Graham v. Koerner, 10th Cir. (2006)
Graham v. Koerner, 10th Cir. (2006)
Graham v. Koerner, 10th Cir. (2006)
No. 05-3485
(D.C. No. 03-CV-3075-SAC)
(D . Kan.)
Respondents-Appellees.
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relief. Her subsequent application for a COA was also denied. Failing to secure
a COA from that court, Graham now seeks a COA from this court. 1
Under 28 U.S.C. 2254(b)(1), habeas corpus may not be granted unless the
applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the state courts. The
exhaustion requirement is satisfied if the federal issue has been properly
presented to the highest state court, either by direct review of the conviction or in
a postconviction attack. Dever v. Kansas State Penitentiary, 36 F.3d 1531, 1534
(10th Cir. 1994).
Graham failed to appeal the denial of her first post-conviction petition.
This court may not consider issues raised in a habeas petition that have been
defaulted in state court on an independent and adequate procedural ground [ ]
unless the petitioner can demonstrate cause and prejudice or a miscarriage of
Grahams petition was filed after April 24, 1996, the effective date of the
Antiterrorism and Effective D eath Penalty Act (AEDPA); as a result, AEDPAs
provisions apply to this case. See Rogers v. Gibson, 173 F.3d 1278, 1282 n.1
(10th Cir. 1999) (citing Lindh v. M urphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997)). AED PA
conditions a petitioners right to appeal a denial of habeas relief under 2254
upon a grant of a COA. 28 U.S.C. 2253(c)(1)(A ). A COA may be issued only
if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
right. 2253(c)(2). This requires G raham to show that reasonable jurists could
debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been
resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to
deserve encouragement to proceed further. Slack v. M cDaniel, 529 U.S. 473,
484 (2000) (quotations omitted). Because the district court denied Graham a
COA, she may not appeal the district courts decision absent a grant of COA by
this court.
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justice. Thomas v. Gibson, 218 F.3d 1213, 1221 (10th Cir. 2000) (alteration in
original) (citation omitted).
In this case, Graham procedurally defaulted twice. She first defaulted when
she failed to appeal the denial of her first application for post-conviction relief.
She also procedurally defaulted with respect to her second application for postconviction relief by failing to comply with state rules for filing an appeal.
Because Graham failed to exhaust her state court remedies, we may not review
her claims unless she shows cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of
justice. Id.
Graham argues that counsel during her criminal trial and direct appeal
failed to preserve or raise claims of constitutional deprivation based on the
alleged misconduct of the prosecutor and the trial courts failure to properly
instruct the jury. Attorney error amounting to constitutionally ineffective
assistance of counsel can constitute cause for a petitioners procedural default.
See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 754 (1991). However, an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim asserted as cause must be presented as an independent
claim to the state courts. Hawkins v. M ullin, 291 F.3d 658, 670 (10th Cir. 2002).
If, as in this case, that independent claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was
itself procedurally defaulted, then petitioner must establish cause and prejudice
for that default before the independent claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
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can serve as cause and prejudice for her other defaulted claims. See Edw ards v.
Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 453 (2000).
As to her first procedural default, Graham states only that she w as unaw are
of her legal right to appeal the denial of relief on her first post-conviction motion.
Grahams ignorance of applicable rules, however, does not demonstrate cause.
See W atson v. New M exico, 45 F.3d 385, 388 (10th Cir. 1995).
Grahams request for a COA is DENIED and the appeal is DISM ISSED.
Carlos F. Lucero
Circuit Judge
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