IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE U.S.

AGENCY FOR
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (USAID) DISTRICT
STABILITY FRAMEWORK (DSF) IN AFGHANISTAN

ROBERT SWOPE
FINAL PAPER
12/14/2012

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

II.

THE CLIENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

III.

THE POLICY QUESTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

IV.

BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM

a. County Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
b. The Importance of Reducing Conflict & Role of Conflict Assessment . . . . . . . . 13
c. A Discussion of Stabilization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15
d. Conflict Analysis Prior to the District Stability Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17

V.

THE DISTRICT STABILITY FRAMEWORK IN AFGHANISTAN

a. An Overview of the District Stability Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
b. How the District Stability Framework is Being Used . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
c. Problems with Implementing the District Stability Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

VI.

POLICY OPTIONS
a. Description of Policy Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
b. Decision Criteria for Choosing a Recommendation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
c. Analysis of Policy Alternatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

VII.

POLICY RECOMMENDATION
a. Discussion of Preferred Policy Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

VIII.
IX.

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
ANNEXES
a. Annex 1 Bibliography
b. Annex 2 List of Acronyms
c. Annex 3 DSF Fact Sheet
d. Annex 4 DSF Reference Guide
e. Annex 5 Qualtrics Survey Data Set
f.

Annex 6 Problem Tree

g. Annex 7 Stakeholder Analysis

h. Annex 8 Stakeholder Matrix

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This paper looks at the use of the USAID District Stability Framework (DSF) in
Afghanistan and recommends policy options for how it may be improved. The DSF is a
conflict assessment and planning tool that stabilization practitioners use to diagnose the
sources of instability in an environment, and then develop context-appropriate
programming for reducing and eventually eliminating them.

The framework, which

evolved from two previous conflict analysis methodologies developed by USAID, is a tool
currently used by U.S. government civilian and military teams in parts of Afghanistan (in
some provinces it has been mandated), and will likely remain the applied approach in
these areas until America exits the country.
The paper begins by examining the client, which is the USAID Office of CivilianMilitary Cooperation, which owns the DSF and manages DSF training and other related
programs, in addition to International Security Assistance Force-Afghanistan, the UNmandated and NATO-led coalition that is working to stabilize the country. It moves on
to stating the policy question and then reviewing the background of the problem with an
in-depth look at the security and development situation in Afghanistan. The importance
of reducing conflict and why good conflict analysis is required if this is to happen are also
discussed, as are U.S. government definitions of stabilization and previous USAID conflict
assessment frameworks.
The DSF itself is then looked at (a six-page summary of the DSF, developed by the
U.S. Armys Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, is attached in the annexes)
and its four main components of 1) situational awareness, 2) analysis, 3) design, and 4)
monitoring and evaluation, are examined to provide the reader sufficient understanding as

to what the framework consists of and how practitioners are supposed to use it when
going about the task of analyzing and responding to instability. How the DSF is actually
being utilized in the field and problems associated with implementation are then
reviewed, with most of the information developed through practitioner interviews and
survey responses. The problems associated with the DSF mainly center on the lack of
leadership support and data collection and validation challenges, and these issues are
discussed.
The next section deals with a description and analysis of policy options for
improvement as well was decision criteria for choosing one option, the latter of which is
based on feasibility and time constraints. The final section discusses the recommended
policy options. There are eight of these: 1) mandating the use of the DSF in all areas of
Afghanistan where the U.S. has the lead; 2) instituting a quality assurance regime to check
on implementation; 3) developing implementation standards; 4) providing suitable
resources for tactical units so they may carry out the DSF methodology properly; 5)
providing more training for leaders so they understand the importance and value of the
DSF, in addition to staff so they may better implement it; 6) creating an online database
archiving DSF related information throughout the theater of operations; 7) publishing a
resource list and handbook for where and how to go about collecting DSF data; and 8)
bringing in Afghan colleagues and other outside observers to check data validity. The
content of this paper is then summarized in a conclusion and followed by a series of
annexes.

A Note on Research Methodology

The research strategy used in this paper is three-fold. First, I look at the existing
literature available on the DSF, both published and unpublished, with an eye to the how it
how it is being used and any problems associated with it. There is not a significant well
to draw from in this respect, necessitating the second part, which consists of interviews
with a small number of individuals who have extensive experience using the DSF in
Afghanistan. A total of eleven people were interviewed for this paper, with each
conversation lasting thirty minutes or more. This was done to attain a depth of
understanding as to the framework itself, the way it is being used, problems associated
with it, and ideas for improvement. Third, utilizing the Duke University-licensed
Qualtrics survey software, I crafted a questionnaire comprising 33 questions in order to
develop a larger data set and solicit views from as wide a group as possible, as well as
make it easier to receive input from USG military and civilian personnel currently in
Afghanistan. The survey was anonymous and a majority of the questions were openended so as to not force answers and to permit respondents to reply in their own words.
This would allow the opportunity to gather data from which hypothesis would be built
and to explore more fully the question of how the DSF is being used and the why
behind certain reactions to it. Exactly 45 people began the survey, though only 34 people
fully completed it. However, some response rates on individual questions are as high as
40. The trimmed mean time, which is the amount of time the average respondent took
to complete the survey, was 47 minutes. The full data set is included in the annexes.
Subjects for both personal interviews and the survey were acquired through
contacting USAID directly, as well as Development Transformations, a contractor which

USAID uses to conduct DSF training and support DSF implementation in field operations
in Afghanistan. Personnel at these two organizations were asked to set up interviews and
pass on the online survey link to anyone they knew who had used the DSF in Afghanistan,
in addition to encouraging them to pass the link on to additional people. A LinkedIn
search query for District Stability Framework, was also used, primarily to distribute the
survey, but also to solicit individuals willing to participate in a phone interview. Because
of the dispersed distribution method it is unknown how many people actually received
the survey. Lacking a listing of everyone who uses or has used the DSF in Afghanistan,
there is insufficient information as to the true population size for either the interviews or
survey. Therefore, the figures given later on in this paper from the Qualtrics survey
derive from responses given by those who received and voluntary answered the
questions, and should not be considered as representing a statistically sufficient sample of
the DSF-user population.

THE CLIENT
There are two clients for this paper. At the strategic-level it is the United States Agency
for International Development and its sub-office: the Office of Civilian-Military
Cooperation (DCHA/CMC), which was partly responsible for the development of the
DSF and owns it in the sense that it is responsible for its content and manages training
and other programs related to its use. At the field level, the client is the U.S.-led
International Security Assistance Force for Afghanistan (ISAF), whose subsidiary units use
the DSF on the ground in tactical settings.

USAID was created by an executive order from U.S. President John F. Kennedy
after signing into law the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. 1 It is Americas principal
development agency. Though technically independent, USAID receives policy guidance
from the Department of State and works closely with the Department of Defense in
countries where stabilization challenges exist. The organizations goals are two-fold: to
promote American interests while improving the lives of those in developing nations. 2
This latter task includes assisting conflict-prone countries or those currently immersed in
conflict as one of the United States key foreign policy priorities is a more peaceful and
stable world.
The Office of Civilian-Military Cooperation which is nested within the Bureau
for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance was created to help strengthen
a whole of government approach and improve cooperation between the Department
of Defense and USAID when it came to the way U.S. foreign assistance efforts are
planned and implemented in locations where violent conflict and instability persist. 3 Such
areas comprise almost 60% of the countries in which USAID operates. 4
DHCA/CMCs role within USAID is to serve as the focal point for USAID
interaction with US and foreign militaries in formalized relationships through coordinated
planning, training, education and exercises. 5 Managing the District Stability Framework,
which was originally developed in Afghanistan by DCHA/CMC staff, is one of its
responsibilities. DCHA/CMC oversees training programs for the DSF in addition to
providing trained and experienced stability operations experts to assist with field
implementation. 6 It is also responsible for making changes to the existing framework.

The International Security Assistance Force for Afghanistan is the UN-mandated,

NATO-led coalition whose job it is to secure the country and aid in its reconstruction. It
currently comprises 43 countries and 130,386 troops, not including civilian contractors. 7
ISAFs mission is to create stability by ending violence while improving Afghan governance
and fostering economic development. 8 Though ISAF has not required the use of the DSF
throughout the country, it has required the staffs of all incoming military units to receive
training in it. 9 Various lower-level military echelons have, however, mandated that the
DSF be used by their units. At the national level, ISAF can implement policy decisions
that will improve the use of DSF throughout Afghanistan, while subordinate military
organizations can make decisions that strengthen implementation at the local level.

THE POLICY QUESTION

Given that the District Stability Framework is the USAID model and an ISAF tool used
for assessing subnational conflict and informing program design in selected areas of
Afghanistan, what policies can better improve its use in field operations?

BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM

Country Context
The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan is a nation in southwest Asia that for more than three
decades has been in a state of almost constant internal warfare. It is estimated to have 30
million people and is comprised of four main ethnic groups who together make up
around 90% of the citizenry. 10 The primary competitors for power are two ethnicallybased tribes known as the Pashtuns and Tajiks, who make up 42% and 27% of the
8

population respectively. 11 Both Pashto and Dari (which is spoken by Tajiks) are the
nations official languages, though there are 32 other minor tongues used throughout the
country. 12 According to the Central Intelligence Agencys World Factbook, about 77% of
the population lives in rural areas. 13 Afghanistan has one of the youngest populations in
the world with a median age of 18.2 years. 14 It also has the worlds highest infant
mortality rates with 121.63 deaths for every 1,000 live births. 15
Afghanistans state of quasi-permanent internal conflict began with a Marxist
revolution in 1978. 16 The following year Soviet troops invaded and fought a decade-long
counterinsurgency campaign against Afghan and foreign mujahideen (translated from
Arabic it means people doing jihad) that left the country in ruins. In 1979, when
Afghanistans last census was taken, the population was 15.5 million. 17 By the time the
Soviets exited in 1989, Amnesty International estimated that about 1 million of them had
been killed. 18 According to the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, another
6 million Afghans were living outside the country as refugees or were internally displaced
by the end of the 1980s. 19
Before the Soviets left they installed President Mohammad Najibullah to lead a
communist regime in the countrys capital of Kabul, which received financial, military, and
other assistance, including food and oil aid, from Moscow. 20 This was needed as
Najibullahs government continued to fight a civil war against many of the faction leaders
and mujahideen who had previously been struggling against the Soviets. In the early
nineties when the USSR collapsed and Boris Yeltsin rose to power it was announced that
Russia would scale down its international commitments, and on New Years Day 1992 all
aid to Afghanistan ceased. 21 The result was that the already stressed Najibullah regime
9

began to crumble and a new government comprised of Afghan faction leaders (often
referred to as warlords) came to power. They renamed the country the Islamic State
of Afghanistan.
Instability and disputes over who would rule persisted, however, and small fights
between factions soon evolved into another full-scale civil war that lasted until 1996
when an Islamic extremist group led by Mullah Mohammed Omar, and known as the
Taliban, seized the reins of power by taking control of Kabul and declaring the Islamic
Emirate of Afghanistan. Two years later with the help of Pakistan the Taliban were able
to command most of the country, including Maza-i-Sharif, Afghanistans fourth largest city
and until then an opposition stronghold. Yet despite occupying the capital and other
major population centers, the Taliban were unable to assert control over the entire
territory, particularly in the northeast quadrant of the country where Northern Alliance
Commander Ahmed Mahmoud Shah held sway. Even so, from 1996 until 2001 the
Taliban regime was able to retain authority in about 70% of Afghanistan and in most areas
maintain a semblance of stability through the institution of Sharia Law, draconian
punishments meted out to opposition groups, and the occasional massacre. 22
It was during the 1990s that the term failed state began to be closely associated
with Afghanistan as each year saw continued conflict and instability. When the
millennium rolled around and a new phase of conflict would begin the country had
already experienced over two decades of brutal warfare. Prior to the initiation of conflict
the nation had been on a modernizing upswing as both the Soviet Union and the United
States competed for influence in the form of development assistance (a great deal of the
countrys transportation and other infrastructure was built via foreign assistance funds in
10

the years prior to the Soviet invasion). The country was also becoming increasingly
educated. But by the time the September 11th attacks occurred against America the
country had regressed to some of the worlds lowest levels of human development and
was widely considered a basket case, one in which transnational terrorist groups like Al
Qaeda could find sanctuary, human rights were regularly violated, and women were
prevented from holding jobs and attending school in addition to being barred from leaving
their homes without the accompaniment of a male relative. Though some improvements
would occur in the ensuing decade after an American-led international coalition
overthrew the Taliban in December 2001 and began a period of opposed state-building,
the country continues to remain stuck in a quagmire of instability and violence.
According to the United Nations Human Development Index, Afghanistan is in the
bottom 10% of countries worldwide, with a ranking of 172 out of 187. 23 Life expectancy
is extremely low with the World Bank estimating it at 48 years. 24 It has been reported
that only 28% of the population over the age of 15 can read or write. 25 In some
provinces, however, that number is believed to be below 5%. 26 Afghanistan, according to
the UNs Office on Drugs & Crime, also has the world highest percentage of people who
regularly use opiate drugs. 27 Economic indicators are equally disappointing. About 36%
of the Afghan population lives below the poverty line. 28 Gross domestic product based
on purchasing power parity stands at $966 per capita, one the worst worldwide. 29
Unemployment, meanwhile, is around 35% 30 Most of these problems have been created
or exacerbated by Afghanistans continued state of instability.
According to Foreign Policy magazines Failed States Index for 2012, Afghanistan
ranks as the globes 6th most failed state (down from the 7th place a year ago). 31 Whats
11

more important than the general ranking among countries, however, are how a state
measures up on 12 indicators which highlight areas of weakness and pressure points that
assessors believe may lead to increased levels of conflict and societal breakdown. These
include things like demographic pressures and human flight, but also government
legitimacy levels and the performance of state security apparatuses. In these last two
measures, what some have argued are the root causes of instability, Afghanistan scores
very poorly. 32
The security situation, a proxy for the level of instability in Afghanistan, is dire.
While the country was relatively stable in the first few years following the removal of the
Taliban, things have gotten progressively worse. Beginning in 2008 the level of attacks
against Afghan government and international security forces began to rise, and as a result
of the fighting, the number of solider and civilian deaths has also increased. However, it
appears that in the last year the amount of violence has begun to decrease slightly. The
following statistics paint a picture of the current levels of violence and instability
Afghanistan is experiencing.
According to a recently published Congressional Research Service report, in 2008
there were 155 American troops killed in action with another 795 wounded. 33 In 2010
the numbers increased to 499 soldiers killed (a rise of 322%) with another 5200 wounded
(a surge of 650%). 34 Last years totals decreased with 414 killed and 5,195 more
wounded in action. 35 This years combat causalities are projected to be lower.
According to iCausualites.org, as of December 14th only 303 American military personal
have been killed as a result of hostile fire. 36 The Brookings Institutions monthly Afghan
Index reports similar trends in the civilian death toll which have grown steadily every year
12

since 2006 except the current year where there appears to be a significant drop off,
mostly attributable to a decline in attacks initiated by Armed Opposition Groups, the
term used for anti-government forces such as the Taliban. 37
The number of attacks against pro-government and international security forces
has also gotten worse since the mid-2000s, only decreasing for the first time in the last
year. International Security Forces-Afghanistans monthly data trends briefing reports
that in January 2008 there were around 400 enemy-initiated attacks against Afghan and
international security forces compared to about 700 in the same month the following
year. 38 In January 2010 there were about 1400 attacks and close to 2100 in January
2011. 39 January 2012 saw the number of drop to around 1500, yet still about 3.5 times
more than they were four years ago. 40 So far in 2012, according to ISAF, enemy-initiated
attacks have decreased 4% in [between] Jan-Sep 2012 compared to the same period in
2011. 41
Based on the above data it seems this year has seen minor progress towards
security, though indicators of instability have not returned to their pre-2008 levels. The
reasons for this shift are no doubt varied. Regardless of the reasons, it is clear that
stability in Afghanistan is still a challenge and has yet to be sufficiently achieved.

The Importance of Reducing Conflict and the Role of Conflict Assessment

Among the tasks facing those seeking to alleviate suffering in the world, perhaps none is
as difficult, or more important, than that of resolving violent conflict. Reducing or ending

13

war and instability is essential not only to prevent unnecessary and continued death and
destruction, but also so development efforts have a stable foundation upon which to
build. Natural and man-made disasters in contexts where conflict is absent may be
managed with appropriately targeted humanitarian assistance. Similarly, low-income and
poorly governed countries may be assisted with economic development, good
governance, and capacity building programs. None of these tasks are possible, however,
without sufficient stability, which is discussed throughout this paper as the absence of
violent conflict.
In order to address conflict there are many things that must be done. One of the
most important is identifying sources of instability and administering well-designed
intervention strategies that are capable of being measured. As noted in a United States
Institute of Peaces Stabilization and Reconstruction Series report, [t]he success of
efforts to stabilize and reconstruct failed states and war-torn societies is heavily
dependent on proper assessment tools and reliable measures of progress. Previous
interventions have been severely hampered by faulty initial analysis that has overlooked
the entrenched drivers of conflict and instability. 42

The U.S. Armys Stability Operations

Field Manual, FM 3-07, concurs with this view stating that [s]uccessful stability
operations are predicated on identifying and reducing the causes of instability, in addition to
reestablishing or building community and state capacity to diminish, manage, or prevent
them from recurring in the future, (emphasis added). 43
Without a proper understanding of the context, efforts to reduce or eliminate the
sources of instability will not be successful and may even enflame the problem. Various
conflict assessment tools exist, and while not always perfect, allow for a certain degree of
14

evidence-based decision-making. This paper looks at one in particular, the United States
Agency for International Developments District Stability Framework, a targeted conflict
assessment methodology that originated in Afghanistan and has been used to analyze
sources of local instability and then design appropriate programming to address them.
The DSF has since been used in other countries, including Iraq, Pakistan, Kenya, South
Sudan and the Philippines. 44 For the purposes of this paper, however, the analysis is
limited to Afghanistan where it is more widely implemented.

A Discussion of Stabilization
Since 9/11 the U.S. has taken part in two major military campaigns in Afghanistan and
Iraq, each intended to defeat a foe and then help establish a durable peace. It has also
engaged in smaller, much less visible efforts in Yemen, the Philippines, parts of Africa, and
elsewhere. The U.S. government officially sees stability operations or stabilization as
occurring during all phases of military operations, from peacetime engagement activities
that occur prior to conflict, to major combat operations, to the transition period
between when most of the fighting ends and sustainable development begins, on back to
peacetime engagement. Such efforts have sometimes been called state-building or
nation-building, though these terms are different and more akin to traditional
development. 45 In this paper, the operative term is stabilization, which is defined below.
Suffice it to say, for the foreseeable future America will continue to be involved in conflict
stabilization missions.

15

U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) doctrine defines stability operations as [a]n

overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted
outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to
maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental
services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. 46 By
accomplishing these four objectives, stabilization activities can lay the foundation for longterm sustainable development, especially if it can achieve the primary goal of establishing a
safe and secure environment.
Though neither the Department of State neither (DoS) nor USAID have
doctrine in the way the military does, they do have what the State Department calls a
practical roadmap for helping countries transition from violent conflict to peace. 47 This
is in the form of a civilian manual entitled Guiding Principles for Stabilization and
Reconstruction, which refers to stabilization as [e]nding or preventing the recurrence of
violent conflict and creating the conditions for normal activity and nonviolent politics. 48
The definition is not as specific in terms of activities as the militarys, but is perhaps more
precise due to its focus on ending or preventing violence. Both definitions can be said to
seek the same outcome: the setting of conditions to enable a durable peace which is
characterized by a safe and secure environment and the absence of violence. These
organizations (DoD, DoS, and USAID) are the primary U.S. government agencies that
operate on the ground in stabilization scenarios.

