Republic

SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

EN BANC
G.R. No. 81958 June 30, 1988
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS,
INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON as Secretary of Labor and
Employment,
and
TOMAS
D.
ACHACOSO,
as
Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration, respondents.
Gutierrez & Alo Law Offices for petitioner.
SARMIENTO, J.:
The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc.
(PASEI, for short), a firm "engaged principally in the recruitment
of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas
placement," 1 challenges
the
Constitutional
validity
of
Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the Department of
Labor and Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES
GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF
FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS," in this
petition for certiorari and prohibition. Specifically, the measure
is assailed for "discrimination against males or females;" 2 that
it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic
helpers and females with similar skills;" 3 and that it is violative
of the right to travel. It is held likewise to be an invalid exercise

of the lawmaking power, police power being legislative, and not

executive, in character.
In its supplement to the petition, PASEI invokes Section 3, of
Article XIII, of the Constitution, providing for worker
participation "in policy and decision-making processes affecting
their rights and benefits as may be provided by
law." 4 Department Order No. 1, it is contended, was passed in
the absence of prior consultations. It is claimed, finally, to be in
violation of the Charter's non-impairment clause, in addition to
the "great and irreparable injury" that PASEI members face
should the Order be further enforced.
On May 25, 1988, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the
respondents Secretary of Labor and Administrator of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, filed a
Comment informing the Court that on March 8, 1988, the
respondent Labor Secretary lifted the deployment ban in the
states of Iraq, Jordan, Qatar, Canada, Hongkong, United States,
Italy, Norway, Austria, and Switzerland. * In submitting the
validity of the challenged "guidelines," the Solicitor General
invokes the police power of the Philippine State.
It is admitted that Department Order No. 1 is in the nature of a
police power measure. The only question is whether or not it is
valid under the Constitution.
The concept of police power is well-established in this
jurisdiction. It has been defined as the "state authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in
order to promote the general welfare." 5 As defined, it consists
of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in
order to foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact

definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to

underscore its all-comprehensive embrace.

subject to the far more overriding demands and requirements of

the greater number.

"Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times,

even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides
enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions
and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits." 6

Notwithstanding its extensive sweep, police power is not

without its own limitations. For all its awesome consequences, it
may not be exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. Otherwise,
and in that event, it defeats the purpose for which it is
exercised, that is, to advance the public good. Thus, when the
power is used to further private interests at the expense of the
citizenry, there is a clear misuse of the power. 12

It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that

it does not owe its origin to the Charter. Along with the taxing
power and eminent domain, it is inborn in the very fact of
statehood and sovereignty. It is a fundamental attribute of
government that has enabled it to perform the most vital
functions of governance. Marshall, to whom the expression has
been credited, 7 refers to it succinctly as the plenary power of
the State "to govern its citizens." 8
"The police power of the State ... is a power coextensive with
self- protection, and it is not inaptly termed the "law of
overwhelming necessity." It may be said to be that inherent and
plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things
hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society." 9
It constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill of Rights.
According to Fernando, it is "rooted in the conception that men
in organizing the state and imposing upon its government
limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend
thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to
obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary
measures calculated to ensure communal peace, safety, good
order, and welfare." 10 Significantly, the Bill of Rights itself does
not purport to be an absolute guaranty of individual rights and
liberties "Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is not
unrestricted license to act according to one's will." 11 It is

In the light of the foregoing, the petition must be dismissed.

As a general rule, official acts enjoy a presumed vahdity. 13 In
the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary,
the presumption logically stands.
The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the
contested measure should be nullified. There is no question that
Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract
workers," 14 but it does not thereby make an undue
discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that
"equality before the law" under the Constitution 15 does not
import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and women. It
admits of classifications, provided that (1) such classifications
rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the
purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing
conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of the
same class. 16
The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the
preference for female workers rests on substantial
distinctions.

As a matter of judicial notice, the Court is well aware of the

unhappy plight that has befallen our female labor force abroad,
especially domestic servants, amid exploitative working
conditions marked by, in not a few cases, physical and personal
abuse. The sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by migrant
Filipina workers, even rape and various forms of torture,
confirmed by testimonies of returning workers, are compelling
motives for urgent Government action. As precisely the
caretaker of Constitutional rights, the Court is called upon to
protect victims of exploitation. In fulfilling that duty, the Court
sustains the Government's efforts.
The same, however, cannot be said of our male workers. In the
first place, there is no evidence that, except perhaps for
isolated instances, our men abroad have been afflicted with an
Identical predicament. The petitioner has proffered no argument
that the Government should act similarly with respect to male
workers. The Court, of course, is not impressing some male
chauvinistic notion that men are superior to women. What the
Court is saying is that it was largely a matter of evidence (that
women domestic workers are being ill-treated abroad in
massive instances) and not upon some fanciful or arbitrary
yardstick that the Government acted in this case. It is evidence
capable indeed of unquestionable demonstration and evidence
this Court accepts. The Court cannot, however, say the same
thing as far as men are concerned. There is simply no evidence
to justify such an inference. Suffice it to state, then, that insofar
as classifications are concerned, this Court is content that
distinctions are borne by the evidence. Discrimination in this
case is justified.
As we have furthermore indicated, executive determinations are
generally final on the Court. Under a republican regime, it is the
executive branch that enforces policy. For their part, the courts
decide, in the proper cases, whether that policy, or the manner

