that something is owed to a being or that depriving it
of that treatment wrongs it. We can have duties to behave in certain ways
toward entities that count in their own right and, as a subset, to entities that
have moral status [i.e., moral standing]. But this still does not imply that all
of these are entities to which we owe it to behave in certain ways.
44
Kamm
suggests that entities to whom we owe certain things may have a higher
moral status than other entities which also have moral status (as I defined
it).
45
Kamm's view is that there are several kinds of moral status. The broadest
sense of moral status is that defined as what it is morally permissible
or impermissible to do to some entity.
46
A narrower sense of moral status
comes in when something counts morally in its own right. Kamm interprets
this sense as involving something having value as an end, but this is not yet
what people have in mind when they ordinarily attribute moral status to an
entity. This moral statuswhat I have interpreted as moral standingis to
be attributed only to a proper subset of the set of entities that count in their
own right, namely those which also for their own sake give us reasons to act
in certain ways. In addition, a proper subset of this last class will be entities
to whom we owe certain treatment.
We can illustrate Kamm's complex view with examples taken from her essay:
Page 18 of 29
(1) something to which it is permissible to do anything, for instance,
a rock;
(2) something which counts in its own right, for instance, a work of
art or a tree;
(3) something which in its own right and for its own sake gives us
reasons to act, for instance, a bird;
(4) something owed certain treatment, for instance, a person.
The first is said to have moral status in the broad sense. The second
introduces a narrower sense. The third has moral status of the sort people
have in mind when they ordinarily attribute moral status to an entity, what
I have called moral standing. And the fourth, she thinks, has a higher moral
status than the third.
Comparing Kamm's account with my juridical interpretation of moral
standing, they differ in their attributions of moral standing to 3 and 4 above:
I now think that Kamm, as I have interpreted her, is right to think that there
are two kinds of moral standing. When one saves a bird or a dog from harm,
one does
property example moral standing
(Kamm)
moral standing
(juridical acct)
counting in its own
right
work of art, tree no no
+ for its own sake bird yes no
+ is owed duties person yes yes
so for its own sake, and this is a consideration which is what people have
in mind when they ordinarily attribute moral status [i.e., moral standing] to
an entity.
Let me motivate this view, that there are two kinds of moral standing,
by drawing attention to an important feature of Hume's moral theory. He
thought that we have no obligations of justice to animals. His account of
justice is conventionalist, much like Hobbes's and some contemporary
theories. Nevertheless, Hume notes, we should be bound, by the laws of
humanity, to give gentle usage to these creatures, but should not, properly
speaking, lie under any restraint of justice with regard to them . Our
compassion and kindness [is] the only check, by which they curb our lawless
will.
47
Justice for Hume is not the only source of moral considerations. There
Page 19 of 29
is humanity, as well as benevolence, which are important for Hume, unlike
thinkers like Hobbes.
Hume does not talk about moral status or moral standing, but we can see
in his kind of moral theory a motivation for eschewing a purely juridical
interpretation of moral standing and introducing an additional kind of moral
standing. If benevolence or humanity is a sufficiently central and even
demanding virtue, why do not animals thereby have a status which is a
kind of moral standing? They wont if we think of moral standing juridically,
as privileging justice, but we can also think of moral standing in relation
to benevolence. There is nothing in the meaning of moral standing, a
constructed notion, expressed by a technical term, to determine which way
to go. Much depends on the importance of benevolence or other virtues or
values, and these receive different interpretations in different frameworks.
Many traditions will understand the virtues of charity and benevolence to be
much more important than they are often thought to be by contemporary
moral theorists, and these accounts may have room for a second kind of
moral standing.
I might note here that a count against my juridical interpretation is that it
is not neutral; it begs the question against some moral traditions. Moral
consequentialists, for instance, have little use for this interpretation of
moral standing. They understand the relation of being owed something,
much like that of a right or any other deontic relation, as derivative from the
object of morality (maximum good). On this view, someone is owed moral
considerations when instituting duties (or rights) will increase the realization
of greater good. The utilitarian understanding of moral standing might be
expressed thus: something has moral standing if its interests are to be
counted by the fundamental principle of morality. I do not wish to make this
particular formulation (something has moral standing if its interests are to be
counted by _____) canonical; some moral traditions dont have fundamental
principles, much less privilege interests. It may not be an important objection
to an interpretation of moral standing that it is not theory-neutral. Much
depends on what we wish the concept to do, and it may be that it cannot do
much without being embedded in a particular understanding of morality.