16

USAID Conflict Analysis Prior to the Introduction of the District Stability Framework
The U.S. mission of stabilizing Afghanistan has experienced significant amounts of
controversy over the way it has been conducted with most observers believing the
implementation of post-war stabilization activities has been poor. 49 Critiques have
included the lack of proper planning or insufficient resources dedicated to the mission.
But in terms of actual conduct, one of the most frequently noted problems has been the
USGs supposed inability to fully understand the operating environment and the
challenges being faced, particularly during the early stages of the conflict. According to a
2010 report by U.S. Air Force Lieutenant General Michael Flynn, who served in
Afghanistan as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence with ISAF, the vast intelligence
apparatus [of ISAF in Afghanistan] is unable to answer fundamental questions about the
environment in which U.S. and allied forces operate and the people they seek to
persuade. 50 This is problematic because as noted in the Stability Operations Field Manual,
understanding the environment is fundamental to planning interventions. Effective
planning requires a broad understanding of the operational environment at all levels, says
FM 3-07. 51 Furthermore, [g]reater understanding enables commanders and staffs to
make quantifiably better decisions. 52
In Afghanistan the U.S. government currently conducts subnational stabilization
activities through military units and civilian-led interagency Provincial Reconstruction
Teams (PRTs) and District Stability Teams (DSTs), which are comprised of both military
and civilian personnel. Some PRTs, DSTs, and independent military units with USAID
advisers utilize the DSF to assess the sources of instability in their locales, and then design
appropriate stabilization programs.
17

According to civilian and military personnel who served in Afghanistan between

2001 and 2011, there was no generally accepted or mandated framework for assessing
conflict or developing context-appropriate programming. 53 One Provincial
Reconstruction Team Leader, a retired U.S. Army Colonel who served in Ghazni
Province between September 2004 and August 2005, reported that his team did not have
a way to assess the sources of instability prior to developing stabilization programs. 54
What his team and others were doing was more akin to tradition development and did
not focus on addressing sources of instability. There was no model on-hand for tying
interventions to specific sources of instability that would then be measured. Instead,
reconstruction and humanitarian assistance projects were carried out based on inputs
from local citizens, and then the number of insurgent activities before and after the
projects completion were compared to determine the effectiveness of the program. 55 It
was assumed that by simply doing things for the populace the level of stability would
increase.
When it came to designing intervention programming, choices for how to allocate
scarce funding resources, he said this was determined by the security situation and the
likelihood of achieving a positive impact based upon meetings with the local government
and tribal leaders. 56 No real framework for assessing whether or not the programming
targeted actual sources of instability was used. Asked if there was a formal monitoring
and evaluation process in place to measure programming output and impacts, such as
changes in the overall level of stability, he answered that there wasnt and that each PRT
came up with its own set of indicators. 57

18

Part of the assumptions and practices common among U.S. government personnel
during this period, especially among members of the military, was there wasnt a need to
engage in targeted stability programming. 58 Violence in Afghanistan would work itself out
if kinetic (read: combat) operations managed to capture or kill a sufficient number of
insurgents and destroy their infrastructure. 59 This is because they were seen as the sole
sources of instability and it was assumed that by removing them stability would increase.
There was a vague notion that strengthening local government capabilities and indigenous
security forces was part of the answer, but the intellectual horizons of those on the
ground did not sufficiently encompass understandings of the tasks involved in conflict
stabilization as they are currently understood today.
This was understandable to some extent since until the post-9/11 era, the core
competency the military was to fight and win the nations wars, not address stabilization
and state legitimacy issues or build nations. 60 Soldiers are trained mainly to kill and
destroy their enemy in traditional force-on-force scenarios that involve high-intensity
conflict, referred to as Major Combat Operations. Neither counterinsurgency nor
stabilization was well-known or understood. As Former Vice-Chief of Staff of the U.S.
Army Jack Keane noted in 2006, We put an Army on the battlefield that I had been a
part of for 37 years. It doesnt have any doctrine, nor was it educated and trained, to
deal with an insurgency . . . After the Vietnam War, we purged ourselves of everything
that had to do with irregular warfare or insurgency, because it had to do with how we
lost that war. 61 Not until the mid-2000s when the military engaged in a serious effort to
learn from repeated failures in Iraq and Afghanistan did the doctrine evolve and thought
leaders emerge promoting the idea that in order to end the violence the sources of
19

instability must be precisely identified and addressed, and that military forces couldnt just
kill their way to victory. 62 Only later would there be developed methodologies that
personnel on the ground could use to facilitate the assessment and program design
process, as well as develop monitoring and evaluation schemes to gauge how they were
doing. In other words, conflict analysis and stabilization practice as it is used now was in
Afghanistan for much of the first half decade somewhat of an afterthought.
Though USAID has had in place a long-standing military cooperation office, it
wasnt until 2003 that the Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (DCHA/CMM)
was created. 63 The offices key task is to perform in-depth conflict assessments, which
produce comprehensive reports that map out destabilizing patterns and trends in specific
developing countries and recommend changes in development programs so that they can
be structured to better address these trends. 64 Over years it has developed a series of
conflict assessment toolkits that provide USAID missions with access to concrete,
practical program options, lessons learned, and options for partners, mechanisms and
monitoring and evaluation tools for implementing more effective conflict programs. 65
Yet it was not until April 2005, nearly four years after the after the war in Afghanistan
began, that they released what was the first formal USAID guidance on conflict
assessment and program development. 66
Entitled Conducting a Conflict Assessment: A Framework for Strategy and Program
Development, (and known as the Conflict Assessment Framework, or CAF), the 43-page
document sought to mainstream ideas that would help USAID missions map out
destabilizing patters and trends and better develop recommendations about possible
points of intervention so as to reduce violent conflict. 67 By bringing this type of rigor
20

and depth to the initial analysis, the CAF said, those on the ground would be better able
to guard against proceeding on the basis of partial or incomplete understandings of what
they are dealing with. 68
The CAF consists of three main parts. First, a discussion of factors related to the
outbreak of violent conflict, derived from over a decade of academic and other research.
The idea was that teams conducting assessments could use these generic variables as a
guide to determining the source of instability in their areas. To aid in this a checklist of
109 questions in five thematic areas was developed to spur thinking. 69 The second part
of the framework looked at how development programming could be linked to the
sources of instability identified in part one. Understanding how development activities
interact with these factors would help when it came to designing conflict-sensitive
programming, which the third part sought to address by helping field personnel
determine windows of opportunity or entry points for where development and
humanitarian assistance can most effectively support local efforts to manage conflict and
build peace. 70
Though a step in the right direction, the CAF was neither mandated as an
assessment tool in Afghanistan, nor was it focused at the local level. It was not a
methodology or planning process those with tactical responsibilities would be able to use
to determine sources of instability in their areas or tailor programs towards stabilization
objectives. Additionally, there was no discussion of the importance of monitoring and
evaluation. Even so, it served as theoretical framework USAID and others could use to
broadly understand the operating environment and the way development activities (at the

21

time the term stabilization was not in common usage) interacted with the sources and
drivers of conflict. 71
A more localized framework, known as the Tactical Conflict Assessment and Planning
Framework (or TCAPF) was developed from the CAF and began to be implemented in
Afghanistan beginning in 2007. 72 It served as a diagnostic and planning tool practitioners
in Afghanistan could use until it was renamed as the District Stability Framework in
2010. 73 The TCAPF included the CAFs attempt at better understanding the operating
environment and the causes of instability, yet also sought to more closely link conflict
assessment to planning and program design, and it included a new section on monitoring
and evaluation. 74 It also heralded a shift in language towards the term stabilization. The
TCAPF also provided civilian and military personnel a standardized assessment process
that allowed for a common view of the causes of instability, which would then help them
to link and synchronize civilian programs with military operations. By focusing on the
local level, the TCAPF would also be able to better integrate tactical information into
strategic planning and create bottom-up programming solutions based on local conditions
as opposed to those delivered from higher-level headquarters.
The TCAPF began with the gathering information about local perceptions
concerning the sources of instability via a four question survey. The purpose behind
these questions was also to establish baseline data that could be used to measure the
impact of projects and general level of stability over time. The survey became known as
the Tactical Conflict Survey (or TCS). The questions were:
1. Have there been changes in the village population in the last year?
22

2. What are the most important problems facing the village?

3. Whom do you believe can solve your problems?
4. What should be done first to help the village?
An implicit fifth question of why was added to the end of each question so that
data collectors could follow up on responses and conduct an in-depth discussion. The
results of the TCS were then collated with additional data that took into account factors
such as the political, military, economic, and cultural environment, as well as instability
dynamics, namely, grievances, resiliencies, key actors, [and] events. Once the data was
analyzed and sources of instability determined, intervention activities could be proposed.
These activities where then filtered through three criteria: ensuring each activity
increased support for the government, decreased support for spoilers causing instability,
and/or strengthened the institutional and societal capability and capacity to manage
conflict. 75 If each activity was able to satisfy two of these concerns, then the next step
was making sure they complied with eight design principles that constitute good
practice for programming. These were asked in the form of a series of questions, for
instance, does the activity:

1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)

Ensure sustainably by the local government or institutions?

Facilitate local ownership?
Consider the trade-offs between short-term vs. long-term impacts?
Fit the local political and cultural context?
Strengthen governmental accountability and transparency?
Leverage/support other government agencies, IGO, NGO, and host nation
programs?
7) Draw upon readily accessible local resources?
8) Provide flexibility?

23

Once activities were chosen, designed, and implemented, the monitoring and
evaluation process would start. This entailed measuring performance to see if program
activities were be completed (outputs), whether or not program objectives were bring
achieved (impacts) and whether the overall level of stability in the area was increasing or
decreasing. This latter assessment was derived by the aggregation of a series of locally
decided upon indicators as determined by members of the military and civilian team
responsible for the area and who were using the TCAPF to foster stability. The overall
level of stability measurement took into account things such as number of attacks,
casualty levels, or whether or not the four questions of the TCS showed increasing levels
of government legitimacy and decreasing security concerns in the eyes of the population.
Based on the results from the monitoring and evaluation process adjustments could be
made to stabilization strategies.
According to Mick Crnkovich, a planner in DCHA/CMC who spent time working
on the TCAPF program for USAID, one of the main problems of the TCAPF involved the
way it was implemented. [P]eople were looking for a magic bullet and INCORRECTLY
latched onto the 4-question survey thinking that would solve their problems. 76 In using
the TCAPF, he said, [practitioners in Afghanistan] over-surveyed, over-promised and
under-deliveredfailing to do proper analysis of the data gathered ([which] was faulty at
best anyway due to over-surveying). 77 In other words, they werent doing the TCAPF.
According Major Jonathan Pan whose unit used the TCAPF in Southern
Afghanistan in 2009, the methodology also lured staffs to focus in on one source of
instability at a time, when the truth on the ground is that there are many sources of
instability at the local level, and they must be targeted simultaneously. 78 Another issue

24

was that for some units, even if they could assess the sources of instability, they were still
unable to fully address them. The reasons for this were varied but as one State
Department official he worked with quipped to him: the local source of instability
across all of southern Afghanistan is Quetta, Pakistan. 79
The TCAPF is the precursor to the District Stability Framework. Some have
referred to it as a rebranded TCAPF. 80 The DSF contains everything found in the
TCAPF with the inclusion of an implementation matrix. The next section explores the
DSF more fully.

THE DISTRICT STABILITY FRAMEWORK IN AFGHANISTAN

An Overview of the District Stability Framework
The District Stability Framework (formerly the TCAPF) is a conflict assessment and
programming methodology encompassing four main parts: Situation Awareness, Analysis,
Design, and Monitoring and Evaluation. 81 Each section has a set of tools and matrixes for
use in collecting and organization data as well as approaches for decision making. In the
annexes is a six-page reference guide on the DSF put together by the Peacekeeping and
Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) at the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle Barracks,
Pennsylvania. 82 This guide is worth reviewing as it is both succinct and comprehensive.
Like the TCAPF, the District Stability Framework is based on the following four
premises:

1) Instability results when the factors fostering instability overwhelm the ability
of the host nation to mitigate these factors;
25

2) A program management framework is necessary for a strategic, targeted and

iterative approach;
3) Comprehensive situation awareness is required to identify true sources of
instability; and
4) Monitoring and evaluating impacts against stability objective and the change in
overalls stability within an area are the only way to measure success. 83

The DSF process begins with the collection of data about the operating
environment using a variety of situational awareness tools. These include the U.S.
military civil affairs communitys population-focused model of ASCOPE-PMESII for
describing the operational environment. 84 Like the TCAPF, the DSF process seeks to
thoroughly understand relevant cultural factors, such as traditional authorities and
conflict resolution mechanisms in addition to major cultural groups and their interests.
Perception dynamics are also included. In addition to utilizing the TCAPFs four question
survey described earlier, this part also looks at data derived from sources such as Human
Terrain Team reports (groups of researchers contracted by the military to perform
sociological and anthropological analysis), key leader engagements (in-depth meetings
with local authorities), intelligence findings, and other reports, including those generated
from the local population and the media. Stability/instability dynamics are then added into
the equation. Factors when considering instability are: community grievances, events
with the potential to be destabilizing (aka: windows of vulnerability) and individuals
with the means and motivations to exploit grievances and windows of opportunity. 85
On the stability side are mitigating forces such as [r]esiliencies or the processes,
relationships and institutions that can reduce the effects of grievances, as are events with

26

the potential to mitigate conflict and foster stability (windows of opportunity) and
individuals with the means and motivations to foster stability. 86
After gathering all of the above data, the DSF methodology then requires the
creation of a Stability Working Group (SWG), which is usually comprised of various
interagency partners (DoD, USAID, DoS). The SWG then filters the information
collected through an analytical process aimed at discovering the true sources of instability
in an area. This is done by conducting a source of instability (SOI) analysis against three
criteria: 1) Does the potential instability factor increase support for Anti-Government
Elements? 2) Does the potential instability factor decrease support for the
government? and 3) Does the potential instability factor undermine the normal
functioning of societies.
After the SOI Analysis, the identified sources of instability are taken and entered
into a Tactical Stability Matrix, as seen in Figure 1. The matrix is one of the most crucial
parts of the analytic portion of the DSF process as it zeros in on the sources of instability
and their causes, as well as developing stability objectives to be achieved and ways
determining to measure them.

27

Figure 1.

The Tactical Stability Matrix looks at the SOIs presumed or proximate cause, (as
cited by the local population); the SOIs root or systemic cause; and an objective to be
achieved, which is described as a statement of conditions practitioners wish to see
realized (sometimes simply the opposite of the sources of instability and its associated
conditions). 87 The matrix also includes a section for impact indicators (also known as
measures of effectiveness) which are used to measure the effectiveness of activities
against predetermined objective and systematic causes, and data sources for where
information will be obtained to measures the impact indicators. 88
Once the analysis stage is completed, the design phase kicks off, in which the DSF
is used to develop programmatic interventions. This begins by SWG members coming up
with activities that will mitigate the assessed sources of instability. Output indicators for
28

each activity (measures of performance) are developed, and output data sources are
identified. Then an Activity Design Worksheet is used in which each activity is checked
to ensure it conforms to at least two of the three criteria mentioned above and that
appropriate design principles are met. 89 These design principles are based on
internationally accepted development norms. Resource availability is then taken into
account, such as whether the organization implementing the stabilization intervention has
the required money, personnel, expertise, and time to complete the task. 90
Finally, the DSF seeks to measure monitor and evaluate activity implementation to
determine if they are stabilizing the area. It does this by examining three things: 1)
activity outputs (measures of performance); 2) activity impacts (measures of
effectiveness); and 3) the overall level of stability. An M&E Matrix is used for later
comparison between assessed activity impact and previously stated objectives. A series
of questions are also presented to help practitioners think through the monitoring and
evaluation design process to ensure outputs and impacts are valid and are being
effectively measured. 91 An Overall Stability Index is also created. The index is an
aggregate derived from a basket of locally identified indicators, as determined by the
Stability Working Group, to track changes in the level of local stability.

How the District Stability Framework is Being Used in Afghanistan

The following understanding of how the DSF has been employed in Afghanistan comes
from descriptions by those who have utilized the framework in the field. Their
experiences are combined with insights from the Qualtrics survey to provide a general
picture of DSF implementation in Afghanistan.

29

While the International Security Forces-Afghanistan mission does not mandate the
use of the DSF throughout the country, training in the application of the DSF is
considered important enough to be part of the organizations required counterinsurgency
qualification standards. 92 A three day course on the DSF is taught at the
Counterinsurgency Training Center in Kabul and mobile teams travel throughout the
country providing DSF trainings upon request. 93 These courses are also taught in the
United States to military units and interagency teams prior to deploying to Afghanistan.
In June 2011 Regional Command-East (RC-East), which is responsible for the 14 of
Afghanistans 34 provinces, issued an order directing all of its brigade-level military task
forces to establish the DSF as a common interagency planning and program management
framework for identifying and addressing the root causes of instability at the district
level. 94 RC-East covers 43,000 square miles of territory (about 17% of Afghanistan),
including 450 miles of border with Pakistan. 95 As of his writing more than 26,000
Coalition Forces are operating there. 96
According to Justin Richmond, an employee of Development Transformations, a
private sector company that has a multimillion dollar contract with USAID to provide
DSF training and personnel support in the form of stability experts who rotate
throughout the Afghanistan providing expert assistance, the use of the DSF varies from
place to place. 97 Richmond spent over a year in Afghanistan traveling throughout the
country acting as a mediator and advisor on the DSF to military units, in addition to
having implemented the DSF in the field while serving as a military officer. Since the
DSFs precursor the TCAPF began to be adopted in 2007, Richmond says, those areas in
which it and the DSF have been used have developed a sophisticated set of data that is
30

passed on to replacement units. 98 For areas where the methodology is being used for the
first time, however, Richmond says at least three weeks to a month are suggested for
gathering information and learning about the community before the analysis phase
begins. 99 Richmond says newly arrived units implementing the DSF for the first time have
taken the suggested interval to collect data and learn about their new environment
before starting the analytic portion. 100
As a general rule, those who have utilized the DSF in Afghanistan have received
formal training. According to those who responded to the Qualtrics survey (and who
consist of civilian and military personnel who have utilized the DSF in Afghanistan), 90%
said that they had taken part in DSF training prior to being asked to implement it. 101
About 72% said that their training instructors reported actual experience using the DSF
in the field though most stated their trainers had not applied it in the specific locations
trainees would be deployed. 102
Once personnel were trained a unit is ready to begin implementing the DSF
process. If they relieved a unit that had already been using it then they would receive
previously constructed data sets and programming activities to confirm and upon which
to build. If this was the first time DSF was being implemented in the area, they would
have spent some time getting to know their operating environment.
When it came to information collection respondents all say they went to a variety
of sources, from existing civilian military data sets and information sources, to those
belonging to the Afghanistan governments Central Office of Statistics and Information
Technology, and everywhere in between. 103
31

However, there were concerns about data quality. In response to the survey
question: In your experience, would you say that the DSF processes collect accurate
information to make informed decisions? only 9% of the respondents said Yes, with
59% responding Usually, and 26% saying Not Usually, and 6% saying No. 104
Additionally, some respondents complained they saw others manipulate the data to fit
their own biases. This is significant because it means DSF is not being used as intended
since corrupted data does not allow for a proper analysis to take place.
I saw too many instances of groups backing the DSF into supporting favored
programs, rather than objectively assessing grievances, SOIs and resiliencies to identify
the appropriate interventions (and areas in which not to intervene), says one
respondent. 105 Another said that, [p]eople who want to see a specific outcome can rig
the data to look like a lack of healthcare or something is driving instability, when really
the issue is more fundamental than that. 106 Yet another commented that in order for
data to be accurate, the collectors have to be 100% sold on the tool and not [see it as]
something that they are doing just because they have been asked to. There have been
cases where the data collected provided skewed information because there was not
enough effort to get to the bottom of the data. 107
Issues were also raised in reference to the availability of data. Part of this is the
result of the way ISAF knowledge management was organized in Afghanistan. According
to one respondent much of the data [needed] was stored at the Regional Command or
Brigade Combat Team level (e.g., RCs did the contracting for monthly/quarterly/annual
surveys). However, those field staff at the PRT and District Stability Team levels either

32

were not made aware of what information was already available or had access to a
morass of unsynthesized, poorly labeled/organized data. 108
[E]fforts need to be facilitated, he said, for efficiency and empowering field staff
to most effectively utilize the DSF and to avoid duplication of effort (or apathy derived
from being confronted by a mass of unorganized data). 109 He went on to state that
tribal, historical and other information was available if one looked hard enough and had a
little bit of luck. I was able to find detailed studies of tribal/sub-tribal mapping and
conflict, for example, and ask local leaders about these conflicts in KLEs. Unfortunately I
had to spend time discovering sources of data should must have been known by
predecessors but not passed on. 110
Having sufficient time and resources to collect data was also raised as an issue. In
response to the question: In your experience, would you say that your operational unit
usually has enough time and other resources to collect the right DSF data to make better
informed decisions? only 27% responded Usually with 71% responding Not Usually,
or No. 111 This lack of time and resources to collect the right DSF data results in
insufficient data available, meaning suboptimal analysis.
Though issues exist with information collection, its clear that units employing the
DSF use the methodology to plan activities and determine where scarce assistances funds
go. According to one respondent, [w]e used DSF in every phase of planning and
implementation . . . DSF overhauled our understanding of the local drivers of instability
and allowed us to do course corrections for the units and areas that were just doing
development or kinetic operations. 112

33

Another DSF user reported that [i]n RC-East, during my second tour, we (finally)
established DSF as the guiding tool to address sources of instability and resiliencies, [and]
to prioritize, coordinate and deploy human and program resources (USAID, CERP and
DoS resources). 113 This respondents unit, he said, were mostly utilizing [the] DSF to
guide programming, syncing and coordination with LGCD, CDP, QRF and CERP [project
funding] resources.
Says another:
I used DSF to streamline development activities. During my work in the
field I always asked how the intended activities were linked to the three
criteria for an SOI. For instance, I started requiring that all development
activities be discussed and approved by the local [governing authorities]
which would contribute to the expansion of the government reach to its
citizens. I also wanted my team members to avoid being simplistic, [and]
instead take the time to determine the root cause of the problem being
addressed. 114
Another respondent pithily stated it was [u]sed as an invaluable focusing tool to
take emotional, aimless do-gooder impulses out of project/activity development.
When it came to determining stabilization strategy the SWGs collectively analyzed
data and made decisions. How they were constituted varied according to location, but in
general they were interagency and comprised of military, USAID, Department of State,
and other personnel. 115 Sometimes this would include Afghans. Together they sorted
through the available information and filtered it through the DSF analytical process.
Consensus was then reached about what activities the team responsible for the area
would be engaged in and how they would be designed, in addition to the expected
outputs and impacts, and project sequencing. How success and changes in stability would
be measured was also a product of SWGs.
34

The role of the DSF in bringing together diverse players to decide upon strategy
was regularly lauded in interviews and survey results. According to one respondent, part
of the DSFs value is that [i[t gets everyone around a table talking about instability, not
about whatever their pet project is. It makes us focus on the population's grievances
instead of our assumptions. It gives us a way to bring Afghans into the stabilization
process. 116 Another concurred saying that it brings diverse stakeholders to the table
around a common analytical framework, rhetoric, and set of concepts. This helps to
allow for interagency coordination, a whole of government approach, and unity of effort.
Where the DSF really shines, says Justin Richmond, is youre using it to analyze
stabilization problem in a coordinated, interagency way. 117
Of key importance, however, is tying the implementation of activities decided
upon to increased stability in the area undergoing the intervention. Impressions of the
degree to which this is done are anecdotal. There appears no methodologically rigorous,
academic, or peer-reviewed study on how the DSF has contributed to stability in the
areas where it has been used. Nonetheless, insights from practitioners are still valuable
and may be used as jumping off points for further research.
In response to the question: Were you able to tie positive changes to the level of
stability to the DSF-inspired projects? exactly 50% of respondents stated Yes with 50%
responding No. 118 When asked to give an example of a situation in which they were
able to tie positive changes in the overall level of stability to the DSF, one respondent
said, [w]e saw less violence overall where DSF was properly implemented, though the
numbers for Afghans wasn't as statistically reliable as the numbers for coalition.
However, Coalition Forces did sustain fewer casualties where DSF was executed
35

correctly. 119 Another stated that perception surveys during and after offered
indications of positive impacts form DSF-based programming, in the areas of
community well-being, intra-community cooperation and cohesion, and support for the
local GIRoA (Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan), but did not comment
on whether quantitative declines occurred in indicators such as the level of violence. 120
According to Richmond, who initially used the DSF as a solider and then traveled
thought the country as a stability expert, there was a significant difference between
regions where the DSF was used and those where it wasnt. In one area in particular, he
says, there was a dramatic uptick [in instability] by following traditional model once
fighting season in Afghanistan rolled around. 121 The place that decided to do traditional
development, he commented, was by far the worst. 122
Even so, some responded that they were unable to tie the DSF to any
improvement in stability. 123 According to one respondent, changes take time, and none
of us were in a place long enough to assess whether changes (pos[itive] or neg[ative])
occurred . . . I have no idea how people correlated their working with DSF to making the
connection to any change in behavior or stability. 124 Another said, per the overall
stability changing - this is very complicated to measure and cannot be directly attributable
to DSF. 125
In summary, the DSF was implemented in different ways in Afghanistan though
there are a few commonalities. For instance, interagency teams known as Stability
Working Groups were established. All the teams using the DSF appear to consist of
trained staff. As a general rule, problems exist in developing sufficient data sets, both in
36

terms of compiling the information and ensuring it is valid. When it comes to deciding on
a stabilization strategy, activities are jointly designed and sequenced. These activities are
then measured against performance and impact criteria, and changes to the overall level
of stability. However, about half of the survey respondents said they were unable to tell
whether or not the DSF was able to lead to positive changes in stability, the essential
purpose of the methodology. The below descriptions of problems associated with the
DSF in Afghanistan point to why this might be the case.

