Smoke Management Systems - WTC

NIST NCSTAR 1-4D
Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the

World Trade Center Disaster

Smoke Management Systems

Michael J . Ferreira
Steven M. Strege

NIST NCSTAR 1-4D

Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the
World Trade Center Disaster

Smoke Management Systems

Michael J . Ferreira
Steven M. Strege
Hughes Associates, Inc.

September 2005

U.S. Department of Commerce
Carlos M. Gutierrez, Secretary

Technology Administration
Michelle ONeill, Acting Under Secretary for Technology

National Institute of Standards and Technology
William Jeffrey, Director

Disclaimer No. 1
Certain commercial entities, equipment, products, or materials are identified in this document in order to describe a
procedure or concept adequately or to trace the history of the procedures and practices used. Such identification is
not intended to imply recommendation, endorsement, or implication that the entities, products, materials, or
equipment are necessarily the best available for the purpose. Nor does such identification imply a finding of fault or
negligence by the National Institute of Standards and Technology.

Disclaimer No. 2
The policy of NIST is to use the International System of Units (metric units) in all publications. In this document,
however, units are presented in metric units or the inch-pound system, whichever is prevalent in the discipline.

Disclaimer No. 3
Pursuant to section 7 of the National Construction Safety Team Act, the NIST Director has determined that certain
evidence received by NIST in the course of this Investigation is voluntarily provided safety-related information that is
not directly related to the building failure being investigated and that disclosure of that information would inhibit the
voluntary provision of that type of information (15 USC 7306c).
In addition, a substantial portion of the evidence collected by NIST in the course of the Investigation has been
provided to NIST under nondisclosure agreements.

Disclaimer No. 4
NIST takes no position as to whether the design or construction of a WTC building was compliant with any code
since, due to the destruction of the WTC buildings, NIST could not verify the actual (or as-built) construction, the
properties and condition of the materials used, or changes to the original construction made over the life of the
buildings. In addition, NIST could not verify the interpretations of codes used by applicable authorities in determining
compliance when implementing building codes. Where an Investigation report states whether a system was
designed or installed as required by a code provision, NIST has documentary or anecdotal evidence indicating
whether the requirement was met, or NIST has independently conducted tests or analyses indicating whether the
requirement was met.

Use in Legal Proceedings
No part of any report resulting from a NIST investigation into a structural failure or from an investigation under the
National Construction Safety Team Act may be used in any suit or action for damages arising out of any matter
mentioned in such report (15 USC 281a; as amended by P.L. 107-231).

National Institute of Standards and Technology National Construction Safety Team Act Report 1-4D
Natl. Inst. Stand. Technol. Natl. Constr. Sfty. Tm. Act Rpt. 1-4D, 248 pages (September 2005)
CODEN: NSPUE2

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON: 2005
_________________________________________

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2250
Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001

NIST NCSTAR 1-4D, WTC Investigation iii
ABSTRACT
This report documents the design and installation of the smoke management systems in World Trade
Center (WTC) 1, 2, and 7 and compares the designs to the requirements contained in applicable codes and
standards. The normal operation of the fully functional smoke management systems in WTC 1 and
WTC 2 on September 11, 2001, is also documented.
The report provides an overview of smoke management system concepts, discusses the various
considerations impacting smoke management system design, and provides a history of the development
of smoke control related requirements within various national codes and standards. The report also
summarizes the smoke management systems in WTC 1, 2, and 7, and the applicable Building Code of the
City of New York (BCNYC) requirements pertaining to smoke management systems for each building.
The performance of the installed smoke management systems for WTC 1 and WTC 2 as well as other
candidate smoke management system configurations were evaluated using the CONTAM building
airflow and contaminant dispersal computer model for specified fire scenarios. These scenarios included
the severe aircraft impact related event scenarios that occurred on September 11, 2001, in order to provide
a context in which to evaluate smoke management system performance in WTC 1 and WTC 2.
The report concludes that the smoke management systems in WTC 1 and WTC 2 were not initiated on
September 11, 2001, and had the designed smoke purge sequence been initiated it is unlikely that the
system would have functioned as designed, due to loss of electrical power and/or damage to the heating,
ventilating, and air conditioning (HVAC) shafts and other structural elements in the impact zone. In
addition, none of the potential smoke management system configurations evaluated in this report would
have provided sufficient pressure differentials to contain smoke for the postulated aircraft impact damage
scenarios, even if these systems were capable of operation after the building sustained damage from the
aircraft impact. The report further concludes that stair pressurization would have been ineffective in
improving conditions for occupants trying to exit the building.
Installation of combination fire/smoke dampers in HVAC ductwork, which was not required in WTC 1 or
WTC 2, would have acted to slow the development of hazardous conditions on the uppermost floors of
the building, but would likely not have had a significant effect on the ability of occupants to egress the
building due to the impassibility of the exit stairways.
Keywords: airflow, building codes, modeling, smoke, smoke management, World Trade Center

Abstract
iv NIST NCSTAR 1-4D, WTC Investigation

This page intentionally left blank.

NIST NCSTAR 1-4D, WTC Investigation v
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abstract........................................................................................................................................................iii
List of Figures..............................................................................................................................................ix
List of Tables...............................................................................................................................................xi
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations.........................................................................................................xiii
Preface......................................................................................................................................................xvii
Executive Summary................................................................................................................................xxvii
Chapter 1
Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 1
1.1 Scope................................................................................................................................................ 1
1.2 Objectives........................................................................................................................................ 1
1.3 Primary Tasks.................................................................................................................................. 2
Chapter 2
Background ................................................................................................................................. 5
2.1 Smoke Management Concepts......................................................................................................... 5
2.1.1 Definition of Important Terms............................................................................................. 5
2.1.2 Smoke Management Approaches......................................................................................... 6
2.1.3 Factors Affecting Smoke Management.............................................................................. 12
2.1.4 Smoke Management System Reliability............................................................................ 16
2.2 Evolution of Smoke Management System Code Requirements.................................................... 19
2.2.1 Historical Milestones.......................................................................................................... 19
2.2.2 Smoke Management in the Model Building Codes............................................................ 21
2.3 References...................................................................................................................................... 23
Chapter 3
Applicable Codes and Standards ............................................................................................ 27
3.1 Building Code of New York City.................................................................................................. 27
3.2 WTC 1 and WTC 2 Code Requirements....................................................................................... 28
3.2.1 Compartmentation.............................................................................................................. 28
3.2.2 Fire/Smoke Dampers.......................................................................................................... 29
3.2.3 Smoke and Heat Detectors................................................................................................. 30
3.2.4 Smoke and Heat Venting.................................................................................................... 31
3.2.5 Stair Pressurization............................................................................................................. 31
Table of Contents
vi NIST NCSTAR 1-4D, WTC Investigation
3.2.6 Fire Safety Plan.................................................................................................................. 32
3.3 WTC 7 Code Requirements........................................................................................................... 32
3.3.2 Smoke and Heat Detectors................................................................................................. 33
3.3.3 Emergency Power............................................................................................................... 33
3.3.4 Smoke Control.................................................................................................................... 34
3.3.5 Smoke Purge....................................................................................................................... 34
3.3.6 Stair Pressurization............................................................................................................. 34
3.3.7 Fire Safety Plan.................................................................................................................. 35
3.4 References...................................................................................................................................... 35
Chapter 4
Building Descriptions ............................................................................................................... 37
4.1 WTC 1 and WTC 2........................................................................................................................ 37
4.1.1 Architectural Features........................................................................................................ 37
4.1.2 HVAC Systems.................................................................................................................. 41
4.1.3 Electrical Systems.............................................................................................................. 49
4.2 WTC 7............................................................................................................................................ 49
4.2.1 Architectural Features........................................................................................................ 49
4.2.2 HVAC Systems.................................................................................................................. 51
4.2.3 Electrical Systems.............................................................................................................. 53
4.3 References...................................................................................................................................... 53
Chapter 5
Relevant HistoryPast Studies and Fire-Related Events..................................................... 55
5.1 WTC 1 FireFebruary 13, 1975................................................................................................... 55
5.1.1 Post-Event Building Modifications1975 Fire................................................................. 56
5.1.2 Important Considerations1975 Fire................................................................................ 56
5.2 WTC BombingFebruary 26, 1993............................................................................................. 57
5.2.1 Post-Event Building Modifications1993 Bombing........................................................ 58
5.2.2 Important Considerations1993 Bombing....................................................................... 58
5.3 Engineering Studies....................................................................................................................... 59
5.3.1 Prototype Stair Pressurization System Study..................................................................... 59
5.3.2 Rolf J ensen Smoke Movement Analysis............................................................................ 60
5.3.3 Hughes/Dillon Smoke Management System Evaluation.................................................... 60
5.4 References...................................................................................................................................... 62
Table of Contents

Chapter 6
Smoke Management System Design and Installation ........................................................... 63
6.1 WTC 1 and WTC 2........................................................................................................................ 63
6.1.1 Sequence of Operations...................................................................................................... 64
6.1.2 Applicable Code Requirements.......................................................................................... 67
6.1.3 Emergency Power............................................................................................................... 67
6.2 WTC 7............................................................................................................................................ 68
6.2.1 Sequence of Operations...................................................................................................... 68
6.2.2 Applicable Code Requirements.......................................................................................... 69
6.3 References...................................................................................................................................... 70
Chapter 7
Evaluation of System Performance on September 11, 2001................................................. 71
7.1 Actions of Emergency Response Personnel................................................................................... 71
7.2 Damage to System Components.................................................................................................... 72
7.2.1 Exit Stair and Elevator Shaft Damage................................................................................ 76
7.2.2 Exterior Observations......................................................................................................... 77
7.2.3 Status of Power................................................................................................................... 79
7.3 Summary........................................................................................................................................ 80
7.4 References...................................................................................................................................... 81
Chapter 8
Evaluation of Potential Smoke Management System Effectiveness ................................... 83
8.1 Smoke Management System Approaches...................................................................................... 83
8.1.1 Smoke Purge....................................................................................................................... 84
8.1.2 Core Pressurization............................................................................................................. 84
8.1.3 Building Pressurization...................................................................................................... 85
8.1.4 Sandwich Pressurization..................................................................................................... 85
8.1.5 Zoned Smoke Control With Stair Pressurization............................................................... 86
8.2 Design Fire Scenarios.................................................................................................................... 87
8.2.1 Sprinklered Fire.................................................................................................................. 87
8.2.2 Full-Floor Burnout............................................................................................................. 87
8.2.3 Two-Floor Fire................................................................................................................... 88
8.2.4 WTC 1 and WTC 2, September 11, 2001, Fire Scenarios (No Shaft Damage) ................. 88
8.2.5 WTC 1 and WTC 2, September 11, 2001, Fire Scenarios (Shaft Damage Assumed) ....... 88
Table of Contents
viii NIST NCSTAR 1-4D, WTC Investigation
8.3 Methods of Analysis...................................................................................................................... 89
8.3.1 CONTAM Building Airflow Model................................................................................... 90
8.3.2 System Performance Criteria.............................................................................................. 92
8.3.3 Calibration of the Model .................................................................................................... 94
8.4 Results of Analysis........................................................................................................................ 95
8.4.1 Sprinklered Fire ScenarioResults..................................................................................... 95
8.4.2 Full-Floor Burnout ScenarioResults................................................................................. 96
8.4.3 Two-Floor Fire ScenarioResults..................................................................................... 97
8.4.4 WTC 1 and WTC 2, September 11, 2001, Fire Scenarios (No Shaft Damage)
Results................................................................................................................................ 97
8.4.5 WTC 1 and WTC 2, September 11, 2001, Fire Scenarios (Shaft Damage
Assumed)Results............................................................................................................ 99
8.5 Summary of Analysis................................................................................................................... 100
8.6 References.................................................................................................................................... 105
Chapter 9
Summary.................................................................................................................................. 107
9.1 Evaluation of Smoke Management Systems Available on September 11, 2001......................... 107
9.2 Alternate Means of Smoke Management..................................................................................... 108
9.2.1 Design Requirements in Prevailing Codes and Standards................................................ 108
9.2.2 Past Recommendations for Changes to Smoke Management Systems............................ 109
9.2.3 Summary of Potential Changes........................................................................................ 109
9.3 Evaluation of Smoke Management System Performance............................................................ 110
9.3.1 Impact of Stair Pressurization Systems............................................................................ 111
9.3.2 Smoke Dampers............................................................................................................... 111
9.4 Summary of Results..................................................................................................................... 112
Appendix A
NIST Preliminary Damage Estimates .................................................................................... 113
Appendix B
CONTAM Model Construction ............................................................................................... 129
Appendix C
CONTAM Model Calibration ................................................................................................... 161

NIST NCSTAR 1-4D, WTC Investigation ix
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure P1. The eight projects in the federal building and fire safety investigation of the WTC
disaster. .................................................................................................................................xix

Figure 21. Exhaust method of smoke management................................................................................... 7
Figure 22. Positive pressurization smoke management system................................................................. 9
Figure 23. Negative pressurization smoke management system............................................................. 10
Figure 24. Airflow method of smoke management................................................................................. 12
Figure 25. Building airflows due to winter stack effect. ......................................................................... 13
Figure 26. Wind forces on WTC 1.......................................................................................................... 15

Figure 41. Floor layout, 95th floor, WTC 1. ........................................................................................... 38
Figure 43. Stair and elevator shafts, WTC 1 and WTC 2........................................................................ 40
Figure 44. Location of MERs, WTC 1 and WTC 2. ............................................................................... 42
Figure 45. HVAC zones per floor, WTC 1 and WTC 2.......................................................................... 43
Figure 46. Schematic, supply HVAC units, lower level 75th floor MER, WTC 2. ................................ 44
Figure 47. Air distribution system, 80th floor, WTC 2. .......................................................................... 45
Figure 48. Exhaust HVAC units, upper level 75th floor MER, WTC 2.................................................. 46

Figure 61. Documented smoke purge sequence of operations, WTC 1 and WTC 2............................... 65
Figure 62. Documented smoke management sequence, WTC 7............................................................. 69

Figure 71. Preliminary damage estimates, WTC 1.................................................................................. 74
Figure 72. Preliminary damage estimates, WTC 2.................................................................................. 75
Figure 73. Impact damage to north and west faces of WTC 1. ............................................................... 78

Figure 81. Modeled versus real flow conditions. .................................................................................... 92
Figure 82. Effect of core pressure on airflows in impact zones. ............................................................. 98

List of Figures
x NIST NCSTAR 1-4D, WTC Investigation


NIST NCSTAR 1-4D, WTC Investigation xi
LIST OF TABLES
Table P1. Federal building and fire safety investigation of the WTC disaster....................................xviii
Table P2. Public meetings and briefings of the WTC Investigation. ....................................................xxi

Table 81. Smoke purge sequence of operations..................................................................................... 84
Table 82. Core pressurization sequence of operations........................................................................... 85
Table 83. Building pressurization sequence of operations..................................................................... 85
Table 84. Sandwich pressurization sequence of operations................................................................... 86
Table 85. Zoned smoke control with stair pressurization sequence of operations................................. 86
Table 86a. CONTAM modeling results, sprinklered fire scenario........................................................ 101
Table 86b. CONTAM modeling results, full-floor burnout and two-floor fire scenario. ...................... 102
Table 86c. CONTAM modeling results, WTC 1 and WTC 2 (no shaft damage) fire scenarios. .......... 103
Table 86d. CONTAM modeling results, WTC 1 and WTC 2 (with shaft damage) fire scenarios. ....... 104

List of Tables
xii NIST NCSTAR 1-4D, WTC Investigation


NIST NCSTAR 1-4D, WTC Investigation xiii
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
Acronyms
AHU air handling unit
ANSI American National Standards Institute
ASHRAE American Society of Heating, Refrigerating, and Air-Conditioning Engineers
ASTM ASTM International
BCNYC Building Code of the City of New York
BOCA Building Officials and Code Administrators
CFAST Consolidated Fire and Smoke Transport
CFD computational fluid dynamics
Con Ed Consolidated Edison
CONTAM National Institute of Standards and Technology Building Airflow and Contaminant
Dispersal Model
DCE Dillon Consulting Engineers
DTAP dissemination and technical assistance program
EMR elevator machine room
FCU fan coil unit
FDNY New York City Fire Department
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency
GSA General Services Administration
HAI Hughes Associates, Inc.
HVAC heating, ventilating, and air conditioning
IBC International Building Code
ICC International Code Council
J FK J ohn F. Kennedy International Airport
MER mechanical equipment room
NBFU National Board of Fire Underwriters
NFPA National Fire Protection Association
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations
xiv NIST NCSTAR 1-4D, WTC Investigation
NRCC National Research Council Canada
NYBFU New York Bureau of Fire Underwriters
NYPD New York City Police Department
OCC Operations Control Center
PANYNJ Port Authority of New York and New J ersey
PATH Port Authority Trans-Hudson
R&D research and development
RJ A Rolf J ensen & Associates
SFBC San Francisco Building Code
SFPE Society of Fire Protection Engineers
SSB Salomon Smith Barney
UBC Uniform Building Code
UL Underwriters Laboratories
USC United States Code
UUKL Underwriters Laboratories Product CategorySmoke Control Equipment
VAV variable air volume
WTC World Trade Center
WTC 1 World Trade Center 1 (North Tower)
WTC 2 World Trade Center 2 (South Tower)
WTC 7 World Trade Center 7
Abbreviations
C degrees Celsius
F degrees Fahrenheit
m micrometer
cfm cubic feet per minute
ft foot
ft/min foot per minute
ft
2
square foot
ft
3
cubic feet
H
2
O water
in. inch
NIST NCSTAR 1-4D, WTC Investigation xv
in. H
2
O inches of water gauge (unit of pressure)
in.
2
square inch
L liter
lb pound
lb
f
pounds-force
m meter
m
2
square meter
m
3
/h cubic meter per hour
mph miles per hour
min minute
MW megawatt
N newton
Pa pascal
s second
V volt

xvi NIST NCSTAR 1-4D, WTC Investigation


NIST NCSTAR 1-4D, WTC Investigation xvii
PREFACE
Genesis of This Investigation
Immediately following the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center (WTC) on September 11, 2001, the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the American Society of Civil Engineers began
planning a building performance study of the disaster. The week of October 7, as soon as the rescue and
search efforts ceased, the Building Performance Study Team went to the site and began its assessment.
This was to be a brief effort, as the study team consisted of experts who largely volunteered their time
away from their other professional commitments. The Building Performance Study Team issued its
report in May 2002, fulfilling its goal to determine probable failure mechanisms and to identify areas of
future investigation that could lead to practical measures for improving the damage resistance of buildings
against such unforeseen events.
On August 21, 2002, with funding from the U.S. Congress through FEMA, the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) announced its building and fire safety investigation of the WTC
disaster. On October 1, 2002, the National Construction Safety Team Act (Public Law 107-231), was
signed into law. The NIST WTC Investigation was conducted under the authority of the National
Construction Safety Team Act.
The goals of the investigation of the WTC disaster were:
To investigate the building construction, the materials used, and the technical conditions that
contributed to the outcome of the WTC disaster.
To serve as the basis for:
Improvements in the way buildings are designed, constructed, maintained, and used;
Improved tools and guidance for industry and safety officials;
Recommended revisions to current codes, standards, and practices; and
Improved public safety.
The specific objectives were:
1. Determine why and how WTC 1 and WTC 2 collapsed following the initial impacts of the
aircraft and why and how WTC 7 collapsed;
2. Determine why the injuries and fatalities were so high or low depending on location,
including all technical aspects of fire protection, occupant behavior, evacuation, and
emergency response;
3. Determine what procedures and practices were used in the design, construction, operation,
and maintenance of WTC 1, 2, and 7; and
4. Identify, as specifically as possible, areas in current building and fire codes, standards, and
practices that warrant revision.
Preface
xviii NIST NCSTAR 1-4D, WTC Investigation
NIST is a nonregulatory agency of the U.S. Department of Commerces Technology Administration. The
purpose of NIST investigations is to improve the safety and structural integrity of buildings in the United
States, and the focus is on fact finding. NIST investigative teams are authorized to assess building
performance and emergency response and evacuation procedures in the wake of any building failure that
has resulted in substantial loss of life or that posed significant potential of substantial loss of life. NIST
does not have the statutory authority to make findings of fault nor negligence by individuals or
organizations. Further, no part of any report resulting from a NIST investigation into a building failure or
from an investigation under the National Construction Safety Team Act may be used in any suit or action
for damages arising out of any matter mentioned in such report (15 USC 281a, as amended by Public
Law 107-231).
Organization of the Investigation
The National Construction Safety Team for this Investigation, appointed by the then NIST Director,
Dr. Arden L. Bement, J r., was led by Dr. S. Shyam Sunder. Dr. William L. Grosshandler served as
Associate Lead Investigator, Mr. Stephen A. Cauffman served as Program Manager for Administration,
and Mr. Harold E. Nelson served on the team as a private sector expert. The Investigation included eight
interdependent projects whose leaders comprised the remainder of the team. A detailed description of
each of these eight projects is available at http://wtc.nist.gov. The purpose of each project is summarized
in Table P1, and the key interdependencies among the projects are illustrated in Fig. P1.
Table P1. Federal building and fire safety investigation of the WTC disaster.
Technical Area and Project Leader Project Purpose
Analysis of Building and Fire Codes and
Practices; Project Leaders: Dr. H. S. Lew
and Mr. Richard W. Bukowski
Document and analyze the code provisions, procedures, and
practices used in the design, construction, operation, and
maintenance of the structural, passive fire protection, and
emergency access and evacuation systems of WTC 1, 2, and 7.
Baseline Structural Performance and
Aircraft Impact Damage Analysis; Project
Leader: Dr. Fahim H. Sadek
Analyze the baseline performance of WTC 1 and WTC 2 under
design, service, and abnormal loads, and aircraft impact damage on
the structural, fire protection, and egress systems.
Mechanical and Metallurgical Analysis of
Structural Steel; Project Leader: Dr. Frank
W. Gayle
Determine and analyze the mechanical and metallurgical properties
and quality of steel, weldments, and connections from steel
recovered from WTC 1, 2, and 7.
Investigation of Active Fire Protection
Systems; Project Leader: Dr. David
D. Evans; Dr. William Grosshandler
Investigate the performance of the active fire protection systems in
WTC 1, 2, and 7 and their role in fire control, emergency response,
and fate of occupants and responders.
Reconstruction of Thermal and Tenability
Environment; Project Leader: Dr. Richard
G. Gann
Reconstruct the time-evolving temperature, thermal environment,
and smoke movement in WTC 1, 2, and 7 for use in evaluating the
structural performance of the buildings and behavior and fate of
occupants and responders.
Structural Fire Response and Collapse
Analysis; Project Leaders: Dr. J ohn
L. Gross and Dr. Therese P. McAllister
Analyze the response of the WTC towers to fires with and without
aircraft damage, the response of WTC 7 in fires, the performance
of composite steel-trussed floor systems, and determine the most
probable structural collapse sequence for WTC 1, 2, and 7.
Occupant Behavior, Egress, and Emergency
Communications; Project Leader: Mr. J ason
D. Averill
Analyze the behavior and fate of occupants and responders, both
those who survived and those who did not, and the performance of
the evacuation system.
Emergency Response Technologies and
Guidelines; Project Leader: Mr. J . Randall
Lawson
Document the activities of the emergency responders from the time
of the terrorist attacks on WTC 1 and WTC 2 until the collapse of
WTC 7, including practices followed and technologies used.
Preface
NIST NCSTAR 1-4D, WTC Investigation xix
NIST WTC Investigation Projects NIST WTC Investigation Projects
Analysis of
Steel
Structural
Collapse
Evacuation
Baseline
Performance
& Impact
Damage
Analysis of
Codes and
Practices
Emergency
Response
Active Fire
Protection
Thermal and
Tenability
Environment
Video/
Photographic
Records
Oral History Data
Emergency
Response
Records
Recovered
Structural Steel
WTC Bui lding
Performance Study
Recommendations
Government,
Industry,
Professional ,
Academic Inputs
Public Inputs

Figure P1. The eight projects in the federal building and fire safety
investigation of the WTC disaster.
National Construction Safety Team Advisory Committee
The NIST Director also established an advisory committee as mandated under the National Construction
Safety Team Act. The initial members of the committee were appointed following a public solicitation.
These were:
Paul Fitzgerald, Executive Vice President (retired) FM Global, National Construction Safety
Team Advisory Committee Chair
J ohn Barsom, President, Barsom Consulting, Ltd.
J ohn Bryan, Professor Emeritus, University of Maryland
David Collins, President, The Preview Group, Inc.
Glenn Corbett, Professor, J ohn J ay College of Criminal J ustice
Philip DiNenno, President, Hughes Associates, Inc.
Preface
xx NIST NCSTAR 1-4D, WTC Investigation
Robert Hanson, Professor Emeritus, University of Michigan
Charles Thornton, Co-Chairman and Managing Principal, The Thornton-Tomasetti Group,
Inc.
Kathleen Tierney, Director, Natural Hazards Research and Applications Information Center,
University of Colorado at Boulder
Forman Williams, Director, Center for Energy Research, University of California at San
Diego
This National Construction Safety Team Advisory Committee provided technical advice during the
Investigation and commentary on drafts of the Investigation reports prior to their public release. NIST
has benefited from the work of many people in the preparation of these reports, including the National
Construction Safety Team Advisory Committee. The content of the reports and recommendations,
however, are solely the responsibility of NIST.
Public Outreach
During the course of this Investigation, NIST held public briefings and meetings (listed in Table P2) to
solicit input from the public, present preliminary findings, and obtain comments on the direction and
progress of the Investigation from the public and the Advisory Committee.
NIST maintained a publicly accessible Web site during this Investigation at http://wtc.nist.gov. The site
contained extensive information on the background and progress of the Investigation.
NISTs WTC Public-Private Response Plan
The collapse of the WTC buildings has led to broad reexamination of how tall buildings are designed,
constructed, maintained, and used, especially with regard to major events such as fires, natural disasters,
and terrorist attacks. Reflecting the enhanced interest in effecting necessary change, NIST, with support
from Congress and the Administration, has put in place a program, the goal of which is to develop and
implement the standards, technology, and practices needed for cost-effective improvements to the safety
and security of buildings and building occupants, including evacuation, emergency response procedures,
and threat mitigation.
The strategy to meet this goal is a three-part NIST-led public-private response program that includes:
A federal building and fire safety investigation to study the most probable factors that
contributed to post-aircraft impact collapse of the WTC towers and the 47-story WTC 7
building, and the associated evacuation and emergency response experience.
A research and development (R&D) program to (a) facilitate the implementation of
recommendations resulting from the WTC Investigation, and (b) provide the technical basis
for cost-effective improvements to national building and fire codes, standards, and practices
that enhance the safety of buildings, their occupants, and emergency responders.
Preface
NIST NCSTAR 1-4D, WTC Investigation xxi
Table P2. Public meetings and briefings of the WTC Investigation.
Date Location Principal Agenda
J une 24, 2002 New York City, NY Public meeting: Public comments on the Draft Plan for the
pending WTC Investigation.
August 21, 2002 Gaithersburg, MD Media briefing announcing the formal start of the Investigation.
December 9, 2002 Washington, DC Media briefing on release of the Public Update and NIST request
for photographs and videos.
April 8, 2003

New York City, NY J oint public forum with Columbia University on first-person
interviews.
April 2930, 2003 Gaithersburg, MD NCST Advisory Committee meeting on plan for and progress on
WTC Investigation with a public comment session.
May 7, 2003 New York City, NY Media briefing on release of May 2003 Progress Report.
August 2627, 2003 Gaithersburg, MD NCST Advisory Committee meeting on status of the WTC
investigation with a public comment session.
September 17, 2003 New York City, NY Media and public briefing on initiation of first-person data
collection projects.
December 23, 2003 Gaithersburg, MD NCST Advisory Committee meeting on status and initial results
and release of the Public Update with a public comment session.
February 12, 2004 New York City, NY Public meeting on progress and preliminary findings with public
comments on issues to be considered in formulating final
recommendations.
J une 18, 2004 New York City, NY Media/public briefing on release of June 2004 Progress Report.
J une 2223, 2004 Gaithersburg, MD NCST Advisory Committee meeting on the status of and
preliminary findings from the WTC Investigation with a public
comment session.
August 24, 2004 Northbrook, IL Public viewing of standard fire resistance test of WTC floor
system at Underwriters Laboratories, Inc.
October 1920, 2004 Gaithersburg, MD NCST Advisory Committee meeting on status and near complete
set of preliminary findings with a public comment session.
November 22, 2004 Gaithersburg, MD NCST Advisory Committee discussion on draft annual report to
Congress, a public comment session, and a closed session to
discuss pre-draft recommendations for WTC Investigation.
April 5, 2005 New York City, NY Media and public briefing on release of the probable collapse
sequence for the WTC towers and draft reports for the projects on
codes and practices, evacuation, and emergency response.
J une 23, 2005 New York City, NY Media and public briefing on release of all draft reports for the
WTC towers and draft recommendations for public comment.
September 1213,
2005
Gaithersburg, MD NCST Advisory Committee meeting on disposition of public
comments and update to draft reports for the WTC towers.
September 1315,
2005
Gaithersburg, MD WTC Technical Conference for stakeholders and technical
community for dissemination of findings and recommendations
and opportunity for public to make technical comments.
A dissemination and technical assistance program (DTAP) to (a) engage leaders of the
construction and building community in ensuring timely adoption and widespread use of
proposed changes to practices, standards, and codes resulting from the WTC Investigation
and the R&D program, and (b) provide practical guidance and tools to better prepare facility
owners, contractors, architects, engineers, emergency responders, and regulatory authorities
to respond to future disasters.
The desired outcomes are to make buildings, occupants, and first responders safer in future disaster
events.
Preface
xxii NIST NCSTAR 1-4D, WTC Investigation
National Construction Safety Team Reports on the WTC Investigation
A final report on the collapse of the WTC towers is being issued as NIST NCSTAR 1. A companion
report on the collapse of WTC 7 is being issued as NIST NCSTAR 1A. The present report is one of a set
that provides more detailed documentation of the Investigation findings and the means by which these
technical results were achieved. As such, it is part of the archival record of this Investigation. The titles
of the full set of Investigation publications are:
NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology). 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety
Investigation of the World Trade Center Disaster: Final Report on the Collapse of the World Trade
Center Towers. NIST NCSTAR 1. Gaithersburg, MD, September.
NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology). 2006. Federal Building and Fire Safety
Investigation of the World Trade Center Disaster: Final Report on the Collapse of World Trade Center 7.
NIST NCSTAR 1A. Gaithersburg, MD.
Lew, H. S., R. W. Bukowski, and N. J . Carino. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of
the World Trade Center Disaster: Design, Construction, and Maintenance of Structural and Life Safety
Systems. NIST NCSTAR 1-1. National Institute of Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg, MD,
September.
Fanella, D. A., A. T. Derecho, and S. K. Ghosh. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety
Investigation of the World Trade Center Disaster: Design and Construction of Structural Systems.
NIST NCSTAR 1-1A. National Institute of Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg, MD,
September.
Ghosh, S. K., and X. Liang. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World
Trade Center Disaster: Comparison of Building Code Structural Requirements. NIST
NCSTAR 1-1B. National Institute of Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg, MD, September.
Fanella, D. A., A. T. Derecho, and S. K. Ghosh. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety
Investigation of the World Trade Center Disaster: Maintenance and Modifications to Structural
Systems. NIST NCSTAR 1-1C. National Institute of Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg,
MD, September.
Grill, R. A., and D. A. J ohnson. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World
Trade Center Disaster: Fire Protection and Life Safety Provisions Applied to the Design and
Construction of World Trade Center 1, 2, and 7 and Post-Construction Provisions Applied after
Occupancy. NIST NCSTAR 1-1D. National Institute of Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg,
MD, September.
Razza, J . C., and R. A. Grill. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World
Trade Center Disaster: Comparison of Codes, Standards, and Practices in Use at the Time of the
Design and Construction of World Trade Center 1, 2, and 7. NIST NCSTAR 1-1E. National
Institute of Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg, MD, September.
Grill, R. A., D. A. J ohnson, and D. A. Fanella. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety
Investigation of the World Trade Center Disaster: Comparison of the 1968 and Current (2003) New
Preface
NIST NCSTAR 1-4D, WTC Investigation xxiii
York City Building Code Provisions. NIST NCSTAR 1-1F. National Institute of Standards and
Technology. Gaithersburg, MD, September.
Trade Center Disaster: Amendments to the Fire Protection and Life Safety Provisions of the New
York City Building Code by Local Laws Adopted While World Trade Center 1, 2, and 7 Were in
Use. NIST NCSTAR 1-1G. National Institute of Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg, MD,
September.
Trade Center Disaster: Post-Construction Modifications to Fire Protection and Life Safety Systems
of World Trade Center 1 and 2. NIST NCSTAR 1-1H. National Institute of Standards and
Grill, R. A., D. A. J ohnson, and D. A. Fanella. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation
of the World Trade Center Disaster: Post-Construction Modifications to Fire Protection, Life
Safety, and Structural Systems of World Trade Center 7. NIST NCSTAR 1-1I. National Institute of
Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg, MD, September.
Trade Center Disaster: Design, Installation, and Operation of Fuel System for Emergency Power in
World Trade Center 7. NIST NCSTAR 1-1J . National Institute of Standards and Technology.
Gaithersburg, MD, September.
Sadek, F. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade Center Disaster:
Baseline Structural Performance and Aircraft Impact Damage Analysis of the World Trade Center
Towers. NIST NCSTAR 1-2. National Institute of Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg, MD,
September.
Faschan, W. J ., and R. B. Garlock. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the
World Trade Center Disaster: Reference Structural Models and Baseline Performance Analysis of
the World Trade Center Towers. NIST NCSTAR 1-2A. National Institute of Standards and
Kirkpatrick, S. W., R. T. Bocchieri, F. Sadek, R. A. MacNeill, S. Holmes, B. D. Peterson,
R. W. Cilke, C. Navarro. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade
Center Disaster: Analysis of Aircraft Impacts into the World Trade Center Towers, NIST
NCSTAR 1-2B. National Institute of Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg, MD, September.
Gayle, F. W., R. J . Fields, W. E. Luecke, S. W. Banovic, T. Foecke, C. N. McCowan, T. A. Siewert, and
J . D. McColskey. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade Center
Disaster: Mechanical and Metallurgical Analysis of Structural Steel. NIST NCSTAR 1-3. National
Luecke, W. E., T. A. Siewert, and F. W. Gayle. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety
Investigation of the World Trade Center Disaster: Contemporaneous Structural Steel
Specifications. NIST Special Publication 1-3A. National Institute of Standards and Technology.
Preface
xxiv NIST NCSTAR 1-4D, WTC Investigation
Banovic, S. W. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade Center
Disaster: Steel Inventory and Identification. NIST NCSTAR 1-3B. National Institute of Standards
and Technology. Gaithersburg, MD, September.
Banovic, S. W., and T. Foecke. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World
Trade Center Disaster: Damage and Failure Modes of Structural Steel Components. NIST
NCSTAR 1-3C. National Institute of Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg, MD, September.
Luecke, W. E., J . D. McColskey, C. N. McCowan, S. W. Banovic, R. J . Fields, T. Foecke,
T. A. Siewert, and F. W. Gayle. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World
Trade Center Disaster: Mechanical Properties of Structural Steels. NIST NCSTAR 1-3D.
National Institute of Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg, MD, September.
Banovic, S. W., C. N. McCowan, and W. E. Luecke. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety
Investigation of the World Trade Center Disaster: Physical Properties of Structural Steels. NIST
NCSTAR 1-3E. National Institute of Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg, MD, September.
Evans, D. D., R. D. Peacock, E. D. Kuligowski, W. S. Dols, and W. L. Grosshandler. 2005. Federal
Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade Center Disaster: Active Fire Protection
Systems. NIST NCSTAR 1-4. National Institute of Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg, MD,
September.
Kuligowski, E. D., D. D. Evans, and R. D. Peacock. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety
Investigation of the World Trade Center Disaster: Post-Construction Fires Prior to September 11,
2001. NIST NCSTAR 1-4A. National Institute of Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg, MD,
September.
Hopkins, M., J . Schoenrock, and E. Budnick. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation
of the World Trade Center Disaster: Fire Suppression Systems. NIST NCSTAR 1-4B. National
Keough, R. J ., and R. A. Grill. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World
Trade Center Disaster: Fire Alarm Systems. NIST NCSTAR 1-4C. National Institute of Standards
and Technology. Gaithersburg, MD, September.
Ferreira, M. J ., and S. M. Strege. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the
World Trade Center Disaster: Smoke Management Systems. NIST NCSTAR 1-4D. National
Gann, R. G., A. Hamins, K. B. McGrattan, G. W. Mulholland, H. E. Nelson, T. J . Ohlemiller,
W. M. Pitts, and K. R. Prasad. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade
Center Disaster: Reconstruction of the Fires in the World Trade Center Towers. NIST NCSTAR 1-5.
Pitts, W. M., K. M. Butler, and V. J unker. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of
the World Trade Center Disaster: Visual Evidence, Damage Estimates, and Timeline Analysis.
NIST NCSTAR 1-5A. National Institute of Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg, MD,
September.
Preface
NIST NCSTAR 1-4D, WTC Investigation xxv
Hamins, A., A. Maranghides, K. B. McGrattan, E. J ohnsson, T. J . Ohlemiller, M. Donnelly,
J . Yang, G. Mulholland, K. R. Prasad, S. Kukuck, R. Anleitner and T. McAllister. 2005. Federal
Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade Center Disaster: Experiments and
Modeling of Structural Steel Elements Exposed to Fire. NIST NCSTAR 1-5B. National Institute of
Ohlemiller, T. J ., G. W. Mulholland, A. Maranghides, J . J . Filliben, and R. G. Gann. 2005. Federal
Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade Center Disaster: Fire Tests of Single
Office Workstations. NIST NCSTAR 1-5C. National Institute of Standards and Technology.
Gann, R. G., M. A. Riley, J . M. Repp, A. S. Whittaker, A. M. Reinhorn, and P. A. Hough. 2005.
Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade Center Disaster: Reaction of
Ceiling Tile Systems to Shocks. NIST NCSTAR 1-5D. National Institute of Standards and
Hamins, A., A. Maranghides, K. B. McGrattan, T. J . Ohlemiller, and R. Anleitner. 2005. Federal
Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade Center Disaster: Experiments and
Modeling of Multiple Workstations Burning in a Compartment. NIST NCSTAR 1-5E. National
McGrattan, K. B., C. Bouldin, and G. Forney. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety
Investigation of the World Trade Center Disaster: Computer Simulation of the Fires in the World
Trade Center Towers. NIST NCSTAR 1-5F. National Institute of Standards and Technology.
Prasad, K. R., and H. R. Baum. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World
Trade Center Disaster: Fire Structure Interface and Thermal Response of the World Trade Center
Towers. NIST NCSTAR 1-5G. National Institute of Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg,
MD, September.
Gross, J . L., and T. McAllister. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade
Center Disaster: Structural Fire Response and Probable Collapse Sequence of the World Trade Center
Towers. NIST NCSTAR 1-6. National Institute of Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg, MD,
September.
Carino, N. J ., M. A. Starnes, J . L. Gross, J . C. Yang, S. Kukuck, K. R. Prasad, and R. W. Bukowski.
2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade Center Disaster: Passive
Fire Protection. NIST NCSTAR 1-6A. National Institute of Standards and Technology.
Gross, J ., F. Hervey, M. Izydorek, J . Mammoser, and J . Treadway. 2005. Federal Building and
Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade Center Disaster: Fire Resistance Tests of Floor Truss
Systems. NIST NCSTAR 1-6B. National Institute of Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg,
MD, September.
Zarghamee, M. S., S. Bolourchi, D. W. Eggers, . O. Erbay, F. W. Kan, Y. Kitane, A. A. Liepins,
M. Mudlock, W. I. Naguib, R. P. Ojdrovic, A. T. Sarawit, P. R Barrett, J . L. Gross, and
Preface
xxvi NIST NCSTAR 1-4D, WTC Investigation
T. P. McAllister. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade Center
Disaster: Component, Connection, and Subsystem Structural Analysis. NIST NCSTAR 1-6C.
Zarghamee, M. S., Y. Kitane, . O. Erbay, T. P. McAllister, and J . L. Gross. 2005. Federal
Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade Center Disaster: Global Structural
Analysis of the Response of the World Trade Center Towers to Impact Damage and Fire. NIST
NCSTAR 1-6D. National Institute of Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg, MD, September.
McAllister, T., R. W. Bukowski, R. G. Gann, J . L. Gross, K. B. McGrattan, H. E. Nelson, L. Phan,
W. M. Pitts, K. R. Prasad, F. Sadek. 2006. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World
Trade Center Disaster: Structural Fire Response and Probable Collapse Sequence of World Trade
Center 7. (Provisional). NIST NCSTAR 1-6E. National Institute of Standards and Technology.
Gaithersburg, MD.
Gilsanz, R., V. Arbitrio, C. Anders, D. Chlebus, K. Ezzeldin, W. Guo, P. Moloney, A. Montalva,
J . Oh, K. Rubenacker. 2006. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade
Center Disaster: Structural Analysis of the Response of World Trade Center 7 to Debris Damage
and Fire. (Provisional). NIST NCSTAR 1-6F. National Institute of Standards and Technology.
Gaithersburg, MD.
Kim, W. 2006. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade Center
Disaster: Analysis of September 11, 2001, Seismogram Data. (Provisional). NIST NCSTAR 1-6G.
National Institute of Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg, MD.
Nelson, K. 2006. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade Center
Disaster: The Con Ed Substation in World Trade Center 7. (Provisional). NIST NCSTAR 1-6H.
National Institute of Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg, MD.
Averill, J . D., D. S. Mileti, R. D. Peacock, E. D. Kuligowski, N. Groner, G. Proulx, P. A. Reneke, and
H. E. Nelson. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade Center Disaster:
Occupant Behavior, Egress, and Emergency Communication. NIST NCSTAR 1-7. National Institute of
Fahy, R., and G. Proulx. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade
Center Disaster: Analysis of Published Accounts of the World Trade Center Evacuation. NIST
NCSTAR 1-7A. National Institute of Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg, MD, September.
Zmud, J . 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade Center
Disaster: Technical Documentation for Survey Administration. NIST NCSTAR 1-7B. National
Lawson, J . R., and R. L. Vettori. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World
Trade Center Disaster: The Emergency Response Operations. NIST NCSTAR 1-8. National Institute of

