Indian Foreign Affairs Journal Vol. 6, No.

4, October-December 2011, 437-448

The South China Sea Dispute: Implications for

India
Raman Puri and Arun Sahgal
The end of the cold war created a strategic vacuum in the South China Sea.
The collapse of the Soviet Union and its departure from Cam Ranh Bay; the
closure of the United States' naval bases in the Philippines; and Vietnam's
withdrawal from Cambodia diminished superpower influence in the region.
These events also prompted several East Asian littoral governments to
recalculate the strategic and national security implications of sovereignty claims
made to islands in the South China Sea. The financial turmoil that whipsawed
national economies throughout East Asia in 1998 also contributed to
exacerbating tensions over conflicting maritime claims in the area.

Geopolitics of the South China Sea

The South China Sea, covering an area of 800,000 square kilometres (310,000
square miles), is semi-enclosed, with 90 per cent of its circumference rimmed
by land. Many of Asia's most influential states are among its littoral countries:
the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, Singapore, and Thailand; the
Indochinese countries of Cambodia and Vietnam; and the People's Republic of
China (PRC, or China) and Taiwan (the Republic of China).
Freedom of navigation through the South China Sea, particularly through
the chokepoints of the Taiwan Strait in the north and the Strait of Malacca in
the south, remains essential to the region's geo-strategic role in linking NorthEast Asia's seaborne trade with the rest of the world. Even so, the South China
Sea's significance has been recently highlighted, not just for its strategically
important commercial and military sea lanes, but also for furnishing living and

*Vice Admiral (Retd.) Raman Puri is a former Chief of the Integrated Defence Staff (CISC) and
is currently the Executive Director of the Institute of National Security Studies. Brigadier
(Retd.) Arun Sahgal is Joint Director at the Institute and a Visiting Fellow, Vivekananda
International Centre, New Delhi.

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mineral resources to the littoral states. Almost 50 per cent of the protein
requirement of the population bordering the South China Sea is met by the
abundant fishing activity in the region. As a consequence, over the past two
decades competing claims to island territories, maritime and seabed
jurisdictions, and access to fisheries have cast governments into a tangled
nexus of regional jurisdictional conflicts and rivalries.
The matter of maritime boundary delimitation in the South China Sea is
especially problematic, primarily because the present situation is defined in
terms of a configuration of overlapping unilateral claims to sovereignty over
an assortment of semi-submerged natural formations scattered throughout
the region. These hundreds of islands, islets, cays, reefs, rocks, shoals and
banks comprise four main archipelagos: the Pratas, Macclesfield Bank, Paracels
and Spratlys.
Eight states currently claim title to these islands. Singapore and Malaysia
dispute claims over Pisang Island and Pulau Batu Puteh, strategically situated
in the congested waters of Malacca and Singapore Straits. China, Taiwan and
Vietnam contest each other's claims to sovereignty over the Paracels, a group
of fifteen islets and several reefs and shoals scattered over a 200 km area in
the northern South China Sea. China in a bloody clash captured all the islands
in Paracels from South Vietnam in 1974. Taiwan also contests China's claims
to Pratas Island and Macclesfield Bank. As for the Spratlys, seven states assert
their claims. Whereas China, Taiwan and Vietnam claim the entire archipelago,
Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei claim sovereignty over portions of
it. Except Brunei and Indonesia, all the others have established a military
presence in the Spratlys.
The Spratlys are located in the southern South China Sea over a width of
400 nautical miles (west to east) and 500 nm (north to south). There are
approximately 400 land features, of which only 33 are above mean sea level
and only seven have an area greater than 0.5 sq km. With elevations ranging
from 2 to 6 metres, the mapped islands of the Spratlys, including shallow
territorial waters, cover an area of approximately 180,000 sq km (69,500 sq
miles).
The Spratlys are too small and barren to support permanent human settlement
independently, and few have freshwater or any significant land-based resources.
Yet they are considered strategic, economic, and political assets by the littoral
states, principally because they can serve as legal base points for states to project
claims of exclusive jurisdiction over waters and resources in the South China
Sea. The Spratlys area holds strategic importance for all states in the region,

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simply because these islands straddle the sea lanes through which commercial
vessels must sail en route to and from South Asian ports.

