Consti 1 Doctrines

Constitutional Law 1 (INTRODUCTION, CONCEPT OF STATE, STATE IMMUNITY)
Instructor: Atty. Edgardo Luardo Jr.

INTRODUCTION
I.
Constitutional Law
certain rules relative to its administration, and

defining the electorate, e.g., Arts. VI, VII, VIII
and IX.
Constitutional Law defined. The study of the

maintenance of the proper balance between authority
as represented by the three inherent powers of the
State and liberty as guaranteed by the Bill of Right
c) Constitution of Sovereignty. The provisions

pointing out the mode or procedure in accordance
with which formal changes in the fundamental law
may be brought about, e.g., Art. XVII.
Political Law defined. That branch of public law

which deals with the organization, and operations of
the governmental organs of the State and defines the
relations of the State with the inhabitants of its
territory [People v. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 887;
Macariola v. Asuncion, 114 SCRA 77].
D. Characteristics
Constitution
Definition - That body of rules and maxims in

accordance with which the powers of sovereignty
are habitually exercised [Cooley, Constitutional
Limitations, p. 4].
With particular reference to the Constitution
of the Philippines: That written instrument
enacted by direct action of the people by which
the fundamental powers of the government are
established, limited and defined, and by which
those powers are distributed among the several
departments for their safe and useful exercise for
the benefit of the body politic [Malcolm,
Philippine Constitutional Law, p. 6].
Purpose - To prescribe the permanent framework
of a system of government, to assign to the
several departments their respective powers and
duties, and to establish certain first principles on
which the government is founded [11 Am. Jur.
606].
B. Doctrine of constitutional supremacy

The Constitution is the basic and paramount
law to which all other laws must conform
and to which all persons, including the
highest officials of the land, must defer. No
act shall be valid, however noble intentions,
if it conflicts with the Constitution. The
Constitution must ever remain supreme.
All must bow to the mandate of this law.
Expediency must not be allowed to sap its
strength nor greed for power debase its rectitude.
Right or wrong, the Constitution must be upheld
as long as it has not been changed by the
sovereign people lest its disregard result in the
usurpation of the majesty of law by the
pretenders to illegitimate power.
C.
Parts
a) Constitution of Liberty. The series of
prescriptions setting forth the fundamental civil
and political rights of the citizens and imposing
limitations on the powers of government as a
means of securing the enjoyment of those rights,
e.g., Art. III.
b) Constitution of Government. The series of
provisions outlining the organization of the
government, enumerating its powers, laying down
good
written
a) Broad. Not just because it provides for the

organization of the entire government and covers
all persons and things within the territory of the
State but because it must be comprehensive
enough to provide for every contingency.
II. The Constitution

A.
of
b) Brief. It must confine itself to basic principles

to be implemented with legislative details more
adjustable to change and easier to amend.
c) Definite. To prevent ambiguity in its provisions
which could result in confusion and divisiveness
among the people [Cruz, ibid,, pp. 5-6],
E.
Self-executing
provisions
vs.
non-self-executing
A provision which lays down a general

principle is usually not self-executing. But a
provision which is complete in itself and
becomes operative without the aid of
supplementary or enabling legislation, or
that which supplies a sufficient rule by means of
which the right it grants may be enjoyed or
protected, is self-executing.
Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R.
122156, February 3, 1997
Whether Article XII Section 1 of
Constitution, is self-executing.
No.
the
Doctrine: a constitutional provision is selfexecuting if the nature and extent of the

right conferred and the liability imposed
are fixed by the Constitution itself, so that
they can be determined by an examination
and construction of its terms, and there is
no language indicating that the subject is
referred to the legislature for action

III. The Constitutions of the Philippines

A. Pre-1987 Constitution
Planas v. Comelec,
January 22, 1973
G.R.
No.
L-35925,
also Sanidad vs. Comelec [GR L-35929], Roxas vs. Comelec

[GR L-35940], Monteclaro vs. Comelec [GR L-35941],
Ordonez vs. National Treasurer of the Philippines [GR L35942], Tan vs. Comelec [GR L-35948], Diokno vs. Comelec
[GR L-35953], Jimenez vs. Comelec [GR L-35961], Gonzales
vs. Comelec [GR L-35965], and Hidalgo vs. Comelec [GR L35979]
(collectively known as the Plebiscite Cases
Facts: Petitioners seek to enjoin respondents

from implementing PD 73, which called for a
plebiscite (to be held on January 15, 1973) for the
constitution approved by the CONCON on 1972,
on the theory that: (a) the power to submit is
lodged exclusively in Congress, and (b) there is no
proper submission to the people.
Held: Petition dismissed. The issue of
validity
of
calling
for
a
plebiscite
(submission) is justiciable; BUT, issue
became moot.
The cases were eventually dismissed for
being moot and academic when President
Marcos issued Presidential Proclamation
1102, declaring that the Constitution had
been ratified and has come into force and
Javellana vs. Exec. Sec., 50 SCRA 33

The (collectively
basic issues and
the votes
the Ratification
SC justices were:
known
as of
the
(1) Whether
Cases) the validity of Proclamation 1102 is a political or a
justiciable question - Six justices said it is justiciable, three said
it is political,
one justice seek
qualified to
his vote.
(2) Whether
Facts: and
Petitioners
enjoin
the the
from
implementing
of theif not
new respondents
Constitution was
validly
ratified (withany
substantial
of conformably
the new constitution
not
found in - Six
strictprovisions
compliance)
with the 1935
Constitution
the said
1935
on the
that it
was
justices
no,Constitution,
three said there
wastheory
substantial
compliance,
in (3)
accordance
withpeople
the had
and not
one validly
qualified ratified
his vote.
Whether the
provisions
of Art.1,
XV. (with or without valid
acquiesced
in the
new Section
Constitution
ratification) - Four justices said the people had already
Held: Although the question of whether a
accepted the new Constitution, two said that there can be no
Constitution was validly ratified is a justiciable
free question,
expressionthebyquestion
the people
qualified
to vote of their
of whether
a Constitution
acceptance
or
repudiation
of
the
proposed
Constitution
has come into force and effect is a politicalunder
martial
law, one
said he
not prepared of
to the
state
that a new
question
beyond
theis competence
Courtto
Constitution
decide. once accepted by the people must be accorded
recognition independently of valid ratification, and three
expressed their lack of knowledge or competence to rule on the
question because under a regime of martial law with the free
expression of opinions restricted, they have no means of
knowing, to the point of judicial certainty, whether the people
have accepted the Constitution. (4) Whether the petitioners are
entitled to relief - Six justices voted to dismiss the petitions,
while four were for giving due course to the petitions. (5)
Whether the new Constitution is already in force - Four said yes
by virtue of the peoples acceptance of the same, four said
they could not with judicial certainty whether or not the people
had accepted the Constitution, and two declared that the new
Constitution is not in force, with the result that there are
Aquino v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183

Topic: Judicial Review
Doctrine: The power of the courts to test the
validity of executive and legislative acts in light
of their conformity with the Constitution. This is
not an assertion of superiority by the courts over
the other departments, but merely an
expression of the supremacy of the Constitution.
The duty remains to assure that the
supremacy of the Constitution is upheld.
The power is inherent in the Judicial
Department, by virtue of the doctrine of
Sanidad v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-44640

October 12, 1976 (affirming the validity of
Javellana)
Topic: Judicial Review of Amendments
Facts: Petitioners question the authority of the
President in issuing several PDs proposing
amendments to the New Constitution and calling
for a national referendum-plebiscite for the said
amendments.
Held: (1) The amending process, both as to
proposal and ratification, raises a justiciable
question. (2) In a crisis government, the President
shall have the power to assume the constituent
power to propose amendments lodged in the
Legislative body.
Doctrine:
- The question is now regarded as subject
to judicial review, because invariably, the
issue will boil down to whether or not the
constitutional
provisions
had
been
followed.
-Presidential exercise of legislative powers
(and proposing amendments) is valid in
martial law.
-Amending process is a sovereign act,
although the authority to institute the
Occea
v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-56350 April
Doctrine:
2,-The
1981question is now regarded as subject
(affirming
the
validity
of Javellana)
to judicial
review,
because
invariably, the
issue will boil down to whether or not the
constitutional
provisions
had
been
followed.
-Authority for the principle that the choice

of method of proposal, i.e., whether made
directly by Congress or through a

Phil. Bar Association v. Comelec, G.R. No.
72915, Dec. 20, 1985
Facts: The challenge in these two prohibition

proceedings against the validity of three Batasang
Pambansa Resolutions proposing constitutional
amendments, goes further than merely assailing
their alleged constitutional infirmity. Samuel
Occena and Ramon A. Gonzales, both members of
the Philippine Bar and former delegates to the
1971 Constitutional Convention that framed the
present Constitution, are suing as taxpayers. The
rather unorthodox aspect of these petitions is the
assertion that the 1973 Constitution is not the
fundamental law, the Javellana ruling to the
contrary notwithstanding.
Held:
1. Citing the case of Javellana v. The Executive
Secretary where they dismissed the petitions for
prohibition and mandamus to declare invalid its
ratification with a vote of six(6) to four(4), the
Supreme Court said: This being the vote of
majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to
the new constitution being considered in force
and effect(in force and effect on January 17,
1973). With such the pronouncement of the
Supreme Court, and with the recognition of the
cardinal postulate that what the Supreme Court
says is not only entitled to respect but must also
be obeyed, a factor for instability was removed.
Thereafter, as a matter of law, all doubts are
resolved.
The
1973
constitution
isa
fundamental law.
The existence of the power of the Interim
Batasang Pambansa is indubitable. The
applicable provision of the 1976 amendment is
quite explicit, which reads: The Interim Batasang
Pambansa shall have the same powers and its
Members shall have the same functions,
responsibilities,
rights,
privileges,
and
disqualifications as the interim National Assembly
and the regular National Assembly and the
Members thereof." One of such powers is
precisely that of proposing amendments. The
1973
Constitution
in
its
Transitory
Provisions vested the Interim National
Assembly with the power to propose
amendments upon special call by the Prime
Minister by a vote of the majority of its
members to be ratified in accordance with
the Article on Amendments.
The Interim Batasang Pambansa, sitting as a
constituent body, can propose amendments.
In that capacity, only a majority vote is needed. It
would be an indefensible proposition to assert
that the three-fourth votes required when it sits
as a legislative body applies as well when it has
been convened as the agency through which
amendments could be proposed. That is not a
requirement as far as a constitutional convention
is concerned. It is not a requirement either when,
as in this case, the Interim Batasang Pambansa
exercises its constituent power to propose
amendments.
Topic: Snap presidential election of 1986; A