Some have recently counseled that we abandon the notion. James Rachels
understands the concept the way I have: Theories of moral standing try to
answer the question: To whom do we have direct duties?
48
And he thinks
that these different theories all assume that the answer to the question
of how an individual may be treated depends on whether the individual
Page 20 of 29
qualifies for a general sort of status, which in turn depends on whether the
individual possesses a few general characteristics. But no answer of this form
can be correct.
49
Rachels thinks this is the wrong way to think about the
question of how to treat different sorts of beings. There is no characteristic,
or set of characteristics, that sets some creatures apart from others as
meriting respectful treatment . Instead we have an array of characteristics
and an array of treatments, with each characteristic relevant to justifying
some types of treatment but not others.
50
We should abandon talk of moral
standing, he thinks, and just say, for instance, that the fact that a certain act
would cause pain to a creature is a reason not to do it.
51
I think that the notion of moral standing is still useful in moral philosophy.
One use is to clarify the different kinds of status a being can have. But I am
sympathetic to Rachels dissatisfaction with the concept and to his thought
that we should turn our attentions instead to the characteristics of beings
that are reasons for our acting in certain ways. And here I think that the fact
that the nature of some animals is a reason to act charitably or beneficently
towards them is of some significance insofar as we regard the virtue of
charity or benevolence as important. This fact about animals may make us
think of them as having a moral status different from other beings such as
trees or objects such as great paintings, as having a kind of moral standing,
even if they are owed no duties.
I said earlier that the distinction I drew between direct and indirect moral
objects may mislead. It does so insofar as it suggests that the two classes
exhaust the possibilities. Some may assume that if an animal is not a direct
moral object it must be an indirect one. The thought would be that if we
do not owe duties to animals then the only way they could be protected by
duties would be if they were third-party (or indirect) beneficiaries as a result
of direct duties owed to humans or persons. Now it seems that animals could
fail to be direct moral objects and still be the proper objects of charitable or
beneficent acts. If there are, as I have been suggesting, two kinds of moral
standing, animals who are the proper objects of other-regarding virtues
different from justice could have a kind of moral standing. The distinction
that I drew between direct and indirect moral objects may suggest a false
dilemma.
I shall now briefly sketch a way in which animals would be thought to have
this second kind of moral standing. Suppose that we have duties of charity
or benevolence (or a similar other-directed virtue). This assumption is
not uncontroversial, but it will simplify the case for understanding the
Page 21 of 29
beneficent treatment of animals as reflecting their possession of a kind of
moral standing. Some consider charity or benevolence supererogatory. Much
good done for others certainly is over and above the call of duty. But some
isnt over and above the call of duty. It is not uncommon to think that we
have duties of charity or benevolence; many give to the poor thinking they
have a duty to do so. If one thinks that the recipient of such aid has a claim-
right to it, then one has in effect understood these as duties of justice in the
broad sense introduced earlier. Many positive dutiesduties of service, as
opposed to non-interferenceare in fact duties of justice, for instance, duties
to rescue such as the one we have on the high seas. But some duties to help
others are not connected to correlative rights. As I said, many who give away
part of their income or who volunteer certain services for the poor do so
thinking they have a duty to help others, believing that it would be wrong for
them not to do so.
Charity and benevolence seem to require us to help others in a number of
ways. Duties to give to the poor may be imperfect duties, the choice of when
and where to act being up to the agent.
52
So we might fulfill our duty to
help by giving to some but not all needy people near us or elsewhere. But
sometimes charity or benevolence seems to require us to refrain from doing
something whenever we can or whenever we encounter severe suffering. It
would be wrong to do something even though desisting from doing it is not
owed to another.
As we saw, Hume thinks us constrained by the laws of humanity to give
gentle usage to these creatures. We think ill of or condemn someone who
fails to act as he or she is bound, by the laws of humanity, but we do not
praise them for acting as they should if their acts were supererogatory. It is
wrong not to refrain from inflicting certain harms on animals, we often think,
even if they have no right against us that we desist.
The framework I deploy here may be controversial, and my appeal to a
common opinion will not be shared by all. But suppose what I have said is
right, that we have duties of charity or benevolence to help animals, that
it is wrong to do certain things to them even if it does not wrong them.