Nature and Status of South China Sea Claims

Though long ignored internationally, claims to sovereignty over territory in the
South China Sea are based on acts of discovery, occupation and, more recently,
on certain inferred rights over continental shelf delimitation. Legal facets of
the claims became more salient for governments when the prospects for
petroleum exploration became real during the 1970s and the 1982 UNCLOS
(UN Convention on the Law of the Sea) emerged as the standard for
demarcating offshore jurisdictional limits for resource exploitation.
China's assertions of sovereignty in the South China Sea rest on historical
claims of discovery and occupation. The Chinese case is well documented,
going back to references made in Chou Ch'u-fei's Ling-Wai- tai-ta (Information
on What Lies beyond the Passes) during the Sung dynasty (twelfth century)
and in the records of Chinese navigators during the Qing dynasty (eighteenth
century). Notable problems of authenticity and accuracy exist, however, in
describing coastal points as implied references for the Spratly Islands. These
problems are compounded by the fundamental question whether proof of
historical title today carries sufficient legal weight to validate acquisition of
territory. Modern international law clearly recognizes that mere discovery of
some territory is not sufficient to vest in the discoverer valid title of ownership
to territory. Rather, discovery only creates inchoate title, which must be
perfected by subsequent continuous and effective acts of occupation, generally
construed to mean permanent settlement. Evidence of such permanent
settlement is not compelling in the case of China's claim to the Spratlys.
Claims by Taiwan today mirror those of the PRC and evidence suggests
that both governments have made efforts to coordinate positions on Chinese
claims in international discussions of the Spratly issue. The legal bases for
Taiwan's claims are its longstanding historical ties to the islands. Consequently,
Taiwan's claims suffer from deficiencies like those of the PRC, namely, that
discovery of, and intermittent contact with, scattered island formations are
insufficient cause to establish legal title to sovereignty.
The legal grounds for Vietnam's claims to South China Sea islands flow
from historical activities during the Nguyen dynasty (seventeenth to nineteenth
centuries). Maps and other supporting historical evidence for Vietnam's claims
were compiled and set out by the government in two white papers, Vietnam's

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Sovereignty over the Hoang Sa and Trung Sa Archipelagos, issued in 1979

and 1982. Vietnam's evidence for asserting claims to title is diluted by the
failure to specifically identify and distinguish between the Spratlys and Paracels.
Both are treated generically, without one being geographically distinguished
from the other, which has compounded the difficulty of assessing the lawfulness
and propriety of the claims. Considerable doubts also arise over the authenticity
and accuracy of the historical record itself. Such doubts explain why
international law usually regards mere historical claims, without evident
occupation and permanent settlement, as only arguably binding and susceptible
to legal challenge for assuring valid claim to title over territory in the oceans.
Regarding Vietnam, the Gulf of Tonkin has been disputed by China and
France for more than a century. France forced the Qing dynasty to sign the
Sino-French Convention of 1887, which gave France exclusive territorial rights
over the area. Taking advantage of this fact, China and Vietnam both claim the
Gulf of Tonkin as part of their territory and a natural land extension as per
UNCLOS Article 76, even though it is only 170 nm wide at its widest. Vietnam
bases its claims to sovereignty over the Spratlys by right of cession from
France in 1933. The French, however, made no subsequent efforts to perfect
title to the Spratlys by occupation. Nor did they act by returning after Japan's
departure following World War II, or by acting after Japan formally relinquished
all title and future claims to the islands at the San Francisco Conference of
1951. Consequently, France possessed no lawful title to the Spratlys to which
Vietnam could succeed.
The Philippines justifies its claim to the Spratlys principally on "discovery"
of certain islands by Thomas Cloma in 1947. In 1956 Cloma proclaimed the
creation of a new island state, "Kalayaan" (Freedom Land), with himself as
chairman of its Supreme Council. While no government ever recognized the
lawfulness of this "state", Cloma persisted with his claim until 1974, when
"ownership" was officially transferred under a "Deed of Assignment and Waiver
of Rights" to the Philippine government. The first official claim by the Philippine
government came in 1971, mainly in response to a Philippine fishing vessel
being fired upon by Taiwanese forces stationed on Itu Aba Island. The Philippine
government reacted by protesting the incident and then asserted legal title by
annexing islands in the Spratly group based on Cloma's claim. In 1978 the
Marcos government formally annexed the archipelago to the Philippines and
placed it under the administration of Palawan province. Interestingly enough,
the official Philippine position contends that the Kalayaan Islands group is
separate and distinct from the Spratlys and Paracels. This Philippine claim is
predicated on a geological assertion that the continental shelf of the so-called