petition to prohibit the holding of the snap
election was filed with the SC but the
petition
was
dismissed
because
considerations other than legal had already
set in, the candidates were in the thick of
the campaign, and the people were already
looking forward to the election.
Doctrine: The issue turned into a political
question (from the purely justiciable issue of
the questioned constitutionality of the act due to
the lack of the actual vacancy of the Presidents
office) which can be truly decided only by
the people in their sovereign capacity at
the scheduled election, since there is no
issue more political than the election. The
Court cannot stand in the way of letting
the people decide through their ballot,
either to give the incumbent president a
new mandate or to elect a new president.
B. 1987 Constitution
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 104768,
July 21, 2003
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/10
4768.htm
Doctrine: the directives and orders of the

revolutionary
government
were
the
supreme law because no constitution
limited the extent and scope of such
directives and orders. With the abrogation
of the 1973 Constitution by the successful
revolution, there was no municipal law
higher than the directives and orders of
the
revolutionary
government.
Thus,
during this interregnum, a person could
not invoke an exclusionary right under a
In Re: Letter of Associate Justice Renato S.

Puno,
A.M. No. 90-11-2697-CA, June 29, 1992
Doctrine: A revolution has been defined as
the complete overthrow of the established
government in any country or state by
those who were previously subject to it as
as sudden, radical, and fundamental
change in the government or political
system, usually effected with violence. A
government as a result of people's revolution is
considered de jure if it is already accepted by
the family of nations or countries like the US,
Great Britain, Germany, Japan, and others.
Facts: The Court of Appeals and the Intermediate

Appellate Court existing prior to EO 33 were phased
out as part of the legal system abolished by the
revolution. The Court of Appeals established under EO

33 is an entirely new court; hence reference to
preference in rank contained in BP 129 refers to
prospective situations, not retroactive ones. As head
of the revolutionary government, President
Aquino can disregard any seniority ranking in
the Court of Appeals.
Held:
The present CA is a new entity, different
and distinct from the CA or the IAC, for it was created
in the wake of the massive reorganization launched by
the revolutionary government of Corazon Aquino in
the people power. In the new government under
Pres. Aquino, it was installed through direct
exercise of the Filipino power. Therefore, it is
the present CA that would negate the claims of
Justice Puno concerning his seniority ranking.
territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty

or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial and
aerial domains, including its territorial sea, the
seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other
submarine areas [1st sentence, Sec. 1, Art. II].
Components: Terrestrial, Fluvial, Maritime and Aerial
domains.
Archipelago Doctrine: The waters around, between
and connecting the islands of the archipelago,
regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part
of the internal waters of the Philippines (2nd
sentence, Sec. 1, Art II)
C.
Government
Defined. The agency or instrumentality through which

the will of the State is formulated, expressed and
realized. See U.S. v. Dorr, 2 Phil 332)
1.
functions: constituent vs. ministrant
ACCFA vs. FLU, 30 SCRA 649

Topic: Two-fold Function of the Government
Free Enterprise Ministrant vs Constituent
Functions
Doctrine: The functions of the government
are
classified
into
governmental
or
constituent and proprietary or ministrant.
The
former
involves
exercise
of
sovereignty and therefore compulsory; the
latter connotes merely the exercise of
proprietary functions and thus considered
THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE

I.
Elements of a state
Definition of a State. A community of persons, more or
less numerous, permanently occupying a definite
portion of territory, independent of external control,
and possessing a government to which a great body
of inhabitants render habitual obedience.
Distinguished from Nation. State is a legal or juristic
concept, while nation is an ethnic or racial concept.
Distinguished from Government. Government is
merely an instrumentality of the State through which
the will of the State is implemented and realized.
A.
People refers simply to the inhabitants of

the State.
Different meanings as used in the Constitution: (i)
Inhabitants [Sec. 2, Art. Ill; Sec. 1, Art. XIII]; (ii)
Citizens [Preamble; Secs. 1 & 4, Art. II; Sec. 7, Art. Ill];
(iii) Electors [Sec. 4, Art. VII].
As requisite for Statehood: Adequate number for selfsufficiency and defense; of both sexes for perpetuity.
B.
Territory [Art. I; R.A. 3046; R.A. 5446]
The National Territory: The national territory

comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the
islands and waters embraced therein, and all other
PVTA vs. CIR, 65 SCRA 416

Doctrine:
-The Court noted that the distinction between the
two functions had become blurred.
-Government has to provide for general welfare.
Traditionally, the functions of the government have
been classified into constituent, which are
mandatory for the Government to perform
because they constitute the very bonds of
society, such as the maintenance of peace and order,
regulation of property and property rights, the
administration of justice, etc; and ministrant, those
intended to promote the welfare, progress and
prosperity of the people, and which are merely
optional for Government to perform.
Under this traditional classification, such

constituent functions are exercised by the
State as attributes of sovereignty, and not
merely to promote the welfare, progress and
prosperity of the people these latter
functions being ministrant, the exercise of
which is optional on the part of the
government. Nonetheless, as he explained so
persuasively: "The growing complexities of

2.
types of government: de jure vs. de facto
Co Kim Cham v. Valdez Tan Keh, G.R. No. L-5,

September 17, 1945
Doctrine:
De Jure - has a rightful title but no power
or control, either because the same has been
withdrawn from it or because it has not yet
actually entered into the exercise thereof.
De Facto - actually exercises power or
control but without legal or legitimate authority.
Continuity of Law: Law, once established,
continues until changed by some competent
legislative power (not changed by mere change
of sovereignty)
All acts and proceedings of the 3 gov. depts. of
a de facto government are good and valid.
Kinds of De facto government:
(1) de facto proper government obtained by force
or voice of the majority
(2) paramount force by military forces who
invade the territory
(3) independent government established by
inhabitants through insurrection
Estrada v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 146710, 3/2/01

-
EDSA 1 is extraconstitutional and the

legitimacy of the new government that
resulted.
Whereas
EDSA
II
is
intraconstitutional and the resignation of the
sitting president had caused the succession.
The Supreme Court said that the resignation of

President Estrada could not be doubted as
confirmed by his leaving Malacanang. In the
press release containing his final statement, [i] he
acknowledged the oathtaking of the respondent as
President; [ii] he emphasized he was leaving the
palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin
the healing process (he did not say that he was
leaving due to any kind of disability and he was
going to reassume the Presidency as soon as the
disability disappears); [iii] he expressed his gratitude
to the people for the opportunity to serve them as
President (without doubt referring to the past
opportunity; [iv] he assured that he will not shirk
from any future challenge that may come in the
3.
It has been held that the Second Republic of the
Philippines was a de facto government of paramount
force, having been established by the Japanese belligerent
during the occupation of the Philippines in World War II.
The characteristics of this kind of de facto
government are:
1. Its existence is maintained by active military power
within the territories, and against the rightful authority of
an established and lawful government.
2. During its existence, it must necessarily be obeyed in
civil matters by private citizens who, by acts of obedience
rendered in submission to such force, do not become
responsible, as wrongdoers, for those acts, though not
warranted by the laws of the rightful government. Actual
governments of this sort are established over districts
differing greatly in extent and conditions. They are usually
administered by military authority, supported more or less
directly by military force.
The Government of the Republic of the

Phils.
Government of the Philippines is the corporate

governmental entity through which the functions of
government are exercised throughout the Philippines,
including, save as the contrary appears from the context,
the various arms through which political authority is made
effective in the Philippines, whether pertaining to the
autonomous regions, the provincial, city, municipal or
barangay subdivisions or other forms of local government"
[Sec. 2 (1), Administrative Code of 1987].
4.
government vs. administration
Government is the institution through which the state

exercises power. Administration consists of the set of
people currently running the institution
Lawyers League v. Aquino, G.R. No. 73748, 5/22/86

Doctrine: the people have made the judgment;
they have accepted the government of President
Corazon Aquino which is in effective control of the
entire country so that it is not merely a de facto
government but in fact and law a de jure
government. Moreover, the community of nations
has recognized the legitimacy of the present
FACTS: On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino

issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and Vice
President Laurel were taking power. On March 25, 1986,
proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the
Aquino government assumption of power by stating that
the new government was installed through a direct
exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by
units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines.
Held: The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a
justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where
only the people of the Philippines are the judge. And the
people have made the judgment; they accepted the
government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in
effective control of the entire country. It is not merely a
de facto government but in fact and law a de jure
government.
D.
Sovereignty
1.
Definition
Defined:
The supreme and uncontrollable
power inherent in a State by which that State is
governed.
2.
types: legal vs. political sovereignty