NIST NCSTAR 1-4D, WTC Investigation xxvii
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The information presented in this report describes the design, installation, and performance of the smoke
management systems installed in World Trade Center (WTC) 1, 2, and 7. The work described in this
report is in support of the investigation of active fire protection systems. This is part of the federal
building and fire safety investigation being performed by the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST).
Specific objectives associated with this effort include the following:
Document the design and installation of the smoke management systems and compare
designs to applicable code and standard requirements.
Document the normal operation of the fully functional smoke management systems, and its
potential effect on smoke conditions in WTC 1 and WTC 2 on September 11, 2001.
In order to establish a context in which to evaluate the WTC smoke management systems, this report
provides an overview of smoke management system concepts, discusses the various considerations
affecting smoke management system design, and provides a history of the development of smoke control
related requirements within various national codes and standards.
The report also summarizes the smoke management systems provided in WTC 1, 2, and 7, and the
Building Code of the City of New York (BCNYC) requirements pertaining to smoke management
systems for each building. The performance of the installed smoke management systems for WTC 1 and
WTC 2 as well as other candidate smoke management system configurations was evaluated using the
CONTAM building airflow and contaminant dispersal computer model for specified fire scenarios. These
scenarios include the severe aircraft impact related events that occurred on September 11, 2001, in order
to provide a context in which to evaluate smoke management system performance in WTC 1 and WTC 2.
E.1 APPLICABLE CODE REQUIREMENTS
As a compact entity created under a clause of the U.S. Constitution, the Port Authority of New York and
New J ersey (PANYNJ or Port Authority) is not governed by state or local building codes. Although not
required to conform to the BCNYC, the Port Authoritys longstanding policy was to assure that its
facilities in the City of New York met and, where appropriate, exceeded the requirements of the BCNYC.
In 1993, the Port Authority and the New York City Department of Buildings entered into a memorandum
of understanding in which the Port Authoritys longstanding policy was restated. Under this policy, the
Port Authority required that the construction drawings for WTC 1, 2, and 7 conform to the requirements
of the BCNYC. WTC 1 and WTC 2 were constructed under the 1968 edition of the BCNYC. WTC 7 was
constructed under the 1968 BCNYC, including amendments to J anuary 1, 1985, incorporated in the
following local laws enacted after 1968:
Local Law No. 5, Fire Safety Requirements and Controls, J anuary 18, 1973
Executive Summary
xxviii NIST NCSTAR 1-4D, WTC Investigation
Local Law No. 16, Local Laws of the City of New York for the Year 1984, March 27, 1984
Local Law No. 33, Local Laws of the City of New York for the Year 1978, October 6, 1978
Local Law No. 54, Local Laws of the City of New York for the Year 1970,
November 17, 1970
Local Law No. 55, Local Laws of the City of New York for the Year 1976, November 1,
1976
Local Law No. 84, Fire Safety Pressurization Requirements in Certain Office Buildings,
December 13, 1979
Local Law No. 86, Dates for Compliance with the Local Laws Enacted for Fire Safety
Requirements and Controls in Certain Buildings, December 13, 1979
The BCNYC differs from other building codes in one major respect. Changes to a building code generally
affect only new buildings and are applied to an existing building only when a major renovation or change
in occupancy occurs within the building. Many provisions contained within the local laws amending the
BCNYC are applied retroactively; thus, these provisions are required to be implemented in existing
buildings. All of the requirements included in the local laws listed above were in effect at the time of
construction of WTC 7, since the local laws all predate the design and construction dates of WTC 7.
However, only some of the provisions were retroactively applied to WTC 1 and WTC 2.
In accordance with the BCNYC requirements, WTC 1, 2, and 7 were required to be equipped with fire
dampers at all duct openings into vertical shaft enclosures, and at penetrations of fire resistance rated
floors or ceilings. Smoke dampers were required in the main supply duct and main return duct for heating,
ventilating, and air conditioning (HVAC) systems having a capacity of over 15,000 ft
3
/min and were
arranged to close automatically by the operation of duct smoke detectors. Smoke detectors were required
at the return shaft inlet on each floor. Activation of a detector was required to stop air supply to and return
from the affected floor. In addition, WTC 7 was required to have either a combined fire/smoke damper or
independent fire and smoke dampers at any penetration of construction required to have a fire resistance
rating, under the provisions of Local Law No. 16 pertaining to smoke control.
Local Law No. 5 required that unsprinklered high-rise buildings be subdivided by fire separations into fire
compartments on each floor of the building. WTC 1 and WTC 2 were originally subdivided into
quadrants to meet this requirement, but were later provided with full automatic sprinkler protection,
negating this requirement. WTC 7 was not required to provide compartmentation, as the building was
fully sprinklered at the time of its construction.
Local Law No. 5 required existing office buildings to be provided with one or more smoke shafts by
means of which smoke and heat could be mechanically vented to the outdoors. In lieu of providing smoke
shafts, all enclosed exit stairs could be provided with stair pressurization. This requirement applied
retroactively to WTC 1 and WTC 2.
Local Law No. 16 added requirements for smoke control that included the provision of smoke dampers in
HVAC ductwork and separation of ventilation systems serving specified areas of buildings. In addition, a
Executive Summary
NIST NCSTAR 1-4D, WTC Investigation xxix
mechanical means to exhaust six air changes per hour, or 1 cfm/ft
2
(whichever is greater) from the largest
floor of a building, operated manually to exhaust one floor at a time, was required. Under the Port
Authority policy, these provisions of Local Law No. 16 applied to WTC 7.
Local Law No. 16 required that an emergency power system be provided having the capacity to operate
life safety related equipment in high-rise buildings, including ventilation systems for smoke venting or
control and stair pressurization. This provision was not applied retroactively to WTC 1 and WTC 2.
Local Law No. 86 stated that existing buildings would be exempt from the smoke shaft and optional stair
pressurization requirements if they were provided with automatic sprinklers throughout. This provision
applied retroactively to WTC 1 and WTC 2; therefore, negating the stair pressurization requirement of
Local Law No. 5 as automatic sprinkler systems were installed throughout WTC 1, 2, and 7.
E.2 BUILDING DESCRIPTIONS
Building construction details and building systems comprising WTC 1, 2, and 7 were evaluated to
develop an understanding of building features that may have impacted smoke movement within the
buildings and the design/function of smoke management systems. Building HVAC systems are described
in somewhat greater detail below in order to understand the capabilities of the HVAC systems to perform
smoke management functions.
E.2.1 WTC 1 and WTC 2
WTC 1 and WTC 2 were comprised of 110 stories above grade and seven levels below grade, and each
had an approximate footprint area of 42,900 ft
2
. WTC 1 and WTC 2 were similar architecturally, with
minor differences in layout. The interiors of each floor differed due to the particular tenant build-out on
that floor. In addition, the service core for the North Tower (WTC 1) was oriented east/west while the
service core for the South Tower (WTC 2) was oriented north/south. The service core gradually decreased
in size on the upper floors of the building as the numbers of elevators contained on the floors decreased.
The core spaces were separated from the perimeter spaces in the building by a 2 hour fire resistance rated
barrier extending slab-to-slab. The cores contained the elevators, exit stairs, bathrooms, and
miscellaneous equipment rooms. The perimeter office spaces were generally open-plan office spaces
containing office cubicles. Individual office spaces on the perimeter were generally separated by non-
rated partitions extending only to the drop ceiling. The ventilation plenum above the drop ceiling was
open around the perimeter of the floor.
Each tower was provided with three emergency exit stairways, enclosed in 2 hour rated gypsum
wallboard construction. The plan location of the stairways shifted at some levels, with occupants required
to move from one stairway segment to another via a horizontal transfer corridor, separated from the stair
shafts by fire rated doors. Stairs 1 and 2 had transfers at the 42nd, 48th, 76th, and 82nd levels. Stair 1
had an additional transfer on the 26th floor. Stair 3 had only a single transfer, at the 76th floor. Stairs 1
and 2 were located closer to the perimeter of the core, while Stair 3 was located more toward the center of
the core.
Executive Summary
xxx NIST NCSTAR 1-4D, WTC Investigation
Ninety-nine elevator shafts were located in each building. In order to facilitate movement of the
thousands of office workers who regularly worked in the towers to the upper office floors in the building,
a system of express and local elevators was installed in the building. High-speed express elevators
shuttled people from the lobby to sky lobbies on the 44th floor and 78th floor of the building. Escalators
connected the sky lobbies to the floors immediately above and below. Local elevators provided access
from the sky lobby floors to the upper floors of the building. Freight elevators 49 and 50 extended to
different heights in the building, with freight elevator 50 extending the full height of the building.
Building ventilation (heating and cooling) was provided in WTC 1 and WTC 2 by HVAC systems located
in four mechanical equipment rooms (MERs) located on the 7th, 41st, 75th, and 108th floors of each
building. Each MER was approximately two stories tall and had an upper and lower level. With the
exception of the 108th floor MER, which was located at the top of the building, above the floors that it
served, the MERs served the floors immediately above and below the floors in which they were located.
The WTC 1 aircraft impact occurred in the uppermost portion of the building (92nd through 98th floors),
served by the 108th floor MER. The WTC 2 aircraft impact occurred slightly lower in the building (77th
through 84th floors), served by the 75th floor MER.
HVAC supply fans were located on the lower level of each MER. Supply air was provided to the
building via core, interior, and perimeter HVAC units. There were two core supply ventilation zones
(north/south in WTC 2 and east/west in WTC 1, due to the orientation of the core), four interior space
HVAC zones (corresponding to the four quadrants of the building), and four perimeter zones
(north/south/east/west). The core and interior units provided low pressure air that was conditioned at each
unit in the MER. Perimeter supply air was provided by high pressure fans and was conditioned at
induction units located around the perimeter of the building on each floor. The induction units were
roughly 18 in. high and were located in front of the windows at the perimeter of the office space.
Exhaust HVAC fans were located on the upper level of each MER. Four sets of return air shafts were
located along the east and west sides of the core, returning air from the interior HVAC zones at the four
quadrants of each floor. Whereas supply ventilation was provided by a ducted supply system utilizing
metal ductwork, the return ventilation was provided by way of gypsum wallboard return shafts. Air was
drawn through return grilles on each floor into a return plenum above the occupied spaces on each floor.
Return air was then drawn to the MER exhaust fans via the gypsum wallboard shafts.
The original air distribution system configuration may have been substantially modified on some floors of
the buildings, based on the needs of the tenants occupying various floors of the building and the design
standards being used at the time of individual tenant retrofits. On some floors new ductwork was
connected to the base building HVAC ductwork at the major supply air shafts and connections remained
from the return plenum to the return air shafts. Perimeter heating and cooling was provided on certain
floors using small fan coil units (FCUs) located around the perimeter of the return air plenum, replacing
most of the perimeter induction units. The FCUs were designed to draw air from the plenum, heat or cool
the air as necessary as it passed through the coil, and then distribute the air via a small number (24) of
supply air diffusers ducted from each FCU.
The smoke management system (smoke purge) for WTC 1 and WTC 2 utilized only the interior air
systems and core systems, which were not modified substantially as a result of tenant retrofits. Perimeter
air was not used for smoke management. Further, the plenum exhaust arrangement and total air quantities
remained unchanged, despite individual tenant retrofit configurations. While smoke movement may have
Executive Summary
NIST NCSTAR 1-4D, WTC Investigation xxxi
been impacted on a given floor due to changes to the ventilation system on individual floors, overall
pressure differentials would be expected to remain the same.
E.2.2 WTC 7
WTC 7 was completed in 1987 and was located to the north of the WTC complex on the opposite side of
Vesey Street. The building consisted of 47 stories above-grade and had a footprint area of approximately
48,000 ft
2
. WTC 7 was built over an existing Con Ed substation and a shipping ramp that served the entire
WTC complex. The lower six floors of the building contained the substation, electrical switchgear,
emergency generators, transformers, and fuel storage tanks. Floors 3 and 4 also contained a conference
center for Salomon Smith Barney (SSB), the tenant occupying the largest portion of the building. Floors 7
through 25 housed multiple tenants, with most occupying a single floor. Floors 7 and 8, 11 through 13, 19
through 21, and 26 through 27 were occupied by multi-floor tenants. SSB occupied floors 28 through 45.
The service core for the building was located in the east-west direction, and contained the elevators, exit
stairs, bathrooms, and mechanical/electrical equipment rooms. The perimeter spaces were generally either
open-plan office spaces containing cubicles or hard-walled individual office spaces. Individual office
spaces were generally separated by non-rated partitions extending only to the drop ceiling. The ventilation
plenum above the drop ceiling was open around the perimeter of the floor. The building was protected
throughout by automatic sprinklers with the exception of certain equipment rooms on the lower floors of
the building.
The building was served by low-rise (floors 7 through 20), mid-rise (floors 21 thruogh 37), and high-rise
(floors 38 through 45) elevators, as well as service and freight elevators that ran the entire height of the
building. There were a total of 31 elevators serving the building. Two exit stairs served the building, and
were referred to as Stair 1 (or Stair A) and Stair 2 (or Stair B). The position of Stair 1 remained constant
on each floor of the building. The position of Stair 2 shifted at the 23rd floor, due to the location of the
low-rise elevators serving the lower floors.
The individual floors of WTC 7 were served by HVAC equipment located in a fan room on each floor.
This is in contrast to WTC 1 and WTC 2, which had dedicated MER floors that served multiple floors of
the buildings.
During the early 1990s, SSB performed a major tenant retrofit to floors 28 through 45. The retrofit
included combining adjacent floors into single floors, relocation of HVAC shafts, and installation of new
HVAC equipment to supplement base building equipment. Two two-story trading floors were created by
combining the 40th/41st and 42nd/43rd floors. The trading floors each had a raised floor that served as a
return plenum. HVAC fans and electrical/data services were located beneath the raised floors.
In addition to the trading floors, various SSB floors were retrofit with technology spaces housing
computer equipment. Individual HVAC units were provided to recirculate air within these spaces. A
large auditorium was included in the northwest corner of the building, spanning the 38th/39th floors.
Cafeteria spaces with kitchens were also located on the 34th and 41st floors.
Building ventilation (heating and cooling) was provided on the tenant floors (floors 7 through 47) for the
base building configuration in WTC 7 by variable air volume (VAV) air handling units (AHUs) located
on each floor. Each floor in WTC 7 was served by an AHU located in the fan room on that floor that
Executive Summary
xxxii NIST NCSTAR 1-4D, WTC Investigation
consisted of two fans feeding into a common plenum. Conditioned air was then distributed to the floor in
two zones, corresponding to the north/east and south/west portions of the building. The fan room served
as a return plenum. Return air was drawn into the fan room via three branch ducts leading from the fan
room. Make-up air was drawn into the fan room via make-up air shafts that connected to the exterior of
the building via louvers either at the roof or at the 6th floor.
In accordance with the BCNYC, the WTC 7 HVAC systems were designed to incorporate a smoke purge
mode, by which each floor of the building could be exhausted/purged of smoke manually on a
floor-by-floor basis from the fire command center, which was located on the 3rd floor of the building at
the main lobby security desk. Two smoke exhaust fans were originally located within the building on the
6th floor and 47th floor. The return air ductwork was connected to the exhaust duct. Return air either
dumped into the fan room via the return dampers in each branch duct or was exhausted via the smoke
exhaust riser. A smoke exhaust damper opened at the shaft and the return dampers closed to exhaust
smoke in the smoke purge mode. Curtain fire dampers were located throughout the building where
ductwork crossed fire rated shaft walls, in accordance with the BCNYC. Separate pneumatic smoke
dampers were used in the fan room to direct airflow within HVAC ductwork.
Major changes/additions to the building HVAC systems were made during the SSB tenant retrofit. AHUs
were added to handle the increased air conditioning loads created by the extensive computer and data
processing equipment. Existing building systems were modified to add an increased make-up air
capacity. A new, larger, make-up air shaft was added. The shaft was relocated to create more usable
space by allowing the removal of the original fan room on the trading floors and other select floors. A
transfer fan and ductwork were added to provide outside air to the existing outside air shaft in its original
location below the 24th floor.
In order to bring additional make-up air into the building, a large make-up AHU was installed in a new
rooftop mechanical penthouse. This provided forced ventilation make-up air rather than the open shaft
configuration present in the original building. Additional AHUs and exhaust fans were also located in the
penthouse.
A new smoke exhaust fan was added to replace the existing smoke purge fan. An additional smoke purge
fan was also installed to provide smoke exhaust from the 45th through 47th floors of the building.
Dedicated smoke exhaust fans were also provided for the trading room floors.
Several new fan rooms were added to house the additional AHUs. A fan room was added at the midpoint
of the west wall of WTC 7 on the SSB floors. A louvered opening was provided to the exterior of the
building from each fan room along the west wall. Various types of HVAC equipment were located within
these fan rooms, including kitchen exhaust fans serving the cafeteria spaces on the 34th and 41st floors.
New fan rooms were also added to serve the two-story trading floors. The new fan rooms were located
along the east wall of WTC 7, on the upper level of the trading floors (referred to as the mechanical
mezzanine level). Fans within the east fan rooms returned air via ductwork from beneath the raised
trading room floor, re-conditioned the air, and then supplied air at the upper level of the two-story space.
Small FCUs were located beneath the raised floor to draw return air through the trading desks back into
the raised-floor return plenum.
Executive Summary
NIST NCSTAR 1-4D, WTC Investigation xxxiii
The SSB tenant modifications incorporated combination fire/smoke dampers at many locations within the
HVAC ductwork in accordance with the BCNYC requirements for fire separation and to direct airflow
within HVAC ductwork.
E.3 RELEVANT HISTORY
Two major fire-related events in the history of the WTC complex resulted in building modifications that
affected the spread of fire and smoke within WTC 1 and WTC 2 in the event of a fire, and had the
potential to impact the smoke management systems installed in the towers. The first incident involved a
major fire that occurred on the 11th floor of WTC 1 on February 14, 1975. The second incident resulted
from a car bomb that exploded in the WTC complex parking garage on February 26, 1993, resulting in
smoke spread throughout the towers.
Three important engineering studies were performed pertaining to the smoke management systems in
WTC 1 and WTC 2. A study of an early prototype stair pressurization system was performed in WTC 1.
This study was examined to understand the feasibility of employing stair pressurization in the towers.
Two engineering studies were performed subsequent to the 1993 bombing that examined the effectiveness
of various smoke management approaches and recommended changes to the smoke management system
design for the towers.
E.3.1 WTC 1 FireFebruary 13, 1975
On February 14, 1975, a fire occurred in WTC 1. The fire originated from an unknown source at
approximately 11:30 p.m. in an office suite occupying roughly the entire southeast quadrant of the
11th floor of the building.
A worker noticed the fire and reported it to the WTC police headquarters. The city fire department was
called; three policemen responded to the fire floor with a fire equipment cart (typically stationed in the
44th and 78th floor sky lobbies of each tower), and the building engineer was advised to be prepared to
put the HVAC system in the purge mode. When police reached the fire floor, they reported a serious
fire and the HVAC system was placed in the purge mode.
In accordance with New York City Local Law No. 5, the floor had been subdivided into quadrants via fire
barriers, which contained the fire to the southeast quadrant of the building. The fire involved roughly
9,000 ft
2
of the 11th floor, destroying about half the contents and damaging the remainder of the contents
in this area. Because fire barriers did not extend into the return plenum above the office space on each
floor, hot smoke migrated around the perimeter of the floor within the open return plenum and was
exhausted via the exhaust risers serving the other three quadrants of the building. The fire was eventually
extinguished by the New York City Fire Department (FDNY).
The published accounts of the 1975 fire describe the use of the WTC 1 smoke purge sequence as an active
fire protection measure used to improve conditions during the fire, as opposed to using the HVAC system
purge as part of post-fire cleanup efforts. These reports document that during a fire, office areas could be
put on 100 percent exhaust, with the core getting 100 percent supply, accomplished in 32 floor segments
corresponding to a single HVAC zone. Because this sequence differs from the sequence of operations
Executive Summary
xxxiv NIST NCSTAR 1-4D, WTC Investigation
listed in the building operations manuals with regard to the operation of the smoke purge sequence, it is
unclear what the actual smoke purge sequence was at the time of the 1975 fire.
The primary enhancement to WTC 1 and WTC 2 following the 1975 fire that impacted the issues of
smoke movement and smoke management in the buildings was an improvement with regard to the
provision of firestopping to unsealed vertical penetrations. The fire illustrated the ability of fire and
smoke to spread vertically in high-rise buildings via unprotected vertical openings.
E.3.2 WTC BombingFebruary 26, 1993
On February 26, 1993, a bomb exploded in a parking garage located in the sub-levels of the WTC
complex. When the building HVAC systems shut down due to loss of electrical power, the building was
subjected to extreme stack effect forces, since at the time of the bombing the outside temperature was in
the twenties (degrees Fahrenheit). Because the explosion caused penetrations into several elevator shafts
in WTC 1 on the sub-grade levels, in addition to creating openings into the lobby level, smoke was
rapidly transported to the upper portions of the WTC 1 due to forces caused by the explosion and stack
effect.
A review committee was convened by the City of New York subsequent to the 1993 bombing that
included representatives from the New York City Building and Fire Departments and the Port Authority
of New York and New J ersey (PANYNJ or Port Authority). The committee concluded that the complex
issue of smoke control was beyond the scope of the committee at that time and required future review.
However, the committee recommended that building code requirements for smoke dampers should be
clarified and that elevator lobbies should be provided in new high-rise buildings to resist the passage of
smoke. Despite this recommendation, elevator lobbies are only required in high-rise residential buildings
under the current provisions of the BCNYC.
The report concluded that stair pressurization systems, not installed in the WTC towers, would not
function in an incident involving a mass evacuation due to the simultaneous opening of more than three
stairway doors. The report did conclude, however, that the BCNYC (Reference Standard 5-18) lacked
regulatory provisions for periodic testing and maintenance of stair pressurization systems and
recommended that these requirements be added. Finally, the committee report recommended that the
issue of providing fire towers in new high-rise commercial office buildings be revisited. The requirement
for fire towers (stairways separated from the interior environment of the building via open-air balconies)
was included in the 1938 edition of the BCNYC, but removed in the 1968 edition of the code. Fire towers
are not required under the current provisions of the BCNYC.
A number of changes were eventually made to the buildings as a result of the committees
recommendations. Improvements were made to exiting, and a new fire alarm system was installed in
each building. In one published account of the 1993 bombing it was purported that emergency power was
provided for smoke purge fans. No other sources were found to corroborate this assertion.
The 1993 bombing demonstrated that the stack effect could be a primary driver of rapid smoke spread
through high-rise buildings. The bombing showed that large amounts of smoke can be transmitted to the
upper floors of a building due to a fire on the lower floor of the building, particularly when that fire
produces a large quantity of smoke, such as was the case for the terrorist bombing. The 1993 bombing
Executive Summary
NIST NCSTAR 1-4D, WTC Investigation xxxv
also clearly demonstrated that, as expected, stack effect is enhanced by openings created in the vertical
shafts within the building, such as stair and elevator shafts.
Smoke spread via the stairways was substantial in the building during the 1993 event due to the large
number of open stair doors occurring as a result of the mass evacuation of occupants in the building. The
stairways, which were designed to provide an exit capacity that met or exceeded prevailing code
requirements for the buildings, did not provide the exit capacity to ensure rapid egress of all of the
occupants of the building. As a result, doors remained blocked open by building occupants
entering/exiting the stairways, increasing the magnitude of the airflow up the stairs due to stack effect.
The 1993 bombing also clearly showed the importance of emergency power to maintain the function of
building systems, including emergency lighting systems, in the event of a fire.
E.3.3 Engineering Studies
Several engineering studies were performed between the time the WTC complex was constructed and the
WTC disaster to evaluate candidate smoke management system approaches for various areas of the
complex. Three particular studies were conducted to examine smoke management systems in the towers
(WTC 1 and WTC 2). These studies must be considered in the evaluation of the smoke management
systems actually in place on September 11, 2001.
Between 1976 and 1979, the Port Authority performed a study aimed at understanding the feasibility of
providing stair pressurization systems in WTC 1 and WTC 2. Beginning in 1976, tests were run using
building air handling systems located in the 7th floor MER and 41st floor MER of WTC 1, reconfigured
to supply air to Stair 3.
This stair pressurization system study examined stair pressurization system performance with the building
HVAC systems in normal mode and smoke purge mode. At the time of the study, the smoke purge
sequence was defined as pressurizing the core using core supply ventilation and exhausting the interior
spaces using the low pressure return fans. Perimeter supply/exhaust fans were shut down in purge mode.
The study demonstrated that the system as designed was unable to meet the performance criteria outlined
in Local Law No. 5. With three doors open, differential pressures were generally low. With doors closed,
door opening forces were excessive. The study concluded that stair pressurization systems should be
installed based on the prototype design, with modifications being made to the design as stair
pressurization technology improved. Based on the results of the study, construction drawings were
prepared outlining the proposed stair pressurization systems.
Local Law No. 86 (enacted on December 13, 1979) stated that existing buildings shall be exempt from the
smoke shaft and optional stair pressurization requirements if they were provided with automatic
sprinklers throughout. A decision was made sometime after this date to fully sprinkler WTC 1 and
WTC 2. As a result, stair pressurization systems were never installed in WTC 1 and WTC 2.
Subsequent to the 1993 bombing, an analysis was performed by Rolf J ensen & Associates (RJ A). The
SMOKESIM computer model was used to verify and explain the movement of smoke in WTC 1
following the explosion. The report also addressed the potential effectiveness of elevator venting, stair
venting, and stair pressurization to improve conditions in the building.
Executive Summary
xxxvi NIST NCSTAR 1-4D, WTC Investigation
The RJ A report concluded that the results of the modeling generally agreed with the observed smoke
spread given the wind/weather/damage conditions on February 26, 1993. The report also concluded that
stair venting, defined as exhausting a stair using mechanical ventilation, was not an effective protection
measure. Although stair venting decreased the amount of smoke migrating onto floor areas at the top of
the building, it caused stack effect to be increased, and more smoke to be drawn into the stairs on the
lower floors of the building. Elevator venting was found to improve overall conditions in the building.
Stair pressurization was found to be feasible, and capable of maintaining adequate pressure with stair
doors closed. However, it was concluded that some sort of relief venting was needed at the top of each
stair segment to relieve unacceptable door opening forces at the top of the stair shaft due to stack effect.
This was particularly true for Stair 3, which had the longest stair segment uninterrupted by a horizontal
transfer corridor.
With or without overpressure relief, stair pressurization was found to be capable of maintaining a slightly
positive pressure in the stair with several doors open. However, as expected, positive pressure could not
be maintained with all stair doors open, as would be the case in a mass evacuation scenario.
During the same timeframe that RJ A was conducting their smoke movement study (19941995), Hughes
Associates, Inc. (HAI) and Dillon Consulting Engineers (DCE) were performing a joint study to examine
potential configurations using the existing HVAC systems in WTC 1 and WTC 2 to improve smoke
control performance, without examining the provision of stair pressurization systems. The HAI/DCE
study concluded that for most fire scenarios, a sequence involving pressurizing the core in the HVAC
zone of fire origin and exhausting the perimeter office spaces (core pressurization) provided adequate
smoke control performance. The study also strongly recommended that smoke management systems be
activated automatically using smoke detectors installed in the building. This was a somewhat
controversial recommendation, as automatic activation of smoke management systems is generally not
allowed for high-rise buildings in New York City.
The HAI/DCE report provided a recommended sequence of operations that could be used to better control
smoke given an uncontrolled fire event on a floor that involves visible flame and heat exiting the building
via broken windows. The approach involved placing all of the HVAC systems in the building on supply
only and shutting down return fans. This approach effectively pressurizes the entire building and forces
smoke out the broken windows on the fire floor. It was cautioned, however, that this approach should
only have been used when occupants had already evacuated the fire floor and windows had been broken
out due to the fire, as high door opening forces would have been created.
E.4 SMOKE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM DESIGN AND INSTALLATION
The purpose of this study was to document the design and installation of the smoke management systems
in the towers (WTC 1 and WTC 2) and WTC 7 on September 11, 2001, and to compare the system
designs to applicable code requirements. The designs were compared to the requirements of the BCNYC
at the time of the event.
In order to document the smoke management systems, multiple documents were reviewed in order to
determine how the systems were designed and operated. In the case of WTC 1 and WTC 2, information
obtained that documented the operation of smoke management systems presented conflicting versions of
how the systems operated. In the case of WTC 7, the base building systems installed when the building
Executive Summary
NIST NCSTAR 1-4D, WTC Investigation xxxvii
was constructed was modified/supplemented to add smoke management system capabilities during tenant
retrofits. Instances where conflicting or incomplete information was provided are fully documented in this
report.
E.4.1 WTC 1 AND WTC 2
The tower buildings (WTC 1 and WTC 2) were equipped with a non-dedicated smoke management
system (a smoke purge system). Non-dedicated refers to the fact that the system utilized the base building
HVAC systems that provided ventilation to the buildings under normal operating conditions, as opposed
to a dedicated system that only existed for the purposes of smoke management. No dedicated smoke
management systems were installed in the buildings.
The normal base building HVAC systems could be manually configured or operated in a smoke purge
mode that allowed smoke to be removed from the building. Smoke purge could only be accomplished for
an entire ventilation zone served by a particular MER; thus, in the smoke purge mode the entire
ventilation zone represents a single smoke zone. Because no operable fire/smoke dampers were present
within the ventilation ductwork, it was not possible to provide the smoke purge, or any other smoke
management sequence, on a floor-by-floor basis.
Smoke detectors were located at the exhaust duct inlets on each floor and within the HVAC system
ductwork in the MER to provide automatic shutdown of individual fans in the presence of smoke.
Automatic shutdown of the ventilation systems could be overridden in the smoke purge mode.
The fire safety plan for WTC 1 and WTC 2, revised in J anuary of 1999, defines smoke purge as the
removal of smoke and other gaseous combustion products from the (fire) area after a fire has been
extinguished. As documented in the fire safety plan, mechanical systems could be configured to perform
the smoke purge function by the Port Authority mechanical section staff when requested by the chief
officer of the responding FDNY units. The FDNY would ask the WTC fire safety director to provide a
smoke purge for a given zone. The WTC fire safety director would then instruct the mechanical section
staff to perform the requested action.
The smoke purge sequence is documented in WTC Instruction Manual No. 23, Operation and
Maintenance of Fire Protection System, dated February 1986. The documented sequence involves using
the interior exhaust fans to exhaust an entire multi-floor ventilation zone. Based on the information
contained in the fire safety plan for WTC 1 and WTC 2 and WTC Instruction Manual No. 23, it could be
concluded that the buildings were equipped with a manual purge system that utilized the interior zone
exhaust fans serving the four quadrants of the building to remove smoke after a fire was extinguished.
Core supply/exhaust fans and perimeter supply fans would be shut down. Smoke purge could be
accomplished within each HVAC zone, the largest of which had 32 floors. However, a number of sources
were found containing conflicting information regarding how the smoke purge system functioned and
how it was intended to be used.
Accounts of the 1975 fire state that the smoke purge sequence pressurized the core with 100 percent
outside air and exhausted 100 percent from the office spaces. These accounts also state that during the
1975 fire, the smoke purge sequence for the fire floor and adjacent floors was initiated from the
appropriate MER shortly after discovery of the fire, once police had examined the fire floor and identified
the presence of a significant fire. This documented sequence of events is important, as it signifies that the
Executive Summary
xxxviii NIST NCSTAR 1-4D, WTC Investigation
system was used at that time as an active fire protection system, to control smoke during the fire event
and that the documented core pressurization mode differed from the sequence of operations.
WTC Instruction Manual No. 23 makes the statement that in the event of smoke in an interior tenants
space involving personnel evacuation, the smoke purge procedure to be used is as follows In
referencing an event involving personnel evacuation, this statement also implies use of the smoke purge
sequence as an active fire protection sequence rather than a post-fire smoke cleanup sequence. The
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) report summarizing events on September 11, 2001,
states (in Sec. 2.1.3.3) that, a zoned smoke control systemwas designed to limit smoke spread from the
tenant areas to the core area, thereby assisting both individuals evacuating from an area and those
responding to the scene by limiting smoke spread into the core. Again, this statement implies an active
smoke management system based on the concept of pressurizing the core, which conflicts with the
documented smoke purge sequence for the buildings.
The Port Authority was asked to clarify the operation of the smoke purge sequence, since the available
information regarding its intended operation provides conflicting accounts of smoke purge operation.
According to the Port Authority,
1
the operation of the smoke purge sequence is as follows:
During a fire/smoke incident, the fans stayed in operation until shut
down by a smoke detector on interlocking exhaust fans or at the direction
of FDNY. FDNY would also direct what mode of operation the fans
should be in. If fans were still operating, as would often be the case, the
engineer at FDNY direction would key over to purge mode. This would
sequence spill dampers to open 100%. In addition, building operating
procedure during a purge was to run the interior supply fans for purging
[the] affected quadrant. During purge, the interior fans outside supply
air dampers would go to 100% open. For example, during a smoke
incident on 38NE in tower one, ACS 41-6 [northeast interior supply fan]
would be operating on purge, outside damper open 100%. ACR 41-4,5
and/or 6 [northeast interior return fans] would be operating on purge,
spills open 100%. Core fans would not normally operate during a smoke
purge unless conditions warranted and requested by FDNY.
According to the Port Authority, smoke purge would occur by starting the supply and exhaust fans
serving one of the four interior quadrants within a ventilation zone. Core supply/exhaust fans and
perimeter supply fans would be shut down. HVAC systems serving the other ventilation zones in the
building would be left operating unless they were shut down at the direction of FDNY. The Port
Authority further recognized that WTC Instruction Manual No. 23 had not been updated since the base
building fire alarm system was upgraded after the 1993 bombing. Therefore, this manual did not always
reflect the most current fire protection system configuration.
Operation of the smoke management system for WTC 1 and WTC 2 could be achieved by aligning the
equipment within the individual MERs or at a central control panel located in the Operations Control

1
E-mail communication from the Port Authority to NIST, dated February 18, 2004, responding to questions posed by NIST.
Executive Summary
NIST NCSTAR 1-4D, WTC Investigation xxxix
Center (OCC) on the B1 level of WTC 2. At either location, building personnel had to perform two
distinct operations:
1. Align the HVAC systems in smoke purge mode.
2. Start the appropriate HVAC fans.
Operation of the purge switch aligned all dampers that served as part of that quadrants HVAC systems in
a 100 percent outside air configuration. This would mean that supply and spill dampers would be fully
open and that return dampers would be closed.
To achieve the smoke purge, it was up to the operator of the systems to turn on those fans necessary to
achieve system operation. It would be equally possible to initiate an exhaust only type sequence as
outlined in the fire safety plan, the core pressurization sequence (supply and exhaust operating) reportedly
initiated during the 1975 fire, or the sequence stated by the Port Authority as the smoke purge sequence in
effect on September 11, 2001. Alignment of the system would be up to the understanding of the operator
as to the proper function of the smoke purge sequence, when called upon to initiate this sequence.
With regard to the use of the smoke purge function to aid in active smoke management during a fire event
versus during post-fire cleanup operations, it would be up to the responding fire department personnel to
initiate system operation. Depending on the type of fire event, it is possible that the system could have
been used either during the fire or after it was extinguished.
For the purposes of this report, the function of the smoke purge system documented by the Port Authority
was assumed to be in effect on September 11, 2001. It was also assumed that the system was to be used
after the fire was extinguished, at the discretion of the responding fire department personnel.
At the time the buildings were constructed, the ability to provide a smoke purge from each HVAC zone
was the only smoke management system provided in the buildings. When it was enacted in 1973, Local
Law No. 5 retroactively imposed the requirements for smoke shafts for existing high-rise buildings. In
lieu of such smoke shaft(s), stair pressurization systems could be provided.
In order to respond to the requirements of Local Law No. 5, the Port Authority initiated a pilot study into
the requirements for pressurizing the exit stairs in WTC 1 and WTC 2. Stair pressurization was examined
as a means of meeting the requirements of Local Law No. 5 since the smoke shaft requirements would
have been prohibitive for a building the size of WTC 1 and WTC 2. Existing buildings that were
sprinklered throughout were exempt from the smoke shaft and optional stair pressurization requirement
by Local Law No. 86 (enacted in 1979). A decision was made at some subsequent time to fully sprinkler
the WTC buildings. Therefore, the Port Authority did not move forward with the stair pressurization
option. Because WTC 1 and WTC 2 were fully retrofitted with automatic sprinklers, smoke and heat
venting and/or stair pressurization was not required in WTC 1 and WTC 2 on September 11, 2001.
WTC 1 and WTC 2 were equipped throughout with fire dampers at duct penetrations into vertical shafts,
as required by the BCNYC. Combination fire/smoke dampers were not required by the code to be
provided in existing buildings. Since tenant retrofit projects generally connected to the existing base
building systems, fire/smoke dampers at HVAC shafts were not generally provided during tenant retrofits.
Executive Summary
xl NIST NCSTAR 1-4D, WTC Investigation
As documented in Chapter 3, emergency power was not retroactively required by the BCNYC, but was
provided following the 1993 bombing in WTC 1 and WTC 2 serving all emergency systems (lighting, fire
alarm system, etc.) and the building elevators. While one account summarizing the building restoration
activities following the 1993 bombing purported that emergency power was provided for smoke purge
fans, the Port Authority stated that emergency power was not provided to WTC 1 and WTC 2 base
building smoke purge fans. However, the MERs were equipped with redundant power sources from
different substations.
No other redundant features were identified with respect to the HVAC systems used to accomplish the
smoke purge functions. No back-up systems or emergency power was provided.
E.4.2 WTC 7
WTC 7 was designed with a dedicated smoke management system (a smoke purge system) that utilized
dedicated HVAC equipment that served only a smoke management function. This type of system differed
from that used in WTC 1 and WTC 2, which utilized the HVAC systems that provided normal ventilation
to the buildings to perform the smoke purge function. In WTC 7, dedicated smoke exhaust fans/dampers
could be manually aligned at the fire command center to provide smoke purge from a specified floor
within the building. Since the smoke purge function could be provided on a floor-by-floor basis, each
floor of the building constituted an individual smoke control zone.
The building operations manual for WTC 7 specifies three alarm modes pertaining to operation of the
building HVAC systems. ALARM-1 initiated shutdown of HVAC equipment based on duct smoke
detection. ALARM-2 initiated smoke purge on the affected floor. ALARM-3 specified the smoke purge
sequence for non-affected floors. The smoke management sequence pertaining to the smoke purge
function involved exhausting the fire floor and pressurizing the remaining floors with supply air.
Local Law No. 16 required that all buildings in occupancy group E (business) be provided a manual
override capability to exhaust one floor at a time at a rate of 6 air changes per hour, or 1 cfm/ft
2
,
whichever is greater. For WTC 7, with a footprint area of approximately 48,000 ft
2
, this would require an
exhaust capacity of at least 48,000 ft
3
/min (81,552 m
3
/h). The base building system serving the lower
floors (up to the 23rd floor) of the building provided a smoke exhaust capacity of 36,000 ft
3
/min
(61,164 m
3
/h), which is not consistent with the minimum value specified by code. An 84,000 ft
3
/min
(142,716 m
3
/h) exhaust fan was provided for the SSB floors during the tenant retrofit.
WTC 7 was sprinklered throughout and was therefore exempted from the requirement for stair
pressurization systems. The building was provided with a Class E fire alarm system per code, was
provided with emergency power serving all emergency systems, and was equipped throughout with fire
dampers at duct penetrations into vertical shafts.
E.5 EVALUATION OF SYSTEM PERFORMANCE ON SEPTEMBER 11, 2001
The purpose of this study was to document the normal operation of the fully functional smoke
management systems on smoke conditions in WTC 1 and WTC 2 on September 11, 2001. Elements
involved the evaluation of expected system performance for postulated design fires in business
Executive Summary
NIST NCSTAR 1-4D, WTC Investigation xli
occupancies, as well as documentation of the expected performance of fully functional smoke
management systems in the towers.
The smoke management systems in WTC 1 and WTC 2 were designed to provide a manual smoke purge
function. Given the design and intended operation of the smoke management systems, two key questions
must be answered to approximate the performance of the system on September 11, 2001:
1. Was manual operation of the smoke purge systems in either WTC 1 or WTC 2 initiated by
emergency response personnel?
2. Were the systems capable of operating given the damage caused by the aircraft impacts on
each building?
In order to answer the second question, damage to both the building electrical and mechanical systems
had to be evaluated. It had to be determined whether electrical power was available to the building
mechanical systems subsequent to impact so that they were capable of operating. Then, potential damage
to HVAC system components had to be evaluated to determine whether the systems were capable of
performing as designed.
E.5.1 Actions of Emergency Response Personnel
The events of September 11, 2001, clearly represented an extraordinary challenge, both to emergency
response personnel, and to the installed building systems. The damage caused by an aircraft impact into a
building is outside the range of typical design considerations for most building systems, including fire
protection systems. In addition, from a fire department perspective, a fire involving multiple floors of the
uppermost portion of WTC 1 or WTC 2, or worse in both buildings simultaneously, represents a difficult
operational environment.
As documented in Chapter 7, the WTC fire safety director on duty on September 11, 2001 stated that no
recommendation was given on his part to initiate a smoke purge sequence, nor was smoke purge
performed on September 11, 2001, to his knowledge. There is no record of FDNY personnel having
initiated a smoke purge sequence in WTC 1 or WTC 2.
Radio and phone traffic from various sources was reviewed in an effort to determine if any attempts were
made to manipulate building ventilation systems or initiate the smoke purge sequence locally from one of
the MERs in WTC 1 or WTC 2. One reference to smoke purging was found where a maintenance worker
reporting heavy smoke from Stair A on the 103rd floor in WTC 1 transmitted the message Need
immediate purge. At roughly the same time, an unidentified male was recorded on the same radio
channel transmitting the message Electric, we have Staircase C (inaudible), is there any way to pump
any outdoor air in? No conversations were identified confirming use of the ventilation systems.
E.5.2 Damage to System Components
The exact extent of damage within individual floors of WTC 1 and WTC 2 may never be known because
the collapse of the buildings prohibited a detailed inspection of the impact area. However, the potential
extent of damage was estimated based on the results of engineering analysis and based on observations
recorded by people located within WTC 1 and WTC 2 at the time of the events.
Executive Summary
xlii NIST NCSTAR 1-4D, WTC Investigation
Potential damage estimates were overlaid onto representative floor plans for the impact areas in WTC 1
and WTC 2 in order to determine the potential damage to key electrical/mechanical system components
located in the core spaces. The damage estimates were corroborated to a certain extent by observations of
people in various locations in the buildings after aircraft impact. The observers primarily described stair
shaft damage, damage to freight elevator 50, and in some cases elevator shafts. HVAC shaft conditions
could be corroborated by visual evidence of smoke spread seen from the exterior of the building. An
attempt was also made to corroborate the extent of core damage using observations of the presence of
power in the building.
Numerous accounts were recorded of all three exit stairs in WTC 1 being blocked on the 92nd floor and
above. The extent of damage into the core of WTC 1 is also evidenced by damage to elevator shafts in
the core, particularly freight elevator 50. A notable event occurring in WTC 1 was a reported
explosion/fireball that occurred in the lobby of WTC 1 due to jet fuel that was ignited at the base of an
elevator shaft. This is further evidence of core damage as far in as the express elevator shafts.
In WTC 2, the core layout was such that the three exit stairs were located remotely from one another on
the impact floors. As a result, the aircraft impact left the northwest stair in the building (Stair 1) relatively
undamaged. At least four survivors were able to safely exit the building via Stair 1 from floors as high as
the 91st floor. However, given that damage to two out of three exit stairs was substantiated by survivor
testimony and that significant damage was caused to the exterior walls in the northeast corner of WTC 2,
the path of damage would also logically include the ventilation shafts located on the east half of the
impact floors.
Potential damage to the HVAC shafts was also determined to some degree by examining photographic
evidence depicting the exterior of the buildings after the time of aircraft impact. Initial damage estimates
support the hypothesized damage to the HVAC shafts in one-half of each building within the impact zone.
The damage would have created large holes in the gypsum wallboard exhaust shafts and potentially shear
off or collapse metal supply ductwork. If the HVAC shafts were undamaged, the fire dampers at the
HVAC shaft walls would have been expected to close in an intense fire, limiting the extent of airflow via
the ventilation shafts. Fire dampers would not be expected to be as effective in limiting smoke spread as
combination fire/smoke dampers, which are designed to be smoke-tight and close earlier in the fire event.
In WTC 1, spread of large amounts of smoke via the ventilation shafts was evident in the examination of
pictures of the exterior of WTC 1 subsequent to impact. A significant amount of smoke can be seen
exiting the 108th floor MER from a localized area on the north face of the building and along the length
of the west face of the building. At the 108th floor MER in WTC 1, the smoke emanating from the north
face of the building corresponds to the location of the supply fan inlet for the northwest interior supply
zone. The exhaust plenum for the northwest quadrant exhaust fans is located along the west face of the
MER. The visual evidence supports damage to the primary ventilation shaft serving the northwest
quadrant of the impact zone.
Since the damage estimate suggests similar damage to the northeast shaft, a similar pattern of smoke
exiting the 108th floor MER would be expected to be seen at the northeast supply inlet and east exhaust
outlets. However, due to the direction of the wind driven smoke plume from the fire toward the
southeast, it is difficult to see patterns of smoke emanating from the MER at this location on the exterior
of the building. Therefore, large amounts of smoke exiting supply/ventilation shafts serving the northeast
quadrant of the impact zone, which would substantiate the shaft damage to the northeast quadrant
Executive Summary
NIST NCSTAR 1-4D, WTC Investigation xliii
ventilation shafts, could not be verified from visual observations of the exterior of the building, as the
smoke plumes obscured views of this area of the building.
Once smoke enters the ventilation ductwork, it can very quickly spread to all areas of the upper floors of
the building via the air distribution plenum in the ceiling. This is contrasted to smoke entering a floor via
elevator doors, which might have to pass through multiple barriers in the core and office space to reach
the perimeter offices. As a result, smoke spread via the ventilation shafts has the potential to cause a more
rapid deterioration of smoke conditions in the perimeter office spaces than smoke spread via the elevator
and stair shafts.
The hypothesized rapid spread of smoke vertically via the ventilation shafts in WTC 1 is supported by the
fact that smoke conditions became untenable (high heat/high toxicity) to the extent that people trapped on
the uppermost floors of WTC 1 were observed breaking windows to obtain outdoor air and some jumped
from the building to escape the rapidly deteriorating conditions in the building shortly after impact in
WTC 1. The FDNY noted people jumping from the building shortly after their arrival in the lobby of
WTC 1.
In WTC 2, shaft damage (stair/elevator/ventilation shafts) would also have caused smoke to spread
upward through the building. However, in WTC 2 the ventilation shaft above the 83rd floor impact
terminated at the 91st floor. This prevented a direct pathway for the smoke to follow to the upper floors.
Smoke would have to spread upward into the building to floors above the 91st floor through the other
primary vertical airflow paths, which were limited primarily to the local elevator banks.
The fact that there were relatively few vertical airflow paths between the impact zone in WTC 2 and the
uppermost floors of the building is supported by the length of time conditions remained tenable in some
areas of the upper floors of the building. Numerous occupants of WTC 2 were trapped on the upper floors
of the building, and several people used their cell phones to call family members. The experience of
occupants on the upper floors of the building supports the fact that spaces in the uppermost portion of
WTC 2 were tenable for periods as long as 45 min after impact.
An attempt was made to identify the presence or lack of power to the MER floors serving the impact
zones in WTC 1 and WTC 2 by using survivor testimony and transcripts of phone calls made by people
trapped above the impact zone. Little evidence was available regarding the presence of electrical power,
particularly on the upper floors of the buildings. Isolated reports were noted of lights flickering and
going out in the buildings. These accounts also corresponded to floors where ceiling collapse and other
minor structural damage was noted. Therefore, loss of lighting could have coincided with local structural
damage rather than being indicative of an overall loss of electrical power. Despite the lack of definitive
survivor testimony with regard to the presence of electrical power in WTC 1 and WTC 2, estimates
support damage to one or more of the electrical closets/risers in each building. In WTC 1, damage likely
occurred to both the north and central electrical closets/risers. In WTC 2, damage likely occurred to at
least the east electrical closet/riser.
E.5.3 Summary of System Performance on September 11, 2001
Examination of the available evidence provides strong indications that the smoke management systems in
WTC 1 and WTC 2 played no role in the events that occurred on September 11, 2001. There is no
evidence to support the fact that an attempt was made to activate the smoke purge sequence. In the chaos
Executive Summary
xliv NIST NCSTAR 1-4D, WTC Investigation
following the aircraft impacts and preceding the collapse of the buildings, the focus was on rescue
operations rather than on manipulation of building systems.
Should a decision have been made to attempt to align the building ventilation systems into the smoke
purge mode, it is doubtful that this would have had any impact on overall smoke conditions within the
building. Upon arriving at the scene FDNY personnel had a difficult time determining the exact floors of
impact, especially for WTC 1. Since the WTC 1 impact occurred near the boundary between ventilation
zones at the 91st/92nd floors, and the impact was thought to have originally occurred on floors
somewhere between the 80th and 90th floors (Smith 2002), smoke purge may have been inadvertently
initiated for the 59th91st floor HVAC zone in WTC 1.
The aircraft impacts caused significant damage to the core spaces in both WTC 1 and WTC 2, making it
unlikely that the smoke purge could have been accomplished in either building. In WTC 1, it is likely that
the impact eliminated or significantly impaired electrical power on floors above the impact zone.
Therefore, because power would not have been available at the 108th floor MER (which served the zone
of impact), HVAC systems would not have been operational. In addition, the ventilation shafts for at least
the north half of the building were likely damaged, thus reducing the possibility for the smoke purge to
function properly even if the HVAC systems had been operable.
In WTC 2, it is possible that electrical power may have been available to the fans located in the 75th floor
MER, which was located below the impact zone in this building. Survivor testimony indicates that power
may have been available up to the 75th floor. Initially, all fans would have shut down due to detection of
substantial quantities of smoke by the duct smoke detectors. Damage estimates suggest that the HVAC
shafts utilized to accomplish smoke purging would likely have been damaged on the east side of the
building, eliminating half of the smoke venting capacity for the floor. Even if the ventilation shafts on the
west side of the building remained intact, the performance of the smoke venting system would have been
reduced. Damage to HVAC shafts had a particularly detrimental impact on WTC 1, where smoke
conditions deteriorated in the uppermost portions of the building at a much faster rate than WTC 2.
E.6 EVALUATION OF POTENTIAL SMOKE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
EFFECTIVENESS
In order to fully understand the potential impact of smoke management systems for events like those
occurring on September 11, 2001, it is important to analyze how various smoke management system
configurations might have performed in WTC 1 and WTC 2, had they been available on September 11,
2001. To develop an understanding of the capabilities of the various smoke management system
configurations that were evaluated, it is also important to analyze their performance for other hypothetical
fire scenarios in high-rise buildings, both typical/expected design scenarios and worst case scenarios. All
of the smoke management approaches analyzed utilized some variation of the pressurization method of
smoke management. The pressurization method is the smoke management system design method for
well-compartmented structures with low-ceiling spaces.
The performance of each of the smoke management approaches, given the postulated design fire
scenarios, was evaluated using the CONTAM building airflow and contaminant dispersal model,
developed by NIST. CONTAM is a recognized tool for the evaluation of smoke management systems that
are based on the pressurization method of smoke management. Based on a review of the various issues
Executive Summary
NIST NCSTAR 1-4D, WTC Investigation xlv
relating to the use of tenability (dilution) analysis, it was determined that the performance of the candidate
smoke management approaches would be evaluated based solely on the ability to provide pressure
differentials consistent with the pressurization method of smoke control.
The various codes and standards that reference the use of pressurization smoke control require the
provision of 0.05 in. H
2
O (12.5 Pa) pressure differentials in sprinklered buildings and 0.1 in. H
2
O (25 Pa)
in non-sprinklered buildings to contain smoke. It is important to note, however, that these pressures are
measured with a buildings HVAC systems placed in smoke management mode, without the presence of a
fire. The required pressure differentials are high enough to contain heated smoke were a fire to be present
in sprinklered and non-sprinklered occupancies, and are used for design purposes. Since the modeling
performed using CONTAM includes the temperature of the fire compartment as a parameter in the model,
it is only necessary that the system maintain a positive pressure differential to contain smoke when the
barrier across which the pressure is maintained is fairly tight. For barriers containing large openings,
creation of a positive pressure differential may not be sufficient to contain smoke. Unless sufficient
airflow velocity is applied to hold back the smoke, two-way flow will occur. Heated smoke will flow
from the fire compartment at the uppermost portion of the large opening, and pressurization air will be
introduced into the fire compartment through the lower portion of the large opening.
The CONTAM model of WTC 1 that was constructed as part of the 1996 HAI/DCE study was used as the
baseline to which modifications were made to perform the modeling effort documented in this report. As
part of the 1996 study, calibration measurements were made of actual airflows and pressure differentials
obtained at various locations in WTC 1 for different ventilation modes. For the current modeling effort,
the 1996 calibration data were reviewed, and an attempt was made to better calibrate the model to match
the data. Limitations relating to the calibration data included several uncertainties that existed with regard
to the accuracy of the reported data, and the determination of the exact configuration of the building
(openings and HVAC system alignment) at the time the calibration measurements were made.
After extensive effort, it was determined that a single building configuration could not be developed that
conclusively matched the 1996 calibration data. The primary obstacle was the existence of too many
independent variables (leakage types, wind/weather conditions, HVAC system alignments, design versus
measured supply/return airflow, unknown architectural changes to individual floor plans) to allow for a
single building model that matched all of the data for the various ventilation modes. It was determined
that in order to accurately represent the uncertainty involved in the type of modeling being performed,
and the potential range of results given this uncertainty, three separate building configurations would be
used in the modeling. Examining the CONTAM results for a particular fire scenario/smoke management
approach for the three building configurations as a group enabled an assessment of whether smoke
management may have been effective for that fire scenario.
E.6.1 Smoke Management System Approaches
Five distinct smoke management approaches were examined for the WTC towers. These approaches are
as follows:
1. Smoke Purge
2. Core Pressurization
Executive Summary
xlvi NIST NCSTAR 1-4D, WTC Investigation
3. Building Pressurization
4. Sandwich Pressurization
5. Zoned Smoke Control with Stair Pressurization
The smoke purge approach is based on the documented smoke purge sequence for WTC 1 and WTC 2 as
it appears in WTC Instruction Manual No. 23, Operation and Maintenance of Fire Protection System,
dated February 1986. The sequence involved placing the interior HVAC zone exhaust fans and core
exhaust fans (toilet exhausts, elevator machine room [EMR] exhausts) in the multi-floor ventilation zone
containing the fire in 100 percent exhaust mode. HVAC systems in all other ventilation zones in the
buildings were aligned in a summer normal mode. Perimeter supply fans were shut down.
The core pressurization approach is a slight variation of the documented smoke purge sequence for
WTC 1 and WTC 2, in that rather than the exhaust fans in the core, the core supply fans were activated to
prohibit smoke spread into the core from the surrounding office spaces. Accounts of the 1975 fire and
other sources cite this variation as being the smoke purge sequence provided for the building.
The building pressurization approach is an approach that was recommended in the 1996 HAI/DCE study.
This approach was recommended to be used in the event of a severe fire involving a substantial portion of
one floor of the building, where windows were observed to be broken out. The approach involves turning
on the supply fans in the entire building and turning on the exhaust fans only in the ventilation zone of
fire origin. The intent of this approach was to exhaust smoke where possible from the floor containing the
fire, and to induce a substantial airflow toward the floor of fire origin to force smoke out of the broken
windows.
The sandwich pressurization approach was not previously examined for WTC 1 and WTC 2 in any of the
engineering studies reviewed in the preparation of this report. The approach analyzed is not the classic
floor-by-floor sandwich approach, which involves exhausting the floor of fire origin and pressurizing the
floors above and below. The HVAC systems in WTC 1 and WTC 2 were not equipped with operable
fire/smoke dampers; thus, it was not possible to configure the system to exhaust and supply to only single
floors within a ventilation zone. Instead, an approach was examined where the sandwich was achieved by
ventilation zones. In the event of a fire, the ventilation zone of origin would have all of its exhaust fans
turned on, and supply fans turned off. The ventilation zones above and below would have all supply fans
activated and exhaust fans turned off. These actions would create a multi-floor sandwich effect in the
building, with the net effect being the creation of a pressure differential between the core and perimeter
spaces within the HVAC zone of fire origin.
The final approach analyzed, zoned smoke control with stair pressurization, was an approach based on
best practices in smoke management system design enforced in many jurisdictions in the United States as
of September 11, 2001. It was assumed that the building was retrofitted with stair pressurization systems,
as required for all new high-rise construction by the major building codes in the United States, and was
capable of exhausting on a floor by floor basis within the ventilation zone containing the fire to create the
desired pressure differential with respect to the floors above and below. Other ventilation zones were
assumed to operate in the summer normal mode. It was assumed that operable fire/smoke dampers were
also installed in all supply/exhaust ducts at the appropriate shaft connections and that these dampers were
closed within the zone of fire origin.
Executive Summary
NIST NCSTAR 1-4D, WTC Investigation xlvii
E.6.2 Design Fire Scenarios
Several different design fire scenarios were evaluated for WTC 1 and WTC 2, encompassing the range of
expected fires that could be envisioned within the office spaces of the building. The fire scenarios were
limited to those that could occur on the above-grade office floors of the building. Other possible fire
scenarios could result in smoke migration through the towers due to a fire in the sub-grade areas or
adjacent spaces within the WTC complex (i.e., truck dock fire, car fire in the garage, fire in the
concourse). Because the focus of this report is on examining the fires that occurred on September 11,
2001, (which occurred on the uppermost floors of the building) and bounding these events with other
comparable fires, it was relevant to examine only those fire scenarios on the office floors of the building.
The design fire scenarios that were evaluated are as follows:
1. Sprinklered Fire
2. Full-Floor Burnout
3. Two-Floor Fire
4. WTC 1 and WTC 2, September 11, 2001, Fire Scenarios (No Shaft Damage)
5. WTC 1 and WTC 2, September 11, 2001, Fire Scenarios (Shaft Damage Assumed)
The first fire scenario assumes that a typical fire in a sprinklered building would typically involve only a
single fuel package, or a small number of adjacent fuel packages, and would either be controlled by the
automatic sprinkler system, or be extinguished. A simplifying assumption is to assume that the
temperature in the zone of origin never exceeds the operation temperature of the sprinklers, which were
assumed to have an activation temperature of 165 F (74 C). Given the large size of the majority of the
office spaces in the towers, some of which encompassed an entire floor, the average temperature
throughout the floor would be expected to be less than the assumed 165 F.
The second fire scenario, the full-floor burnout scenario, is a design scenario for a fire involving the
contents of a typical office building floor. In a fully-sprinklered building, a full-floor burnout would only
be possible with some sort of catastrophic failure of the sprinkler system, or with a fuel load that exceeds
the capacity of the sprinkler system. The full-floor burnout scenario is essentially the same as the
uncontrolled fire scenario analyzed in the 1996 HAI/DCE study. The full floor burnout fire scenario
evaluated in this report assumed a temperature on the floor of fire origin of 1,800 F (1,000 C),
consistent with the temperature assumed in the 1996 report for fully involved fires. This fire scenario
assumed that 58 windows on each face (as assumed in the 1996 study) were broken out. This provided a
sufficient influx of air to sustain roughly a 250 MW fire.
The third fire scenario, the two-floor fire scenario, corresponds to a multi-floor event caused by a small
explosion. The purpose of this fire scenario was to examine smoke management system performance for a
multi-floor fire scenario of far less severity than the aircraft impact caused on September 11, 2001. This
scenario also challenges the typical floor-to-floor separation that exists in typical building fire scenarios
due to an intact floor slab. The fire scenario assumes that a small explosion has opened up a 100 ft
2
(9.3
m
2
) hole in the floor slab at the midpoint along one of the faces of the building. The explosion does no
damage to the core but causes half the windows on the near face of the building to be blown out by the
Executive Summary
xlviii NIST NCSTAR 1-4D, WTC Investigation
blast. It is assumed that sprinkler piping may be damaged, but some sprinklers operate, to reduce the
overall temperature on the two open floors of the building. The average temperature on the two floors is
assumed to be identical to that of the sprinklered fire scenario, 165 F (74 C).
The fourth fire scenario was used to model smoke management system performance under the conditions
in WTC 1 and WTC 2 on September 11, 2001. Estimates of the size of the exterior openings after aircraft
impact including impact damage and window breakage, were used along with the preliminary damage
estimates to model the damage conditions existing within each building. Where the extent of damage was
unknown, estimates regarding the extent of damage were used. The sensitivity of the model was checked
to determine how the results would vary for wide variations to the assumed extent of damage. For
example, the size of the hole between floors within the impact zone was difficult to estimate. The models
used a floor opening equal to the footprint of the impact damage depicted in the NIST damage figures up
to, but not including, the core. Several estimates of the temperature within the impact zone in the towers
were made. It is estimated that the temperature may have been as low as 750 F (400 C) in some areas of
the impact zone and as high as 1,800 F (1,000 C) in the hottest areas of the impact zone. Both the lower
cited temperature and the upper cited temperature were used to model the temperature throughout the
impact zone. For all cases, the outside air temperature was modeled as 70 F (21 C) with the wind out of
the north at 11.2 mph (5 m/s).
The fifth and final fire scenario was a hypothetical fire scenario in which the majority of the structural
damage occurring on September 11, 2001, was modeled, but with no damage occurring to the buildings
core. This scenario, although unlikely, was modeled to estimate the performance of the candidate smoke
management system approaches for a scenario involving a multi-floor fire event with high temperatures
throughout the fire compartment and large openings in the exterior of the building.
E.6.3 Results of the Analysis
The five candidate smoke management system approaches were evaluated to determine whether these
approaches could provide adequate pressurization to confine smoke to the zone of fire origin for the five
postulated fire scenarios.
The smoke purge and the core pressurization approaches were shown to create adequate pressure
differentials for only the sprinklered fire scenario. Substantial negative pressure differentials, indicating
flow of smoke from the zone of fire origin into the core, occurred for the other fire scenarios.
The building pressurization approach created high pressure differentials from the core to the perimeter
office spaces for all fire scenarios except the multi-floor September 11 aircraft impact scenarios. Positive
pressures were demonstrated for both the undamaged core and shaft damage September 11 scenarios in
WTC 1, but sufficient airflow velocity was not created to prohibit smoke spread via large openings in
ventilation shafts and in the core/office space boundaries resulting from aircraft impact damage. Use of
the building pressurization method could potentially create excessive door opening forces that could
hinder or prohibit the egress of building occupants. The magnitude of the door opening forces is a
function of the fire scenario, size of interior and exterior openings, and location of the floor(s) of fire
origin relative to the location of the MER.
The zoned smoke control with stair pressurization approach was shown to be effective for the sprinklered
fire scenario, the full-floor burnout, and the two-floor fire. For each of these fire scenarios, however, stack
Executive Summary
NIST NCSTAR 1-4D, WTC Investigation xlix
effect was shown to have a substantial impact on the performance of the system, in some cases causing
airflow from the floor of fire origin into the core. Therefore, this approach might not be effective using a
single speed fan, or a fixed airflow quantity. It is likely that fan speed would have to be adjusted based on
differential pressure readings to ensure the success of a smoke management system using this approach.
Because the zoned smoke control method involves exhausting from a single floor of the building, it was
not effective for the multi-floor aircraft impact scenarios. In addition, stair pressurization did not prohibit
smoke spread into the stairs when large openings in the stairway walls were present due to aircraft impact
damage.
The sandwich pressurization approach was determined to be effective for the sprinklered fire, full-floor
burnout, and two-floor fire scenarios, even in the presence of stack effect. Positive pressures were
demonstrated in the model scenarios for both the undamaged core and shaft damage September 11
scenarios in WTC 1, but sufficient airflow velocity was not created to prohibit smoke spread via large
openings into ventilation shafts or the core resulting from aircraft impact damage.
E.7 SUMMARY
The following results were reported to NIST by the contractor based on the information and analysis
documented in this report:
The smoke management systems in WTC 1 and WTC 2, which provided the capability for a
manual smoke purge within an individual HVAC zone on a quadrant-by-quadrant basis, were
not initiated on September 11, 2001.
Had the smoke purge sequence been initiated in WTC 1 or WTC 2, it is unlikely the system
would have functioned as designed, due to loss of electrical power and/or damage to the
HVAC shafts and other structural elements in the impact zone.
Provision of active smoke management systems and/or combination fire/smoke dampers was
not required by the 1968 BCNYC or retroactive provisions in the various local laws enacted
after WTC 1 and WTC 2 were constructed for existing high-rise buildings provided with
automatic sprinklers throughout.
None of the potential smoke management system configurations evaluated in this report
would have provided sufficient pressure differentials to contain smoke for the postulated
aircraft impact damage scenarios, even if these systems were capable of operation after the
building sustained damage from the aircraft impact.
The smoke purge sequence in existence on or before September 11, 2001, would have been
expected to be capable of limiting the spread of smoke from the zone of fire origin only for
fire scenarios in which the sprinkler system was operational and controlled the fire. Other
smoke management strategies capable of being implemented using the existing WTC 1 and
WTC 2 ventilation systems may also have been capable of controlling smoke from the
postulated full-floor burnout and two-floor fire scenarios evaluated in this report had these
strategies been identified and implemented into the sequence of operations.
Executive Summary
l NIST NCSTAR 1-4D, WTC Investigation
During the events occurring on September 11, 2001, stair pressurization likely would have
been ineffective in improving conditions for occupants trying to exit the building.
Installation of combination fire/smoke dampers in HVAC ductwork, which was not required
in WTC 1 or WTC 2, would have acted to slow the development of hazardous conditions on
the uppermost floors of the building, but would likely not have had a significant effect on the
ability of occupants to egress the building due to the impassibility of the exit stairways.