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Kalayaans is juxtaposed to the Palawan Province and extends some 300 miles
westward, into the heart of the Philippines' exclusive economic zone (EEZ).
To defend its claim, the Philippines currently has 595 marines stationed on
eight islands. These bases are fortified with heavy artillery and are equipped
with radar facilities, a weather station, and ammunition depots.
More recently, Malaysia and Brunei have asserted claims to certain islands
and reefs in the Spratlys, based principally on certain continental shelf provisions
in UNCLOS. Article 76 of UNCLOS describes what legally constitutes a
continental shelf for a state, and the sovereign rights it may exercise for exploring
and exploiting the resources of its continental shelf. However, the countries
which signed UNCLOS have several reservations about Article 76. In 1996,
when China signed UNCLOS it had five reservations, the very first being that
China would claim sovereign rights over the continental shelf: the implication
was that China was refusing to abide by UNCLOS even as it signed on to it.
Malaysia is the most recent claimant to occupy part of the Spratlys militarily.
In late 1977, Malay troops landed on Swallow Reef. Since then, about seventy
soldiers have been stationed on three of the twelve islets claimed by Malaysia.
Regardless of troops occupying islands in the Spratlys, it must be understood
that the continental shelf gives greater area to the northern South China Sea,
i.e. China, Taiwan and Vietnam stand to benefit rather than the southern side,
i.e. Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines.
Brunei has only one claim to the Spratly group, that being to a naturally
submerged formation known as Louisa Reef. Similar to Malaysia the legal
premise for substantiating Brunei's claim flows from continental shelf
provisions in UNCLOS. Unlike Malaysia's claims to island formations, however,
Louisa Reef is a submarine feature and part of the seabed. Hence, it may be
regarded legally as an extension of a continental shelf. The critical point here,
of course, is Brunei's ability to demonstrate that Louisa Reef is indeed part of
the extension of its continental shelf. Settlement here is neither necessary nor
possible; the key criterion to be satisfied for ownership is whether the continental
shelf can be substantiated as a natural prolongation seaward from the coastal
territory of Brunei. Granting that, Brunei would enjoy the exclusive right to
exploit resources of the reef. Brunei is the only claimant without a military
presence in the Spratlys. Even so, Louisa Reef is also claimed by Malaysia,
which took possession of it in 1984.
In sum, the Spratlys situation remains complicated by competing claims
and the possibility of military clashes. Taiwan remains in control of Itu Aba
Island; the PRC has occupied seven reefs and rocks since January 1988;

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Vietnam now occupies at least twenty-seven islands, reefs and cays. The
Philippines controls at least eight principal islands and claims some fifty other
islets, reefs and shoals. Malaysia has troops on three atolls and asserts claims
to nine other geological formations in the area. Brunei claims Louisa Reef. The
South China Sea thus has become a patchwork of conflicting national claims,
most recently driven by geopolitical considerations over development of potential
hydrocarbon resources.
Once competing states unilaterally assert territorial and maritime
competence in the South China Sea, articulate enforceable limits of national
jurisdiction, and then proceed to grant to multinational companies concessions
or licensing projects within the areas claimed, conditions become ripe for
conflict over boundaries for allocating development opportunities in resource
zones. National anxieties also become aggravated, and regional tensions can
escalate to the point where military options become acceptable to some
governments. This pattern emerged during the past decade for states with
competing claims over the Spratlys.
The intractable and contentious nature of jurisdictional disputes over the
Spratlys has prompted claimant states to make efforts to enforce their claims
by stationing a permanent military presence in the archipelago. By 1999, nearly
1650 troops of five claimant governments had occupied at least forty-six of
the fifty-one land formations. In the process, the two principal antagonists,
China and Vietnam, have each increased naval patrols and established new
military outposts on previously unoccupied islets.