Bernas: Political writers distinguish
between legal sovereignty and political
sovereignty.
Legal is described as the supreme power to
make laws and Political as the sum total of
all influences in a state, legal or non-legal,
which determine the course of law.
Sinco prefers not to make the distinction and

places legal sovereignty in the state itself
considered as a juridical person.
3.
doctrine of jus postliminium
Political laws, except the law on treason, are

suspended [Laurel v. Misa, 77 Phil. 856];
municipal laws remain in force unless repealed
by the belligerent occupant. At the end of the
belligerent occupation, when the occupant is
ousted from the territory, the political laws
which had been suspended during the
occupation shall automatically become effective
again, under the doctrine of jus postliminium.
4.
Philippines by the Japanese forces, ceased to be good

and valid ipso facto upon the reoccupation of these
Island
and
the
restoration
therein
of
the
Commonwealth Government.
effect of suspension
sovereignty
or
change
in
Co Kim Chan v. Valdez, supra

Doctrine:
Continuity of Law: Law, once established,
continues
until
changed
by
some
competent legislative power (not changed
by mere change of sovereignty)
All acts and proceedings of the 3 gov.
depts. of a de facto government are good
and valid.
Peralta v. Director of Prisons, 75 Phil 285

Effects of belligerent occupation:
No change in sovereignty
Facts: After the Japanese lost in the Second World

War and left the Philippines, Peralta who was
convicted of robbery as defined and penalized by
section 2 (a) of Act No. 65 enacted by the National
Assembly under the Japanese rule, filed a petition for
habeas corpus based on the ground that the Court of
Special and Executive Criminal Jurisdiction created by
Ordinance No. 7 "was a political instrumentality of the
military forces of the Japanese Imperial Army, the
aims and purposes of which are repugnant to those
aims and political purposes of the Commonwealth of
the Philippines, as well as those of the United States
of America.
Held: The habeas corpus is granted and Peralta was
released. The Court argued that it was within the
power and competence of the belligerent occupant to
promulgate, through the National Assembly of the socalled Republic of the Philippines, Act No. 65, which
penalizes the crimes of robbery and other offenses by
imprisonment, and to try those who are accused of
crimes in the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal
Jurisdiction as an instrument of the Japanesecontrolled government. However, by the time of
the reoccupation of the Philippines and
restoration of the Commonwealth Government
the punitive sentence ceased to be valid as the
belligerent occupants also ceased to exercise
power and control over the Philippine territory.
The punitive sentence under consideration, although
good and valid during the military occupation of the
Alcantara v. Director of Prisons, 75 Phil 749

Doctrine:
No change in sovereignty
The rule that laws of political nature or

affecting political relations are considered
superseded or held in abeyance during the
military occupation, is intended for the
governing of the civil inhabitants of the
occupied territory and not for the enemies
FACTS: Petitioner Aniceto Alcantara was convicted of

the crime of illegal discharge of firearms with less
serious physical injuries. The Court of Appeals
modified the sentence to an indeterminate penalty
from arresto mayor to prison correccional. Petitioner
now questions the validity of the decision on the sole
ground that said court was only a creation of the socalled Republic of the Philippines during Japanese
military occupation, thus, a petition for the issuance of
writ of habeas corpus from petitioner.
HELD: Judgments of such court were good and valid
and remain good and valid for the sentence which
petitioner is now serving has no political complexion.
A penal sentence is said to be of a political
complexion when it penalizes a new act not defined in
the municipal laws, or acts already penalized by the
latter as a crime against the legitimate government
but taken out of territorial law and penalized as new
offenses committed against the belligerent occupant
which is necessary for the control of the occupied
territory and the protection of the army of the
occupier.
Such is the case at hand, the petition for writ of
habeas corpus is denied.
Laurel v. Misa, 77 Phil 856

Doctrine:
Nature of Allegiance to sovereign: Absolute
and permanent
Effect of enemy occupation: sovereignty of
the government not transferred to occupier
Characteristics: permanence, exclusiveness,
comprehensiveness,
absoluteness,
indivisibility, inalienability, imprescriptibility.
FACTS: A petition for habeas corpus was filed by

Anastacio Laurel who gave the enemy aid and comfort
during the Japanese occupation and was prosecuted
for the crime of treason. Petitioner contended that he
cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason defined
and penalized by article 114 of the Revised Penal
Code, for the reason (1) that the sovereignty of the
legitimate government in the Philippines and,
consequently, the correlative allegiance of Filipino
citizens there to was then suspended; and (2) that
there was a change of sovereignty over these Islands
upon the proclamation of the Philippine Republic. His
claim is that he cannot be tried under a change of
sovereignty since his acts were against the
Commonwealth which was already replaced by the
Republic.

HELD: Considering that the absolute and permanent
allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by
the enemy of their legitimate government or
sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy
occupation, because the sovereignty of the
government or sovereign de jure is not transferred
thereby to the occupier and if it is not transferred to
the occupant it must necessarily remain vested in the
legitimate government. There is no such thing as
suspended allegiance; sovereignty can may be
destroyed, or severed and transferred to another, but
it cannot be suspended because the existence of
sovereignty cannot be suspended without putting it
out of existence or divesting the possessor thereof at
least during the so-called period of suspension. What
may be suspended is the exercise of the rights of
sovereignty with the control and government of the
territory occupied by the enemy passes temporarily to
the occupant.
Laurel is subject to Article 114 of the Revised Penal
code as there was merely a change of the name of
government from Commonwealth to Republic
and does not affect the act of treason made by
the petitioner as the offense is made to the
same
sovereign
people
and
the
same
government as expressed in the Constitution:
"Sovereignty resides in the people and all government
authority emanates from them" (Section 1, Article II).
Furthermore, a crime against the Government of the
Philippines established by authority of the people of
the Philippines, in whom the sovereignty resides
according to section 1, Article II, of the Constitution of
the Philippines, by virtue of the provision of Section 2,
Article XVI provides that "All laws of the Philippine
Islands . . . shall remain operative, unless inconsistent
with this Constitution . . . and all references in such
laws to the Government or officials of the Philippine
Islands, shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to
refer to the Government and corresponding officials
under this constitution.
People v. Perfecto, 43 Phil 887

Doctrine:
abrogated
Political
laws
are
FACTS: The issue started when the Secretary of the

Philippine Senate, Fernando Guerrero, discovered that
the documents regarding the testimony of the
witnesses in an investigation of oil companies had
disappeared from his office. Then, the day following
the convening of Senate, the newspaper La Nacion
edited by herein respondent Gregorio Perfecto
published an article against the Philippine Senate.
Here, Mr. Perfecto was alleged to have violated Article
256 of the Spanish Penal Code provision that
punishes those who insults the Ministers of the Crown.
Hence, the issue.
REASONING: The Court stated that during the
Spanish Government, Article 256 of the SPC was
enacted to protect Spanish officials as representatives
of the King. However, the Court explains that in the
present case, we no longer have Kings nor its
representatives for the provision to protect. Also, with
the change of sovereignty over the Philippines from
Spanish to American, it means that the invoked
provision of the SPC had been automatically
abrogated. The Court determined Article 256 of the
SPC to be political in nature for it is about the
relation of the State to its inhabitants, thus, the Court
emphasized that it is a general principle of the public

law that on acquisition of territory, the previous
political relations of the ceded region are totally
abrogated. Hence, Article 256 of the SPC is
considered no longer in force and cannot be applied to
the present case.
Therefore, respondent was acquitted.
Macariola v. Asuncion, 114 SCRA 77

Effects of change in sovereignty: Political laws
are abrogated, municipal laws remain in force.
It is a general principle of the public law that
on acquisition of territory the previous
political relations of the ceded region are
totally abrogated. "Political" is here used to
denominate the laws regulating the relations
sustained by the inhabitants to the sovereign.
xxx Every nation acquiring territory, by treaty
or otherwise, must hold it subject to the
Constitution and laws of its own government,
and not according to those of the government
ceding it.
Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain
to the US and later to RP, the provisions of the
Code of Commerce must be deemed to have
been abrogated because where there is a
change of sovereignty, the political laws of the
former sovereign, whether compatible or not
with those of the new sovereign, are
Vilas v. City of Manila, 42 Phil 953

Doctrine: The mere change of sovereignty of a
country does not necessarily dissolve the
municipal corporation organized under the
former sovereign; only the governmental
functions that are not compatible with the
present sovereignty are suspended.
Facts:
Prior to the incorporation of the City of
Manila under the Republic Act No. 183, petitioner
Vilas is the creditor of the City. After the
incorporation, Vilas brought an action to recover the
sum of money owed to him by the city. The City of
Manila that incurred the debts has changed its
sovereignty after the cession of the Philippines to the
US by the Treaty of Paris and its contention now is
founded on the theory that by virtue of the Act No.
183 its liability has been extinguished.
Held: The mere change of sovereignty of a country
does not necessarily dissolve the municipal
corporation organized under the former sovereign.
The new City of Manila is in a legal sense the
successor of the old city. Thus the new city is
entitled to all property and property rights of
the predecessor corporation including its
liabilities.
The
court
held
that
only
the
governmental functions that are not compatible with
the present sovereignty are suspended. Because the
new City of Manila retains its character as the
predecessor of the old city it is still liable to the
creditors of the old City of Manila.