NIST NCSTAR 1-4D, WTC Investigation 1
Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 SCOPE
The work described in this report is in support of the investigation of active fire protection systems. The
purpose of this project is to investigate the performance of the active fire protection systems in World
Trade Center (WTC) 1, 2, and 7 and their role in fire control, emergency response, and fate of occupants
and responders. Information related to the overall scope or results of the analysis of active fire protection
systems may be found in National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) NCSTAR 1-4.
2

1.2 OBJECTIVES
This effort involves evaluation of the design, installation, and performance of the smoke management
systems installed in WTC 1, 2, and 7. Specific objectives associated with this effort include the following:
Document the design and installation of the smoke management systems and compare
designs to applicable code and standards requirements.
Document the normal operation of the fully functional smoke management systems, and its
In order to establish a context in which to evaluate the WTC smoke management systems, Chapter 1
provides an overview of smoke management system concepts. Chapter 2 of this report summarizes the
various considerations impacting smoke management system design, along with a brief history of the
development of smoke control related requirements within various national codes and standards. Chapter
3 summarizes the local Building Code of the City of New York (BCNYC) requirements and compares
these code requirements to applicable national codes and standards.
Chapter 4 provides a brief building description of WTC 1, 2, and 7, with a focus on the building
ventilation systems, which are the key components in a buildings smoke management systems. Other
building elements impacting smoke movement and control are also described in this chapter.
Two major fire-related events in the history of the WTC complex had an impact on decisions that affect
the spread of fire and smoke within WTC 1 and WTC 2 in the event of a fire, and had the potential to
impact the smoke management systems installed in the towers. The first incident involved a major fire
that occurred on the 11th floor of WTC 1 on February 14, 1975. The second incident resulted from a car
bomb that exploded in the WTC complex parking garage on February 26, 1993, resulting in smoke spread
throughout the towers. Chapter 5 provides a summary of these two events and discusses changes to the

2
This reference is to one of the companion documents from this Investigation. A list of these documents appears in the Preface
to this report.
Chapter 1
2 NIST NCSTAR 1-4D, WTC Investigation
buildings made subsequent to each event impacting smoke movement and control. Chapter 5 also
summarizes two engineering studies performed subsequent to the 1993 bombing that recommended
changes to the tower smoke management system design, as well as a study of an early proto-type stair
pressurization system.
Chapter 6 addresses the documentation of the smoke management systems (if any) provided in WTC 1, 2,
and 7. Chapter 6 also compares the installed systems to the requirements contained in the applicable
codes and standards.
Chapter 7 addresses the documentation of the normal operation of the fully functional smoke management
systems in WTC 1 and WTC 2, and its potential effect on smoke conditions in the towers on
September 11, 2001.
Chapter 8 discusses the use of the CONTAM building airflow and contaminant dispersal computer model
to evaluate the performance of several smoke management system configurations in the towers under
specified fire scenarios. These fire scenarios included the severe aircraft impact related events that played
out on September 11, 2001, as well as less severe fire scenarios typical of business occupancies. This
additional modeling was performed in an effort to provide analysis that can be used to support one of the
overall objectives of the NIST-led investigation, the identification of areas in current building and fire
codes, standards, and practices that may warrant revision.
Chapter 9 provides a discussion of the analysis and conclusions reached by this report.
1.3 PRIMARY TASKS
Task 1: Document the design and installation of the smoke management systems and compare designs to
applicable code and standard requirements.
The necessary input required to evaluate the performance of the installed smoke management systems in
WTC 1, 2, and 7 required detailed documentation of what was in each building on September 11, 2001, as
well as applicable code requirements. This required review of Port Authority of New York and New
J ersey documents, system operations manuals, drawings, and other relevant documents. Task 1 involved
identification and documentation of such information at the greatest level of detail possible in order to
address issues of performance in the follow-on tasks.
This task had several elements, including the following:
Documentation of the smoke management strategies employed within the buildings and the
location of smoke control zones designated by the system designs
Documentation of the location and function of the major components of the smoke
management system, including air handlers, ducts, dampers, and shafts
Documentation of smoke management system sequences of operation and automatic
initiating devices (if any)
Documentation of smoke management control panel locations and design
Introduction
Documentation of design performance criteria, such as smoke exhaust rates or required
pressure differentials
Documentation of emergency power systems (if any) providing back-up power for the
existing smoke management systems
Documentation of past smoke control studies performed after the 1993 bombing of the WTC
and design changes made (if any) subsequent to these studies
Identification of differences in the design of the smoke management systems installed in
WTC 1, 2, and 7
Comparisons between documented existing systems for each of the three buildings with
applicable codes and standards requirements for these occupancies
Task 2: Document the normal operation of the fully functional smoke management systems, and its
Estimates were made of the likely performance of the systems that existed in the north and South Tower
buildings (WTC 1 and WTC 2) under varying fire exposures. These estimates were made using the
CONTAM computer-based building airflow and contaminant dispersal model to estimate the performance
of smoke management systems for specified fire and damage scenarios.
Elements of this task include the following:
Documentation of expected system performance for design fires in business occupancies,
based on the existing smoke management systems as documented in Task 1
Documentation of redundant systems, if any, that were installed and pre-planned to provide
smoke management in the event that the primary system was unavailable
Documentation of the probable effect of fully functional smoke management systems in
WTC 1 and WTC 2 on smoke conditions in the buildings above the floors impacted by the
aircraft on September 11, 2001

Chapter 1


Chapter 2
BACKGROUND
2.1 SMOKE MANAGEMENT CONCEPTS
Smoke management is a term used interchangeably with smoke control to define the use of active or
passive means to minimize and control smoke movement within a building in the event of a fire. Active
smoke management generally involves the use of ventilation systems to control the movement of smoke.
Passive smoke management generally involves the use of smoke barriers to provide compartmentalization
within a building to minimize smoke spread. Although some attempts have been made by design
professionals to attach different meanings (and implied performance) to differentiate management from
control, these terms are considered to have the same meaning for the purposes of this report.
The objectives of smoke management systems are generally defined in the codes and standards in terms
of meeting life safety objectives with regard to the occupants of a building; although, there are instances
where a smoke management system may be used to provide property protection or aid in fire department
operations and post-fire clean-up.
The primary references used by professionals involved in designing state-of-the-art smoke management
systems are:
Principles of Smoke Management (Klote and Milke 2002), published by the American
Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE)
NFPA 92A, Smoke Control Systems, published by the National Fire Protection Association
(NFPA)
NFPA 92B, Guide for Smoke Management Systems in Malls, Atria, and Large Areas,
published by NFPA
Another valuable technical reference is the book Smoke Movement and Control in High-Rise Buildings,
authored by George T. Tamura, who conducted pioneering research in smoke control at the National
Research Council Canada (NRCC).
2.1.1 Definition of Important Terms
Heating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) SystemWithin the context of smoke management
system design, the system of fans, dampers, and ductwork that distributes air to and from the spaces
within a building.
Fire DamperA multi-blade device located within HVAC system ductwork that is equipped with a
spring-loaded fusible element that when exposed to heated air/smoke above a specified design
temperature will close to prohibit fire propagation to adjacent spaces via the ductwork. In the
United States, fire dampers are generally required to conform with Underwriters Laboratories (UL)
Chapter 2
Standard 555, Standard for Safety Fire Dampers. Fire dampers are not generally designed to be air-tight
nor to prohibit the passage of smoke.
Smoke BarrierA continuous membrane, either vertical or horizontal, such as a wall, floor, or ceiling
assembly, that is designed and constructed to restrict the movement of smoke (NFPA 2000b). A smoke
barrier may or may not be required to have a fire-resistance rating.
Smoke DamperA multi-blade device located within HVAC system ductwork that functions similarly to
a fire damper, but in addition is equipped with a local smoke detector that will cause the damper to close
when the presence of smoke is detected. In lieu of a local detector, some smoke dampers are controlled
automatically by a buildings smoke management system. Smoke dampers are designed to prohibit the
passage of smoke and are classified for leakage in accordance with UL standard UL 555S, Standard for
Safety Leakage Rated Dampers for Use in Smoke Control Systems.
Smoke Management/Smoke ControlA means for minimizing smoke migration through a building due
to a fire occurring within that building.
Smoke PurgingA means for reducing the amount of smoke within a space in a building using
mechanically supplied ventilation. Smoke purging generally involves introducing smoke-free supply air
into the space and exhausting smoke-filled air from the space directly to the exterior of the building, with
no re-circulation back into the building via the supply system. Smoke purging can be used during the fire
event to provide dilution of a smoke-filled environment in an effort to improve tenability or during post-
fire operations to remove smoke from the building once the fire has been extinguished.
Tenability SystemA smoke management system that as part of its basis for design anticipates occupant
contact with smoke. Such a design considers various tenability criteria (i.e., smoke temperature, visibility,
toxicity) to determine acceptable occupant exposure during egress. A timed egress analysis is typically
performed in conjunction with such a design.
2.1.2 Smoke Management Approaches
The ASHRAE text Principles of Smoke Management (Klote and Milke 2002) states that smoke
movement can be managed by use of one or more of the following mechanisms: compartmentation,
dilution, air-flow, pressurization, or buoyancy. National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 92A
(NFPA 2000b) defines smoke control as the use of pressurization produced by mechanical fans. As stated
by Klote and Milke, by this definition, stairway pressurization, elevator pressurization, and zoned smoke
control are all types of smoke control systems.
Compartmentation
Compartmentation is a passive smoke control approach where smoke spread is minimized by the use of
smoke barriers between defined areas of the building, typically referred to as smoke zones. The leakage
characteristics are defined so that the allowable openings contained in the barrier are small enough as to
resist the passage of smoke. Features such as firestopping of barrier penetrations, door
gaskets/sweeps/drop seals, and stair/elevator vestibules are used to provide compartmentation. Smoke
dampers in HVAC ductwork and automatic door hold-open devices may also be used to provide
compartmentation in the event of smoke detection in a given zone.
Background
Exhaust Method
The exhaust method of smoke control is an active smoke control approach that uses mechanical
ventilation along with the buoyancy of the smoke to maintain smoke at a height 6 ft to 10 ft above the
highest occupied floor of a large space such as an atrium. The buoyancy of the smoke causes it to rise to
the upper levels of the space, which acts as a smoke reservoir to contain the descending smoke. The most
commonly used approach is to provide mechanical smoke exhaust from the upper portions of the space,
sized at a rate equal to the volumetric flow of the smoke entering the smoke layer to maintain the smoke
layer above a design smoke layer interface. Figure 21 illustrates conceptually the exhaust method of
smoke management (M
exhaust
- mechanical exhaust rate; M
plume
mass flow rate of plume as it enters the
smoke layer).

Figure 21. Exhaust method of smoke management.
NFPA 92B (NFPA 2000c) describes the calculation methods associated with smoke management system
design for large volume spaces such as atriums. The calculations described have been adopted in the
atrium requirements included in the various model building codes adopted in the United States.
NFPA 92B, while discussing the exhaust method of smoke control, also recognizes the use of natural
ventilation to exhaust atrium-like spaces, a method not widely employed in the United States. NFPA 92B
also discusses tenability approaches, recognizing that in some configurations, such as very large volume
spaces, the amount of air being entrained into the fire plume dilutes the smoke to such an extent that the
smoke in the descending layer presents little hazard to building occupants.
Chapter 2
The exhaust method is not intended for use in low-ceiling spaces, as a smoke reservoir is needed to
maintain the smoke above the level of building occupants. Sprinkler operation may also impact this
approach for spaces with low ceiling heights, cooling the smoke so that it loses stratification and descends
below the desired smoke layer interface.
Pressurization Method
For highly compartmented buildings with predominately low-ceiling spaces, such as high-rise office
buildings (including open-plan office buildings, which are compartmented at the core and floor to floor),
the pressurization method is an appropriate smoke management approach. The pressurization method
involves use of mechanical ventilation systems to induce a pressure differential across a smoke barrier
between the zone of fire origin and adjacent spaces, in order to contain the smoke to the zone of fire
origin.
The pressure differential required to achieve containment is a function of the smoke temperature within
the zone of origin and the smoke layer height within the space, which impacts the buoyancy pressure of
the layer. For unsprinklered buildings, the design pressure difference is generally 0.10 in. H
2
O (25 Pa),
calculated based on an assumed gas temperature of 1,700 F (925 C) and a ceiling height of 9 ft. For
sprinklered buildings, the design pressure is 0.05 in. H
2
O (12.5 Pa), including a 0.03 in. H
2
O safety factor.
For zoned smoke management systems, the pressure difference is measured between the smoke zone and
adjacent spaces while the affected areas are in the smoke-management mode (NFPA 2000b). It should be
noted that because of the lower pressure differential required for sprinklered spaces, it is essential that
sprinklers operate to ensure that the smoke management works properly. A system designed to 0.05 in.
H
2
O will not create a sufficient pressure differential to hold back the high temperature smoke resulting
from an unsprinklered fire.
When designing a pressurization smoke management system it is important to not create excessive
pressure differential to the extent that door overpressures may impede safe egress from a building.
Depending on the size of the door and force applied by the door closer, maximum allowable pressure
differentials typically range from 0.21 in H
2
O0.45 in. H
2
O (52.2 Pa112.0 Pa) and are designed to
maintain maximum door opening forces below 30 lb
f
(133.4 N) (NFPA 2000b). However, some
jurisdictions enforce maximum door opening forces as low as 15 lb
f
(66.7 N) (CBC 1998).
There are two general types of pressurization smoke management systems: positive pressure systems, and
negative pressure systems. These two types of systems are depicted in Figs. 22 and 23.
Background

Figure 22. Positive pressurization smoke management system.
Chapter 2

Figure 23. Negative pressurization smoke management system.
Positive pressurization systems supply air to the zones adjacent to the zone of fire origin to create a
positive pressure in the adjacent zones with respect to the fire zone. Although a properly designed
positive pressurization system should perform adequately to contain smoke, there are two drawbacks to
using this type of system. First, excessive overpressures or imbalanced positive pressures may force
smoke from the zone of fire origin into unintended areas of the building, thereby promoting smoke
spread. Second, positive pressure systems do not result in the removal smoke from the building.
Negative pressurization systems typically exhaust the zone of fire origin, either alone or in combination
with supply in adjacent zones, to achieve the desired pressure differential. The simplest approach is to
shut down ventilation in adjacent zones and exhaust the zone of fire origin. The benefit of this type of
system is that smoke is directly removed from the building, improving conditions within the zone of fire
origin and within the building as a whole.
Stair pressurization is a type of positive pressurization smoke management system and is designed to limit
smoke spread into the stairways of buildings such as a high-rise buildings. The intent of stairway
pressurization systems is to maintain the primary egress paths of a building clear of smoke. Stairway
pressurization, depicted in both Figs. 22 and 23, is required by the building codes currently enforced in
the United States regardless of the smoke control approach selected in high-rise buildings. It is interesting
Background
to note that in the various building codes enforced in the United States, stairway pressurization
requirements are generally included in the section of the code containing the requirements for means of
egress, and are not included in the section of the code pertaining to smoke control system design.
For pressurization smoke management systems, system performance is often dependent on maintaining
the integrity of the smoke barriers surrounding the zone to which smoke is to be contained. The applicable
codes and standards generally contain requirements specifying maximum allowable smoke barrier
leakage. While a looser system of barriers may be successful in providing the required performance, so
long as fan capacity is increased to maintain the desired pressure differential, maintaining the integrity of
smoke barriers is generally recommended as a basis of design.
Airflow Method
For large openings where the pressurization method is not applicable, it is possible to prevent smoke from
migrating through the opening by means of an opposed airflow directed to limit smoke migration from
the fire zone. In general, it is also preferable that the area of the opening be relatively small in relation to
the plane in which it is contained. In addition, the airflow method is typically only used for openings that
are in the vertical plane, such as doorways, hallways, etc.
As shown in Fig. 24, if the airflow is not of sufficiently high velocity, or the temperature of the heated
smoke is excessive, smoke backflow is still possible at the uppermost portion of the opening, resulting in
two-way flow through the opening. The airflow method is generally more applicable to conditions where
the smoke is diluted and of relatively low temperature. In addition, it is generally required that use of this
method not result in excessive airflows toward a fire, so as not to unduly intensify the fire, disrupt plume
dynamics, or interfere with exiting. This technique is not recommended in the ASHRAE text Principles of
Smoke Management, except when the fire is suppressed or, in the rare cases when fuel can be restricted
with confidence (Klote and Milke 2002).
Dilution
The term smoke purge, defined in Sec. 2.1.1, refers to the use of supply and exhaust ventilation to reduce
the concentration of smoke within a space. Smoke purge is most often employed in post-fire cleanup
operations; however, when this approach is used during a fire event, it is often referred to as dilution.
System performance using dilution is often determined based on maintaining tenable smoke conditions.
Tenability is a function of various criteria, including smoke temperature, toxicity, and visibility distance.
Use of the dilution method to improve smoke conditions within a space containing a fire may be
ineffective unless a fire is relatively small and the space in which it is contained is relatively large. Klote
and Milke (2002) provide the following cautionary text regarding the use of dilution near a fire:
There is no theoretical or experimental evidence that using a buildings
HVAC system for smoke dilution will result in any significant
improvement in tenable conditions within the fire space. It is well known
that HVAC systems promote a considerable degree of air mixing within
the spaces they serve. Because of this and the fact that very large
quantities of smoke can be produced by building fires, it is generally
believed that dilution of smoke by an HVAC system in the fire space will
Chapter 2
not result in any practical improvement in the tenable conditions of that
space. Thus it is recommended that smoke purging systems intended to
improve hazard conditions within the fire space or in spaces connected to
the fire space by large openings not be used.

Figure 24. Airflow method of smoke management.
Use of the dilution method to improve smoke conditions remote from a fire may be effective, providing
that the rate of smoke leakage is small compared to either the total volume of the protected space or the
rate of air supplied to and removed from the space (smoke purge rate).
2.1.3 Factors Affecting Smoke Management
The performance of a buildings smoke management systems can be impacted by a number of factors,
including: stack effect, wind, air movement caused by the buildings HVAC systems, and temperature
associated with the fire (i.e., buoyancy and expansion of hot combustion products).
Background
Stack Effect
Stack effect is a phenomenon which induces an upward or downward airflow within buildings due to the
temperature difference between a buildings interior and the outdoors. Generally, when the ambient air is
colder than the building interior, air will move upward through the building. This is sometimes referred
to as normal stack effect and will occur under winter conditions. When the ambient air temperature is
warmer than the building temperature, air will move downward through the building. This is referred to
as reverse stack effect and will occur under summer conditions. The magnitude of the stack effect
induced airflow is directly dependent on the magnitude of the temperature differential between the
building and ambient, as well as the buildings height. Building airflows resulting from winter (normal)
stack effect are depicted in Fig. 25.
Because the magnitude of a stack effect is a function of temperature, stack effect is of greatest concern
when the temperature differential between the inside of a building and outside the building is greatest.
Except for extremely hot locales, such as Phoenix or Las Vegas, winter (normal) stack effect conditions
are typically of greater concern than summer (reverse) stack effect conditions. Winter stack effect is of
greater concern for buildings located in New York City, due to the greater prevalence of colder outdoor
air temperatures.

Figure 25. Building airflows due to winter stack effect.
Chapter 2
Climate data for the New York City area, measured at J FK International Airport were obtained from the
ASHRAE Handbook (ASHRAE 2001). The extreme summer and winter conditions (corresponding to
99 percent dry bulb temperatures) recommended by ASHRAE for use in the design of smoke
management systems are as follows:
Minimum design temperature (winter): 15 F (-9.4 C)
Maximum design temperature (summer): 88 F (31 C)
Stack effect has a greater impact for extremely tall buildings, as the magnitude of the stack effect is
dependent on the temperature differential as well as the distance from the neutral plane. For World Trade
Center (WTC) buildings 1 and 2, at the winter design temperature, stack effect pressures are on the order
of 1.1 in. H
2
O (280 Pa) at the bottom and top of the building. Considering that these pressures are an
order of magnitude higher than the design pressure for unsprinklered buildings, it is evident that stack
effect can be a significant contributor to smoke spread in tall buildings.
Wind
The effect of wind on a building is a very complex phenomenon, which is affected by wind speed and
direction, building shape, building height, and other nearby buildings. Wind pressures can vary widely
across each face of a building, making input of wind pressure into computer simulations difficult. Wind is
a transient phenomenon. The magnitude of the wind and its direction can fluctuate wildly. Therefore,
many assumptions must be made in order to model wind in a smoke control analysis. In the absence of
accurate wind pressure data from sources such as wind tunnel models or computational fluid dynamics
(CFD) programs, idealizations of wind pressure magnitudes must be made. For buildings that are
rectangular in shape, average wind pressure coefficients have been calculated based on average values
across a building face.
Buildings that are exposed to the wind, without significant obstructions, experience a positive wind
pressure on the wall facing the wind and negative wind pressures on the other three faces. The shape of
the building as well as the wind velocity has an effect on the magnitude of the wind pressures on the
various faces of the building. A simplified representation of wind-driven pressure differentials on WTC 1
is depicted in Fig. 26.
Figure 26 depicts a northerly wind impacting the building. On September 11, 2001, wind fluctuated out
of the north/northwest at speeds between 515 mph, or an average of 10 mph.
The ASHRAE Fundamentals Handbook lists a design wind speed of 27 mph for the City of New York
(J FK International Airport). This wind speed corresponds to the 1 percent extreme wind speed. The text
accompanying this information indicates that this wind speed is used in the design of smoke management
systems and that it is appropriate for this application (ASHRAE 2001).
Wind generally acts to promote horizontal, rather than vertical air movement through a building, resulting
in smoke spread from the windward side to the leeward side of a building. For buildings with relatively
tight exterior walls, no operable exterior windows, and office spaces connected by a common HVAC
plenum, wind effects tend to be minimal on smoke spread within the building. However, should windows
be broken out (as may result from a fully involved fire on an office floor), or should other large openings
Background
be created in the exterior walls of a building (as a result of an aircraft impact) wind can have a greater
impact on smoke spread. Wind driven flows may help to force smoke into vertical shafts in the building
(such as stairways or elevator hoistways), resulting in increased smoke spread to other floors due to
buoyancy driven flows or stack effect.

Figure 26. Wind forces on WTC 1.
HVAC Systems
Building HVAC systems in addition to those dedicated for smoke control purposes, need to be evaluated
for their contribution to smoke movement within a building. HVAC systems that are not shut down
during a fire, or are set in a mode that re-circulates air through the building, may directly cause smoke
spread through the building.
HVAC ductwork systems are often equipped with duct smoke detectors that shut down the associated
fans in an effort to limit smoke spread via the fan. However, the ductwork system may provide another
conduit for smoke spread from floor-to-floor, particularly if the ductwork contains fire dampers rather
than smoke dampers. Smoke temperatures may not be sufficient to cause closure of the dampers
(particularly in sprinklered fire scenarios), resulting in the movement of smoke past the open fire damper
and through the HVAC duct system.
Temperature Effects
For an unsprinklered fire, buoyancy of hot fire gases can be a significant contributor to smoke movement
through a building. Smoke will form a layer in the upper part of the fire compartment and adjacent spaces,
and spread vertically via shaft openings and other openings to floors above. For a sprinklered fire, the
contribution of these buoyant forces to overall smoke movement in the building is reduced. Once the
Chapter 2
sprinkler is activated, the water spray will cool the hot gases. The momentum of the water spray will also
stir the smoke layer, resulting in a more uniform smoke concentration within the room.
The temperature of the fire gases for an unsprinklered fire may also affect smoke management system
performance if the severity of the fire threatens the integrity of the smoke barriers (which are often
required by code to have a fire resistance rating as well). As previously stated, maintenance of smoke
barrier integrity is an important aspect of smoke management design.
2.1.4 Smoke Management System Reliability
The reliability of an installed smoke management system is a function of a number of factors, including
the relative simplicity of the system, and the frequency and type of testing performed on the system. The
ASHRAE text Principles of Smoke Management (Klote and Milke 2002) provides a brief discussion of
system reliability, nothing that overall system reliability declines with increasing system complexity. This
discussion recognizes, however, that the analysis provides only very rough estimates of reliability, due to
the difficulty of obtaining data about the reliability of smoke management system components.
A survey of the fire protection literature and discussions with persons knowledgeable in the area of smoke
management system design conducted during the preparation of this report failed to identify any data on
smoke management system component failure, nor did this inquiry identify any instances where operation
of a smoke management system (successfully or unsuccessfully) during a fire could be adequately
documented.
In the absence of data to document smoke management system/component failure rates, it is necessary to
perform testing to verify the proper operation of a smoke management system. In general, three types of
testing are required to ensure proper system operation over the life of a building:
1. Commissioning/Acceptance Testing
2. Periodic Performance Testing
3. Automatic Component Testing
Commissioning/Acceptance Testing
System commissioning, otherwise known as acceptance testing, is performed when the smoke control
system is first installed in a building. This typically occurs when the building is being constructed, as
building codes do not often require retroactive installation of smoke control in existing buildings. The
purpose of this type of testing is to ensure that the system has been properly installed and that all
sequences of operation perform as designed. In addition to verifying the proper installation and
functionality of individual system components (i.e., fans, dampers, ductwork), automatic operation of
system components and manual operation (typically via a fire fighters control panel) are verified. For
pressurization smoke management systems, including stair pressurization systems, pressure differentials
are verified to meet the design intent.
It is important during commissioning that all related fire protection or building systems be tested to the
extent that their operation impact the operation of the smoke management systems. Fire/smoke detection
Background
devices and/or sprinkler water flow switches that initiate the smoke management system must be tested.
In addition, the emergency/standby power systems must also be tested. Finally, the integrity of any
barrier, partition, or floor assembly intended to resist smoke passage (smoke barrier) be either visually
inspected or tested to verify that it will meet the design intent.
Periodic Performance Testing
Periodic performance testing is critical to ensure proper operation of a smoke management system over
the life of a building. During a periodic test, all sequences of operation should be verified, and
performance parameters such as pressure differentials should be re-measured as part of the test. It is
possible that ongoing construction or maintenance work may have damaged a system component or in the
case of a pressurization system, modified a smoke barrier in such a way as to affect its air leakage, which
will impact the pressure differential capable of being achieved across that smoke barrier.
NFPA 92A (2000b) and NFPA 92B (2000c) recommend annual or semi-annual periodic testing
frequencies, depending on whether a smoke management system is a dedicated, or non-dedicated system.
A dedicated system is one that is installed in the building solely to perform a smoke management function
and is unused until called upon to perform in the event of a fire. Stair pressurization fans are typically
dedicated system components. A non-dedicated system is one that uses components that are
predominately used in the daily operation of the overall HVAC systems. The reliability of system
components that are used frequently is expected to be much higher, due to the fact that any problem with
system operation would likely be quickly corrected in order to ensure continued operation of the normal
building HVAC systems.
Up until the most recent editions of NFPA 92A and NFPA 92B (2000 editions), these documents existed
as design guides. Therefore, the periodic testing frequencies are suggested practices, and are not written
into any of the model building codes in the United States. While individual jurisdictions may require and
enforce rigorous periodic testing, either at more frequent or less frequent intervals than those
recommended by NFPA, some jurisdictions may require little or no periodic testing of smoke control
systems. In fact, anecdotal evidence suggests that a majority of smoke control systems installed in high-
rise buildings may undergo limited or no periodic testing.
Automatic Component Testing
Automatic smoke management system component testing involves the periodic (usually weekly) self-
testing of individual system components (i.e., fans and dampers) by the fire alarm or smoke management
panel that controls the system. The panel incorporates a time clock and a programmed sequence that
exercises system components once per week and receives positive confirmation that the component
operated properly. For fans, the self-test typically involves turning on the fan just long enough to receive
positive confirmation of airflow via a pressure transducer, current transducer or sail switch. For dampers,
the self-test typically involves cycling the damper into both the open and closed positions and receiving
positive confirmation of each position via contact switches. The fire alarm or smoke control panel prints a
report of each self-test and identifies components that failed to operate properly, and also generates a fault
condition so that this failure may be identified by building personnel.
Chapter 2
The automatic testing feature is a relatively new development, and is increasingly common in smoke
management systems designed after 1998. This feature came into being primarily to address the issue of
supervision of smoke management system components. Various building codes and standards required
that system components be supervised, with typical language stated as follows: Supervision shall include
positive confirmation of actuation, testing, manual override, and the presence of power downstream of all
disconnects.
The requirement to monitor power conductors for the presence of power downstream of all disconnects is
somewhat problematic. The presence or absence of power to a fan will verify only that power is supplied
to a fan. In the case of a fan that is normally OFF, such a monitor would show no power to the fan until
the system is activated. The case where maintenance activities have resulted in the opening of a
disconnect device in the circuit would not be detected or prevented by such a monitoring device, and
hence, there is no improvement in system reliability by the installation of such a device.
In the case of a fan that is normally ON, such a monitor would show the presence of power to the fan, and
would alert building personnel to an instance where maintenance activities resulted in a fan being shut
off. If a fan is normally operating, it is reasonable to assume that there is some reason for the airflow, and
that occupants will notice the absence of that airflow in rather short order, initiating a service call.
A device that monitors the presence of power cannot verify air movement, much less the proper quantity
or direction of air movement. Underwriters Laboratories developed UL listing category UUKLSmoke
Control System Equipment in part to address this issue as well as other problems that exist with system
supervision.
The basic standard used by UL to investigate fire alarm/smoke control panels is UL 864, Control Units
for FireProtective Signaling Systems. This standard does not cover the motors, fans, dampers, ducts,
etc., which provide the HVAC function, and which are covered under their respective product categories.
UL 864 does not investigate the safety of end-to-end supervision of power conductors.
UL 864 was originally written, and is primarily used, as the governing standard for fire alarm system
control units. The 9th Edition of UL 864, published in September, 2003, includes a section titled Smoke
Control Service, which has been added to include the requirements for smoke control system equipment
to obtain the UUKL listing. Prior to 2003, UL provided manufacturers of smoke control equipment with a
letter of interpretation outlining the requirements for obtaining the UUKL listing.
In drafting their standards (i.e., UL 864) for the listing of products to be used in complying with the
various building and fire codes, UL considered all of the code language contained in the three model
building codes. UL recognized that the traditional means to maintain the integrity of a system is electrical
supervision of wiring and that the proper operation of the fans and dampers involves mechanical parts that
may not be supervised by such electrical supervision. UL therefore considered end-process verification to
be an acceptable alternative (Shudak 1998).
UL 864 applies different testing criteria to HVAC systems based on their use. For those systems that are
dedicated entirely to smoke control function, UL requires the following:
Monitoring of the interconnecting wiring between the fire alarm control panel and the
auxiliary relay controlling the motor control center for the fan
Background
End process verification of the operational status of each fan or damper
Automatic weekly activation of the smoke control system, with annunciation of the failure of
any required function to operate
The UL requirements to maintain the integrity of non-dedicated components (those components of the
HVAC system within a building that are operated regularly) of the smoke control system are significantly
less demanding. UL determined that the normal comfort level associated with the operability or non-
operability of the equipment is an acceptable means of maintaining system integrity for non-dedicated
systems. Combined with the monitoring of the interconnecting wiring between the fire alarm control
panel and the auxiliary relay controlling the motor control center for the fan, and end process verification
of the operational status of each fan or damper during system operation, system reliability is maintained at
an acceptable level.
Prior to 1998, only a few of the major manufacturers of fire alarm system equipment had panels that
carried the UUKL listing. Since that time, all of the major manufacturers have obtained UUKL listings on
their products. While not currently codified in any of the major building codes, several jurisdictions, such
as the City of San Francisco, now require, by way of local code amendments, the installation of UUKL
smoke control panels in conjunction with smoke management system installation.
In summary, the ability to perform automatic weekly self testing of smoke control system components has
gone a long way toward improving the reliability of todays smoke management systems. This technology
is relatively new and is currently used in only a small proportion of the smoke management systems
installed in high-rise buildings in the United States.
2.2 EVOLUTION OF SMOKE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM CODE
REQUIREMENTS
In order to evaluate the adequacy of the smoke management systems installed in WTC 1, 2, and 7 at the
time of the terrorist events of September 11, 2001, it is not only important to understand the applicable
code requirements for the buildings (discussed in Chapter 3), but also to develop an understanding of the
timeframe in which various passive and active smoke-related code provisions came into being, both as
concepts in the technical literature and as requirements in the major model building codes in the
United States. This provides a reference as to what was considered state-of-the-art smoke management
system design at various points over the life of the buildings.
The fire protection literature was reviewed along with past editions of the Building Officials and Code
Administrators (BOCA) National Building Code and the Uniform Building Code (UBC), as well as
NFPA guides and standards. More recent developments in the International Building Code (IBC) and
NFPAs model building code (NFPA 5000) pertaining to smoke management systems were also
considered.
2.2.1 Historical Milestones
The origin of smoke management in buildings can be traced to an article that appeared in the NFPA
Quarterly in 1939 titled Smoke Hazards of AirConditioning Systems (NBFU 1939). The article
Chapter 2
summarizes a study performed by the National Board of Fire Underwriters (NBFU) and identifies the
hazards associated with the spread of fire and smoke via HVAC system ductwork.
The NBFU study states that in the event of fire occurring in an air-conditioned building, either inside or
outside of the duct system or in the vicinity of air intakes, it is necessary to shut down the blowers so
that the movement of air will not augment the fire, and interrupt the continuity of the duct system using
dampers so that smoke, flame, and heat may not travel from their source to the places where damage may
be caused. The current air-conditioning standard published by the NFPA, NFPA 90A contains
requirements that are consistent with the findings of the NBFU study (Klote 1994).
It is interesting to note that the NBFU study examines the use of smoke-tight dampers operated
electrically or pneumatically based on smoke detection using photoelectric smoke detectors, a
requirement that would not make its way into the building codes until a much later time. The study also
states that with some changes in design, an air-conditioning system could be arranged so as to reverse its
flow at time of fire and eject smoke and products of combustion from the building. However, the study
further concluded that very few systems could be so arranged except at a cost that would be prohibitive,
and a further study of the matter casts grave doubts on the advisability of such an arrangement
(NBFU 1939).
According to J ohn Klote, co-author of the ASHRAE text Principles of Smoke Management (Klote and
Milke 2002), the major impact of the 1939 NBFU study was that for many years the approach for
managing smoke was limited to shutting down the HVAC system. Combined with the then-prevailing
higher emphasis on property damage over life safety, this practice led to the development of a fire damper
standard well before a smoke damper standard (Klote 2004).
The issue of smoke management in buildings did not gain further momentum until the late
1960s/early1970s, right about the time that the WTC complex was being designed and built. The first
edition of UL 555Standard for Fire Dampers was published in 1968. ASHRAE also held a symposium
covering fire hazards in buildings and air-handling systems at its annual meeting in 1968. A second
ASHRAE symposium addressing these issues was held in 1970, followed by the International Conference
on Firesafety in High-Rise Buildings in 1971. This conference was sponsored by the U.S. General
Services Administration (GSA) (Klote 1994).
The early 1970s saw several full-scale test programs that examined the effectiveness of smoke
management systems (Klote 1995). In 1973, the Atlanta Building Department conducted tests in the
Henry Grady Hotel to evaluate the effectiveness of stairway pressurization with and without stair
vestibules, as well as elevator hoistway pressurization. Also during 1973, the Brooklyn Polytechnic
Institute tested the effectiveness of stairway pressurization in a 22-story office building on Church Street
in New York City. In 1976, an installed stair pressurization system in a new 7-story office building in
Hamburg, Germany was tested by way of a full-scale fire test. In each of these test programs
pressurization smoke management systems were shown to be effective in managing the spread of smoke
created by full-scale unsprinklered test fires.
In 1973, the ASHRAE handbook introduced a chapter titled Fire and Smoke Control, providing general
information about fire protection, smoke production, smoke movement, and smoke control (Klote 1994).
In subsequent years ASHRAE sponsored a series of seminars to educate design professionals on smoke
management system design. In 1983, ASHRAE published a text titled Design of Smoke Control Systems
Background
in Buildings (Klote and Fothergill 1983), which outlined the engineering principles pertaining to smoke
management system design. This book was later updated as Design of Smoke Management Systems (Klote
and Milke 1992).
In 1983, the same year that ASHRAE published its design book, Underwriters Laboratories published the
first edition of UL 555SLeakage Rated Dampers for use in Smoke Control Systems. The 1985 edition of
NFPA 90AInstallation of Air Conditioning and Ventilation Systems required that smoke dampers be
installed in ducts which penetrate smoke barriers and that the smoke dampers satisfy the provisions of
UL 555S.
The NFPA formed its Technical Committee on Smoke Management Systems in 1985. This committee
authored the first edition of NFPA 92ARecommended Practice for Smoke-Control Systems, published in
1988. NFPA 92A was intended to be used for systems designed based on the pressurization method of
smoke control and brought together many of the previous developments in smoke management system
design, referencing UL 555 for fire dampers, UL 555S for smoke dampers, and NFPA 90A for HVAC
system design. The document also references the ASHRAE text Design of Smoke Control Systems in
Buildings (Klote and Fothergill 1983) for further guidance on detailed design information. The committee
went on to author the first edition of NFPA 92BGuide for Smoke Management Systems in Malls, Atria,
and Large Areas, published in 1991.
In 1989, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) conducted a series of tests of zoned
smoke control systems at the Plaza Hotel in Washington, D.C. (Klote 1990). Fans were used to pressurize
the stairway, exhaust the fire floor, and pressurize the floors above and below the fire floor. The
experiments demonstrated that the smoke control system worked as intended (Klote 1995). The approach
used in these tests would later become commonly referred to as sandwich pressurization.
2.2.2 Smoke Management in the Model Building Codes
Past editions of the BOCA National Building Code and the UBC were reviewed back to 1968 in order to
understand the evolution of smoke control system requirements in the model building codes. The year
1968 was selected because (as discussed in Chapter 3 of this report), WTC 1 and WTC 2 were
constructed under the provisions of the 1968 Building Code of New York City (BCNYC). The BOCA
code was selected for comparison since this code covered the majority of the northeastern United States
until approximately 1999. The UBC was selected since this code in recent years included the most
stringent smoke control requirements of the major model building codes enforced in the United States.
Prior to 1970, both BOCA and UBC required provision of stairways in high-rise buildings constructed as
smokeproof enclosures that are naturally ventilated. This means that building occupants had to traverse an
open air vestibule prior to entering a stairway, such that the stairway did not directly connect to the
interior of the building. The 1970 edition of the UBC and 1971 supplement to the BOCA code specify the
first requirements for mechanical ventilation options for smokeproof enclosures, requiring that vestibules
be purged at a specified air change rate and stair shafts be pressurized to 0.05 in. H
2
O with all stair doors
closed. At that time, both model codes only required that at least one of the required exits be a
smokeproof enclosure. The chapter pertaining to exits was revised in the 1982 edition of the UBC, and
required that all required high rise exits be smokeproof enclosures. The code did allow exemptions for
enclosed stairways equipped with a minimum exhaust of 2,500 ft
3
/min and positive pressure maintenance
Chapter 2
of 0.25 in. H
2
O with all stair doors closed. The 1985 edition of the UBC added the requirement that a
building be fully protected by an automatic sprinkler system in order to use this exemption. The UBC
requirements for smokeproof enclosures remained essentially unchanged until they were eliminated in
1992. BOCA made the change requiring all exits to be smokeproof enclosures starting in 1990.
Both UBC (1973 edition) and BOCA (1978 edition) initially required fire dampers only in HVAC
ductwork at shaft and fire barrier penetrations. The 1988 edition of the UBC first specified the
requirement for approved smoke dampers, although no standard was actually referenced. The 1989
supplement to the UBC referenced the newly created UBC Standard 43-12 for smoke dampers, which was
based on UL 555S, Standard for Safety Leakage Rated Damages for Use in Smoke Control Systems.
Smoke dampers were required wherever ducts penetrated smoke and draft barriers. The 1987 edition of
the BOCA code first required approved smoke dampers wherever ducts penetrated a smoke barrier;
however, no corresponding standard (i.e., UL 555S) was specified up to and including the 1999 edition of
the BOCA code.
In the 1970s and 1980s, smoke management system requirements varied from providing specified air
change rates to exhaust smoke from a fire floor to providing break-out windows to vent smoke from the
building. The 1973 edition of the UBC and the 1978 edition of the BOCA code required that high-rise
office buildings have ventilation for the removal of smoke on every floor. Several methods of venting
were allowed including using the HVAC equipment in fully-sprinklered buildings or mechanically
venting the largest compartment served at a rate of 60 air changes per hour (this option was removed in
1979), or using panels or windows in the exterior walls that were capable of venting smoke. If the HVAC
equipment was used, this equipment was required to provide a minimum of one exhaust air change every
10 min (6 air changes per hour) for the area involved. The 1982 edition of UBC included requirements for
mechanical smoke removal from atria. Four air changes per hour were required for an atrium volume less
than 600,000 ft
3
while 6 air changes per hour were required for atriums with greater volumes. Local
amendments to the code specified different smoke control approaches. For example, the 1992 edition of
the San Francisco Building Code (SFBC) required that systems be capable of exhausting 6 air changes
per hour and supplying make-up air to the occupied space of any 2 adjacent floors, while simultaneously
supplying outside air to (without return or exhaust from) the floors directly above and below the
exhausted floors (SFBC 1992).
The 1992 supplement to the BOCA code removed the requirement for smoke control systems in high-rise
buildings. Sec. 1019, Smoke Control Systems,was also rewritten to state that active smoke control is not
required in atria where it can be demonstrated that the smoke interface level requirement can be met by
passive means. The BOCA smoke interface level requirement was maintenance of the smoke layer above
the highest unprotected opening or maintenance of a clear height of at least 6 ft above the highest floor of
exit access open to the atrium. The most recent editions of the BOCA code, up to and including the
1999 edition, did not require zoned smoke control in high-rise buildings. Stairways were required to be
pressurized but did not have to be provided with vestibules.
In 1994, a substantial revision was made to the smoke control requirements included in the UBC,
resulting in UBC Sec. 905Smoke Control. This code section represents the first code language based on
the scientific and engineering principles included in NFPA 92A and NFPA 92B. The 1994 UBC specifies
that a zoned smoke control system be provided for high-rise buildings, even though these buildings were
now required to be fully sprinklered. In fact, the smoke control system design was predicated on the
building being sprinklered in that the design pressure specified for sprinklered buildings was 0.05 in.
Background
H
2
O. Stairways were required to have vestibules and be pressurized, but these requirements were
included in the provisions of the code pertaining to means of egress. The 1994 UBC provisions remained
unchanged in the 1997 edition of the code.
In the late 1990s, a major restructuring occurred with regard to the model building codes in the
United States. The BOCA, UBC, and the Standard Building Code groups formed the International Code
Council (ICC) and proceeded to develop a single family of model codes that would replace their
individual model codes. The first complete set of ICC codes, including the International Building Code
(IBC) was published in 2000. At about the same time, the NFPA published its own building code,
NFPA 5000, which was completed in 2002 and included in the 2003 edition of the National Fire Codes.
The 2000 and subsequent 2003 editions of IBC largely adopted the smoke management system design
requirements contained in UBC Sec. 905. NFPA 5000, 2003 edition, references NFPA 92A and
NFPA 92B, which are currently being converted from design guides into standards.
In both the 2000 and 2003 editions of the IBC and the 2003 edition of NFPA 5000, provision of a zoned
smoke management system is no longer required for sprinklered high-rise buildings. The smoke
management system provisions are only invoked for atriums and special occupancies such as correctional
facilities. Stair pressurization systems are required by both the IBC and NFPA 5000 for high-rise
buildings.
During the draft review and comment process in the development of the IBC, at least five different
proponents made proposals for the inclusion of a IBC Sec. 403.13, Smoke Control,requiring smoke
control systems in high-rise buildings (ICC 1999). The main reason cited by the proponents was concern
about smoke migration to upper levels of a building due to stack effect occurring in winter months. In
each case the committee disapproved of the proposed change. Reasons for disapproval included a
perceived low benefit versus a high cost in buildings that are sprinklered (which is required for high-rise
buildings), as well as the lack of an adverse life loss history in high rise buildings and the resulting lack of
data to substantiate the need for smoke control.
2.3 REFERENCES
ASHRAE. 2001. ASHRAE Fundamentals Handbook. American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and
Air-Conditioning Engineers, Atlanta, GA.
BOCA/BBC, various editions. 1965-1999. BOCA Basic Building Code, Building Officials and Code
Administrators, International, Country Club Hills, IL.
CBC. 1998. California Building Code. Title 24, Part 2, Vol. 1, Sacramento, CA.
ICC (International Code Council). 1999. Proposed Code Changes to the IBC (International Building
Code). International Code Council, Country Club Hills, IL.
ICC (International Code Council). 2000. IBC (International Building Code). International Code Council,
Country Club Hills, IL.
ICC (International Code Council). 2003. IBC (International Building Code). International Code Council,
Country Club Hills, IL.
Chapter 2
Klote, J . H. 1990. Fire Experiments of Zoned Smoke Control at the Plaza Hotel in Washington, DC.
NISTIR 90-4253. National Institute of Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg, MD.
Klote, J . H. 1994. Fire and smoke control: an historical perspective. ASHRAE Journal, J uly.
Klote, J . H. 1995. An overview of smoke control research. ASHRAE Transactions: Symposia. Vol. 101,
No. 1.
Klote, J . H., and J . W. Fothergill. 1983. Design of Smoke Control Systems for Buildings. U.S.
Department of Commerce, National Bureau of Standards. Washington, DC.
Klote, J . H., and J . A. Milke. 1995. Design of Smoke Management Systems. American Society of Heating,
Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE). Atlanta, GA.
Klote, J . H., and J . A. Milke. 2002. Principles of Smoke Management. American Society of Heating,
Klote, J . H. 2004. J ohn H. Klote, Inc., Leesburg, VA, personal communication to M. Ferreira, Hughes
Associates, Inc. Baltimore, MD, Development of fire and smoke damper standards with regards to
property damage and life safety. December 29.
NBFU (National Board of Fire Underwriters). 1939. Smoke Hazards of Air-Conditioning Systems. NFPA
Quarterly, Volume 33, p. 113-122.
NFPA (National Fire Protection Association). 1985. Installation of Air Conditioning and Ventilation
Systems. NFPA 90A, Quincy, MA.
NFPA (National Fire Protection Association). 1988. Recommended Practice for Smoke-Control Systems.
NFPA 92A, Quincy, MA.
NFPA (National Fire Protection Association). 2000a. Recommended Practice for Smoke-Control
NFPA (National Fire Protection Association). 2000b. Recommended Practice for Smoke-Control
NFPA (National Fire Protection Association). 2000c. Guide for Smoke Management Systems in Malls,
Atria, and Large Areas. NFPA 92B, Quincy, MA.
NFPA (National Fire Protection Association). 2003. Building Construction and Safety Code. NFPA 5000,
Quincy, MA.
SFBC (San Francisco Building Code). 1992. Building Code. SFBC 1992, San Francisco, CA.
Shudak, L. J . 1998. Letter of Interpretation: Testing of Smoke Control Equipment (UUKL) Underwriters
Laboratories. Northbrook, IL.
Tamura, G. T. 1995. Smoke Movement and Control in High-Rise Buildings. National Research Council
Canada, Ottawa, ON.
Background
UBC, various editions. 1967-1997. ICBO Uniform Building Code. International Conference of Building
Officials, Whittier, CA.
UL (Underwriters Laboratories). 2003a. Standard for Safety Fire Dampers. UL Standard 555,
Northbrook, IL.
UL (Underwriters Laboratories). 2003b. Standard for Safety Leakage Rated Dampers for Use in Smoke
Control Systems. UL Standard 555S, Northbrook, IL.
UL (Underwriters Laboratories). 2003c. Control Units for Fire Protective Signaling Systems. UL
Standard 864, Northbrook, IL.