Benevolence thus requires us to act in certain ways, even if some beneficent
actions are over and above the call of duty. If this is right, then it seems that
the status of those animals we have duties to help, even if these duties are
not owed to them, is a kind of moral standing. We act wrongly in failing to
keep these duties, and this wrong is not to be explicated in terms of duties
Page 22 of 29
owed to others. Charity and benevolence require us to help some animals for
their own sake and not for that of another.
This seems to be, to use Kamm's words, what people have in mind
when they ordinarily attribute moral status [i.e., moral standing] to an
entity. If some animals are objects, as I have suggested, of our charity
or benevolence, in their own right and for their own sake, then they are
objects of a possible wrong even if they cannot be wronged. Their status
seems to merit being called moral standing. If the use of the term here
worries some, then I can resort to another term, for instance Kamm's
language of the different kinds of moral status. But I think that would be
disingenuous. One of two kinds of moral status on her view seems to be
what people have in mind when they ordinarily attribute moral status to an
entity. This is what many have called moral standing.
I do not know if supplementing the juridical account with a second kind
of moral standing, as I have recommended, will resolve many substantial
questions in practical ethics. My first order of business has been to
clarify what we have been talking about the past several decades in our
controversies about moral status and standing. As I said in regard to Rachels
challenge to the notion of moral standing, clarifying the different kinds of
status beings can have makes something clearer than it was before, and I
think it is helpful to distinguish the two kinds of moral standing identified in
this chapter.
53
Suggested Reading
Bernstein, Mark H. On Moral Considerability: An Essay on Who Morally
Matters. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.
Find This Resource
Worldcat
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Cohen, Andrew I. Contractarianism, Other-regarding Attitudes, and the Moral
Standing of Nonhuman Animals. Journal of Applied Philosophy 24 (2007):
188200.
Find This Resource
Worldcat
Google Preview
Page 23 of 29
DeGrazia, David. Moral Status as a Matter of Degree? Southern Journal of
Philosophy 46 (2008): 18198.
Find This Resource
Worldcat
Google Preview
Goodpaster, Kenneth. On Being Morally Considerable. Journal of Philosophy
75 (1978): 30825.
Find This Resource
Worldcat
Google Preview
Kamm, Francis. Moral Status. In Intricate Ethics: Rights, Responsibilities,
and Permissible Harm. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.
Find This Resource
Worldcat
Google Preview
Rachels, James. Drawing the Line. In Animal Rights: Current Debates and
New Directions, ed. Cass Sunstein and Martha Nussbaum, 16274. New York:
Oxford University Press, 2004.
Find This Resource
Worldcat
Google Preview
Sachs, Benjamin. The Status of Moral Status. Unpublished paper.
Find This Resource
Worldcat
Google Preview
Singer, Peter. Speciesism and Moral Status. Metaphilosophy 40 (2009):
56781.
Find This Resource
Worldcat
Google Preview
Page 24 of 29
Warren, Mary Ann. Moral Status. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.
Find This Resource
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Notes:
(1.) I am very grateful to Tom Beauchamp, Andrew I. Cohen, and Benjamin
Sachs for helpful written comments on drafts of this chapter.
(2.) Jeremy Bendik-Keymer, review of James Rachels, The Legacy of Socrates:
Essays in Moral Philosophy, Ethics 117 (2007): 781.
(3.) My distinction is the one Wayne Sumner made some years ago: Every
physical object has some status or other; it makes no more sense to say that
a thing lacks moral status than to say it lacks shape or color . To count for
nothing is to have no moral standing. L. W. Sumner, Abortion and Moral
Theory (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981), p. 26.
(4.) Bonnie Steinbock, Life Before Birth: the Moral and Legal Status of
Embryos and Fetuses (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 9.
(5.) L. W. Sumner, A Third Way, in The Problem of Abortion, 3rd ed., ed.
Susan Dwyer and Joel Feinberg (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Press, 1997), p.
99. See also his Abortion and Moral Theory, pp. 2629, 195200.
(6.) Allen Buchanan, Moral Status and Human Enhancement, Philosophy &
Public Affairs 37 (2009): 346. Buchanan notes that The terms moral status
and moral standing are sometimes used interchangeably, and he wishes to
distinguish them.