RULING:
The Constitution provides for the
strengthening of the family as the basic social unit, and
that whenever any member thereof such as in the case
at bar would
be
prejudiced
and
his
interest
be affected then the judiciary if a litigation has been filed
should resolve according to the best interest of that
person.
II. Doctrine of the state as parens patriae
Govt v. Monte de Piedad, 35 Phil 728
Doctrine: Doctrine of Parens Patriae which
literally means, parent of the people. As such,
the Government may act as guardian of the rights
of people who may be disadvantaged or suffering
from some disability or misfortune.
Under the Principle of Parens Patriae, the

Philippine Government being the guardian of
the rights of the people can represent the
legitimate claimants of the beneficiary and
therefore has the capacity to file a suit against
the appellant. The Philippine Government is not
Facts: About $400,000 were paid into the treasury of the
Philippine Islands by the inhabitants of the Spanish
Dominions for the relief of those damaged by the
earthquake on June 3, 1863 in the Philippines. Upon the
petition of the governing body of respondent, the
Philippine government directed its treasurer to turn over
to the respondent the sum of $80,000 of the relief fund in
instalments of $20,000 each. Petitioner now bring suit to
recover said amount with interest against respondents in
behalf of the various petitions of the persons and heirs to
whom the relief was intended. Defendant contends that
the amount was given as a donation and that the court
erred in stating that the Philippine Islands has subrogated
the Spanish government in its rights.
Ruling: The legislature or government of the State, as
parens patriae, has the right to enforce all charities of
public nature. The court further asserted that said amount
was not a donation and that respondent is liable for the
debt regardless of the cession of the Philippine Islands to
the United States. It is said that there is total abrogation of
the former political relations of the inhabitants of the
ceded region, however, the circumstances present in the
case are not political in nature. The great body of
municipal law which regulates private and domestic
rights continue in force until abrogated or changed
by the new ruler, as such, the government has the
authority to file a suit in behalf of its people by
virtue of the principle of parens patriae.
It may happen; family relations may press their respective

claims. It would be more in consonance not only with the
natural order of things but the tradition of the country for
a parent to be preferred. It could have been different
if the conflict were between father and mother. Such
is not the case at all. It is a mother asserting priority.
Certainly the judiciary as the instrumentality of the
State in its role of parens patriae, cannot remain
insensible to the validity of her plea.
III. State immunity from suits
Doctrine of State Immunity. As a consequence of
independence, territorial supremacy and equality, a
state enjoys immunity from the exercise of jurisdiction
(legislative, executive or judicial) by another state,
unless it has given consent, waived its immunity, or
voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court
concerned. Neither may its public property be
attached or taxed, nor its public vessels be boarded,
arrested or sued. This is based on the principle of par
in parem non habet imperium. The states
immunity extends to the Head of State who is the
personification of the state
A.
Article XVI, Sec. 3 of the 1987 Constitution provides

the State may not be sued without its consent.
Elements of the Provision:
a. State when the provision refers to the State
it includes both the host state and foreign states.
As such sovereign immunity is likewise available
to foreign states in so far as they are sought to be
sued in the courts of the local state. Under the
doctrine of sovereign equality of states, a state
cannot assert jurisdiction over another. (Par en
parem non habet imperium)
b.
Suit - When is a suit considered as a suit

against the state? State immunity, as a matter of
defense, may only be invoked if the state is
considered the real party in interest. State is the
real party in interest as defendant in a suit if it
produces adverse consequences to the public
treasury in terms of the need to appropriate
funds or property to satisfy the judgment.
c.
Consent - Sovereign immunity may be waived

by the state. Thus, giving its consent to be sued
either expressly or impliedly. Expressly, thru the
enactment of general laws or special laws or
impliedly, when the government into business
contracts or for reasons of equity.
Cabanas v. Pilapil, 58 SCRA 94

Doctrine: It is buttressed by its adherence to the
concept that the judiciary, as an agency of the
State acting as parens patriae, is called upon
whenever a pending suit of litigation affects one
who is a minor to accord priority to his best
Facts: Florentino
Pilapil insured himself
and
indicated his child to be his sole beneficiary and the
proceeds shall be administered by his brother
Francisco when he dies, while the child is still a mino.
Melchora Cabaas filed a complaint seeking the delivery
of the sum of money in her favor and allow herself to be
the childs trustee. Francisco asserted the terms of the
insurance policy
and
contended
that
as
a
private contract its terms and obligations must be binding
only to the parties and intended beneficiaries.
Constitutional Basis
Kawanakoa v. Polybank, 205 US 349

Argued March 21, 1907 / Decided April 8, 1907, 205
U.S.
349
Doctrine:
A sovereign is exempt from suit not
because of any formal conception or obsolete
. theory, but on the logical and practical ground

that there can be no legal right against the
authority that makes the law on which the right
depends.
It is an international law principle which is
founded on the positivist theory that there can be

Facts: This is an appeal from a decree affirming a decree

of foreclosure and sale under a mortgage executed by the
appellants to the appellee, Sister Albertina. 17 Haw. 82.
The defendants (appellants) pleaded to the jurisdiction
that after the execution of the mortgage a part of the
mortgaged land had been conveyed by them to one
Damon, and by Damon to the Territory of Hawaii, and was
now part of a public street. The bill originally made the
Territory a party, but the Territory demurred and the
plaintiffs dismissed their bill as to it before the above plea
was argued. Then the plea was overruled, and after
answer and hearing the decree of foreclosure was made,
the appellants having saved their rights. The decree
excepted from the sale the land conveyed to the Territory
and directed a judgment for the sum remaining due in
case the proceeds of the sale were insufficient to pay the
debt. Eq. Rule 92.
Allied Technologists through its architects, Enrique J. L.

Ruiz, Jose V. Herrera and Pablo D. Panlilio were
approved
by
the
United
States
Veterans
Administration in Washington, D.C. Because of the
technical objection to the capacity of the Allied
Technologists, Inc. to practice architecture and upon
the advice of the Secretary of Justice, the contract
was signed on the part of the Allied Technologists,Inc.
by Mr. Ruiz as President and Mr. Panlilio as Architect.
When the officials of the Department of National
Defense paid the Allied Technologists the contract
price for the architectural engineering service, they
retained 15 per cent of the sum due, for the reason
that Mr. Panlilio has asserted that he is the sole and
only architect of the Veterans Hospital to the
exclusion of his fellow architects Ruiz and Herrera, an
assertion aided and abetted by Col. Nicolas Jimenez.
This action deprived Mr. Ruiz andMr. Herrera monetary
value of their professional services and damaged their
professional prestige and standing.
Issue:
Whether the suit filed by the appellants
against the government without its consent qualify.
B.
Concept of Restrictive State Immunity

This immunity, however, is recognized only
with respect to sovereign or public acts of
the state, and cannot be invoked with respect to
private or proprietary acts.
C.
Typologies of suits against the state

1.
Suits Against Public Officials
The doctrine of State immunity also applies to

complaints filed against officials of the
State for acts performed by them in the
discharge of their duties within the scope of
their authority.
Held:
Based from the facts and circumstances
surrounding this case, the court decided that the
suit should be answered not by the government
but to its officials to compel them to act in
accordance with the rights to be established by the
contending architects, or to prevent them from
making payment and recognition until the contending
architects have established their respective rights and
interest in the funds retained and in the credit for the
work done. The order of dismissal is hereby reversed
and set aside, and the case is remanded to the court a
quo for further proceedings. With costs against the
defendants-appellees
b.
Effect when public officer acts without,

or in excess of, jurisdiction
Del Mar v. PVA, 51 SCRA 340

a. Test: will require an affirmative act from
the state
On the assumption that decision is
rendered against the public officer or
agency impleaded, will the enforcement
thereof require an affirmative act from
the State, such as the appropriation of
the needed amount to satisfy the
judgment? If so, then it is a suit against
Garcia v. Chief of Staff, 16 SCRA 120
Doctrine:
When a public officer is
sued for damages in the performance of
official duties and the judgment if the
claim
is
allowed
would
need
appropriation of public funds, this is
considered as suit against the state.
Ruiz v. Cabahug, 102 Phil 110 (1957)

Facts:
On July 31, 1950 Hon. Sotero B. Cabahug (Secretary of
National Defense) accepted the bid of the Allied
Technologists, Inc., to furnish the architectural and
engineering services in the construction of the
Veterans Hospital at a price of P302,700.00 . The
plans, specifications, sketches and detailed drawings
and other architectural requirements submitted by the
Doctrine:
However, when the suit is to
compel a public officer to perform a ministerial
duty to pay the plaintiff with amounts already
appropriated, this is no longer a suit against the
state because there is no more need to
appropriate funds for the purpose.
Festejo v. Fernando, GR No. L-5156, March 11,

1954
Doctrine:
When the case clearly indicates
that the public official is sued in his personal
capacity/or for acts beyond his authority, the suit
is not against the state.
2.
Suits Against Government Agencies

a. Tests
i. If incorporated: consult charter
If the charter provides that the agency can sue
and be sued, then suit will lie, including one for
tort. The provision in the charter constitutes
express consent on the part of the State to be
sued.
*If incorporated there are always be a
charter, special laws passed by congress in
creating them.

