The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for review via Rule 45 filed by petitioners Orlando A. Rayos, Fe A. Rayos Dela Paz, and Engr. Manuel A. Rayos seeking to challenge the trial court's denial of their motion to dismiss the eminent domain case filed against them by the City of Manila. The Supreme Court ruled that an order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and not appealable under Rule 45. The proper remedy is to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals, not directly with the Supreme Court, in observance of the hierarchy of courts. The petition was also dismissed for being the wrong remedy.
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for review via Rule 45 filed by petitioners Orlando A. Rayos, Fe A. Rayos Dela Paz, and Engr. Manuel A. Rayos seeking to challenge the trial court's denial of their motion to dismiss the eminent domain case filed against them by the City of Manila. The Supreme Court ruled that an order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and not appealable under Rule 45. The proper remedy is to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals, not directly with the Supreme Court, in observance of the hierarchy of courts. The petition was also dismissed for being the wrong remedy.
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for review via Rule 45 filed by petitioners Orlando A. Rayos, Fe A. Rayos Dela Paz, and Engr. Manuel A. Rayos seeking to challenge the trial court's denial of their motion to dismiss the eminent domain case filed against them by the City of Manila. The Supreme Court ruled that an order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and not appealable under Rule 45. The proper remedy is to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals, not directly with the Supreme Court, in observance of the hierarchy of courts. The petition was also dismissed for being the wrong remedy.
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for review via Rule 45 filed by petitioners Orlando A. Rayos, Fe A. Rayos Dela Paz, and Engr. Manuel A. Rayos seeking to challenge the trial court's denial of their motion to dismiss the eminent domain case filed against them by the City of Manila. The Supreme Court ruled that an order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and not appealable under Rule 45. The proper remedy is to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals, not directly with the Supreme Court, in observance of the hierarchy of courts. The petition was also dismissed for being the wrong remedy.
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ORLANDO A.
RAYOS - versus - THE CITY OF MANILA
G.R. No. 196063. December 14, 2011 CARPIO, J.: FACTS: The present case originated from a complaint for eminent domain filed by respondent City of Manila against Remedios V. De Caronongan, Patria R. Serrano, Laureano M. Reyes, Paz B. Sison, Teofila B. Sison, Leticia R. Ventanilla, Rosalinda R. Barrozo (defendants). In its Complaint, the City of Manila alleged that it passed Ordinance No. 7949 authorizing the City Mayor to acquire by expropriation, negotiation or by any other legal means the parcel of land co-owned by defendants, which is covered by TCT No. 227512 and with an area of 1,182.20 square meters. The City of Manila offered to purchase the property atP1,000.00 per square meter.
In their Answer, defendants conveyed their willingness to sell the
property to the City of Manila, but at the price of P50,000.00 per square meter which they claimed was the fair market value of the land at the time. In the course of the proceedings, Laureano, one of the defendants, died on 1 December 2003 and was substituted by his son petitioner Manuel A. Rayos. Meanwhile, petitioner OrlandoA. Rayos intervened while petitioner Fe A. Rayos Dela Paz was added as a defendant.
Petitioners Orlando A. Rayos, Fe A. Rayos Dela Paz, and Engr.
Manuel A. Rayos filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that (1) Ordinance No. 7949 is unconstitutional and (2) the cases of Lagcao v. Labra7 and Jesus Is Lord Christian School Foundation, Inc. v. Municipality (now City) of Pasig, Metro Manila8 apply squarely to the present case. On 11 March 2010, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss. The trial court ruled that the motion to dismiss did not show any compelling reason to convince the court that the doctrine of stare decisis applies. Petitioners failed to demonstrate how or why the facts in this case are similar with the cited cases in order that the issue in this case be resolved in the same manner. ISSUE: WON appeal via Rule 45 is proper.
RULING: An order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and not appealable. An order denying a motion to dismiss does not finally dispose of the case, and in effect, allows the case to proceed until the final adjudication thereof by the court. Clearly, no appeal, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, may be taken from an interlocutory order. In case of denial of an interlocutory order, the immediate remedy available to the aggrieved party is to file a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
In this case, since the trial courts order denying the motion to dismiss is not appealable, petitioners should have filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to assail such order, and not a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. For being a wrong remedy, the present petition deserves outright dismissal. Even if the Court treats the present petition as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, which is the proper remedy to challenge the order denying the motion to dismiss, the same must be dismissed for violation of the principle of hierarchy of courts. This wellsettled principle dictates that petitioners should file the petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, and not directly with this Court.
Indeed, this Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts exercise concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpusand injunction. However, such concurrence in jurisdiction does not give petitioners unbridled freedom of choice of court forum. In Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor, citingPeople v. Cuaresma, the Court held:This Courts original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts and with the Court of Appeals. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed.There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level (inferior) courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the
petition. This is [an] established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent
inordinate demands upon the Courts time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Courts docket. (Emphasis supplied.)