Special Geo-strategic Interests in the Spratlys

All of the claimant states assert special geo-strategic interests in the South
China Sea. These are focused at two levels, geo-strategic and economic. China's
main strategic interest lies in what it sees in dealing with two "unfavourable"
factors. One, China has actual control over only a small number of disputed
islands and lacks channels that give connection to the oceans (major straits
are controlled by the US and its allies or partners: these include Sunda, Lombok,
Luzon and Malacca). Two, while the PLA Navy has developed major operational
capabilities for what can be termed as green- and blue-water roles, it remains
constrained by the First Island Chain that inhibits power projection and puts
restraints on the security of sea lines of communication (SLOCs). It is to deal
with these constraints in concert with growing military capabilities that China
can be seen as adopting a policy of strategic coercion. Singular Chinese control
or autonomy is unacceptable; all regional actors are keen to maintain open

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commercial sea lanes throughout this region to sustain their international trade.
It in this context that Americans and their allies and partners - that includes
Japan and India - look upon the Chinese moves as an attempt to control and
dominate this strategic sea space. These opposing stands carry all the portents
for friction and contest leading to conflict.
Economics too plays an important part. Fishing remains an important
economic activity for all littoral states, and these waters hold abundant supplies
of numerous fish species. A recent study indicates that the Spratlys area,
covering some 390,000 sq km, is one of the world's richest fishing grounds,
yielding 7.5 tons of fish per sq km. Second is the energy perspective. Oil and
gas exploration is being used to ratchet tensions in the region. Promoting an
offshore energy industry has become a major factor in China's national economic
reform policy. China's strategy of moving offshore to develop potential oilfields
has strained its relations with other littoral states in South-East Asia. Its desire
to acquire vast areas of oil-rich seabed undoubtedly has been a prominent
catalyst in motivating other claimant states to carve out and assert national
claims throughout the Spratlys. This rivalry has compounded regional tensions
over the past decade.
However, the reality is that there is declining enthusiasm for oil exploration
in the South China Sea. Tall claims of the area being the second "Persian Gulf"
have not been substantiated by the results of oil surveys. This is leading analysts
to conclude that energy exploration is nothing but a ruse to occupy areas close
to the SLOCs. China in particular feels disadvantaged, given its geographic
location with regard to SLOCs. Its only achievement of some sort in exercising
control has been the occupation of the Spratlys in 1988.
Vietnam has emerged as China's main rival in the South China Sea. China
has created an agency called China Marine Surveillance (CMS) to conduct
surveillance over what it calls its "near seas (jinhai)". In recent years there
have been a number of incidents involving ships of the CMS accosting
Vietnamese and Filipino oil exploration vessels operating in their EEZ. In a
sense this competition has provided China with the opportunity to extend its
influence as a maritime power in Asia. The Chinese desire to preserve economic
and political interests through a strategic doctrine of active defence offshore
makes it necessary for the Chinese navy to be prepared for maritime disputes.
Sovereign rights, fishing rights, and the perceived potential of offshore
hydrocarbon resources are being used as potential triggers that have driven
the PRC's claims to islands in the South China Sea.
There is little doubt that Chinese claims to the Spratlys, which at their

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nearest point lie some 1110 km (600 nm) south of the Chinese mainland,
reflect strategic island grabbing. Such claims ostensibly support diplomacy
that will reinforce China's naval presence in the South-East Asian waters.
Chinese warships thus have become a projection of Beijing's politics into the
South China Sea. Moreover, China's intentions clearly are to acquire both
aircraft carrier and long-range, in-flight refuelling capabilities backed by active
sea denial capabilities through its increased maritime domain awareness and
anti-ship ballistic missiles and long-range cruise missiles, to facilitate projection
of those politics throughout the region.
Prospects of Military Conflict
Developments affecting the Spratlys over the past decade have exacerbated
tensions in the South China Sea. Several incidents involving bilateral intimidation
contributed to an uneasy, belligerent mood among various claimants during
the late 1990s and the first decade of the current century. Indeed, the Spratlys
have surfaced as a primary flashpoint for conflict, particularly with Vietnam.
The declaration of the South China Sea as one of its "core issues" recently by
China is an escalation of regional tensions by putting this claim on the same
pedestal as Taiwan and Tibet, legitimizing the use of military means to enforce
its claims. This has made China's neighbours like Vietnam and Philippines
nervous; they have sought regional international guarantees and intervention
from other interested players like the US and multilateral arrangements such
as the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting plus, to prevent China from
undertaking unilateral action.
Until last year, China shied away from an open declaration of "sovereign
claims" over the South China Sea. With the claim of the South China Sea in
terms of nine dotted lines marking its claimed boundaries, China appears to
have overplayed its hand. The claim has precipitated an international crisis,
with the affected nations openly criticizing China's activities in the South China
Sea. The Hanoi meeting in 2010 was a watershed development. US Secretary
of State Hillary Clinton publicly acknowledged US right of intervention in case
freedom of navigation was restricted in the South China Sea.
Significantly, in the recent past China has become aggressive in the maritime
domain. It maintains that it has the right to regulate foreign military activities in
its EEZ whereas the US claims freedom of navigation and over-flight in
international waters. Armed with naval and air infrastructure and a large fleet
of modern destroyers and frigates, the PLA Navy is now conducting regular
operations in the East and South China Sea, including aggressive patrolling of
the Paracels and Spratlys. Further, the number of PLA Navy exercises and the

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levels of participation have gone up substantially.