*Is the charter silent or not? If not then
theres no question whether it has a
governmental function, it can be sued
consent, the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal

of the complaint. Finally the petitioner filed an appeal
before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether a suit against the Central Bank for
refund a suit against the State?
Bermoy v. PNC, GR No. L-8670, May 18, 1956

Note: *General Corp. Law charter is silent
but makes reference to this law
*Since the Gen Corp Law contains provision
that allows you to sue or be sued, then
PNC can be sued
Held: It is not a suit against the state. The

charter of the Central Bank of the Philippines
authorize that it can sue and be sued. The consent of
the State to be sued, therefore, has been given.
Rayo v. CFI, 110 SCRA 460

Facts: On July 6, 1954, (24) twenty four employees
from its dormitory known as Normal Hall of the
Philippine Normal College, filled an action in the COF
of Manila against the PNC for the recovery of salary
differentials and overtime pay. The Solicitor General
on behalf of the defendant answers and denies the
latter liability. The court ordered it dismissed before
the case was tried on the merits, on the ground that
neither one of the defendants was a corporation or a
juridical entity with capacity to be sued. The plaintiffs
took an appeal to Supreme Court, alleging that it was
an error to dismiss their case on the ground that, R.A.
No. 416 took effect July, 1949 converted PNS to PNC,
thus created a Board of Trustees to administer the
affairs as a corporation under section 13 of the
amended Act 1455 (Corporate Law), with the power
to sue and to be sued in any court.
Held: The state has already given the consent by
investing the college with express power to be sued in
the court. The act Authorizes the College to be sued is
also made clear in Section 6, where it is provided that
all process against the Board of Trustees shall be
served on the President or Secretary thereof. The
order appealed from is re revoked and the case
remanded to the court of origin for further
proceedings. No cost
Doctrine:
If the charter provides
that the agency can sue and be sued, then
suit will lie, including one for tort. The
provision in the charter constitutes express
consent on the part of the State to be sued
FACTS: At the height of the infamous typhoon

"Kading", the respondent opened simultaneously all
the three floodgates of the Angat Dam which resulted
in a sudden, precipitate and simultaneous opening of
said floodgates several towns in Bulacan were
inundated. The petitioners filed for damages against
the respondent corporation. Petitioners opposed the
prayer of the respondents forn dismissal of the case
and contended that the respondent corporation is
merely performing a propriety functions and that
under its own organic act, it can sue and be sued in
court.
HELD:
The government has organized a private corporation,
put money in it and has allowed it to sue and be sued
in any court under its charter.
As a government owned and controlled
corporation, it has a personality of its own,
distinct and separate from that of the
government. Moreover, the charter provision
that it can sue and be sued in any court.
Arcega v. CA, 66 SCRA 229

FACT: The petitioner Alicia O. Arcega, doing business
under the firm name Fairmont Ice Cream Company,
filed a complaint before the court against the
respondents Central Bank of the Philippines and
Philippine National Bank, for the refund from allegedly
unauthorized payments made by her of the 17%
special excise tax on foreign exchange. The Central
Bank moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds,
among others, that the trial court has no jurisdiction
over the subject-matter of the action, because the
judgment sought will constitute a financial charge
against the Government, and therefore the suit is one
against the Government, which cannot prosper
without its consent, and in this case no such consent
has been given. The petitioner appealed, but the court
dismissed the complaint on the ground set forth in the
Central Banks motion to dismiss. The petitioner
Arcega filed a motion for reconsideration of the
resolution to which an opposition was filed by the
Central Bank. This time, the Central Bank submitted a
certification that the balance of the collected special
excise tax on sales of foreign exchange was turned
over to the Treasurer of the Philippines. Then the court
denied the petitioners motion forreconsideration as a
result Arcega appealed to the Court of Appeals.
Holding that the suit is indirectly against the Republic
of the Philippines which cannot be sued without its
PNR (Philippine National Railways)

SCRA 401
v. IAC, 217
It was held that although the charter of PNR is

silent on whether it may sue or be sued, it had
already been ruled in Malong v. PNR, 185 SCRA
63, that the PNR is not performing any
governmental function and may, therefore, be
sued.
By the doctrine of implied powers, the power to
sue and be sued is implicit from the faculty to
transact private business. PNR is not exercising
FACTS: The passenger express train of Philippine

National Railways (PNR) and a passenger bus of
Baliwag Transit Inc. collided at the railroad crossing at
Barrio Balungao, Calumpit Bulacan at 1:30 in the
afternoon of August 10, 1947 causing damage to the
bus and its passengers, 18 of whom died and 53
suffered physical injuries. Plaintiff alleges that the
collision was due to the negligence and imprudence of
PNR and its engineer Honorio Cirbado in operating in a
busy intersection without any bars, semaphores,
signal lights, flagman or switchman.
ii.
If unincorporated: determine nature

of primary function

If governmental: NO suit without consent

If proprietary: suit will lie^ because when
the State engages in principally proprietary
functions, then it descends to the level of a
private individual, and may, therefore, be
vulnerable to suit
Bureau of Printing
Employees Assn,
1 SCRA 340
v.
Bureau
of
Printing
Doctrine:
- Acceptance of outside work and payment of
overtime compensation does not make work of
Bureau of Printing proprietary.
- Non-suability of the State is available to the
agency even if it is shown that it is engaged
not only in governmental functions but also,
incidentally,
in
proprietary
enterprises
(unincorporated agency).
Facts: Upon complaint of the respondents of the

Bureau of Printing Employees Association against the
Bureau of Printing, the complaint alleged that the
latter have been engaging in unfair labor practices by
interfering with, or coercing their employees, in the
exercise of their right to self-organization and
discriminating in regard to hire and tenure of their
employment in order to discourage them from
pursuing the union activities. The Petitioners of
Bureau of Printing denied the charges of unfair labor
practices attributed to and, by way of affirmative
defenses, alleged, among other things, that the
respondents of the Bureau of Printing Employees
Association were suspending the pending result of an
administrative investigation against them for breach
of Civil Service rules and regulations petition; that the
Bureau of Printing has no juridical personality to sue
and be sued; that said bureau is not an industrial
concern engaged for the purpose of gain but is an
agency of the Republic performing government
functions. The petitioners filed an "Omnibus Motion"
asking for a preliminary hearing on the question of
jurisdiction raised by them in their answer and for
suspension of the trial of the case on the merits
pending the determination of such juridical question.
Mobil Phils. v. Customs Arrastre Service, 18

SCRA 1120
Doctrine:
If an agencys function is deemed
proprietary, if such is a necessary incident of
the primary and gov. function of such agency,
such
agency
is
not
suable
(for
an
unincorporated agency only).
It was held that the Customs Arrastre Service is
merely an adjunct of the Bureau of Customs. A
suit against it is, therefore, a suit against the
Bureau of Customs, an unincorporated agency
performing primarily governmental functions.
[NOTE: Even in the exercise of proprietary
functions
incidental
to
its
primarily
governmental functions, an unincorporated
agency still cannot be sued without its
FACTS: Four cases of rotary drill parts were shipped

from abroad on S.S. "Leoville", consigned to Mobil
Philippines Exploration, Inc., Manila. The shipment

was discharged to the custody of the Customs
Arrastre Service, the unit of the Bureau of Customs
then handling arrastre operations therein. The
Customs Arrastre Service later delivered to the broker
of the consignee three cases only of the shipment.
Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc., filed suit in the
Court of First Instance of Manila against the Customs
Arrastre Service and the Bureau of Customs to recover
the value of the undelivered case in the amount of
P18,493.37 plus other damages. Defendants filed a
motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that
not being persons under the law, defendants cannot
be sued. Appellant contends that not all government
entities are immune from suit; that defendant Bureau
of Customs as operator of the arrastre service at the
Port of Manila, is discharging proprietary functions and
as such, can be sued by private individuals.
3.
Suits Against Foreign States
Syquia v. Almeda Lopez, 84 Phil 312

(read also the dissent of Justice Perfecto)
It was the ruling that respondent Judge acted
correctly considering that the action must be
considered
as
one
against
the
U.S.
Government.
The
opinion
of
Justice
Montemayor continued: It is clear that the
courts of the Philippines including the
Municipal Court of Manila have no jurisdiction
over the present case for unlawful detainer.
The question of lack of jurisdiction was raised
and interposed at the very beginning of the
action. The U.S. Government has not given its
consent to the filing of this suit which is
essentially against her, though not in name.
Moreover, this is not only a case of a citizen
filing a suit against his own Government
without the latters consent but it is of a citizen
filing an action against a foreign government
without said governments consent, which
renders more obvious the lack of jurisdiction of
FACTS: The plaintiffs Pedro, Gonzalo, and Leopoldo,

all surnamed Syquia, are the undivided joint owners of
three apartment buildings situated in the City of
Manila known as the North Syquia Apartments, South
Syquia Apartments and Michel Apartments. About the
middle of the year 1945, said plaintiffs executed three
lease contracts, one for each of the three apartments,
in favor of the United States of America at a monthly
rental of P1,775 for the North Syquia Apartments,
P1,890 for the South Syquia Apartments, and P3,335
for the Michel Apartments. The term or period for the
three leases was to be "for the duration of the war
and six months thereafter, unless sooner terminated
by the United States of America." The apartment
buildings were used for billeting and quartering
officers of the U. S. armed forces stationed in the
Manila area.
Dissenting by Judge Perfecto
The petition must be granted. The government of the
United States of America had entered into a private
contract with private citizens of the Philippines and
the deed executed in our country concerns real
property located in Manila, places said government,
for purposes of the jurisdiction of our courts, on the
same legal level of the lessors. Although, generally,
foreign
governments
are
beyond
the
jurisdiction of domestic courts of justice, such
rule is inapplicable to cases in which the foreign
government enters into private contracts with

the citizens of the court's jurisdiction. Once a
foreign government enters into a private contract with
the private citizens of another country, such foreign
government cannot shield its non-performance or
contravention of the terms of the contract under the
cloak of non- jurisdiction.
Sanders v. Veridiano, 162 SCRA 88