Chapter 2


Chapter 3
APPLICABLE CODES AND STANDARDS
A study was performed as part of the analysis of building and fire codes of the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) World Trade Center (WTC) Investigation to document the code
requirements in the code of record under which WTC 1, 2, and 7 were built as well as the changes in
building code regulations occurring subsequent to construction of the buildings that were enforced
retroactively. The results of this study are documented in the report, Fire Protection and Life Safety
Provisions Applied to the Design and Construction of WTC 1, 2, and 7 and Post-Construction Provisions
Applied after Occupancy (NIST NCSTAR 1-1D). The summary of code requirements pertaining to
smoke management systems contained in this chapter is paraphrased from NIST NCSTAR 1-1D.
The WTC was constructed and maintained under the jurisdiction of the Port Authority of New York and
New J ersey (PANYNJ or Port Authority). While Port Authority facilities are not technically subject to
the requirements of the local building codes, the PANYNJ voluntarily followed the New York City codes
where applicable. In accordance with the instructions issued by the Port Authority at the start of the WTC
project, WTC construction drawings were required to conform to the requirements of the Building Code
of the City of New York (BCNYC).
As stated in the Rolf J ensen & Associates report, WTC 1 and WTC 2 were constructed under the 1968
edition of the BCNYC. The 1968 BCNYC, including amendments to J anuary 1, 1985, was used to
provide the fire protection and life safety provisions during the design and construction phases (base
building) of WTC 7.
3.1 BUILDING CODE OF NEW YORK CITY
At the time of construction of WTC 1, 2, and 7, the majority of the northeast portion of the United States
used building codes based on the Building Officials and Code Administrators (BOCA) national building
code, with local amendments. New York City has developed a unique building code that references
technical guidelines and installation requirements from a mixture of nationally recognized standards
(National Fire Protection Association [NFPA], American Society for Testing and Materials, American
National Standards Institute, etc.) as well as New York City developed reference standards.
WTC 1 and WTC 2 were designed according to the requirements of the 1968 BCNYC. In subsequent
years, a number of local laws provided changes to fire protection and life safety provisions in the
BCNYC. These local laws are as follows:
Local Law No. 5, Fire Safety Requirements and Controls (effective date immediately except
as noted), J anuary 18, 1973.
Local Law No. 16, Local Laws of the City of New York for the Year 1984 (effective date
immediately except as noted), March 27, 1984.
Chapter 3
immediately), October 6, 1978.
immediately), November 17, 1970.
immediately), November 1, 1976.
Local Law No. 84, Fire Safety Pressurization Requirements in Certain Office Buildings
(effective date immediately), December 13, 1979.
Local Law No. 86, Dates for Compliance with the Local Laws Enacted for Fire Safety
Requirements and Controls in Certain Buildings (effective date immediately),
December 13, 1979.
The BCNYC differs from other model building codes in one major respect. Changes to a building code
generally affect only new buildings and are applied to an existing building only when a major renovation
or change in occupancy occurs within the building. Many provisions contained within the local laws
amending the BCNYC are applied retroactively; thus, these provisions are required to be implemented in
existing buildings.
All of the requirements included in the local laws listed above were in effect at the time of construction of
WTC 7, since the local laws all predate the 1985 construction date of WTC 7. However, only some of the
provisions are retroactively applicable to WTC 1 and WTC 2. These retroactive provisions are
summarized in Sec. 3.2.
3.2 WTC 1 AND WTC 2 CODE REQUIREMENTS
The following is a summary of the 1968 BCNYC provisions and post construction (retroactive)
provisions that were in force at the time of construction of WTC 1 and WTC 2, as they pertain to smoke
management systems and related requirements.
3.2.1 Compartmentation
All new buildings classified in occupancy group E (business), and existing office buildings, 100 ft or
more in height having air-conditioning and/or mechanical ventilation systems that serve more than the
floor on which the equipment is located, unsprinklered floor areas, more than 40 ft above curb level, shall
be subdivided by fire separations into spaces or compartments as required (C26-504.1, added by Local
Law No. 5, Sec. 6).
All unsprinklered floor areas shall be segregated by 1 hour fire separations into spaces or
compartments not to exceed 7,500 ft
2
.
Where the floor area exceeds 10,000 ft
2
, at least one of the subdividing fire separations shall
be of 2 hour construction, creating areas of refuge.
Applicable Codes and Standards
The floor area or any subdivided area may be increased to not more than 15,000 ft
2
if
complete area protection by approved devices for the detection of products of combustion
other than heat is provided within such increased area and provided further that at least one of
the subdividing fire separations shall be of 2 hour construction where the floor area exceeds
15,000 ft
2
, creating areas of refuge as previously noted.
In existing buildings, existing 1 hour fire separations may be accepted in lieu of the 2 hour
fire separation provided all of the requirements previously noted are complied with.
Compartmentation is not required when complete sprinkler protection is provided.
Existing office buildings 100 ft or more in height shall comply with the following
requirements:
At least 1/3 of the total floor area of the building not in compliance with the requirements
above on February 7, 1973, shall comply with the requirements above by December 13,
1981. Complete plans showing such compliance shall be filed with, and a permit secured
from the commissioner, by September 13, 1980 (Local Law No. 5, Sec. 6, dates revised
by Local Law No. 86, Sec. 1).
At least 2/3 of the total floor area of the building not in compliance with the requirements
above on February 7, 1973, must be in compliance on or before August 7, 1984 (Local
Law No. 5, Sec. 6, dates revised by Local Law No. 86, Sec. 1).
Full compliance must be provided on or before February 7, 1988 (Local Law No. 5,
Sec. 6, dates revised by Local Law No. 86, Sec. 1).
In existing office buildings 100 ft or more in height, the commissioner may waive or modify
the above requirements and accept alternatives fulfilling the intent of the requirements if
compliance would cause practical difficulty or undue hardship. Where compliance with the
time requirements above would cause undue hardship, the commissioner, with the approval
of the fire commissioner, may extend the time for compliance (Local Law No. 5, Sec. 6,
revised by Local Law No. 86, Sec. 1).
3.2.2 Fire/Smoke Dampers
Fire dampers are required in accordance with NFPA 90A (C26-504.5(a)) in the following locations:
Duct penetrations of walls with a 2 hour fire resistance rating or greater (Reference
Standard 13-1 902.a).
Each opening in required vertical shaft enclosures (Reference Standard 13-1 902.b).
Each outlet or inlet opening in vertical shaft enclosure of duct systems serving two or more
floors (Reference Standard 13-1 902.c).
Chapter 3
As an alternate, dampers may be provided at each point where the vertical duct pierces a floor
it serves (Reference Standard 13-1 902.c).
Branch duct penetrations of vertical duct shaft enclosures (Reference Standard 13-1 902.c).
Outdoor air intakes (Reference Standard 13-1 902.e).
Aluminum Class I duct penetrations of fire resistance rated floors (Reference Standard 13-1
902.d).
Fire dampers are not required at the following locations (Reference Standard 13-1 903):
Non-aluminum or Class I vertical shaft branch duct penetrations with a cross-sectional area of
less than 20 in.
2
which supply only air conditioning units discharging air at not over 4 ft
above the floor (Reference Standard 13-1 903.a).
Non-aluminum or Class I duct penetrations of a floor (at one place only) with a cross-
sectional area of less than 20 in.
2
which supply air conditioning units in one story only that
discharge air at not over 4 ft above the floor (Reference Standard 13-1 903.b).
Duct penetrations in systems serving only one floor and used only for exhaust to the outside
and not penetrating a fire wall or fire partition or passing entirely through the vertical shaft
enclosure (Reference Standard 13-1 903.d).
Branch ducts connected to a return riser where subducts are extended at least 22 in. upward
(Reference Standard 13-1 903.e).
Fire dampers should be automatic closing 1 1/2 hour fire rated with a fusible link or other
heat actuated device rated approximately 50 F above the maximum system operating
temperature (Reference Standard 13-1 905.and 905.g).
Duct openings permitted in fire resistance rated ceilings should be protected with fire dampers
(C26-502.5(b)). Smoke dampers should be installed in the main supply duct and the main return duct in
systems over 15,000 ft
3
/min capacity (Reference Standard 13-1 1003). Smoke dampers should be
arranged to close automatically when the system is not in operation, by the operation of duct smoke
detectors, and by the manual emergency fan stop (Reference Standard 13-1 1003).
3.2.3 Smoke and Heat Detectors
Local Law No. 5 requires an approved smoke detecting device at the return shaft at each floor in order to
monitor each inlet to the return air shaft. Activation of any of the detectors installed in the HVAC system
shall stop the air supply to and the return from the affected floor. Airflow may be halted by the activation
of an approved remote controlled reversible fire shutter or by automatically shutting down the air supply
fans and the air return fans serving the floor where activated.
3.2.4 Smoke and Heat Venting
Buildings classified in occupancy group E (business), 100 ft or more in height, having air-conditioning
and/or mechanical ventilation systems that serve more than the floor on which the equipment is located,
shall be provided with at least one smoke shaft by means of which smoke and heat shall be mechanically
vented to the outdoors as provided in Reference Standard 5-17 (C26-504.15(b)) (Local Law No. 5,
Sec. 7). Reference Standard 5-17 was added by Local Law No. 5, Sec. 32.
Existing office buildings, 100 ft or more in height, having air-conditioning and/or mechanical ventilation
systems that serve more than the floor on which the equipment is located, shall be provided with at least
one smoke shaft by means of which smoke and heat shall be mechanically vented to the outdoors as
provided in Reference Standard 5-17 or in lieu of such smoke shaft(s), all interior enclosed stairs other
than a fire tower or access stairs may be provided with a system of pressurization for fire emergency use
(C26-504.15(c)) (Local Law No. 5 Sec. 7, revised by Local Law No. 86, Sec. 2).
Where the pressurization system(s) option has been chosen, the system(s) shall be provided in
accordance with Reference Standard 5-18.
The smoke and heat venting requirements shall be completed by September 13, 1982.
New buildings that are sprinklered throughout shall be exempt from the smoke shaft requirements
(C26-504.15(b)) (Local Law No. 5, Sec .7).
Existing buildings that are sprinklered throughout shall be exempt from the smoke shaft and optional stair
pressurization requirements under the following conditions (C26-504.15(b)) (Local Law No. 86, Sec. 2):
The installation shall proceed in conformance with a schedule acceptable to the
commissioner.
At least 1/3 of the total floor area of the building, including but not limited to the entrance
lobby, corridors and elevator landing areas, is sprinklered by December 13, 1981.
At least 2/3 of the total floor area of the building is sprinklered by December 13, 1982.
The building is sprinklered throughout by December 13, 1983.
Where compliance with the time requirements would cause undue hardship, the
commissioner, with approval of the fire commissioner, may extend the time for compliance.
3.2.5 Stair Pressurization
Stair pressurization is not directly required by code in an occupancy classified as group E (business).
However, stair pressurization can be used to eliminate the requirement for smoke and heat venting. If
stair pressurization is provided, each stair shall be provided in accordance with Reference Standard 5-18
(Reference Standard 5-18 added by Local Law No. 5, Sec. 33, amended by Local Law No. 84, Sec. 3).
Chapter 3
3.2.6 Fire Safety Plan
A fire safety plan for fire drill and evacuation procedures shall be submitted to the commissioner. The
applicable parts of the fire safety plan shall be distributed to the tenants and service employees. All
occupants of the building shall participate and cooperate in carrying out the provisions of the fire safety
plan (C19-161.2, added by Local Law No. 5, Sec. 1).
3.3 WTC 7 CODE REQUIREMENTS
The following is a summary of the 1968 BCNYC provisions and subsequent local law provisions that
were in force at the time of construction of WTC 7, as they pertain to smoke management systems and
related requirements. Compartmentation requirements that pertained to WTC 1 and WTC 2 (see
Sec. 3.2.1) at the time of construction did not apply to WTC 7 since this building was provided with
complete sprinkler protection at the time of its construction.
Fire dampers are required to be provided in accordance with NFPA 90A (C26-504.5(a)) in the following
locations:
Duct penetrations of walls with a 2 hour fire resistance rating or greater (Reference Standard
13-1 902.a).
Each opening in required vertical shaft enclosures (Reference Standard 13-1 902.b).
Each outlet or inlet opening in vertical shaft enclosure of duct systems serving two or more
floors (Reference Standard 13-1 902.c).
As an alternate, dampers may be provided at each point where the vertical duct pierces a floor
it serves (Reference Standard 13-1 902.c).
Branch duct penetrations of vertical duct shaft enclosures (Reference Standard 13-1 902.c).
Outdoor air intakes (Reference Standard 13-1 902.e).
Aluminum Class I duct penetrations of fire resistance rated floors (Reference Standard 13-1
902.d).
Fire dampers are not required at the following locations (Reference Standard 13-1 903):
Non-aluminum or Class I vertical shaft branch duct penetrations with a cross-sectional area of
less than 20 in.
2
which supply only air conditioning units discharging air at not over 4 ft
above the floor (Reference Standard 13-1 903.a).
Non-aluminum or Class I duct penetrations of a floor (at one place only) with a cross-
sectional area of less than 20 in.
2
which supply air conditioning units in one story only that
discharge air at not over 4 ft above the floor (Reference Standard 13-1 903.b).
Duct penetrations in systems serving only one floor and used only for exhaust to the outside
and not penetrating a fire wall or fire partition or passing entirely through the vertical shaft
enclosure (Reference Standard 13-1 903.d).
Branch ducts connected to a return riser where subducts are extended at least 22 in. upward
(Reference Standard 13-1 903.e).
Fire dampers should be automatic closing 1 1/2 hour fire rated with a fusible link or other
heat actuated device rated approximately 50 F above the maximum system operating
temperature (Reference Standard 13-1 905.and 905.g).
Duct openings permitted in fire resistance rated ceilings should be protected with fire dampers
(C26-502.5(b)). Smoke dampers should be installed in the main supply duct and the main return duct in
systems over 15,000 ft
3
/min capacity (Reference Standard 13-1 1003). Smoke dampers should be
arranged to close automatically when the system is not in operation, by the operation of duct smoke
detectors, and by the manual emergency fan stop (Reference Standard 13-1 1003).
3.3.2 Smoke and Heat Detectors
Local Law No. 5 requires an approved smoke detecting device at the return shaft at each floor in order to
monitor each inlet to the return air shaft. Activation of any of the detectors installed in the HVAC system
shall stop the air supply to and the return from the affected floor. Airflow may be halted by the activation
of an approved remote controlled reversible fire shutter or by automatically shutting down the air supply
fans and the air return fans serving the floor where activated.
3.3.3 Emergency Power
An emergency power system shall be provided in high-rise buildings in occupancy group E (business)
(C26-610.3, added by Local Law No. 16, Sec. 50).
The emergency power system shall have the capacity to operate the following equipment, where such
equipment is installed (C26-610.1, added by Local Law No. 16, Sec. 50):
1. Fire pumps
2. At least three elevators at one time, with manual transfer to other elevators
3. Alarm systems
4. Communications systems
5. Emergency lighting, if battery packs are not provided
6. Ventilating systems used for smoke venting or control
7. Stair pressurization
Chapter 3
Emergency power generation equipment shall be registered with the Department of Environmental
Protection, Bureau of Air Resources in accordance with the requirements of section 1403.2-3.09 of the
administrative code (C26-610.2, added by Local Law No. 16, Sec. 50).
3.3.4 Smoke Control
Smoke control shall be installed in all buildings classified in occupancy group E (business) as follows
(C26-1300.8(a), added by Local Law No. 16, Sec. 53):
Ventilation systems supplying different occupancy groups shall not be interconnected,
provided however that a ventilation system may serve two occupancy groups located on the
same floor when the accessory use occupies less than 20 percent of the floor area occupied by
the principal use.
Ventilation systems supplying corridors shall not be interconnected with systems serving
other spaces, except that this requirement shall not apply to floors used exclusively as office
space in buildings classified in occupancy group E (business) which are fully sprinklered.
A ventilation system supplying any part of a means of egress shall not be interconnected with
any other ventilation system.
A ventilation system supplying public areas and assembly spaces shall have smoke detecting
devices that will shut down the system upon detecting smoke.
Either a combined heat and smoke damper or independent heat and smoke dampers shall be installed at
any penetration of construction required to have a fire resistance rating, unless otherwise provided by
section C26-504.5.
3.3.5 Smoke Purge
In all buildings classified in occupancy group E (business), there shall be provided a system of
mechanical means of sufficient capacity to exhaust six air changes per hour or 1 cfm/ft
2
, whichever is
greater, from the largest floor in the building, using either dedicated fan equipment or the building
ventilation system arranged to shut down automatically with manual override capability to exhaust one
floor at a time through a roof or an approved location on an exterior wall other than a lot line wall
(C26-1300.8(b), added by Local Law No. 16, Sec. 53).
3.3.6 Stair Pressurization
Stair pressurization is not directly required by code in an occupancy classified as group E (business).
However, stair pressurization can be used to eliminate the requirement of smoke and heat venting. If stair
pressurization is provided, each stair shall be provided in accordance with Reference Standard 5-18
(Reference Standard 5-18 added by Local Law No. 5, Sec. 33, amended by Local Law No. 84, Sec. 3).
3.3.7 Fire Safety Plan
A fire safety plan for fire drill and evacuation procedures shall be submitted to the commissioner. The
applicable parts of the fire safety plan shall be distributed to the tenants and service employees. All
occupants of the building shall participate and cooperate in carrying out the provisions of the fire safety
plan (C19-161.2, added by Local Law No. 5, Sec. 1).
3.4 REFERENCES
BCNYC (Building Code of the City of New York). 1968. Building Code-Local Law No. 76 of the City of
New York. New York, NY.
BCNYC (Building Code of the City of New York). 1970. Local Laws of the City of New York for the
Year 1970 -Local Law No. 54 of the City of New York. New York, NY, November.
BCNYC (Building Code of the City of New York). 1973. Fire Safety Requirements and Controls -Local
Law No. 5 of the City of New York. New York, NY, J anuary.
Year 1976 -Local Law No. 55 of the City of New York. New York, NY, November.
Year 1978 -Local Law No. 33 of the City of New York. New York, NY, October.
BCNYC (Building Code of the City of New York). 1979a. Fire Safety Pressurization Requirements in
Certain Office Buildings -Local Law No. 84 of the City of New York. New York, NY, December.
BCNYC (Building Code of the City of New York). 1979b. Dates for Compliance with the Local Laws
Enacted for Fire Safety Requirements and Controls in Certain Buildings -Local Law No. 86 of the
City of New York. New York, NY, December.
Year 1984 -Local Law No. 16 of the City of New York. New York, NY, March.
NFPA (National Fire Protection Association). 2000. Recommended Practice for Smoke-Control Systems.
NFPA 90A, Quincy, MA.

Chapter 3


Chapter 4
BUILDING DESCRIPTIONS
The purpose of this chapter is not to provide an exhaustive description of the construction features and
building systems comprising World Trade Center (WTC) 1, 2, and 7, but rather to provide pertinent
details pertaining to building features that may have impacted smoke movement within the buildings or
the design/function of smoke management systems. Building heating, ventilating, and air conditioning
(HVAC) systems are described in somewhat greater detail in order to understand the capabilities of the
HVAC systems to perform smoke management functions.
4.1 WTC 1 AND WTC 2
WTC 1 and WTC 2 were constructed in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The buildings were the first
constructed as part of the seven-building WTC complex and were occupied by 1972. The buildings were
110 stories above grade and seven levels below grade. WTC 1 (North TowerTower A) at 1,368 ft was
slightly higher than WTC 2 (South TowerTower B) at 1,362 ft. Each building had a square floor plate
measuring 207 ft 2 in. on a side. The buildings each had an approximate footprint area of 42,900 ft
2
.
4.1.1 Architectural Features
WTC 1 and WTC 2 were similar architecturally, with minor differences in layout. The interior of each
floor differed due to the particular tenant build-out on that floor. In addition, the service core for the North
Tower (WTC 1) was oriented east/west while the service core for the South Tower was oriented
north/south. The service core gradually decreased in size on the upper floors of the building as the
numbers of elevators contained on the floors decreased.
The core spaces were separated from the perimeter spaces in the building by a 2 hour fire resistance rated
barrier extending slab-to-slab. The cores contained the elevators, exit stairs, bathrooms, and
miscellaneous equipment rooms. The perimeter office spaces were generally open-plan office spaces.
Individual office spaces on the perimeter were generally separated by non-rated partitions extending only
to the drop ceiling. The ventilation plenum above the drop ceiling was open around the perimeter of the
floor. When the building was originally constructed, the perimeter office spaces were separated roughly
into fourths by fire resistance rated partitions extending from the floor to the plenum ceiling. The fire-
rated compartmentation was required by the provisions of the Building Code of the City of New York
(BCNYC) Local Law No. 5. When the building was retrofitted with automatic sprinklers, the fire resistive
separations sub-dividing a floor were no longer required. Therefore, when floors were renovated, the
separations were generally removed, and open plan layouts extending around the perimeter of a floor
became more common.
The towers were segmented roughly in thirds vertically by two mechanical equipment rooms (MERs)
encompassing the entire 41st floor and 75th floor, in addition to the MERs at the top (108th floor) and
bottom (7th floor) of the buildings. The aircrafts that crashed into WTC 1 and WTC 2 impacted the upper
third of each building, between the 75th floor MER and 108th floor MER.
Chapter 4
The floor layouts for representative floors in WTC 1 and WTC 2 are depicted in Figs. 41 and 42,
respectively. The floors depicted are typical of the primary aircraft impact floor in each building, the 95th
floor in WTC 1 and the 80th floor in WTC 2. Figs. 41 and 42 show the differences in orientation of the
service core, locations of electrical risers, and shaft types and location.

Figure 41. Floor layout, 95th floor, WTC 1.
During tenant renovations, tenants occupying multiple floors often added additional convenience stairs
connecting multiple levels. The stairs were most often open to two levels, interrupted by a rated partition
and stair door at every other level. As an example, Marsh & McLennan was a building tenant occupying
the 93rd through 100th floors of WTC 1 (also the zone of aircraft impact for this building). Up to three
convenience stairs were provided on the Marsh & McLennan floors, open at every other level. Figure 41
depicts the two convenience stairs on the 95th floor; one happens to be open at that floor, the other has a
rated partition with a door.
Building Descriptions

It is well-documented that vertical shafts are the primary conduit for smoke spread in high-rise buildings.
It has been estimated that in a high-rise building up to 65 percent of the vertical airflow (and thus, smoke
spread) is via the stair and elevator shafts, while the remaining 35 percent is via the other vertical shafts in
the building (Tamura and Shaw 1976). Figure 43 depicts the stairs and elevator shafts in the building.
Chapter 4

Figure 43. Stair and elevator shafts, WTC 1 and WTC 2.
As seen in Fig. 43, each tower was provided with three emergency exit stairways, enclosed in 2 hour
rated gypsum wallboard construction. The plan location of the stairways shifted at some levels, with
occupants required to move from one stairway segment to another via a horizontal transfer corridor,
separated from the stair shafts by fire rated doors. Stairs 1 and 2 had transfers at the 42nd, 48th, 76th, and
82nd level. Stair 1 had an additional transfer on the 26th floor. Stair 3 had only a single transfer, at the
76th floor. Stairs 1 and 2 were located more on the perimeter of the core, while Stair 3 was located more
toward the center of the core. Figures 41 and 42 show the different stair locations on the 80th and 95th
floors of the buildings.
Figure 43 also shows the locations of the ninety-nine elevator shafts in each building. In order to
facilitate movement of the thousands of office workers who regularly worked in the towers to the upper
office floors in the building, a system of express and local elevators was installed in each building.
High-speed express elevators shuttled people from the lobby to sky lobbies on the 44th floor and
78th floor of each building. Escalators connected the sky lobbies to the floors immediately above and
below.
Local elevators provided access from the sky lobby floors to the upper floors of the buildings. Freight
elevators 49 and 50 extended to different heights in the buildings, with freight elevator 50 extending the
full height of each building.
4.1.2 HVAC Systems
Building ventilation (heating and cooling) was provided in WTC 1 and WTC 2 by HVAC systems located
in four MERs located on the 7th, 41st, 75th, and 108th floors of each building. The building HVAC
systems for WTC 1 and WTC 2 are described in detail in Operation & Maintenance Manual #15HVAC
System, Towers A & B (PANYNJ 1987) and are summarized in the paragraphs that follow.
The buildings were effectively broken up into four vertical HVAC zones, as shown in Fig. 44. Each
MER was approximately two stories tall and had an upper and lower level. With the exception of the
108th floor MER, which was located at the top of the building above the floors that it served, the
MERs served the floors immediately above and below the floor on which they were located. As seen in
Fig. 44, the WTC 1 aircraft impact occurred in the uppermost portion of the building (92nd through
98th floors), served from above by the 108th floor MER. The WTC 2 aircraft impact occurred slightly
lower in the building (77th through 84th floors), on floors served from below by the 75th floor MER.
HVAC supply fans were located on the lower level of each MER. Supply air was provided to the building
via core, interior, and perimeter HVAC units. As shown in Fig. 45, there were two core supply
ventilation zones (north/south in WTC 2, east/west in WTC 1, due to the orientation of the core), four
interior space HVAC zones (corresponding to the four quadrants of the building), and four perimeter
zones (north/south/east/west). The core and interior units provided low pressure air that was conditioned
at each unit in the MER. Perimeter supply air was provided by high pressure fans and was conditioned at
induction units located around the perimeter of the building on each floor.
Chapter 4

Figure 44. Location of MERs, WTC 1 and WTC 2.

Figure 45. HVAC zones per floor, WTC 1 and WTC 2.
Figure 46 shows the location of the various supply HVAC units on the lower level of the 75th floor
MER in WTC 2. This MER was selected since it served both floors above and below the MER, and was
also the MER serving the floors of impact in WTC 2. For WTC 2, the primary HVAC shafts were located
at the east and west sides of the core. The supply fans were also located on the east/west sides of the floor
and used air drawn from supply plenums running along both the east and west sides of the MER. It can be
seen that there were two HVAC units that served the core spaces. One unit provided supply air to the
north core zone on all floors served by the MER, with the other unit supplying the south core zones.
Ductwork ran from the fans to several shafts within the core. These shafts ran both upward and downward
to the floors served.
Chapter 4
S
U
P
P
L
Y

P
L
E
N
U
M
S
U
P
P
L
Y

P
L
E
N
U
M
S
U
P
P
L
Y

P
L
E
N
U
M
S
U
P
P
L
Y

P
L
E
N
U
M

Figure 46. Schematic, supply HVAC units, lower level 75th floor MER, WTC 2.
Interior space supply air was provided by eight large HVAC units. Four groups of two fans each were
located in each quadrant of the MER. One fan in each group served the floors above the MER, while the
other unit served the floors below the MER. The fan location corresponds to the location of the interior
zones served. For example, the fans located in the northeast corner of the MER served the interior zones
in the northeast quadrant interior ventilation zone.
The four high pressure perimeter zone fans each served either the north, south, east, or west zones. It can
be seen (Fig. 46) that two runs of high pressure circular ductwork branched out from each fan and were
routed to the same shaft. One high pressure duct extended upward to the floors above the MER, and the
other dropped down to the floors below. In contrast to the high pressure ductwork, the low pressure
ductwork used by the core and interior HVAC units was generally rectangular in shape.
The high pressure supply ductwork supplied air from the perimeter HVAC units in the MERs to induction
units located around the perimeter of floor. The induction units stood roughly 18 in. high and were
located in front of the windows at the perimeter of the office space. High pressure air was discharged
through nozzles in each induction unit across a coil, with the air being heated or cooled depending on the
temperature of the water flowing through the coil. The function of the induction units was to offset the
high heating/cooling loads at the perimeter of the building and to induce circulation of the room air in
combination with the overhead interior supply registers.
Figure 47 shows a simplified representation of the air distribution systems as originally designed for a
typical tenant floor, in this case the 80th floor in WTC 2. As previously stated, low pressure supply air
was ducted to air inlets in the four perimeter HVAC zones in the four quadrants of the building. Air inlets
were generally slot diffusers integrated in the overhead light fixtures. All HVAC ductwork ran in the
return plenum above each floor. It should be noted, however, that the high pressure perimeter zone
ductwork actually served the floor above, entering the perimeter induction units from the plenum below
the floor served. Fire dampers were provided at the exhaust air inlets into the return shafts and within the
supply ductwork at the shaft walls, as depicted in Fig. 47. Smoke detectors were also provided at the
exhaust air inlets to facilitate shutdown of the HVAC systems in the event of a fire.

Figure 47. Air distribution system, 80th floor, WTC 2.
Chapter 4
Return HVAC fans were located on the upper level of each MER. Figure 48 depicts the return fan
locations on the 75th floor MER in WTC 2. Four sets of return air shafts were located along the east and
west sides of the core, returning air from the interior HVAC zones at the four quadrants of each floor.
Whereas supply ventilation was provided by a ducted supply system utilizing metal ductwork, the return
ventilation was provided by way of gypsum wallboard return shafts. Air was drawn through return grilles
on each floor into a return plenum above the occupied spaces on each floor. Return air was then drawn to
the MER exhaust fans via the gypsum wallboard shafts.

Figure 48. Exhaust HVAC units, upper level 75th floor MER, WTC 2.
The return fans discharged air from the return shafts into spill plenums on the east and west sides of the
MER. Two sets of dampers were located within the spill plenum:
1. Return dampers
2. Exhaust dampers
The return dampers, located in the floor of the spill plenum, allowed air to be re-circulated to the supply
air fans. Alternately, air could be discharged directly to the exterior of the building. The amount of air
exhausted/recirculated was a function of the outside air temperature. More air was recirculated under
extreme hot and cold outside air conditions to reduce the cooling/heating load on the HVAC systems and
reduce the cost of space conditioning.
Air was returned from the core spaces via small fans located on the north and south sides of the MER
(shown in Fig. 48). Exhaust air fans for the core provided toilet exhaust and elevator machine room
(EMR) exhaust. Because of the nature of these exhaust streams no exhaust air was recirculated from the
core back into the building.
The air distribution system configuration described above was the base building design at the time that
WTC 1 and WTC 2 were constructed. While the air distribution systems remained as designed on some
floors of the building (with little to no modification), these systems may have been substantially modified
on other floors of the buildings, based on the needs of the tenants and the design standards being used at
the time of tenant retrofits.
An example of such modifications is the HVAC systems serving the Marsh & McLennan offices on the
93rd through 100th floors of WTC 1. The lower floors of this office space were also the aircraft impact
floors in WTC 1. The Marsh & McLennan floors were retrofit in the years just preceding September 11,
2001. Therefore, the HVAC systems were relatively new in this area of the building. Figure 49 shows a
simplified representation of the air distribution system on the 95th floor of WTC 1.
The Marsh & McLennan HVAC systems utilized the base building supply air for the interior HVAC
zones. New ductwork connected to the base building HVAC ductwork at the major supply air shafts and
connections remained from the return plenum to return air shafts. However, perimeter heating and cooling
was provided using small fan coil units (FCUs) located around the perimeter of the return air plenum, as
most of the perimeter induction units were removed from the Marsh & McLennan floors. The FCUs were
designed to draw air in from the plenum, heat or cool the air as necessary as it passed through the coil,
and then distribute the air via a small number (2-4) of supply air diffusers ducted to each FCU.
As seen in Fig. 49, several re-circulating air handling units (AHUs) were installed on the 95th floor to
provide additional HVAC capacity for a computer room located on that floor. These AHUs re-circulated
air within the computer room.

Chapter 4

Supply air provided by the high pressure ductwork outlets on each floor was sometimes used to supply
other HVAC systems. For instance, a small AHU was located on the 99th floor of WTC 1 to provide
additional heating/cooling to a conference center located on that floor. This AHU received supply air by
connecting to one of the four high pressure HVAC ducts serving the floor.
By examining modifications to the Marsh & McLennan HVAC systems, it can be seen that the HVAC
configuration for each floor of WTC 1 and WTC 2 had the potential to vary, creating unique layouts for
many floors of the building. However, these changes were not likely to have an effect on smoke
management system performance since the changes impacted the use of the high pressure perimeter air as
well as the patterns in which air was distributed within a given floor. As will be discussed in Chapter 6 of
this report, the smoke management systems for WTC 1 and WTC 2 utilized only the interior air systems
and core systems, which were not modified substantially as a result of tenant retrofits. Perimeter air was
not used for smoke management. Further, the plenum return arrangement and total air quantities
remained unchanged, despite individual tenant retrofit configurations. While smoke movement may have
been impacted on a given floor, overall pressure differentials would be expected to remain the same.
4.1.3 Electrical Systems
Electrical power for the building was provided via two separate feeds from a Consolidated Edison
(Con Ed) substation located on the lower floors of WTC 7. An additional power feed was provided
subsequent to the 1993 bombing via the Port Authority Trans-Hudson train tunnel from New J ersey.
Emergency generators and fuel tanks located on the B6 level of the complex just to the southwest of
WTC 1 provided emergency power to all emergency systems (emergency lighting, fire alarm system and
fire pumps) and the elevators in the building.
Three electrical risers were located in each building. The electrical closets/risers were designated north,
central, and south in WTC 1. The risers were designated east, central, and west in WTC 2. The
location of the electrical closets on each floor are depicted in Figs. 41 and 42. Electrical substations
were provided on each MER level.
4.2 WTC 7
WTC 7 was completed in 1987 and was located to the north of the WTC complex on the opposite side of
Vesey Street. The building was 47 stories above-grade and had a height of 618 ft. WTC 7 had a footprint
area of approximately 40,000 ft
2
and was designated Type I-C construction.
WTC 7 was built over an existing Con Ed substation and a shipping ramp that served the entire WTC
complex. The lower six floors of the building contained the substation, electrical switchgear, emergency
generators, transformers, and fuel storage tanks. Floors 3 and 4 also contained a conference center for
Salomon Smith Barney (SSB), the tenant occupying the largest portion of the building. Floors 7 through
25 housed multiple tenants, with most occupying a single floor. Floors 7 and 8, 11 to 13, 19 to 21, and
26 to 27 were occupied by multi-floor tenants. SSB occupied floors 28 through 45.
WTC 7 collapsed on September 11, 2001, at 5:20 p.m. National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) is investigating the cause of failure of WTC 7 and hypotheses regarding the collapse of this
building are discussed in NIST NCSTAR 1-6E.
4.2.1 Architectural Features
Figure 410 depicts the floor layout for a typical floor in WTC 7. The service core for the building was
located in the east-west direction, and contained the elevators, exit stairs, bathrooms, and
mechanical/electrical equipment rooms. The perimeter spaces were generally either open-plan office
spaces or hard-walled individual office spaces. Individual office spaces were generally separated by non-
rated partitions extending only to the drop ceiling. The ventilation plenum above the drop ceiling was
open around the perimeter of the floor. The building was protected throughout by automatic sprinklers
with the exception of certain equipment rooms on the lower floors of the building.
The building was served by low-rise (floors 7 through 20), mid-rise (floors 21 through 37), and high-rise
(floors 38 through 45) elevators, as well as service and freight elevators that ran the entire height of the
building. There were a total of 31 elevators serving the building. The locations of high-rise and mid-rise
elevators and freight/service elevators are shown in Fig. 410.
Chapter 4

Two exit stairs served the building and were referred to as Stair 1 (or Stair A) and Stair 2 (or Stair B). The
position of Stair 1 remained constant on each floor of the building. The position of Stair 2 shifted at the
23rd floor, due to the location of the low-rise elevators serving the lower floors. Below the 23rd floor
Stair 2 was located approximately where the electrical closet is shown, to the east of its location in
Fig. 410.
The individual floors of the original building layout were served by HVAC equipment located in a fan
room on each floor. This is in contrast to WTC 1 and WTC 2, which had dedicated MER floors that
served multiple floors of the buildings, as shown in Fig. 44.
During the early 1990s, SSB performed a major tenant retrofit to floors 28 through 45. The retrofit
included the combining of adjacent floors into single floors, the relocation of HVAC shafts, and the
provision of new HVAC equipment to supplement base building equipment. Two two-story trading floors
were created by combining the 40th/41st and 42nd/43rd floors. The trading floors each had a raised floor
that served as a return plenum. HVAC fans and electrical/data services were located beneath the raised
floors.
In addition to the trading floors, various SSB floors were retrofit with technology spaces housing
computer equipment. A large auditorium was included in the northwest corner of the building, spanning
the 38th/39th floors. Cafeteria spaces with kitchens were also located within the building.
4.2.2 HVAC Systems
Building ventilation (heating and cooling) was provided on the tenant floors (floors 7 through 47) for the
base building configuration in WTC 7 by variable air volume (VAV) AHUs located on each floor. The
building HVAC systems for WTC 7 are described in the WTC 7 Operations Manual (PANYNJ 1988).
Each floor in WTC 7 was served by an AHU located in the fan room on that floor that consisted of two
fans feeding into a common supply plenum. Conditioned air was then distributed to the floor in two
zones, corresponding to the north/east, and south/west portions of the building. The fan room served as a
return plenum. Return air was drawn into the fan room via three branch ducts leading from the fan room.
Make-up air was drawn into the fan room via make-up air shafts that connected to the exterior of the
building either at the roof or at the 6th floor via louvers. The base building HVAC configuration for
WTC 7 is depicted in Fig. 411.

The WTC 7 HVAC systems were designed to incorporate a smoke purge mode, by which each floor of
the building could be exhausted/purged of smoke manually on a floor-by-floor basis from the fire
command center, which was located on the 3rd floor of the building at the main lobby security desk
(PANYNJ 1988).
Two smoke exhaust fans, each having a capacity of 36,000 ft
3
/min (61,164 m
3
/h) were originally located
at two locations within the building. Exhaust fan SX-5-1 was located on the 6th floor and served floors 7
through 23. Exhaust fan SX-47-1 was located on the 47th floor and served floors 24 through 47. As
shown in Fig. 411, the smoke exhaust duct was located near Stair 2 within the fan room. The return air
Chapter 4
ductwork was connected to the exhaust duct. Return air either dumped into the fan room via the return
dampers in each branch duct or was exhausted via the smoke exhaust riser. A smoke exhaust damper
opened at the shafts and the return dampers closed to exhaust smoke in the smoke purge mode.
Curtain fire dampers were located throughout the building where ductwork crossed fire rated shaft walls.
Separate pneumatic smoke dampers were used in the fan room to direct airflow within HVAC ductwork.
Major changes/additions to the building HVAC systems were made during the SSB tenant retrofit. AHUs
were added to handle the increased air conditioning loads created by the extensive computer and data
processing equipment. Existing building systems were modified to add an increased make-up air capacity.
A new, larger, make-up air shaft was added near the existing smoke shaft in the vicinity of Stair 2. The
shaft was relocated to create more usable space by allowing the removal of the original fan room on the
trading floors and other select floors. A transfer fan and ductwork were added to provide outside air to
the existing outside air shaft in its original location below the 24th floor.
In order to bring additional make-up air into the building, a large make-up AHU was installed in a new
rooftop mechanical penthouse. This provided forced ventilation make-up air rather than the open shaft
configuration present in the original building. Additional AHUs and exhaust fans were also located in the
penthouse.
A new smoke exhaust fan was added to replace the existing SX-37-1 smoke purge fan. The new, larger,
fan had a capacity of 84,000 ft
3
/min (142,000 m
3
/h). An additional smoke purge fan (SX-47-2) was also
installed, to provide smoke exhaust from the 45th through 47th floors of the building. Dedicated smoke
exhaust fans were also provided for the trading room floors (SX-40-1, SX-41-1, SX-42-1, SX-43-1).
Each of these fans had a capacity of 15,560 ft
3
/min (26,452 m
3
/h).
Several new fan rooms were added to house the additional AHUs. A fan room was added at the midpoint
of the west wall of WTC 7 on the SSB floors. A louvered opening was provided to the exterior of the
building from each fan room along the west wall. Various types of HVAC equipment were located within
these fan rooms, including kitchen exhaust fans serving the cafeteria spaces on the 34th and 41st floors.
New fan rooms were also added to serve the two-story trading floors. The new fan rooms were located
along the east wall of WTC 7, on the upper level of the trading floors (referred to as the mechanical
mezzanine level). Fans within the east fan rooms returned air via ductwork from beneath the raised
trading room floor, re-conditioned the air, and then supplied air at the upper level of the two-story space.
Small FCUs were located beneath the raised floor to draw return air through the trading desks back into
the raised-floor return plenum.
In several locations throughout the SSB floors, individual FCUs were provided within the return plenums
to recirculate and condition air within the perimeter spaces of the building. Free standing Leibert units
(recirculating HVAC systems) were also provided within technology spaces/computer rooms to provide
local air conditioning within these spaces.
The SSB tenant modifications incorporated combination fire/smoke dampers at many locations within the
HVAC ductwork to provide fire separation and to direct airflow within HVAC ductwork.
4.2.3 Electrical Systems
Electrical power for WTC 7 was provided from the Con Edison substation on the lower floors of the
building and stepped down by transformers on the 5th floor of the building to be distributed throughout
the building. Within electrical substations on each floor, one of the 277 V legs was stepped down to
supply 120 V branch circuits. Emergency power generators were located on various levels of the building
and supplied backup power for communications equipment, elevators, emergency lighting in corridors
and stairways, and fire pumps. Individual backup batteries were provided for emergency lighting units
located in exit stairways, elevator lobbies, and elevator cabs (McAllister 2002).
4.3 REFERENCES
McAllister, T., ed. 2002. World Trade Center Building Performance Study: Data Collection, Preliminary
Observations, and Recommendations. FEMA 403. Federal Emergency Management Agency.
Washington, DC, May.
PANYNJ (Port Authority of New York and New J ersey). 1987. World Trade Center Manual No. 15:
Operation & Maintenance of HVAC System, Towers A & B. New York, NY, J une.
PANYNJ (Port Authority of New York and New J ersey). 1988. World Trade Center 7 Operations
Manual. New York, NY.
Tamura, G. T., and C. Y. Shaw. 1976. Air leakage data for the design of elevator and stair shaft
pressurization systems. ASHRAE Transactions. Vol. 82, Part 2. American Society of Heating,
Refrigeration and Air-Conditioning Engineers, Atlanta, GA.

Chapter 4


Chapter 5
RELEVANT HISTORYPAST STUDIES AND FIRE-RELATED EVENTS
Two major fire-related events in the history of the World Trade Center (WTC) complex had an impact on
decisions that affected the spread of fire and smoke within WTC 1 and WTC 2 in the event of a fire and
had the potential to impact the smoke management systems installed in the towers. The first incident
involved a major fire that occurred on the 11th floor of WTC 1 on February 14, 1975. The second
incident involved a car bomb that exploded in the WTC complex parking garage on February 26, 1993,
resulting in smoke spread throughout the towers. The following sections provide a summary of these two
events and discuss changes to the buildings that were made subsequent to each event that impacted smoke
movement and control. Two engineering studies performed subsequent to the 1993 bombing that
recommended changes to the smoke management system design for the towers are also discussed in this
chapter, as well as a study of an early prototype stair pressurization system.
5.1 WTC 1 FIREFEBRUARY 13, 1975
On February 13, 1975, a fire occurred in WTC 1 (Powers 1975; Lathrop 1975). The fire was reported by a
worker in the building at approximately 11:35 p.m., who noticed flames under the door leading to the
office suite occupying roughly the entire southeast quadrant of the 11th floor of the building. It was later
estimated that the fire originated in an executive office in this area from an unknown source at
approximately 11:30 p.m.
The worker reported the fire to the WTC police headquarters. According to the New York Bureau of Fire
Underwriters (NYBFU) report (Powers 1975), the police put into effect the planned fire procedure. The
city fire department was called, three policemen responded to the fire floor with a fire equipment cart
(typically stationed in the 44th and 78th floor sky lobbies of each tower), and the building engineer was
advised to be prepared to put the heating, ventilating, and air conditioning (HVAC) system in the purge
mode. When police reached the fire floor, they reported a serious fire, and the HVAC system was placed
in the purge mode.
Subsequent to the start of the firefighting efforts, a search of the building disclosed that fire had spread to
the telephone closets on the 9th through the 19th floors, via a 12 in. by 18 in. unprotected cable opening
in the floors closets. These fires were reportedly readily extinguished, and they did not spread from the
telephone closets.
At the time of the fire, each floor of the building was subdivided into quadrants via fire barriers, which
contained the fire to the southeast quadrant of the building, which was consistent with the requirements of
New York City Local Law No. 5. The fire involved roughly 9,000 ft
2
of the 11th floor, destroying about
half the contents and damaging the remainder of the contents in this area (Powers 1975). The fire barriers
did not extend into the return plenum above the office space on each floor. Therefore, the return plenum
was open around the perimeter of the building.
Chapter 5
The fusible link on the fire shutter at the southeast quadrant exhaust shaft operated and closed down the
exhaust inlet sometime after the fire gained in intensity. However, hot smoke migrated around the
perimeter of the floor within the open return plenum and was exhausted via the exhaust risers serving the
other three quadrants of the building. High temperatures in the plenum reportedly (Powers 1975) radiated
enough heat into the offices in the uninvolved quadrants on the 11th floor to melt plastic phones and char
papers on desk tops, but ignition did not occur outside the area of fire origin. The fire was eventually
extinguished by the New York City Fire Department (FDNY).
5.1.1 Post-Event Building Modifications1975 Fire
The primary enhancement to WTC 1 and WTC 2 following the 1975 fire that impacted the issues of
smoke movement and smoke management in the buildings was an improvement with regard to unsealed
vertical penetrations. The fire illustrated the ability of fire and smoke to spread vertically in high-rise
buildings via unprotected vertical openings. As a direct result of the fire, the floor openings were fire-
stopped with vermiculite concrete poured into forms around the cables in the telephone closets. The
louvers in the doors to the closets were sealed with steel plates.
5.1.2 Important Considerations1975 Fire
There are several items identified in the Powers and Lathrop accounts of the 1975 fire that potentially
relate to the understanding of the installed smoke management systems and their potential function on
September 11, 2001.
Both Powers and Lathrop describe the use of the WTC 1 smoke purge sequence as an active fire
protection measure used to improve conditions during the 1975 fire, as opposed to using the HVAC
system purge as part of post-fire cleanup efforts. With regard to the function of the purge mode, Powers
(1975) states that this means that outdoor air was being blown into the core area to keep it free of smoke
and air was being drawn out of all the tenant areas on this floor to prevent smoke from spreading
throughout the building. He also states that in the case of fire, the supply air fans for the air
conditioning section are shut down and only the return air fans operate and discharge to the outside of the
building The other part of this protection is achieved by supplying outdoor air to the core and shutting
down its normal vents. This pressurizes the elevators as well as the stairs and keeps the exit corridors free
of smoke. Lathrop (1975) also documents that during a fire, office areas could be put on 100 percent
exhaust, with the core getting 100 percent supply, accomplished in 32 floor segments corresponding to a
single HVAC zone. As will be discussed in Chapter 6 of this report, this differs from the sequence of
operations listed in the building operations manuals with regard to the smoke purge sequence.
The NYBFU report (Powers 1975) recognized that when a fire shutter closes, the ability of that exhaust
shaft to exhaust smoke is nullified. The report recommended that in unsprinklered buildings, detectors
be provided at the return air shafts on each floor to cause them to discharge the return air and stop the
delivery of outdoor air to the fire area.
The Lathrop account of the 1975 fire implied that the smoke purge system cleared smoke from all floors
except the fire floor. This is significant since the building was unsprinklered at the time of the fire and the
fire was substantial in nature, involving over 9,000 ft
2
of office space. Yet, fire/smoke spread to other
floors was minor and was due primarily to unprotected openings in the telephone closets.
Relevant HistoryPast Studies and Fire Related Events
It is significant to note that since the fire occurred in February, and at a time when the building HVAC
systems were largely shut down, stack effect would have been expected to have been substantial at the
time of the fire. Since the floor of fire origin was low in the building (11th floor), stack effect flows would
cause air to flow inward toward the buildings core then upward via stair/elevator shafts and open HVAC
ducting. Yet, little smoke spread to other floors was noted. The degree of passive compartmentation
present in the building at the time of the fire, coupled with the operation of smoke exhaust from the zone
of fire origin appears to have been effective in minimizing the smoke movement that would have occurred
due to stack effect.
5.2 WTC BOMBINGFEBRUARY 26, 1993
At 12:18 p.m. on February 26, 1993, a bomb exploded in a parking garage located in the sub-levels of the
WTC complex (Isner and Klem 1993). The task force that investigated the bombing concluded that the
explosion and subsequent fire were caused by the detonation of at least 1,000 lb of explosives located in a
van parked on the B2 level of the complex, in an area of the garage adjacent to WTC 1 and under WTC 3
(then referred to as the Vista Hotel). The explosion created a crater involving six levels of the
underground portion of the complex. The uppermost portion of this large open space connected to the
lobby of the Vista Hotel via an 18 ft by 22 ft hole in the lobbys floor slab. The blast also created a large
hole in the glass wall separating the hotel lobby from the lobby of WTC 1.
The explosion damaged four of seven operating electrical feeders (an eighth was undergoing maintenance
at the time of the bombing), causing short circuits in the system. This resulted in loss of normal electrical
power to most areas of WTC 1 and WTC 2. Normal lighting systems and the building HVAC systems
shut down. Emergency generators operated for approximately 20 min before overheating, causing
automatic shutdown of the diesel engines. The lighting system in the stairways of both towers operated
for approximately 1 hour and 15 min. while the emergency lighting systems were being powered by the
normal or emergency electrical system. However, normal electrical power was eventually shut down due
to a concern for firefighter safety in and around the blast area, causing the remaining occupants in the
stairways to have to evacuate in complete darkness.
As noted in Chapter 4 of this report, the tower buildings were designed to be maintained at a slight
positive pressure by the building HVAC systems. When the building HVAC systems shut down due to
loss of electrical power, the building was subjected to extreme stack effect forces, since at the time of the
bombing the outside temperature was in the twenties (degrees Fahrenheit) (Isner and Klem 1993).
Because the explosion caused penetrations into several elevator shafts in WTC 1 on the subgrade levels
and lobby level, smoke was rapidly transported to the upper portions of the WTC 1 due to forces caused
by the explosion and stack effect. A Port Authority of New York and New J ersey (PANYNJ or Port
Authority) engineer working on the 44th floor of WTC 1 when the explosion occurred reported that
smoke reached his location about 1 min after the explosion, resulting in a rapid decrease in visibility
(Isner and Klem 1993). Smoke eventually spread throughout WTC 1 and to a lesser degree to WTC 2.
Although smoke spread to most areas of WTC 1 and WTC 2 as a result of the bombing, the event resulted
in a relatively low loss of life, limited to the six people killed in the immediate area of the blast. Even
though it took building occupants in some cases up to 3 hours to negotiate their way out of the building
via the stairways, through smoke dense enough to dramatically reduce visibility, the smoke was diluted
sufficiently such that only respiratory irritation was caused.
Chapter 5
5.2.1 Post-Event Building Modifications1993 Bombing
A review committee was convened by the City of New York, including representatives from the New
York City building and fire departments and the Port Authority. The committees mission was to study
the 1993 WTC bombing and determine the adequacy and effectiveness of the existing New York City
building and fire codes as they related to high-rise buildings (World Trade Center Review Committee
1994). With regard to smoke management systems, the committee concluded that the complex issue of
smoke control was beyond the scope of the committee at that time and required future review. However,
the committee recommended that building code requirements for smoke dampers should be clarified and
that elevator lobbies should be provided in new high-rise buildings to resist the passage of smoke. Despite
this recommendation, elevator lobbies are only required in high-rise residential buildings under the
current provisions of the Building Code of New York City (BCNYC).
The report concluded that stair pressurization systems, not installed in the WTC towers, would not
function in an incident involving a mass evacuation due to the simultaneous opening of more than three
stairway doors. The report did conclude, however, that the BCNYC, Reference Standard 5-18 lacked
regulatory provisions for periodic testing and maintenance of stair pressurization systems and
recommended that these requirements be added. Finally, the committee report recommended that the
issue of providing fire towers in new high-rise commercial office buildings be revisited. The requirement
for fire towers, stairways separated from the interior environment of the building via open-air balconies,
was included in the 1938 edition of the BCNYC, but removed in the 1968 edition of the code. Provision
of fire towers is not required under the current provisions of the BCNYC.
A number of changes were eventually made to the buildings as a result of the committees
recommendations, as reported by the Port Authority risk management staff in an article titled The World
Trade Center Complex, published in Fire Engineering (Port Authority Risk Management Staff 1993).
The enhancements made include the following:
1,600 emergency battery-powered lighting units were installed in exit stairways, elevator
lobbies, and elevator cabs.
Phosphorescent signs were installed to guide the way to floor entry doors in exit stairways.
Phosphorescent tape-paint was applied to stair treads, handrails, and the perimeters of
doorways in the exit stairways.
New fires alarm and communications systems were installed in each building with a separate
command center located in each building.
In a separate article published in the December 1993 Fire Engineering issue, titled Fire Prevention and
Building Restoration Activities (Corcoran 1993), it was purported that emergency power was provided
for smoke purge fans. No other sources were found to corroborate this assertion.
5.2.2 Important Considerations1993 Bombing
The 1993 bombing demonstrated that the stack effect could be a primary driver of rapid smoke spread
through high-rise buildings. The bombing showed that large amounts of smoke can be transmitted to the
upper floors of a building due to a fire on a lower floor of the building, particularly when that fire
produces a large quantity of smoke, such as was the case for the 1993 bombing. The 1993 bombing also
clearly demonstrates that, as expected, stack effect is enhanced by openings created in the vertical shafts
within the building, such as stair and elevator shafts.
Smoke spread via the stairways was substantial in WTC 1 during the 1993 event due to the large number
of open stair doors occurring as a result of the mass evacuation of occupants in the building. The
stairways, which were designed with an exit capacity that met or exceeded prevailing code requirements
for the buildings, did not provide the exit capacity to ensure rapid egress of all of the occupants of the
building. As a result, doors remained blocked open by building occupants entering/exiting the stairways,
increasing the magnitude of the airflow up the stairs due to stack effect.
The 1993 bombing also clearly showed the importance of emergency power to maintain the function of
building systems, including emergency lighting systems, in the event of a fire.
5.3 ENGINEERING STUDIES
Between the time the WTC complex was constructed and the 2001 WTC disaster, several engineering
studies were performed to evaluate candidate smoke management system approaches for various areas of
the complex. Three particular studies were conducted to examine smoke management systems in the
towers (WTC 1 and WTC 2). These must be considered in the evaluation of the smoke management
systems actually in place on September 11, 2001.
5.3.1 Prototype Stair Pressurization System Study
Between 1976 and 1979, the Port Authority performed a study aimed at understanding the feasibility of
providing stair pressurization systems in WTC 1 and WTC 2 (PANYNJ 1979).
Beginning in 1976, tests were conducted using building air handling systems located in the 7th floor
mechanical equipment room (MER) and 41st floor MER of WTC 1, reconfigured to supply air to Stair C
(Stair 3). The goal of the tests was to meet the performance criteria outlined in Local Law No. 5, which
was to provide 0.05 (12.5 Pa) in. H
2
O across closed stair doors with three doors open to the stair and
0.1 (25 Pa) in. H
2
O across stair doors with all doors closed, along with a 35 lb
f
(156 N) maximum door
opening force.
The stair pressurization system study examined stair pressurization system performance with the building
HVAC systems in normal mode and smoke purge mode. At the time of the study, the smoke purge
sequence was defined as pressurizing the core using core supply ventilation and exhausting the interior
spaces using the low pressure return fans. Perimeter supply/exhaust fans were shut down in purge mode.
The study demonstrated that the system as designed was unable to meet the performance criteria outlined
in Local Law No. 5. With 3 doors open, differential pressures were generally low (approximately 0.03 in.
H
2
O). With doors closed, door opening forces approached 35 lb
f
. The study concluded that stair
pressurization systems should be installed based on the prototype design, with modifications being made
to the design as stair pressurization technology improved. Based on the results of the study, construction
drawings were prepared outlining the proposed stair pressurization systems.
Chapter 5
Local Law No. 86 (enacted on December 13, 1979) stated that existing buildings shall be exempt from the
smoke shaft and optional stair pressurization requirements if they were provided with automatic
sprinklers throughout. A decision was made sometime after this date to fully sprinkler WTC 1 and
WTC 2. As a result, stair pressurization systems were never installed in WTC 1 and WTC 2.
5.3.2 Rolf Jensen Smoke Movement Analysis
Subsequent to the 1993 bombing, an analysis was performed by Rolf J ensen & Associates (RJ A).
Computer modeling was used to attempt to verify and explain the movement of smoke in WTC 1
following the explosion (RJ A 1995). The report also addressed the potential effectiveness of elevator
venting, stair venting and stair pressurization to improve conditions in the building.
RJ A performed modeling using the SMOKESIM computer model, a precursor to the CONTAM model
described in Chapter 8 of this report. The modeling effort only examined building airflows and pressure
differentials, as the capabilities of the SMOKESIM model were not fully developed to handle
contaminant (i.e., smoke spread) calculations for a building as large as the WTC towers.
The RJ A report concluded that the results of the modeling generally agreed with reported smoke spread
given the wind/weather/damage conditions on February 26, 1993. The report also concluded that stair
venting, defined as exhausting a stair using mechanical ventilation, was not an effective protection
measure. Although stair venting decreases the amount of smoke migrating onto floor areas at the top of
the building, it causes stack effect to be increased, and more smoke to be drawn into the stairs on the
lower floors of the building. Elevator venting was found to improve overall conditions in the building.
Stair pressurization was found to be feasible, and capable of maintaining adequate pressure (0.05 in. H
2
O)
with stair doors closed. However, it was concluded that some sort of relief venting was needed at the top
of each stair segment to relieve unacceptable door opening forces at the top of the stair due to stack effect.
This was particularly true for Stair 3, which had the longest stair segment uninterrupted by a horizontal
transfer corridor.
With or without overpressure relief, stair pressurization was found to be capable of maintaining a slightly
positive pressure in the stair with several doors open. However, as expected, positive pressure could not
be maintained with all stair doors open, as would be the case in a mass evacuation scenario.
5.3.3 Hughes/Dillon Smoke Management System Evaluation
During the same timeframe that RJ A was conducting their smoke movement study (19941995), Hughes
Associates, Inc. (HAI) and Dillon Consulting Engineers (DCE) were performing a joint study of smoke
movement and control for the concourse and plaza portion of the WTC complex. The study evaluated
proposed changes to the plaza/concourse level to add additional public (i.e., a food court, atria) and retail
space. The purpose of this study was to evaluate the effectiveness of a proposed smoke control approach
for the plaza/concourse levels.
When the initial study was completed, HAI/DCE were asked to examine smoke management for the
office buildings in the WTC complex, with a primary emphasis on the towers (WTC 1 and WTC 2).
HAI/DCE were instructed to examine potential configurations using the existing HVAC systems in the
towers to improve smoke control performance, without examining the provision of stair pressurization
systems.
The resulting study (HAI and DCE 1996) used the DOS-based computer model CONTAM96, another
precursor to the windows-based CONTAM version of the model used to complete the analysis described
in Chapter 8 of this report. A key component of the study was to use the model to examine system
performance in terms of tenability (visibility distance, toxicity) as well as pressure differentials. System
success could thus be achieved by maintaining acceptable smoke conditions in areas remote from the fire,
even though sufficient pressure was not achieved to maintain total containment of the smoke.
The HAI/DCE study examined numerous fire scenarios. The study examined fires originating in the Port
Authority Trans-Hudson (PATH) terminal, loading dock, parking garage, and lobby, as well as fires on
various office floors. In addition, the study examined fire scenarios where the installed sprinkler system
was assumed to fail to function, resulting in an uncontrolled fire on an office floor. Finally, wind and
stack effects were examined.
The study concluded that for most fire scenarios, a sequence involving pressurizing the core in the HVAC
zone of fire origin and exhausting the perimeter office spaces (core pressurization) provided adequate
smoke control performance. The study also strongly recommended that smoke management systems be
activated automatically using smoke detectors installed in the building. This was a somewhat
controversial recommendation as automatic activation of smoke management systems is generally not
allowed for high-rise buildings in New York City.
The HAI/DCE report provided a recommended sequence of operations that could be used to better control
smoke given an uncontrolled fire event on a floor that involved visible flame and heat exiting the building
via broken windows. The approach involves placing all of the HVAC systems in the building on supply
only and shutting down return fans. This approach effectively pressurizes the entire building and forces
smoke out the broken windows on the fire floor. It is cautioned, however, that this approach should only
be used when occupants have already evacuated the fire floor and windows have been broken out due to
the fire, as high door opening forces may be created.
Several other recommendations were made involving the other buildings in the WTC complex. These
findings are not summarized here because they do not impact WTC 1 and WTC 2. One interesting finding
of the HAI/DCE study, however, pertains to the interrelationship of the buildings in the WTC complex.
During the course of the study, measurements of airflows and pressures were taken at various points
throughout the complex. It was found that during extremely cold ambient temperatures (15 F [-9.4 C]
on the day of the test) and when many ventilation systems are shutdown (night mode), the neutral plane of
the entire complex is at a height above the other tallest connected building in the complex, WTC 3 (the
Marriott hotel, formally the Vista hotel).
Because WTC 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 were essentially connected to one another via the concourse and other sub-
grade levels, the substantial stack effect caused by the two towers created patterns of air flow toward the
towers from the other buildings. Even at their uppermost floors airflow was into WTC 3, 4, and 5 from
outside. It was also found that a substantial source of air was drawn up the escalators in the concourse
leading from the PATH station. This air in turn is being drawn through the PATH tunnel from the
opposite side of the Hudson River, in New J ersey. Therefore, during extreme weather conditions, the air
entering the PATH tunnel in New J ersey exited the top of WTC 1 and WTC 2 due to stack effect. The
Chapter 5
implications of the interdependence of the various buildings in the WTC complex with regard to stack
effect will be discussed further in Chapter 8 of this report. The computer modeling described in Chapter 8
examines the impact of stack effect on smoke management system performance.
5.4 REFERENCES
BCNYC (Building Code of the City of New York). 1979. Dates for Compliance with the Local Laws
Corcoran, D. 1993. Fire prevention and building restoration activities. In The World Trade Center
Bombing: Report and Analysis. Fire Engineering. Manning, W. A. ed. Vol. 146, No. 12. December.
HAI (Hughes Associates, Inc.) and DCE (Dillon Consulting Engineers). 1996. Smoke Management
Evaluation Study of The World Trade Center Complex Excluding the Concourse and Plaza. Prepared
for the PANYNJ (Port Authority of New York and New J ersey). New York, NY.
Isner, M. S., and T. J . Klem. 1993. Explosion and fire disrupt World Trade Center. NFPA Journal.
National Fire Protection Association. November/December.
Lathrop, J . K. 1975. World Trade Center Fire New York, New York. Fire Journal. J uly.
PANYNJ (Port Authority of New York and New J ersey). 1979. Stair pressurization study (Tower 1,
Stair C) engineering documents. New York, NY.
The Port Authority Risk Management Staff. 1993. The World Trade Center Complex. In The World
Trade Center Bombing: Report and Analysis. Fire Engineering. Manning, W. A. ed. Vol. 146,
No. 12. December.
Powers, W. R., Superintendent. 1975. One World Trade Center Fire New York, NY, February 13, 1975.
NYBFU (New York Board of Underwriters), New York, NY.
RJ A (Rolf J enson and Associates). 1995. World Trade Center Smoke Movement Analysis. Prepared for
PANYNJ (Port Authority of New York and New J ersey). New York, NY.
World Trade Center Review Committee. 1994. The Report of the World Trade Center Review Committee.
The City of New York Department of Buildings. New York, NY.