Problems with Implementing the District Stability Framework in Afghanistan

A variety of problems with the way the DSF is being implemented have been noted, both
in published literature and in project research. Below in order of most importance, are
the challenges reported regarding the implementation of the DSF

1).

Insufficient Command Support

The support and emphasis of organizational leadership for an initiative is often an

indicator for its chances of success or failure. Research indicates that command support
for the DSF in areas where it was being used is idiosyncratic. The Qualtrics survey
provides additional insight on this issue with responses to the question Do you believe
your organization's leadership provides sufficient resources and/or support to those
responsible for utilizing the DSF? 126 According to respondents, less than half (47%) said
Yes with a slight majority (53%) saying No. 127 Said one respondent: [a] units
leadership has to care about doing it right and then using the data and analysis to make
37

his/her decisions. This isnt usually the case, in my opinion. 128 One reason given for this
was a lack of understanding and buy-in of the DSF on the part of leaders. Another was
the absence of an incentive placed upon leaders to use the DSF and resource it properly.
Another commented that the military unit he worked with only assigned one
person to run the DSF program with limited formal training or assistance. Lacking
support, he wrote, [the sergeant] had to dumb-down the process and thereby not
employ all the tools (and processes) normally associated with the DSF. 129 Leadership
must be indoctrinated in the value of field-based stabilization techniques, he said. If not,
the DSF will continue to be marginalized, which will lead to its imminent demise. 130
One stated that in his area, the DSF was never given a real chance to succeed
since many commanders didnt understand its value and always fell back on what they
knew, which was the kinetic approaches. 131
Another who strongly believed in the DSF noted that the lack of across the board
command emphasis was a major problem and said DSF usage should be monitored and
enforced. If a commander doesnt want to do the DSF, fine, but he better have his own
plan. And if he fails, then it reflects on his [officer evaluation review]. 132 When it comes
to civilian leaders, he said, if they want to do their own thing and cant show progress,
they get fired. When operating in a war zone, we cannot allow inept personnel to follow
their own plans. 133

38

2.)

Information Availability & Validity Problems

Information collection and validity challenges appear to be common issues, as is finding

sufficient time to collect data. In response to the question In your experience, would
you say that the DSF processes collect accurate information to make informed
decisions? only 9% of respondents said Yes, with 59% saying Usually, and the
remaining 32% reporting Not Usually, or No. 134
However, in response to the question In your experience, would you say that
your operational unit usually has enough time and other resources to collect the right
DSF data to make better informed decisions? the numbers were reversed with only 29%
of respondents saying Yes or Usually and 71% responding Not Usually, or No. 135
According to multiple interviewees and survey respondents, getting suitable
information was difficult, particularly when it came to local perceptions. One commented
that [p]eople had to be pro-active in finding the data and ensuring that the data was
strong. The training course sometimes makes the perception data part seem very easy,
when in fact much time goes into getting the data and vetting it. 136 Another said that,
[t]here are notable challenges in the collection of the populations perceptions,
resulting from the quality of collectors, the answers provided by the interviewee, and
the ability to properly log the information that often prevented a proper perception
based analysis. 137 Still another said that, [a]lthough some resources were available for
community perception data (provided by the military) it was often difficult to access or [it
was] not well organized. So the local perception information was much more based on
individual conversations and not hard research data. 138 This meant that the data
39

analyzed to get a local understanding of the sources of instability was less likely to be
accurate or sufficient, resulting in a flawed analysis.
One interview respondent commented that ultimately, they were unable to get the
data they needed to do a proper SOI analysis.
The thing we never had was an accurate sense of public perception[one of]the
underpinnings of DSF. No one wanted to contract out a company to get perception
data, none of the team leaders asked the questions correctly, and their interpreters
never had a good grounding of what the questions were to ask them in the most
effective way....instead of interpreting the questions, they simply translated the
words...so what happened was that folks would fill in the DSF worksheet using what
they knew and did this through the lens of an expat....the truth is, we never, ever had
enough of the Afghans perception of what was going on....ALL other information was
either made up, guessed, or based off of token conversations with 3-5 Afghans...but
nowhere close to a representative sample. 139

Another complained that some follow-on units were deleting data that had been
transferred to them by the units they relived.
I tried to leave behind a system for my successors but BCTs have a habit of
deleting their predecessors' SIPR, NIPR and Centix sites - unbelievable as
that was to me at the time. My records were eventually deleted by a new
BCT. 140
He went on to say that. . .
I later discovered vast amounts of information of which I had not been
made aware, information collected at the provincial and district levels being
used at the RC . . . While I was still . . . in Khost [province] I visited RC-E
for a few days to attend a meeting. While there I was provided access to a
work station and discovered a lot of information of which I had not been
aware, as well as briefs and plans with which BCT and PRT plans were not
nested . . . including DSF efforts. This was valuable insight as I prepared
40

for my second tour based at RC-E and planned to better support field staff
with DSF and programming support. 141
Another commented that Afghans needed to be brought into the collection and
analyzing phase to help with validating the information. Where Afghans were involved
early in DSF situational awareness and analysis, he said, the impact was always far
greater than when DSF was done by westerners. 142 The lack of Afghans was not
reported in the survey or interviews as a significant data collection problem, but some
thought it would aid in terms of validating the data.

3).

Analysis Problems

In addition to collection and data validation difficulties, another challenge identified from
the interviews and survey was analyzing of information. According to the Qualtrics
survey, when asked In your experience, would you say that your operational unit usually
has enough time and other resources to do the right analysis of DSF data in order to
make better informed decisions? approximately 71% of respondents said Not Usually,
or No, with 26% saying Usually, and only 3% saying Yes. 143
One concern respondents had was that some in their organizations didnt do a
proper analysis and simply tried to make the DSF data say what they wanted it to say. In
training, youre taught to let the data drive the decisions in conflict mitigation
programming, but you can still make decisions drive that data through intentional or
unintentional database manipulation and even biased collection, said one respondent. 144
The results of this, he said, would negate the value of the DSF. 145

41

One survey respondent stated analysis wasnt even done in his unit: DSF was
not used to design projects, but to validate decisions and strategies that were already in
place. 146 Another reiterated this point saying [t]he terms root causes of instability and
resiliencies permeate throughout many [DSF] PowerPoints that are simply
regurgitatedbut in reality . . . real reality . . . DSF has not shaped anything. They are
mostly retro-fitted, where someone has an idea of an activity in mind, then retro-fills the
DSF workbook to make it fit. Because policy/strategy is not ground in reality, DSF has
been used extensively to justify PowerPoints and slide decks. 147

POLICY OPTIONS
One question worth asking before discussing policy options is whether or not the DSF
should even be used. If the answer is yes, then it makes sense to develop policy
options that will facilitate implementation.
There are two arguments in support of using the DSF. The first is that an
assessment tool of some sort is needed for analyzing conflict and developing
programming in Afghanistan. Of the various methodologies out there, the DSF is the
only one that was created and vetted by practitioners on the ground in Afghanistan, who
designed it based on academic research and best practices for stabilization programming.
The other reason for using it is that both the interviews and survey responses indicate
those who have used it are happy with the framework itself, but believe that
implementation issues are the main problem with its effectiveness.

42

A Description of Policy Options

There are four basic policy options for addressing problems identified in the previous
section to facilitate the use of the DSF in Afghanistan. They are: 1) do nothing and
maintain the status quo; 2) make revisions to the content of the existing framework; 3)
make revisions the systems and procedures used in its implementation; and 4) engage in a
combination of selective revisions to either the content of the DSF and/or
implementation processes.
There are also additional policy options to consider that do not speak to shortterm operational fixes but which would aid in providing proof of concept (or not) to the
DSF and building legitimacy for the methodology as a conflict assessment and planning
tool. They are relevant from a strategic perspective by providing the opportunity for
USAID to have a rigorously tested and validated approach that is translatable to other
contexts in the future. This could be achieved mandating its use in all the U.S. areas of
responsibility throughout the Afghan theater and by engaging in rigorous and
comprehensive analysis of its use in the Afghan theater.

Decision Criteria for Choosing a Recommendation

The decision criteria for choosing policy recommendations related to the DSF is based on
two factors. The first is the degree to which a proposal makes sense as way for
improving DSF implementation in the field. Next is how easily a proposal can be
implemented. This includes consideration as to how much time it would take for changes
to be made. It is assumed that minor tweaks that dont require significant change or
complex implementation schemes are most likely to be operationalized on a short time
43

table and would serve as useful quick fixes. More difficult options, if of high value, will
also be considered with an eye to the long-term strategic use of the DSF in Afghanistan
and beyond. The chosen policy recommendation in the next section seeks to balance
these two concerns.

Analysis of Policy Alternatives

Option #1: The Status Quo
As a general rule, the status quo alternative is always available and usually the first to be
disregarded. No one, after all, likes to do nothing. Yet it should not be dismissed out of
hand as often times problems are made worse by those who wish to solve them,
especially when they seek to implement externally-driven and top-down solutions, as
opposed to those originating endogenously from within. Sometimes we are wise to do
nothing and let nature take its course.
The argument can be made that since the U.S. (and by extension the international
community) is planning on withdrawing all troops from Afghanistan in 2014 regardless of
what happens, that expending significant effort on making changes to the content or
systems and process related to the DSF is unnecessary. 148 This is especially true for
those who are of the opinion that instability in Afghanistan is structural or the result of
the foreign troop presence and therefore unsolvable by outside forces.
Letting the situation play out with a variety of conflict assessment and
programming methods being used in the field may be the best strategic option so long as
lessons learned collection systems can capture data and best practices that may later on

44

be sorted through and analyzed more rigorously as a guide to planning and stabilization
efforts in future conflict. The question then becomes whether or not appropriate
information collection systems exist and if data is being properly archived for further use.
Whether or not this is the case is outside scope of this paper, however, which seeks to
address what changes can be made to improve the use of the DSF in the field.

Option #2: Selected Content Changes to the Framework

Making substantive content changes to the DSF itself is another option. One of the
problems mentioned with the methodology by some practitioners is that it is too
complex and needs to be simplified to make implementation easier. One argument
against simplifying the framework is that conflict stabilization is itself a multifaceted and
complex endeavor, so it stands to reason that a diagnostic tool for analyzing such an
effort would be complex too.
Some of those interviewed say that the problem isnt the methodology is too
complex, just that properly utilizing it requires more work than people want to do,
especially when they are already overburdened with other work, as is often the case in
Afghanistan. 149 This points to the issue of proper training in the DSF, resource availability
and leadership support more than the content of the framework itself. Most of those
interviewed stated they found the DSF to be a valuable tool when properly implemented.
If the DSF content was changed, the question then arises as to what a reworked
version should include. Finding the right balance between too much and too little poses a
challenge, one that doesnt lend itself to an easy or quick fix since whatever changes are

45

made will need to be thoroughly discussed and approved by multiple bureaucracies. It is

worth recalling that it wasnt until April 2005 when USAID produced its first conflict
assessment framework, after two different wars and stabilization missions had already
been ongoing for several years. It was another two years between then and when the
DSFs precursor, the Tactical Conflict Assessment and Planning Framework was
introduced. Revising the framework is doable, eventually, but may not be appropriate for
the time horizon ISAF is currently dealing with in Afghanistan, which has U.S. troops
leaving within a two year time period.

Option #3: Selected Changes to Implementation Systems and Procedures

Unlike Option #2, this alternative appears to provide the opportunity for immediate
improvements to the utilization of the DSF without having to go through a long and
bureaucratic process. It does so by not touching the framework itself but rather simply
adjusting the way civilian and military teams are implementing it in the field. However,
two challenges present themselves.
The first is determining what changes should be made. Some have suggested
themselves in the research done about ways the DSF is being implemented and
practitioner responses to the Qualtrics survey. They include steps that may be taken to
improve the data collection, such as better knowledge management systems at multiple
levels where information may be archived and which practitioners may use as a reference
source. The inclusion of Afghans to aid analysis has been mentioned, as have steps to be
taken to ensure the data used in the DSF is valid. Greater emphasis on ensuring the data
drives the analysis, and not the other way around, would also improve implementation.
46

More training, a set of implementation standards, and perhaps additional human and
material resources dedicated to the DSF process may help with implementation, as might
more time dedicated to the information collection, analytical, and program design phases.
Repeatedly mentioned has also been a greater degree of leadership emphasis on the part
of military commanders and civilian officials who are the deciders in their area of
operations.
One individual also mentioned that the use of a full-time facilitator would help.
Such an individual could travel to various provinces in order to supplement the training,
and support the building of stability working groups, as well as educate [those in] the
field regarding sources of information and data. 150 Independent eyes would help
determine sources of instability and with honing measures of effectiveness and
performance, which are crucial parts of the DSF. They could also facilitate information
sourcing and synthesizing, since much of the available perception data gets dumped on
an RC or BCT site with little effort in categorization or organization - meaning each
individual accessing the information must spend an inordinate amount of time sifting
through the information. 151
The other challenge with this option deals with the enforcement of changes.
Higher level headquarters units can issue all the mandates they want, but this is no
guarantee theyll be implemented, especially if those at lower levels havent bought into
the change or are not being monitored for compliance. Though Regional Command-East
in Afghanistan issued an order directing the use of the DSF by the military units under its
control, the degree to which it was used varied based upon how much those in charge at
the tactical level had bought into it. Difficulty also presents itself when you have
47

interagency teams (such as PRTs) that are asked to achieve unity of effort without
requiring unity of command, meaning leadership officials answer to different masters and
operate under different incentives. Figuring out a way to track implementation and hold
individuals accountable will also be a key part of success if this option is chosen. All of
this suggests some sort of quality assurance/quality control system should be put in place.

Option #4: Selected Changes to Framework Design and Implementation Processes

This option is the most comprehensive in that it engages in a combination of selective
revisions to either the content of the DSF and/or implementation processes. It is
essentially a combination of Options #3 & #4. Yet this means that it incorporates the
difficulties with decision-making making and implementation that these two options
present.
In regards to changes to framework content, any alternations will likely take much
discussion and bureaucratic approval. Changes to implementation processes will no
doubt be quicker, but deciding upon which ones to make and how to ensure they are
implemented may prove difficult, and additional revisions will have to be made once a
new framework is field tested. Since Option #4 is a conglomeration of two alternatives,
it will take longer than all the rest and will require more resources to see completion.
There is one upside to this option, and this is that a deliberative process to
improve both the content of the DSF and the way it is implemented may, in theory, lead
to the superior use of the DSF in field operations. The reality is, however, that no
methodology is perfect and the level of improvement made to the content will likely be

48

minimal (as seen the problem discussion, the issue isnt the tool itself, but the way it is
being implemented). Focusing on the content and then implementation will entail an
opportunity cost derived from not focusing on the main issue, which is the problem with
implementation. As evidenced by the Qualtrics survey, DSF content issues are not really
of concern to practitioners.

Option #5: Wholesale Redesign of the Framework and Implementation Procedures

This final option essentially involves scrapping the current framework in favor of
something new. It may be simply a radical scaling down of the existing framework or the
introduction of an entirely different one. Engaging in a wholesale revision of the DSF
would require going back to the drawing board and examining everything that is known
about conflict and stabilization.
It is entirely possible that a new framework might be even more complex and
difficult to implement than DSF. It may be even less useful and valid than the current
framework. Knowing if this will be the case will not occur until a new framework has
been implemented and field-tested. By that time, there may be not be a need for it in
Afghanistan and even if there is it will still have to achieve the buy-in necessary for it to
be put into widespread use. The DSF, which originated in Afghanistan, has already
achieved some legitimacy, but as has already been stated, not everyone has been
convinced of its usefulness. Furthermore, context appropriate implementation
procedures will also have to be designed, put in place, and certainly adjusted once the
plan meets reality.

49

In the meantime, the DSF or some other tool will still be needed. Based on the
long lead time involved, this option does not seem appropriate.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS & IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY

Discussion of Preferred Policy Option
The policy recommendation is Option #3: Selected changes to implementation systems and
procedures.
This option was chosen for a variety of reasons. First, doing nothing and
maintaining the status quo, as discussed in Option #1, is not preferred when it seems
reasonably clear that doing something (even if minor) will have the effect of improving the
use of the DSF in the field. This is especially important since stakes are so high. It should
also be considered that minor tweaks to the implementation of the DSF based on
practitioner feedback can have outsized impacts.
Option #2 of making changes to the content of the framework is not viewed as
feasible. This is because the DSF represents the latest evolution of a long and considered
process to design a conflict assessment and planning tool for use by stabilization
practitioners. Further changes to the content of the framework would entail extensive
discussion and review along with pushback by multiple stakeholders, which means it
would never get done in time to satisfy operational needs in Afghanistan. In the interim
the existing format would continue to be used the same as before, just without any
changes to problems regarding implementation that would still be present in any newly
revised framework. Additionally, as is clear from the preceding section, most of the
50

problems identified do not have to do with the tool itself, but rather, the way the tool is
being utilized. As Jason Alexander, a DSF expert from Afghanistan noted, [we] quickly
recognized it as a valuable tool, but we need to be made sure it is done properly. 152
Some might think that Option #4, the combination of Options #2 and #3, should
be the preferred option. After all, this option covers the content and implementation.
Yet the same issue of time required to get changes made arises as with Option #2.
Decoupling Option #3, which solely involves implementing changes, from #2, which
addresses content, allows for a recommendation to be implemented more quickly than if
both were done simultaneously. Additionally, there is always the chance that new
changes to the content of the DSF will not be improvements. It would not be surprising
to discover that getting a committee together to adjust the framework resulted in one
that was more complex, unwieldy and less useful.
Option #5 of starting from scratch by replacing the framework with something
different is a non-starter. As with Options #4 & #5, getting stakeholders to agree on an
entirely new conflict assessment tool would take time and resources which could be
much better used on making changes to the way the framework is being implemented and
which would achieve a bigger bang for each unit of time or money expended, and do so
sooner. As has already been noted, reports from the field about the DSF is that most
practitioners find it to be a good and useful tool, even if some may think it may be a little
too complex for their taste (or workloads).
Therefore, the preferred recommendation is Option #3. The question
then becomes what exactly does Option #3 entail. From what we have seen in the
51

discussion regarding problems with the DSF, problems center on leader support and data
collection issues. Selected changes then should focus on these two areas.
In regards to leader support, it is recommended that the commanding general of
the International Security Assistances Forces in Afghanistan and the U.S. Ambassador to
Afghanistan both mandate the use of the DSF in the areas where U.S. civilian and military
personnel have operational responsibility. Subordinates most know that the seriousness
with which they utilize it will be noted in their evaluation reports. After mandating usage,
a quality assurance regime should be put in place, along with a set of implementation
standards to ensure that units and civilian teams have gone through the assessment
process properly and are using it to inform all programming. Additionally, leaders must
also ensure they provide the necessary resources to subordinates so that they can meet the
standards. Mandating the use of the DSF and ensuring it is used in an appropriately
throughout the area of responsibility will allow for comparisons and feedback.
Regarding DSF data, the main issues were collection and validation of data.
Practitioners complained that data was not widely available and was difficult to get.
Mentioned was there was no centralized data base listing previous DSF collected
information. One survey respondent even said the data set his unit collected and
transferred on to their relief was later deleted. To address this issue it is recommended
that a centralized DSF-specific database be created on the Department of Defenses Secret
Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPERnet) that all military units and civilian teams in
the field have access to and that its use be mandated. The DSF has been in use for two
years and significant data sets exist in areas where it has been fielded. Maintaining that

52

information in an archive which is accessible to future units is essential and it should not
be lost.
Because the database only deals with ensuring the continuity of already collected
data, for those collecting data for new areas, a list of resources and a data collection
handbook should be developed to assist them. The handbook should cover the issue of
where and how to go about collecting the data since the DSF already lists the type of data
needed. It should also discuss best practices for how to organize and present the data.
On the issue of improving the accuracy of data, there are two ways to go about
this. The first is for the implementation of a quality assurance regime. Data quality
should be measured via sample testing and reported back to higher headquarters. An
outside pair of eyes on the data from a higher unit headquarters or some other source
should also be used to objectively assess the data and check on analysis. This will provide
an extra incentive for field staff to get the data and analysis right. Since practitioners
would know they will be checked they will be less likely to massage the data to get it to
say what someone wants it to say. Bringing in Afghan partners from the local community
to look at the data would be an additional way to help ensure the data is accurate. This
could be done several ways, such as by using a cross section of the population, in a
method similar to that of a focus group, or through presentations to key Afghan leaders
who have been vetted as honest brokers who are supportive of Afghan government and
ISAF efforts, and have a good understanding of their communities. Bringing in Afghans to
vet data has pitfalls on its own, such as security concerns and making sure they are not
skewing the results out of self-interest, and should just be used as one validation method
among others.
53

In summary the preferred recommendation is Option #3, consisting of selected

changes to implementation. This involves first addressing the leadership support issue by
1) mandating the use of the DSF; 2) instituting a quality assurance regime; 3) developing
implementation standards and 4) providing suitable resources for tactical units so they
can carry out the DSF properly. The combination of incentives (mandating use and
inspections with results listed on personnel/employee evaluation reports) along with
additional resources and guidance should go a long way to ensuring the DSF is utilized
properly. This should be supplemented with 5) more training, however, particularly
among military commanders and senior civilian leaders so they come to understand the
importance and value of the DSF as a programming tool that will help them accomplish
organizational and U.S. government stabilization goals in Afghanistan. Additional training
for DSF staff on data collection, analysis, activity design, and monitoring and evaluation
should also occur. The data collection/validation issue, which appear to be most pressing
as indicated by survey responses, is dealt with by 6) creating an online database archiving
DSF related information throughout the theater of operations; 7) publishing a resource
list and handbook for where and how to go about collecting DSF data; and 8) bringing in
Afghan colleagues and other outside observers to check data validity.