In 2011 the number of clashes between China and other countries have
increased. On 2 March PLA Navy's patrol boats harassed the Philippines' oil
exploration vessel in Reed Bank which is located 240 km west of Palawan. In
response the Philippine Air Force launched OV-10 bomber and Islander aircraft
and deployed three coast guard ships. It also lodged a diplomatic protest. In
May, the cables of the Vietnamese oil exploratory vessel were deliberately cut
by Chinese ships in the disputed area. The tensions continued to escalate, and
in June, Vietnam reported that the Chinese naval boats had opened fired on
Vietnamese fishing boats in the Vietnamese territorial waters. Similar incidents
of standoff between China and Philippines have been reported in Reed Bank.
These incidents are clear indication that China is trying intimidation and coercion
to assert its claims over the disputed islands. This has led the South East Asian
countries that have stakes in these islands to beef up their sea denial capabilities.

Indian Interests in South China Sea

The fundamental perspective of Indian interest in the South China Sea is
underscored by the growing arc of Indian strategic interests in tune with its
increasing trade and economic engagements. ASEAN and East Asia form the
fastest growing component of India's economic interests and an area of acute
economic and strategic interest. These linkages are likely to grow with growing
trade with these two blocs, which is expected to cross US$ 100 billion by
201516. This has led to strategically linking the ocean spaces of the Indian
Ocean and Pacific Ocean; a term has been coined - the Indo-Pacific Ocean to highlight seamless connectivity. It is therefore but natural that Indian interests
will gravitate toward the security and stability of this expanded geo-economic
and geo-political space at the confluence of the two major oceans.
The extension of Indian strategic space into the Indo-Pacific Ocean will
naturally have strategic consequences. China has reacted by asking India to
stay away from the South China Sea while the South-East Asian countries and
Japan have welcomed the Indian presence. China, which looks upon the South
China Sea as a springboard for its power projection in Asia-Pacific, looks
upon the Indian presence with the blinkered vision of China containment in
concert with the democracies along the Asian Rim Land.
It is indeed unfortunate that India's growing bilateral relations with Vietnam
and with other South-East Asian countries, in particular Indonesia, and growing
strategic cooperation with Japan, are seen by the Chinese as an Indian attempt

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at strategic assertion in the Chinese backyard. The paranoia gets enhanced in

the backdrop of US-India strategic partnership and American attempts at
ensuring freedom of seas and asking China to resolve the issue bilaterally.
As discussed earlier, India does not seek any confrontation with China
nor is it trying to create any concert of democracies or any other mechanism
that will restrain China or impinge on its interests. Just as the Chinese footprints
in Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh are driven by trade and resource
considerations apart from building strong bilateral ties, India too is attempting
to build strong economic and strategic relations with ASEAN and East Asia to
secure its markets and transportation linkages through the security of sea
lanes.
India has genuine economic interests in the region. During the recent visit
of the Vietnamese Prime Minister to India, the two countries signed an oil and
gas exploration agreement, in addition to significantly upgrading their military
and trade relationship. In a rather trenchant editorial, China accused India of
getting involved in the South China Sea dispute despite China urging India to
stay out. It concluded that India has a vested interest in becoming involved as
part of the larger strategy to contain China in the region. An influential Chinese
Communist Party-run newspaper warned that "every means possible" should
be used to stop India's Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC-Videsh)
engaging in exploration projects in the South China Sea. It further warned
India that its actions would push China to the limits, implying that India would
bear the consequences of its action.
There are mixed views on India's continued oil exploratory activity in the
South China Sea. Some diplomats and analysts, generally concerned about
China's rise, take a view that there is a need to pay close attention to the
Chinese protest. They remind us of a range of possibilities that exist and a
range of options that are available to the Chinese. The concern is what happens
if China decides to take the conflict to the next level by triggering a confrontation
in its own backyard, in terms of physical harassment. They question what
would be the reaction of the Indian government or for that matter Vietnam:
will the Indian Navy be asked to react and in what manner? They also point
out that China's propensity of upping the ante along the disputed India-China
border is nuanced.
Implicit in these arguments is a perspective that India has limited options
and it would be prudent to give up its exploration rights or negotiate these with
the Chinese, foregoing any confrontation. This is unnecessary passivism. While
nobody wants to confront China, India needs to take all such steps in