Chapter 6
SMOKE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM DESIGN AND INSTALLATION
In order to document the smoke management systems, multiple documents were provided by the Port
Authority of New York and New J ersey (PANYNJ or Port Authority) for review, in order to determine
how the systems were designed and operated. These documents included the following:
Base building architectural and mechanical drawings for World Trade Center (WTC) 1, 2,
and 7
Tenant retrofit architectural and mechanical drawings (when available)
Operations and maintenance manuals
Fire safety plans
Answers to questions posed via National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to the
Port Authority and other knowledgeable personnel
In the case of WTC 1 and WTC 2, information obtained that documented the operation of smoke
management systems presented conflicting versions of how the systems operated. In the case of WTC 7,
the base building systems installed when the building was constructed was modified/supplemented to add
smoke management system capabilities during tenant retrofits. Instances where conflicting or incomplete
information was provided are fully documented in this report.
6.1 WTC 1 AND WTC 2
The tower buildings (WTC 1 and WTC 2) were equipped with a non-dedicated smoke management
system (a smoke purge system) that utilized the base building heating, ventilating, and air conditioning
(HVAC) systems that provided normal ventilation to the buildings. The smoke purge sequence is
discussed in detail in Sec. 6.1.1 of this report. No dedicated smoke management systems were installed in
the buildings.
The normal base building HVAC systems in WTC 1 and WTC 2 are summarized in Chapter 4 of this
report. These HVAC systems could be manually aligned in a smoke purge mode that allowed smoke to be
removed from the building. Smoke purge could only be accomplished for an entire ventilation zone
served by a particular mechanical equipment room (MER) (ventilation zones are depicted in Fig. 44);
thus, in the smoke purge mode the entire ventilation zone represented a single smoke zone. Because no
operable fire/smoke dampers were present within the ventilation ductwork, it was not possible to provide
the smoke purge, or any other smoke management sequence, on a floor-by-floor basis.
Smoke detectors were located at the exhaust duct inlets on each floor and within the HVAC system
ductwork in the MER to provide automatic shutdown of individual fans in the presence of smoke.
Automatic shutdown of the ventilation systems could be overridden in the smoke purge mode.
Chapter 6
6.1.1 Sequence of Operations
The fire safety plan for WTC 1 and WTC 2, revised in J anuary of 1999 (PANYNJ 1999), defines smoke
purge as the removal of smoke and other gaseous combustion products from the (fire) area after a fire
has been extinguished. As documented in the fire safety plan, mechanical systems could be aligned to
perform the smoke purge function by the Port Authority mechanical section staff when requested by the
chief officer of the responding New York City Fire Department (FDNY) units. The FDNY would ask the
WTC fire safety director to provide a smoke purge for a given zone. The WTC fire safety director would
then instruct the mechanical section staff to perform the requested action.
The smoke purge sequence is documented in WTC Instruction Manual No. 23, Operation and
Maintenance of Fire Protection System, dated February 1986 (PANYNJ 1986). The documented
sequence is as follows:
Based on the information contained in the fire safety plan for WTC 1 and WTC 2 and WTC Instruction
Manual No. 23, it could be concluded that the buildings were equipped with a manual purge system that
utilized the interior zone exhaust fans serving the four quadrants of the building to remove smoke after a
fire was extinguished. Core supply/exhaust fans and perimeter supply fans would be shut down. Smoke
purge could be accomplished within each HVAC zone, the largest of which having 32 floors, as depicted
in Fig. 44. However, a number of sources contain conflicting information regarding how the smoke
purge system functioned and how it was intended to be used.
Accounts of the 1975 fire (Powers 1975; Lathrop 1975) state that the smoke purge sequence pressurized
the core with 100 percent outdoor air and exhausted 100 percent from the office spaces. These accounts
also state that during the 1975 fire, the smoke purge sequence for the fire floor and adjacent floors was
initiated from the appropriate MER shortly after discovery of the fire, once police had examined the fire
floor and identified the presence of a significant fire. This documented sequence of events is important,
as it signifies that the system was used at that time as an active fire protection system, to control smoke
during the fire event and that the described core pressurization mode differed from the sequence of
operations (Fig. 61) documented in WTC Instruction Manual No. 23.
WTC Instruction Manual No. 23 makes the statement that in the event of smoke in an interior tenants
space involving personnel evacuation, the smoke purge procedure to be used is as follows In
referencing an event involving personnel evacuation, this statement also implies use of the smoke purge
sequence as an active fire protection sequence rather than a post-fire smoke cleanup sequence. The
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) report summarizing events on September 11, 2001,
(McAllister 2002) states (in Sec. 2.1.3.3) that, a zoned smoke control systemwas designed to limit
smoke spread from the tenant areas to the core area, thereby assisting both individuals evacuating from an
area and those responding to the scene by limiting smoke spread into the core. Again, this statement
implies an active smoke management system based on the concept of pressurizing the core, which
conflicts with the documented smoke purge sequence for the buildings.

Smoke Management System Design and Installation
Towers A and B
Interior Areas
Note: Only the Fire Safety Director on duty may request
smoke purge.
In the event of smoke in an interior tenants space involving
personnel evacuation, the smoke purge procedure to be used is as
follows:
1. Secure all fans in the pertinent MER.
2. Set all quadrant Normal/Purge/Reset switches to the Purge
position.
3. Start all return air fans.
4. Start MER exhaust fan(s), if necessary.
Tower Core
1. Secure all fans in the pertinent MER.
2. Set all quadrant Normal/Purge/Reset switches to the Purge
position.
3. Start all return air fans.
4. Open Mens and Ladies Room doors on the floors involved, and
start the relevant toilet exhaust fan(s).
Source: PANYNJ 1986. Reproduced with permission of The Port Authority of New York and
New J ersey.
Figure 61. Documented smoke purge sequence of operations, WTC 1 and WTC 2.
The Port Authority was asked to clarify the operation of the smoke purge sequence, since the available
information regarding its intended operation provides conflicting accounts of smoke purge operation.
3
the operation of the smoke purge sequence is as follows:
During a fire/smoke incident, the fans stayed in operation until shut
down by a smoke detector on interlocking exhaust fans or at the direction
of FDNY. FDNY would also direct what mode of operation the fans
should be in. If fans were still operating, as would often be the case, the
engineer at FDNY direction would key over to purge mode. This would
sequence spill dampers to open 100 %. In addition, building operating
procedure during a purge was to run the interior supply fans for purging
[the] affected quadrant. During purge, the interior fans outside supply
air dampers would go to 100 % open. For example, during a smoke
incident on 38NE in tower one, ACS 41-6 [northeast interior supply fan]
would be operating on purge, outside damper open 100 %. ACR 41-4,5
and/or 6 [northeast interior return fans] would be operating on purge,

3
Chapter 6
spills open 100 %. Core fans would not normally operate during a smoke
purge unless conditions warranted and requested by FDNY.
According to this version of the sequence of operations, smoke purge would occur by starting the supply
and exhaust fans serving one of the four interior quadrants within a ventilation zone. Core supply/exhaust
fans and perimeter supply fans would be shut down. HVAC systems serving the other ventilation zones in
the building would be left operating unless they were shut down at the direction of FDNY.
The Port Authority further recognized that WTC Instruction Manual No. 23 had not been updated since
the base building fire alarm system was upgraded after the 1993 bombing. Therefore, this manual did not
always reflect the most current fire protection system configuration
4
.
Operation of the smoke management system for WTC 1 and WTC 2 could be achieved by aligning the
equipment within the individual MERs or at a central control panel located in the Operations Control
Center (OCC) located on the B1 level of WTC 2. At either location, building personnel had to perform
two distinct operations:
1. Aligning the HVAC systems in smoke purge
2. Starting the appropriate HVAC fans
Operation of the purge switch simply aligned all dampers that served as part of that quadrants HVAC
systems in a 100 percent outdoor air configuration. Supply and spill dampers would be fully open, and
return dampers would be closed.
To achieve the smoke purge, it was up to the operator of the systems to turn on those fans necessary to
achieve system operation. It would be equally possible to initiate an exhaust only type sequence as
outlined in the fire safety plan, the core pressurization sequence (supply and exhaust operating) reportedly
initiated during the 1975 fire, or the sequence stated by the Port Authority as the smoke purge sequence in
effect on September 11, 2001. Alignment of the system would be up to the understanding of the operator
as to the proper function of the smoke purge sequence, when called upon to initiate this sequence.
With regard to the use of the smoke purge function to aid in active smoke management during a fire event
versus during post-fire cleanup operations, it would be up to the responding fire department personnel to
initiate system operation. Depending on the type of fire event, it is possible that the system could have
been used either during the fire or after it was extinguished.
For the purposes of this report, the function of the smoke purge system documented by the Port
Authority
1
was assumed to be in effect on September 11, 2001. It was also assumed that the system was
to be used after the fire was extinguished, at the discretion of the responding fire department personnel.

4
6.1.2 Applicable Code Requirements
Individual code requirements of the BCNYC that pertain to smoke management are discussed in Sec. 3.2
of this report. At the time the buildings were constructed, the ability to provide a smoke purge from each
HVAC zone was the only smoke management system provided in the buildings. Local Law No. 5
retroactively imposed the requirements for smoke shafts for existing high-rise buildings when it was
enacted in 1973. In lieu of such smoke shaft(s), stair pressurization systems could be provided.
In order to respond to the requirements of Local Law No. 5, the Port Authority initiated a pilot study into
the requirements for pressurizing the exit stairs in WTC 1 and WTC 2. This pilot study is discussed in
Sec. 5.3.1. Stair pressurization was examined as a means of meeting the requirements of Local Law No. 5
since the smoke shaft requirements would have been prohibitive for a building the size of WTC 1 and
WTC 2. The smoke shaft requirements contained in reference standard Reference Standard 5-17 called
for the capability of providing 60 air changes per hour in the largest compartment served, which would
have required the capacity to exhaust 300,000400,000 ft
3
/min from each floor of the towers being
exhausted. This was clearly outside the capabilities of the existing ventilation systems.
Existing buildings that were sprinklered throughout were exempt from the smoke shaft and optional stair
pressurization requirement by Local Law No. 86 (enacted in 1979). A decision was made at some
subsequent time to fully sprinkler the WTC buildings. Therefore, the Port Authority did not move forward
with the stair pressurization option. Because WTC 1 and WTC 2 were fully retrofitted with automatic
sprinklers, smoke and heat venting and/or stair pressurization was not required in WTC 1 and WTC 2 on
September 11, 2001.
WTC 1 and WTC 2 were equipped throughout with fire dampers at duct penetrations into vertical shafts.
Combination fire/smoke dampers were not required by the code to be provided in existing buildings.
Since tenant retrofit projects generally connected to the existing base building systems, fire/smoke
dampers at HVAC shafts were not generally provided during tenant retrofits. This was verified by
examining the mechanical drawings for the Marsh & McLennan tenant retrofit in WTC 1, considering this
retrofit occurred in the years just prior to the events on September 11, 2001.
6.1.3 Emergency Power
Emergency power was provided subsequent to the 1993 bombing for WTC 1 and WTC 2, serving all
emergency systems (lighting, fire alarm system, etc.) and the building elevators. While one account
summarizing the building restoration activities following the 1993 bombing (Corcoran 1993) purported
that emergency power was provided for smoke purge fans, no other sources were found to corroborate
this assertion. According to the Port Authority,
5
emergency power was not provided to WTC 1 and
WTC 2 base building smoke purge fans. However, the MERs were equipped with redundant power
sources from different substations.
No other redundant features were identified with respect to the HVAC systems used to accomplish the
smoke purge functions. No back-up systems or emergency power was provided.

5
Chapter 6
6
all of the base building duct penetrations through fire rated partitions
were equipped with fire dampers. There were no smoke dampers in the base building HVAC system,
except for those within the air handling unit serving the Windows on the World restaurant in WTC 1. The
smoke dampers were designed to segregate the restaurant from tenant floors below.
6.2 WTC 7
WTC 7 was equipped with a dedicated smoke management system (a smoke purge system) that utilized
dedicated HVAC equipment that served only a smoke management function. This type of system differed
from that used in WTC 1 and WTC 2, which used the HVAC systems that provided normal ventilation to
the buildings to perform the smoke purge function. The smoke purge sequence for WTC 7 is discussed in
detail in Sec. 6.2.1 of this report.
The HVAC systems serving WTC 7 are summarized in Chapter 4 of this report. As stated in Chapter 4,
dedicated smoke exhaust fans/dampers could be manually aligned at the fire command center to provide
smoke purge from a specified floor within the building. Since the smoke purge function could be
provided on a floor-by-floor basis, each floor of the building constituted an individual smoke control
zone.
6.2.1 Sequence of Operations
The WTC 7 fire safety plan (PANYNJ 1988a) specifies the sequence for emergency exhausting of heat
and smoke as follows:
Heat and smoke exhausted from the building by activation of smoke
purge and related air handling upon report of fire.
The fire safety plan does not identify the responsibility for activating the smoke purge system, the means
for activating the system, or the location from which it was to be activated. However, the building was
provided with a Class E fire alarm signal center (BCNYC Reference Standard 17-3A), which required fan
control to be provided at the Fire Command Station, which was located in the 3rd floor main lobby in
WTC 7 (PANYNJ 1988a).
The building operations manual for WTC 7 (PANYNJ 1988b) specifies three alarm modes pertaining to
operation of the building HVAC systems. ALARM-1 initiated shutdown of HVAC equipment based on
duct smoke detection. ALARM-2 initiated smoke purge on the affected floor. ALARM-3 specified the
smoke purge sequence for non-affected floors. The smoke management sequence pertaining to the smoke
purge function involved exhausting the fire floor and pressurizing the remaining floors with supply air.
The documented sequences (PANYNJ 1988b) are shown in Fig. 62.

6
WTC 7
Smoke Detection, etc., (ALARM-1)
1. Upon an alarm condition, system will completely shut-down. Dampers will close.
Smoke Purge Affected Floor (ALARM-2)
1. When fans are operating, system will slow to 15 %.
a. Heating coils will de-energize.
b. Cooling System will stop.
c. Economizer coil valves will close fully to supply all condenser water to economizer coils.
d. Supply air dampers will remain fully open.
e. Minimum outside air dampers and smoke damper will open.
f. Maximum outside air dampers and return air dampers will remain closed.
g. VAV terminal box dampers will open fully.
1. When fans are off, fans will start and run at 15 %.
ALARM-2 is functional in manual mode and overrides ALARM-1.
Smoke Purge Non-Affected Floors (ALARM-3)
1. When fans are operating, system will run at 100 %.
a. Heating coils will de-energize.
b. Cooling System will stop.
c. Economizer coil valves will close fully to supply all condenser water to economizer coils.
d. Supply air dampers will remain fully open.
e. Minimum outside air dampers and maximum outside air dampers will open.
f. Smoke exhaust dampers and return air dampers will remain closed.
g. VAV terminal box dampers will open fully.
2. When fans are off, fans will start and run at 100 %.
3. ALARM-3 is functional in manual mode and overrides ALARM-1 and ALARM-2.
Source: PANYNJ 1988b. Reproduced with permission of The Port Authority of New York and New J ersey.
Figure 62. Documented smoke management sequence, WTC 7.
6.2.2 Applicable Code Requirements
Individual code requirements of the Building Code of the City of New York (BCNYC) are discussed in
Sec. 3.3 of this report. Local Law No. 16 required that all buildings in occupancy group E (business) be
provided a manual override capability to be capable of exhausting one floor at a time at a rate of six air
changes per hour, or 1 cfm/ft
2
, whichever is greater. WTC 7, having a footprint area of approximately
48,000 ft
2
, would require an exhaust capacity of at least 48,000 ft
3
/min (81,552 m
3
/h) to be consistent with
the code. As documented in Chapter 4 of this report, the base building system serving the lower floors of
the building provided a smoke exhaust capacity of 36,000 ft
3
/min (61,164 m
3
/h), which was not consistent
with the minimum value specified by code. An 84,000 ft
3
/min (142,716 m
3
/h) exhaust fan was provided
for the SSB floors during the tenant retrofit, which exceeded the capacity required by code.
WTC 7 was sprinklered throughout and was, therefore, exempted from the requirement for stair
pressurization systems. The building was provided with a Class E fire alarm system per code, was
provided with emergency power serving all emergency systems, and was equipped throughout with fire
dampers at duct penetrations into vertical shafts, consistent with the BCNYC.
Chapter 6
6.3 REFERENCES
BCNYC (Building Code of the City of New York). 1979. Dates for Compliance with the Local Laws
Year 1984 -Local Law No. 16 of the City of New York. New York, NY, March.
Corcoran, D. 1993. Fire Prevention and Building Restoration Activities. In The World Trade Center
Bombing: Report and Analysis. Fire Engineering. Manning, W. A. ed. Vol. 146, No. 12. December.
Lathrop, J . K. 1975. World Trade Center Fire New York, New York. Fire Journal. J uly.
PANYNJ (Port Authority of New York and New J ersey). 1986. World Trade Center Instruction Manual
No. 23: Operation & Maintenance of Fire Protection System. New York, NY, February.
PANYNJ (Port Authority of New York and New J ersey). 1988a. Fire Safety Plan, 7 World Trade Center.
New York, NY, April.
PANYNJ (Port Authority of New York and New J ersey). 1988b. World Trade Center 7 Operations
Manual. New York, NY.
PANYNJ (Port Authority of New York and New J ersey). 1999. World Trade Center Fire Safety Plan:
One World Trade Center , Two World Trade Center, Condensed Version. New York, NY, J anuary.
Powers, W. R., Superintendent. 1975. One World Trade Center Fire New York, NY, February 13, 1975.
NYBFU (New York Board of Underwriters), New York, NY.

Chapter 7
EVALUATION OF SYSTEM PERFORMANCE ON SEPTEMBER 11, 2001
As discussed in Chapter 1 of this report, expected system performance was evaluated for postulated
design fires in business occupancies, as well as documentation of the expected performance of fully
functional smoke management systems in World Trade Center (WTC) 1 and WTC 2.
Evaluation of hypothetical design fires, smoke management modes, and building configurations is
documented in Chapter 8 of this report. First, the expected function of the installed smoke management
systems, given the actual events on September 11, 2001, was evaluated.
As discussed in Chapter 6, the smoke management systems in WTC 1 and WTC 2 were designed to
provide a manual smoke purge function. Given the design and intended operation of the smoke
management systems, two key questions must be answered to approximate the performance of the system
on September 11, 2001:
1. Was manual operation of the smoke purge systems in either WTC 1 or WTC 2 initiated by
emergency response personnel?
2. Were the systems capable of operating given the damage caused by the aircrafts impacting
each building?
In order to answer the second question, damage to both the building electrical and mechanical systems
must be evaluated. It must first be determined whether electrical power was available to the building
mechanical systems subsequent to impact so that they were capable of operating. Then, potential damage
to heating, ventilating, and air conditioning (HVAC) system components must be evaluated to determine
if the systems were capable of performing as designed.
7.1 ACTIONS OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE PERSONNEL
The events of September 11, 2001, clearly represented an extreme challenge, both to emergency response
personnel and to the installed building systems. The damage caused by an aircraft impact into a building
is outside the range of typical design considerations for the design of most building systems, including
fire protection systems. In addition, from a fire department perspective, a fire involving multiple floors of
the uppermost portion of WTC 1 or WTC 2, or worse in both buildings simultaneously, represents a
difficult operational environment.
A comprehensive accounting of New York City Fire Department (FDNY) policies, procedures, and
performance in connection with the events on September 11, 2001, was assembled by Howard Safir, the
former commissioner of FDNY and the New York City Police Department (NYPD) (Safir 2002). Safirs
report reflects findings from interviews with FDNY personnel and analysis of publicly available sources.
Dennis Smiths book Report From Ground Zero (Smith 2002) also documents fire department operations
on September 11, 2001.
Chapter 7
The battalion chief established a command post in the lobby of WTC 1. According to the Safir report, the
battalion chief attempted to determine the floors of impact, which he estimated as near the 80th floor. The
deputy division chief arrived at the WTC 1 lobby command post approximately 3 min after the battalion
chief and assumed command. The deputy division chiefs account of the events stated that all building
services were out. The elevators werent working; there were no communications lines established
(Smith 2002).
According to the Safir report, upon his arrival at WTC 1 the battalion chief met the then-acting WTC fire
safety director. The two worked to address the situation with the elevators and discussed the condition of
water and power sources. The battalion chief, deputy division chief, and the WTC fire safety director then
conferred and issued the order to evacuate WTC 2. No recommendation was given to initiate a smoke
purge sequence, nor was smoke purge performed on September 11, 2001, to their knowledge
7
. The deputy
division chief met with the WTC 1 fire safety director, who put his engineers to work to gain control of
the elevators and building communications systems (Safir 2002).
Initial FDNY operations at WTC 1 were focused on dispatching fire department personnel arriving at the
building to assist in rescue efforts and on responding to distress calls from people stuck at various
locations within the building, including elevators. The responding FDNY officers focused on rescue
efforts rather than trying to extinguish the fire (Safir 2002).
Subsequent to the second aircraft impact into WTC 2, two other chiefs were dispatched to the lobby of
WTC 2, to set up a command post there (Smith 2002). There is no record of either chief having initiated a
smoke purge sequence in WTC 2. First hand accounts of their actions are not available as both chiefs
perished during the collapse of WTC 2.
Radio and phone traffic from various sources (New York City police and fire departments, the Port
Authority of New York and New J ersey [PANYNJ or Port Authority] police, and WTC
mechanical/electrical/structural divisions) was reviewed in an effort to determine if any attempts were
made to manipulate building ventilation systems or initiate the smoke purge sequence locally from one of
the mechanical equipment rooms (MERs) in WTC 1 or WTC 2. One reference to smoke purging was
found. WTC channel 25/radio channel B was used by the WTC maintenance and electrical shops at the
WTC. For a period of time from roughly 10 to 25 min after the aircraft impact into WTC 1, radio traffic
was received from a person on radio structural five from Stair A on the 103rd floor in WTC 1.
Structural five reported heavy smoke in the stairway and some time between 20 and 25 min after impact
was recorded as transmitting the message Need immediate purge. At roughly the same time, an
unidentified male was recorded on the same radio channel transmitting the message Electric, we have
Staircase C (inaudible), is there any way to pump any outdoor air in? No conversations were identified
confirming use of the ventilation systems.
7.2 DAMAGE TO SYSTEM COMPONENTS
The exact extent of damage within individual floors of WTC 1 and WTC 2 may never be known, since
the collapse of the buildings prohibited a detailed inspection of the impact area. However, the potential

7
PANYNJ interview 3 (Fall 2003).
Evaluation of System Performance on September 11, 2001
extent of damage can be estimated based on the results of engineering analysis and based on observations
recorded by people located within WTC 1 and WTC 2 at the time of the events.
Preliminary damage estimates identified damage areas based on damage to structural columns within the
core of WTC 1 and WTC 2.
8
These preliminary damage estimates are included in Appendix A of this
report and were used to provide a first order estimate of the potential damage caused to building electrical
and mechanical systems in order to estimate whether the smoke purge sequence had the potential to
function properly during the events that occurred on September 11, 2001.
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) damage estimates included in Appendix A
were overlaid onto representative floor plans for the impact areas in WTC 1 and WTC 2 in order to
determine the potential damage to key electrical/mechanical system components located in the core
spaces. Damage estimates for WTC 1 and WTC 2 are shown in Figs. 71 and 72, respectively. In these
figures, only those floors where major structural damage in the core was estimated are shown.
Figures 71 and 72 depict damage estimates to key electrical/mechanical system components located in
the core spaces. The preliminary NIST damage estimates are used to define the impact area on each of the
three primary floors where the majority of core damage was expected. A hypothetical boundary is also
shown for shaft damage caused by impact debris, given the fact that the shafts in the building are
constructed using gypsum wallboard construction and are susceptible to impact damage.
The location of the HVAC shafts used for interior zone ventilation are shown in Figs. 71 and 72, as
these are the primary HVAC systems used to accomplish the smoke purge sequence. The locations of the
three electrical closets/risers providing power to the upper floors of the building are also shown. The
locations of exit stairways and freight elevator 50 are also shown, as damage witnessed to these shafts can
be used to verify the extent of shaft damage throughout the core.
The damage estimates shown in Figs. 71 and 72 can be corroborated to a certain extent using
observations made by people located in various locations in the buildings after aircraft impact. The
observations primarily have to do with stair shaft damage, damage to freight elevator 50, and in some
cases elevator shafts. HVAC shaft data could be corroborated using visual evidence of smoke spread seen
from the exterior of the buildings. An attempt was also made to corroborate the extent of core damage
using observations as to the presence of power in the buildings.
Part of the NIST WTC Investigation included an aircraft impact damage analysis of WTC 1 and WTC 2.
The final results of these analyses are provided in NIST NCSTAR 1-2. Once the damage estimates were
finalized, they were compared to the initial damage estimates (Figs. 71 and 72) developed that were
used for the purposes of this analysis of active fire protection systems. The main areas of interest with
respect to the smoke management systems are damage to vertical shafts. The debris fields of the revised
damage estimates were determined to indicate damage to vertical shafts, on one floor or another, to a
similar degree indicated by the preliminary damage estimates.

8
Preliminary damage estimates provided by NIST (T. McAllister and F. Sadek), October 27, 2003.
Chapter 7

Figure 71. Preliminary damage estimates, WTC 1.

Figure 72. Preliminary damage estimates, WTC 2.
Chapter 7
7.2.1 Exit Stair and Elevator Shaft Damage
Numerous accounts were recorded of all three exit stairs in WTC 1 being blocked on the 92nd floor and
above. Multiple calls received by the Port Authority police desk reported rapidly worsening smoke
conditions and blocked exits from the Windows on the World restaurant, located at the top of WTC 1
(NYPD 2001). Several occupants contacted friends and family via email or cell phone from floors above
the impact floors and reported heavy amounts of smoke and all exits blocked (Beyler 2002). Several
employees from Carr Futures, located on the 92nd floor of WTC 1, placed calls to family and reported
that the exit stairs were impassible (Cauchon 2001). Two of the three occupants that escaped from the
91st floor reported that only two of three exit stairs were accessible due to debris in the exit corridor
(Beyler 2002).
Of the two accessible stairs, one was blocked with pieces of gypsum wallboard from above. The other
exit stair had some debris in the stair but was passable. A Port Authority architect located on the 88th
floor of WTC 1 identified the open exit stair as Stair C (Murphy 2002), which, based on the description
provided in his account, was the northwest exit stair (Stair 1). These accounts would tend to support the
damage estimates depicted in Fig. 72, as far as core shaft damage enveloping the footprint of the three
exit stairs. On the lower floors in the impact area, Stair 1 (the northwest stair) is furthest removed from
the identified impact damage area, due to the orientation of the aircraft as it impacted the north face of the
building.
The extent of damage into the core of WTC 1 is also evidenced by damage to elevator shafts in the core,
particularly freight elevator 50. A notable event occurring in WTC 1 was a reported explosion/fireball
that occurred in the lobby of WTC 1 due to jet fuel that was ignited at the base of an elevator shaft,
witnessed by three survivors (Beyler 2002). This is evidence of a major opening created into one of the
full height elevators in the impact zone. Freight elevator 50 and two express elevators connecting the
lobby floors to the Windows on the World Restaurant on the 106th floor and observation deck were the
only full height elevators in this area. The preliminary damage estimates depicted in Fig. 71 indicate
damage as far into the core as freight elevator 50 and potentially as far as the express elevators. Since the
elevator doors on the lobby level for freight elevator 50 open to a corridor within the core, and the doors
to the express elevators face outward toward the exterior walls of the lobby where the explosion/fireball
damaged the exterior walls, this is further evidence of core damage as far in as the express elevator shafts.
Damage to local elevator shafts was also evident based on survivor testimony. The base of the local
elevator shafts serving the impact zone in WTC 1 was the 78th floor sky lobby. Two occupants that
escaped noted fire in a vertical shaft coming out through gaps in a shaft wall as they passed through the
sky lobby (Beyler 2002). The marble walls encasing the elevators on this level were also noted to have
buckled and snapped (Beyler 2002). Another survivor reported jumping through large drops of blue
flame to exit an open elevator door on the 78th floor (Beyler 2002).
Figure 72 depicts damage estimates for core spaces in WTC 2. Compared to WTC 1 (Fig. 71), damage
to the core was not estimated to be quite as extensive due to the projected path of the aircraft through the
building and orientation of the buildings core.
In WTC 2, the core layout was such that the three exit stairs were located remotely from one another on
the impact floors. As shown in Fig. 72, the northwest stair in the building (Stair 1) was relatively
undamaged. At least four survivors were able to safely exit the building via Stair 1, from floors as high as
the 91st floor (Murphy 2002; Cauchon 2001). It appears that more people could have escaped via Stair 1
but chose not to go down through the smoke in Stair 1 near the floors of impact or chose to try to exit by
accessing the roof, but found the roof doors locked (Cauchon 2001).
As seen in Fig. 72, the full-height freight and express elevators were located out of the way of the
postulated path of impact. Given that there were limited accounts of spread of flaming jet fuel to lower
levels via the elevator shafts, unlike WTC 1, this is likely a reasonable assumption. The availability of
survivor testimony for WTC 2 regarding fires in elevator shafts is not as prevalent since the primary
floors of impact in WTC 2 are near the bottom of the local elevator shafts, just above the 78th floor sky
lobby.
Since damage to two out of three exit stairs was substantiated by survivor testimony and significant
damage was caused to the exterior walls in the northeast corner of WTC 2 caused by impact damage, the
path of damage would also logically include the ventilation shafts located on the east half of the impact
floors, as depicted by the damage estimates shown in Fig. 72.
7.2.2 Exterior Observations
Potential damage to the HVAC shafts was determined to some degree by examining photographic
evidence depicting the exterior of the buildings after the time of aircraft impact. As was shown in
Fig. 44, the WTC 1 impact zone was located in the uppermost HVAC zone of the building, serving the
92nd through 107th floors from the 108th floor MER, while the WTC 2 impact zone was located in the
HVAC zone serving the 59th through 91st floors from the 75th floor MER. Thus, the MER serving the
impact zone was located above the impact zone in WTC 1 and below the impact zone in WTC 2.
As shown in Figs. 71 and 72, initial damage estimates support damage to the HVAC shafts in one-half
of each building within the impact zone. Such damage would create large holes in the gypsum wallboard
exhaust shafts and potentially shear off or collapse metal supply ductwork. If the HVAC shafts were
undamaged, the fire dampers at the HVAC shaft walls would have been expected to close in an intense
fire, limiting the extent of airflow via the ventilation shafts. Fire dampers would not be expected to be as
effective in limiting smoke spread as combination fire/smoke dampers, which are designed to be smoke-
tight and close earlier in the fire event due to activation of the integrated smoke detectors installed as part
of the damper assembly.
In WTC 1, spread of large amounts of smoke via the ventilation shafts is evident in the examination of
pictures of the exterior of WTC 1 after impact. Figure 73 depicts views of WTC 1 from the north and the
west. A significant amount of smoke is observed coming out of the 108th floor MER from a localized
spot on the north face of the building, and that smoke seems to exit from the MER along the length of the
west face of the building. Figures 46 and 48 depict the supply and exhaust system layout in a typical
MER (shown for WTC 2). At the 108th floor MER in WTC 1, the localized smoke emanating from the
north face of the building corresponds to the location of the supply fan inlet for the northwest interior
supply zone. The exhaust plenum for the northwest quadrant exhaust fans is located along the west face of
the MER. The visual evidence depicted in Fig. 73, showing smoke exiting from the 108th floor MER,
supports damage to the primary ventilation shaft serving the northwest quadrant of the impact zone,
depicted in Fig. 71.
Chapter 7

North Face WTC 1

Smoke Exits NW Interior
Ventilation Zone Supply Inlet
(smoke exits at localized point)
West Face WTC 1

Smoke Exits NW Interior Ventilation
Zone Exhaust Plenum (smoke spills
out length of plenum)

Figure 73. Impact damage to north and west faces of WTC 1.
Since the damage estimate suggests similar damage to the northeast shaft, a similar pattern of smoke
exiting the 108th floor MER would be expected to be seen at the northeast supply inlet and east exhaust
outlets. However, due to the direction of the wind driven smoke plume from the fire toward the southeast,
it is difficult to see patterns of smoke emanating from the MER at this location on the exterior of the
building. Therefore, large amounts of smoke exiting supply/ventilation shafts serving the northeast
quadrant of the impact zone, which would substantiate the shaft damage to the northeast quadrant
ventilation shafts depicted in Fig. 71, could not be verified using visual observations of the exterior of
the building.
Once smoke enters the ventilation ductwork, it can very quickly spread to all areas of the upper floors of
the building via the air distribution plenum in the ceiling. However, smoke entering a floor via elevator
doors might have to pass through multiple barriers in the core and office space to reach the perimeter
offices. As a result, smoke spread via the ventilation shafts has the potential to cause a more rapid
deterioration of smoke conditions in the perimeter office spaces than smoke spread via the elevator and
stair shafts.
Rapid spread of smoke vertically via the ventilation shafts in WTC 1 is supported by the fact that smoke
conditions became untenable (high heat/high toxicity) on the uppermost floors of WTC 1, where people
were observed breaking windows to obtain outdoor air and some jumped from the building to escape the
rapidly deteriorating conditions in the building. This occurred shortly after impact in WTC 1. The FDNY
noted people jumping from the building shortly after their arrival in the lobby of WTC 1 (Smith 2002).
In WTC 2, shaft damage (stair/elevator/ventilation shafts) would also cause smoke to spread upward
through the building. However, in WTC 2 the MER is located below the impact zone. Therefore, smoke
would spread upward via the shafts to floors up to the 91st floor and outward onto those floors. Smoke
would have to spread upward into the building to floors above the 91st floor through the other primary
vertical airflow paths, which in this case were local elevator banks III-C and III-D, as depicted in
Fig. 43.
The relatively few vertical airflow paths between the impact zone in WTC 2 and the uppermost floors of
the building is supported by the length of time conditions remained tenable in some areas of the upper
floors of the building. Numerous occupants of WTC 2 were trapped on the 105th floor of the building.
These people decided not to go down through the smoke in Stair 1, and tried during the initial period after
impact to get to the roof, but found the doors locked. Most people returned to the 105th floor and several
people called family members on their cell phones. One occupant was on the phone with his wife until the
collapse of WTC 2 (Beyler 2002). The experience of occupants on the 105th floor supports the fact that
spaces in the uppermost portion of WTC 2 were tenable for periods as long as 45 min after impact.
7.2.3 Status of Power
An attempt was made to identify the presence of power or lack thereof up to the MER floors serving the
impact zones in WTC 1 and WTC 2, utilizing survivor testimony and transcripts of phone calls made by
people trapped above the impact zone. Little evidence was available regarding the presence of electrical
power, particularly on the upper floors of the buildings. Isolated reports were noted of lights flickering
and going out in the buildings. These accounts also correspond to floors where ceiling collapse and other
Chapter 7
minor structural damage was noted. Therefore, loss of lighting could coincide with local structural
damage rather than being indicative of an overall loss of electrical power.
There were two data points of note identified with regard to loss of power. A phone call recorded by the
Port Authority police desk from the Windows on the World restaurant on the 106th floor of WTC 1
appears to indicate that electrical power and fire phones were out (NYPD 2001). Given the path of aircraft
damage in WTC 1 (Fig. 71) and the relative location of the electrical closets/risers, this may be evidence
of a loss of power to the upper floors of the building due to damage to the electrical risers.
In WTC 2, a survivor noted the presence of power on the 74th floor during his descent from the 84th floor
(Murphy 2002). This observation may be evidence of the presence of power up to the floors of impact in
WTC 2.
Despite the lack of definitive survivor testimony with regard to the presence of electrical power in WTC 1
and WTC 2, the damage estimates in Figs. 71 and 72 support damage to one or more of the electrical
closets/risers in each building. In WTC 1, damage likely occurred to both the north and central electrical
closets/risers. In WTC 2, damage likely occurred to at least the east electrical closet/riser.
7.3 SUMMARY
Examination of the available evidence provides strong indications that the smoke management systems in
WTC 1 and WTC 2 played no role in the events that occurred on September 11, 2001. There is no
evidence to support the fact that an attempt was made to activate the smoke purge sequence. In the chaos
surrounding the events, the focus following the aircraft impacts and preceding the collapse of the
buildings was on rescue operations.
Should a decision have been made to attempt to align the building ventilation systems into the smoke
purge mode, it is doubtful that this would have had any impact on overall smoke conditions within the
building. First, upon arriving at the scene, FDNY personnel had a difficult time determining the exact
floors of impact, especially for WTC 1. Since the WTC 1 impact occurred near the boundary between
ventilation zones at the 91st/92nd floors, and the impact was thought to have originally occurred on floors
somewhere between the 80th and 90th floors (Smith 2002), smoke purge may have been inadvertently
initiated for the 59th through 91st floor HVAC zone in WTC 1.
The aircraft impacts caused significant damage to the core spaces in both WTC 1 and WTC 2, making it
unlikely that the smoke purge could have been accomplished in either building. In WTC 1, it is likely that
the impact eliminated or significantly impaired electrical power on floors above the impact zone.
Therefore, because power would not have been available at the 108th floor MER, serving the zone of
impact, HVAC systems would not have been operational. In addition, the ventilation shafts for at least the
north half of the building were likely damaged, thus reducing the possibility for the smoke purge to
function properly even if the HVAC systems had been operable.
In WTC 2, it is possible that electrical power may have been available to the fans located in the 75th floor
MER, which was located below the impact zone in this building. Survivor testimony indicates that power
may have been available up to the 75th floor. Initially, all fans would have shut down due to detection of
substantial quantities of smoke by the duct smoke detectors. As shown in Fig. 72, the HVAC shafts
utilized to accomplish smoke purging would likely have been damaged on the east side of the building,
eliminating half of the smoke venting capacity for the floor. Even if the ventilation shafts on the west side
of the building remained intact, the performance of the smoke venting system would have been reduced.
This would have had a particularly detrimental impact on WTC 1, where smoke conditions deteriorated in
the uppermost portions of the building at a much faster rate than WTC 2.
7.4 REFERENCES
Beyler, C. L. 2002. Appendix D, Witness Observations Summary. In Analysis of the Fire Aspects of the
World Trade Center Terrorist Attacks: 11 September 2001. Hughes Associates, Inc. Baltimore, MD.
Prepared at the direction of council Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, New York, NY, J uly 31.
Couchon, D. 2001. For many on Sept. 11, survival was no accident. USA Today, December 19.
Murphy, D. E. 2002. September 11: An Oral History. Doubleday. New York, NY, September.
NYPD (New York Police Department). 2001. World Trade Center Channel 09. Police Desk 3541
Center. Police radio transcript, Volume 2. September 11.
Safir. 2002. Expert Report of Howard Safir. Omnicom Group, Inc., New York, NY. Prepared at the
direction of council Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, New York, NY, August 1.
Smith, D. 2002. Report From Ground Zero: The Story of the Rescue Efforts at the World Trade Center.
Viking Penguin. New York, NY.

Chapter 7


Chapter 8
EVALUATION OF POTENTIAL SMOKE MANAGEMENT
SYSTEM EFFECTIVENESS
In the previous chapter it was determined that, based on the available information, the smoke purge
sequence provided for the ventilation systems in World Trade Center (WTC) 1 and WTC 2 was not
initiated during the events occurring on September 11, 2001. It was further concluded that it is highly
probable that the electrical system and heating, ventilating, and air conditioning (HVAC) system
components involved in the smoke purge function were critically damaged. Even if the smoke purge
sequence was initiated, it is unlikely that the smoke purge would have performed as designed.
In order to fully understand the potential impact of smoke management systems for events like those
occurring on September 11, 2001, it is desirable to analyze how various smoke management system
configurations might have performed in WTC 1 and WTC 2, had they been available on September 11.
To develop an understanding of the capabilities of the various smoke management system configurations
that were evaluated it is also important to analyze their performance for other hypothetical fire scenarios
in high-rise buildings, both typical/expected design scenarios and worst case scenarios.
8.1 SMOKE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM APPROACHES
Five distinct smoke management approaches were examined for the WTC towers. These approaches are
as follows:
1. Smoke purge
2. Core pressurization
3. Building pressurization
4. Sandwich pressurization
5. Zoned smoke control with stair pressurization
Four of the five approaches evaluated are smoke management configurations that could have been
achieved using the building HVAC systems as they existed prior to September 11, 2001, with little to no
modification. However, unless automatic activation of a smoke management system was provided, the
HVAC systems would have had to be manually aligned, requiring pre-planning of the sequence of
operation to be used. The fifth approach, zoned smoke control with stair pressurization, is a smoke
management system based on state of the art methods of smoke control practices on September 11. Use of
this approach would have required major renovations to building systems to achieve the desired
performance.
All of the smoke management system approaches modeled assumed that electrical power was available to
operate the necessary HVAC systems. The CONTAM computer program was used to evaluate the
Chapter 8
pressure differentials achieved once the system was aligned per the appropriate sequence of operations.
Because automatic activation of the smoke management system is not standard practice in New York City
(HAI and DCE 1996), it must be recognized that substantial smoke movement may occur prior to manual
system operation, regardless of the smoke management approach adopted for the building.
8.1.1 Smoke Purge
The smoke purge approach is based on the documented smoke purge sequence for WTC 1 and WTC 2 as
it appears in WTC Instruction Manual No. 23, Operation and Maintenance of Fire Protection System,
dated February 1986 (PANYNJ 1986), as discussed in Chapter 6 of this report (see Fig. 61). The
sequence involved placing the interior HVAC zone exhaust fans and core exhaust fans (toilet exhausts,
elevator machine room (EMR) exhausts) in the multi-floor ventilation zone containing the fire in
100 percent exhaust mode. HVAC systems in all other ventilation zones in the buildings were aligned in a
summer normal mode. Perimeter supply fans were shut down. The sequence of operation for the smoke
purge mode is summarized in Table 81.
Table 81. Smoke purge sequence of operations.
Fan Operation Damper Operation
HVAC Zone
Core
Supply
Core
Exhaust
Interior
Supply
Interior
Exhaust
Perimeter
Supply Supply
Exhaust
(Spill) Return
Zone of Fire
Origin
Off On Off On Off 100 %
Open
100 %
Open
Closed
Other Zones Summer
Normal
Summer
Normal
Summer
Normal
Summer
Normal
Summer
Normal
Summer
Normal
Summer
Normal
Summer
Normal
As discussed in Chapter 6, the Port Authority of New York and New J ersey (PANYNJ or Port Authority)
stated that a different smoke purge sequence than that documented in WTC Instruction Manual No. 23
was in place at the time of the events on September 11, 2001. This sequence involved using the interior
supply and return fans serving only one quadrant of a ventilation zone to purge the zone of smoke.
Because the supply and return fans would both be used, this sequence would not be expected to create a
significant pressure differential between the core and perimeter spaces. The purge would not be expected
to greatly improve conditions within the building during the fire event.
Since the success of the smoke management approaches being evaluated is based on the pressurization
method of smoke control, the sequence reported by the Port Authority (see Section 6.1.1) was not
evaluated using the CONTAM model. This sequence, which involves supplying to and exhausting from a
given quadrant at an equal air flow rate, would not be capable of achieving a pressure differential with
respect to adjacent areas of the building.
8.1.2 Core Pressurization
The core pressurization approach is a slight variation of the documented smoke purge sequence for
WTC 1 and WTC 2, in that the supply fans rather than the exhaust fans in the core were activated to
pressurize the core in an effort to limit smoke spread into the core from the surrounding office spaces. As
documented in Chapter 6, accounts of the 1975 fire and other sources cite this variation as being the
Evaluation of Potential Smoke Management System Effectiveness
smoke purge sequence provided for the building. The sequence of operation for the core pressurization
mode is summarized in Table 82.
Table 82. Core pressurization sequence of operations.
HVAC Zone
Core
Supply
Core
Exhaust
Interior
Supply
Interior
Exhaust
Perimeter
Supply Supply
Exhaust
(Spill) Return
Zone of Fire
Origin
On On Off On Off 100 %
Open
100 %
Open
Closed
Other Zones Summer
Normal
Summer
Normal
Summer
Normal
Summer
Normal
Summer
Normal
Summer
Normal
Summer
Normal
Summer
Normal
8.1.3 Building Pressurization
Building pressurization is an approach that was recommended in the 1996 Hughes Associates
Incorporated (HAI)/Dillon Consulting Engineers (DCE) Smoke Management Evaluation Study (HAI and
DCE 1996). This approach was recommended to be used in the event of a severe fire involving a
substantial portion of one floor of the building, where windows were observed to be broken out. The
approach involves turning on the supply fans in the entire building and turning on the exhaust fans only in
the ventilation zone of fire origin. The intent of this approach was to exhaust smoke where possible from
the floor containing the fire, and to induce a substantial airflow toward the floor of fire origin to force
smoke out of the broken windows. The core pressurization approach was not adopted as part of the fire
safety plan for the building subsequent to the 1996 study. The sequence of operation for the building
pressurization mode is summarized in Table 83.
Table 83. Building pressurization sequence of operations.
HVAC Zone
Core
Supply
Core
Return
Interior
Supply
Interior
Return
Perimeter
Supply Supply
Exhaust
(Spill) Return
Zone of Fire
Origin
On On On On Off 100 %
Open
100 %
Open
Closed
Other Zones On Off On Off Off 100 %
Open
100 %
Open
Closed
8.1.4 Sandwich Pressurization
The sandwich pressurization approach was not previously examined for WTC 1 and WTC 2 in any of the
engineering studies reviewed in the preparation of this report. The approach analyzed is not the classic
floor-by-floor sandwich approach, which involves exhausting the floor of fire origin and pressurizing
the floors above and below. The HVAC systems in WTC 1 and WTC 2 were not equipped with operable
fire/smoke dampers; thus, it was not possible to configure the system to exhaust and supply to only single
floors within a ventilation zone. Instead, an approach was examined where the sandwich was achieved by
ventilation zones.
In the event of a fire, the ventilation zone of origin would have all of its exhaust fans turned on, and
supply fans turned off. The ventilation zones above and below would have all supply fans activated and
Chapter 8
exhaust fans turned off. These actions would create a multi-floor sandwich effect in the building, with the
net effect being the creation of a pressure differential between the core and perimeter spaces within the
HVAC zone of fire origin. The sequence of operation for the sandwich pressurization mode is
summarized in Table 84.
Table 84. Sandwich pressurization sequence of operations.
HVAC Zone
Core
Supply
Core
Exhaust
Interior
Supply
Interior
Exhaust
Perimeter
Supply Supply
Exhaust
(Spill) Return
Zone of Fire
Origin
Off On Off On Off 100 %
Open
100 %
Open
Closed
Other Zones On Off On Off Off 100 %
Open
100 %
Open
Closed
8.1.5 Zoned Smoke Control With Stair Pressurization
The final approach analyzed was a hypothetical approach based on best practices in smoke management
system design enforced in many jurisdictions in the United States as of September 11, 2001. It was
assumed that the building was retrofitted with stair pressurization systems, as required for all new high-
rise construction by the major building codes in the United States, and that the HVAC system was
capable of exhausting on a floor by floor basis within the ventilation zone containing the fire to create the
desired pressure differential with respect to the floors above and below. Other ventilation zones were
assumed to operate in the summer normal mode. It was assumed that operable fire/smoke dampers were
also installed in all supply/exhaust ducts at the appropriate shaft connections and that these dampers were
closed within the zone of fire origin. The sequence of operation for the zoned smoke control with stair
pressurization mode is summarized in Table 85.
Table 85. Zoned smoke control with stair pressurization sequence of operations.
HVAC
Zone
Core
Supply
Core
Exhaust
Interior
Supply
Interior
Exhaust
Perimeter
Supply Supply
Exhaust
(Spill) Return
Interior
Return
Shaft
Dampers
Other
HVAC
Shaft
Dampers
Zone
of Fire
Origin
Off Off Off On Off 100 %
Open
100 %
Open
Closed Open
on floor
of fire
origin
Closed
Other
Zones
Summer
Normal
Summer
Normal
Summer
Normal
Summer
Normal
Summer
Normal
Summer
Normal
Summer
Normal
Summer
Normal
Open Open
The capability to provide floor-by-floor exhaust could be achieved in one of two ways. The first option
would be to provide variable speed drives for the interior exhaust zone fans to reduce their flow rate to
provide the desired rate of exhaust from a single floor, with the exhaust dampers on that floor being open.
The constant volume fans installed in the building provided such a high a rate of exhaust that directing all
of the available exhaust from a single floor within the ventilation zone would create high pressure
differentials that could lead to the creation of unacceptable door opening forces. The second option would
be to provide dedicated smoke exhaust fans having the desired flow rates to pressurize a single floor.
8.2 DESIGN FIRE SCENARIOS
Several different design fire scenarios were evaluated for WTC 1 and WTC 2, encompassing the range of
expected fires that could be envisioned within the office spaces of the building. The fire scenarios were
limited to those that could occur on the above-grade office floors of the building. Other possible fire
scenarios could have resulted in smoke migration through the towers due to a fire in the sub-grade areas
or adjacent spaces within the WTC complex. Several of these fire scenarios (i.e., truck dock fire, car fire
in the garage, fire in the concourse) were evaluated in the 1996 HAI/DCE study (HAI and DCE 1996).
Because the focus of this report is on examining the fires that occurred on September 11, 2001 (which
occurred on the uppermost floors of the building) and bounding these events with other comparable fires,
it was desirable to examine only those fire scenarios on the office floors of the building. The design fire
scenarios that were evaluated are as follows:
Sprinklered fire
Full-floor burnout
Two-floor fire
WTC 1 and WTC 2, September 11, 2001, fire scenarios (no shaft damage)
WTC 1 and WTC 2, September 11, 2001, fire scenarios (shaft damage assumed)
8.2.1 Sprinklered Fire
By September 11, 2001, WTC 1 and WTC 2 had been fully retrofitted with a full coverage automatic
sprinkler system on all of the office floors of the buildings. A typical fire in a sprinklered building would
typically involve only a single fuel package, or a small number of adjacent fuel packages and would either
be controlled by the automatic sprinkler system or be extinguished. A simplifying assumption is to
assume that the temperature in the zone of origin never exceeds the operation temperature of the
sprinklers, which had an activation temperature of 165 F (74 C) in WTC 1 and WTC 2 (NFPA 2000b).
Given the large size of the majority of the office spaces in the towers, some of which encompassed an
entire floor, the average temperature throughout the floor would be expected to be less than the assumed
165 F.
The sprinklered fire scenario represents the least challenging fire scenario analyzed for WTC 1 and
WTC 2. As discussed in Sec. 2.1.2, a pressurization smoke management system in a sprinklered building
is only required to provide a design pressure differential of 0.05 in. H
2
O across the smoke zone boundary
due to the reduced temperature of the smoke produced from a sprinklered fire.
8.2.2 Full-Floor Burnout
The full-floor burnout is a design fire scenario for a fire involving the contents of a typical office
building. In a fully-sprinklered building, a full-floor burnout would only be possible in the case of a
catastrophic failure of the sprinkler system, or with a fuel load that exceeds the capacity of the sprinkler
system. The full-floor burnout scenario is essentially the same as the uncontrolled fire scenario
analyzed in the 1996 HAI/DCE study (HAI and DCE 1996). The 1996 report references testing performed
Chapter 8
at the National Research Council Canada (NRCC) which demonstrated that mobile shelving units in an
office building can overtax standard light hazard sprinkler system designs (Lougheed, Mawhinney and
ONeil 1994).
Two prominent examples of office buildings where full-floor burnout on single or multiple office floors
occurred (albeit in non-sprinklered buildings) are the First Interstate Bank fire in Los Angeles
(Nelson 1989) and the One Meridian Place fire in Philadelphia (Klem 1991). In each of these fires most
of the windows broke out on the fully involved fire floor.
The full floor burnout fire scenario evaluated in this report assumed a temperature on the floor of fire
origin of 1,800 F (1,000 C), consistent with the temperature assumed in the 1996 report for fully
involved fires. This fire scenario assumed the break-out of 58 windows on each face (as assumed in the
1996 study) to sustain roughly a 250 MW fire.
8.2.3 Two-Floor Fire
The two-floor fire scenario corresponds to a multi-floor event caused by a small explosion. The purpose
of this fire scenario was to examine smoke management system performance for a multi-floor fire
scenario of far less severity than the aircraft impacts that occurred on September 11, 2001. This scenario
also challenges the typical floor-to-floor separation that exists in building fire scenarios with an intact
floor slab.
The fire scenario assumes that a small explosion has opened up a 100 ft
2
hole in the floor slab at the
midpoint along one of the faces of the building. The explosion does no damage to the core but causes half
the windows on the near face of the building to be blown out by the blast. It is assumed that sprinkler
piping may be damaged, but some sprinklers operate, to reduce the overall temperature on the two open
floors of the building. The average temperature on the two floors is assumed to be identical to that of the
sprinklered fire scenario, 165 F (74 C). Use of this temperature does not represent a worst-case two-
floor scenario. Rather, in contrast to the relatively high temperatures assumed for the multi-floor WTC 1
and WTC 2 aircraft impact fire scenarios (discussed in Secs. 8.2.4 and 8.2.5), the low temperature was
assumed in order to examine the smoke management system effectiveness where the increased exterior
wall leakage and the two-floor fire are the primary challenge to the smoke management system.
A hypothetical fire scenario was envisioned in which the majority of the structural damage occurring on
September 11, 2001 was modeled, but with no damage occurring to the buildings core. This scenario,
although unlikely, was modeled to estimate the performance of the candidate smoke management system
approaches for a scenario involving a multi-floor fire event with high temperatures throughout the fire
compartment and large openings in the exterior of the building.
Assumed)
This design fire scenario was used in an attempt to model smoke management system performance under
the conditions in WTC 1 and WTC 2 on September 11, 2001. Estimates of the size of the exterior
openings after aircraft impact (McAllister 2002), including impact damage and window breakage, were
used, along with the preliminary damage estimates provided by the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) (Appendix A), to model the damage conditions existing within each building. A full
accounting of the opening areas assumed in the models of each building is provided in Appendix B.
Where the extent of damage was unknown, the damage was estimated. The sensitivity of the model was
checked to see how the results would vary for wide variations in the assumed extent of damage. For
example, the size of the hole between floors within the impact zone was difficult to estimate. The models
used a floor opening equal to the footprint of the impact damage depicted in the NIST damage figures, up
to but not including the core. Several model runs were then conducted varying the size of the holes (larger
and smaller by factors of 2) to verify that this variable did not have too great an effect on the pressure
differentials predicted by the model (see Runs 55, 55b, 55cTable 86c). Although the final damage
estimates to the building slabs presented in NIST Special Publication 1000-7 were somewhat less than the
initial estimates (Figs. 71 and 72), this analysis revealed that the resulting pressure differentials were
not overly sensitive to the size of the holes in the slabs.
Several estimates of the temperature within the impact zone in the towers were made, ranging from as low
as 750 F (400 C) in some areas of the impact zone (Beyler 2002) to as high as 1,800 F (1,000 C) in
the hottest areas of the impact zone (McAllister 2002). Both the lower and the higher temperature were
used to model the temperature throughout the impact zone in the model runs (described in Sec. 8.4) in
order to bound the range of expected performance for the candidate smoke management system
approaches. For all cases the outside air temperature was modeled as 70 F (21 C) with the wind out of
the north at 11.2 mph (5 m/s).
8.3 METHODS OF ANALYSIS
All of the smoke management approaches analyzed utilized some variation of the pressurization method
of smoke management, as described in concept in Sec. 2.1.2. The pressurization method is the smoke
management system design method for well-compartmented structures with low-ceiling spaces.
The performance of each of the smoke management approaches, given the postulated design fire
scenarios, was evaluated using the CONTAM building airflow and contaminant dispersal model,
developed by NIST. CONTAM is identified by the American Society of Heating, Refrigerating, and Air-
Conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE), in the ASHRAE Fundamentals Handbook (ASHRAE 2001) and the
ASHRAE text Principles of Smoke Management (Klote and Milke 2002), as well as National Fire
Protection Association (NFPA) standard 92A (NFPA 2000a) as an appropriate tool for the evaluation of
smoke management systems that are based on the pressurization method of smoke management.
Construction of the CONTAM model used in the analysis is discussed in Appendix B of this report.
Calibration of the model is discussed in Appendix C.
Although the CONTAM model used was based on architectural/mechanical drawings of WTC 1, it was
used to evaluate scenarios in both WTC 1 and WTC 2 because the buildings were very similar. None of
the other buildings in the WTC complex were included in the model. The 1996 HAI/DCE study
determined that the buildings interacted due to their connections, with the neutral plane for the complex
being located above all of the other buildings in the complex other than the towers. Therefore, CONTAM
runs that evaluated stack effects on smoke management system performance are only indicative of the
Chapter 8
potential impacts of stack effect on the buildings in isolation, as the impact of the other WTC buildings
was not included in the model.
8.3.1 CONTAM Building Airflow Model
CONTAM 2.1 (Walton and Dols 2003) is the latest, Windows- based version in the CONTAM family of
public domain multi-zone building airflow and contaminant dispersal models developed by NIST.
Version 2.0 (Dols and Walton 2002) was used in this study because for the purposes of this study, the
simulation capabilities are essentially the same.
The program combines state-of-the-art algorithms for modeling airflow and contaminant analysis in
multi-zone buildings. Methods for using CONTAM to evaluate the performance of smoke management
systems are documented in the ASHRAE text Principles of Smoke Management (Klote and Milke 2002)
and in the engineering literature (Ferreira 2002).
CONTAM utilizes a graphic SketchPad interface to create an idealized representation of a building in
terms of zones that are connected by airflow paths. The SketchPad illustrates the connection between
zones, openings between zones (i.e., flow paths), ventilation system components, and contaminant
sources and sinks (which were not used for this study). The SketchPad is used to establish the geometric
relationships of the relevant building features. It is not intended to produce a scale drawing of the
building; rather, it is used to create a simplified model where the walls, zones, and airflow paths are
topologically similar to the actual building (Dols, Walton, and Denton 2000).
CONTAM is capable of modeling wind effects on the building, as well as stack effects caused by
differences between a buildings interior temperature and the exterior temperature. Simplified HVAC
system models and a detailed ductwork sub-model are available to evaluate the effect of HVAC systems
on contaminant spread. The sub-model is capable of modeling re-circulating as well as 100 percent
outdoor air ventilation systems, although in the case of smoke control, re-circulating HVAC systems are
seldom used. The positions of doors and windows as well as HVAC system capacities can be varied over
time using the models schedule feature.
In order to use CONTAM to model smoke flow within a building, a number of limitations must be taken
into account (Ferreira 2002). First, each zone is treated as a well-mixed volume. Temperature or
contaminant stratification within a zone, as would be the case given a hot smoke layer, is not taken into
account. Also, while individual temperatures can be assigned to each zone, a temperature cannot be
assigned to individual contaminants. Thus, the buoyancy-induced flow exhibited by smoke, particularly in
those zones closest to the fire, is not taken into account. CONTAM has been shown to provide relatively
good agreement with empirical data for airflows at or near ambient temperatures (Emmerich 2001).
Validation studies have not been performed to evaluate the use of CONTAM to model buoyant flows.
Because buoyancy-induced flows have the potential to play an important role in smoke spread, the
CONTAM model is best suited for those applications where buoyancy effects are minimized. For
instance, sprinklered buildings are better suited to use of the CONTAM model than are non-sprinklered
buildings. Upon sprinkler activation in the room/zone of fire origin, the sprinkler water spray cools the
hot smoke and stirs the smoke layer, driving some smoke down to the floor level. Although some degree
of stratification does occur, stratification is not nearly as great as with an unsprinklered fire scenario
(Tamura 1994). The mixing that occurs better approximates CONTAMs assumption of a well-mixed
zone, meaning that each zone is characterized by a single temperature, pressure, and contaminant
concentration at any given point in time. However, pressure does vary hydrostatically with elevation
within each zone. The reduced smoke temperature reduces the extent of the buoyancy-induced flow
associated with the smoke.
Buildings that are highly compartmented are also better suited to using CONTAM, particularly those that
are broken up into multiple compartments using smoke barriers. Confining a fire to a specific volume
will aid in the development of a well-mixed volume. Smoke spread across the smoke barriers will be
predominately governed by forces such as wind, stack effect, and HVAC systems operation. Smoke
spread from the confined compartment due to buoyancy can also be better approximated by defining an
elevated smoke temperature in the room/zone of fire origin and using this temperature as the mechanism
for buoyant spread across the compartment boundaries in the model. Once smoke has migrated from the
room of fire origin, it is either cool enough where the buoyant forces are minimized or additional
sprinklers may activate to further aid in the creation of a well-mixed volume in the adjacent spaces.
In buildings that are not sprinklered or where individual zones are connected by large openings, such as
were caused due to the events on September 11, 2001, buoyancy may play a more predominant role in
smoke spread. When used for modeling smoke movement where buoyant flow is expected to be the
predominant factor in the spread of smoke, CONTAM is most appropriately used to examine far-field
conditions. Far-field conditions exist in those areas of a building further from a zone containing a fire,
where cold-smoke conditions prevail. Far-field smoke conditions better approximate the well-mixed zone
volume assumed in the model. Near-field conditions exist in those areas of the building close to the fire,
in which hot-smoke conditions result in buoyancy induced smoke flow.
Figure 81 depicts the problem with using CONTAM where buoyant flow of smoke is expected to be the
primary factor in smoke spread through the building. The right side of Fig. 81 shows buoyant flow
conditions where smoke flows from a fire compartment to another compartment at some level above, via
a vertical shaft. In reality, the temperature of the smoke cools as it rises up the shaft. The temperature
gradient affects the pressure differentials throughout the shaft and, ultimately, between the shaft and the
upper compartment. As shown in Fig. 81, the flow into the upper compartment is a function of T
1