CONCLUSION
This paper examined the District Stability Framework, USAIDs conflict assessment and
programming methodology and how it is being used in Afghanistan. Utilizing available

54

literature, interviews with practitioners, and an online survey, it detailed how the DSF is
being implemented in the field and problems associated it.
The paper began with an in-depth report on the country context and how conflict
in Afghanistan has led to significant loss of life and a low standard of living for the Afghan
people. It moved on to note the importance of good conflict assessment and stabilization
practice to remedy the problems with insecurity in Afghanistan before reviewing how
stabilization is defined and what USAID diagnostic tools existed prior to the DSF.
How the DSF is being used in Afghanistan was then broadly discussed, as were
problems associated with it. These mainly centered on the lack of leadership support and
data collection and validation problems. Some also suggested the framework itself was
too complex a tool and needed to be simplified. Once these problems were fleshed out,
policy options where then discussed and weighed.
The paper concluded with a policy recommendation that selected changes be
made to the way the DSF is being implemented. There were eight of these: 1) mandating
the use of the DSF in area of Afghanistan where the U.S. has the lead; 2) instituting a
quality assurance regime to check on implementation; 3) developing implementation
standards; 4) providing suitable resources for tactical units so they can carry out the DSF
methodology properly; 5) more training for leaders about the importance and value of
the DSF, as well as for DSF project staff to increase their competency using it; 6) creating
an online database archiving DSF related information throughout the theater of
operations; 7) publishing a resource list and handbook for where and how to go about

55

collecting DSF data; and 8) bringing in Afghan colleagues and other outside observers to
check data validity.
Whether the DSF is being implemented poorly or not is a matter of extreme
importance for the U.S. government, which has expended a great deal of blood and
treasure in Afghanistan. It is also important for the Afghan people who suffer most from
instability in Afghanistan. Proper conflict analysis and appropriately designed
programming to address the sources of instability is vital if stabilization goals are to be
achieved. The DSF methodology allows military and civilian teams on the ground to do
this when it is being properly implemented. The above research has shown, however,
that suboptimal implementation of the DSF is a problem. By taking steps to improve the
way the DSF is implemented, mainly by focusing on the leadership issue and data
collection problems, USAID and ISAF can go a long way towards improving stability in
Afghanistan.

56

ENDNOTES
1

USAID. History. [Website Entry]. Available at: http://usaid.gov/who-we-are/usaid-history

Ibid.

USAID. Office of Conflcit Management and Mitigation. Conflict and Development. [Website Entry].
Available at: http://transition.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/conflict/

Ibid.

USAID. Office of Civilian Military Cooperation. About the Office. [Website Entry]. Available at:
http://www.usaid.gov/work-usaid/partnership-opportunities/us-military/office-civilian-militarycooperation
6

Ibid.

ISAF. About US. [Website Entry]. Available at: http://www.isaf.nato.int/troop-numbers-andcontributions/index.php

8

ISAF. Mission. [Website Entry]. Available at: http://www.isaf.nato.int/mission.html

Email Communication with Jim Derelth, December 6 , 2012.

th

10

CIA. World Factbook: Afghanistan: People and Society. [Website Entry]. Available at:
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html (accessed October 7, 2012).
11

CIA. World Factbook: Afghanistan: People and Society: Ethnic Groups. [Website Entry]. Available at:
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html (accessed October 7, 2012).

12

CIA. World Factbook: Afghanistan: People and Society: Languages. [Website Entry]. Available at:
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html (accessed February 7, 2012).

13

CIA. World Factbook: Afghanistan: People and Society: Urbanization. [Website Entry]. Available at:
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html (accessed February 7, 2012)
14

CIA. World Factbook: Afghanistan: People and Society: Median Age. [Website Entry]. Available at:
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html (accessed February 7, 2012).
15

CIA. World Factbook: Afghanistan: People and Society: Infant Mortality Rate. [Website Entry]. Available
at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html (accessed February 7,
2012).
16

Tanner, Stephen. Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the War against the
Taliban. Da Cap Press. New York. April 2009.
17

United Nations News Centre. Afghanistan & the United Nations. [Website Entry]. Available at:
http://www.un.org/news/dh/latest/afghan/un-afghan-history.shtml (accessed February 19, 2012).

57

18

PBS. Background Report: The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan. [Website Entry]. Available at:
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/indepth_coverage/asia/afghanistan/soviet.html (accessed February 19,
2012).
19

Khan, Ayesha. Two steps forward, one step back. UNHCR Refugees Magazine, June 1, 1995. AVaialbie
at: http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/search?page=search&docid=3b542f1f2 (accessed February 19,
2012).
20

Steele, Johnathan. Ten Myths About Afghanistan. The Guardian, September 27, 2011. Available at:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/sep/27/10-myths-about-afghanistan
21

Ibid.

22

Gargan, Edward. Taliban Massacres Outlined for UN. The Chicago Tribune, October 12, 2001.
Available at: http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2001-10-12/news/0110120312_1_taliban-fightersmassacres-in-recent-years-mullah-mohammed-omar
23

UNDP. Afghanistan Country Profile: Human Development Indicators. [Website Entry]. Available at:
http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/AFG.html (accessed February 7, 2012).

24

World Bank. Data: Afghanistan: Life expectancy at birth, total (years). [Website Entry].
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN/countries/AF?display=default (accessed February19,
2012).

25

CIA. World Factbook: Afghanistan: People and Society: Literacy. [Website Entry]. Available at:
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html (accessed February 7, 2012).
26

AusAid. Afghanistan: Uruzgan Province. [Website Entry]. Available at:

http://www.ausaid.gov.au/country/country.cfm?CountryID=27886219&Region=AfricaMiddleEast (accessed
February 20, 2012).
27

UNDOC. World Drug Report 2011: The Opium/Heroin Market. Available at:
http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/WDR2011/The_opium-heroin_market.pdf (accessed
February 7, 2012), pg. 48
28

World Bank. Data: Afghanistan: Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty line (% of population)
[Website Entry]. Available at: http://data.worldbank.org/country/afghanistan (accessed February 7, 2012)
29

IMF. World Economic Outlook Database: September 2011. Available at:

http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/02/weodata/index.aspx (accessed February 7, 2012)

30

CIA. World Factbook: Afghanistan: Economy: Unemployment rate. [Website Entry]. Available at:
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html (accessed February 7, 2012).
31

Foreign Policy Magazine. Failed States Index 2012. Available at:

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/failed_states_index_2012_interactive
32

Ibid.

33

Chesser, Susan. Afghanistan Casualties: Military Forces and Civilians. Congressional Research Service.
September 6, 2012. Report # R41084

58

34

Ibid.

35

Ibid.

36

Icausalties.org. Coalition Deaths by Year. Available at: http://icasualties.org/OEF/ByYear.aspx

37

Livingston, Ian and Michael OHanlon. Afghan Index. Brookings Institution. September 20, 2012.
Available at:
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Programs/foreign%20policy/afghanistan%20index/index20120930.pdf
38

ISAF. ISAF Monthly Data through September 2012. Available at:

http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/media/PDFs/20121019_niu_isaf_monthly_data_release%20%28final%29.
pdf
39

Ibid.

40

Ibid.

41

Ibid.

42

United States Institute for Peace. Measuring Progress in Stabilization and Reconstruction. Stabilization
and Reconstruction Series No. 1. March, 2006.
43

U.S. Army. Stability Operations. Field Manual. FM3-07. September 2008. Pg. D-1

44

USAID. [Website Entry]. The District Stability Framework Available at:

http://transition.usaid.gov/our_work/global_partnerships/ma/dsf.html
45

State building involves building the intuitions and capacities of the state. Nation-building is similar, but
different and properly understood deals with building the sense of nationhood among the populace.
Stability focuses on the addressing the causes of instability.
46

Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02, Joint Definitions and Terms. Available at:
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf
47

Department of State, Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Website: Resources. Available at:
http://www.state.gov/j/cso/resources/index.htm
48

This definition comes from the United Kingdoms Stabilization Units article Helping Countries Recover
from Violent Conflict. It is included in Appendix E: Acronyms and Glossary of Selected Key Terms of
Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction.
49

A variety of books on this subject exist, most recently Rajiv Chandrasekarans Little America: The War in
Afghanistan.
50

Center for a New American Security. Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in
Afghanistan. January 2010. pps 1-2.
51

U.S. Army. Stability Operations. Field Manual. FM3-07. September 2008. Pg. 4-7

52

Ibid.

59

53

Email Communication with Colonel Gerald Timoney, U.S. Army (Retired). November 2012; and email
communication with Jim Derelth, December 6, 2012.
54

Ibid.

55

Ibid.

56

Ibid.

57

Ibid.

58

The ideas for the next two paragraphs are drawn from the authors own experiences and discussion
related to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as the introductions to the U.S. Armys
counterinsurgency and stability operations field manuals which discuss the evolution of U.S. military COIN
and stabilization doctrine vis--vis Iraq and Afghanistan.
59

Peters, Ralph. Progress and Peril. Armed Forces Journal. February 2007. Available at:
http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2007/02/2456854
60

U.S. Army. Counterinsurgency Operations. Field Manual. FM 3-22. December 2006. Pg. xiii

61

U.S. Army. Stability Operations. Field Manual. FM 3-07. September 2008. Pg. ix

62

U.S. Army. Counterinsurgency Operations. Field Manual. FM 3-22. December 2006. See introduction.

63

Beller, Klein and Fisher. US Government Innovations in Peacebuilding and Conflict Resolution:
Implications for the IPCR Program. American University. November 2010. Available at:
http://www.american.edu/sis/ipcr/upload/US-Government-Innovations-in-Peacebuilding-11-29-10-withExec-Summary.pdf
64

USAID. Office of Conflcit Management and Mitigation. Conflict and Development. [Website Entry].
Available at: http://transition.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/conflict/
65

Ibid.

66

USAID. Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation. Conducting a Conflict Assessment: A Framework
for Strategy and Program Development. April 2005.

67

Ibid.

68

Ibid., pg. 37

69

Ibid., Annex A

70

Ibid, pg. 8

71

Sources of instability are akin to root causes. Drivers are other dynamics that accelerate or worsen
conflict resulting from sources of instability.
72

USAID. Tactical Conflict Assessment and Planning Framework.

60

73

Ibid.

74

Ibid.

75

Ibid.

76

Email Communication with Mick Crnkovich, October 25 2012.

77

Ibid.

78

Pan, Jonathan. Persistent Security, Then Development. Military Review. July-August 2010.

79

Ibid.

80

Interview with Mick Crnkovich, November 2012.

81

USAID. District Stability Framework. More information is available here:

http://www.mors.org/UserFiles/file/2010%20Mini-Symposium/SSUCO_Wednesday_Crkovich.pdf; and
here: http://transition.usaid.gov/our_work/global_partnerships/ma/dsf.html Off
82

U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute. District Stability Framework Reference Guide.
December 2010. Available at:
https://www.pksoi.org/document_repository/misc/DSF_Quick_Reference_Guide_Dec_2010-COP-239.pdf
83

Ibid.

84

Ibid.

85

Ibid.

86

Ibid.

87

Ibid.

88

Ibid.

89

Ibid.

90

Ibid.

91

Ibid.

92

Author Interview with Sloan Mann, September 21, 2012.

93

Ibid.

94

RC-East FRAGO, June 2011.

95

ISAF. RC-East. Available at: http://www.isaf.nato.int/subordinate-commands/rc-east/index.php

61

96

Ibid.

97

Author Interview with Justin Richmond, October 7, 2010.

98

Ibid.

99

Ibid.

100

Ibid.

101

Qualtrics Survey by Author, (see attached survey report in the annex for the full data set), QUESTION #1

102

Qualtrics Survey by Author, QUESTION # 4 & QUESTION #5

103

Qualtrics Survey by Author, QUESTION #16

104

Qualtrics Survey by Author, QUESTION #17

105

Qualtrics Survey by Author, QUESTION #27

106

Qualtrics Survey by Author, QUESTION #28

107

Qualtrics Survey by Author, QUESTION #28

108

Qualtrics Survey by Author, QUESTION #16

109

Qualtrics Survey by Author, QUESTION #16

110

Qualtrics Survey by Author, QUESTION #16

111

Qualtrics Survey by Author, QUESTION #18

112

Qualtrics Survey by Author, QUESTION #14

113

Qualtrics Survey by Author, QUESTION #14

114

Qualtrics Survey by Author, QUESTION #14

115

Interview with Justin Richmond, October 7, 2010.

116

Qualtrics Survey by Author, QUESTION #23

117

Interview with Justin Richmond, October 7, 2010.

118

Qualtrics Survey by Author, QUESTION #30

119

Qualtrics Survey by Author, QUESTION #23

120

Qualtrics Survey by Author, QUESTION #22

121

Interview with Justin Richmond, October 7, 2010.

62

122

Ibid.

123

Qualtrics Survey by Author, QUESTION #22

124

Qualtrics Survey by Author, QUESTION #22

125

Qualtrics Survey by Author, QUESTION #22

126

Qualtrics Survey by Author, QUESTION #26

127

Qualtrics Survey by Author, QUESTION #26

128

Qualtrics Survey by Author, QUESTION #21

129

Qualtrics Survey by Author, QUESTION #8

130

Qualtrics Survey by Author, QUESTION #24

131

Qualtrics Survey by Author, QUESTION #14

132

Qualtrics Survey by Author, QUESTION #24

133

Qualtrics Survey by Author, QUESTION #24

134

Qualtrics Survey by Author, QUESTION #17

135

Qualtrics Survey by Author, QUESTION #18

136

Qualtrics Survey by Author, QUESTION #11

137

Qualtrics Survey by Author, QUESTION #11

138

Qualtrics Survey by Author, QUESTION #8

139

Qualtrics Survey by Author, QUESTION #8

140

Qualtrics Survey by Author, QUESTION #16

141

Qualtrics Survey by Author, QUESTION #16

142

Qualtrics Survey by Author, QUESTION #12

143

Qualtrics Survey by Author, QUESTION #19

144

Qualtrics Survey by Author, QUESTION #11

145

Qualtrics Survey by Author, QUESTION #11

146

Qualtrics Survey by Author, QUESTION #21

63

147

Qualtrics Survey by Author, QUESTION #14

148

Obama, Barack. Remarks by the President on the Way Forward in Afghanistan. Jun. 22, 2011. The
White House. Available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/06/22/remarks-presidentway-forward-afghanistan
149

Interviews with Justin Richmond (October 2012), Joe Auger (November 2012), Jason Alexander
(November 2012).
150

Qualtrics Survey by Author, QUESTION #13

151

Qualtrics Survey by Author, QUESTION #13

152

Interview with Jason Alexander, November 2012.

64

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Chesser, Susan. Afghanistan Casualties: Military Forces and Civilians. Congressional
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dex20120930.pdf
Mann, Sloan. Phone Interview with Author. September 21, 2012.
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USAID. District Stability Framework. More information is available

here: http://www.mors.org/UserFiles/file/2010%20MiniSymposium/SSUCO_Wednesday_Crkovich.pdf; and here:
http://transition.usaid.gov/our_work/global_partnerships/ma/dsf.html
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_2010-COP-239.pdf
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[Website Entry]. Available at: http://data.worldbank.org/country/afghanistan (accessed
November 3, 2012)

ANNEX 2 - ACRONYMS LIST

CAF

Conflict Assessment Framework

CDP

Community Development Program Funds

CERP

Commanders Emergency Response Program Funds

CMC

Office of Civilian-Military Cooperation

CMM

Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation

DCHA

Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance

DoD

Department of Defense

DoS

Department of State

DSF

District Stability Framework

DST

District Stability Team

ISAF

International Security Assistance Force

KLE

Key Leader Engagement

LGCD

Local Governance & Community Development Funds

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

OTI

Office of Transition Initiatives

PRT

Provincial Reconstruction Team

QRF

Quick Reaction Funds

RC

Regional Command

SIPR

Secret Internet Protocol Router Network

SOI

Source of Instability

SWG

Stability Working Group

TCAPF

Tactical Conflict Assessment and Planning Framework

TCS

Tactical Conflict Survey

UN

United Nations

USAID

United States Agency for International Development

DISTRICT STABILITY FRAMEWORK

POINT PAPER
District Stability Framework (DSF) is a common interagency and effects based program management framework
that encourages unity of effort and allows users to; Understand the operating environment; Understand how local
perceptions influence overall stability; Identify and address the root causes (sources) of instability, design activities
that specifically address instability at the local level; Monitor and evaluate outputs, impacts and overall stability
The DSF supports unity of effort by promoting the establishment of interagency platforms for stability
programming referred to as Stability Working Groups (SWGs) The SWG is a stability focused planning and
coordination body ideally comprised of: USG Civilians, Coalition Forces, GIRoA, International Organizations, and
NGOs. The SWG meets regularly to identify and address sources of instability within a local operating environment.
DSF is an iterative four step process.
1. Situational Awareness. DSF requires population-centric and stability oriented situational awareness. The
framework contains focused steps to assist with gaining situational awareness.

Identify Stability and Instability factors and their relevance to the population using the Operational Variables of
PMESII and the civil considerations of ASCOPE for a local Operating Environment.
Understand the Cultural Environment by determining cultural specific dynamics that exist in the local
environment; traditional conflict resolution mechanisms, traditional authorities, limits to the traditional
mechanisms and how Anti-Government Elements exploit them.
Understand Perception Dynamics by determining priority issues (grievances) that are effecting the local
population. Identify gaps in knowledge about a local operating environment and confirm or deny our
assumptions using multiple (available) sources and types of perception data.
Apply Stability and Instability Dynamics using gained situational awareness to further refine possible factors of
Instability, possible factors of Stability (Resiliencies), and determine what Key Actors with the means and
motivations to foster stability and instability are present in a local area.

2. Analysis. During analysis, the SWG determines the sources of instability (SOI) within an operating environment
and develops an objective statement to address them. The SWG identifies perceptive and systemic causes of the
SOIs as well as predetermines the impact (measure of effect) necessary to mitigate and/or diminish the systemic
(root) causes of instability.

Identify the actual SOIs for a local operating environment. SWGs screen possible factors of instability identified
in DSF step one to determine the actual SOIs that are fostering instability in the area. SOIs are defined as local
issues that meet the three stability criteria; Decrease support for GIRoA; Increase support for Anti-Government
Elements (AGEs); and Disrupt the normal functioning of society.
Identify the perceived and systemic (root) causes that are contributing to the continuation or exploitation of a
SOI.
Develop an effect oriented Objective that is designed to orient SWGs to the desired end state of diminishing the
SOI.
Determine Impact Indicators and their data sources. The SWG identifies the impact (effect) required to see
change in the environment as a result of diminishing each systemic cause.

Source: CTC-A & USAID Afghanistan | As of: 10 September 2010

3. Design. All activities identified through the DSF process are designed to target SOIs by diminishing the systemic
(root) causes that contribute to the SOIs. Activities are filtered against the three stability criteria and refined by
applying seven common sense design principles. To ensure the ability to monitor activity completion, output
(measure of performance) indicators and data sources are identified.

Design Activities by filtering possible activities against the three stability criteria that ask: Does the activity
Increase support for GIRoA? Decrease support for Anti-Government Elements? Increase institutional and
societal capacity and capability? SWGs then screen remaining activities against the seven design principles that
ask: Is the activity.Sustainable by the local government and/or local institutions? Promote local ownership by
putting local institution in the lead? Foster long-term vs. short term results? Leverage support from other
organizations? Politically and culturally appropriate? Strengthen accountability and transparency? and is the
activity flexible? The final step of activity design asks Do we have the required Money, Personnel, Expertise,
and Time to realistically conduct the activity?
Identify Output Indicators and Data Sources. Once the appropriate activities are identified, SWGs identify Output
indicators (measures of performance) that allow them to determine whether an activity is be completed as
expected and when it is completed.
Synchronize Activities. Lastly in the design phase, SWGs synchronize and prioritize identified activities by
establishing logical sequence for activities, coordination of activities along the lines of operation, and prioritize
activities that address multiple causes of instability in order to maximize impact and minimize effort/cost.

4. Monitoring and Evaluation. Effective stability programming relies on the ability to understand and measure
change in the stability environment with respect to specific SOIs as well as overall stability trends. The DSF looks
at three different levels of Monitoring and Evaluation:

Level 1, activity output, asks SWGs to do some critical evaluation to determine, have your activities been
completed? Are your activities being implemented successfully? Are there external factors affecting the
implementation of your activities? Are your indicators measuring the appropriate outputs? If not, should you
identify new indicators? Are your data sources providing the correct indicator data? If not, do you need new
data sources?
Level 2, impact, asks SWGs to do some critical evaluation to determine; Are you seeing the intended
impact/change in your environment?; Does this change represent progress towards the objective and a
diminishment of a root cause?; How are external factors influencing and/or causing the changes you are
observing?; Are the activities contributing to the expected impact and the overall objective? If not, consider
alternative activities. Are your indicators measuring the impact appropriately? If not, consider adopting new
indicators. Are your data sources providing the correct indicator data? If not, consider adopting new data
sources and/or new means to collect them.
Level 3, Overall Stability looks at monitoring and evaluating overall stability effects in a local operating
environment in order to determine if programming against identified SOIs as whole is having a stabilizing effect.
Measuring the change in overall stability is a key component of the DSF process. By identifying and measuring a
common basket of stability-focused indicators, it is possible to track the change in stability for a given district by
identifying and measuring locally focused overall stability indicators. The overall stability indicators are not
linked to activities but on societal norms and behavioral points in the local environment. When aggregated,
they can provide a measurement of overall changes in stability over time for a given district.
Source: CTC-A & USAID Afghanistan | As of: 10 September 2010

District Stability Framework Quick Reference Guide

To increase the effectiveness of stability assistance, the U.S. Agency
for International Development and the Counterinsurgency Training
Center-Afghanistan (CTC-A) developed the District Stability
Framework (DSF), a program management framework that utilizes a
range of situational awareness and planning tools to inform stability
programming. DSF supports collaborative planning within Stability
Working Groups and assists stability practitioners in identifying
sources of instability (SOIs), developing activities to diminish or
mitigate the causes, and monitoring and evaluating the impact of
programming against stability objectives in a particular area. DSF is
based on the following premises:
Instability results when the factors fostering instability overwhelm
the ability of the host nation to mitigate these factors
A program management framework is necessary for a strategic,
targeted and iterative approach
Comprehensive situational awareness is required to identify true
sources of instability
Monitoring and evaluating impacts against stability objectives and
the change in overall stability within an area are the only way to
measure success

DSF Situational Awareness Tools

DSF requires population-centric and stability oriented situational awareness. There are four filters that help ensure you have
holistic situational awareness in stability operations:
1. Operating environment
2. Cultural environment
3. Perception dynamics
4. Stability/instability dynamics
Unlike many traditional operational assessments, stability assistance programming requires assessments informed by locallevel (tactical) conditions and perceptions. For example, knowing the number of security forces present in an area is not as
important as knowing if the locals in that area are happy with and trust those security forces.
OPERATING ENVIRONMENT
One model for describing the operational environment is ASCOPE
PMESII. Each letter stands for an aspect of the operational
environment. The six ASCOPE areas of civil considerations are used
to inform the six PMESII operational variables:
Areas Structures Capabilities Organizations People Events
Political/Governance
Military/Security
Economic
Social
Infrastructure
Information
ASCOPE PMESII is population-focused rather than enemy-focused.
In contrast to a traditional area assessment, ASCOPE-PMESII organizes
and examines strategic and operational factors for their relevance to
local stability.