by which it is implemented, agrees with the Constitution or the

laws, but it is not for them to question its wisdom. As a co-equal
body, the judiciary has great respect for determinations of the
Chief Executive or his subalterns, especially when the
legislature itself has specifically given them enough room on
how the law should be effectively enforced. In the case at bar,
there is no gainsaying the fact, and the Court will deal with this
at greater length shortly, that Department Order No. 1
implements the rule-making powers granted by the Labor Code.
But what should be noted is the fact that in spite of such a
fiction of finality, the Court is on its own persuaded that
prevailing conditions indeed call for a deployment ban.
There is likewise no doubt that such a classification is germane
to the purpose behind the measure. Unquestionably, it is the
avowed objective of Department Order No. 1 to "enhance the
protection for Filipino female overseas workers" 17 this Court has
no quarrel that in the midst of the terrible mistreatment Filipina
workers have suffered abroad, a ban on deployment will be for
their own good and welfare.
The Order does not narrowly apply to existing conditions.
Rather, it is intended to apply indefinitely so long as those
conditions exist. This is clear from the Order itself ("Pending
review of the administrative and legal measures, in the
Philippines and in the host countries . . ." 18), meaning to say
that should the authorities arrive at a means impressed with a
greater degree of permanency, the ban shall be lifted. As a
stop-gap measure, it is possessed of a necessary malleability,
depending on the circumstances of each case. Accordingly, it
provides:
9. LIFTING OF SUSPENSION. The Secretary of
Labor and Employment (DOLE) may, upon
recommendation of the Philippine Overseas

Employment Administration (POEA), lift

suspension in countries where there are:

the

1. Bilateral agreements or understanding with the

Philippines, and/or,
2. Existing mechanisms providing for sufficient
safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection
of Filipino workers. 19
The Court finds, finally, the impugned guidelines to be
applicable to all female domestic overseas workers. That it does
not apply to "all Filipina workers" 20 is not an argument for
unconstitutionality. Had the ban been given universal
applicability, then it would have been unreasonable and
arbitrary. For obvious reasons, not all of them are similarly
circumstanced. What the Constitution prohibits is the singling
out of a select person or group of persons within an existing
class, to the prejudice of such a person or group or resulting in
an unfair advantage to another person or group of persons. To
apply the ban, say exclusively to workers deployed by A, but not
to those recruited by B, would obviously clash with the equal
protection clause of the Charter. It would be a classic case of
what Chase refers to as a law that "takes property from A and
gives it to B." 21 It would be an unlawful invasion of property
rights and freedom of contract and needless to state, an invalid
act. 22 (Fernando says: "Where the classification is based on
such distinctions that make a real difference as infancy, sex,
and stage of civilization of minority groups, the better rule, it
would seem, is to recognize its validity only if the young, the
women, and the cultural minorities are singled out for favorable
treatment. There would be an element of unreasonableness if
on the contrary their status that calls for the law ministering to
their needs is made the basis of discriminatory legislation
against them. If such be the case, it would be difficult to refute

the assertion of denial of equal protection." 23 In the case at bar,

the assailed Order clearly accords protection to certain women
workers, and not the contrary.)
It is incorrect to say that Department Order No. 1 prescribes a
total ban on overseas deployment. From scattered provisions of
the Order, it is evident that such a total ban has hot been
contemplated. We quote:
5. AUTHORIZED DEPLOYMENT-The deployment of
domestic helpers and workers of similar skills
defined herein to the following [sic] are
authorized under these guidelines and are
exempted from the suspension.
5.1 Hirings by immediate members
of the family of Heads of State and
Government;
5.2 Hirings by Minister, Deputy
Minister and the other senior
government officials; and
5.3 Hirings by senior officials of the
diplomatic
corps
and
duly
accredited
international
organizations.
5.4 Hirings by employers in
countries
with
whom
the
Philippines have [sic] bilateral labor
agreements or understanding.
xxx xxx xxx