(7.) Francis Kamm, Moral Status, in Intricate Ethics: Rights, Responsibilities,
and Permissible Harm (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 22728.
(8.) A being has moral standing if it or its interests matter intrinsically,
to at least some degree, in the moral assessment of actions and events.
Agnieszka Jaworska, Caring and Full Moral Standing, Ethics 117 (2007):
460.
Page 25 of 29
(9.) Kamm, Moral Status, 228. The reference to Christine Korsgaard is to
her Two Distinctions in Goodness, Philosophical Review 40 (2004): pp.
136786.
(10.) Claire Andre and Manuel Velasquez, Who Counts? available at http://
www.scu.edu/ethics/publications/iie/v4n1/counts.html (emphasis added).
(11.) Kamm, Moral Status, pp. 22829.
(12.) Kamm, Moral Status, p. 229.
(14.) David DeGrazia, Moral Status As a Matter of Degree? Southern Journal
of Philosophy 46 (2008): 183, italics omitted.
(15.) Mary Ann Warren, On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion, Monist
57 (1973), reprinted in Dwyer and Feinberg, Problem of Abortion, 165.
(16.) Mary Ann Warren, Moral Status: Obligations to Persons and Other Living
Things (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997).
(17.) The question of who or what has moral standing, of who or what is
a member of the moral community, has received wide exposure in recent
years. R. G. Frey, Moral Standing, the Value of Lives, and Speciesism,
Between the Species 4 (1988): 191.
(18.) Warren, Moral Status, p. 3. She emphasizes that an important feature
of the concept of moral status [i.e., moral standing] is that the moral
obligations that are implied by the ascription of moral status to an entity
are obligations to that entity. To violate an obligation arising from A's moral
status [i.e., moral standing] is to wrong A, and not merely a third party (p.
10).
(19.) Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? Toward Legal
Rights for Natural Objects, reprinted in Should Trees Have Standing? Law,
Morality, and the Environment, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press,
2010).
(20.) Mark H. Bernstein, On Moral Considerability: An Essay on Who Morally
Matters (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 20.
Page 26 of 29
(21.) Warren's multi-criterial conception of moral standing may have some
relativistic implications insofar as the criteria include certain relational
properties, which sometimes include being part of a particular social or
biological community, Moral Status, p. 21. Gilbert Harman's conventionalist
moral theory has very clear relativist implications. See the essays reprinted
in Part I of his Explaining Value and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 2000). For a treatment of some questions about the
justification of punishment and moral standing, see my Punishment and
Loss of Moral Standing, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 21 (1991): 5379.
(22.) My ideas about moral standing and their implications in a contractarian
moral framework have been developed in a number of essays. See
especially my Moral Standing and Rational-Choice Contractarianism, in
Contractarianism and Rational Choice: Essays on David Gauthier's morals by
agreement, ed. Peter Vallentyne (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1991), pp. 7695, and A Contractarian Account of Moral Justification, in
Moral Knowledge? New Readings in Moral Epistemology, ed. Walter Sinnott-
Armstrong and Mark Timmons (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp.
21542.
(23.) Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, trans. and ed. Mary Gregor
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996 [1797]), pp. 19293.
(24.) Saint Thomas, Summa contra Gentiles, ed. Joseph Kenny (New York:
Hanover House, 195557), Bk. III, ch. 112.
(25.) Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and
Legislation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1907 [1823]), ch. 17, note 122.
(26.) See Sumner, Abortion and Moral Theory.
(27.) See Peter Singer, Speciesism and Moral Status, Metaphilosophy 40
(2009): 56781.
(28.) See the chapters in this Handbook by Bryce Huebner and Mark
Rowlands that directly or indirectly address such threshold problems. For a
good discussion of the question of matter of degrees, see David DeGrazia,
Moral Status as a Matter of Degree?
(29.) For characterizations of a person, see Warren, On the Moral and
Legal Status of Abortion and Daniel Dennett, Conditions of Personhood,
Page 27 of 29
reprinted in Brainstorms (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1978), pp. 26997.
See also Sarah Chan and John Harris's contribution to this Handbook.
(30.) For an interesting discussion of potentiality, as well as the matter of
degrees of moral standing, see Elizabeth Harman, The Potentiality Problem,
Philosophical Studies 114 (2003): 17398.
(31.) Alan Donagan, The Theory of Morality (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1977), p. 171; Sumner, Abortion and Moral Theory, pp. 9699.