CULTURAL ENVIRONMENT
The cultural environment is the second aspect of DSF situational
awareness. This awareness starts with a thorough understanding of
the organization, history and interests of local groups.
In depth knowledge of cultural factors is essential to the development
of stability-focused situational awareness. In particular,
understanding how traditional conflict resolution mechanisms
function or how stabilizing or destabilizing actors can leverage these
factors for negative and positive effects is critical. Six key factors to
analyze include:
Major cultural groups and their interests
Cultural codes, traditions, and values
Traditional conflict resolution mechanisms
Traditional authorities
Disruptions to traditional authorities
Ways destabilizing elements take advantage of these factors
PERCEPTION DYNAMICS
Local perception data is the third filter of situational awareness and is
important for the following reasons:
Popular support is the key to success
Populations perceptionsnot our assumptionsmust be the
focus of our operations
Stability programming must address the root causes of
instability that have been identified at the local level
Changes in perceptions over time have an impact on stability
Perception data can be obtained through a variety of sources, some
of which are listed below:
APAS from IJC
Tactical Conflict Survey
Human Terrain Team Reports (HTT)
Key Leader Engagements (KLEs)
Stability Operations Information Cell Reports (SOIC)
ANSF Reports
Local Organization Assessments
Shuras and Jirgas
The Tactical Conflict Survey is one way of obtaining local perceptions
in which surveyors ask the following four questions. Understanding
the why for each question is critical.
1. Has the number of people in the village population changed in the
last year? WHY?
2. What is the most important problem facing the
village/town/neighborhood? WHY?
3. Who do you believe can solve your problems? WHY?
4. What should be done first to help the
village/town/neighborhood? WHY?

Tactical Conflict Survey

What is the most important problem facing the
village/town/neighborhood?

APAS

STABILITY/INSTABILITY DYNAMICS
Stability/Instability Dynamics is the last filter of situational awareness.
It allows you to synthesize information from ALL situational
awareness tools to identify factors of instability and stability.
INSTABILITY
There are three main factors of instability to consider:
1. Community grievances
2. Events with the potential to be destabilizing (windows of
vulnerability)
3. Individuals with the means and motivations to exploit
grievances and windows of vulnerability
Although there can be many grievances, they do not all necessarily
foster instability unless key actors with both the motivation and the
means to translate these grievances into widespread instability
emerge. Windows of vulnerability are often precipitated by a specific
event that key actors can capitalize on.
STABILITY
Parallel to factors of instability are mitigating forces such as:
1. Resiliencies or the processes, relationships, and institutions
that can reduce the effects of grievances
2. Events with the potential to mitigate conflict and foster
stability (windows of opportunity)
3. Individuals with the means and motivations to foster stability

DSF Analysis Tools

Once comprehensive situational awareness is completed, DSF provides tools for the analysis of potential sources of instability,
their causes, desired impacts and objectives. These steps are captured in two worksheets: the SOI Analysis and the Tactical
Stability Matrix (TSM).
SOI ANALYSIS
Acknowledged problems in a community are not necessarily
underlying sources of instability. Effective stability programming relies
on careful assessment of potential SOIs against the Stability Criteria:
1. Does the potential instability factor increase support for AntiGovernment Elements?
2. Does the potential instability factor decrease support for the
government?
3. Does the potential instability factor undermine the normal
functioning of society?
The SOI Analysis tool takes factors of instability identified during
Situational Awareness and applies the 3 Stability Criteria. Not all
grievances are destabilizing. If you have perception data to support
your identified SOIs, it can be used to assist with prioritization.
TACTICAL STABILITY MATRIX ANALYSIS
The Tactical Stability Matrix (TSM) guides stability assistance
programming and takes you from the analysis phase to the design
phase. Sources of instability are taken directly from the SOI Analysis.

Analysis Components of the TSM:

Source of Instability (SOI) A very brief description of the
problem or issue, often just a couple of words, as identified
through the analysis of all available operational, cultural, tribal,
and local perception data on a given area.
Cause (Perception) The perceived cause of a source of
instability (i.e. priority grievances commonly cited by the local
population).
Cause (Systemic) The root causes of the problem that relate to
the perceived causes. To identify systemic causes, ask yourself
what circumstances led to community perceptions? What
circumstances allow the problem to continue? What conditions
prevent the problem from being fixed?
Objective A statement of the conditions that will diminish the
identified SOI. Often it is simply the opposite of the source of
instability and its associated conditions. Keep in mind the 3
Stability Criteria when developing the objective statement.
Impact Indicators Also called Measures of Effect, impact
indicators measure the effectiveness of your activities against the
predetermined objective and systemic causes. To identify impact
indicators, ask: How will I know if the objective has been
achieved?
Example: If police abuse is the source of instability, impact
indicators might include:
- Increased popular support for the police
- Population provides more actionable intelligence to
the police
- Police presence in previously no-go areas
Impact Data Sources Methods to obtain the information
identified in your impact indicators.

DSF Design Tools

The next phase of DSF is designing stability activities that address the objective identified on the TSM and target systemic
causes of instability. All potential activities should be screened against the 3 stability criteria, the 7 design principles and
resource availability. Activities should then be coordinated among the actors involved in the Stability Working Group.
TACTICAL STABILITY MATRIX DESIGN
The Tactical Stability Matrix (TSM) is used during the design phase to
identify potential activities addressing the objective and systemic
causes, as well as to identify output indicators and data sources to
monitor those activities.
Design Components of the TSM:
Activities The things you will do to mitigate the systemic causes
of instability and achieve the identified objective.
Output Indicators Also called Measures of Performance,
output indicators determine whether an activity has been
completed. To identify output indicators, ask yourself: How can I
confirm that the proposed activity is progressing as planned or
has been completed?
- # of projects completed

- # of police trained
- # of road miles completed
- # of dollars spent
Example: If police training were an activity, an output
indicator would be the # of police trained.
Output Data Sources Methods to obtain the information
identified in your output indicators.
ACTIVITY DESIGN WORKSHEET
The Activity Design Worksheet is a tool to assist with filtering
activities against the stability criteria, design principles and resource
availability. It should be used while completing the TSM.
Stability Criteria: Does the activity
1. Increase support for GIRoA?
2. Decrease support for Anti-Government Elements (AGEs)?
3. Increase institutional and societal capacity and capability?
Design Principles: Is the activity
1. Sustainable by the local government and/or local institutions?
2. Promoting local ownership putting local institutions in the
lead?
3. Fostering long-term vs. short-term results?
4. Leveraging support from other organizations?
5. Politically and culturally appropriate?
6. Strengthening accountability and transparency?
7. Flexible?
Resource Availability: Do you have the required
1. Money?
2. Personnel?
3. Expertise?
4. Time?
ACTIVITY SYNCHRONIZATION MATRIX
When designing and implementing activities, it is critical to coordinate
with other actors working in the same district. The Synchronization
Matrix helps actors in a Stability Working Group with the following:

Plan a logical sequence for activities

Coordinate along multiple lines of operation
Address multiple causes of instability
Maximize impact and minimize effort/cost

DSF Monitoring & Evaluation Tools

Effective stability programming relies on the ability to understand and measure change in the stability environment with
respect to specific SOIs as well as overall stability trends. The DSF looks at three different levels of M&E:
Level 1 Output (Measures of Performance)
Level 2 Impact (Measures of Effect)
Level 3 Overall Stability

M&E MATRIX
The M&E Matrix is a program management and reporting tool that
measures activity output and impact. It tracks progress against a
baseline to assess the impact activities are having. The M&E Matrix
focuses on the first two levels of M&E.
Level 1, activity output, focuses on:
Have your activities been completed?
Are your activities being implemented successfully?
Are there external factors affecting the implementation of
your activities?
Are your indicators measuring the appropriate outputs? If
not, should you identify new indicators?
Are your data sources providing the correct indicator data? If
not, do you need new data sources?
Level 2, impact, focuses on:
Are you seeing the intended impact/change in your
environment?
Does this change represent progress towards the objective
and a diminishment of a root cause?
How are external factors influencing and/or causing the
changes you are observing?
Are the activities contributing to the expected impact and the
overall objective? If not, consider alternative activities.
Are your indicators measuring the impact appropriately? If
not, consider new adopting new indicators.
Are your data sources providing the correct indicator data? If
not, consider adopting new data sources and/or new means
to collect them.
OVERALL STABILITY
Measuring the change in overall stability is a key component of the
DSF process, and the third level of M&E. By measuring a common
basket of stability-focused indicators, it is possible to track the change
in stability for a given district. Seven recommended overall stability
indicators are listed below; however, they can be modified as needed
for adaptation to a specific operating environment. The overall
stability indicators are not linked to activities. When aggregated, they
can provide a measurement of overall changes in stability over time
for a given district. The seven indicators were selected to provide a
picture of what life is like in a district and how it is changing for the
local population.
1) District Government Recognition
2) Afghan on Afghan Violence
3) Bazaar Activity
4) ANSF Presence
5) Afghan Freedom of Movement
6) Governance Perceptions
7) Security Perceptions

Initial Report
Last Modified: 12/06/2012

1.

Have you received any formal training on the DSF?

Answer

Yes

Bar

Response

36

90%

No

10%

Total

40

Statistic

Value

Min Value

Max Value

Mean

1.10

Variance

0.09

Standard Deviation

0.30

Total Responses

40

2.

What organization delivered the training?

Text Response
Development Transformations, Inc
USAID Training Center in Kabul
COIN Academy and OTI
NATO/CTC-A mobile training team, conducted at FOB Salerno around Fall 2010
DAI
USAID
Jim Derleth and Sloan Mann
USAID
USAID
USAID and the Military
COIN Academy- Afghanistan
The Counterinsurgency Training Center (Afghanistan)
USAID - OTI
USAID
DAI and the COIN Academy, Camp Julien, Kabul
USAID OMA
USAID
4th Civil Affairs Group in Washington DC with presentation from USAID reps
JMRC
Robert swope.
USAID
USAID
COIN Academy
DAI
CSTC-A (Combined Security Transition Command Afghanistan)
JMTC / contact workers
USAID at the COIN training center - Camp Julien
United States Marines Corps
USAID
Development Transformations through USAID (CMC)
USAID and COIN Center in Afghanistan
DAI and US military
DAI
USAID
USAID
DAI
N/A
Statistic
Total Responses

Value
37

3.

Please state the number of training hours you received.

Text Response
24 hours
8
40
initial training referred to above: about 24 hours over three days
24
1
2-3 days
8
20
24
4 days
3-Day course (About 30 Hours)
20+
15
24 -38 (not sure exactly)
@ 80 hours
40
About 4-6 hours classroom, then practical application prior to deployment
3
2 days
20
40
24 hours (3-day course).
24
40 hrs
6 plus 15 day field problem
3 days
8
10
80 (It was an IDC for trainers)
Was initial part of developing with USAID and taught various parts of the course
3 day course and then two months of instructor training.
10
40
24
3 days
N/A
Statistic
Total Responses

Value
37

4.

Did your trainer(s) report experience applying the DSF in the field?

Answer

1
2

Bar

Response

Yes

28

72%

No

11

28%

Total

39

Statistic

Value

Min Value

Max Value

Mean

1.28

Variance

0.21

Standard Deviation

0.46

Total Responses

39

5.

Did your trainer(s) report experience using the DSF in your location?

Answer

1
2

Bar

Response

Yes

14

37%

No

24

63%

Total

38

Statistic

Value

Min Value

Max Value

Mean

1.63

Variance

0.24

Standard Deviation

0.49

Total Responses

38

6.

Have you applied the DSF individually, in a team, or both?

Answer

1
2
3

Bar

Response

Individually

11%

Team

13%

Both

29

76%

Total

38

Statistic

Value

Min Value

Max Value

Mean

2.66

Variance

0.45

Standard Deviation

0.67

Total Responses

38

7.

In applying the DSF did you or your team have all of the skills, tools, and
resources to complete the analysis per the instructions?

Answer

1
2

Bar

Response

Yes

14

37%

No

24

63%

Total

38

Statistic

Value

Min Value

Max Value

Mean

1.63

Variance

0.24

Standard Deviation

0.49

Total Responses

38

8.

If you or your team did NOT have the all the skills, tools, and resources to
complete the DSF analysis per the instructions, please explain what essential skills,
tools, and resources you and/or your team lacked.

Text Response
Although some resources were available for community perception data (provided by the military) it was often difficult to access or not well organized. So the local perception information
was much more based on individual conversations and not hard research data.
No, because the military unit I worked with assigned a single individual (very smart but overly-burden sergeant) to run the program. He had to make due with limited formal training and
manpower. Lacking support, he had to dumb-down the process and thereby did not employ all the tools (and processes) normally associated with DSF. But he did an amazing job
considering these constraints.
ASCOPE: Perception data was generally available but not synthesized. Indivudual informant reports and surveys/interviews from HTTs, for example, were available in abundance but
were not contiually synthesized for better guidance. In Afghanistan / RC-East DSF was initially focused in KTDs in rank order, which were ranked, even when a KTD was relatively stable
and a another less stable KTD ranked lower should have been targeted. In RC-East the KTD list became somewhat obsolete, not being updated after April 2011. In addition, due to
instability, percetion data was over reliant on the methjod involving engagements with the few community member identified as power brokers or having indepth knowledge, as opposed
to statistically relevant surveys, etc. The survey data from army contractors (E.G., BINA survey) and HTT had to be treated with some healthy skepticism. USAID was introducing a new
stab program as I was departing Afghanistan. The methods were almost entirely reliant on perception data, theoretically including 6-10 methods to include statisticaL sampling, However,
I was skeptical and rather certain the method involing interviews of the community leaders/ power brokers would by far be the most used. It's a great supplementary method but these
guys have agendas and the results are obviously biased. Statistical sampling in an unstable district is highly questionable. Necessarily the interviewers must be ethnically close to the
area in question and operate on their own with distant supervision or be accompanied my CF - caufing skewed results in either case.
A lack of understanding of sources of instability and the ability to program against identified sources
One could never actually have all the requisite skills or tools needed. There is an infinite supply of information available. The thing we never had was an accurate sense of public
perception - the underpinnings of DSF. No one wanted to contract out a company to get perception data, none of the team leaders asked the questions correctly, and their interpreters never
had a good grounding of what the questions were to ask them in the most effective way....instead of interpreting the questions, they simply translated the words...so what happened was
that folks would fill in the DSF worksheet using what they knew and did this through the lens of an expat....the truth is, we never, ever had enough of the Afghans perception of what was
going on....ALL other information was either made up, guessed, or based off of token conversations with 3-5 Afghans...but no where close to a representative sample. The other issue is,
NONE of the DSF trainers had actually completed a DSF in an Afghan context. They all spoke about its merits, but none of them had actually done one correctly.
Public perception data was sorely lacking, particularly in 2011
Skills: need to have a mix of experience among practitioners- using DSF is as much an "art" as anything. It helps to have one or more persons on a team who have experience using the
tool; Resources: trying to use DSF in a closed environment (i.e. constrained to a COP/FOB, restricted entry/movement etc) is almost impossible- it makes it impossible to convene a true
multi-stakholder stability working group- multi- stakholders can be interviewed in sequence, but you lose the synergy and some of the robustness of the outputs
Our Human Terrain Team has the skills and tools, but lacked the resource of inter-agency participation and the ability to transgress the human (and political) barriers of keeping sustained
and focused dialog between all stakeholders. The inherent problem, in my estimation was the lack of "Unity of Effort" accross the spectrum of stakeholders. The missing resource is
mission investment by way of cultural and political moore.
Local Afghan staff lacked sufficient background in the use of program management tools and analytical thinking to properly collect information for use within the DSF or to use the DSF as
a management took for programing.
Lack of local population input.
I found most of my colleague had little to no experience in social science or cultural studies and struggled with non-quantitative tools. PS the answer to the below question is both yes and
no. it depends on the skill and tool. for me personally, I had years of experience in developing countries and in muslim societies, which are highly diverse, to draw on.
Team was not adequately trained to understand how to implement DSF
Team lacked formal DSF training, only couple members had DSF training, and no one had any prior experience.
One of the limiting factors in applying DSF analysis in a complex operating environment, such as in Afghanistan, is the level of coordination among all actors and elements operating in
the AO. Without unity of effort, at the strategic and operational levels, DSF implementation is limited. The basic lack of coordination among NATO-ISAF units in terms of stabilization and
development was a resource that was missing, in my experience.
We completed the DSF analysis only with USAID and Chemonics staff. We did not have any input from ISAF, State Dept, GIRoA or ANSF, or access to any of their analyses.
Lack of cooperation from the battle space owner hindered completing the analysis.
3 years of graduate work in CMO
More perception data and data on the current situation
I did as the resident expert, but my military colleagues on my PRT didn't. This was 2009. They had only heard of it, and then it was called TCAPF.
The ASCOPE/PMESII is a tool that is only as good as the combined effort of the unit within the AO. More often than not, most components are not properly assessed within the cultural
and societal norms for the country and the "western mindset" with the teams personality and capability drives the outcome. The "intellect" of the village elder or mullah is rarely
considered. The initial intent was to develop the capability of the PRT but provide the ability of the MRRD/NSP and CDCs to carry on. The process itself grew too complex for most of the
Afghans.
Contact with host country nationals is usually limited.
When working with teams that do not have development experience, the concepts, process and connection to the community is not understood and impedes the ability to actual
implement programs. DSF is but a tool- any tool can be used in any situation but it is the people with the in-depth knowledge of how to implement programs that make the difference. Most
of the military saw this as a checklist and/or obstacle that must be completed to get money out to the community. Waste of time and effort to make development understood by those
whose primary objective is NOT development.
Statistic
Total Responses

Value
22

9.

Were the skills, tools, and resources YOU personally used in applying the DSF
acquired through the training you received?

Answer

1
2

Bar

Response

Yes

28

74%

No

10

26%

Total

38

Statistic

Value

Min Value

Max Value

Mean

1.26

Variance

0.20

Standard Deviation

0.45

Total Responses

38

10.

Do you think that the skills, tools, and resources your TEAM used in applying
the DSF were acquired through the training you received?

Answer

1
2

Bar

Response

Yes

26

68%

No

12

32%

Total

38

Statistic

Value

Min Value

Max Value

Mean

1.32

Variance

0.22

Standard Deviation

0.47

Total Responses

38

11.

Were there parts of the DSF training you attended that turned out to be
inconsistent with your experience using the DSF in the field? Please provide as much
detail as you can on the inaccurate or inappropriate parts of the training.

Text Response
Gathering perception data is difficult. People had to be pro-active in finding the data and ensuring that the data was strong. The training course sometimes makes the perception data part
seem very easy, when in fact much time goes into getting the data and vetting it.
I was rather happy with the way my training based on practical experiences and not bogged down in to much non-sense. The only thing I would say was misleading was the constant
referencing of Stability Working Groups. The training talked about large SWGs that would have 10 or 12 actors - US, ISAF, Afghans - but in reality, the DSFs were usually put togeher
with 3 or 4 people who were willing to talk. If I were giving the training I would stress that the DSF can be done as an individual as much as I talked about doing it with a SWG.
The only concern is that you can make the data "say what you want it to say." In training, you're taught to let the data drive the decisions in conflict mitigation programming, but you can
still make the decisions drive the data through intentional or unintentional database manipulation and even biased collection (often done by untrained/angry/frightened soldiers that want to
get out of the village rather than interview villagers). This would negate the value of DSF. I heard about this anecdotally from other DSF practitioners, but never saw it myself.
See above comments regarding perception data availability.
Yes. The notion of what constitutes an SOI was always difficult to clearly define. The communities or government officials we worked with defined an SOI in a way that included problems
that will not necessarily qualify as an SOI if applying a strict definition of an SOI. My conclusion in this area was that an SOI should be whatever the locals consider to be their
"nightmare" if you will. One example was the notion of lack of electricity- it was always cited as an SOI but if one was to follow the three criteria that would probably not make the cut to an
SOI.
A lack of understanding on behalf of trainers in the lack of availability of resources to adequate program agains SOIs
This question is poorly written. We were taught how to fill out an excel-based workbook. Anyone can fill out such a workbook.. But essentially, DSF training was talking off of powerpoints
(that hadn't changed/evolved) that were simply plagiarizing Jim Derleth's work. None of the trainers had actually struggled through the process of doing a DSF in an active warzone - so
everything in the training was idealized, very little based in reality - so what happened was, the DSF became a 'garbage in, garbage out' product. The trainers also made a big deal about
USAID endorsing DSF as an institutional process - that assertion carried no water in the field...no one cared. The trainers talked about showing results within 3 months of doing a DSF this clearly showed that NONE of the trainers had actually done this in the field. NOTHING in AF is done within 3 months, funding is too slow - that turned a lot of people off.
DSF training was complete, DSF was just not fully incorporated throughtout the RCT8 area in Helmand
All the detailed program design stuff was not terribly useful because we did not really have money for interventions. We got to the point of SOIs and then stopped
As mentioned previously- in a confined situation it is almost impossible to use the tool as taught. Also, unless the team has actual access to funds and/or programs they can directly
control and shape it is difficult to follow through on the activity phase of the analysis- the SWG can identify SOI's, root/systemic causes etc. and make recommendations as to what
activities might be executed, but it will not be possible for them to actually design and execute interventions.
Sometimes, the tools forced the participants' conclusions and/or observations to be relegated to a "box" which did not capture the essence of "sources of instability". Problems are often
complex--and the tools and techniques meant to analyze them can be too cumbersome to properly synthesize/frame the issues. Also, there's no shortage of information within the O/E-but there's a lack of coordinated time for stakeholder's to discuss the problem sets (and make timely decisions) before they are overcome by events. The metholdogy seems sound, but
because events and new information continue to evolve within the O/E, the framework did not allow for the process outputs to be easily adapted. Thus, one shortfall of committing to the
framework means that you continue down a path to develop a plan and commit to the Common Operational Picture as it looked when you began, or you constantly hinge decision points
on new information that becomes available as your team's understanding of the O/E changes.
The ability to consistently gather data needed to gauge impact was presented in a misleading manner. That is to say, it was far more difficult to gather data in unstable areas than the
trainer explained.
Training indicated that programming and US response to needs and situations identified in the field by using the DSF would be applied to future response by either ISAF or US gov't
(PRT). This was not the case. The DSF was widely ignored and supplanted by other metrics and information gathering/reporting mechanisams.
I did not attend formal DSF training - I read the manual and learned from others who attended the training
There are notable challenges in the collection of poplations perceptions'; the quality of collectors, the answers provided by the interviewee and the ability to properly log the information by
the collector often prevented a proper "perception based" analysis. Not that the collection training was inconsistent with its application, it was more a matter of difficulty to to properly apply
the collection methodology in order to have proper results.
The training materials provide in depth and fairly accurate data which was collected from the surveys. Data collection in the field varies based on the training/experience level of collector.
Also, afghans will keep giving you different answers with each survey....... they are just tired of being asked questions for the past 10 yrs!!!
DSF was right on the money. It is VERY hard to apply in reality however.. Specifically looking at Afghanistan you have Western and Middle Eastern thought process' - both different.
Complexities in applying DSF center around differing national priorities and cultural norms. Ultimately we applied DSF unilaterally to identify direction, goals, underlying problems, etc.
The process worked well for us and allowed us to document our observations and to quantify our actions/plans. Very effective!!
The practical exercises executed during the training were relevant, however, applying them in a more local context in the training scenario would have been more accurate and been more
appropriate, given the participants in the training class.
Two separate questions. The first was based on the personality of the person in charge (civ or mil) in an area. The second (inaccuracies), I didn't experience any. The DSF seems to be
based on general stability, conflict mitigation and development principles. E.g. Do no harm, identify and prioritize sources of instability, local buy in, etc.
The DSF training assumed a best-case scenario in that the implementing team would be broad-based and have a considerable amount of time to apply to the process. This was not the
case when we applied DSF.
No
The definition of root cause is nonsenicle. the time horizin is vaugue and a root cause to one may only be a intermediate objective of a long term cause. it is all a mater of time and
relevence as to what a root cause is.
the SWGs don't really meet or work M&E is difficult to organize for all stab efforts
Measuring change over time, as 'treatment' is applied. Very difficult to do. Monitoring for progress/effects should have been stressed more.
TCS questioning was too narrow. This is a part of tactical questioning and the four questions are just a start. There is a vast amount of information which needs to be derived from the
populace. Key actors needs to be better developed.
Culture and perception dynamics are lacking. Afghanistan as a whole is extremely complex and one can not understand a "general" overview of the issues. Without have something
more specific to an AO, you will generally find that the outcome will not be what was intended. Example: Kunar to Faryab or Mez to Helmand.
The version of DSF that was taught when I first arrived in Afghanistan was largely theoretical and unpractical. We tried to create a more practical and simplified field version while I was
there. It seemed to be well received, but I wasn't there long enough to measure the actual effect of the training on stabilization. Teams did seem to be using the new version with
assistance from a DSF advisor and at times on their own initiative.
Every and all aspects of the training. Not one individual who trained the DSF had ever used it in the field. Mostly theory and not practical application at all. Complete pompous statements
from those who thought they knew the process of good community interaction.
The DSF training I received in Kabul via DAI and the COIN Center was excellent. However, the DSF training I attended stateside was not the complete training. It was not specific and did
not give scenarios.