Test to determine if suit is against the State:
On the assumption that decision is rendered
against
the
public
officer
or
agency
impleaded, will the enforcement thereof
require an affirmative act from the State, such
as the appropriation of the needed amount to
satisfy the judgment? If so, then it is a suit
against the State.
Mere
allegation
that
a
government
functionary is being sued in his personal
capacity will not automatically remove him
from the protection of the laws of public
officers and doctrine of state immunity;
FACTS:
Petitioner Dale Sanders was the special
services director of the US Naval Station (NAVSTA) in
Olongapo City. Private respondents, Anthony Rossi
and Ralph Wyers, are American citizens permanently
residing in the Philippines and were employed as
game room attendants in the special services
department of NAVSTA. On October 3, 1975, the
respondents were advised that their employment had
been converted from permanent full-time to
permanent part-time. In a letter addressed to
petitioner Moreau, Sanders disagreed with the hearing
officers report of the reinstatement of private
respondents to permanent part-time plus back wages.
Respondents allege that the letters contained libelous
imputations which caused them to be ridiculed and,
thus, filed for damages against petitioners.
RULING: Sanders, as director of the special services
department of NAVSTA, undoubtedly had supervision
over its personnel, including the private respondents.
Given the official character of the letters, the
petitioners were being sued as officers of the United
States government because they have acted on
behalf of that government and within the scope of
their authority. Thus, it is that government and
not the petitioners personally that is responsible
for their acts.
FACTS: This petition arose from a controversy over a

parcel of land consisting of 6,000 square meters
located in the Municipality of Paranaque. Said lot was
contiguous with two other lots. These lots were sold to
Ramon Licup. In view of the refusal of the squatters to
vacate the lots sold, a dispute arose as to who of the
parties has the responsibility of evicting and clearing
the land of squatters. Complicating the relations of
the parties was the sale by petitioner of the lot of
concern to Tropicana
HELD: The Court held that Holy See may
properly invoke sovereign immunity for its nonsuability. As expressed in Section 2 of Article II
of the 1987 Constitution, we have adopted the
generally accepted principles of International
Law. Even without this affirmation, such principles of
International Law are deemed incorporated as part of
the law of the land as a condition and consequence of
our admission in the society of nations. In the present
case, if petitioner has bought and sold lands in the
ordinary course of real estate business, surely the said
transaction can be categorized as an act jure
gestionis. However, petitioner has denied that the
acquisition and subsequent disposal of the lot were
made for profit but claimed that it acquired said
property for the site of its mission or the Apostolic
Nunciature in the Philippines.
The Holy See is immune from suit for the act of
selling the lot of concern is non-proprietary in
nature. The lot was acquired by petitioner as a
donation from the Archdiocese of Manila. The
donation was made not for commercial purpose, but
for the use of petitioner to construct thereon the
official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio. The
decision to transfer the property and the subsequent
disposal thereof are likewise clothed with a
governmental character. Petitioner did not sell the lot
for profit or gain. It merely wanted to dispose of the
same because the squatters living thereon made it
almost impossible for petitioner to use it for the
purpose of the donation.
Doctrine:
Pursuant to the 1961 Vienna
Convention
on
Diplomatic
Relations,
a
diplomatic envoy is granted immunity from the
civil and administrative jurisdiction of the
receiving state over any real action relating to
private immovable property situated in the
territory of the receiving state which the envoy
holds on behalf of the sending state for the
Holy
See v.of
Rosario,
238 SCRA 524
purposes
the mission
Note: The Holy See has all the constituent elements
of statehood (people: less than 1000 individuals;
territory: 108.7 acres; government with the Pope as
head; and independence by virtue of the Lateran
Treaty of February 11, 1929, which constituted the
Vatican as a territory under the sovereignty of the
Holy See). It has all the rights of a state, including
diplomatic intercourse, immunity from foreign
jurisdiction, etc..
A state may be said to have descended to the

level of an individual and can thus be deemed
to have tacitly given its consent to be sued
USA
Guinto,
182 SCRA
644 (GRcontracts.
No. 76607)
onlyv.when
it enters
into business
where the contract involved a concession for a barber
shop facility in the naval base, and was considered a
contract in jus gestionis

made, claimant has 30 days to appeal by
certiorari to the CA.
FACTS: The private respondents are suing several

officers of the US Air Force in Clark Air Base in
connection with the bidding conducted by them for
contracts for barber services in the said base, which
was won by Dizon. The respondents wanted to cancel
the award because they claimed that Dizon had
included in his bid an area not included in the
invitation to bid, and also, to conduct a rebidding.
RULING: The contract bidded out for barbershop
facilities in the Clark Field US Air Force Base was
deemed commercial.
D.
Waiver of Immunity: Consent to be Sued

The state is deemed to have waived its
immunity
when it gives consent at the time the
proceeding is instituted;
when it takes steps relating to the merits of
the case before invoking immunity;
when, by treaty or contract, it had previously
given consent; or
when, by law or regulation in force at the time
the complaint arose, it has indicated that it will
consent to the institution of the proceedings
In order that suit may lie against the state,
there must be consent, either express or
implied. Where no consent is shown, state
immunity from suit may be invoked as a
defense by the courts sua sponte at any stage of
the proceedings, because waiver of immunity,
being in derogation of sovereignty, will not be
inferred lightly and must be construed in
strictissimi juris. Accordingly, the complaint (or
counterclaim) against the State must allege the
existence of such consent (and where the same is
found), otherwise, the complaint may be
dismissed [Republic v. Feliciano, 148 SCRA
424].
Article 2180 of the Civil code which allows

complainants to sue the state for quasidelicts committed by special agents.
Incorporation of Government Owned and

Controlled Corporation granting it a separate
personality from the national government.
Local Government Code (RA 7160) which

grants local government units the power to
sue and be sued.
Amigable v. Cuenca, 43 SCRA 360

Doctrine:
Even if, in exercising the power of
eminent domain, the State exercises a power
jus imperii (sovereign acts), as distinguished
from its proprietary right of jus gestionis
(commercial or proprietary acts) , where
property
has
been
taken
without
just
compensation being paid, the defense of
Facts: An action for the recovery of the value of

the property taken by the government and
converted into a public street without payment of
just compensation was allowed, despite the failure
of the property owner to file his claim with the
Auditor General.
Held: The government, when it takes away a
property from a private land owner for public use
without going through the legal process of
expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved
party may properly maintain a suit against the
government without thereby violating the doctrine
of governmental immunity from suit. This doctrine
cannot be used in perpetrating injustice to a
citizen.
Doctrines:
ii. Thru
a special law
The State
is responsible
in like manner
when itlaws
acts through
agent;
but not to
Special
granting a special
particular
person/entity
when
the damage
has been
by the by
sue
government
agencies
maycaused
be granted
official to
whom
the task done properly
congress
thru
a resolution.
pertains.
(Art.
2180
par.
6,
Civil
Code)
CASE: Merrit v. Government of the Phil.

The 34
state
Islands,
Phil is
311not responsible for the
1.
Forms of Consent
a.
Express
Express consent can be given only by

an act of the legislative boyd, in a
general or a special law.
i.
Thru a general law (Read Act No.

3083 and C.A. 327, as amended
by P.D. 1445)
General laws granting consent to be sued

include:
Money claims arising from contract under Act

No. 3048, CA 327, Art. IX-A Sec. 7, 1987
Const. Must be filed with COA which has 60
days within which to act. Once a decision is
damages suffered by private individuals in

consequence of acts performed by its
employees in the discharge of the functions
pertaining to their office, because neither
fault nor even negligence can be presumed
on the part of the state in the organization
of branches of public service and in the
appointment of its agents. (Merritt vs.
Government of the Philippine Islands)
The State is not liable for the torts
committed by its officers or agents whom it
employs, except when expressly made so by
legislative enactment. The government does
not undertake to guarantee to any person
the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it
employs since that would involve it in all its
operations in endless embarrassments,
difficulties and losses, which would be
subversive of the public interest. (Merritt vs.
Government of the Philippine Islands)
By consenting to be sued, a state simply
waives its immunity from suit. It does not
thereby concede its liability to the plaintiff,

defense.
FACTS: Merrit who was a constructor was riding a

motorcycle along Padre Faura Street when he was bumped
by the ambulance of the General Hospital. Merrit
sustained severe injuries rendering him unable to return to
work. The legislature later enacted Act 2457 authorizing
Merritt to file a suit against the Government in order to fix
the responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle
and the ambulance of the General Hospital, and to
determine the amount of the damages, if any, to which he
is entitled. After trial, the lower court held that the
collision was due to the negligence of the driver of the
ambulance. It then determined the amount of damages
and ordered the government to pay the same.
ACT 2457 reads:

"An act authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit against the
Government of the Philippine Islands and authorizing the
Attorney-General of said Islands to appear in said suit.
"Whereas a claim has been filed against the Government
of the Philippine Islands by Mr. E. Merritt, of Manila, for
damages resulting from a collision between his
motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital on
March twenty-fifth, nineteen hundred and thirteen;
"Whereas it is not known who is responsible for the
accident nor is it possible to determine the amount of
damages, if any , to which the claimant is entitled; and
"Whereas the Director of Public Works and the AttorneyGeneral recommend that an act be passed by the
Legislature authorizing Mr. E. Merritt to bring suit in the
courts against the Government, in order that said
questions may be decided: Now, therefore,
"By authority of the United States, be it enacted by the
Philippine Legislature, that:
"SECTION 1. E. Merritt is hereby authorized to bring suit in
the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila against the
Government of the Philippine Islands in order to fix the
responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle and
the ambulance of the General Hospital, and to determine
the amount of the damages, if any, to which Mr. E. Merritt
is entitled on account of said collision, and the attorneyGeneral of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and
directed to appear at the trial on the behalf of the
Government of said Islands, to defend said Government at
the same.
"SEC. 2. This Act shall take effect on its passage.
"Enacted, February 3, 1915."
HELD:
1. By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its
immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its
liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his
favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously
recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a
preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of
the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful
2. Under the Civil Code, the state is liable when it acts

through a special agent, but not when the damage should
have been caused by the official to whom properly it
pertained to do the act performed. A special agent is one
who receives a definite and fixed order or commission,
foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a
special official. This concept does not apply to any
executive agent who is an employee of the acting
administration and who on his own responsibility performs
the functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain
to his office and which are regulated by law and the
regulations. The driver of the ambulance of the General
Hospital was not a special agent; thus the Government is
not liable.
b.
Implied
i.
When state commences litigation
Froilan v. Pan Oriental Shipping Co., GR No. L6060, Sept. 30, 1950
Doctrine: When the State commences
litigation, it becomes vulnerable to a
counterclaim.
Facts: Fernando A. Froilan purchased the vessel
FS-197 from the Shipping Commission for P200,000,
paying P50,000 down and agreeing to pay the
balance in installments. However, the installments
were not paid and the Shipping Commission took
possession of the vessel and considered the sale
cancelled. The Shipping Commission then chartered
the vessel to Pan Oriental Shipping Co.
Froilan then filed a complaint against Pan Oriental
Shipping Co. Pan Oriental Shipping Co. filed its
answer denying the right of Froilan to the vessel.
Following this, the Republic of the Philippines, as
intervenor, filed a complaint in intervention alleging
that Froilan had failed to pay to the Shipping
Commission the balance. Froilan then tendered to
the Board of Liquidators (which was liquidating the
affairs of the Shipping Administration) a check in
payment of his obligation for the vessel. The lower
court held that the check constituted a payment
and a discharge of Froilan's obligation to the
government.
However, Pan Oriental Shipping Co. had also filed an
answer to the government's complaint in
intervention saying that the government was
obligated to deliver the vessel to it by contract. In
response, the government filed a motion to dismiss
the counterclaim of Pan Oriental Shipping Co.
against it on the grounds that the action of
delivering the vessel to Pan Oriental Shipping Co.
was no longer feasible and was barred by prior
judgment, and also that the court has no jurisdiction
over the intervenor government of the Republic of
the Philippines.
Held: Supreme Court held that the dismissal of the
counterclaim was untenable, because by filing its

complaint in intervention the Government in
effect waived its right to non-suability.
enemy nor ally of an enemy for the purpose of

establishing his right, title or interest in vested
property, and of recovering his ownership and
possession. Congressional consent to such suit has
expressly been given by the US.
Lim v. Brownell, 107 SCRA 345

Doctrine: Intervention by the State would
constitute
commencement
of
litigation,
except when the State intervenes not for the
purpose of asking for any affirmative relief,
but only for the purpose of resisting the
claim precisely because of immunity from
suit.
The claim for damages for the use of property
against the intervenor dependant Republic of
the Philippines to which it was transferred
cannot be maintained because of the
immunity of the State from suit. The claim
obviously constitutes a charge against, or
Facts: The property in dispute consists of 4 parcels

of land in Tondo, city of Manila, with a total area of
29,151 sq. meters. The lands were, after the last
world war, found by the Alien Property Custodian of
the US to be registered in the name of Asaichi
Kagawa, national of an enemy country, Japan, as
evidenced by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 64904
to 65140.
The order of dismissal with respect to plaintiffs claim

for damages against Atty. General of the US must be
upheld because congressional consent to such suit
has not been granted. The relief available to a person
claiming enemy property which has been vested by
the Philippines Alien Property Custodian is limited to
those expressly provided for in the Trading with the
Enemy Act, which does not include a suit for damages
for such use of such vested property.
The claim for damages for the use of the property
against the intervenor defendant Republic of the
Philippines cannot be maintained because of the
immunity of the state from suit which needs the
consent of that said government. The Republic of the
Philippines did not waive its right of non-suability
because Republic intervened in the case merely to
unity with the defendant Attorney General of the
United States in resisting plaintiffs claims, and for
that reason asked no affirmative relief against any
party in the answer in intervention it filed
On March 14, 1946, the Alien Property Custodian

issued a vesting order on the authority of the Trading
with the Enemy Act of the United States, vesting in
himself the ownershi over two of the said lots lots 1
and 2.
On July 6, 1948, the Philippine Alien Property
Administrator (Successor of the Alien Property
Custodian), under the same statute, issued a
supplemental vesting order, vesting in himself title to
the remaining lots 3 and 4.
On August 3, 1948, The Philippine Alien Property
administrator transferred all the said four lots to the
Republic of the Philippines upon the latters
undertaking fully to indemnify the US for all claims in
relation to the property transferred, which claims are
payable by the US or the Philippine Alien Property
Administrator of the US under the Trading with the
Enemy Act.
On November 15, 1948, Benito E. Lim, son of Arsenia
Enriquez, filed a formal notice of claim
to the
property on the theory that the lots in question still
belonged to Arsenia and that she mortgaged these
lots to the Mercantile Bank of China. And that the
mortgaged having been foreclosed, the property was
sold at public auction to Asaichi Kagawa, who, by
means of threat and intimidation succeeded in
preventing Arsenia to exercise her rights of
redemption; and that Kagawa never acquired any
valid title to the property because he was ineligible
under the Constitution to acquire residential land in
the Philippines by reason of alien age.
Issue:
Whether or not the lower court erred in
dismissing the case over the reason that it does not
have jurisdiction over the claim for rentals since the
action in that regard constituted a suit against the US
to which it had not given its consent.
Ruling: The court decided that the order of dismissal
couldnt be sustained in its entirety. The immunity of
the state from suit cannot be invoked where the
action is instituted by a person who is neither an
ii.
When state enters into a contract
US v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487

Doctrine:
where the Supreme Court
classified contracts entered into by the
state into those in jure imperii and those in
jure gestionis
by right of sovereign power, in the exercise
of sovereign functions. No implied consent.
Thus, the contract for the repair of wharves
was a contract in jus imperii, because the
wharves were to be used in national defense,
FACTS: The United States of America had a
naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base was
one of those provided in the Military Bases
Agreement between the Philippines and the US. On
May, 1972, the United States invited the submission
of bids for some projects. Eligio de Guzman & Co.,
Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids.
But the US informed the company that it did not
qualify to receive an award for the projects because
of its previous unsatisfactory performance rating.
Respondent alleges that it won in the bidding
conducted by the US for the construction of
wharves in said base that was wrongly awarded to
another group. For this reason, a suit for specific
performance was filed by him against the US.

HELD: The traditional rule of State immunity
exempts a State from being sued in the courts
of another State without its consent or waiver.
This rule is a necessary consequence of the
principles of independence and equality of States.
However, the rules of International Law are not
petrified; they are constantly developing and
evolving. And because the activities of states have
multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish
them-between sovereign and governmental acts
(jure imperii) and private, commercial and
proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that,
State immunity now extends only to acts jure
imperii.
court will have to receive the evidence of the

alleged irregularity in the grant of the barbershop
concessions before it can be known in what capacity
the petitioners were acting at the time of the
incident.
E.
Santiago v. Republic, 87 SCRA 294

Doctrine:
The government's waiver of
immunity was implied by virtue of the terms
provided in the deed of donation.
The restrictive application of State immunity

is proper only when the proceedings arise out
of commercial transactions of the foreign
sovereign,
its
commercial
activities
or
economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may
be said to have descended to the level of an
individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly
given its consent to be sued only when it enters into
business contracts. It does not apply where the
contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign
functions. In this case the projects are an integral
part of the naval base which is devoted to the
defense of both the United States and the
Philippines, indisputably a function of the
government of the highest order; they are not
utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business
purposes.
an action for the revocation of a donation

because of the failure of the defendant to
comply with stipulated conditions was
allowed, inasmuch as the action did not
involve a money claim.
Facts:
Petitioner Ildefonso Santiago donated a parcel of
land to the Bureau of Plant Industry on the terms
that the Bureau should construct a building and
install lighting facilities on the said lot.
When time passed and there were still no
improvements on the lot, Santiago filed a case
pleading for the revocation of such contract of
donation but the trial court dismissed the petition
claiming that it is a suit against the government
and should not prosper without the consent of the
government.
USA v. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644
Held:
The
doctrine
of
governmental
immunity from suit cannot serve as an
instrument for perpetrating an injustice on
a citizen. It would be manifestly unfair for the
Republic, as done, alleged to have violated the
conditions under which it received gratuitously
certain property, to use the concept of nonsuitability as its defence. The government is the
beneficiary and therefore should adhere to the
highest ethical standards, which can only be
ignored at the risk of losing the confidence of the
people, the repository of the sovereign power.
Doctrine: the contract bidded out for

barbershop facilities in the Clark Field US
Air Force Base was deemed commercial.
Similarly, in a companion case, U.S. v.
Rodrigo, a contract for restaurant services
within the Camp John Hay Air Station was
likewise held commercial in character.
FACTS: The cases have been consolidated because
they all involve the doctrine of state immunity. In
GR No. 76607, private respondents re suing several
officers of the US Air Force in connection with the
bidding for barbering services in Clark Air Base. In
GR No. 80018, Luis Bautista was arrested following
a buy-bust operation for violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act. Bautista then filed a complaint for
damages claiming that because of the acts of the
respondents, he lost his job. In GR No. 79470,
Fabian Genove filed a complaint for damages
against petitioner for his dismissal as cook in the US
Air Force. In GR No. 80258, complaint for damage
was filed by the respondents against petitioners for
injuries allegedly sustained by plaintiffs. All cases
invoke the doctrine of state immunity as ground to
dismiss the same.
HELD: It is clear that the petitioners in GR No.
80018 were acting in the exercise of their official
functions. They cannot be directly impleaded for the
US government has not given its consent to be
sued. In GR No. 79470, petitioners are not immune
for restaurants are commercial enterprises,
however, claim of damages by Genove cannot be
allowed on the strength of the evidence presented.
Barber shops are also commercial enterprises
operated by private persons, thus, petitioners in GR
No. 76607 cannot plead any immunity from the
complaint filed. In GR No. 80258, the respondent
Suit allowed even without consent to be

sued
The government is a beneficiary of the terms of the

donation but it did not comply with such terms. Thus,
the donor Santiago has the right to be heard in the
court. Also, to not allow the donor to be heard would
be unethical and contrary to equity which the
government so advances. The Court of First Instance
is hereby directed to proceed with the case.
F.
Scope of Consent: Consent to be Sued not