through T
7
. In CONTAM, the temperature of each compartment must be specified by the user. The model
does not perform an energy balance to determine the temperature of the smoke as it moves throughout the
building; thus, temperature is not carried along as a property of the migrating smoke. In the model, then,
the flow into the upper compartment is only a function of the difference between T
0
and T
1
.
In order for smoke movement behavior to be adequately modeled using CONTAM, the near-field
behavior of the smoke must be accounted for using other appropriate tools. Models such as the
Consolidated Fire and Smoke Transport Model (CFAST) developed by NIST can be used to approximate
near-field conditions where buoyancy is a concern (Peacock, J ones and Bukowski 1993). CFAST would
be used to estimate the temperature of intermediate spaces (i.e., T
1
through T
7
in Fig. 81). However,
using CFAST as a basis for selecting inputs into CONTAM compounds the uncertainty related to
combining the models. Further research is needed to quantify the uncertainty and to develop the best
strategies for coupling fire models to CONTAM.
Chapter 8

Figure 81. Modeled versus real flow conditions.
Little information is available regarding the validation of CONTAMs handling of wind. However, any
uncertainty inherent in the model is outweighed by uncertainties in selecting wind coefficients for the
various exterior faces of a building. In the absence of detailed wind tunnel test data for a building, the
coefficients used are at best rough approximations.
8.3.2 System Performance Criteria
The 1996 HAI/DCE smoke management study performed for WTC 1 and WTC 2 (HAI and DCE 1996)
utilized not only pressure differentials, but also smoke tenability (i.e., temperature, visibility, toxicity) as
system performance criteria. In some of the cases modeled in the 1996 study, smoke escaped the floor of
fire origin. As long as the smoke migrating to other areas of the building did not violate pre-defined
tenability criteria, the performance of the system was judged to be a success.
Based on a review of the various issues relating to the use of tenability (dilution) analysis, it was
determined that the performance of the candidate smoke management approaches described in Sec. 8.1
would be evaluated based solely on the ability to provide pressure differentials consistent with the
pressurization method of smoke control (see Sec. 2.1.2). Several concerns were identified related to the
evaluation of whether acceptable tenability was maintained in remote areas of the building using a
particular smoke management system approach.
First, as discussed in Sec. 2.1.2 of this report, use of a smoke management approach based on diluting
smoke to provide a tenable environment is not recommended in the space containing the fire. In spaces
remote from the fire, acceptable dilution of smoke may be achieved if the volume of the remote space is
relatively large or the air change rate in the space is high relative to the amount of smoke migrating from
the fire compartment. Several of the design fire scenarios evaluated, including the WTC 1 and WTC 2
aircraft impact scenarios, involved the creation of large openings that allowed smoke to travel to remote
areas of the building above the impact region; therefore, significant airflow volumes would be necessary
to accomplish dilution.
Establishing meaningful, conservative tenability criteria was also a concern given the large volumes of
smoke migrating through the buildings and the nature of the primary fuel involved in the fire (jet fuel).
Methods for assessing smoke tenability are discussed in the ASHRAE text Principles of Smoke
Management Systems (Klote and Milke 2002) and within various chapters of the Society of Fire
Protection Engineers SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering (Mulholland 2002; Purser 2002).
However, these references do not provide definitive tenability criteria to be used for assessing acceptable
occupant exposure limits. Selection of appropriate tenability criteria is left up to the evaluating engineer,
based on consideration of the fuel(s) involved in the fire and type(s) of occupants within the building.
Furthermore, some tenability criteria such as smoke temperature and toxicity are a function of time of
exposure to the smoke. Methods are available for calculating egress times (Proulx 2002; Nelson and
Mowrer 2002), but calculation of egress time is a function of many factors affecting human behavior in
fire that may introduce uncertainty into this type of calculation.
Finally, as discussed in Sec. 8.3.1, the CONTAM model is not well equipped to handle the modeling of
scenarios where gas temperature is a primary driver of air (smoke) flow. Other methods (i.e., use of fire
models) would be necessary to estimate the effects of buoyancy driven flow within the model. These
methods introduce further uncertainty into the results obtained with the model.
Because of the various uncertainties involved with determining acceptable tenability in remote areas of
WTC 1 and WTC 2 using the CONTAM model, particularly for the aircraft impact scenario, smoke
management system performance was evaluated based on the ability to contain smoke to the compartment
of fire origin using pressure differentials. As discussed in Sec. 2.1.1, the various codes and standards that
reference the use of pressurization smoke control require the provision of 0.05 in. H
2
O (12.5 Pa) pressure
differentials in sprinklered buildings and 0.1 in. H
2
O (25 Pa) in non-sprinklered buildings to contain
smoke. These pressures are measured with a buildings HVAC systems placed in smoke management
mode, without the presence of a fire. The required pressure differentials are high enough to contain heated
smoke were a fire to be present in sprinklered and non-sprinklered occupancies, and are used for design
purposes.
The modeling performed using CONTAM includes the temperature of the fire compartment as a
parameter in the model. Therefore, it is only necessary that the system maintain a positive pressure
differential to contain smoke when the barrier across which the pressure is maintained is fairly tight. For
barriers containing large openings, creation of a positive pressure differential may not be sufficient to
contain smoke. Unless sufficient airflow velocity is applied to hold back the smoke, two-way flow will
occur. Heated smoke will flow from the fire compartment at the uppermost portion of the large opening,
and pressurization air will be introduced into the fire compartment through the lower portion of the large
opening.
A rough approximation of whether pressurization air may be capable of prohibiting passage of smoke
from the fire compartment through a large opening may be obtained using equations pertaining to the
Chapter 8
airflow method of smoke control, discussed in Sec. 2.1.1. As stated in NFPA 92B (2000b), the limiting
airflow velocity for sprinklered spaces is on the order of 300 ft/min (1.5 m/s), while the limiting airflow
velocity for unsprinklered spaces is on the order of 600 ft/min (3 m/s).
8.3.3 Calibration of the Model
As part of the 1996 HAI/DCE study, a model of WTC 1 was constructed using an earlier version of
CONTAM (Walton 1997). This model was used as the baseline to which modifications were made to
perform the current modeling effort documented in this report. As discussed in Appendix B, many
changes to the existing model (hereafter referred to as the 1996 CONTAM model) were necessary to
allow it to be used for the current modeling effort. Many of the changes were made to reflect lessons
learned over the intervening years with regard to use of CONTAM to model the performance of smoke
management systems in high-rise buildings. The 1996 study was one of the earliest uses of CONTAM to
model smoke movement and control in large high-rise buildings.
As part of the 1996 study, calibration measurements were made of actual airflows and pressure
differentials obtained at various locations in WTC 1 for different ventilation modes. At the time, a crude
calibration was performed in order to develop the building model used to perform the analysis in the 1996
study.
For the current modeling effort, the 1996 calibration data was reviewed, and an attempt was made to
calibrate the model to match the data. Appendix C documents the calibration of the model. As discussed
in Appendix C, several uncertainties existed with regard to the accuracy of the reported data, and the
determination of the exact configuration of the building (openings and HVAC system alignment) at the
time the calibration measurements were made.
After extensive effort, it was determined that a single building configuration could not be developed that
conclusively matched the 1996 calibration data. The primary problem was the existence of too many
independent variables (leakage types, wind/weather conditions, HVAC system alignments, design versus
measured supply/return airflows, and unknown architectural changes to individual floor plans) to allow
for a single building model that matched all of the data for the various ventilation modes.
It was determined that in order to accurately represent the uncertainty involved in the type of modeling
being performed, and the potential range of results given this uncertainty, that three separate building
configurations would be carried forth in the modeling. These configurations, described in detail in
Appendix B, are as follows:
Configuration ABest estimate of building parameters (i.e. leakage areas, HVAC system
airflows, etc.), based on available building information.
Configuration BConfiguration A ventilation system parameters changed in order to
better match data from different ventilation modes tested.
Configuration CConfiguration A assumed leakage values changed in order to better
match data from different ventilation modes tested.
8.4 RESULTS OF ANALYSIS
A total of 180 model runs were conducted using CONTAM to evaluate the performance of the candidate
smoke management system approaches for the proposed design fire scenarios. The results of these model
runs are shown in Table 86. The results presented in Table 86 are grouped in banded sets of runs for
each fire scenario. Within each set of runs, each of the three potential building configurations (A, B,
and C) were repeated for each fire scenario.
Tables 86a through 86d show the pressure differential achieved across key vertical and horizontal
leakage paths for given smoke management mode/fire scenario combinations. Positive pressures signify
airflow in a direction outward from the stairs/elevators, to the core, and into the office spaces. Thus,
positive pressures mean desirable system performance with respect to conditions in the core/stairs.
Negative pressures signify airflow in the opposite direction, into the core and into the vertical shafts, and
indicate the probable spread of smoke to other floors of the building.
The fire floor is generally modeled as the 80th floor, which corresponds to a floor of impact in WTC 2 on
September 11, 2001. This floor was selected in order to provide a direct comparison to results obtained
for the WTC 2 September 11 fire scenarios. The ambient temperature modeled was also generally 70 F
(21 C), the reported temperature in New York City on the morning of September 11, 2001
(McAllister 2002). Within each group of modeling runs, building configuration A, B, or C was sometimes
repeated, with the fire floor changed to a lower floor in the building (15th floor) and the ambient
temperature changed to 15 F (-9.5 C). This was done to examine system performance under maximum
stack effect conditions, as 15 F is the design winter temperature for New York City listed in the ASHRAE
Fundamentals Handbook (ASHRAE 2001).
Given the uncertainty associated with the construction of the model, it is not appropriate to examine an
individual data point as an absolute indicator of whether it is possible to maintain the required pressure
differential. Rather, the entire set of data should be reviewed as a whole, as an indicator of whether the
candidate smoke management system would be capable of providing pressure differentials in the desired
range for that fire scenario.
8.4.1 Sprinklered Fire ScenarioResults
The CONTAM modeling results for the sprinklered fire scenario are shown in Table 86a. As previously
stated, the sprinklered fire scenario assumed a temperature of 165 F (74 C) in the zone of fire origin,
which is conservative for a sprinklered fire in a large open plan office space.
The results show that all of the five candidate smoke management approaches evaluated would be capable
of providing at least a positive pressure across the tenant doors on the floor of fire origin. So long as the
doors remained closed, the pressure differential would be sufficient to contain smoke to the office space
on the floor of fire origin.
For some of the smoke management approaches, the pressure differential provided by the system would
decrease for a fire on a lower floor (15th floor) in the event of a design stack effect condition (15 F [-9.5
C]); however, positive pressure could be maintained for building configuration A.
Chapter 8
It is important to note that for all of the approaches except for the zoned smoke control with stair
pressurization, the pressure differentials become negative at one or more of the exit stairways. In each of
the other approaches, the stairways are not pressurized; therefore, air from other portions of the building
pressurizing the core on the fire floor may cause the flow direction to be into one or more stairways on the
fire floor. This means that if smoke should enter the core during the fire, due to a tenant door being
blocked open or some other means, smoke could be forced into the exit stairways.
Stair 3 generally maintains a positive pressure in all of the smoke control modes except for core
pressurization mode under extreme stack effect conditions (Run 8). As seen in Fig. 43, this stair only has
one interruption via a transfer corridor as it rises vertically through the building, as opposed to five
transfer corridors in Stairs 1 and 4 transfer corridors in Stair 2. This lack of interruption allows more
supply air to enter the stair on other floors and effectively pressurize Stair 3 in the various smoke
management modes modeled.
8.4.2 Full-Floor Burnout ScenarioResults
The CONTAM modeling results for the full-floor burnout case are shown in Table 86b. A temperature
of 1,800 F (1,000 C) in the zone of fire origin was assumed for this fire scenario (as in the
1996 HAI/DCE study).
The results show that for the case of a full-floor burnout, the buoyancy driven pressure differentials
overcome the ability of the smoke purge and core pressurization configurations to maintain adequate
pressure differentials (0.05 in. H
2
O [12.5 Pa]). Flow direction is into the core via the tenant doors, and
then into freight elevator 50 and the three exit stairs. This would likely result in smoke spread to other
floors via the stairs/elevator shafts.
For the building pressurization smoke management approach, significant pressure differentials are created
due to the fact that the supply air provided throughout the entire building flows to the fire floor and exits
the building via the windows assumed to be broken out by the fire. For all building configurations, the
simulated pressure differentials across tenant doors and stair doors were well in excess of the 0.36 in. H
2
O
maximum pressure differential that would result in the 30 lb
f
maximum allowable door opening force (for
use in a means of egress) recommended by NFPA 92A (2000a), assuming a 3 ft by 7 ft (0.91 m
by 2.13 m) standard door dimension. This is consistent with observations made during the 1996 study,
which is why one of the recommendations of the 1996 HAI/DCE study was not to use building
pressurization unless it was verified that all occupants had exited the building.
Both the zoned smoke control and sandwich pressurization approaches are successful in maintaining
positive pressures across the tenant doors. The success of both approaches is aided by the ability to
pressurize the core, using stair pressurization in the zoned approach and airflow via the elevator shafts
from other ventilation zones in the building in the sandwich approach. However, as documented by
run 32, the zoned approach is sensitive to stack effect as negative pressures in freight elevator 50, Stair 3,
and other vertical shafts cause the core space to become negatively pressurized, resulting in negative
pressure across the tenant doors.
The zoned smoke control approach involves exhausting the zone of fire origin to create the desired
pressure differentials, which also has the positive result of removing smoke from the zone of fire origin.
While this approach was demonstrated to be successful for the sprinklered fire scenario, where barrier
integrity is expected to be maintained, the ability of this approach to maintain a pressure differential is
greatly impeded when large openings are created in the exterior boundary of the zone, as is the case due
to window break-out in the full-floor fire scenario.
8.4.3 Two-Floor Fire ScenarioResults
The CONTAM modeling results for the two-floor fire case are shown in Table 86b. A temperature of
165 F (74 C) in the zone of fire origin was assumed for this fire scenario. The intent of modeling this
fire scenario was to examine the effect of moderate openings in the exterior of the building, as well as an
increase in the effective volume of the zone of fire origin, due to the postulated opening in the floor slab,
on smoke management system effectiveness.
The results show that the smoke purge and core pressurization configurations were not capable of
maintaining adequate pressures to contain smoke (0.05 in. H
2
O [12.5 Pa]). Flow direction is into the core
via the tenant doors, and then into freight elevator 50 and the three exit stairs. The reversal in flow
direction is caused by the fact that for each approach, the floors in the multi-floor ventilation zone
containing the fire are at a net-negative pressure. The openings created on the two fire floors in the
exterior of the building result in the interior exhaust pulling air directly from the outside. Therefore, the
other non-fire floors within the zone become more negative than the floors of fire origin, resulting in the
flow of air into the vertical shafts and then out onto the other floors within the ventilation zone. This
would result in smoke spread throughout the building.
For the building pressurization smoke management approach, significant pressure differentials are again
created due to the fact that the supply air provided throughout the entire building travels to the fire floor
and is then able to exit the building via the windows broken out by the fire. The pressure differentials
across tenant doors and stair doors are well in excess of the 0.36 in. H
2
O maximum pressure differential
that would result in the 30 lb
f
maximum allowable door opening force, and would be expected to impede
occupant egress from the building.
The zoned smoke control and sandwich pressurization approaches both are successful in maintaining
positive pressures across the tenant doors. As previously stated, the success of both approaches is aided
by the ability to pressurize the core, using stair pressurization in the zoned approach and airflow via the
elevator shafts from other ventilation zones in the sandwich approach. Again, the zoned approach is
sensitive to stack effect as negative pressures in freight elevator 50, Stair 3, and other vertical shafts cause
the core space to become negatively pressurized, resulting in negative pressure across the tenant doors.
Results
Table 86c shows the results for the WTC 1 and WTC 2 fire scenarios that model the extent of damage
due to the aircraft impacts into each building on September 11, 2001. It was assumed that no damage
occured to the core and that the damage to the exterior and floor slabs was consistent with the impact
damage described in Appendixes A and B of this report.
The intent of the no shaft damage simulations was to determine whether a smoke management system
might be effective given a multi-floor fire zone heated to an elevated temperature, but where the integrity
of the core is maintained. It is recognized that maintaining the integrity of the core after an aircraft impact
Chapter 8
into the building would be difficult, regardless of the building materials that were used in constructing the
core. The purpose of this scenario is to evaluate whether core damage would be the primary contributing
factor to the success or failure of a candidate smoke management system approach.
In order to evaluate the results of the September 11, 2001, fire scenarios, it is important to note that the
aircraft impact created a large, multi-floor zone with openings to the outside via damage to the building
envelope and openings to the interior core spaces. The temperature throughout the impact zone is
assumed to be uniform, at either 750 F (400 C) or 1,800 F (1,000 C). The temperature within the
multi-floor zone creates a buoyant airflow due to localized stack effect within the zone caused by the high
temperature. This phenomenon is shown in Fig. 82.

Figure 82. Effect of core pressure on airflows in impact zones.
As shown in Fig. 82, air flows into the impact zone on lower floors and out of the impact zone on higher
floors. Only when the positive pressure in the core is high enough can sufficient pressure be maintained
on all floors of the impact zone.
Columns in Table 86c list the high and low pressures achieved across tenant doors, with the floor the
pressure occurs on listed next to the pressure differential in brackets. Table 86c shows that for the smoke
purge, core pressurization, and zoned smoke control approaches, in both WTC 1 and WTC 2, pressure is
positive (out of the core) on the lower floors of the zone and negative (into the core) on the upper floors
of the impact zones. The core pressurization approach does maintain very low positive pressures for
several model configuration/temperature combinations. However, given that negative pressures occur in
other cases and due to the uncertainty inherent in the model, this smoke management system approach
was determined to be unable to contain smoke to the impact zone on all floors.
The results differ between buildings for the building pressurization and sandwich pressurization
approaches. For WTC 1, positive pressure is maintained on all floors. For WTC 2, adequate pressure is
not maintained for the uppermost floors of the impact zone. The reason for the disparity in results
between the two buildings is the difference in location of the aircraft impacts into the two buildings
relative to the mechanical rooms that served the impact zones. As shown in Fig. 44, the mechanical
equipment room (MER) serving the impact zone was located above the impact zone in WTC 1 and was
located below the impact zone in WTC 2.
Both the building pressurization and sandwich pressurization approaches make use of supply air from the
other ventilation zones as part of each smoke management approach. For the building pressurization
mode, both the supply and exhaust ventilation are operated in the zone of fire origin, but only supply is
operated in the other zones. Since the supply and exhaust ventilation in the zone of fire origin were
assumed to cancel each other out from a pressure standpoint, a higher net positive pressure is achieved
within the building when the uppermost ventilation zone served by the 108th floor MER is the zone of
fire origin.
A similar effect occurs in the sandwich pressurization mode. This approach involves exhausting the
ventilation zone of fire origin and supplying air to the other zones. When large openings are present to the
exterior on the fire floor(s), the exhaust ventilation is able to pull air directly from the outside, and
therefore, does not contribute to the pressure differential across the core/office barrier. Positive pressure
must be achieved from the core relative to the office spaces via supply air coming from the rest of the
building. Again, the building is at a higher net positive pressure when the floors served by the 108th floor
MER are the floors of fire origin; thus, the difference in performance noted between WTC 1 and WTC 2
in Table 86c.
Assumed)Results
Table 86d shows the results for the WTC 1 and WTC 2 fire scenarios that model the extent of damage
due to the aircraft impacts into each building on September 11, 2001, assuming shaft damage occurred, as
postulated. The extent of core/shaft damage is discussed in Sec. 8.2.4 (and Appendixes A and B).
As previously stated, it is important to note from a multi-zone modeling perspective that the aircraft
impact created a large, multi-floor zone with openings to the outside via damage to the exterior wall and
openings to the interior core spaces. As shown in Fig. 82, air flows into the impact zone on lower floors
and out of the impact zone on higher floors. Only when the positive pressure in the core is high enough
can sufficient pressure be maintained on all floors of the impact zone.
In Table 86d, columns list the high and low pressures achieved across tenant doors, with the floor on
which the pressure occurs listed next to the pressure differential in brackets. Table 86d shows that for the
smoke purge, core pressurization, and zoned smoke control approaches, in both WTC 1 and WTC 2,
pressure is positive (out of the core) on the lower floors of the zone and negative (into core) on the upper
floors of the impact zones. These smoke management system approaches fail to contain smoke to the
impact zone on all floors.
As with the results for the undamaged core scenarios discussed in Sec. 8.4.4, the results differ between
buildings for the building pressurization and sandwich pressurization approaches. For WTC 1, positive
core pressure is maintained relative to the office spaces on all floors. For WTC 2, adequate pressure is not
maintained between the core and perimeter office spaces for the uppermost floors of the impact zone. As
Chapter 8
previously discussed, the reason for the disparity in results between the two buildings is the relative
location of the aircraft impacts into the two buildings.
Due to the shaft damage, the positive pressure differentials maintained by the building pressurization and
sandwich pressurization approaches in WTC 1 are very low on the upper floors of the impact zone, less
than 0.01 in. H
2
O (2.5 Pa). Airflows across the large openings in the model were found to be less than
150 ft/min (0.75 m/s) at this low pressure differential. This is far less than the limiting airflow velocity of
600 ft/min (3 m/s) needed to keep smoke from entering the shaft, discussed in Sec. 8.3.2. Therefore,
smoke would be expected to enter the core and migrate to other areas of the building via the damaged
shafts, albeit at a lesser rate than if no smoke management was provided.
8.5 SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS
Five candidate smoke management system approaches were evaluated to determine whether each of these
approaches could provide adequate pressurization to contain smoke to the zone of fire origin for five
postulated fire scenarios.
The smoke purge approach and the core pressurization approach were shown to create adequate pressure
differentials for only the sprinklered fire scenario. Substantial negative pressure differentials, indicating
flow of smoke from the zone of fire origin into the core, occurred for each of the other fire scenarios.
The building pressurization approach created high pressure differentials from the core to the perimeter
office spaces for all fire scenarios except the multi-floor September 11, 2001, aircraft impact scenarios.
Positive pressures were demonstrated for both the undamaged core and shaft damage September 11
openings in ventilation shafts and in the core/office space boundaries resulting from aircraft impact
damage. Use of the building pressurization method could potentially create excessive door opening forces
that could hinder or prohibit the egress of building occupants. The magnitude of the door opening forces
is a function of the fire scenario, size of interior and exterior openings, and location of the floor(s) of fire
origin relative to the location of the MER.
The zoned smoke control with stair pressurization approach was shown to be effective for the sprinklered
fire scenario, the full-floor burnout, and the two-floor fire. For each of these fire scenarios, however, stack
effect was shown to have a substantial impact on the performance of the system, in some cases causing
airflow from the floor of fire origin into the core. Therefore, this approach might not be effective using a
single speed fan, or set airflow quantity. It is likely that fan speed would have to be adjusted based on
differential pressure readings to ensure the success of a smoke management system using this approach.
Because the zoned smoke control method involves exhausting from a single floor of the building, it was
not effective for the multi-floor aircraft impact scenarios. In addition, stair pressurization did not prohibit
smoke spread into the stairs when large openings in the stairway walls were present due to aircraft impact
damage.
The sandwich pressurization approach was determined to be effective for the sprinklered fire, full-floor
burnout, and two-floor fire scenarios, even in the presence of stack effect. Positive pressures were
demonstrated in the model scenarios for both the undamaged core and shaft damage September 11
openings into ventilation shafts or the core resulting from aircraft impact damage.

E
v
a
l
u
a
t
i
o
n

o
f

P
o
t
e
n
t
i
a
l

S
m
o
k
e

M
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t

S
y
s
t
e
m

E
f
f
e
c
t
i
v
e
n
e
s
s
N
I
S
T

N
C
S
T
A
R

1
-
4
D
,

W
T
C

I
n
v
e
s
t
i
g
a
t
i
o
n

1
0
1
Table 86a. CONTAM modeling results, sprinklered fire scenario.
Tenant
Doors
Elevator 50 Stair 1 Stair 2 Stair 3
1 A 0.036 0.185 0.021 -0.007 0.095
2 B 0.023 0.092 0.006 -0.011 0.042
3 C 0.024 0.068 0.002 -0.007 0.035
4 A 15 15 F [-9.5 C] 0.018 -0.018 0.036 0.038 0.007
5 A 0.054 0.142 0.010 -0.018 0.068
6 B 0.031 0.071 0.001 -0.016 0.029
7 C 0.031 0.052 -0.002 -0.012 0.023
8 A 15 15 F [-9.5 C] 0.025 -0.041 0.019 0.021 -0.003
9 A 0.018 0.031 -0.023 -0.025 0.034
10 B 0.017 0.006 -0.015 -0.017 0.014
11 C 0.018 0.011 -0.021 -0.019 0.015
12 A 15 15 F [-9.5 C] 0.016 0.027 -0.043 -0.030 0.028
13 A 0.069 0.051 0.138 0.129 0.155
14 B 0.067 0.049 0.137 0.128 0.149
15 C 0.065 0.038 0.123 0.130 0.137
16 A 15 15 F [-9.5 C] 0.023 -0.069 0.167 0.167 0.083
145 A 0.075 0.361 0.030 -0.010 0.286
146 B 0.042 0.182 0.011 -0.016 0.143
147 C 0.044 0.152 -0.001 -0.012 0.129
148 A 15 15 F [-9.5 C] 0.081 0.311 0.032 0.042 0.217
70 F [21 C]
70 F [21 C]
70 F [21 C]
80
80
165 F [74 C] Sprinklered Fire
"Sandwich" Pressurization
Zoned Smoke Control w/
Stair Pressurization
80
Building Pressurization
Core Pressurization
Temperature in
Zone of Origin
Ambient
Temperature
Building
Configuration
(A/B/C)
80
80 70 F [21 C]
Run # Design Fire
Smoke Management
Approach
70 F [21 C]
Simulated Pressure Differentials (in. H
2
0)
Fire Floor
Smoke Purge

C
h
a
p
t
e
r

8

1
0
2

N
I
S
T

N
C
S
T
A
R

1
-
4
D
,

W
T
C

I
n
v
e
s
t
i
g
a
t
i
o
n
Table 86b. CONTAM modeling results, full-floor burnout and two-floor fire scenario.
Tenant
Doors
17 A -0.408 0.024 -0.158 -0.190 -0.097
18 B -0.256 -0.006 -0.099 -0.114 -0.068
19 C -0.213 -0.018 -0.097 -0.112 -0.075
20 A 15 15 F [-9.5 C] -0.560 -0.151 -0.085 -0.083 -0.118
21 A -0.269 -0.022 -0.158 -0.187 -0.112
22 B -0.177 -0.028 -0.098 -0.113 -0.074
23 C -0.139 -0.037 -0.096 -0.109 -0.079
24 A 15 15 F [-9.5 C] -0.427 -0.198 -0.121 -0.121 -0.147
25 A 0.423 0.629 0.420 0.417 0.575
26 B 0.240 0.300 0.197 0.196 0.278
27 C 0.301 0.402 0.237 0.245 0.352
28 A 15 15 F [-9.5 C] 0.326 0.423 0.342 0.348 0.415
29 A 0.067 -0.004 0.059 0.051 0.066
30 B 0.048 -0.010 0.058 0.050 0.059
31 C 0.059 -0.004 0.053 0.060 0.054
32 A 15 15 F [-9.5 C] -0.046 -0.176 0.070 0.070 -0.012
149 A 0.062 0.301 -0.062 -0.104 0.174
150 B 0.039 0.147 -0.051 -0.081 0.070
151 C 0.083 0.131 -0.042 -0.053 0.083
152 A 15 15 F [-9.5 C] 0.117 0.299 0.020 0.030 0.205
33 A -0.229 -0.073 -0.190 -0.233 -0.160
34 B -0.144 -0.065 -0.119 -0.143 -0.108
35 C -0.117 -0.068 -0.108 -0.132 -0.107
36 A 15-16 15 F [-9.5 C] -0.323 -0.287 -0.196 -0.196 -0.239
37 A -0.135 -0.028 -0.164 -0.197 -0.141
38 B -0.088 -0.033 -0.114 -0.133 -0.105
39 C -0.063 -0.027 -0.101 -0.119 -0.101
40 A 15-16 15 F [-9.5 C] -0.227 -0.309 -0.209 -0.208 -0.242
41 A 0.356 0.374 0.354 0.321 0.572
42 B 0.186 0.186 0.173 0.158 0.289
43 C 0.237 0.204 0.201 0.193 0.358
44 A 15-16 15 F [-9.5 C] 0.272 0.437 0.350 0.355 0.424
45 A 0.027 0.011 0.075 0.066 0.087
46 B 0.020 0.003 0.068 0.060 0.073
47 C 0.024 0.006 0.066 0.073 0.071
48 A 15-16 15 F [-9.5 C] -0.028 -0.019 0.057 0.057 -0.024
153 A 0.020 0.314 -0.004 -0.043 0.220
154 B 0.016 0.150 -0.015 -0.046 0.095
155 C 0.037 0.146 -0.004 -0.014 0.120
156 A 15-16 15 F [-9.5 C] 0.088 0.318 0.036 0.046 0.224
70 F [21 C]
70 F [21 C]
70 F [21 C]
70 F [21 C]
70 F [21 C]
80
70 F [21 C] Zoned Smoke Control w/
Zoned Smoke Control w/
70 F [21 C]
Temperature in
Zone of Origin
Ambient
Temperature
Building Pressurization 1800 F [1000 C]
80
80
Run # Design Fire
Smoke Management
Approach
Building
Configuration
(A/B/C)
Two-Floor Fire
Smoke Purge
2
0)
Fire Floor(s)
Core Pressurization
Building Pressurization
Smoke Purge
Full-Floor Burnout
Core Pressurization
80
70 F [21 C]
80 70 F [21 C]
70 F [21 C]
165 F [74 C]
80-81
80-81
80-81
80-81
80-81

E
v
a
l
u
a
t
i
o
n

o
f

P
o
t
e
n
t
i
a
l

S
m
o
k
e

M
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t

S
y
s
t
e
m

E
f
f
e
c
t
i
v
e
n
e
s
s
N
I
S
T

N
C
S
T
A
R

1
-
4
D
,

W
T
C

I
n
v
e
s
t
i
g
a
t
i
o
n

1
0
3
Table 86c. CONTAM modeling results, WTC 1 and WTC 2 (no shaft damage) fire scenarios.
High [Floor] Low [Floor]
49 A 750 F [400 C] 0.020 [92] -0.015 [98] 0.012 -0.056 -0.009 -0.014
50 A 1800 F [1000 C] 0.015 [92] -0.034 [98] 0.010 -0.057 -0.014 -0.019
51 B 750 F [400 C] 0.023 [92] -0.017 [98] -0.004 -0.042 -0.018 -0.019
52 B 1800 F [1000 C] 0.021 [92] -0.025 [98] 0.000 -0.040 -0.014 -0.015
53 C 750 F [400 C] 0.031 [92] -0.004 [98] -0.004 -0.043 -0.025 -0.025
54 C 1800 F [1000 C] 0.031 [92] -0.011 [98] -0.002 -0.043 -0.023 -0.023
55 0.046 [92] 0.007 [98] -0.001 -0.051 -0.019 -0.021
55b 0.040 [92] 0.008 [98] -0.002 -0.053 -0.021 -0.024
55c 0.061 [92] -0.004 [96] 0.000 -0.050 -0.019 -0.022
56 A 1800 F [1000 C] 0.048 [92] 0.005 [98] 0.001 -0.051 -0.017 -0.019
57 B 750 F [400 C] 0.040 [92] 0.006 [98] -0.007 -0.038 -0.020 -0.020
58 B 1800 F [1000 C] 0.042 [92] 0.003 [98] -0.004 -0.037 -0.016 -0.017
59 C 750 F [400 C] 0.048 [92] 0.018 [98] -0.008 -0.042 -0.027 -0.027
60 C 1800 F [1000 C] 0.051 [92] 0.016 [98] -0.006 -0.040 -0.024 -0.025
61 A 750 F [400 C] 0.351 [92] 0.252 [98] 0.583 0.490 0.751 0.666
62 A 1800 F [1000 C] 0.367 [92] 0.268 [98] 0.577 0.483 0.742 0.658
63 B 750 F [400 C] 0.202 [92] 0.146 [98] 0.282 0.221 0.358 0.319
64 B 1800 F [1000 C] 0.217 [92] 0.163 [98] 0.277 0.214 0.350 0.311
65 C 750 F [400 C] 0.233 [92] 0.172 [98] 0.305 0.315 0.425 0.414
66 C 1800 F [1000 C] 0.243 [92] 0.190 [98] 0.300 0.307 0.416 0.405
67 A 750 F [400 C] 0.064 [92] 0.041 [98] -0.003 0.108 0.059 0.056
68 A 1800 F [1000 C] 0.083 [92] 0.048 [98] -0.004 0.107 0.057 0.055
69 B 750 F [400 C] 0.064 [92] 0.041 [98] -0.003 0.108 0.058 0.055
70 B 1800 F [1000 C] 0.083 [92] 0.048 [98] -0.004 0.107 0.057 0.055
71 C 750 F [400 C] 0.064 [92] 0.044 [98] -0.007 0.106 0.056 0.045
72 C 1800 F [1000 C] 0.082 [92] 0.051 [98] -0.008 0.105 0.054 0.043
157 A 750 F [400 C] 0.213 [92] 0.132 [98] 0.602 0.185 0.653 0.486
158 A 1800 F [1000 C] 0.227 [92] 0.149 [98] 0.596 0.178 0.644 0.479
159 B 750 F [400 C] 0.132 [92] 0.085 [98] 0.292 0.071 0.311 0.231
160 B 1800 F [1000 C] 0.147 [92] 0.102 [98] 0.286 0.063 0.301 0.223
161 C 750 F [400 C] 0.163 [92] 0.112 [98] 0.299 0.111 0.320 0.278
162 C 1800 F [1000 C] 0.179 [92] 0.130 [98] 0.294 0.103 0.311 0.270
97 A 750 F [400 C] 0.059 [77] -0.137 [84] -0.007 -0.005 -0.009 -0.029
98 A 1800 F [1000 C] 0.083 [77] -0.201 [84] 0.001 -0.003 -0.010 -0.019
99 B 750 F [400 C] 0.075 [77] -0.139 [84] -0.010 -0.008 -0.014 -0.027
100 B 1800 F [1000 C] 0.109 [77] -0.213 [84] -0.002 -0.007 -0.017 -0.019
101 C 750 F [400 C] 0.083 [77] -0.076 [84] -0.011 -0.005 -0.013 -0.032
102 C 1800 F [1000 C] 0.116 [77] -0.123 [84] -0.005 -0.004 -0.016 -0.025
103 A 750 F [400 C] 0.084 [77] -0.110 [84] -0.020 -0.023 -0.028 -0.045
104 A 1800 F [1000 C] 0.115 [77] -0.179 [84] -0.010 -0.021 -0.029 -0.036
105 B 750 F [400 C] 0.102 [77] -0.101 [84] -0.019 -0.022 -0.027 -0.039
106 B 1800 F [1000 C] 0.139 [77] -0.167 [84] -0.011 -0.019 -0.029 -0.031
107 C 750 F [400 C] 0.110 [77] -0.068 [84] -0.017 -0.019 -0.027 -0.039
108 C 1800 F [1000 C] 0.146 [77] -0.121 [84] -0.012 -0.018 -0.029 -0.033
109 A 750 F [400 C] 0.391 [77] -0.014 [79] 0.387 -0.039 -0.080 0.433
110 A 1800 F [1000 C] 0.432 [77] -0.012 [79] 0.380 -0.049 -0.080 0.432
111 B 750 F [400 C] 0.278 [77] -0.016 [79] 0.190 -0.042 -0.067 0.220
112 B 1800 F [1000 C] 0.321 [77] -0.015 [79] 0.184 -0.049 -0.075 0.226
113 C 750 F [400 C] 0.301 [77] -0.011 [79] 0.197 -0.074 -0.081 0.251
114 C 1800 F [1000 C] 0.341 [77] -0.009 [79] 0.194 -0.081 -0.085 0.261
115 A 750 F [400 C] 0.156 [77] -0.022 [78] 0.005 0.049 0.048 0.075
116 A 1800 F [1000 C] 0.195 [77] -0.055 [84] 0.000 0.050 0.050 0.068
117 B 750 F [400 C] 0.150 [77] -0.023 [78] -0.002 0.051 0.050 0.066
118 B 1800 F [1000 C] 0.188 [77] -0.065 [84] -0.003 0.057 0.056 0.065
119 C 750 F [400 C] 0.148 [77] -0.018 [78] 0.000 0.046 0.049 0.063
120 C 1800 F [1000 C] 0.184 [77] -0.049 [84] -0.002 0.051 0.054 0.060
169 A 750 F [400 C] 0.218 [77] -0.017 [84] 0.300 -0.007 -0.033 0.234
170 A 1800 F [1000 C] 0.263 [77] -0.072 [84] 0.294 -0.008 -0.046 0.227
171 B 750 F [400 C] 0.190 [77] -0.057 [84] 0.141 -0.014 -0.042 0.114
172 B 1800 F [1000 C] 0.231 [77] -0.129 [84] 0.135 -0.026 -0.059 0.102
173 C 750 F [400 C] 0.202 [77] -0.015 [79] 0.138 -0.025 -0.043 0.129
174 C 1800 F [1000 C] 0.241 [77] -0.056 [84] 0.134 -0.031 -0.053 0.126
70 F [21 C]
70 F [21 C]
70 F [21 C]
70 F [21 C]
Ambient
Temperature Stair 2
2
0)
Stair 3
Run # Design Fire
Smoke
Management
Approach
Building
Configuration
(A/B/C)
WTC 1 Fire Scenario
(No Shaft Damage
Assumed)
92-98 [95]
Zoned Smoke
Control w/ Stair
Pressurization
Smoke Purge
Core Pressurization
Building
Pressurization
A
WTC 2 Fire Scenario
(No Shaft Damage
Assumed)
77-84 [80] 70 F [21 C]
70 F [21 C]
Zoned Smoke
Control w/ Stair
Pressurization
70 F [21 C] Core Pressurization
Building
Pressurization
70 F [21 C] Smoke Purge
"Sandwich"
Pressurization
70 F [21 C]
Elevator 50 Stair 1
Tenant Doors, P
"Sandwich"
Pressurization
Fire Floor(s)
[reported floor]
750 F [400 C]
Temperature in
Zone of Origin
70 F [21 C]

C
h
a
p
t
e
r

8

1
0
4

N
I
S
T

N
C
S
T
A
R

1
-
4
D
,

W
T
C

I
n
v
e
s
t
i
g
a
t
i
o
n
Table 86d. CONTAM modeling results, WTC 1 and WTC 2 (with shaft damage) fire scenarios.
High [Floor] Low [Floor]
73 A 750 F [400 C] 0.044 [92] -0.005 [96] 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000
74 A 1800 F [1000 C] 0.047 [92] -0.006 [96] 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001
75 B 750 F [400 C] 0.048 [92] -0.006 [96] -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
76 B 1800 F [1000 C] 0.052 [92] -0.008 [96] -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001
77 C 750 F [400 C] 0.052 [92] -0.006 [96] -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
78 C 1800 F [1000 C] 0.059 [92] -0.008 [96] -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001
79 A 750 F [400 C] 0.057 [92] -0.004 [96] 0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000
80 A 1800 F [1000 C] 0.065 [92] -0.005 [96] -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001
81 B 750 F [400 C] 0.056 [92] -0.005 [96] -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
82 B 1800 F [1000 C] 0.063 [92] -0.006 [96] -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
83 C 750 F [400 C] 0.058 [92] -0.005 [96] 0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000
84 C 1800 F [1000 C] 0.066 [92] -0.006 [96] -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001
85 A 750 F [400 C] 0.129 [92] 0.006 [94] 0.014 -0.003 0.001 0.004
86 A 1800 F [1000 C] 0.157 [92] 0.014 [94] 0.014 -0.006 0.000 0.004
87 B 750 F [400 C] 0.093 [92] 0.003 [94] 0.007 -0.002 0.000 0.002
88 B 1800 F [1000 C] 0.114 [92] 0.007 [94] 0.007 -0.004 0.000 0.003
89 C 750 F [400 C] 0.106 [92] 0.006 [94] 0.015 -0.002 0.001 0.004
90 C 1800 F [1000 C] 0.131 [92] 0.015 [94] 0.014 -0.005 0.000 0.004
91 A 750 F [400 C] 0.062 [92] 0.000 [96] 0.002 -0.001 0.000 0.002
92 A 1800 F [1000 C] 0.081 [92] 0.000 [96] 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.001
93 B 750 F [400 C] 0.061 [92] -0.002 [96] 0.002 -0.001 0.000 0.001
94 B 1800 F [1000 C] 0.077 [92] -0.002 [96] 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.001
95 C 750 F [400 C] 0.062 [92] -0.001 [96] 0.002 -0.001 0.000 0.002
96 C 1800 F [1000 C] 0.080 [92] 0.000 [96] 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.001
163 A 750 F [400 C] 0.091 [92] 0.004 [94] 0.011 -0.003 0.001 0.003
164 A 1800 F [1000 C] 0.112 [92] 0.010 [94] 0.011 -0.005 0.000 0.004
165 B 750 F [400 C] 0.073 [92] 0.002 [94] 0.006 -0.002 0.000 0.002
166 B 1800 F [1000 C] 0.092 [92] 0.005 [94] 0.006 -0.004 0.000 0.002
167 C 750 F [400 C] 0.084 [92] 0.004 [94] 0.012 -0.002 0.000 0.003
168 C 1800 F [1000 C] 0.105 [92] 0.010 [94 0.011 -0.005 0.000 0.003
121 A 750 F [400 C] 0.090 [77] -0.097 [84] -0.042 -0.040 0.020 0.026
122 A 1800 F [1000 C] 0.125 [77] -0.139 [84] -0.041 -0.062 0.026 0.035
123 B 750 F [400 C] 0.110 [77] -0.088 [84] -0.027 -0.028 0.020 0.026
124 B 1800 F [1000 C] 0.155 [77] -0.133 [84] -0.025 -0.047 0.024 0.036
125 C 750 F [400 C] 0.114 [77] -0.060 [84] -0.016 -0.013 0.022 0.026
126 C 1800 F [1000 C] 0.154 [77] -0.101 [84] -0.014 -0.029 0.028 0.035
127 A 750 F [400 C] 0.122 [77] -0.065 [84] -0.025 -0.031 0.012 0.019
128 A 1800 F [1000 C] 0.163 [77] -0.110 [84] -0.025 -0.051 0.013 0.026
129 B 750 F [400 C] 0.137 [77] -0.063 [84] -0.016 -0.021 0.012 0.019
130 B 1800 F [1000 C] 0.182 [77] -0.110 [84] -0.014 -0.038 0.013 0.027
131 C 750 F [400 C] 0.136 [77] -0.039 [84] -0.007 -0.008 0.013 0.019
132 C 1800 F [1000 C] 0.179 [77] -0.075 [84] -0.006 -0.023 0.015 0.026
133 A 750 F [400 C] 0.184 [77] -0.014 [84] 0.608 0.031 -0.008 0.039
134 A 1800 F [1000 C] 0.231 [77] -0.060 [84] 0.588 0.021 -0.017 0.049
135 B 750 F [400 C] 0.165 [77] -0.044 [84] 0.313 0.027 0.003 0.035
136 B 1800 F [1000 C] 0.209 [77] -0.106 [84] 0.300 0.018 -0.001 0.045
137 C 750 F [400 C] 0.176 [77] -0.019 [84] 0.345 0.010 -0.014 0.038
138 C 1800 F [1000 C] 0.220 [77] -0.070 [84] 0.327 0.000 -0.022 0.047
139 A 750 F [400 C] 0.137 [77] -0.032 [84] 0.033 0.090 0.015 0.032
140 A 1800 F [1000 C] 0.180 [77] -0.072 [84] 0.032 0.097 0.017 0.043
141 B 750 F [400 C] 0.136 [77] -0.033 [84] 0.025 0.090 0.016 0.032
142 B 1800 F [1000 C] 0.178 [77] -0.075 [84] 0.025 0.097 0.019 0.042
143 C 750 F [400 C] 0.135 [77] -0.024 [84] 0.024 0.090 0.015 0.033
144 C 1800 F [1000 C] 0.175 [77] -0.060 [84] 0.022 0.098 0.019 0.043
175 A 750 F [400 C] 0.153 [77] -0.097 [84] 0.339 0.027 0.009 0.034
176 A 1800 F [1000 C] 0.198 [77] -0.169 [84] 0.331 0.019 0.005 0.045
177 B 750 F [400 C] 0.151 [77] -0.108 [84] 0.172 0.014 0.013 0.032
178 B 1800 F [1000 C] 0.196 [77] -0.182 [84] 0.165 0.005 0.011 0.043
179 C 750 F [400 C] 0.156 [77] -0.068 [84] 0.192 0.017 0.006 0.034
180 C 1800 F [1000 C] 0.198 [77] -0.126 [84] 0.183 0.008 0.003 0.044
"Sandwich"
Pressurization
70 F [21 C]
WTC 2 Fire Scenario
(Shaft Damage
Assumed)
77-84 [80]
Zoned Smoke
Control w/ Stair
Pressurization
Smoke Purge
70 F [21 C]
70 F [21 C]
Run # Design Fire
Smoke
Management
Approach
Building
Configuration
(A/B/C)
Core
Pressurization
Building
Pressurization
Temperature in
Zone of Origin
Ambient
Temperature
Fire Floor(s)
[reported floor]
70 F [21 C]
70 F [21 C]
"Sandwich"
Pressurization
70 F [21 C]
WTC 1 Fire Scenario
(Shaft Damage
Assumed)
92-98 [95] 70 F [21 C]
70 F [21 C]
Zoned Smoke
Control w/ Stair
Pressurization
Building
Pressurization
Smoke Purge
Core
Pressurization
70 F [21 C]
70 F [21 C]
Tenant Doors, P
Simulated Pressure Differentials (in. H2 0)

8.6 REFERENCES
ASHRAE (American Society of Heating, Refrigeration and Air-Conditioning Engineers). 2001. ASHRAE
Fundamentals Handbook. ASHRAE, Atlanta, GA.
Beyler, C. L. 2002. Analysis of the Fire Aspects of the World Trade Center Terrorist Attacks:
11 September 2001. Hughes Associates, Inc. Baltimore, MD. Prepared at the direction of council
Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, New York, NY, J uly 31.
Dols, W. S., G. N. Walton, and K. R. Denton. 2000. CONTAMW 1.0 User Manual: Multizone Wirflow
and Contaminant Transport Analysis Software. NISTIR 6476 (National Institute of Science and
Technology-Interagency Report). U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington, DC.
Dols, W. S., and G. N. Walton. 2002. CONTAM 2.0 User Manual: Multizone airflow and contaminant
transport analysis software. NISTIR 6921 (National Institute of Science and Technology-Interagency
Report). U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington, DC.
Emmerich, S. J . 2001. Validation of multizone IAQ modeling of residential-scale buildings: A review.
ASHRAE Transactions. Vol. 107, Part 2. American Society of Heating Refrigeration and
Air-Conditioning Engineers, Atlanta, GA, 2001.
Ferreira, M. J. 2002. Use of multi-zone modeling for high-rise smoke control system design. ASHRAE
Transactions. Vol. 108, Part 2. American Society of Heating, Refrigeration and Air-conditioning
Engineers, Atlanta, GA.
Klem, T. J . 1991. Preliminary Investigative Report: One Meridian Plaza, Philadelphia, PA, February 23,
1991, Three Firefighter Fatalities. NFPA (National Fire Protection Association), Quincy, MA.
Klote, J . H., and J . A. Milke. 2002. Principles of Smoke Management. American Society of Heating
Refrigeration and Air-conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE). Atlanta, GA.
Lougheed, G. D., J . R. Mawhinney, and J . ONeill. 1994. Full-scale fire tests and the development of
design criteria for sprinkler protection of mobile shelving units. Fire Technology. Vol. 30.
Mulholland, G. W. 2002. Smoke Production and Properties. SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection
Engineering. 3rd Edition. Chapter 13, Section 2. DiNenno, P. J ., Drysdale, D., Beyler, C. L. Walton,
W. D., eds.. NFPA (National Fire Protection Association), Quincy, MA.
Chapter 8
Nelson, H. E. 1989. An Engineering View of the Fire of May 4, 1988 in the First Interstate Bank Building
Los Angeles, California. NISTIR 89-4061 (National Institute of Standards and Technology-
Interagency Report). U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Washington, DC, March.
Nelson, H. E., and F. W. Mowrer. 2002. Emergency Movement. The SFPE (Society of Fire Protection
Engineers) Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering, 3rd Ed. DiNenno, P. J ., Drysdale, D., Beyler,
C. L. Walton, W. D., eds. National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, MA.
NFPA (National Fire Protection Association). 2000a. Recommended Practice for Smoke-Control
NFPA (National Fire Protection Association). 2000b. Guide for Smoke Management Systems in Malls,
Atria, and Large Areas. NFPA 92B, Quincy, MA.
PANYNJ (Port Authority of New York and New J ersey). 1986. World Trade Center Instruction Manual
No. 23: Operation & Maintenance of Fire Protection System. New York, NY, February.
Peacock, R. D., W. W. J ones, and R. W. Bukowski. 1993. Verification of a Model of Fire and Smoke
Transport. Fire Safety Journal. Vol. 21, No. 2.
Proulx, G. 2002. Movement of People: The evacuation timing. The SFPE (Society of Fire Protection
Purser, D. A. 2002. Toxicity Assessment of Combustion Products. The SFPE (Society of Fire Protection
Tamura, G. T. 1994. Smoke movement and control in high rise buildings. National Fire Protection
Agency, Quincy, MA.
Walton, G. N. 1997. CONTAM96: User Manual. NISTIR 6056 (National Institute of Science and
Technology-Interagency Report). U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington, DC, September.
Walton, G. N., and W. S. Dols. 2003. CONTAM 2.1 Supplemental User Guide and Program
Documentation. NISTIR 7049 (National Institute of Science and Technology-Interagency Report).
U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington, DC.