Statistic
Total Responses

Value
29

12.

Were there elements missing from the DSF training you attended that turned
out to be very important to applying the DSF usefully in the field? Please provide as
much detail as you can on the gaps and limitations of the training.

Text Response
The training should have included how to bring more Afghans into the process. Where Afghans were involved early in DSF situational awareness and analysis, the impact was always
far greater than when DSF was done by westerners.
I think there are more resources out there for local perception data... But the training just said it will be there... I wish the training would of given better guidance on where to find
information.
Yes, the simple practice of looking at complex conflict environments through a conflict lens (local drivers of instability, key actors, etc.). Then, configuring that data in a way that helps walk
you to the answer of what should be done to effectively mitigate the SOI and if/when that succeedes or fails, how to detect the success or failure (i.e., conflict M&E)
The training was good. Those who are to apply DSF need to be able to deal with ambiguity and to understand that they are to adapt and apply DSF to the circumstances on the ground in a
particular community/district. Most rainees seemed somewhat confused in distinguishing sorting through perceived grievances and identifying root causes of SOIs. Also challening in
practice for many participants was honing the SOIs common to most unstable districts in Afghanistan (departure of local leadership, breaKdown of traditional mechanisms for conflict
resolution, etc. to local root causes of SOIs (e.g., locally specific issues with access and control of local resources - land and water - and conflict resolution). Many field staff simply didn't
seem to grasp the concepts to make practical use of DSF to guide design of programs / interventions and to identify appropriate deployment of human and program resources. However, in
the second year of our push in RC-East to establish DSF as the main stab programming tool, we made progress in most provinces.
No
Yes, the importance of limited non-core activities in planning and implemintation of programs
Specifically, we had to adjust some of the TCAPF questions so that Afghans could understand them - there was A LOT lost on cultural nuances. There should have been a focus on
perception data collection - because if we don't collect any amount of local perception data, then the workbook is simply an expat's opinion of what is going on.
No
Just having some common understanding of what the DSF was and what its various components were for was helpful later in implementing DSF with the military
Much attention is paid to convening a stability working group to conduct SOI analysis- no attention is paid to understanding the different skill sets practitioners need to have in order to
utilize the tool. The assumption is that if you complete the training you will be skilled at the analysis of stability dynamics; program design; evaluation design and evaluation analysis- this
is a false assumption. Each of these skills is sufficiently deep that one ought to have at least one member on the team with masters degree level training in each of these skills. If that is
not possible (and it usually isn't) "higher" needs to prep and make available all elements EXCEPT the SOI analysis, which the ground team can and should execute
Interagency coordination training was missing. Students need specific training that details the number of stakeholders necessary to contribute to a plan. Too many projects and working
groups commit time and resources to use the material--but lack the coordination (and knowledge) to implement their plans because of these organizational policies and boundaries.
Recommend that the organizations and stakeholders are detailed through coursework and breifings....
In the early days of the DSF, there was very little attention given to monitoring and evaluation. Rather, most of the emphasis was placed on using the DSF to 1. understand your AoR,
and 2. program activities to address the sources of instability. Because monitoring and evaluation is an essential element of any program management cycle, the lack of guidance on M&E
made it difficult to provide empirical evidence for subsequent activities.
In our AO, the primary impediment to the accuracy of a DSF was the lack of local population input. Essentially, a DSF is worth very little without local input. Training needs to stress that
officers need to immediately begin making plans for how to receive and integrate local input.
monitoring and evaluation is a big problem, as well as the high tempo of personnel rotations. we received very little training on M and E. and its hard to implement M and E anyway when
commanders and priorities are changing every few months.
See Answer above
The "design" phase of the DSF methodology is somewhat weak. What it lacks in details/tools/procedures, it gains in concept and simplicity. The issue here is twofold: 1-the most
important aspect of DSF -and how it differs from other approaches- is its analysis and therefore the "design" phase is only secondary. 2- desigining programs and activities is a very
complex task that cannot be tought in 2.5 hours. Had you conducted the best analysis based on the most complete situational awareness, if your desining of solutions is inadequate, you'll
never see results.
None.
The limitations were that the instructor was not familiar with the local AO. If it were possible to have mobile trainers that spent more time in the area prior to the training, the value of the
DSF training would be increased. Essentially, if the DSF mobile training teams adapted the same model as the COIN mobile training teams, perhaps this gap would be bridged.
Personalities, bias, resources, and implementation time.
Not that I can recall.
a universal understanding of stability. Second is "Disrtict" if this is applicale tonly to Districts then it is not scaleable and therefore a central gov can not adopt this model as directed by the
current Legal construct of the AFGN constitution.
M&E
No.
The SOI analysis and TSM were critical.
Failure to teach the "business" side of the culture and linkages that drive projects. (NSP and CDC concepts are taught, but the underlying aspects of influence are not)
Most instructors teaching DSF did not have actual field experience applying DSF. I tried to remedy that and put a stop to the instruction at Camp Julien by untrained military instruction. At
the end of my tenure there were three of us in country teaching DSF and each had used some version of DSF in the field.
Statistic
Total Responses

Value
26

13.

Please provide any other thoughts you may have on ways to improve DSF
training.

Text Response
More case studies. Hands-on pre-deployment training with roleplayers.
I like DSF a lot. Sometimes, we get to bogged down in the matrix and filling out each block. If I were teaching it, I'd probably simplify the matricies and wouldn't even mention the
worksheets until after the group answered all the questions.... More of a long extend conversation and then put the information into boxes.
Right now, DSF is on the way out. It'll be limited to an emaciated SIKA program. This is a shame. You can't correct that which will soon cease to exist.
Any progress we made in RC-East was due to having a full-time facilitator who could travel to the PRTs and DSTs to supplement the training, facilitate the building of SWGs, etc. We
needed to continually provide or educate the field regarding sources of information and data. Honing our measures of effect and performance was crucial. Simplifying the process was
important. I implemented DSF as a PRT FPO and lead and later on a regional basis at Bagram. I found that many FPOs and their very busy military partners would be overwhlemed by
what appeared to be a paperwork heavy exercise, Often, we were able to convince participants that laying everything out into the DSF workbooks actually made the process more user
friendlly, essentially documenting the thought processes most analytical types would engaage in any case. I would recommend (1) spend as much time in the formal training on
resiliencies as SOIs (not the case in my experience); (2) Provide follow-up in-field facilitation to participants; and (3) facilitate information sourcing and synthesizing (much of the available
perception data gets dumped on an RC or BCT site with little effort in categorization or organization - meaning each individual accessing the ifo must spenbd an inordinate amount of time
sifting through the information. This latter point is probably most applicable to larger wars/conflicts such as our engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan.
One of the issues that the team members always indicated was that the tool was to complex to grasp. It could have been simplified to make it user friendly and attract more users
Have the DSF instructors spend 1 year doing a DSF in an active warzone - have them have to deal with the lack of movement, lack of adequate funding, dealing with shitbird military
leadership that saw no benefit to doing this, and therefore limited our movement even further...the instructors had no credibility with anyone who had field experience doing this - because
the instructors could simply regurgitate what was on a powerpoint - but none of them had the field experience to actually empathize with those who had struggled through this process and
failed.
Training was satisfactory
You must practice conducting the interviews in training before going live. This is key to success.
The military and USAID both badly undervalue the importance of having DSF trainers also implementing the tool on a day to day basis. Some of our trainers had helped design, which is
fine. But you need people with tangible and recent experience implementing the tool doing the training.
Begin training with it one year before arrival in country
DSF is a TOOL. The goal is to develop an understanding of stability dynamics and build the skills to assess them, program against them and monitor progress towards meeting stability
goals. The training needs to back up and have a module or two that focuses on these principles independent of any tool and then introduce DSF as one tool that can be used to conduct this
type of analysis.
N/A
Greater incorporation of real life examples of how people used the DSF at each stage of the program management cycle.
The DSF handbook, training materials, and theory needs to be translated into local languages and local expert trainers need to be provided to field operations.
Make it easier for field personal to receive training or attend training in other locations prior to mobiization to the field
I've been a DSF training for roughly 3 years. I've trained over 10,000 USG and foreign personnel. I can only see one way to improve the training: train individuals during a longer time
span (i.e. spend a month training the senior staff, operators (collectors, analysts, etc.) to ensure that every step of the process is fully understood and that the parent organisation has the
ability to conduct each of these steps. Once the training is completed, accompany the organization in the implementation of the methodology.
DSF training to be effective need to include a field practical exercise to complement the classroom instruction. On the military, it also needs to have buy in from the senior leadership
otherwise it will never be supported during application in the field. The military already has numerous tools for stability ops and assessments, and each one is preferred by various units
therefore it is challenging to change the old norms, especially is DSF reporting is not required by a higher HQ. It basically comes down to "competing" requirements....
The biggest limitation was keeping excel files updated based on tech limitations in the field, which included inputting info that was handwritten from small unit leaders into usable formats
suitable to go to higher headquarters.
Standardized training, resources linked to DSF identified sources of instability, certified instructors, and willingness of the unit being trained to use the DSF.
I think a simplified, 'quick and dirty' DSF methodology could be developed for use by teams which are time or resource constrained.
I see the DSF as a PRA for the military. It's as much about the process as the actual product.
This concept needs to be taught to company commanders on up. In Afghanistan it is imperative that they have a in depth knowledge of this tool so it can be applied properly.
well, DSF doesn't really exist anymore, so it depends on what you are referring to..
Incorporate insights and lessons-learned from the Civil Affairs teams in Philippines who are using it now.
You have to make sure the students know what they priority aspects are, and which ones could be dropped given a situational context. Much of it was regarded as very onerous by
practioners - both AIDers and military. On other hand - its overarching principles were good, and needed to be used.
It needs to be broadened to non-Afghanistan and non-COIN situations. Also more examples or case sudies of where it worked.
Intent is always lowest cost impact with greatest outcome. We have set a precedence and condition, in this case in Afghanistan, to expectations beyond their ability to sustain the project,
be it a road, building, ADT project, etc. Focus continues to be infrastructure. It takes industry to support infrastructure. When you say industry, people still cannot think commensurate to
the countrys economic status, cultural norms or economic levels, not to mention education. With this, I mean that "industry" commensurate to Afghan today in most rural areas, is no
more than goat pens in the form of a stockyard trading environment with fruit stands provided with simplistic overhead cover in an open air type style. This is developing industry
commensurate with Afghan today. Too many think of building with electricity. We continue to inadvertently add to the corruption due to our intellectual level and failure to understand THIS
intellectual level. In the end, our process of bidding contracts with locals and failing to recognize the business within is undermining all we are doing.
May or may not be feasible, but I think each instructor should be embedded with a field unit to practice using DSF prior to being certified as an instructor.
Get rid of it. DSF is an ineffective way to deal with the issues on the ground. Sources of Instability is a simplistic formula with questions that have no merit outside this engagement.. It
would be a complete disaster to use this as a formula for the military to transport to other countries. It is no wonder USAID is not happy with CMC and their desire to be relevant. They are
not practionners and we need better analysis not rinky-dinky methodology that needs to be followed up- but who in the military follows up on any projects except the IG???
Statistic
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14.

Please describe with as much detail as you can specific ways your organization
has utilized the DSF to shape strategy or operations in Afghanistan. Whether or not you
have been personally involved in application or use of the DSF, can you think of times
information or insights from the DSF have been used? Can you think of decisions that
have been influenced by information or insights gained through application of the DSF?
Are there other ways the DSF has been used?

Text Response
We used DSF in every phase of planning and implementation until a district went into transition. DSF overhauled our understanding of the local drivers of instability and allowed us to do
course corrections for the units and areas that were just doing development or kinetic operations.
Used as an invaluable focusing tool to take emotional, aimless do-gooder impulses out of DST project/activity development
My origination actually uses ICAF, not DSF. ICAF is a more strategic approach that has similar concepts to DSF. I only used DSF while in Afghanistan, and that was pretty limited in
locations. DSF was never given a real chance to succeed since many commanders didn't understand its value and always fell back on what they knoew, which was the kinetic
approaches. (make no mistake, the military drove the show in Afghanistan, so if they didn't employ it, it couldn't be successful due to the lack of uniform consistency in use).
In RC-East, during my second tour, we (finally) established DSF as the guiding tool to address sources of instability and resiliencies, ro prioritize, coordinate and deploy human and
program resources (USAID, CERP and DoS resources). In Khost during my second tour, I did the same with my team, mostly utilizing DSF to guide programming, syncing and
coordination with LGCD, CDP, QRF and CERP resources and KLEs (these were the resources with which PRT and DST field staff had effective roles during my tour in Khost, based at
Camp Chapman). During my second tour based at RC-E, I was involved in a program review in which we were able to ensure that an simpleified, "Afghanized and district localized"
version in the appropiate language would be required. This was to involve a local SWG with feedback working one way from Afghan SWG contact to PRT and DST designated staff.
I used DSF to streamline development activities. During my work in the field i always asked how that the intended activities were linked to the three criteria for an SOI. For instance, I
started requiring that all development activities be discussed and approved by the local which would contribute to the expansion of the government reach to its citizens. I also wanted my
team members to avoid being simplistic, instead take the time to determine the root cause of the problem being addressed
The DSF has shaped the very colorful strategy POWERPOINTs for RC/E - but it hasn't shaped strategy. The terms "root causes of instability" and "resiliences" permeate throughout
many powerpoints that are simply regurgitated - but in reality...real reality...DSF has not shaped anything. They are mostly retro-fitted, where someone has an idea of an activity in mind,
then retro-fills the DSF workbook to make it fit. Because policy/strategy is not ground in reality, DSF has been used extensively to justify powerpoints and slide decks.
I operated on the regimental staff. There were some subordinate units that utilized DSF, but the analysis never made it up to the regimental level
The DSF really helped frame problems with a stability mindset. It help prioritize use of resources for the Afghans. It provided consistency in framing problems.
The ASCOPE PMEESI part of the exercise was particularly useful for forcing people to establish some basic SA about the environment. The military and USAID were inclined to act
without knowing and DSF forced everyone to ask some "academic" questions that would likely be ignored otherwise.
Did not apply to the operational and stragic levels ...
RC East- at year 10 of the conflict grudgingly agreed to adopt a comprehensive DSF based approach to stability analysis. Even tho the edict came from the Division, there was still
resistance. None the less, DSF results were used to inform discussions on deployment of civilian assets, application/approval of CERP expenditures, and re-design of proposed program
interventions.
I used the tool at RC(S) to discover (more so to communicate) the sources of instability to the TF Kandahar Commander. I benefited from the framework more in the sense that it clearly
ARTICULATED the logic explaining why I would request resources to conduct operational events.
As a former OTI employee, the DSF played an essential role in the development and implementation of the ASI program in Afghanistan. Two out of three battalions I was embedded with
during my time with OTI used information from the DSF to inform their COIN operations and their understanding of the AoR in general.
Clearly identifying the sources of instability for an area have proven useful; however, programming against those sources has typically been more difficult.
NATO uses the PMSEII tools to evaluate environments.
USAID OTI seemed best suited to apply DSF since they had program funds to use in KTDs while other USAID programs did not. If USAID programming doesn't have the flexibility to
redirect activities to field priorities then DSF is not applicable.
I have been involved in training Stability in Key Areas Afghan and expatriate staff in the DSF methodology as to enable the group to adapt the methodology so that Afghans could teach
Afghans DSF as well as implement the methodology. Once the training had been conducted, we developped tools to support each of the DSF phases. These were then employed to
"implement" DSF at the district level, by Afghans. All programming in these district should now be DSF based.
We used DSF at our local level to help improve our CERP project targeting against sources of instability. Because DSF was not supported by our higher HQ, we were only marginally
successfull at using DSF to effect our Lines of Effort...... so DSF was basically our side project and then we still worked higher's priorities as they were dictated. DSF should be the
standard across all RC's in Afghanistan to effectively measure it's value as a targeting tool.
The biggest advantage of using TCAPF was that it gave obvious conversational ice breakers for all small unit leaders. I am not sure how the info we used and submitted up the chain was
incorporated but I referenced info from an earlier part of deployment to the later part of deployment to quantitatively state how the perceptions of local populations changed over time.
As a Brigade Targeting Officer, we used DSF as part of several data inputs into the assessment working group to describe the operational environment holistically.
Spent MUCH time teaching our coalition partners to apply the process. Aside from the Afghan challenges in applying the process our partners have difficulty understanding/applying the
process which makes the end product very one dimentional.
The clear, hold, build strategy employed by NATO-ISAF partners was in part driven by DSF analysis and monitoring. Particularly decisions on which key districts were identified as areas
where increase in stability funding could be made due to reasonable security conditions. This impacted my team in so far as we were able to receive direct tasking from the PRT command
to assess the local population perceptions on security and development efforts, as well as their perceptoins on rule of law capacity and local ANSF security capabilities.
Two military units I worked with- 1/5 Marines and 3-509 Army- used DSF to drive their targeting process. When I asked the Marines why they were using it when they didn't have to, the
CDR said I need a tool to understand the operating environment. In contrast to others, the DSF gives me a holistic view of the environment and helps prioritize the use of scarce
resources.
DSF was used by the USAID/Chemonics ASI-South programme is a fairly limited manner. Although the training was useful, the Kandahar PRT did not fully buy-in to the use of DSF
and only ASI-South carried out the full DSF process. However, institutional pressures within USAID OTI meant that that DSF was essentially used backwards, with its conclusions fixed
to support the existing ASI-South strategy rather than develop a new strategy.
Through DSF training, disparate stakeholders are given a shared vehicle in which to share facts and ideas.
This approach was used in deciding whether or not to establish a new combat outpost in a district in Eastern Afghanistan. This area was relatively stable at the time. Upon learning of the
proposed new COP my team asked the Afghanistan National Police and the local residents if this would be a stabilizing or destabilizing move. Overwhelmingly the response was that it
would destabilize the area by bringing in insurgents once the American outpost was present. The brigade commander ignored this and established the COP as planned. WIthin a week
the area was destabilized by the constant attacks on the outpost by the insurgents and this resulted in local opinion turning against the US military. The process was partially utilized but
ignored by the battle space owners.
Our USAID personnel were trained in DSF and it gave them a common language to argue about. It was not accepted and created yet another failed system or framework. it revoles around
a short term goal and a district construct. nothing to do with regional stability or national objectives.
USAID/OTI used DSF for programming under ASI-East, also OTI is using adapted DSF concepts for its new program CCI - influences the way to program programs
We used it in Farah Province after a major clearing operation. We used it with our Afghan government counterparts and had them run the questionnaires, and debriefed them after. It

brought us all together around a common framework, allowing us to jointly consider a range of options. Excellent results.
Shaping the use of CERP and projects. Helping to understand the dynamics in the AO.
May 2008 in Kapisa Province - Directed by state dept to conduct a PEF Op with all ANA forces supported by DynCorp Police actions. Operation was from the Naghlo Reservoir in Surobi
North to the 42 Northing. Lead with ANA Mullah to utilize the "Islamic" law and why we were going to cut the poppy down. Understanding the linkages to the Taliban and poppy, we tried
to focus on the potential for saffron and the pomegranates and the "good Muslim" opportunities". Utilized ANA engineers to smooth out roads and approaches to the villages offering better
opportunity to trade and develop agricultural crops that are religiously tolerant. ADT provided appropriate assessments, ANA Engineers cleared roads, ANA provided initial security and
coordinated with ANP for appropriate check points and we rented a qalat in the villages and lived with the people until their confidence and trust was gained. Failure point, the French
moved in had had their own concepts.
I have personally witnessed DSF being implemented in RC-E and RC-N in Afghanistan. The level of host country involvement varied from place to place and thus the quality of the
analysis as well. We were in the process of developing an Afghan version of DSF and rolling it out under the SIKA program, but the willingness of the Afghans to do any stabilization or
analysis varied from day to day.
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15.

Compared to previous assessment tools you have used or seen used, overall
would you say the DSF is an improvement or not?

Answer

1
2
3

Response

Better

24

69%

About the Same

10

29%

Worse

3%

Total

Bar

35

Statistic

Value

Min Value

Max Value

Mean

1.34

Variance

0.29

Standard Deviation

0.54

Total Responses

35

16.

Can you describe how your operational unit organizes data collection for the
different parts of the DSF?