(32.) John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1971), p. 4. Rawls, of course, did not intend this characterization of a
society, much less a morality, to be interpreted as above. The interpretation
in question is Hobbist and Humean (on justice). This type of account is
developed by a number of contemporary thinkers, in particular David
Gauthier and Gilbert Harman. For the first, see Morals by Agreement (Oxford:
Clarendon, 1986); for Harman, see the references in note 21.
(33.) David Hume, An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. Tom L.
Beauchamp (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 3.10 (sect. 3, part 1, para. 10),
pp. 1516.
(34.) See, for instance, the recent criticisms of moral contractarianism
in Martha C. Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, and
Species Membership (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006).
See also my Justice, Reasons, and Moral Standing, in Rational Commitment
and Social Justice: Essays for Gregory Kavka, ed. Jules L. Coleman and
Christopher W. Morris (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp.
186207.
(35.) See the references in note 32. The argument I sketch here is developed
in my Moral Standing and Rational-Choice Contractarianism.
(36.) T. M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1998).
(37.) Compare two caregivers (e.g., baby-sitters), one who believes your
children have moral standing and a second who does not. The latter in other
respects is just like the first and will respect all obligations to the parents,
including those which benefit the children. Given the choice between these
caregivers, few parents would hire the second.
Page 28 of 29
(38.) For a passionate and moving expression of the view that we must
recognize the moral personhood (i.e., moral standing) of severely cognitively
disabled humans, see Eva Feder Kittay, The Personal is Philosophical is
Political: A Philosopher and Mother of a Cognitively Disabled Person Sends
Notes from the Battlefield, Metaphilosophy 40 (2009): 60627. Kittay's view
can, I think, find expression in a contractarian theory.
(39.) This contractarian account of the moral standing of some animals
has been developed by Andrew I. Cohen. See his Contractarianism, Other-
regarding Attitudes, and the Moral Standing of Nonhuman Animals, Journal
of Applied Philosophy 24 (2007): 188201; Dependent Relationships and
the Moral Standing of Nonhuman Animals, Ethics & the Environment 13
(2008): 121; and Contractarianism and Interspecies Welfare Conflicts,
Social Philosophy & Policy (2008): 22757.
(40.) See his contribution to this volume. Wayne Sumner has argued that
the beings accorded moral standing by contractarian moral theory are
determined largely by the concerns of the agents. See L. W. Sumner, A
Response to Morris, Values and Moral Standing, Bowling Green Studies in
Applied Philosophy 8, ed. Wayne Sumner et al. (Bowling Green, Ohio: Bowling
Green State University, 1986), 2223.
(41.) Philippa Foot, Moral Beliefs, in Virtues and Vices (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 2002 [1978]), p. 125.
(42.) Philippa Foot, Euthanasia, in Virtues and Vices (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 2002 [1977]), pp. 4445.
(47.) David Hume, An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding 3.18 (sect.
3, part 1, para. p. 18).
(48.) James Rachels, Drawing the Line, in Animal Rights: Current Debates
and New Directions, ed. Cass Sunstein and Martha Nussbaum (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 164.
Page 29 of 29
(49.) Rachels, Drawing the Line, pp. 16667.
(50.) Rachels, Drawing the Line, p. 182.
(51.) A similar view is expressed by Rosalind Hursthouse in her chapter of
this Handbook.
(52.) The second element in many traditional characterizations of an
imperfect duty is that it is not owed to anyone. I use the distinction between
perfect and imperfect duties to distinguish benevolence from justice in The
Trouble with Justice, in Morality and Self-Interest, ed. Paul Bloomfield (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2008): pp. 1530.
(53.) In an unpublished essay, The Status of Moral Status, Benjamin Sachs
defends a claim stronger than that of Rachels, that the notion of moral
status (or moral standing) just brings confusion to discussions about the
treatment of marginal cases, such as of individuals who do not have the
full set of capacities possessed by typical adult humans. His argument is
complex and points to the considerable lack of clarity about these concepts
in the literature. This chapter could help to alleviate some of that. I also
think, as I have in effect argued in a number of essays, that the notion
of moral standing has uses broader than treatments in contemporary
ethics of marginal cases. But I think he is right to worry about introducing a
technical notion that is ill-understood and about which there is considerable
disagreement.

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