Chapter 9
SUMMARY
The objective of this effort was to evaluate the design, installation, and performance of the smoke
management systems installed in World Trade Center (WTC) 1, 2, and 7. The National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) documented the design and installation of the smoke management
systems in WTC 1, 2, and 7 and compared the systems to requirements in applicable codes and standards.
The effort also included the documentation of the normal operation of fully functional smoke
management systems on smoke conditions in WTC 1 and WTC 2 on September 11, 2001.
In order to complete Tasks 1 and 2, it was necessary to answer several questions to fully understand the
potential impact of smoke management systems on the events occurring on September 11, 2001:
Were other smoke management system design approaches available for WTC 1 and WTC 2
that might have had a substantial impact on smoke conditions in the buildings on
September 11, 2001?
Is it reasonable to expect that an alternate smoke management system configuration could
have been provided for WTC 1 and WTC 2 given the prevailing codes and standards and
building practices in the United States?
What factors could have contributed to the success or failure of a smoke management system
given the aircraft impact scenarios that occurred on September 11, 2001?
9.1 EVALUATION OF SMOKE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS AVAILABLE ON
SEPTEMBER 11, 2001
WTC 1 and WTC 2 were provided with a manual smoke purge system that was capable of exhausting
smoke by quadrant for a multi-floor heating, ventilating, and air conditioning (HVAC) zone. WTC 1 and
WTC 2 were designed to meet the requirements contained in the 1968 Building Code of the City of New
York (BCNYC). Changes were made to the buildings to meet the retroactive provisions of various local
laws enacted subsequent to the time of building construction. Local Law No. 5, enacted in 1973, required
retroactive provision of a smoke shaft for smoke venting or stair pressurization in high-rise building.
Local Law No. 86, enacted in 1979, later omitted these requirements for existing buildings provided with
automatic sprinklers throughout. The Port Authority of New York and New J ersey (PANYNJ or Port
Authority) initially investigated the provision of stair pressurization in a pilot study conducted in WTC 1
over a period of time between 1976 and 1979. This approach was not implemented because a program for
retrofitting the buildings with automatic sprinklers was adopted. WTC 1 and WTC 2 were also equipped
with fire dampers in HVAC ductwork at the shaft walls on each floor. No requirement existed for
retroactive provision of fire/smoke dampers in the buildings.
Documentation of the sequence of operations pertaining to smoke purge in WTC 1 and WTC 2 differed in
the available sources consulted in the preparation of this report. Building operations and maintenance
Chapter 9
manuals, not updated since 1986, referred to a smoke purge mode as exhausting the HVAC zone
containing the fire using the interior zone exhaust fans. No supply ventilation fans were referenced in the
documented sequence. Port Authority personnel noted that the current sequence of operations in place on
September 11, 2001, involved using both the interior supply and exhaust serving one of the four interior
sub-zones to purge the zone of smoke. The New York City Fire Department (FDNY) had the potential to
utilize additional fans as they saw fit to respond to the conditions of a particular fire event.
The smoke purge system for WTC 1 and WTC 2 were designed to be used for post-fire cleanup of smoke,
although smoke purge was shown to have been used during a fire occurring in 1975 in WTC 1 during a
fire event in an effort to control smoke spread. Smoke purge was initiated by the FDNY, but operated by
building operations and maintenance personnel.
From an examination of the available evidence, it was determined that the smoke management (smoke
purge) systems in WTC 1 and WTC 2 played no role in the events that occurred on September 11, 2001.
No record was found of the smoke purge sequence being initiated in WTC 1 or WTC 2 by the FDNY or
building operations and maintenance personnel. Had an attempt been made to initiate the smoke purge
sequence it is unlikely the system would have functioned as designed, due to loss of electrical power
and/or damage to the HVAC shafts and other structural elements in the impact zone. Even if the systems
were in some way fully functional, they would not be capable of substantially reducing the extent of
smoke spread through the building, as demonstrated by the analysis performed within this study.
WTC 7 was provided with a zoned smoke management system that was capable of exhausting smoke
manually on a floor-by-floor basis. Local Law No. 16 amended the 1968 BCNYC to require that all
buildings in occupancy group E (business) be provided a manual override capable of exhausting one floor
at a time at a rate of 6 air changes per hour, or 1 cfm/ft
2
, whichever is greater. For WTC 7, with a
footprint area of approximately 48,000 ft
2
, this would require an exhaust capacity of at least
48,000 ft
3
/min (81,552 m
3
/h). As documented in Chapter 4 of this report, the base building system serving
the lower floors of the building provided a smoke exhaust capacity of 36,000 ft
3
/min (61,164 m
3
/h), which
is not consistent with the minimum value specified by code. An 84,000 ft
3
/min (142,716 m
3
/h) exhaust
fan was provided for the Salomon Smith Barney floors during the tenant retrofit. WTC 7 was sprinklered
throughout and was therefore exempted from the requirement for stair pressurization systems. The
building was provided with a Class E fire alarm system per code and with emergency power serving all
emergency systems, and was equipped throughout with fire dampers at duct penetrations into vertical
shafts.
9.2 ALTERNATE MEANS OF SMOKE MANAGEMENT
9.2.1 Design Requirements in Prevailing Codes and Standards
As discussed in Sec. 2.2, the earliest work pertaining to what we now would consider smoke management
systems in buildings occurred in the late 1960s and early 1970s, right around the time that WTC 1 and
WTC 2 were being constructed. Design requirements for engineered smoke management systems matured
in the late 1980s and early 1990s, with the publication of National Fire Protection Association
(NFPA) 92A and 92B, the American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning Engineers
(ASHRAE) design texts, and updates to requirements in the model building codes in the United States.
These advances in smoke management system design occurred well after the construction of WTC 1 and
Summary
WTC 2. As such, the definition of what was considered state-of-the-art smoke management system design
changed over the life of the building.
Various national and local building codes in the United States required provision of zoned smoke
management systems in the 1980s and 1990s. Requirements predating the publication of NFPA 92A most
often based the design on fixed air change rates such as six air changes per hour. After publication of
NFPA 92A the codes most often based the design on provision of a specified pressure differential.
Current codes, such as the International Building Code (IBC) and NFPA 5000 have removed the
requirement of zoned smoke management for sprinklered high-rise buildings. The current codes are
consistent with regard to the requirement of stair pressurization systems in high-rise buildings and
combination fire/smoke dampers in HVAC system ductwork.
9.2.2 Past Recommendations for Changes to Smoke Management Systems
Subsequent to the 1993 bombing, two separate studies were initiated by the Port Authority to examine the
impact of smoke management systems in WTC 1 and WTC 2. The first study, performed by Rolf J ensen
& Associates (RJ A), modeled smoke movement through the buildings given the conditions at the time of
the bombing. The study also examined the effects of stair venting, elevator hoistway venting, and stair
pressurization on smoke spread through the buildings. The study concluded that of the approaches
analyzed, stair pressurization had the potential to improve conditions for occupants exiting the building.
However, the study concluded that the stair pressurization system design must consider the impact of
stack effect, which greatly impacts the pressures obtained within the stairways. The study also concluded
that stair pressurization would have little to no effect when a large number of doorways were open into
the stairways, as is the case during an event involving a building-wide evacuation. There is no evidence
indicating that provisions were made to provide stair pressurization in WTC 1 and WTC 2 as a result of
the RJ A study.
The second study, performed in 1996 by Hughes Associates, Inc. (HAI) in conjunction with Dillon
Consulting Engineers (DCE), examined the use of the existing building HVAC systems to accomplish
smoke management in the buildings. Several major recommendations resulted from this study, including
that smoke management systems be activated automatically using smoke detectors. The study specified
use of a core pressurization approach, activated automatically by the detectors. The study further
recommended manual alignment of the HVAC systems in a building pressurization mode in the event of a
full-floor-burnout where flames were visible via broken windows on a fire floor.
The recommendations for automatic initiation of smoke management from the 1996 study were not
implemented in WTC 1 and WTC 2, as manual initiation of smoke management system was required in
New York City. The sequence of operations for the existing manual smoke purge system was not updated
to reflect use of a core pressurization approach. Procedures were not put in place for use of the building
pressurization approach, as numerous decisions would have to be made that had the potential to create
adverse door opening forces in the building.
9.2.3 Summary of Potential Changes
New York City differs from many jurisdictions in the extent that new code provisions are retroactively
enforced. Many provisions of the various local laws enacted since the 1968 BCNYC were retroactively
Chapter 9
applied to existing high-rise buildings. Building codes typically do not retroactively apply requirements to
retrofit existing buildings with smoke management systems. Retrofits of existing buildings are often
difficult to achieve, and are costly to the building owners. WTC 1 and WTC 2 were retrofitted with
automatic sprinkler systems, but no retrofit was done to provide additional smoke management systems
for the buildings. Retrofit of WTC 1 and WTC 2 with stair pressurization and/or smoke dampers in
HVAC ductwork would have been a substantial undertaking. Automatic initiation of smoke management
systems was not implemented, as manual initiation of smoke management is the general practice in New
York City.
Based on the 1996 study, the Port Authority could have chosen to change the sequence of operations
pertaining to the smoke purge to reflect use of a core pressurization approach. This arrangement would
have performed adequately for typical building fires if the system was used as an active fire protection
system during a fire event. However, such a change would have had little or no impact relative to the
events that occurred on September 11, 2001.
9.3 EVALUATION OF SMOKE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM PERFORMANCE
Based on the modeling of smoke management system performance for the candidate systems evaluated in
this report, it can be concluded that smoke management systems would not have been effective in
confining smoke to the zone of fire origin given the events of September 11, 2001.
All of the candidate approaches evaluated failed to provide sufficient pressure differentials to confine
smoke for the postulated September 11, 2001, building damage scenarios. Considering the fact that the
availability of power was questionable due to impact damage, and that damage would have affected the
intended pattern of air distribution within the zone of fire origin, successful system operation is even
further in doubt.
An assumption critical to the provision of smoke management systems designed to provide life safety
protection for building occupants is that the system be operated automatically via approved automatic
initiating devices, such as smoke detectors. Even if it was determined that a candidate smoke management
system approach had the potential to provide adequate pressure differentials for a given fire scenario,
substantial amounts of smoke could migrate through a building prior to activation of the system via
manual means. This is particularly true for the extreme fire scenarios occurring as a result of the
September 11, 2001, aircraft impacts. Manual operation of smoke management systems is specified by
New York City regulations.
On September 11, 2001, the aircraft impacts into both WTC 1 and WTC 2 affected floors that were
entirely within only one ventilation zone, the 108th floor mechanical equipment room (MER) in WTC 1,
and the 75th floor MER in WTC 2. If an aircraft were to have impacted the 91st/92nd floors, a large
opening would have been created connecting two HVAC zones. Operation of a smoke management
system in this scenario could have adversely impacted conditions in the building, depending on the smoke
management system approach used. Also, an aircraft impact directly onto an MER floor, such as the
75th floor, could directly damage HVAC systems used for smoke management and cause smoke
movement to all connected floors via the HVAC shafts.
The prevailing national codes for new building construction in effect on September 11, 2001, specified
the provision of stair pressurization systems and combination fire/smoke dampers in HVAC system
Summary
ductwork for new high-rise buildings equipped throughout with automatic sprinkler systems. No other
active smoke management systems were required. Although the effectiveness of these measures was
analyzed using the CONTAM model for the zoned smoke control with stair pressurization approach to
determine if smoke containment via pressurization could be achieved, the modeling did not address
whether provision of stair pressurization or smoke dampers could have improved smoke conditions within
the buildings (i.e. tenability analysis). However, conclusions can be made with regard to the potential
impact of these provisions in WTC 1 and WTC 2 on September 11, 2001, as discussed in the following
sections.
9.3.1 Impact of Stair Pressurization Systems
Provision of stair pressurization systems in WTC 1 and WTC 2 would have been difficult, due to the fact
that the stairways extended 110 stories and changed location within the building at several locations via
horizontal transfer corridors.
It was shown in the RJ A study that provision of stair pressurization systems would require pressure relief
mechanisms within the stairs to relieve excessive overpressure conditions due to stack effect. The study
further demonstrated that the effectiveness of stair pressurization was expected to be minimal when large
numbers of doors were open, as would be the case in a full building evacuation scenario. The stair
pressurization pilot study performed by the Port Authority in WTC 1 demonstrated that stair
pressurization was achievable given a small number of doors open, but also demonstrated that excessive
door opening forces were created under certain stack effect conditions during testing.
During the events occurring on September 11, 2001, stair pressurization using typical existing design
criteria would have been ineffective in improving conditions for occupants trying to exit the buildings. In
the initial stages of the event, a full-building evacuation occurred from all floors that were not
significantly affected by the aircraft impacts. This would have reduced the pressure differential within the
stairs to the point where the required pressure differential was no longer achieved.
In addition, substantial damage occurred to the stairway within the impact zone, causing smoke to migrate
directly into the stairs. Stair pressurization is designed to prohibit smoke entry into a stairway. Supply air
provided into the stair to achieve pressurization would be ineffective in diluting large amounts of smoke
entering the stair. As with all HVAC systems in the building, it is unlikely that stair pressurization
systems would have been fully operable on September 11, 2001, even if they had been installed, as
damage to the buildings electrical and HVAC systems may have prevented proper operation of the
systems.
9.3.2 Smoke Dampers
As discussed in Chapter 7 of this report, significant smoke spread occurred within WTC 1 and WTC 2 via
HVAC system ductwork. Combination fire/smoke dampers would likely have reduced the extent of
smoke spread through the building by reducing smoke spread through damper openings on the upper
floors of the building. Smoke dampers are generally powered open and are designed to fail closed upon
loss of power. Thus, they would have been capable of closing despite a loss of electrical power. The
primary effect of smoke damper operation would likely have been to slow the development of hazardous
smoke conditions on the uppermost floors of the building.
Chapter 9
9.4 SUMMARY OF RESULTS
The following findings are based on the information and analysis documented in this report:
The smoke management systems in WTC 1 and WTC 2, which provided the capability for a
manual smoke purge within an individual HVAC zone on a quadrant-by-quadrant basis, were
not initiated on September 11, 2001.
Had the smoke purge sequence been initiated in WTC 1 or WTC 2, it is unlikely the system
would have functioned as designed, due to loss of electrical power and/or damage to the
HVAC shafts and other structural elements in the impact zone.
Provision of active smoke management systems and/or combination fire/smoke dampers was
not required by the 1968 BCNYC or retroactive provisions in the various local laws enacted
after WTC 1 and WTC 2 were constructed for existing high-rise buildings provided with
automatic sprinklers throughout.
None of the potential smoke management system configurations evaluated in this report
would have provided sufficient pressure differentials to contain smoke for the postulated
aircraft impact damage scenarios, even if these systems were capable of operation after the
building sustained damage from the aircraft impact.
The smoke purge sequence in existence on or before September 11, 2001, would have been
expected to be capable of limiting the spread of smoke from the zone of fire origin only for
fire scenarios in which the sprinkler system was operational and controlled the fire. Other
smoke management strategies capable of being implemented using the existing WTC 1 and
WTC 2 ventilation systems may also have been capable of controlling smoke from the
postulated full-floor burnout and two-floor fire scenarios evaluated in this report had these
strategies been identified and implemented in the sequence of operations.
During the events occurring on September 11, 2001, stair pressurization likely would have
been ineffective in improving conditions for occupants trying to exit the building.
Installation of combination fire/smoke dampers in HVAC ductwork, which was not required
in WTC 1 or WTC 2, would have acted to slow the development of hazardous conditions on
the uppermost floors of the building, but would likely not have had a significant effect on the
ability of occupants to egress the building due to the impassibility of the exit stairways.

Appendix A
NIST PRELIMINARY DAMAGE ESTIMATES
The analysis of smoke management system performance on September 11, 2001, discussed in Chapter 7
of this report, considered preliminary aircraft damage estimates dated October 27, 2003, developed under
the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) World Trade Center (WTC) Investigation.
This information was used to create the estimates of core damage summarized in Figs. 71 and 72.
The preliminary damage estimates predate more current estimates that were not available at the time that
the analyses of the smoke management system were performed. The revised damage estimates are
presented in NIST NCSTAR 1-2. The damage estimated to have occurred to the drywall partitions within
the building cores is of particular interest in the analyses of the smoke management systems, because the
stair and heating, ventilating, and air conditioning shafts were made up of these types of partitions. The
debris fields shown on the revised damage estimates were determined to indicate damage to vertical
shafts to a similar degree shown on the preliminary damage estimates, for both WTC 1 and WTC 2.
Therefore, the effects of implementing the revised estimates on the analyses of WTC 1 and WTC 2 would
be minimal, as the preliminary and revised damage estimates were very similar with respect to vertical
shaft damage.
A.1 WTC 1 PRELIMINARY DAMAGE ESTIMATES
Preliminary damage estimates for WTC 1 are shown in Figs. A1 through A6. The figures summarize
the estimated aircraft damage to core and exterior columns on floors 94 through 98 of the building. Each
figure depicts a shaded region (likely damage) and a region bounded by a dotted line (potential damage).
Appendix A
94
98
96
97
95 94
98
96
97
95

Source: Adapted from McAllister 2002.
Figure A1. Preliminary damage estimates, all floors, WTC 1.
NIST Preliminary Damage Estimates
94 94

Figure A2. Preliminary damage estimates, 94th floor, WTC 1.
Appendix A
95 95

96 96

Appendix A
97 97

98 98


Appendix A
A.2 WTC 2 PRELIMINARY DAMAGE ESTIMATES
Preliminary damage estimates for WTC 2 are shown in Figs. A7 through A14. The figures summarize
the estimated aircraft damage to core and exterior columns on floors 78 through 84 of the building. Each
figure depicts a shaded region (likely damage) and a region bounded by a dotted line (potential damage).
79
78
82
83
84
81
80
79
78
82
83
84
81
80

Figure A7. Preliminary damage estimates, all floors, WTC 2.
78 78 78

Appendix A
79 79

80 80

Appendix A
81 81

Figure A11. Preliminary damage estimates, 81st floor, WTC 2.
82 82

Figure A12. Preliminary damage estimates, 82nd floor, WTC 2.
Appendix A
83 83

Figure A13. Preliminary damage estimates, 83rd floor, WTC 2.
84 84


Appendix A


Appendix B
CONTAM MODEL CONSTRUCTION
As discussed in Chapter 8 of this report, the CONTAM building airflow and contaminant dispersal model
was used to evaluate the performance of candidate smoke management system approaches for various fire
scenarios postulated for World Trade Center (WTC) 1 and 2.
A model of WTC 1 was constructed using a baseline computer model created to support the analysis
included in the 1996 Hughes Associates Incorporated (HAI)/Dillon Consulting Engineers (DCE) study.
This model was utilized to evaluate scenarios in both WTC 1 and WTC 2 due to the similarity between
the two buildings. Individual damage models were constructed simulating the effect of the aircraft
impacts into the two buildings on September 11, 2001.
Only WTC 1 was included in the model. Other buildings in the WTC complex were not modeled. As a
result, simulations that evaluate the impact of stack effect on smoke management system performance do
not consider the impact of the other buildings in the complex on the magnitude of the stack effect in a
single tower or the position of the neutral plane in the building.
This appendix summarizes the inputs included in the 1996 model, and the changes that were made to the
model to perform the analysis included in this report.
B.1 1996 WTC CONTAM MODEL
The 1996 WTC CONTAM model was used as a starting point for the construction of the 2004 WTC
CONTAM model. The physical dimensions, geographical relationship of the spaces, airflow paths, and
the heating, ventilating, and air conditioning (HVAC) setup used in the 1996 WTC CONTAM model are
discussed in the 1996 study report (HAI and DCE 1996).
The network model CONTAM 96 (Walton 1997), a DOS-based precursor to the CONTAC 2.0 model,
was used to analyze the movement of smoke in the WTC complex. The CONTAM 96 model is an
interactive network model designed for analyzing air movement and air quality in multi-zone buildings.
The equations are derived from Bernoulli's equation for airflow and conservation equations for the spread
of contaminants. Further discussion of the theory behind the CONTAM model is discussed in Chapter 8
of this report.
B.1.1 CONTAM SketchPad and Building Zones
CONTAM 96 and CONTAM 2.0 provide a SketchPad feature that can be used to establish the geometric
relationships of building spaces and openings. The SketchPad is not intended to produce a scale drawing
of the building, but rather to provide a spatial representation of the relative locations of zones and flow
paths. Zones only need to be constructed in order to have the proper interconnections between them. The
shape and size of the zones as drawn are not important.
Appendix B
A zone, as defined in the CONTAM model, represents a volume of air with uniform temperature and
contaminant concentration. Thus, individual geometric peculiarities are not important. Figure B1
provides an illustration of the 95th floor of WTC 1 and the corresponding CONTAM SketchPad
representation of that floor, highlighting the major types of zones within the building including, Stairs 1
through 3, local stairs, freight elevator 50, convenience stairs, local elevators, express elevators, HVAC
shafts, and electrical closets.
Because each tower has a large number of shafts and flow paths, it proved easiest to sketch the layout of
each level by exaggerating the size of the shafts and other vertical openings, and shrinking the size of the
tenant (interior) space, so that all flow elements could be shown on the SketchPad. This does not imply
that any of the results are dependent on geometric features of the individual zones shown on the sketches.
As far as the model is concerned, results will be identical for flow into a long corridor or square room, as
long as the zone volume and temperature and other openings into the zone remain constant.
One hundred and sixteen levels were used in the construction of the tower model, including levels B6
through floor 110. The base model contained more than 3,200 discrete zones and more than 14,000 flow
paths between various zones. Each zone is given a zone name that, when tied to the floor level, gives it a
discrete identification from every other zone in the model. A naming convention was used to facilitate
record keeping, and is shown in Table B1.

C
O
N
T
A
M

M
o
d
e
l

C
o
n
s
t
r
u
c
t
i
o
n
N
I
S
T

N
C
S
T
A
R

1
-
4
D
,

W
T
C

I
n
v
e
s
t
i
g
a
t
i
o
n

1
3
1

Architectural Plan View - 95th Floor CONTAM Sketchpad - 95
th
Floor

Figure B1. Building zones, real versus modeled, WTC 1.

Appendix B
Table B1. Tower model zone naming convention.
Zone
Designation x (Number) y (Number) w (Letter) Description
80Ex ID Number NA NA Elevator Machine Room
AIRw NA NA Special ID Loading Dock Air Lock Entrances
ATR NA NA NA Atrium Space
CORE NA NA NA Core Space
DOC NA NA NA Loading Dock Space
ELCL NA NA NA Building Services Space Adjacent to Elevators
FxM Car Number NA NA Elevator Machine Room
FxV Car Number NA NA Elevator Machine Room Exit Vestibule
MECH NA NA NA Mechanical Room
OS NA NA NA Occupant Space, Tenant Area
PARK NA NA NA Parking Garage Space
PExM NA NA NA Elevator Machine Room Vestibule
PxM NA NA NA Elevator Machine Room
SRVC NA NA NA Misc. Service Area
STJ 4 NA NA NA Stair J 4
SV1 NA NA NA Service Elevator Lobby
SVJ 4 NA NA NA Exit Vestibule for Stair J 4
SVx ID Number NA NA Stair Vestibules in Basement
TX1 NA NA NA Duct Reserved for Toilet Exhaust from Core Space
xDy Tower Number ID Number NA Duct Space
xE Floor Number NA NA Elevator Machine Room
xEM Floor Number NA NA Elevator Machine Room
xFy Tower Number Car Number NA Freight Elevator
xM Floor Number NA NA Elevator Machine Room
xPy Tower Number Car Number NA Passenger Elevator
xSy Tower Number Stair Number NA Stairway
xSyV Tower Number Stair Number NA Stair Exit Vestibule
xSyw Tower Number Stair Number ID Letter Special Stair Section, i.e., Crossovers, Hallways, etc.
Zx-C Zone Number NA NA Reserved Zoned Duct Space for Core
Zx-R Zone Number NA NA Reserved Zoned Duct Space for OS Returns
Zx-S Zone Number NA NA Reserved Zoned Duct Space for OS Supply

CONTAM Model Construction
B.1.2 Openings and Leakage Paths
Large openings were modeled as ASCOS openings in the model. These openings follow a simple power
law opening relationship (Klote and Milke 1992):

P 2
CA
K
= Q
0

(B1)
where:
Q =volumetric flow rate (ft
3
/min)
C =dimensionless flow coefficient (0.6)
A =flow area (leakage area) (ft
2
)
P =pressure difference, in m.g.
=density of air (0.075 lb/ft
3
)
K
0
=unit conversion factor (776)
A number of smaller openings were also included in the model. These consisted of elevators, stairs, doors,
walls, and floor leakages. Both elevators and stairs were modeled as ASCOS openings, governed by
equation 1. Flow though smaller leakage areas was modeled using the power law equation:

) p c( = Q
n
(B2)
In this equation, p is the pressure difference across the opening in in. of H
2
O, and Q is the mass flow
across the opening in ft
3
/min, and n is the power law exponent. The value of c, the flow coefficient, is
determined using the following equation:

) p ( )
2
( L
C K
= c
n - 0.5
r
0.5
D 0

(B3)
where:
c =flow coefficient
n =power law exponent
p
r
=reference pressure at which leakage factor was determined (in. H
2
O)
K
0
=unit of conversion factor (776)
A =density of air (0.075 lb/ft
3
)
Appendix B
L =leakage area determined at reference pressure (ft
2
)
C
D
=discharge coefficient
In order for CONTAM to calculate flow through an opening using the leakage area approach, a flow
coefficient, reference pressure difference, and power law exponent are required to be input for each
opening type. For different types of openings, the values listed in Table B2 were used.
Table B2. Leakage area parameters.
Opening Type Size Coefficient
Reference P
(in. H
2
O) Exponent
Floor 0.008 in.
2
/ft
2
0.65 0.1 0.5
Exterior wall 0.03 in.
2
/ft 1.0 0.3 0.65
Interior wall 2 in.
2
/ft 0.65 0.3 0.5
Doorway see Table B3 0.65 0.3 0.5
Large opening 0.82 0.3 0.5
Entrances to openings can be characterized as intruding, flush, or well-rounded inlets. Exits can be
characterized in the same manner. Entrance conditions can be characterized as either plenum or pipe-
flow, self-generated eddies caused by stagnation or separation can occur based on the angle of attack of
the airflow. Virtually all of the opening areas in the WTC complex can be reasonably approximated by
use of an orifice discharge coefficient, C
D
, equal to 0.65. This coefficient is well documented and
applicable to virtually all of the flow conditions where the Reynolds number, Re, is fully turbulent, i.e.,
greater than 10,000.
Some of the very large areas with very low velocities are not well characterized by this same C
D
. In these
instances, it is more appropriate to use values observed by F.C. Lea (Lea 1942) and those of Newell.
These two works lead to the conclusion that for these conditions a number lying between 0.74 and 0.91 is
more appropriate. Given that the experimental data reported has a spread of nearly 15 percent, the value
of 0.82 was selected for C
D
to characterize these openings. The parameters for the various leakage paths
in the model are shown in Table B2. Leakage areas for the various doors in the model are shown in
Table B3.
Table B3. Door leakage areas.
Description/Use Type
Average
Measured
Leakage Area
(ft
2
)
Corrected
a

Leakage Area
(ft
2
)
Side hinged single leaf door
(stairs, tenant space, etc.)
A
0.1688 0.20
Center parting double leaf doors (tenant space,
escalator cut-off, etc.)
A
0.3376 0.081
Center parting single speed elevator doors
(freight elevators)
B
0.4017 0.4017
Center parting double speed elevator doors
(freight elevators)
C
0.7885 0.7885
(local passenger elevators) B 0.5673 1.00
(shuttle passenger elevators) C 1.2014 1.2014
Freight elevator door D 1.2500 1.25
Tenant doors A 0.3866 2.60
Elevator pit doors A 0.63 0.63
Mechanical room door A 1.00 1.00
Automatic closing dock door 1.00 1.00
Rolling steel dock doors 6 in.
2
/ft
2
6 in.
2
/ft
2

Rubber door at dock 1.00 1.00
a. 1996 WTC model.
B.1.3 1996 CONTAM HVAC System
Air handling systems in the 1996 CONTAM model were simulated by using CONTAMs Simple Air
Handling System feature. A simple air handling system consists of two implicit airflow nodes (supply and
return), three implicit flow paths (recirculation, outdoor, and exhaust air), and multiple supply and return
points, each with specified airflows, in the building zones. Outside air supply to a system is set either by
definition, as a fixed percentage, by profile, or by calculation. If the sum of supply flows exceeds the sum
of return flows, the balance is made up from outside air. Excess return flow is exhausted. The model does
not require that both supply and return points be defined for a system.
To facilitate the various scenarios and cases that were simulated, four simple air handling systems were
constructed for each HVAC zone in the tower: Interior space supply, interior space return, core supply,
and core return. (The perimeter and interior systems were combined into a single system in the model).
Additional systems were constructed for the elevator machine room (EMR) exhausts, the mechanical
equipment room (MER) exhausts, the sub-grade transfer fans, and the garage and truck dock systems.
Supply and return points for each system were added to the appropriate zones in the model. The flow for
each point was derived from a careful study of the HVAC plans for the building. The fan schedules and
riser diagrams were reviewed, and the supply and return flow for each zone was determined. To simulate
actual operating efficiency (based on building engineer estimates), the simulations were conducted using
Appendix B
85 percent of the design flow to each floor. Tables B4a through B4e show the HVAC flows used in the
WTC 1 model.
Table B4a. HVAC system flows in tower model.
Fan Service Schedule Flow
Design Flow
(85 % of Schedule)
Supplies to Sub-Grade
VS-S5-3 MER Ventilation 30,030 25,526
VS-S5-7 MER Ventilation 38,200 32,470
Supplies to B-1B-6
ACS-S5-1 B-1 6,100 5,185
B-2 5,015 4,263
B-2 5,470 4,650
Fan Total 19,340 16,439

ACS-S5-2 Electrical sub station on B-1 13,800 11,730
ACS-S5-3 B-1 12,940 10,999
ACS-S5-5 B-1 7,145 6,073
B-1 2,400 2,040
B-2 4,430 3,766
B-2 3,340 2,839
B-2 6,000 5,100
Fan Total 37,625 31,981

VS-S5-4 Tenant Storage B-4 4,940 4,199
Tenant Storage B-3 4,670 3,970
Fan total 49,720 42,262

Table B4b. HVAC system flows in tower model.
Fan Service Schedule Flow
Design Flow
(85 % of Schedule)
ACR-S5-1 B-1 5,875 4,994
B-2 7,740 6,579
Fan Total 13,615 11,573

ACR-S5-2 Electrical sub station on B-1 13,800 11,730
ACR-S5-5 B-1 8,100 6,885
B-1 5,500 4,675
B-2 8,200 6,970
B-2 3,400 2,890
Fan Total 26,185 22,257

MER Exhaust to Garage
E-S5-7 To Garage on B-4 24,000 20,400
E-S5-8 To Garage on B-4 44,000 37,400

Transfer Fans from Tower A to Garage
T-S3-1 From B-4 thru north wall 24,470 20,800
T-S2-2
From B-3 thru north wall on
B-4 14,910 12,674

Garage Exhausts
E-S3-S3 90,500 76,925
E-S2-S4 92,000 78,200
E-S2-S5 92,000 78,200
E-S1-S1 90,500 76,925
E-S1-S2 90,500 76,925
E-S1-S3 90,500 76,925
E-S1-S4 101,000 85,850
E-S1-S5 101,000 85,850
E-S1-S6 101,000 85,850
E-S1-S7 101,000 85,850

Appendix B
Table B4c. HVAC system flows in tower model (100 percent).
Floor Core Supply
Core
Return
Interior
Supply
Interior
Return LMRS LMRX SMRS SMRX
B-4 55,630 68,000 0 0 0 0 0 0
B-3 28,794 28,765 0 0 0 0 0 0
B-2 26,271 21,985 0 0 0 0 0 0
B-1 26,486 12,420 0 0 0 0 0 0
Service 204,451 23,245 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 8,200 2,500 219,000 200,100 0 0 0 0
2 985 985 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 3,820 3,880 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 3,820 3,880 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 3,880 3,880 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 1,680 1,620 0 0 0 0 0 0
9 2,140 1,785 26,060 23,320 0 0 0 0
10 2,140 1,785 26,060 23,320 0 0 0 0
11 2,140 1,785 26,060 23,320 0 0 0 0
12 2,140 1,785 26,060 23,320 0 0 0 0
13 2,140 1,785 26,060 23,320 0 0 0 0
14 2,140 1,785 26,060 23,320 0 0 0 0
15 2,140 1,785 26,060 23,320 0 0 0 0
16 2,245 1,595 26,060 23,320 0 0 0 0
17 2,000 1,675 26,060 23,320 4,530 4,530 0 0
18 2,005 1,675 26,060 23,320 2,270 2,270 0 0
19 2,380 1,785 26,060 23,755 0 0 0 0
20 2,380 1,785 26,060 23,755 0 0 0 0
21 2,130 1,785 26,560 23,425 0 0 0 0
22 2,130 1,785 26,560 23,755 0 0 0 0
23 2,130 1,785 26,560 23,755 0 0 0 0
24 2,335 1,565 26,360 23,755 0 0 0 0
25 2,105 1,565 26,365 23,585 5,930 5,930 0 0
26 2,175 1,565 26,060 23,320 2,970 2,970 0 0
27 1,855 1,565 27,500 24,570 0 0 0 0
28 1,855 1,565 27,500 24,570 0 0 0 0
29 1,855 1,565 27,500 24,570 0 0 0 0
30 1,855 1,565 27,500 24,570 0 0 0 0
31 1,855 1,565 27,500 24,570 0 0 0 0
32 2,105 1,565 27,190 24,570 0 0 0 0
33 1,855 1,565 27,190 24,300 6,670 6,670 0 0
34 1,855 1,565 27,190 24,300 3,330 3,330 0 0
Floor Core Supply
Core
Return
Interior
Supply
Interior
35 1,845 1,565 28,030 25,025 0 0 0 0
36 1,845 1,565 28,030 25,025 0 0 0 0
37 1,845 1,565 28,030 25,025 0 0 0 0
38 1,845 1,565 28,030 25,025 0 0 0 0
39 1,845 1,565 28,030 25,025 0 0 0 0
40 12,950 12,350 24,945 21,661 0 0 0 0
43 1,600 2,315 17,390 11,650 0 0 0 0
44 6,960 765 21,475 11,150 0 0 0 0
Key: LMRS/X, Elevator Machine Room Supply/Exhaust; SMRS/X, Machine Room Supply/Exhaust.
Appendix B
Table B4d. HVAC system flows in tower model (100 percent).
Floor Core Supply
Core
Return
Interior
Supply
Interior
45 2,585 2,210 25,710 23,010 0 0 0 0
46 2,830 1,785 25,710 23,010 0 0 0 0
47 1,925 1,785 25,710 23,010 0 0 14,300 14,700
48 2,100 1,785 25,500 22,830 0 0 0 0
49 1,895 1,785 27,900 24,760 0 0 0 0
50 1,895 1,785 27,900 24,920 0 0 0 0
51 1,895 1,785 27,900 24,920 0 0 0 0
52 1,895 1,785 27,900 24,920 0 0 0 0
53 1,895 1,785 27,900 24,920 0 0 0 0
54 2,130 1,785 27,900 24,920 0 0 0 0
55 1,760 1,785 27,745 24,620 3,160 3,160 0 0
56 1,760 1,785 27,745 24,620 1,590 1,590 0 0
57 1,760 1,785 28,575 25,505 0 0 0 0
58 1,760 1,785 28,575 25,505 0 0 0 0
59 1,835 1,785 28,640 25,270 0 0 0 0
60 1,670 1,785 28,315 25,280 0 0 0 0
61 2,310 1,825 27,890 25,500 0 0 0 0
62 1,765 1,785 28,225 25,200 4,430 4,430 0 0
63 1,760 1,785 28,575 25,215 2,220 2,220 0 0
64 1,665 1,565 29,290 26,130 0 0 0 0
65 1,665 1,565 29,310 26,145 0 0 0 0
66 1,665 1,565 29,175 26,145 0 0 0 0
67 2,010 1,565 38,755 37,195 0 0 0 0
68 1,580 1,565 28,910 25,760 4,750 4,750 0 0
69 1,510 1,565 29,085 26,445 2,400 2,400 0 0
70 1,525 1,565 29,905 26,660 0 0 0 0
71 1,525 1,565 29,905 26,660 0 0 0 0
72 1,525 1,565 29,800 26,570 0 0 0 0
73 1,525 1,565 29,650 26,570 0 0 0 0
74 1,525 1,565 24,005 26,240 0 0 0 0
77 2,460 2,335 26,795 23,115 0 0 0 0
78 6,350 1,320 37,040 32,660 0 0 0 0
79 2,535 1,735 26,845 23,995 0 0 0 0
80 2,470 1,735 27,125 24,240 0 0 0 0
81 1,780 1,735 27,125 24,250 0 0 19,000 19,000
82 2,205 1,785 26,915 24,060 0 0 0 0
83 1,600 1,755 30,730 27,375 0 0 0 0
Floor Core Supply
Core
Return
Interior
Supply
Interior
84 1,600 1,755 30,730 27,375 0 0 0 0
85 1,600 1,755 30,730 27,375 0 0 0 0
86 1,600 1,755 30,730 27,375 0 0 0 0
87 1,605 1,755 30,385 26,845 3,160 3,160 0 0

Appendix B
Table B4e. HVAC system flows in tower model (100 percent).
Floor Core Supply
Core
Return
Interior
Supply
Interior
88 1,605 1,755 30,365 26,825 1,590 1,590 0 0
89 1,605 1,755 31,300 27,870 0 0 0 0
90 1,605 1,755 31,300 27,870 0 0 0 0
91 1,605 1,755 31,300 27,872 0 0 0 0
92 1,605 1,655 31,300 27,870 0 0 0 0
93 1,575 1,585 31,300 27,870 0 0 0 0
94 1,445 1,585 30,525 27,270 4,430 4,430 0 0
95 1,445 1,585 30,525 26,995 2,220 2,220 0 0
96 1,445 1,585 31,275 27,850 0 0 0 0
97 1,445 1,585 31,275 27,850 0 0 0 0
98 1,445 1,585 31,275 27,850 0 0 0 0
99 1,445 1,685 31,275 27,850 0 0 0 0
100 1,665 1,685 31,275 27,850 0 0 0 0
101 1,555 1,685 31,275 27,850 4,750 4,750 0 0
102 1,555 1,685 31,275 27,850 2,400 2,400 0 0
103 1,465 1,765 31,500 28,145 0 0 0 0
104 1,465 1,765 29,585 25,335 0 0 0 0
105 1,465 1,685 28,215 28,065 0 0 0 0
106 1,640 1,825 34,011 30,513 0 0 0 0
107 0 0 5,250 0 0 0 0 0
110 5,000 5,000 0 0 0 0 14,000 14,000
B.1.4 1996 Site Survey and Physical Testing
As part of the 1996 study, a site survey and physical testing of the WTC complex was conducted. The site
survey was performed on J une 28J uly 2, 1996 with a follow up visit on J uly 23, 1996. The physical
testing was conducted on June 30, between 1:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. Temperatures early in the morning
were nominally 60 F 5 F, and the wind was fairly constant at 2 mph (HAI and DCE 1996). The
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration reported a New York City temperature range of
60 F75 F on J une 30, 1996.
The purpose of the testing that was conducted was to determine the performance of the buildings air
movement pathways as well as the various barriers to air movement. Pressure measurements were taken
at various locations through the building under various HVAC modes. The HVAC modes included:
Mode 1All fans on
Mode 2Fans set on summer normal
Mode 3Fans set for core pressurization for the full height of WTC 1
Mode 4Floors 59 through 91 set on core pressurization and all other floors set on
100 percent purge
Site survey pressure measurement results, for HVAC Modes 1 through 4, are listed in Tables B5
through B8.
Measurements of the leakage areas of several types of door assemblies were also taken during the site
survey. Survey measurements are presented in two tables:
1. Table B9 is the raw data recorded during the site survey.
2. Table B10 is the adjusted data with outlying measurements discarded.
Table B11 lists the adjusted average leakage areas proposed to be used for the various types of leakage
paths by the 1996 HAI/DCE study (HAI and DCE 1996).

A
p
p
e
n
d
i
x

B

1
4
4

N
I
S
T

N
C
S
T
A
R

1
-
4
D
,

W
T
C

I
n
v
e
s
t
i
g
a
t
i
o
n
Table B5. Measured pressure differentials in Mode 1.
1 2 3 5 6 17 49 50 1-2 3-4 6-7 8-9 10-11 12-13 14-15 16-17 18-19 20-21 22-23 W X Y Z
1 -0.02 -0.02 -0.05
29 0.01 0.01 0 0.01 0 0.01 0.01 0
44 -0.006 0 0 0.014 0.016 0.006 0.01 0.006 0.03 0.018 0.016 0.038 0.03 -0.018 0 0 0
56 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
60 0.006 0 0.006 0.01 0 0 0 0
78 -0.015 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.015 0.02 0.015
83 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
92 -0.015 -0.01 0 -0.01 -0.01 0 0 0 0
104 -0.04 -0.005 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.01 0.01
I-A I-B
24-26 30-32 36-38 39-41 51-53 54-56 57-59 60-62 63-65 66-68 69-71 72-74 75-77 78-80 81-83 84-86 87-89 90-92 93-95 96-98
1 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02
29 0.02 0.01
44 0 0 0 0 -0.012 -0.006 -0.006 0
56 0 0
60 0.006 0.004
78 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.001 -0.02 0.001
83 0.001 0.001
92 0 0
104 -0.01 0.001
Local Elevator Banks
I-C II-A II-B Floor
Floor
III-D
Tenat Doors Shuttle & Frieght Elevators Stair
II-C II-D III-A III-C III-B

Note: Listed differential pressure values have units of in. H
2
O. Negative (-) values indicate air flowing into a space. Positive values indicate air flowing out of a space.
Source: HAI and DCE 1996.

C
O
N
T
A
M

M
o
d
e
l

C
o
n
s
t
r
u
c
t
i
o
n
N
I
S
T

N
C
S
T
A
R

1
-
4
D
,

W
T
C

I
n
v
e
s
t
i
g
a
t
i
o
n

1
4
5
1 2 3 5 6 17 49 50 1-2 3-4 6-7 8-9 10-11 12-13 14-15 16-17 18-19 20-21 22-23 W X Y Z
1 0.02 0.01 0
29 -0.19 -0.25 -0.23 -0.24 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.06
44 -0.014 0 0.004 -0.05 -0.066 0 0 0 -0.06 -0.048 -0.066 -0.038 -0.038 -0.074 -0.058 -0.056 -0.06
56 -0.02 -0.07 -0.07 0 0 -0.11 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.04
60 -0.024 -0.08 -0.08 -0.1 -0.09 -0.11 0.034 0.03 0.032 0.016
78 -0.05 -0.07 -0.04 -0.075 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.005 -0.01 -0.015
83 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.06 -0.028 0 0.03 0.026 0
92 -0.17 -0.11 -0.075 -0.13 -0.075 0 0 -0.015 -0.01
104 0 -0.03 -0.01 -0.035 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.03 0
I-A I-B
24-26 30-32 36-38 39-41 51-53 54-56 57-59 60-62 63-65 66-68 69-71 72-74 75-77 78-80 81-83 84-86 87-89 90-92 93-95 96-98
1 0.03 0.01 0.12
29 -0.2 -0.19
44 0.024 0.044 0.072 0.068 0.07 0.062 0.044 0.062
56 -0.01
60 -0.02 -0.02
78 0.001 0.001 0.01 0.01 -0.005 -0.005 -0.09 -0.05
83 -0.008 -0.008
92 -0.01 -0.01
104 0.01 0.001
III-B Floor
I-C II-A II-B II-C II-D III-A III-C III-D
Floor
Stair Shuttle & Frieght Elevators Tenat Doors

2
O. Negative (-) values indicate air flowing into a space. Positive values indicate air flowing out of space.

A
p
p
e
n
d
i
x

B

1
4
6

N
I
S
T

N
C
S
T
A
R

1
-
4
D
,

W
T
C

I
n
v
e
s
t
i
g
a
t
i
o
n
1 2 3 17 49 50 W X Y Z
1
29 -0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 0
44
56
60 0.03 0.006 0.1 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.008 0 0.03 0.01
78
83
92 -0.01 -0.025 -0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
104
36-38 39-41 57-59 60-62 81-83 84-86
1
29 0.04 0.03
44
56
60 0.032 0.038
78
83
92 -0.01 -0.01
104
Floor
Stair Shuttle & Frieght Elevators Tenat Doors
Local elevator Banks
Floor I-C II-B III-C

2
O. Negative (-) values indicate air flowing into a space. Positive values
indicate air flowing out of a space.

C
O
N
T
A
M

M
o
d
e
l

C
o
n
s
t
r
u
c
t
i
o
n
N
I
S
T

N
C
S
T
A
R

1
-
4
D
,

W
T
C

I
n
v
e
s
t
i
g
a
t
i
o
n

1
4
7
1 2 3 5 6 17 49 50 W X Y Z
1
29 -0.18 -0.23 -0.26 -0.25 -0.32 -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 -0.08
44
56
60 0.006 0 0.076 0.018 0 0.078 0.054 0.024 0.02 0
78
83
92 -0.16 -0.13 -0.055 -0.055 0.03 0 0 0 0
104
36-38 39-41 57-59 60-62 81-83 84-86
1
29 -0.19 -0.19
44
56
60 0.114 0.11
78
83
92 -0.11 -0.11
104
Shuttle & Frieght Elevators
Tenat Doors
Floor I-C
Floor
Stair
II-B III-C

2
O. Negative (-) values indicate air flowing into a space. Positive values indicate
air flowing out of a space.

Appendix B
Table B9. Door leakage path measurements (raw data).

Table B10. Adjusted door leakage path measurements.