Text Response
I pretty much compiled the perception data from existing IJC resources, then would rely on the COIST, CA, or MISO teams to vet the information through various channels.
not sure
N/A
See comments above about one of the main challenges being a lack of organization. At least in Afghanistan, much of the data was stored at the RC or BCT level (e.g., RCs did the
contracting for monthly/quarterly/annual surveys). However, those field staff at the PRT and DST levels either were not made aware of what information was already available or had
access to a morass of unsynthesized, poorly labeled/organized data. These efforts need to be facilitated for efficiency and empowering fiedl staff to most effectivly utilize DSF and to avoid
duplication of effort (or apathy dervived from being confronted by a mass of unorgaized data). Again, these comments are likely most applicable to larger areas of conflict such as
Afghanistan. An SWG collectoing all or most of the data directly culd obvioulsy organize its own data utilizing DSF workbook and terminology for electronic organization. In Khost we
necessarily relied on HTTs, civil affairs, KLEs, ANA/ANP SWG partners and thier reports for much of the data. Tribal information, historical and long standing sources of conflict over
land, etc. were generally available through all of these means. I was able to find detailed studies of tribal/sub-tribal mapping and conflict, for example and ask local leaders about these
conflicst in KLEs. Unfortunately I had to spend time discovering sources of data should must have been known by predecessors but not passed on. A reliable and continuous KMS would
be highly recommended. I tried to leave behind a system for my successors but BCTs have a habit of deleting their predecessors' SIPR, NIPR and Centix sites - unbelievable as that was
to me at the time. My records were eventually deleted by a new BCT ... However, I later discovered vast amounts of information of which I had not been made aware, information collected
at the provincial and district levels being used at the RC ... While I was still an FPO in Khost I visited RC-E for a few days to attend a meeting. While there I was provided access to a work
station and discovered a lot of information of which I had not been aware, as well as briefs and plans with which BCT and PRT plans were not nested .... including DSF efforts. This was
valuable insight as I prepared for my second tour based at RC-E and planed to better support field staff with DSF and programming support.
The team I worked with always used data that was collected by the military such as perception data
they didn't - no one bought on to DSF - they simply did their own data collection and I went around trying to shepherd it.
Did not have direct association with data collection.
Spreadsheets & analysis.
we get reports / we translate them from civilian to military and brief them up ...
Units used trip reports, secondary data sources, HUMIT, etc. to gather information for ASCOPE. Limited TCAPF data for perception data, primarily relied on secondary survey data
PMESII/ASCOPE matrix... Attempted to formulate within a common operational picture. I worked with the Human Terrain System, so the information was couched within a sociocultural context--to inlude estimations of "power", "influence" and other factors...
We gathered information from a variety of sources to include, but not limited to: ISAF, GIRoA, USG, local staff, Afghan citizens, polling, open source materials (e.g., internet,
monographs, news, etc.), and personal observation.
Originally, the tasks would be divided up between Civil Affairs, USAID/State, and the unit we were assigned to. Once the initial data was collected the teams would meet to discuss and
organize the information into the matrix. The process usually took about 2 months to put together. Once completed the files were stored on shared drives for the unit and the PRT and
programming was intended to be created based on it.
Very limited due to inability to collect data from Afghans due to security constraints
With SIKA-East, there was no Situational Awareness as the Afghans already knew what was going on in their neck of the wood. This said, we had to modify the analysis to reflect that.
Therefore, we would either have the Afghans at the district level list the different grievances they faced and try to understand their root causes as best as we could or, we would have the
Afghans list all the grievances that would decrease support for the government, increase support for insurgents or prevent the normal functionning of society. When a grievance/problem
would be listed in 2-3 of the analysis categories, we'd go thru a problem shaping phase with the district officials and share information and solutions to come to an agreement on how to
solve the issues. It was a continual local engagement process where interactions would be documented throughout.
We organized data at the BDE S9 shop, however data was limited due to the fact that DSF reporting was not supported by our chain of command so reporting was on a voluntary basis.
Only the selected company commanders would choose to report DSF data which was collected at their COIST.
We mainly used the info to present to senior commanders and VIPs to definitively state how perceptions of locals changed over time. Early on in our deployment in Nawa (2009) the
biggest concern was security. Toward the end of the deployment it ended up being more government service related -- security was established and then people could focus on quality of
life and commercial issues.
DSF data is consolidated and briefed by the BDE S9 in the assessment working group.
Fieldwork, question cards, tracking metrics, time. TIME is critical and its very hard to see results in short periods of time
Currently HTS, to my knowledge, has no specific standard operating procedure for data collection geared towards DSF. However, most teams do use the PMESI/ASCOP matrix, which
could be used to supplement the DSF approach.
Varied by unit.
Information was not systematically organised at all. We used a mix of local staff reporting, personal experience and opinion, previous grant completion reports and PRT reporting to fill in
the DSF.
After the first pass and populating the DSF, inquiries are made by the team member best suited to find the information.
In my experience a lot of the information was gleamed by KLE's or key leader engagements with the local populace.
CIM information is collected and used for analysis. DSF was not used because it is not useful above the disrtict level or once stability has been achieved. The tool is valid for a limited
scope of problems. Beyond district and momentary stability it is meaningless to a well developed strategy that links local to district to provincial to national to international governace and
human rights nor does it look at a time horizon or adapt once a semblance of stability is achieved. I would say it has th attentio span of my teenage daughter and I do not trust her with
running our household finances
Not well. It tended to be seperate from the unit's collection plan and owned by CA.
I am not currently involved today directly in the DSF.
They were trying to consolidate data collection under MISTI in Afghanistan, but there was reluctance to gather and use specific data sets. With different organizations using different data
bases it seems unlikely that there will ever be a central system that any user can access. We tried to remedy this, but there was reluctance by all parties to put data on an open system that
could be accessed by anyone.
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17.

In your experience, would you say that the DSF processes collect accurate
information to make informed decisions?

Answer

Bar

Response

Yes

9%

Usually

20

59%

Not usually

26%

No

6%

Total

34

Statistic

Value

Min Value

Max Value

Mean

2.29

Variance

0.52

Standard Deviation

0.72

Total Responses

34

18.

In your experience, would you say that your operational unit usually has enough
time and other resources to collect the right DSF data to make better informed
decisions?

Answer

Bar

Response

Yes

3%

Usually

26%

Not usually

15

44%

No

26%

Total

34

Statistic

Value

Min Value

Max Value

Mean

2.94

Variance

0.66

Standard Deviation

0.81

Total Responses

34

19.

In your experience, would you say that your operational unit usually has enough
time and other resources to do the right analysis of DSF data in order to make better
informed decisions?

Answer

Bar

Response

Yes

3%

Usually

26%

Not usually

16

47%

No

24%

Total

34

Statistic

Value

Min Value

Max Value

Mean

2.91

Variance

0.63

Standard Deviation

0.79

Total Responses

34

20.

Can you think of any ways that using the DSF or information from the DSF has
influenced your organizations design or implementation of projects to address sources
of instability in your area of operations?

Text Response
We threw out many projects that were not designed properly. If it wasn't targeting an SOI or it wasn't sustainable, we ended it.
no comments for this section. i did not use DSF at the grassroots level.
Yes, in some cases. Again, the unit's leadership has to care about doing it right and then using the data and analysis to make his/her decisions. This isn't usually the case in my opinion.
It became our primary tool for RC-East ast, first pbviously with OTI and then for all stab programming in RC-East (at least we made progress on this front in most provinces). Rc-South,
however, to my knowledge never embraced DSF, having devised teir own system. However, SIKA and CDP programs did incoirporate DSF requirements / guidance into their scopes for
all RCs in 2012.
Not sure
The only benefit to DSF has been to make very nice powerpoint slides and regurgitate buzzwords. Yes, we may have several dozen DSF excel workbooks filled with information, but it
was simply an academic exercise. No one in any of the other RCs used this tool - what does that tell you about its efficacy?
Address issues impacting instability as viewed by wider audience.
yes,see previous comments
Not really. The reality is that little deviation from the CONOPS and commander's campaign plan are allotted... Sometimes the discoveries from the DSF process are too radical to
motivate commanders and staff to change the way they view the operational environment. A DSF analysis should be a pre-deployment input for commanders and staff....
In RC-E, the DSF was used as the primary tool for program design and implementation of stability operations and related activities.
Not fully. Our DSF was very heavy in the lack of security having the most influence, this meant that most responses to it were in that area.
the information collected can help shape communications with local stakeholders and facilitate better communication and cooperation with them.
Based on where DSF was used we attempted to have complementary programming focus on those areas; however, we there was limited flexibility to redirect program resources.
In SIKA-East, all programming is DSF based. Next question: Did you notice a change in the overall level of stability since applying the DSF? Answer: No, I did not observe any change
over the time I supported SIKA and cannot say if stability increased of decreased or remained the same as I had no metrics to track change.
DSF helped us program appropriate agricultural projects to stimulate the economy.
DSF data was used to make targeting decisions -non-lethal tasks such as which mayor or provincial official to engage and support to improve conditions.
No.
Yes. I'll send in a separate attachment.
DSF was not used to design projects, but to validate decisions and strategies that were already in place.
The DSF helps one visualize all the SOIs and prioritize actions collectively.
Informally the info we gathered from KLE's was used to base some military ops on
inital entry into a problem set can be supported with DSF, Ussually it does no more harm at least not more than any other initial contact. Rarely if ever does it consider a five year
outcome. Instability is sometimes required to achieve long term objectives.
all programming is directed at SOIs and community-based resiliencies.
Comments of the above two questions - my units were too rushed (our fault) and jumped into actions before having enough data to do good analysis. DSF did at least keep us from some
pitfalls and helped us understand the AO better.
Unfortunately, I think money and opportunity drives the projects more than actual data. Take the money away and try to solve the problem. THINGS bought with are NOT always the
answer. Most times they become the NEW root source of instability.
See previous responses. I covered a variety of regions as a trainer and DSF coordinator.
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21.

Please give an example of a situation in which you were you able to tie positive
changes in the level of stability to DSF-inspired projects? How did you go about making
the connection?

Text Response
We saw less violence overall where DSF was properly implemented, though the numbers for Afghans wasn't as statistically reliable as the numbers for coalition. However, CF did
sustain fewer casualties where DSF was executed correctly.
I was an instructor, so I only heard about the positive change or no-change through units employing the framework.
We largely relied on perception surveys conducted during and after projects as indications of positive impacts from DSF-based programming. Notable improivements in perceptions were
reported at community level more than at the district or provincial levels for such areas as "community "well being", inter-community and intra-community cooperation and cohesion, and
support for local GIRoA (although not national GIRoA). ANA was generally perceived positively in these areas, although perceptions of ANP continued to be largely negative, National
GIRoA and ANP were considered to be corrupt, not to care for the communities and districts, etc. These connections were primarly made through surveys conducted by OTI and by CDP.
These surveys were extremely useful in gaining support form senior leadership for stabilization programming at a time when folks in DC thought of stabilization as something in the past
and didn't connect with its crucial role in paving the way for a security-based transition and ongoing development assistance.
Not sure
For the record, I cannot accurately answer the question, "Did you notice a change in the overall level of stability since applying the DSF?" - changes take time, and none of us were in a
place long enough to assess whether changes (pos or neg) occurred. I would love to hear others' response to this...I have no idea how people correlated their working with DSF to making
the connection to any change in behavior or stability. I know most people are woo'ed by the powerpoint slides that the DSF instructors use for Helmand to "show" changes over time, but
none of those instructors can show those results anywhere else.
Made better decisions about water projects.
We were able to communicate the tie between sources of instability and how our operations can "irritate" the human terrain. For example, one source of instability was lack of proper water
resource--particularly for irrigation amongst grape farmers in western Khandahar. We weren't able to sponsor or recommend projects to increase the overall supply of water to these local
stakeholders, but we did plan our operations so that we would have the least amount of impact on the current resource constraint....
DSF identified a lack of faith in local government officials. DSF inspired projects led to increased training and outreach programs for those officials. Local perceptions of their officials
increased and those officials generally became more effective and engaged.
Stability improved because specific villages received program funding - whcih was not necessarily tied to DSF.
Unable
In our AO, improved security (with US or afghan forces in Hold phase) is what improved stability. Once we had the security down and it was enduring with afghans leading the way, then
we could work on the projects identified by DSF.......... however the grievences always changed based on the level of security.
Local "complaints" trended toward economic issues -- "That guy is trying to undercut my sales," or "I need the roads to improve so I can get my goods to market" rather than 'If I leave my
village I will get killed."
Time, political shifts, and combat made quantitative and qualitative measurements difficult. It was obvious that we were doing the right thing. PRT's are very small all of the Military
needs to support the process in order for DSF toro pearly work
In interviewing local leaders in a district in Kunduz Province, there was a great appreciation for USAID efforts to bring power to individual family homes through the use of portable solar
panel distribution. This was a project that had been DSF-inspired, and brought more confidence among the local population, in terms of competency of their district and village level
(Arbabs, District Governor) in communicating to NATO resources what infrastructure their villages/district needed.
UK used the DSF in Lashkar Gar to identify the lack of water as a source of instability which increased insurgent support in certain districts. After implementing targeted water projects,
the number of SIGACTs decreased and surveys showed government support increased.
Long answer.
The DSF we worked on was never fully implemented.
short term, or temporay behavioral change did occur, but the capactity and capabilities of the government were diminished by the DSF projects leading to further erosion of the legitimate
government since they did not build a capacity to address problems or root causes. investment in people and systems solves problems.
Per the overall stability changing - this is very complicated to measure and cannot be directly attributable to DSF.
Positive can be measure in many areas. However, we are currently part of the stability by our presents. True measurement will be upon our departure. Money can buy temporary stability.
Stability in many areas today is areas that are heavy with Taliban - like Sherzad District. If we went there today there would be instability.
Rational deduction. If stabilization projects were the only dev projects in the area then it was easy. It was also easy to see how we destabilized some areas with our projects if they weren't
implemented effectively.
Statistic
Total Responses

Value
21

22.

In your view, what is useful about the DSF?

Text Response
It gets everyone around a table talking about instability, not about whatever their pet project is. It makes us focus on the population's grievances instead of our assumptions. It gives us a
way to bring Afghans into the stabilization process.
it is standardized, takes guesswork out of things, brings diverse stakeholders to the table around a common analytical framework, rhetoric, and set of concepts
It's a comprehensive framework that allows non-specialists to employ sound collection, analysis, and decision making in an environment that is incredibly complex and amorphous, thus
limiting the "fog of war.
It provides a logical framework for identifying SOIs and resiliencies, a KMS, a guide for designing project interventions and for prioritizing, syncing and deploying both human and
financial program resources. DSF facilitates the formation of effective SWGs by providing a common "language" (even in careful translartion) and methodology.
It is a good tool if applied with ground reality. I personally have enjoyed using it but I cannot say the same about many others within the mission. Because of the nature of the mission
(multiple agencies) with different levels of development background I believe the tool was not properly applied. it helped me frame the conversation about activities that I was to implement
in the field and how they tied to the overall stability continuum. I would recommend this tool to continue being used provided its applicability is reassessed.
It is a useful academic exercise to think about problem solving. It makes for great powerpoints and talking points
Gives you a stability mindset by viewing what is causing the instability.
In Afghanistan many actors think they are too busy to ask ponderous, academic questions. They do not realize that they know nothing about the environment, they just act. The USG
bureaucracies encourage that behavior by rewarding soldiers and diplomats for outputs rather than outcomes. DSF forces everyone to stop and think, which is very valuable.
photo imagery of real change in real time ....
it is a logical framework; if used across units it provides a common language/denominator for comparing progress, it is a complete tool
The thinking process and to get stakeholders discussing a common goal. It's a framework that creates dialog.
It provides a structure and methodology for analyzing complex, dynamic environments and planning activities to address sources of instability.
When implemented correctly and accurately, it can give a true ground level view of what's wrong with the district and what cn be done to address the basic needs. Stability begins from the
ground level and the DSF shows what's wrong at the ground level.
it is a qualitative tool that forces users to take into account non-quantifiable factors on the battlefield
Designation of specific districts to receive program resources that otherwise would not have.
It enables to target root causes of core issues that are affecting the conflict instead of focussing on needs and wants of the local population.
Good data collection, assessment, and programing tool. The worksheets are definitely helpfull, as DSF is tailored for the Afghan OE.
The key benefit is that the basic questions gave a predictable inroad into starting up conversations with locals, conversations that could be initiated by junior Marines aas well as senior
ones.
It provides subjective data for analysis and comparison against objective data.
Identifying foundation issues and cascading effect
DSF provides a comprehensive, robust way to analyze and assess sources of instability at the district level and below, as well as identify which course(s) of aciton would best bring benefit
and potential change in post-conflict areas.
Its a holistic, data driven process focused on identifying and mitigating local sources of instability. Its not based on implementer assumptions and its design allows it to be integrated into
military and civilian planning processes.
The systematic analysis of information and the project design process.
group effort from disparate parties.
I think it is useful because the framework is just that a frame. The contents depend on the localized conditions and the solutions are geared towards solving local problems and not national
ones.
it is a common language. it is relatively structured
everyone uses the same language, consistent training, more targeted programming than needs or wants
Focus on the populace Rigorous analysis
It drives the assessment of more information and underlying causes to instability.
Host country cooperation and involvement.
shared language for discussion problems, move the discussion away from needs-based analysis
Enter your note here.

23.

In your view, how can the DSF be improved in the way it is operationalized in
the field?

Text Response
DSF usage should be tracked and enforced. If a commander doesn't want to do DSF, fine, but he better have his own plan. And if he fails, then it reflects in his OER. For civilians, if they
want to do their own thing and can't show progress, they get fired. When operating in a war zone, we cannot allow inept personnel to follow their own plans.
enforced more, simplified
Leadership must be indoctrinated in the value of field-based stabilization techniques. If not, DSF will continue to be marginalized, which is leading to its imminent demise.
See above comments regarding regional facilitator, supplement training and training follow-up ...
Simplify the tool to be able to atract users who are not confortable with development principles
focus on a variety of ways to gather population data. AF is not a place where you do Gallup like surveys 1:1. Decisions are made in group settings due to culture...so how about teaching
how to ask/formulate DSF questions that would work in more of a culturally "focus group" type of way. Also, it is vital to figure out how to train our interpreters on how to ask the
questions...check this video out, this is THE problem with data collection: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-cilW8ZSoQc
Make the data easier to enter into a database that's unclass & accessible by wide range of people, to include outside the USG. Perhaps but it online in a web based architecture.
There should be software and tablet or smartphone to make gathering and documenting the details of DSF easier.
the expectation that field units can execute and implement the entire framework is unrealistic- not enough time; not the right skill sets, not enough access to resources. Higher should
expect field units to complete/verify ASCOPE, and cultural data (provided from elsewhere) and to conduct SOI analysis. Once SOI analysis is complete, program design and M&E should
be handed off to others will specific training in those skill sets.
It's biggest constraint is the organizational "culture" that drives the stakeholder's intent and expectations. Unity of effort is key--if the framework can account for this and provide
methodology for integrateing cometeing priorities and views, then that waould be great.
The DSF should be endorsed from the US Embassy-level down through the entire USG organizational structure. Also, the US Ambassador should agree with COMISAF that the US
Military is required to use, or at the very least contribute to, the DSF as part of their planning processes.
Although we had a surprising amount of buy in from the various actors in AF, USAID/State PRT types felt that the military mindset created artificially imposed deadlines. "You must have
this completed by this date" types of things. In many cases, there simply wasn't enough time to build a truly accurate DSF.
Only use it where field personnel can implement programming activiites based on DSF data
Better understanding of the methoology, better staffing and training, allocation of resources to implement the methodology. I understand that people in the field, civilian and military, are
working 28h/day, 8 days/week and that the pre-deployment training (when there is such a thing) is pretty much the same rythm. This said, you cannot simply "add DSF as a tool in the
toolbox" without making sure the toolbox has some space in it. That is, remove something from the box. Effectively, this means that implementing DSF will require eliminating other
tasks that may be redundant or less effective ( I have bi-weekly reporting on PMESII/ASCOPE, Governance, Security and Developement, etc. which in no way, shape or form inform the
decision making process on what to do next.). Otherwise, DSF becomes just another checklist the beast requires to be done and prevents it to be the process that guides a unit's actions.
DSF needs to have buy in at the higher "mil" levels and needs to have standardized reporting requirements, otherwise it jsut becomes a side projects without much emphaisi.
Teach Afghan Officials the process and mentor them as they implement the DSF.
Coordination and unity of effort across all actors in a given AO. DSF is only best utilized if it is in unison across the spectrum of operations (clear, hold, build).
Its use and training should be mandated and the training should be done by certified DSF instructors, not Power Point Rangers. To ensure it is implemented correctly, activities need to be
vetted and tied to DSF data.
It needs a top-level directive to ensure that it is used across all PRTs and stabilisation activities as the basis of their work. Otherwise, it will continue to be used and misused in a
piecemeal, ad-hoc fashion. In addition, follow-up mentoring visits from DSF training teams would be useful for field teams struggling to implement DSF.
More Afghan input.
By educating the battle space owners on its design and application to stability operations. If they are on board then it can be used. Also by developing a computer application to generate the
framework. That would save a lot of time and be more organized.
It is a tool for commanders to consider. it is nothing more than a system that may or may not fit a commanders style, his AO or the local populaces progression towards lasting stability.
Implement it in the early entry stages until the profesionals can do real analyis and real work. It gets in the way because it can not grow as designed. it fosters stagnation and dependance
on outside help instead of developing internal capabilites and problem solving by host nation leaders.
simplified
Again it needs to be owned by the command. It is not just a CA thing.
Stop assessing the efforts as OUR accomplishments!
Mandated use and qualified instructors/mentors to assist in analysis.
Statistic
Total Responses

Value
26

24.

In your experience, would you say that the DSF processes collect enough
information to make informed decisions?

Answer

Bar

Response

Yes

18%

Usually

16

47%

Not usually

10

29%

No

6%

Total

34

Statistic

Value

Min Value

Max Value

Mean

2.24

Variance

0.67

Standard Deviation

0.82

Total Responses

34

25.

In what ways has the DSF been an improvement (or not) compared to previous
conflict assessment tools you have used?