7. VACATIONING DOMESTIC HELPERS AND

WORKERS
OF
SIMILAR
SKILLS--Vacationing
domestic helpers and/or workers of similar skills
shall be allowed to process with the POEA and
leave for worksite only if they are returning to the
same employer to finish an existing or partially
served employment contract. Those workers
returning to worksite to serve a new employer
shall be covered by the suspension and the
provision of these guidelines.
xxx xxx xxx
9. LIFTING OF SUSPENSION-The Secretary of
Labor and Employment (DOLE) may, upon
recommendation of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA), lift the
suspension in countries where there are:
1.
Bilateral
agreements
or
understanding with the Philippines,
and/or,

implementation of the Labor Code, in particular, its basic policy

to "afford protection to labor," 26pursuant to the respondent
Department of Labor's rule-making authority vested in it by the
Labor Code. 27 The petitioner assumes that it is unreasonable
simply because of its impact on the right to travel, but as we
have stated, the right itself is not absolute. The disputed Order
is a valid qualification thereto.
Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order
No. 1 constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power. It is
true that police power is the domain of the legislature, but it
does not mean that such an authority may not be lawfully
delegated. As we have mentioned, the Labor Code itself vests
the Department of Labor and Employment with rulemaking
powers in the enforcement whereof. 28
The petitioners's reliance on the Constitutional guaranty of
worker participation "in policy and decision-making processes
affecting their rights and benefits" 29 is not well-taken. The right
granted by this provision, again, must submit to the demands
and necessities of the State's power of regulation.
The Constitution declares that:

2. Existing mechanisms providing

for sufficient safeguards to ensure
the welfare and protection of
Filipino workers. 24

Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to

labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized, and promote full employment and
equality of employment opportunities for all. 30

xxx xxx xxx

The consequence the deployment ban has on the right to travel
does not impair the right. The right to travel is subject, among
other things, to the requirements of "public safety," "as may be
provided by law." 25 Department Order No. 1 is a valid

"Protection to labor" does not signify the promotion of

employment alone. What concerns the Constitution more
paramountly is that such an employment be above all, decent,
just, and humane. It is bad enough that the country has to send
its sons and daughters to strange lands because it cannot

satisfy their employment needs at home. Under these

circumstances, the Government is duty-bound to insure that our
toiling expatriates have adequate protection, personally and
economically, while away from home. In this case, the
Government has evidence, an evidence the petitioner cannot
seriously dispute, of the lack or inadequacy of such protection,
and as part of its duty, it has precisely ordered an indefinite ban
on deployment.
The Court finds furthermore that the Government has not
indiscriminately made use of its authority. It is not contested
that it has in fact removed the prohibition with respect to
certain countries as manifested by the Solicitor General.
The non-impairment clause of the Constitution, invoked by the
petitioner, must yield to the loftier purposes targetted by the
Government. 31 Freedom of contract and enterprise, like all
other freedoms, is not free from restrictions, more so in this
jurisdiction, where laissez faire has never been fully accepted as
a controlling economic way of life.
This Court understands the grave implications the questioned
Order has on the business of recruitment. The concern of the
Government, however, is not necessarily to maintain profits of
business firms. In the ordinary sequence of events, it is profits
that suffer as a result of Government regulation. The interest of
the State is to provide a decent living to its citizens. The
Government has convinced the Court in this case that this is its
intent. We do not find the impugned Order to be tainted with a
grave abuse of discretion to warrant the extraordinary relief
prayed for.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
FACTS: Petitioner PASEI a firm "engaged principally in the
recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas
placement," It challenges the validity of Department Order No.
1 of herein Respondent DOLE. Petitioner contends that the
Department Order is in "discrimination against males or
females;" that it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but only
to domestic helpers and females with similar skills; and that it
violated the right to travel. Petitioner likewise held that the
Order is invalid exercise the lawmaking power, police power
being legislative, and not executive, in character. The Solicitor
General, on behalf of the respondent Secretary of Labor and
Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration, filed a Comment informing the Court that on
March 8, 1988, the respondent Labor Secretary lifted the
deployment ban in the states of Iraq, Jordan, Qatar, Canada,
Hongkong, United States, Italy, Norway, Austria, and
Switzerland. In submitting the validity of the challenged
"guidelines," the Solicitor General invokes the police power of
the Philippine State.
ISSUE: Whether or not the impugned Department Order is valid
under our Constitution
HELD: The SC dismissed the petition. The court ruled that the
Department Order has valid classification, there is no question
that Order No.1 applies only to female contract workers but it
does not thereby make an undue discrimination between sexes.
It is well settled hat equality before the law under the
constitution does not import a perfect identity of rights among
all men and women. Dept. Order No. 1 does not impair the right
to travel. The consequence of the deployment ban has on the
right to travel does not impair the right, as the right to travel is
a subject among other things, to the requirements of public

safety as may be provided by law. Neither is there merit in the

contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid
exercise of legislative power as the labor code vest the DOLE
with rule making powers.