Appendix B
Table B11. Door leakage areas.
Description/Use Type
Average
a

Measured
Leakage Area
(ft
2
)
Corrected
b

Leakage
Area (ft
2
)
Side hinged single leaf door
(stairs, tenant space, etc.) A 0.1688 0.20
Center parting double leaf doors
(tenant space, escalator cut-off, etc.) A 0.3376 0.081
(freight elevators) B 0.4017 0.4017
(freight elevators) C 0.7885 0.7885
(local passenger elevators) B 0.5673 1.00
(shuttle passenger elevators) C 1.2014 1.2014
Freight elevator door D 1.2500 1.25
Tenant doors A 0.3866 2.60
Elevator pit doors A 0.63 0.63
Mechanical room door A 1.00 1.00
Automatic closing dock door 1.00 1.00
Rolling steel dock doors 6 in.
2
/ft
2
6 in.
2
/ft
2

Rubber door at dock 1.00 1.00
a. Door leakage areas used in 2004 WTC CONTAM model.
b. Door leakage areas used in 1996 WTC CONTAM model.
B.1.6 1996 WTC CONTAM Model Calibration
The pressure measurements obtained during the site survey were used to validate the 1996 WTC
CONTAM model. In order to fine tune the model, the leakage path areas for stair doors, passenger
elevators, and selected other doors were increased. These increases lumped together as part of the stair
and elevator door openings other construction leakages that may have existed, such as penetrations in
elevator/stair shaft walls. Therefore, the leakage areas used may appear higher than that typically
associated with stair doors or elevator doors. The corrected leakage path areas used in the 1996 WTC
CONTAM model are listed in Table B11.
B.2 2004 WTC CONTAM MODEL
The construction process of the 2004 WTC CONTAM model was guided by efforts to provide a better
calibration of the model to the actual pressure measurements taken within the building. Details of this
calibration process are discussed in Appendix C. The following section outlines the final version(s) of the
2004 WTC CONTAM model, including aircraft impact damage models for WTC 1 and WTC 2.
B.2.1 Leakage Areas
The leakage areas used in the 2004 WTC CONTAM model for the various building construction elements
and their associated tightness classification are listed in Table B12, for model configurations A/B and C.
As is discussed in Appendix C, there were several potential building configurations, representing
combinations of assumed leakages and ventilation system parameters that provide relatively good
agreement with the calibration data.
Configuration A represents a best approximation of the various leakages and ventilation system
parameters that existed in the towers on September 11, 2001. Configuration B uses the same leakage areas
assumed for configuration A. The only difference between model configurations A and B is that
configuration A assumes 85 percent fan efficiency, while configuration B assumes 60 percent fan
efficiency. Tightness classifications are based on typical leakage area measurements of walls and floors in
commercial buildings (see Table B12) (Klote and Milke 2002).
Several architectural features were added to the 2004 WTC CONTAM model. Wall transfers grills, which
were observed during the 1996 site survey, were added to the model. A perimeter leakage was added,
intended to model floor slab penetrations for the high-pressure perimeter air system, discussed in
Chapter 4. Given the buildings approximate 800 ft perimeter, a perimeter leakage of 8 ft
2
and 16 ft
2

correlates to a 1/8 in. and 1/4 in. perimeter gap respectively.
Table B12. Leakage area parameters used in 2004 WTC model.
Model Configuration A/B Model Configuration C
Construction Elements Leakage Area
Tightness
a

Classification Leakage Area
Tightness
a

Classification
Floor 0.00095 in.
2
/ft
2
Tight 0.00095 in.
2
/ft
2
Tight
Exterior walls 0.02 in.
2
/ft
2
AverageTight 0.03 in.
2
/ft
2
Average
Stair walls
b
0.6 in.
2
/ft
2
Loose 1.0 in.
2
/ft
2
Very Loose
Shaft walls
b
1.5 in.
2
/ft
2
Average 3.1 in.
2
/ft
2
Loose
Wall transfer grills 6 in.
2
/ft
2
NA 10 ft
2
NA
HVAC louvers 0.3 in.
2
/ft
2
NA 0.3 in.
2
/ft
2
NA
Floor slab perimeter 8 ft
2
NA 16 ft
2
NA
Doorway
c
Average Measured Areas (see Table B11)
a. Tightness classifications are based on typical leakage area measurements of walls and floors in commercial building
(Klote and Milke 2002).
b. Listed wall leakages are per linear ft of wall based on a 12 ft slab-to-slab height.
c. Modeled doorway leakage areas were based on average measured leakage areas.
Key: NA, not applicable.
In the 1996 CONTAM model only one wall leakage type was used, termed interior wall. Variations in
wall leakage were taken into account by lumping extra leakage area into stair and elevator leakage paths.
This methodology presents problems in trying to keep track of the effect of the various leakage
parameters used.
The 2004 CONTAM model added several new leakage path types to provide unique leakage paths for the
various interior wall types (stairs, elevators, tenant/core separations). Leakage areas for doors (elevator,
stair, tenant) were reset to correspond to the actual measured values, as shown in Table B11.
Appendix B
B.2.2 2004 CONTAM HVAC System
The basic framework of the HVAC modeling approach used in the 1996 WTC CONTAM model
(discussed in Sec. B.1.3) remained the same for the 2004 WTC CONTAM model. However, several
additions were made in the 2004 model, which had a sizeable impact on simulated pressures. The
additions to the 1996 HVAC modeling approach included:
Added schedules to the vertical shaft openings, which allowed the user to easily open and
close the shafts when necessary. When both supply and exhaust fans are turned off, the
ventilation shafts are modeled open in CONTAM. This is done to model the passive pathway
created when no air is being mechanically driven within the ventilation ducts. Conversely,
when both supply and exhaust fans are turned on, as in the case of summer normal mode,
ventilation shafts are modeled closed. This is done to model the mechanically driven air,
which eliminates the passive pathway for air transport via the ventilation ducts.
Dampers were added to core and tenant ventilation shafts. Damper dimensions were taken
from WTC mechanical riser diagrams.
Outdoor air louvers, connected to each ventilation unit/shaft, where added on each MER
level. Modeling the outdoor air louvers provided additional pressure relief to the building.
Outdoor air louver dimensions were taken from WTC mechanical riser diagrams.
In the 2004 WTC CONTAM model, configurations A and C assume that air is supplied and returned at
85 percent of listed capacities, while configuration B assumes that air is supplied and returned at
60 percent of listed capacities (see Tables B4a through B4e for details). It is important to note that in all
three configurations (AC) the ratio between supply and return air remains constant (as listed in
Tables B4a through B.4e). The ratio between supply and return air can have a substantial effect on
building pressures.
Zoned Smoke Control With Stair Pressurization
As discussed in Sec. 8.1.5 of this report, the state of the art smoke management approach referred to as
Zoned Smoke Control With Stair Pressurization was analyzed. This smoke management approach
consisted of pressurizing Stairs 13, while exhausting air within the tenant (interior) space on the fire
floor. Theoretical fans sizes for stair pressurization and tenant space exhaust were determined based on
providing 0.05 in. H
2
O across the stair and tenant doors under the following HVAC configuration:
Supply and exhaust fans are turned off in the multi-floor ventilation zone containing the fire.
For example, if a fire occurs on the 80th floor (served by MER 75), interior and core (supply
and exhaust) fans on floors 59 through 91 are turned off. As previously discussed, when both
supply and exhaust fans are turned off (within a ventilation zone), the ventilation shafts are
modeled open in CONTAM. This is done to model the passive pathway created when no air
is being mechanically driven within the ventilation ducts.
Supply and exhaust fans in ventilation zones not containing the fire are set to summer normal
mode. In summer normal mode, both supply and exhaust fans are running and therefore a
passive pathway for air movement is eliminated. Under summer normal mode, ventilation
shafts are modeled in CONTAM as being closed to address the mechanically driven air
within the ventilation ducts.
Class-II smoke dampers activate in the multi-floor ventilation zone containing the fire, as
smoke dampers would typically be provided in a state-of-the-art smoke management system.
Class-II leakage rated smoke dampers (UL 555S) were modeled in CONTAM by multiplying
the flow area of each ventilation shaft damper by a leakage area ratio of 0.6 in.
2
/ft
2
(Klote and
Milke 2002).
Some smoke control designers limit the height of single-injection stairways to 8 stories; however, other
designers feel this limit can be extended to 12 stories (Klote and Milke 2002). Given the height of the
WTC stairways (40 or more stories within each stair section), a multiple-injection point system was used.
A multi injection point stair pressurization system was modeled in CONTAM using the Simple Air
Handling System feature. Supply (injection) points were placed approximately five stories apart within
each stairway. CONTAM schedules were added to each supply point, which allowed the user to adjust
the amount of air supplied to each stair section. Stair sections were determined by the location of the
horizontal transfer corridors.
Stair 1 and Stair 2 consists of three sections:
Section 1: Floors 2 through 42
Section 3: Floors 75 to Roof
Stair 3 consists of two sections:
Through an iterative simulation process using CONTAM, the stair pressurization fan size required to
achieve 0.05 in. H
2
O across the stair doors for each stair section was determined. Stair pressurization fan
sizes were determined for both model configurations A/B and C (as discussed in Sec. 8.3.3). Model
configurations A and B assumed identical leakage areas for the various building construction elements
and therefore the stair pressurization fan sizes required were the same. Modeling results for the stair
pressurization fan sizes required to achieve 0.05 in. H
2
O across stair doors are shown in Table B13. The
listed fan capacities in Table B13 assume that all stair doors, stair transition doors, elevator doors, and
tenant doors were closed.
Appendix B
Table B13. Stair pressurization system fan sizes.
Stair 1 Stair 2 Stair 3
(cfm) (cfm) (cfm)
1* 19,200 17,600 21,000
2 10,500 9,600 7,800
3 13,300 15,400 -
Total 43,000 42,600 28,800
1* 22,400 20,800 27,000
2 14,100 12,600 10,200
3 17,500 19,600 -
Total 54,000 53,000 37,200
Model
Configuration
A/B
C
Stair
Sections

The listed fan capacities for Stairs 1 and 2 in stair section 1 (floors 2 through 42), do not achieve 0.05 in.
H
2
O across the stair doors on floors 2 through 6. Floors 2 through 6 are unique in that a stair vestibule is
located between the core space and stairway. As shown in Table B13 the fan size needed to pressurize
the stairway in model configuration C are considerably higher due to the relative looseness of the building
construction elements compared to model configuration A/B.
In conjunction with stair pressurization, an iterative simulation process was used in CONTAM to
determine the interior zone exhaust fan size required to achieve 0.05 in. H
2
O and 0.1 in. H
2
O across the
tenant doors for both model configurations A/B and C. Modeling results for interior exhaust fan sizes
required to achieve 0.05 in. H
2
O and 0.1 in. H
2
O across tenant doors are shown in Table B14.
Table B14. Calculated interior exhaust fan sizes.
0.05" H
2
0 0.1" H
2
0
(cfm) (cfm)
A/B 29,100 39,500
C 51,000 73,000
Tenant Doors
Model
Configuration

The listed fan capacities in Table B14 assume that all stair doors, stair transition doors, elevator doors,
and tenant doors are closed.
B.3 DAMAGED WTC CONTAM MODELS
A damaged CONTAM model, for both WTC 1 and WTC 2, was developed from the 2004 WTC
baseline CONTAM model (discussed in Sec. B.2). The damaged models reflect the aircraft impact
damage to a towers exterior walls, concrete floor slabs, core walls, and shafts (elevator and stairs) due to
the events on September 11, 2001.
For the damaged models, a northerly wind was modeled in CONTAM at a velocity of 11.2 mph (5 m/s)
and a direction of 328 degrees, depicting wind conditions on September 11, 2001. In the CONTAM
model, the wall azimuth angle (reference point) for the top wall on the SketchPad is defined as 0 degrees.
A 0 degree wind modeled in CONTAM would be directly perpendicular to the north face of WTC 1. As
shown in Fig. B2, a northerly wind is approximately 32 degrees off the perpendicular, equaling a wind
direction of 328 degrees. The outside temperature was modeled in CONTAM as 70 F, depicting
temperature conditions on September 11.

Figure B2. Illustration of a northerly wind modeled in CONTAM at 328 degrees.
B.3.1 Damaged WTC 1 CONTAM Model
The top of the CONTAM SketchPad represents the north face of the building; where as the bottom of the
SketchPad represents the south face of the building. The impact damage to each exterior face of the
building, discussed below, was modeled accordingly. This was to done to ensure that the effects of a
northerly wind across the large exterior (damage) openings were modeled properly.
Table B15 shows the estimated impacted damage to the exterior walls of WTC 1. The impact damage
was added in CONTAM to the external walls as two-way flow openings. The estimated impacted damage
to exterior walls is based on the World Trade Center Building Performance Study performed by the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) (McAllister 2002).
Appendix B
Table B15. Estimated impact damage to exterior walls, WTC 1.
North South East West
(ft
2
) (ft
2
) (ft
2
) (ft
2
)
92 743 0 1,572 0
93 958 0 1,356 0
94 592 54 1,163 0
95 1,055 54 0 420
96 797 151 0 1,518
97 926 151 0 1,798
98 1,335 0 0 0
Floor

Table B16 shows the estimated impact damage to the concrete floor slabs and core walls of WTC 1. The
impact damage was added in CONTAM to the floors in the tenant area and to the core walls as a two-way
flow opening. The estimated impact damage is based on the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) preliminary impact estimates shown in Appendix A. The floor slab damage is based
on the solid lines up to the core area in Figs. A1 through A6. The core wall damage is based on the
dotted lines across the core area walls in Figs. A1 through A6.
Table B16. Estimated impact damage to floor
slabs and core walls, WTC 1.
(ft
2
) (ft
2
)
94 2,800 216
95 1,650 432
96 2,830 588
97 870 0
98 330 0
Floor Slab
Damage
Core Wall
Damage Floor

Table B17 shows the estimated impact damage to the stair and elevator shafts in WTC 1. The impact
damage was added in CONTAM to the associated shaft wall as a two-way flow opening. The estimated
impact damage is based on the NIST impact estimates shown in Appendix A. The stair and elevator
damage is based on the dotted lines in Figs. 71 and 72.
Table B17. Estimated impact damage to stair/elevator shafts, WTC 1.
1 2 3 50 6-7 90-92 93-95
(ft
2
) (ft
2
) (ft
2
) (ft
2
) (ft
2
) (ft
2
) (ft
2
)
94 192 0 0 0 0 0 0
95 480 120 120 468 0 0 0
96 288 576 576 708 672 864 864
Local Elevators Express & Freight Elevators Stairs
Floor

B.3.2 Damaged WTC 2 CONTAM Model
Similar to the damaged WTC 1 model, the damaged WTC 2 model considers the north face of the
building as the top of the SketchPad. The impact damage to each exterior face of the building, discussed
below, was modeled accordingly. This was to done to ensure the effects of a northerly wind across the
large exterior (damage) openings were modeled properly for the different orientations of WTC 1 and
WTC 2. It should be noted, however, that the WTC 2 model does not consider the impact of WTC 1 on
wind driven flow around the building, which is important since WTC 1 was directly in the path of the
prevailing wind on September 11, 2001.
The impact damage to the core walls of WTC 2 were rotated by 90 degrees with respect to WTC 1 (see
Fig. B3). This was done to correctly account for the different core orientation in WTC 2 versus WTC 1
with respect to the point of aircraft impact. Since the CONTAM model considers the interior office space
as one large open zone, the core can be effectively rotated by placing damage openings in the proper
locations, rather than physically rotating the location of the core zones on the CONTAM SketchPad.

Northerly Wind (328
o
)
North (exterior wall)
South (exterior wall)
E
a
s
t

(
e
x
t
e
r
i
o
r

w
a
l
l
)

W
e
s
t

(
e
x
t
e
r
i
o
r

w
a
l
l
)

N
o
r
t
h

(
c
o
r
e

w
a
l
l
)

West (core wall)

S
o
u
t
h

(
c
o
r
e

w
a
l
l
)

East (core wall)
Core Area
Tenant Area
Damaged WTC 1 CONTAMW Model Damaged WTC 2 CONTAMW Model
Northerly Wind (328
o
)
North (exterior wall)
South (exterior wall)
E
a
s
t

(
e
x
t
e
r
i
o
r

w
a
l
l
)

W
e
s
t

(
e
x
t
e
r
i
o
r

w
a
l
l
)
E
a
s
t

(
c
o
r
e

w
a
l
l
)

North (core wall)
W
e
s
t

(
c
o
r
e

w
a
l
l
)

South (core wall)
Core Area
Tenant Area

Figure B3. CONTAM SketchPad, floor 15, exterior and core wall directional orientations
for damaged CONTAM models.
Table B18 shows the estimated impacted damage to the exterior wall of WTC 2. The impact damage
was added in CONTAM to the external walls as two-way flow openings. The estimated impacted damage
to the south exterior wall of WTC 2 is based on Fig. 227 in the FEMA report (McAllister 2002).
Impacted damage to the north and east exterior walls of WTC 2 are based on video data showing post-
impact window damage (Custer 2002).
Table B18. Estimated impact damage to exterior walls, WTC 2.
North South East West
(ft
2
) (ft
2
) (ft
2
) (ft
2
)
78 0 360 0 0
79 0 550 0 0
80 24 472 690 0
81 119 824 690 0
82 143 415 690 0
83 95 241 0 0
84 0 97 0 0
Floor

Appendix B
Table B19 shows the estimated impact damage to the concrete floor slabs and core walls of WTC 2. The
impact damage was added in CONTAM to the floors in the tenant zone and to the core walls as a two-
way flow opening. The estimated impact damage is based on NIST preliminary impact estimates shown
in Appendix A. The floor slab damage is based on the solid line up to the core are in Figs. A7 through
A12. The core wall damage is based on the dotted lines across the core area walls in Figs. A7 through
A12.
Table B19. Estimated impact damage, floor slabs
and core walls, WTC 2.
(ft
2
) (ft
2
)
78 830 0
79 2,210 240
80 650 265
81 910 265
82 1,685 265
83 600 0
84 240 0
Floor
Floor Slab
Damage
Core Wall
Damage

Table B20 shows the estimated impact damage to the stair and elevator shafts in WTC 2. The impact
damage was added in CONTAM to the associated shaft walls as a two-way flow opening. The estimated
impact damage is based on the NIST impacts estimates shown in Appendix A. The stair and elevator
damage is based on the dotted lines in Figs. 71 and 72.
Table B20. Estimated impact damage, stair and elevators, WTC 2.
Express Elevator
2 3 6-7 81-83 84-86 87-89 90-92 93-95
(ft
2
) (ft
2
) (ft
2
) (ft
2
) (ft
2
) (ft
2
) (ft
2
) (ft
2
)
78 288 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
79 120 120 300 432 432 432 264 84
80 0 0 468 144 120 84 0 0
81 0 0 468 144 120 84 0 0
Stairs Local Elevators
Floor

B.3.3 REFERENCES
Custer, R. L. P. 2002. World Trade Center Expert Report: Documentation and analysis of fire spread in
World Trade Center events of September 11, 2001. Arup Fire, New York, NY, August.
Klote, J . H., and J . A. Milke. 1992. Design of Smoke Management Systems. American Society of Heating,
Refrigeration and Air-Conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE). Atlanta, GA.
LEA, F. C. 1942. Hydraulics for Engineers and Engineering Students: Sixth edition. London, UK.
UL (Underwriters Laboratories). 2003b. Standard for Safety Leakage Rated Dampers for Use in Smoke
Control Systems. UL Standard 555S, Northbrook, IL.
Walton, G. N. (1997). CONTAM96 User Manual, NISIR 6065, National Institute of Standards and
Technology.
Appendix B


Appendix C
CONTAM MODEL CALIBRATION
As part of the 1996 Hughes Associates Incorporated (HAI)/Dillon Consulting Engineers (DCE) study,
measurements were made of actual airflows and pressures at various locations in World Trade Center
(WTC) 1 for different ventilation modes. At the time, a limited model calibration was performed in order
to perform the analysis in the 1996 study.
To complete the modeling summarized in this report, many changes were made to the model (summarized
in Appendix B) to add building features not present in the 1996 model and to add additional leakage path
types to provide additional degrees of freedom in performing the simulations. As such, it was desired to
revisit the calibration of the model in order to attempt to provide better agreement between the model and
the measured data.
This appendix discusses the efforts that went into the recalibration of the model, and the relative
agreement between the actual WTC pressure measurements (see Tables B2 through B5) and pressures
simulated using the 2004 WTC CONTAM model. Calibration efforts were conducted for the four
different ventilation modes (Modes 1 through 4), discussed in Appendix B.1.4.
C.1 PRE-CALIBRATION EFFORTS
The 2004 WTC CONTAM model was constructed using the 1996 WTC CONTAM model as a starting
point. Changes were made to the model to add building features that were identified as missing from the
1996 model and to reflect lessons learned over the intervening years with regard to the use of CONTAM
to model the performance of smoke management systems in high-rise buildings. This knowledge was
applied to the calibration process and construction of the 2004 WTC model.
The first step in the 2004 WTC CONTAM model construction involved setting all of the corrected door
leakage areas used in 1996 model back to the values measured during the 1996 WTC site visit. Measured
door leakage areas are given in Appendix B, Table B11. Since the door leakage values (core, elevator,
and stair doors) reflect actual measured values, these leakages remained fixed during the calibration
process.
The leakage areas of several key construction elements were not included as individual elements during
the 1996 study and therefore needed to be estimated. The non-measured construction elements included:
Exterior walls
Stair walls
Elevator walls
Floors
Appendix C
Leakage area estimates for these construction elements were kept within the bounds of tightness typically
observed in commercial buildings (Klote and Milke 2002). Typical leakage areas of walls and floors of
commercial buildings are listed in Table C1.
Table C1. Typical leakage areas of walls and floors in commercial buildings.
Construction Element Tightness Leakage Area Ratio
a

Tight 0.01 in.
2
/ft
2

Average 0.03 in.
2
/ft
2

Loose 0.06 in.
2
/ft
2

Exterior Building Walls
(included construction cracks and cracks
around windows and doors)
Very Loose 0.19 in.
2
/ft
2

Tight 0.02 in.
2
/ft
Average 0.19 in.
2
/ft
Stairway Walls
(includes construction cracks but not cracks
around windows or doors)
Loose 0.61 in.
2
/ft
Tight 0.31 in.
2
/ft
Average 1.45 in.
2
/ft
Elevator Shaft Walls
(includes construction cracks but not cracks
around doors
Loose 3.11 in.
2
/ft
Tight 0.00095 in.
2
/ft
2

Average 0.00749 in.
2
/ft
2

Floors
(includes construction cracks and gaps around
penetrations)
Loose 0.02448 in.
2
/ft
2

a.

For the stairway and elevator shaft walls, the leakage area ratio is the area of the leakage through the
wall per linear ft based on a 12 ft slab-to-slab height.
Measurements made by Tamura and Shaw (Klote and Milke 2002) show stairway walls to be
approximately one order of magnitude tighter than elevator shaft walls (see Table C1 for details). In the
1996 WTC CONTAM model, elevator shaft walls and stairway walls were combined together as one
building construction element for simplicity. In the 2004 WTC CONTAM model, elevator shafts and
stairway walls were modeled as two separate construction elements (airflow elements), to account for
their considerable difference in tightness. This allowed the modeler to independently vary the leakage
areas for the elevator shaft walls and stairway walls.
C.2 CALIBRATION EFFORTS
Initial calibration efforts involved matching simulated data with measured data under Mode 2, where all
fans are set to summer normal. The heating, ventilating, and air conditioning (HVAC) system within
CONTAM was set up to depict ventilation Mode 2, where all fans were running at 85 percent of design
capacity. Using an iterative process, leakage areas for the non-measured construction elements were
varied until simulated results were in reasonable agreement with measured values. Under Mode 2,
simulated results showed the best agreement with measured values when:
Exterior walls were set to tight
Elevator shaft wall were set to tight
CONTAM Model Calibration
Stairway walls were set to average
Floors were set to tight
This tightness configuration for the non-measured construction elements also produced a reasonable
agreement under Mode 1.
The iterative process also involved varying outside temperature and wind velocities. CONTAM
simulations, running under Mode 2, showed that outside temperature differences of up to 10 F and wind
velocity variation of up to 20 mph produced relatively small changes in simulated pressures, as illustrated
in Figs. C21 through C30. Mode 1 was calibrated using an outside temperature of 63 F and Modes 2
through 4 were calibrated using an outside temperature of 70 F. The temperatures used were based on
measurements made during the site survey (see Sec. B.1.4) and the sequence in which the four different
HVAC modes were conducted, as outside temperature would have risen during the day from the early
morning to late morning period in which the pressure tests were performed.
The next calibration step involved testing the tightness configuration that produced a reasonable
agreement under Modes 1 and 2, for Modes 3 and 4. When the CONTAM model was set up for Mode 3
(core pressurization for the full height of the tower), using the tightness configuration used to match
Modes 1 and 2, the model simulations produced very high positive pressures across the tenant doors.
Simulated pressures across the tenant door were greater than 1.0 in. H
2
O. These high pressures across the
tenant doors would have been apparent during the site survey, because the doors would have been pinned
shut due to the substantial overpressure. In actuality, under the core pressurization configuration (Modes 3
and 4), positive pressures were measured between 0.01 in. H
2
O and 0.05 in. H
2
O (see Tables B5 through
B8).
At this point in the calibration process the results showed that the 2004 CONTAM model agreed
reasonably well with Modes 1 and 2, but not with Modes 3 and 4. Because this study involved analyzing
the effectiveness of various smoke management approaches, including the core pressurization mode,
Modes 3 and 4 were used to calibrate the final version(s) of the 2004 WTC CONTAM model. Principally,
the positive pressures measured across the tenant doors and elevator 50 during core pressurization
(Modes 3 and 4) were used to calibrate the final version(s) of the 2004 WTC CONTAM model.
C.2.1 Architectural and Mechanical Building Features Added
The initial simulation results for Modes 3 and 4 warranted further investigation into the buildings
architecture and HVAC system. Investigation of the buildings ventilation system led to modeling shaft
dampers and mechanical equipment room (MER) outdoor air louvers located in WTC 1. This
modification dramatically reduced pressures across the tenant doors in Modes 3 and 4, by adding
additional pressure relief from the core and interior space to the exterior of the building. Investigation of
the buildings architecture lead to modeling the wall transfer grills located over many of the tenant doors,
providing an additional airflow path between the core and interior space. Leakage around the perimeter of
the tenant space due to ventilation penetrations for the high-pressure air was also modeled in CONTAM.
As stated in Appendix B, perimeter gaps of 1/8 in. and 1/4 in. correlate to total perimeter leakages of 8 ft
2
and 16 ft
2
, respectively, given the approximate 800 ft perimeter of the building.
Appendix C
After the architectural and mechanical building features described above were added to the 2004 WTC
model, leakage values for the non-measured construction elements were set based on the construction
characteristics of each element. The construction characteristics of each element are as follows:
FloorsFloor construction typically consisted of 4 in. of lightweight concrete on 1 1/2 in.,
22 gauge non-composite steel deck (McAllister 2002). In the core area, slab thickness was
5 in. Based on this construction, the floor leakage was set and held at tight
(0.00095 in.
2
/ft
2
).
Exterior WallsConstruction of the buildings exterior walls consisted of closely spaced
built-up box columns. A total of 59 perimeter columns were present along each flat face of
the building. The columns were built up by welding four plates together to form an
approximately 14 in. spare section, spaced at 3-4 in. on center. This column spacing resulted
in relatively small window sizes, approximately 2 ft wide. Based on this construction, leakage
areas for the exterior wall were set between average (0.03 in.
2
/ft
2
) and tight (0.01 in.
2
/ft
2
).
Elevator Shaft WallsElevator shaft walls were constructed of taped drywall. Using drywall
greatly reduced the natural weight load of the building. Based on this construction, leakage
areas were set between average (1.45 in.
2
/ft) and loose (3.11 in.
2
/ft).
Stairway WallsStairway walls were constructed of taped drywall. Using drywall greatly
reduced the natural weigh load of the building. Stairway walls contained various types of
penetrations, adding leakage. Based on this construction, leakage areas were set between
loose (0.6 in.
2
/ft) and very loose (1.0 in.
2
/ft).
C.2.2 Model Configurations
Three different model configurations were used in order to represent the uncertainty involved with this
type of modeling. These three model configurations attempt to bracket the estimated leakage rates for the
various building construction elements, as well as the efficiency of the HVAC system. The model
configurations include:
Configuration AThis model configuration is based on best estimates of building variables.
The HVAC efficiency is set at 85 percent based on WTC building engineer estimates (HAI
and DCE 1996). Door leakage areas are set to measured leakage values (Appendix B,
Table B11). Non-measured building construction elements are set to expected leakage
values based on the construction type of each element, as discussed in Sec. C.2.1. A complete
summary of leakage areas for this configuration is given in Appendix B,
Table B12.
Configuration BSame leakage areas as configuration A. This model configuration reduces
the HVAC efficiency from 85 to 60 percent, and results in an overall reduction of pressure
within the building.
Configuration CThis model configuration increases the leakage areas (i.e., loosens) of
configuration A. The HVAC efficiency is held at 85 percent. A complete summary of leakage
areas for this configuration is given in Appendix B, Table B12.
C.3 CALIBRATION RESULTS
A summary of the simulated pressures verses the measured pressures, under HVAC Modes 1 through 4,
are shown in Table C1 (Sec. C.3.1). The simulation results for model configurations AC under HVAC
Modes 1 through 4 are shown in Tables C2 through C12 (Sec. C.3.2). Graphical comparisons between
simulated and measured pressures, for HVAC Modes 1 through 4, are shown in Figs. C1 through C20
(Sec. C.3.3). Temperature effects are shown in Figs. C21 through C25 (Sec. C.3.4). Wind effects are
shown in Figs. C26 through C30 (Sec. C.3.5).
C.3.1 Summary of Results
The values listed in Table C1 are the minimum and maximum pressures under HVAC Modes 1 through
4, observed versus predicted, for the full height of the building, across the tenant doors or within a given
group of shafts. Shaft types included the following:
Stairs: Stair 1, 2, and 3
Elevator 50: Elevator 50 only
Shuttle and freight elevators: Elevator 5, 6, 17, 49, 12, 34, 67, 89, 1011, 1213, 1415,
1617, 1819, 2021, and 2223
Local elevators: Elevator 2426, 3032, 3638, 3941, 5153, 5456, 5759, 6062, 6365,
6668, 6971, 7274, 7577, 7880, 8183, 8486, 8789, 9092, and 9395
Table C1. Comparison of measured and simulated pressures for
HVAC Modes 1 through 4.
Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max
Measured -0.04 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.05 0.04 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.01
Configuration A/B -0.04 0.02 -0.02 0.05 -0.04 0.05 -0.04 0.03 0.00 0.00
Configuration C -0.03 0.02 -0.01 0.03 -0.03 0.04 -0.03 0.02 0.00 0.00
Measured -0.25 0.02 -0.24 0.02 -0.07 0.01 -0.20 0.12 -0.07 0.06
Configuration A -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.00
Configuration B -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
Configuration C -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Measured -0.03 0.10 -0.02 0.05 0.05 0.07 -0.01 0.04 0.00 0.03
Configuration A 0.00 0.05 -0.01 0.05 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.04 0.01 0.02
Configuration B 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01
Configuration C 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01
Measured -0.26 0.08 -0.32 0.08 -0.25 0.02 -0.19 0.11 -0.08 0.05
Configuration A -0.05 0.14 -0.12 0.15 -0.02 0.11 -0.07 0.15 -0.01 0.05
Configuration B -0.04 0.08 -0.07 0.08 -0.02 0.05 -0.04 0.08 0.00 0.03
Configuration C -0.02 0.07 -0.05 0.07 0.00 0.05 -0.04 0.08 0.00 0.02
Tenant Doors
Mode 2
Mode 3
Mode 4
Local Elev. HVAC
Configuration
Data Description
Mode 1
Elevator 50 Stairs Shuttle Elev.

Appendix C
For Mode 1, the 2004 WTC CONTAM model agreed fairly well with measured pressures. Maximum
stairs pressure agreed by a factor of 1.7, elevator 50 by 2.5, shuttle and freight elevators by 1.2, local
elevators by 1.4, and tenant doors by 2.5. Tenant doors agreement factors are high because simulated
pressures were very close to zero.
For Mode 2, the 2004 WTC CONTAM model agreed poorly with measured pressures. Simulated
agreement factors were between 3.1 and 85.7. These agreement factors are high because simulated
pressures were close to zero. Simulated pressure in Mode 2 is close to zero for two main reasons:
1. Non-measured building construction elements were loosened to better match Modes 3 and 4.
2. The ventilation system modeled assumed a relative air balance between the supply and return
air.
Supply and return air rates were modeled based on mechanical drawings, as shown in Tables B4a
through B4e, and not on actual measured ventilation rates. Tenant changes on individual floors to the
ventilation system were not known nor modeled. As shown Tables B6 and B8, relatively high negative
pressures were measured on floors 29 and 92 under Modes 2 and 4. Mode 4 is similar to Mode 2 on
floors 29 and 92 in that the ventilation is set to summer normal. The pressures measured on floor 29 and
92 are over an order of magnitude greater than the other measured floors. These abnormally high
pressures may be attributed to tenant changes to the ventilation system on these floors (or neighboring
floors). Tenant changes to the ventilation system on an individual floor would not only alter the pressures
on that floor, but could alter the entire network of pressures within the WTC complex. These abnormally
high pressures may also be attributed to unique architectures on these floor or neighboring floors, as
discussed in Sec. C.2.3. It should be noted that in many cases, the floors directly above/below floors 29
and 92 had fairly good agreement with measured data for these floors, indicating that pressures were in
the correct range for that area of the building.
For Mode 3, the 2004 WTC CONTAM model agreed reasonably well with measured pressures.
Maximum stair pressures agreed by a factor of 2.1, elevator 50 by 1.0, shuttle and freight elevators by 3.2,
local elevators by 1.0, and tenant doors by 1.7. As previously discussed, calibration of the 2004 WTC
CONTAM model depended heavily on the positive pressures measured during the site survey across the
tenant doors and elevator 50, under Modes 3 and 4 (core pressurization). These principal measured
pressures are highlighted in Table C1. As shown in Table C1, simulated pressures agree very well with
the principal measured pressures across the tenant doors and elevator 50.
For Mode 4, the 2004 WTC CONTAM model agreed reasonably well with measured pressures.
Maximum stair pressures agreed by a factor of 1.1, elevator 50 by 1.0, shuttle and freight elevators by 2.5,
local elevators by 1.3, and tenant doors by 1.1.
C.3.2 Simulated Results for Modes 1 through 4
The simulation results for model configurations A through C under HVAC Modes 1 through 4 are shown
in Tables C2 through C12. The measured data is summarized in Tables B5 through B8 (Appendix B)
as well as the calibration measurements taken during the 1996 HAI/DCE study. The figures discussed in
Sec. C.3.3 provide a comparison between the two sets of data.

N
I
S
T

N
C
S
T
A
R

1
-
4
D
,

W
T
C

I
n
v
e
s
t
i
g
a
t
i
o
n

1
6
7

C
O
N
T
A
M

M
o
d
e
l

C
a
l
i
b
r
a
t
i
o
n
Table C2. CONTAM simulated pressure differentials using configuration AMode 1 (all fans off).
1 2 3 5 6 17 49 50 1-2 3-4 6-7 8-9 10-11 12-13 14-15 16-17 18-19 20-21 22-23
1 -0.023 -0.018
29 0.013 0.010 0.000 -0.017 0.000
44 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.010 -0.042 -0.002 -0.010 -0.014 -0.002
56 -0.023 -0.027 0.000 -0.014 0.012 0.012 -0.042 0.004 0.013 -0.002
60 0.004 0.000 0.022 0.014 0.003
78 0.000 -0.001 -0.023 0.023 0.050 0.037 0.039 0.040 0.041 0.049 -0.001
83 -0.036 -0.003 -0.021 0.022 0.000
92 -0.003 0.019 0.010 0.040 0.003
104 0.004 0.020 0.022 0.046 0.004
I-A I-B
24-26 30-32 36-38 39-41 51-53 54-56 57-59 60-62 63-65 66-68 69-71 72-74 75-77 78-80 81-83 84-86 87-89 90-92 93-95 96-98
1 -0.007 -0.008 -0.023
29 0.008 0.004
44 0.000 0.000 -0.006 -0.007 -0.022 -0.026 -0.029 -0.026
56 -0.004 -0.005
60 0.023 0.023
78 -0.001 -0.002 -0.008 -0.013 -0.030 -0.025 -0.042 -0.042
83 0.000 -0.001
92 0.029 0.024
104 0.008 0.007
Tenant
Doors
Floor
Stair Shuttle & Freight Elevators
III-C Floor
II-D III-A I-C II-A II-B III-B III-D II-C

2

1
6
8

N
I
S
T

N
C
S
T
A
R

1
-
4
D
,

W
T
C

I
n
v
e
s
t
i
g
a
t
i
o
n
A
p
p
e
n
d
i
x

C

Table C3. CONTAM simulated pressure differentials using configuration CMode 1 (all fans off).
1 2 3 5 6 17 49 50 1-2 3-4 6-7 8-9 10-11 12-13 14-15 16-17 18-19 20-21 22-23
1 -0.013 -0.010 -0.016
29 0.006 0.004 0.000 -0.011 0.000
44 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.008 -0.029 -0.003 -0.007 -0.010 0.008 0.008 -0.029 0.002 0.009 -0.001
56 -0.013 -0.017 -0.003 -0.010 -0.001
60 0.003 -0.011 0.013 0.006 0.002
78 0.000 -0.001 -0.018 0.001 0.013 0.038 0.030 0.032 0.034 0.032 0.038 -0.001
83 -0.025 -0.002 -0.015 0.002 0.013 0.000
92 -0.003 0.010 0.007 0.014 0.023 0.002
104 0.003 0.010 0.017 0.020 0.027 0.003
I-A I-B
24-26 30-32 36-38 39-41 51-53 54-56 57-59 60-62 63-65 66-68 69-71 72-74 75-77 78-80 81-83 84-86 87-89 90-92 93-95 96-98
1 -0.005 -0.005 -0.012
29 0.005 0.003
44 0.000 0.000 -0.003 -0.004 -0.011 -0.015 -0.016 -0.015
56 -0.002 -0.002
60 0.016 0.015
78 -0.002 -0.004 -0.007 -0.012 -0.020 -0.013 -0.029 -0.030
83 0.001 -0.001
92 0.021 0.016
104 0.011 0.010
Floor
III-B Floor
I-C II-A
Tenant
Doors
II-B III-D II-C II-D III-A III-C

2

N
I
S
T

N
C
S
T
A
R

1
-
4
D
,

W
T
C

I
n
v
e
s
t
i
g
a
t
i
o
n

1
6
9

C
O
N
T
A
M

M
o
d
e
l

C
a
l
i
b
r
a
t
i
o
n
Table C4. CONTAM simulated pressure differentials using configuration AMode 2 (all fans set to summer normal).
1 2 3 5 6 17 49 50 1-2 3-4 6-7 8-9 10-11 12-13 14-15 16-17 18-19 20-21 22-23
1 0.001 0.002 0.002
29 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001
44 -0.005 -0.002 -0.004 -0.008 -0.004 -0.005 -0.003 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006
56 -0.003 -0.004 -0.005 -0.003 -0.003 -0.006 -0.001
60 -0.002 -0.004 -0.005 -0.003 -0.003 -0.006 -0.001
78 0.000 -0.002 0.006 -0.002 -0.005 -0.003 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005
83 -0.009 -0.002 -0.001 -0.006 -0.007 -0.001
92 -0.012 -0.005 -0.003 -0.008 -0.008 -0.002
104 -0.010 -0.002 0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.002
I-A I-B
24-26 30-32 36-38 39-41 51-53 54-56 57-59 60-62 63-65 66-68 69-71 72-74 75-77 78-80 81-83 84-86 87-89 90-92 93-95 96-98
1 -0.001 0.001 0.001
29 -0.002 -0.003
44 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.004 -0.005
56 0.000
60 0.000 0.000
78 0.006 0.006 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.007 -0.002 -0.002
83 -0.001 -0.002
92 -0.001 -0.001
104 -0.004 -0.004
Tenant
Doors
III-C III-D III-B
Floor
Floor
I-C II-A II-B II-C II-D III-A

2

1
7
0

N
I
S
T

N
C
S
T
A
R

1
-
4
D
,

W
T
C

I
n
v
e
s
t
i
g
a
t
i
o
n
A
p
p
e
n
d
i
x

C

Table C5. CONTAM simulated pressure differentials using configuration BMode 2 (all fans set to summer normal).
1 2 3 5 6 17 49 50 1-2 3-4 6-7 8-9 10-11 12-13 14-15 16-17 18-19 20-21 22-23
1 -0.001 0.000 0.000
29 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001
44 -0.005 -0.001 -0.002 -0.005 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
56 -0.002 -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.004 -0.001
60 -0.002 -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.004 -0.001
78 0.000 -0.002 0.005 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.004
83 -0.008 -0.001 -0.001 -0.004 -0.005 -0.001
92 -0.010 -0.003 -0.002 -0.005 -0.005 -0.001
104 -0.008 -0.002 0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001
I-A I-B
24-26 30-32 36-38 39-41 51-53 54-56 57-59 60-62 63-65 66-68 69-71 72-74 75-77 78-80 81-83 84-86 87-89 90-92 93-95 96-98
1 -0.001 -0.001 0.000
29 -0.001 -0.002
44 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.002 0.000
56 0.000
60 0.000 0.000
78 0.005 0.005 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.007 -0.002 -0.002
83 -0.001 -0.001
92 0.000 -0.001
104 -0.004 -0.004
III-B Floor
Floor
Stair Shuttle & Freight Elevators Tenant
Doors

2

N
I
S
T

N
C
S
T
A
R

1
-
4
D
,

W
T
C

I
n
v
e
s
t
i
g
a
t
i
o
n

1
7
1

C
O
N
T
A
M

M
o
d
e
l

C
a
l
i
b
r
a
t
i
o
n
Table C6. CONTAM simulated pressure differentials using configuration CMode 2 (all fans set to summer normal).
1 2 3 5 6 17 49 50 1-2 3-4 6-7 8-9 10-11 12-13 14-15 16-17 18-19 20-21 22-23
1 0.000 0.000 0.000
29 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000
44 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001
56 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 0.000
60 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 0.000
78 0.000 -0.001 0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002
83 -0.004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001
92 -0.005 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001
104 -0.006 -0.003 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.000
I-A I-B
24-26 30-32 36-38 39-41 51-53 54-56 57-59 60-62 63-65 66-68 69-71 72-74 75-77 78-80 81-83 84-86 87-89 90-92 93-95 96-98
1 -0.001 0.000 0.000
29 -0.001 -0.001
44 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002
56 0.000
60 0.000 0.000
78 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.000 0.001
83 -0.001 -0.001
92 0.000 0.000
104 -0.001 -0.001
III-B Floor
Floor
Doors

2
O. Negative (-)values indicate air flowing into a space. Positive values indicate air flowing out of a space.

1
7
2

N
I
S
T

N
C
S
T
A
R

1
-
4
D
,

W
T
C

I
n
v
e
s
t
i
g
a
t
i
o
n
A
p
p
e
n
d
i
x

C

Table C7. CONTAM simulated pressure differentials using configuration AMode 3
(all fans set to provide core pressurization).
1 2 3 17 49 50
1
29 0.048 0.039 0.005 -0.014 0.018
44
56
60 0.000 -0.004 0.019 0.022 0.012 0.020 0.009
78
83
92 0.006 0.002 0.004 0.050 0.013
104
36-38 39-41 57-59 60-62 81-83 84-86
1
29 0.040 0.032
44
56
60 0.012 0.012
78
83
92 -0.008 -0.004
104
Floor
Doors
Floor
I-C II-B III-C

2
O. Negative (-) values indicate air flowing
into a space. Positive values indicate air flowing out of a space.

N
I
S
T

N
C
S
T
A
R

1
-
4
D
,

W
T
C

I
n
v
e
s
t
i
g
a
t
i
o
n

1
7
3

C
O
N
T
A
M

M
o
d
e
l

C
a
l
i
b
r
a
t
i
o
n
Table C8. CONTAM simulated pressure differentials using configuration BMode 3

2
O. Negative (-) values indicate air flowing into a space.
Positive values indicate air flowing out of a space.

1 2 3 17 49 50
1
29 0.025 0.021 0.001 -0.011 0.009
44
56
60 -0.001 -0.004 0.008 0.009 0.004 0.007 0.004
78
83
92 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.025 0.006
104
36-38 39-41 57-59 60-62 81-83 84-86
1
29 0.021 0.016
44
56
60 0.006 0.006
78
83
92 -0.004 -0.002
104
Floor
I-C II-B III-C
Floor
Doors

1
7
4

N
I
S
T

N
C
S
T
A
R

1
-
4
D
,

W
T
C

I
n
v
e
s
t
i
g
a
t
i
o
n
A
p
p
e
n
d
i
x

C

Table C9. CONTAM simulated pressure differentials using configuration CMode 3
1 2 3 17 49 50
1
29 0.013 0.010 0.002 -0.005 0.006
44
56
60 -0.001 -0.003 0.004 0.009 0.001 -0.004 0.003
78
83
92 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.018 0.006
104
36-38 39-41 57-59 60-62 81-83 84-86
1
29 0.014 0.013
44
56
60 0.003 0.003
78
83
92 -0.002 0.000
104
Floor
I-C II-B III-C
Floor
Doors

2

N
I
S
T

N
C
S
T
A
R

1
-
4
D
,

W
T
C

I
n
v
e
s
t
i
g
a
t
i
o
n

1
7
5

C
O
N
T
A
M

M
o
d
e
l

C
a
l
i
b
r
a
t
i
o
n
Table C10. CONTAM simulated pressure differentials using configuration AMode 4
(floors 59 through 91 set to provide core pressurization, all other floors set on 100 % outside air).
1 2 3 5 6 17 49 50
1
29 0.003 0.001 -0.049 -0.001 -0.121 -0.007
44
56
60 0.035 0.027 0.139 0.105 0.091 0.146 0.050
78
83
92 -0.004 -0.035 -0.011 -0.024 0.096 -0.003
104
36-38 39-41 57-59 60-62 81-83 84-86
1
29 0.001 -0.002
44
56
60 0.145 0.142
78
83
92 -0.071 -0.048
104
Floor I-C
Shuttle & Freight Elevators
II-B III-C
Floor
Stair Tenant
Doors

2

1
7
6

N
I
S
T

N
C
S
T
A
R

1
-
4
D
,

W
T
C

I
n
v
e
s
t
i
g
a
t
i
o
n
A
p
p
e
n
d
i
x

C

Table C11. CONTAM simulated pressure differentials using configuration BMode 4
1 2 3 5 6 17 49 50
1
29 0.006 0.002 -0.036 -0.001 -0.075 -0.004
44
56
60 0.019 0.013 0.083 0.054 0.047 0.075 0.027
78
83
92 -0.017 -0.033 -0.012 -0.023 0.044 -0.004
104
36-38 39-41 57-59 60-62 81-83 84-86
1
29 0.001 -0.002
44
56
60 0.083 0.082
78
83
92 -0.043 -0.030
104
Floor
Stair Tenant
Doors
Floor I-C
II-B III-C
Shuttle & Freight Elevators

2

N
I
S
T

N
C
S
T
A
R

1
-
4
D
,

W
T
C

I
n
v
e
s
t
i
g
a
t
i
o
n

1
7
7

C
O
N
T
A
M

M
o
d
e
l

C
a
l
i
b
r
a
t
i
o
n
Table C12. CONTAM simulated pressure differentials using configuration CMode 4
1 2 3 5 6 17 49 50
1
29 0.003 0.002 -0.020 -0.001 -0.051 -0.003
44
56
60 0.021 0.021 0.070 0.049 0.036 0.068 0.025
78
83
92 -0.005 -0.022 -0.008 -0.004 0.037 -0.002
104
36-38 39-41 57-59 60-62 81-83 84-86
1
29 0.001 -0.002
44
56
60 0.080 0.078
78
83
92 -0.044 -0.028
104
Floor
Doors
Floor I-C
II-B III-C

2

Appendix C
C.3.3 Comparison of ResultsMeasured versus Predicted
Graphical comparisons between measured and predicted pressure differentials, for HVAC Modes 1
through 4, are shown in Figs. C1 through C20. When considering these figures it would appear that in
some cases the agreement between measured and predicted values appears quite good and in some cases
measured and predicted values vary substantially. Since measured pressures were often in the range of
0.01 in. H
2
O to 0.2 in. H
2
O, the overall agreement between measured and predicted values was good, off
by a factor of 12 rather than an order of magnitude. Differences between measured and predicted values
are due to uncertainties and simplifications in the model, as discussed in Sec. C.3.4.
-0.05
-0.04
-0.03
-0.02
-0.01
0
0.01
0.02
0 20 40 60 80 100
Floor
P
r
e
s
s
u
r
e

D
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
t
i
a
l

(
i
n
.

H
2
0
)
Measured Configuration A Configuration C

Figure C1. Mode 1, all fans off, stair 1.
-0.03
-0.02
-0.01
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0 20 40 60 80 100
Floor
P
r
e
s
s
u
r
e

D
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
t
i
a
l

(
i
n
.

H
2
0
)

-0.03
-0.025
-0.02
-0.015
-0.01
-0.005
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
0 20 40 60 80 100
Floor
P
r
e
s
s
u
r
e

D
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
t
i
a
l

(
i
n
.

H
2
0
)

Appendix C
-0.03
-0.02
-0.01
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0 20 40 60 80 100
Floor
P
r
e
s
s
u
r
e

D
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
t
i
a
l

(
i
n
.

H
2
0
)

Figure C4. Mode 1, all fans off, elevator 50.
-0.02
-0.015
-0.01
-0.005
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0 20 40 60 80 100
Floor
P
r
e
s
s
u
r
e

D
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
t
i
a
l

(
i
n
.

H
2
0
)

Figure C5. Mode 1, all fans off, tenant doors.
-0.3
-0.25
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0 20 40 60 80 100
Floor
P
r
e
s
s
u
r
e

D
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
t
i
a
l

(
i
n
.

H
2
0
)
Measured Configuration A Configuration B Configuration C

Figure C6. Mode 2, all fans set to summer normal, stair 1.
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0 20 40 60 80 100
Floor
P
r
e
s
s
u
r
e

D
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
t
i
a
l

(
i
n
.

H
2
0
)

Appendix C
-0.25
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0 20 40 60 80 100
Floor
P
r
e
s
s
u
r
e

D
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
t
i
a
l

(
i
n
.

H
2
0
)

-0.3
-0.25
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0 20 40 60 80 100
Floor
P
r
e
s
s
u
r
e

D
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
t
i
a
l

(
i
n
.

H
2
0
)

Figure C9. Mode 2, all fans set to summer normal, elevator 50.
-0.1
-0.08
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0 20 40 60 80 100
Floor
P
r
e
s
s
u
r
e

D
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
t
i
a
l

(
i
n
.

H
2
0
)

Figure C10. Mode 2, all fans set to summer normal, tenant doors.
-0.03
-0.02
-0.01
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0 20 40 60 80 100
Floor
P
r
e
s
s
u
r
e

D
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
t
i
a
l

(
i
n
.

H
2
0
)

Figure C11. Mode 3, fan set for core pressurization
for the full height of tower, stair 1.
Appendix C
-0.02
-0.01
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0 20 40 60 80 100
Floor
P
r
e
s
s
u
r
e

D
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
t
i
a
l

(
i
n
.

H
2
0
)

-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0 20 40 60 80 100
Floor
P
r
e
s
s
u
r
e

D
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
t
i
a
l

(
i
n
.

H
2
0
)

-0.03
-0.02
-0.01
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0 20 40 60 80 100
Floor
P
r
e
s
s
u
r
e

D
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
t
i
a
l

(
i
n
.

H
2
0
)

for the full height of tower, elevator 50.
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
0.03
0.035
0 20 40 60 80 100
Floor
P
r
e
s
s
u
r
e

D
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
t
i
a
l

(
i
n
.

H
2
0
)

for the full height of tower, tenant doors.
Appendix C
-0.25
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0 20 40 60 80 100
Floor
P
r
e
s
s
u
r
e

D
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
t
i
a
l

(
i
n
.

H
2
0
)

Figure C16. Mode 4, floors 59 through 91 set for core pressurization,
all other floors 100 percent recirculation, stair 1.
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0 20 40 60 80 100
Floor
P
r
e
s
s
u
r
e

D
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
t
i
a
l

(
i
n
.

H
2
0
)

-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0 20 40 60 80 100
Floor
P
r
e
s
s
u
r
e

D
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
t
i
a
l

(
i
n
.

H
2
0
)

-0.3
-0.25
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0 20 40 60 80 100
Floor
P
r
e
s
s
u
r
e

D
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
t
i
a
l

(
i
n
.

H
2
0
)

all other floors 100 percent recirculation, elevator 50.
Appendix C
-0.1
-0.08
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0 20 40 60 80 100
Floor
P
r
e
s
s
u
r
e

D
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
t
i
a
l

(
i
n
.

H
2
0
)

all other floors 100 percent recirculation, tenant doors.
C.3.4 Affect of Temperature Variation
As discussed in Appendix B (Sec. B.1.4), testing of Modes 1 through 4 conducted in support of the
1996 HAI/DCE study took place on J une 30, 1996, between 1:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. The National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration reported a temperature range of 60 F to 75 F on this date.
Since the 1996 study does not document when during the stated time period each test was performed, it is
unclear what the temperature was during each test. This had the potential to impact predicted pressure
differentials due to the impact of stack effect. As seen in Figs. C21 through C25, predicted pressure
differentials varied only slightly over a wide range of assumed temperatures. Therefore, Mode 1 was
calibrated using an outside temperature of 60 F since it was assumed that this test would have logically
been run first, during the early morning period. Modes 2 through 4 were calculated assuming an outside
air temperature of 70 F.

-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0 20 40 60 80 100
Floor
P
r
e
s
s
u
r
e

D
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
t
i
a
l

(
i
n
.

H
2
0
)
Measured Configuration A - 70F Configuration A - 60F

Figure C21. Mode 2, all fans set to summer normal,
configuration A at 60 F and 70 F, stair 1.
-0.3
-0.25
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0 20 40 60 80 100
Floor
P
r
e
s
s
u
r
e

D
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
t
i
a
l

(
i
n
.

H
2
0
)

Appendix C
-0.3
-0.25
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0 20 40 60 80 100
Floor
P
r
e
s
s
u
r
e

D
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
t
i
a
l

(
i
n
.

H
2
0
)


-0.25
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0 20 40 60 80 100
Floor
P
r
e
s
s
u
r
e

D
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
t
i
a
l

(
i
n
.

H
2
0
)

configuration A at 60 F and 70 F, elevator 50.
-0.1
-0.08
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0 20 40 60 80 100
Floor
P
r
e
s
s
u
r
e

D
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
t
i
a
l

(
i
n
.

H
2
0
)

configuration A at 60 F and 70 F, tenant doors.
Appendix C
C.3.3 Affects of Wind Velocity
As discussed in Appendix B (Sec. B.1.4), the 1996 HAI/DCE reported that during the testing performed
using Modes 1 through 4, wind was fairly constant at 2 mph. In Figs. C26 through C30, wind was
varied between 0 mph and 20 mph to test whether variation in wind conditions would affect the
calibration of the model. As seen in these figures, wind had no notable effect on the predicted pressure
differentials, and was therefore not considered in the calibration of the model.
-0.2
-0.18
-0.16
-0.14
-0.12
-0.1
-0.08
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0
0 20 40 60 80 100
Floor
P
r
e
s
s
u
r
e

D
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
t
i
a
l

(
i
n
.

H
2
0
)
Measured Configuration A - 0 mph Configuration A - 20 mph

configuration A, 020 mph wind, stair 1.

-0.3
-0.25
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0 20 40 60 80 100
Floor
P
r
e
s
s
u
r
e

D
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
t
i
a
l

(
i
n
.

H
2
0
)

-0.25
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0 20 40 60 80 100
Floor
P
r
e
s
s
u
r
e

D
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
t
i
a
l

(
i
n
.

H
2
0
)
Measured Configuration A - 0 mph Configuration A -20 mph

Appendix C
-0.3
-0.25
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0 20 40 60 80 100
Floor
P
r
e
s
s
u
r
e

D
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
t
i
a
l

(
i
n
.

H
2
0
)

configuration A, 020 mph wind, elevator 50.
-0.1
-0.08
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0 20 40 60 80 100
Floor
P
r
e
s
s
u
r
e

D
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
t
i
a
l

(
i
n
.

H
2
0
)

configuration A, 020 mph wind, elevator 50.
C.4 FACTORS AFFECTING CALIBRATION
There are a number of factors or combinations of factors which may help explain disagreement between
the measured pressures and simulated pressure including:
Pressure gauge accuracy and user error
Actual outdoor temperature as a function of height was not known. The outdoor temperature
in CONTAM is assumed to be uniform across the exterior face of the building
Architectural changes to individual floors that may substantially alter pressure differentials at
individual points. Potential changes include
Number of tenant doors located between core and interior space
Number and size of wall transfer grills
Configuration of tenant doors (i.e., open, partially open, closed)
Presences of convenience stairs
Configuration of stair doors (i.e., open, partially open, closed)
Configuration of stair transition doors (i.e., open, partially open, closed).
Configuration of elevator doors (i.e., open, partially open, closed)
CONTAM simulations assumed all stair doors, stair transition doors, tenant doors, and
elevator doors over the entire height of the building, were completely closed. CONTAM
simulations assumed the number of tenant doors remained consistent on each floor.
CONTAM simulations also assumed the number and size of wall transfer grills remained
consistent on each floor. Additional factors that may have contributed to variations
between simulated and measured pressure are discussed in Section C.2.3.
Tenant changes on individual floors to architecture and/or ventilation system.
Actual supply and return rates on each floor were not measured. Simulations show that the
rate of air being supplied and returned, and more importantly the ratio between them, will
have a dramatic effects build pressures.
Instructions given to building engineers to set various HVAC modes may have been
misinterpreted. For example, when a purge command was given, building engineers may
have aligned equipment differently than what was assumed. Small fans not thought to impact
the sequence may have been inadvertently left on, affecting overall pressure differentials.
C.5 CALIBRATION SUMMARY
During the calibration of the 2004 CONTAM model there were too many independent variables (leakage
types, wind/weather conditions, HVAC system alignments, design versus measured supply/return airflow,
Appendix C
unknown architectural changes to individual floor plans) to allow for a single model configuration that
matched all of the data for the various ventilation modes tested.
It was therefore determined that in order to capture the uncertainty involved in the type of modeling being
performed, and the potential range of results given this uncertainty that the three separate building
configurations discussed in this appendix (configurations A, B, and C) would be carried forth in the
modeling performed for this report.
C.6 REFERENCES
Refrigeration and Air-Conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE). Atlanta, GA.

Smoke Management Systems - WTC

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Smoke Management Systems - WTC

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Smoke Management Systems - WTC

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

NIST NCSTAR 1-4D

Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the

You might also like