Consent to Execution of Judgment
When the State gives its consent to be
sued, it does not thereby consent to
execution of judgment against it.
The mere fact that the state is suable does not
mean that it is liable, or to put in another way,
waiver of immunity does not mean concession of
liability. (Cruz, Phil. Pol. L aw, 1996 Ed. P. 46)
Assuming for the sake of argument that
complainant wins the case against the state, the

extent of consent granted by the state is only
until the finality of judgment. Execution of the
judgment may not be done thru the ordinary
means of satisfying the award because public
funds or property cannot be garnished or levied
upon just like any private property. (Phil Video,
Inc. vs TESDA, G. R. No. 155504, June 26,
2009).
The victorious claimant against the government

must wait until the funds to satisfy the award are
appropriated by the pertinent legislative body
Rep. v. Villasor, 54 SCRA 84

Doctrine:
- Judgment against the State cannot be
enforced
by
execution.
It
may
limit
claimants action only up to the completion
of proceedings anterior to the state of
execution. Power of courts end when
judgment
is
rendered.
[suability
vs.
liability].
Such execution will require
another waiver, because the power of the
court ends when the judgment is rendered,
since government funds and properties may
not be seized under writs of execution or
garnishment, unless such disbursement is
covered by the corresponding appropriation
as required by law
Facts: The decision that was rendered in favor of

respondents P.J. Kiener Co., Ltd, Gavino Unchuan
and International Construction Corporation was
declared final and executory by Respondent Hon.
Guillermo P. Villasor.
Pursuant
to
the
said
declaration,
the
corresponding Alias
Writ of Execution was issued. And for the strength
of this writ, the provincial sheriff served notices of
garnishment with several banks, specially on the
'monies due the Armed Forces of the Philippines
in the form of deposits; the Philippines Veterans
Bank received the same notice of garnishment.
The funds of the AFP on deposit with the banks
are public funds duly appropriated and allocated
for the payment of pensions of retireees, pay and
allowances of military and civillian personnel and
for maintenance and operations of AFP.
Petitioner filed a petition against Villasor for
acting in excess jurisdiction amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in granting the issuance of a Writ of
Execution against the properties of AFP, hence
the notices and garnishments are null and void.
Issue: Is the Writ of Execution issued by Judge
Villasor valid?
Held: What was done by respondent Judge is not
in conformity with the dictates of the Constitution.
It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism
flowing from the juristic concept of sovereignty
that the state as well as its government is
immune from suit unless it gives its consent. A
sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any
formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the
logical and practical ground that there can be no
legal right as against the authority that makes the
law on which the right depends. The State may
not be sued without its consent. A corollary, both
dictated by logic and sound sense from a basic
concept is that public funds cannot be the object

of a garnishment proceeding even if the consent
to be sued had been previously granted and the
state liability adjudged. The universal rule that
where the State gives its consent Tobe sued by
private parties either by general or special law, it
may limit claimants action only up to the
completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of
execution and that the power of the Courts ends
when the judgment is rendered, since the
government funds and properties may not be
seized under writs of execution or garnishment to
satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious
considerations of public policy. Disbursements of
public funds must be covered
by the
corresponding appropriation as required by law.
The functions and public services rendered by the
State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or
disrupted by the diversion of public funds from
their legitimate and specific objects, as
appropriated by law
1.
Exception
But
funds
belonging
to
government
corporations (whose charters provide that
they can sue and be sued) that are deposited
with a bank are not exempt from
garnishment [Philippine National Bank v.
Pabalan, 83 SCRA 595; Rizal Commercial
Bank v. De Castro, 168 SCRA 49].
In National Housing Authority v. Heirs of
Quivelondo, G.R. No. 154411, June 19, 2003,
it was held that if the funds belong to a public
corporation or a government- owned or
controlled corporation which is clothed with a
personality of its own, then the funds are not
exempt from garnishment. This is so because
when the government enters into commercial
business, it abandons its sovereign capacity
and is to be treated like any other
corporation. NHA is one such corporation;
thus, its funds are not exempt from
garnishment or execution.
PNB v. Pabalan, 83 SCRA 595

Doctrine:
- State immunity from suit cannot be validly
invoked with regard to funds of public
corporations.
- [suable corporations] Public funds of
corporations which can sue and be sued are
not exempt from garnishment.
But
funds
belonging
to
government
corporations (whose charters provide that
they can sue and be sued) that are
deposited with a bank are not exempt from
FACTS:
Judgment
was
rendered
against
respondent
Philippine
Virginia
Tobacco
Administration (PVTA). Judge Javier Pabalan issued
a writ of execution followed thereafter by a notice
of garnishment of the funds of PVTA. The full
amount mentioned in such writ is P12, 724.66.
Philippine National Bank allege that such funds
are public in character, thus, the doctrine of nonsuability of a state is applicable.
HELD:
It is well-settled that when the
government
enters
into
commercial

business, it abandons its sovereign capacity
and is to be treated like any other
corporation. Petitioner cannot set bar to the
garnishment for funds of public corporations
which can sue and be sued, as is the case of
PVTA, are not exempt from garnishment.
G.
Suability vs. liability

Suability not equated with outright liability.
Liability will have to be determined by the
Court on the basis of the evidence and the
applicable law.
1.
Read also The Local Government Code of

1991
Merrit v. Government of the Phil. Islands,

supra
Principle: By consenting to be sued, a state
simply waives its immunity from suit. It
does not thereby concede its liability to the
plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his
favor, or extend its liability to any cause not
Palafox v. Ilocos Norte, GR No. L-10659, Jan.
previously recognized. It merely gives
31, 1958
remedy to enforce a pre-existing liability
and submit itself to the jurisdiction of the
court, subject to its right to interpose any
lawful defense. The Government of the
Philippines is only liable for the acts of its
agents, officers, and employees when they
act as special agents. A special agent is one
who receives a definite and fix order or
Ruling: While consent to be sued was granted

through a special law, the government was
held not liable for damages, because under
the
attendant
circumstances
the
government was not acting through a
special agent.

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Constitutional Law 1 (INTRODUCTION, CONCEPT OF STATE, STATE IMMUNITY)

Instructor: Atty. Edgardo Luardo Jr.

certain rules relative to its administration, and

Constitutional Law defined. The study of the

c) Constitution of Sovereignty. The provisions

Political Law defined. That branch of public law

Definition - That body of rules and maxims in

B. Doctrine of constitutional supremacy

a) Broad. Not just because it provides for the

II. The Constitution

b) Brief. It must confine itself to basic principles

A provision which lays down a general

Doctrine: a constitutional provision is selfexecuting if the nature and extent of the

Constitutional Law 1 (INTRODUCTION, CONCEPT OF STATE, STATE IMMUNITY)

III. The Constitutions of the Philippines

also Sanidad vs. Comelec [GR L-35929], Roxas vs. Comelec

(collectively known as the Plebiscite Cases

Facts: Petitioners seek to enjoin respondents

Javellana vs. Exec. Sec., 50 SCRA 33

Aquino v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183

Sanidad v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-44640

-Authority for the principle that the choice

Constitutional Law 1 (INTRODUCTION, CONCEPT OF STATE, STATE IMMUNITY)

Facts: The challenge in these two prohibition

Topic: Snap presidential election of 1986; A

Doctrine: the directives and orders of the

In Re: Letter of Associate Justice Renato S.

Facts: The Court of Appeals and the Intermediate

Constitutional Law 1 (INTRODUCTION, CONCEPT OF STATE, STATE IMMUNITY)

territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty

Defined. The agency or instrumentality through which

functions: constituent vs. ministrant

ACCFA vs. FLU, 30 SCRA 649

THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE

People refers simply to the inhabitants of

Territory [Art. I; R.A. 3046; R.A. 5446]

The National Territory: The national territory

PVTA vs. CIR, 65 SCRA 416

Under this traditional classification, such

Constitutional Law 1 (INTRODUCTION, CONCEPT OF STATE, STATE IMMUNITY)

types of government: de jure vs. de facto

Co Kim Cham v. Valdez Tan Keh, G.R. No. L-5,

Estrada v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 146710, 3/2/01

EDSA 1 is extraconstitutional and the

The Supreme Court said that the resignation of

The Government of the Republic of the

Government of the Philippines is the corporate

government vs. administration

Government is the institution through which the state

Lawyers League v. Aquino, G.R. No. 73748, 5/22/86

FACTS: On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino

types: legal vs. political sovereignty

Constitutional Law 1 (INTRODUCTION, CONCEPT OF STATE, STATE IMMUNITY)

doctrine of jus postliminium

Political laws, except the law on treason, are

Philippines by the Japanese forces, ceased to be good

Co Kim Chan v. Valdez, supra

Peralta v. Director of Prisons, 75 Phil 285

Facts: After the Japanese lost in the Second World