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conjunction with Vietnam and other regional players to protect its own interests.
While it is nobody's case to enter into confrontation with China, that country's
India-centric jingoism also needs to be analysed. Why is China adopting a
coercive attitude against India while seeking mutual accommodation with
ASEAN countries and even Vietnam and the Philippines?
Under the circumstances, what are India's options? It needs to be
categorically pointed out that India has interests in the region and these are
purely economic and partly political. India's stakes in three blocks in Vietnam
are as old as May 1988. What is important and relevant is that in all these years
China did not formally raise any objection to any of the agreements or projects
undertaken by India. It is only since it started claiming the area as being part of
its core interest that China has become hypersensitive.
India does not seek confrontation with China nor will it forsake its legitimate
economic rights and agreements entered with a sovereign government. Second,
it would be in the Indian interest to work with regional parties - to include
ASEAN, China, Japan and even the US - to develop a framework for maritime
cooperation. China must be encouraged to resolve the issue of its claims in the
South China Sea in a spirit of mutual cooperation, regional harmony and peace.
Unnecessary belligerence and assertiveness will only vitiate the atmosphere
and harm its own long-term interests.
If China insists upon coercing India, then India too can raise the issue of
Chinese presence in Pakistan where the Chinese are involved in over fortyfive projects for a cumulative investment of about $810 billion. PakistanOccupied Kashmir is Indian-claimed territory or, at worst, disputed. Moreover,
China's projects like the upgradation of Karakoram Highway and planned rail
link to Gwadar in Pakistan are aspects which are of strategic concern to India,
which India will be well within its rights to raise. The solution lies in resolving
the issue in a spirit of mutual accommodation. Joint development of fossil and
other resources will be for common good of the region, as against an attempt
to corner them for use by one country flexing its military muscle.

Conclusion
The essence of the Spratlys dispute lies in questions of territorial sovereignty,
not law-of-the-sea issues. UNLOS prescribes new legal rights and duties for
Asian littoral states and other users of ocean space. In the South China Sea,
the extension of 12 nm territorial sea and 200 nm EEZ has exacerbated
conflicting claimed jurisdictions over non-living resources in overlapping

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continental shelf zones. Moreover, various political antagonisms and disputed

sovereignty claims over the Spratlys have seriously complicated the
establishment of agreed-upon baselines for territorial waters.
The complexities of overlapping claims and the long history of the dispute
make determination of national sovereignty in the Spratlys extremely difficult.
Obviously, if the issue of sovereignty can be resolved, then the maritime
jurisdictional principles codified in UNCLOS can be applied to the Spratlys.
Such application would cede undersea resource rights to portions of the South
China Sea to recognized legal owners. Yet, no claimant government is able to
establish sufficiently substantial legal grounds to validate its claim. This situation,
paradoxically, makes resort to binding arbitration or adjudication by claimant
states, especially China, less likely since none is willing to risk an unfavourable
outcome.
The Spratlys dispute is sharpened by strategic and geopolitical
considerations. China requires increasing energy resources to meet the growing
needs of its rapid industrialization process, and its massive population
exacerbates its energy problem, although as per 2008 data, the South China
Sea has a mere 2 per cent of the world's proven oil reserves with projection of
2.4 million barrels per day of gas.
ASEAN states are especially concerned because China historically has
shown readiness to use military force to settle disputes within what it regards
as its sphere of influence. China's build-up of naval forces is seen as expanding
this sphere in the South China Sea through build-up of force projection
capabilities. The Chinese moves at attaining blue-water naval capability are
viewed by some as spawning a naval arms race among Asian states.
Where India is concerned, it has no strategic interests beyond economic
engagement and security of its trade. It has entered into legal contracts with
sovereign states, which are legally binding. It is important for China to recognize
these facts and resolve any contentious issues in a spirit of mutual
accommodation and cooperation, without being unduly jingoistic.