Text Response
It's a comprehensive system which the other tools are not. Any tactical unit can use it to do stability operations. The only real limitation is that the tool doesn't work at operational and
strategic levels because the systemic causes become too broad. That was never an issue for us.
systematic, though time consuming, but if it is used correctly the user will get to a logical conclusion of what to do to address SOIs instead of just guessing
It was the ONLY decent framework. Without it, it's the same ol' "let's just make it up as we go" approach.
The DSF is very similar to USAID's various log frame versions that have evolved over the years, although adapted to specifically address stabilization. However, in my own experience
DSF is the primary tool I used. Prior to Afganistan, my international development experience was not in conflict areas.
I have been using rapid Rural appraisals in the field. the concept of what to look for is the same as with DSF except that with DSF we are looking for sources that cause people to resort to
violence while of the other tools were looking for issues that kept peaople in the poverty trap
The Asia Foundation survey is the only survey to ask same questions over 9 nine years - it is easy to assess trends and make decisions. THe DSF turned out to be an unwieldy
deliverable (not a tool, I wouldn't consider it a tool because it was not useful - I use the term deliverable deliberately because some of us were mandated to use it, so with the 'garbage in,
garbage out' mantra, we delivered an excel DSF workbook). There were other surveys that made decision making easier, and were thus used - DSF was marginalized after a year or so.
It was standardized methodology. It was simple to use.
It provides a good amount of structure while allowing open ended inputs. Many military assessment tools rely on "red yellow green" assessments that are simplified to the point of being
useless. USAID tends to rely on completely open ended reporting such that it is difficult to compare across reports. DSF struck a useful balance between those two extremes.
Old wine - new bottles ... the process is not the challenge ... it is the committment of personnel and resources ...
It is comprehensive, complete and pedagogcically sound
Previously, solderis have adopted one specific assessment tool--ASCOPE, PMESII, DIME, etc... The DSF framework brings in the PMESII/ASCOPE crosswalk, and allows for
scalability. Thus, I appreciated that I could take the strategic assessment tool (PMESII) and the CIVMIL assessment (ASCOPE) and scale it to my O/E.
It more clearly identifies the problems, and in our case, for at least a short period, it put all actors on the same page with a common frame of reference. Unfortunately, this excluded the
local populations and government.
more qualitate
A lack of commitment on the part of USAID and Military Civil Affairs Units made implementation difficult - I have no basis to compare it to.
The analysis process guides programming in a much more effective way. Once everyone agrees on the methodology to be used (i.e. DSF), the engineer, the livelyhoods, the local
governance people in the room will not anymore focus on their experiences and background to develop programming (i.e. "let's build a road", let's reinforce agriculture" or "let's support
local governance" in order to solve the issue) but will instead use their background and experiences to contribute to the solution (i.e. "how can we use our skills in engineering, livelyhoods
and local governance to solve (insert problem here)?"). Shortly said, programming is no longer based on assumptions or worst, lowest hanging fruit.
Used TCAPF previously, and DSF is essentially an upgrade; however is must be noted that DSF is essentially a targeting tool which the military already has, but it does provide
additional tools to help with assessments and programming.
I had to list "About the Same" because I did not use any other assessment tools in the past.
DSF provides subjective data while PMSEII and ASCOPE provide objective data to compare against and make targeting decisions.
Focuses on underlying problems and associative processes. Allows for more accurate process driven results vs product driven results....makes results far more applicable. The biggest
limitation is that it SHOULD be multidimensional.
Compared to U.S. Army Doctrine's use of PMESI/ASCOP, the DSF provides a much more robust, inclusive assessment capability. It is structured in a way that allows operators,
whether they be military or civilian officers, to drill down into the root causes of instaibility and identify in a more specific and evidence-based approach the best possible course of action to
be taken.
It is based on identifying and mitigating sources of instability, not fostering development. In other words it is a tool specifically developed for stabilization. Too many people apply their
development bias to the DSF. In other words they target development problems not the problems which foster instability in an area. Ex. Building a school to improve literacy rather than
solving land disputes which give spoilers traction in an area. Can't have development without stability!
Wider range of inputs; useful tying of conflict drivers to projects designed to mitigate.
The neverending circle of TCAPF questioning as not realistic.
It is an improvement because it does not provide a "one size fits all" approach to stabilization. It is designed to be tailor made to the local area and it's particular problems.
DSF is a poor attempt at targeting. Tradtional Miltary targeting is universally understood. Test over 100s of years. Has approved doctrine a common language and validated.
The SA is incredibly important
We didn't have anything to use prior to it and TCAPF frankly. None of the conflict frameworks had translated down.
This is the only tool I am familiar with that really focuses on the dynamics at a tactical level. The other tools I have seen are either aimed at programming at higher operational or strategic
levels and hence not useful to a tactical operator or do not provide rigorous SOI analysis.
ICAF was "over used" as a tool. It failed to focus on root sources of instability utilizing both social and military aspects. Although we continue to "over analyze" a situation and due to our
intellectual level, normally miss the REAL source of instability. Too often we try to do the "highly visible and overzealous type projects".
DSF is for stabilization. I think there could be a case for using it in other contexts, but it would need to be field tested and modified. The most important part of the DSF--involving host
country nationals--is what usually sets it apart from other assessments that tend towards third country nationals or Americans conducting the assessment in an academic context.
After TCAF Heavy and TCAF light- DSF is a more streamlined version but still the same crap.
Too complex to use with most local staff or government counterparts. Takes a long, long time. Sometimes directs discussion away from an important underlying element (such as
gender) because it doesn't clearly meet the criteria to be an SOI.
Statistic
Total Responses

Value
32

26.

Do you believe your organization's leadership provides sufficient resources

and/or support to those responsible for utilizing the DSF?

Answer

1
2

Bar

Response

Yes

16

47%

No

18

53%

Total

34

Statistic

Value

Min Value

Max Value

Mean

1.53

Variance

0.26

Standard Deviation

0.51

Total Responses

34

27.

In what ways should your organization's leadership provide more resources

and/or support to those responsible for utilizing the DSF?

Text Response
Many of the high level leaders never did stability operations so they struggled to understand why DSF was so useful. They told us to do DSF, but didn't enforce it. Still, the units that took
DSF seriously performed better than the units that did their own thing.
enforce usage
Most didn't even know much about it. Senior leaders (civilian and military) didn't seem to care about making sure everyone was sufficiently trained in it or employed it appropriately.
It's really more a matter of how the resources are provided. A regional DSF facilitator on the ground is extremelly effective in traveling to and working with SWGs - especially if those
SWGs consist of participants new to implementing the tool whether or not they've had the training. Supplemental field training and facilitation is highly recommended. The concepts and
practices need to be reinforced. I saw too many instances of groups backing into the DSF to support favored programs, rather than objectively assessing grievances, SOIs and resiliencies
to identify the appropriate interventions (and areas in which not to intervene).
The organization could have worked to institutionalize the use of the tool including reaching out to the mission as whole to make sure other agencies in the mission were willing to use it
as well
In the beginning, there were resources - but there were no results or real evidence that DSF had an advantage over any other tactical survey - and without evidence that it worked,
leadership felt that it was useless DSF was developed within the Office of Mil Affairs at USAID. When the person who ran OMA went to AF to serve as a senior leader, HE didn't even
want to use DSF because it was too unwieldy...so if he doesn't endorse or mandate its use, who would take it seriously?
DSF needs to be incorporated into the staff planning process when conducting COIN. If a staff is not analyzing instability and just carrying out orders from higher, DSF tends not to be
included.
Boots on the ground ... conflict mitigation teams (one Marine, one DoS, one USAID, one NGO, one IO, one contractor
for USAID, field staff using DSF need delegated program authority, ability to re-direct and apply funds in order to apply program resources to address identified SOI's. RC East developed
that authority, but it was limited and slow to be applied
I used the tool in a position which crosses Strategic/Operational/Tactical decision-making... in my organization, time and quick-decision-making is imprtant. The tool would be great to drive
long term planning--but at a CUOPS or tactical level, it's time consuming.
More regular review of the DSF to ensure that it is a live document and not something that is filled out retro-actively.
CF/ISAF/PRT leadership should have placed greater emphasis on programming against DSF. In our case, I believe the implementation of DSF simply came too late in the effort.
the COIN campaign has never been properly resourced, but I also think the personnel charged with implementing DSF have often been out of their depth and do not understand the
mission or the tools well. we also found that only American units were systematically employing the tool in RC East and very few others had even heard of it throughout theater, due to
the incredibly fragmented structure of ISAF and USFOR-A
USAID did not seem fully committed to implementing DSF - leadership could have provided greater clarity on intent to use DSF. Unfortunately a lack of clarity from leadership resulted in
a lack of commitment in the field to use It. We were not sure which districts should should have DSF - KTDs were ready to transition before DSF workbooks were completed, which made
the whole process seem useless. On the other hand, OTI seemed to use it as an important tool.
What I've often seen in training military units is that DSF is seen as a tool in the tool box just as CAS or fast air is. The problem is that the later won't help you "win the fight" nor guide
your strategy. The implementation of DSF into a unit requires a drastic change in the organization's structure, leadership, natural "end states" and how to measure success. The
resources needed at first is most certainly "brain power" to understand the ramifications of DSF on the unit's strategy, structure, tasks and training. Second comes proper staffing:
collection cannot be done by the Cpl Smith, 19 yrs old, 1st time out of country, nor can basic analysis be done by a junior 13B, just like the Bn Ops O is not a young Capt. Still, we keep
on seeing this. Third comes in dept training. There is extended training for a FAC in order for him to save the day. Why is there no such follow-up training for the analyst/program
designer, etc., to design the campain plan?
You need military buy in at the higher HQ level to receive support/resources for DSF, otherwise it will just be a side project. There are already competining requirements for assessments
and transitions which take precedence over DSF. I honestly believe DSF may be too late in this stage of our operations in Afghanistan as we are focusing on transition to Afghan security
forces.
My unit was 4th Civil Affairs Group, but I've been out of the service for about three years. I suspect that the unit is continuing to use the resources but if not, I suggest frequent use of both
the field skills (ie, interviewing and info collection) and just sitting down to master the tools so that the data can be quickly utilized and presented by all level of Marines.
Direction, acceptance, application must be driven from the top or you end back in the rut of providing what you think leadership wants to hear. Leadership should understand the benefits
of this process IOT ensure it is properly executed
If I were still with Human Terrain System, I would recommend to leadership to include DSF training to all personnel deployed, prior to deployment. Individuals with experience in applying
DSF analysis will bring more value to their supported command, whether it be a PRT, a NATO partner, or a U.S. COCOMM unit.
Stafff support, command emphasis, integration of DSF data into the planning process.
DSF was regarded as a 'tick the box' exercise by my organisation, to be completed to keep Kabul happy rather than for any insights it may bring. As such it was not given high priority by
management.
N/A
I have primarily worked as an embedded police advisor in Afghanistan for the DOD. Numerous times I have made recommendations in line with the DSF on security issues but often the
battle space owners do not take this approach seriously since it does not always conform to military doctrine. The US military in particular should embrace this localized approach to
stabilizing an area.
They should fire all DSF personnel and redirect resources to wholeistic targeting.
It needs to be roadtested more and analyzed to determine if it is relevant.
DSF needs to be owned by the entire organization and be nested in the intel and ops sections
Too many decisions are made for "Eggerstan or Kabulistan" for Afghanistan.
The reason DSF worked in RC-E was because RC-E had a FRAGO mandating its use. USAID--the originator of DSF--did not even bother to mandate its use. That would be the first step
in my opinion.
Far too much to give to a tool that should be shelved.
Statistic
Total Responses

Value
29

28.

How could information collection for the DSF be improved?

Text Response
The blame lies with the person doing the gathering, not the tool. People who want to see a specific outcome can rig the data to look like a lack of healthcare or something is driving
instability, when really the issue is more fundamental than that.
streamlines, simplified, specific observables or "countables" could be suggested as data sources
Make sure collectors actually are the right people to collect info. It's often just seen as "checking the box" by the persons tasked with collection.
See aboce comments
In order for data to be accurate, the collectors have to be 100% sold on the tool and not something that they are doing just because they have been asked to. There have been cases where
the data collected provided skewed information because there was not enough effort to get to the bottom of the data.
There was NEVER a focus on collecting local perception data - so of course the information isn't accurate. The information collected was based off of other reports, intel papers - it was
tantamount to doing a lot of desk research for a project. Sure the information may have been accurate, but it was never localized enough to make any decisions in the village or district
level. Now, if we were able to get a decent sample size of a local population and combine that with the desk research, then we may have something, but without local perception data, we
ended up retro-fitting information in order to solve the problem with the solution that we already had in mind.
The process we implemented or planned to implement was to indirectly collect DSF data. In this collection there was lots of other human terrain mapping and other civil information that
was collected that was not used in the framework.
Need to spend more time analyzing the data.
Gathering accurate data is very time consuming and often requires an understanding of statistics, both of which require a considerable investment in time and energy. It is inherently
difficult given limited resources. However, using locals to gather perception data was a big step forward that should be continued and prioritized.
Bring impacted citizens to the command centers ... rather than have the military in the 'ville ... bring the 'ville to the TOC
Time is the biggest factor- units start using DSF too late in the process and then it's application is rushed- reverse engineered. As it is designed, and if it is applied early enough in an
environment, the DSF tool, as designed, does create a framework that should allow for sufficient data collection and information analysis
The framework should have a clear definition of left and right limites. There's no shortage of information out there... where do you stop gathering? Saturation may not be enough--one
trend may not be sufficient for certain decision-points. Recommend the course provides methodology for data limits.
Information must be drawn from as many sources as possible.
More local input. As an example, OTI programs often use local employees that are out in districts collecting information for atmospheric reports. This method would increase the reliability
of DSF information.
better personnel with longer rotations. better training of military personnel before they get to theater in these tools. and combatting the all-consuimg need of military staff to paint a rosy and
inaccurate picture for commanders - they are extremely reluctant to contradict any assumptions their commanders have made, no matter how inaccurate. they are also too married to
numbers, which are often meaningless in such an opaque and dynamic environment.
Afghans with an ability to move openly in villages, rather than Americans under Military guard talking to villagers
By having better collectors. More seriously, by making sure the collectors understand what kind of information is needed so that they become able to "dig" the data source to become more
knowlegeable on the issues and their ramifications and therefore can better contriibute to the collection process.
More effort by the user to collect surveys over a period of time at the same location to get some decent data, rather than just a few surveys scattered accross the dirstrict. Data should
incorporate mil, civ, and local nationals taking surveys.
DSF is subjective data; whatever the person being surveyed is interested in. Most of the collection for DSF is done by patrols on the ground and they dont ever get enough surveys
conducted to make the DSF data a true representation of operational environment. DSF should be conducted by the Afghan Government in order to get more involvement from the locals
and then the data is shared with US agencies and the DoD. As we transition out of Afghanistan, DSF would be an effective tool for the Afghan Govt (local/provincial) to employ to increase
their capabilities and perception.
Time and implementation must be standardized. Host nation also needs to part of the driving force!
Coordination and unity of effort. If DSF is going to be implemented by certain organizations working in an AO, getting this approach to the theater strategic level, mandating that all units
operating in that AO be aware of DSF and how it is implemented would be a great start.
More time to collect and analyze data!
Standardised collection formats and organisational tools.
More faith has to put in Afghan information sources.
By providing a user friendly computer application to collect and analyze the info gathered.
collection is not the problem but the framework design
The amount and accuracy depends on the people gathering the information, not the tool.
It needs be be nested in the unit collection plan and cycle. The TCS questions are a part of IR, but only a small part of the many questions or IR coming out of the DSF process.
Information collected through companies like Glevin Associates (or other organizations that trained Afghans appropriately), when do properly, often provided more accurate perception data
than what we would attempt to collect through HUMIT or other avenues. Collecting data is obviously critical. An Afghan will tell the collector what they think they want them to hear. One
Afghan will tell a Coalition Force on thing, then a Hazara another and them a Pashtu something totally different. The ANA Generals do the same thing today.
That is a bigger question on how data is collected in Afghanistan. Usually very badly. Right now I don't have a solution.
Take DSF off the table and start learning how the process of engagement in a community with a desired timeline should happen. If there is no time for follow up and no time for analysisdo not use DSF or any framework. Stick to projects that can be completed within 3 months and that's it.
Statistic
Total Responses

Value
31

29.

Did you notice a change in the overall level of stability since applying the DSF?

Answer

Bar

Response

Yes, the overall level of stability increased

10

31%

The overall level of stability remained the same

19

59%

No, the overall level of stability decreased

9%

Total

32

Statistic

Value

Min Value

Max Value

Mean

1.78

Variance

0.37

Standard Deviation

0.61

Total Responses

32

30.

Were you able to tie positive changes to the level of stability to the DSF-inspired
projects?

Answer

1
2

Bar

Response

Yes

16

50%

No

16

50%

Total

32

Statistic

Value

Min Value

Max Value

Mean

1.50

Variance

0.26

Standard Deviation

0.51

Total Responses

32

31.

In your view, how can the DSF be improved, in terms of the framework design?

Text Response
They need to update it from the 2010 slides. I'm sure they've learned a lot in the past two years so add in those factors.
streamlined
keep it as simple as possible. It has already started getting more complex than originally designed. It cannot become another specialist's tool, but must remain a layman's tool.
My observations were that most FPOs and military partners being newly introduced to DSF looked at the workbooks and were either intimidated by wat they saw as onerous data
collection and reporting or simply felt it was "juts a nother exercise". It was often treated with emphasis as a briefing tool rather than a programming tool. The framework appears to
voluminous to the newcomer unaccustomed to such methodology, preciselt because it essentially document in relative depth the thought processes one should logically go through thought processes in which people often engage but do not document. Convincing participants that it wasn'r as challengin as it perhaps appeared and to give it a try was the biggest
challenge. The workbooks could probably be streamlined. This migh have only been an issue in placessuch as Afghanistan where a civilian surge resuolted in a large field presence and
many FPOs working in a conflict environment for the first time and coming from a variety of backgrounds. Smaller areas of conflict in which the field structure in smaller and simpler
wouldn't necessaruily have the same issues in DSF training, acceptance and implementation as a tool, As mentioned previously, DSF is not so different from log frames that have
evolved over the decades. A decent log frame consistently applied is the key point, and it must serve as a KMS and living system.
Make sure the tool reflects the specific context of the country to be applied in. In the context of Afghanistan, the tool did not take into account the multiple agency and diverse level of
understanding of development principles. Often designed activities did not reflect what was being considered SOI mostly because the activities needed to be designed and implemented
within a limited timeframe.
It must be streamlined...the trainers don't understand how cumbersome it is to actually implement DSF in the field - since none of them have actually spent a year doing this.
Understand that it's not perfect, but it does provide useful information.
The DSF is like a rough draft of an essay that is far too "wordy". Take a red pen and cross out large portions of the tool of that are not really necessary. The detailed project design stuff was
particularly unhelpful.
it's pretty complete
Please see previous comments.
The different elements of the DSF should be integrated through the use of a database rather than an Excel spreadsheet or Microsoft Word.
There needs to be a "fast" version of the DSF. A more simplified version. Many colleagues simply gave up on the DSF as they perceived it as too complex.
in my view, it is more about the lack of properly trained personal and resources that hold it back.
Don't implement it unless field program personnel have resources and authority to design, fund, and initiate program activities. In a Kinetic environment, don't bother using DSF where
military colleagues do not support. or where you don't have the resources to collect data
The model is based on an understanding of stability/instability dynamics where grievances of the population mobilized by key actors outweight the resiliencies supported by key actors of
said population. The focus of DSF is almost completely on mitigating the root causes of grievances which are drivers of conflict. There is very little emphasis on identifying and supporting
key resiliencies within the population as to reinforce a stabilizing force. Effort should be placed into this aspect of the stabilization model.
None, have not seen an equal or better product.
The framework design is fine.
More holistic application is critical. This cannot be a one time or short term objective
N/A
Not sure.
Simplification of the frameworks to focus on essentials.
The DSF should not be treated as a panacea. It's as valuable as the information collected.
In my opinion it was set up very well.
Geographical scope and time horizon(S).
simplified (already in procesS)
Broaden to non-COIN environments
RELIGION - The overall root source of instability in Afghanistan is the "Hard-line" Islamic religion. Seeded with radical Islamic from Wazeristan. Until we can reshape the focus of the
religion to MODERATE Islamic, our Rule of Law, educational concepts and gender integration will be ineffective. Today, 11 years later, we have a Christian Chaplain mentoring the
Muslim Religious and Cultural Affairs. We will only reshape the mindset of Afghanistan through re-shaping the Village Mullah mindset, which really runs all and provides the access and
support to whom they choose.
More simplified and usable in the field.
must be simplified and made useful for local staff and partners
Statistic
Total Responses

Value
29

32.

You have answered all the questions. Below you may write in any
additional comments you have regarding the DSF.By clicking on the next tab in the
bottom corner your survey will be submitted and you will be unable to return and change
your answers.

Text Response
DSF is not the only survey analysis method out there; but in my experience it's one of the most complete. It was implemented far too late in the AF response, it was improperly
implemented by military colleagues which impacted how USAID was able to use it, and upper echelons of USAID didn't see the usefulness of it as programs were much larger and
countrywide, having little bearing on what a DSF for a district might say. Lack of local input, and lack of follow on implementation hampered its use. Possibly, groups like OTI were the
only ones to have any real positive impact with it.
Not sure I answered in the way intended, the tool I used and was thinking of specifically in this survey was TCAPF, which was a useful tool in Nawa 2009. It wasn't the main factor in our
success but was a great thinking enabler for all Marines as they got out and walked the ground interacting with the locals.
I would love to see the results of the study!
Your question about having enough time to gather information misses the point -- in unstable areas, there is never enough time to gather all the information or do all the analysis. The
nature of the work requires that we make 49/51 decisions and that we extrapolate from the little we know to plan projects.
Statistic
Total Responses

Value
4

33.

Of what organization are you a member?

Answer

Bar

Response

%
35%

U.S. military

12

Department of State

3%

USAID

13

38%

Other (please list below)

24%

Total

34

Other (please list below)

Military first, then USAID
ISAF International Civilian
DSF trainer, former Canadian Forces CA operator
Chemonics
DOD
military & USAID also
Currently DynCorp. Retired Marine
Statistic

Value

Min Value

Max Value

Mean

2.50

Variance

1.47

Standard Deviation

1.21

Total Responses

34

Problem Tree
Continued Violence

Effects

USG Stabilization Activities are Less Efficient and Effective

Suboptimal Understanding of
the Operating Environment

Focal
Problem

Causes

Decreased Livelihoods Among Afghanis

Improperly Designed
Stabilization Projects

Inability to Fully Monitor

Program Impacts

Poor implementation of the District

Stability Framework in Afghanistan

Insufficient Resources

Data collection problems

Lack of leader support

Improperly validated data

Source: Adapted from ODI Tools for Policy Impact: A Handbook for Researchers.

Stakeholder Analysis
Current Situation
ISAF

HIGH

USAID

POWER
to address
the DSF
problem

DOS

PRIMARY
International Security Assistance
Force for Afghanistan (ISAF)
U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID)

Secondary Stakeholders
Afghan Government (GIRoA)
Afghan Citizens (AC)
Department of State (DOS)

LOW
GIRoA
LOW

INTEREST

AC

In addressing the DSF implementation problem

HIGH

Source: Adapted from ODI Tools for Policy Impact: A Handbook for Researchers.

Stakeholder Matrix
Stakeholder

Position

Interests

Resources

International Security
Assistance Force for
Afghanistan (ISAF)

More effective use of the DSF will

allow them to complete their mission
of stabilizing Afghanistan sooner
rather than later, and better
accomplish U.S. foreign policy goals.

Highly interested
in improving
conflict analysis
and stabilization
programming in
Afghanistan.

Influence with subsidiary units utilizing the DSF. Can

set polices for all subordinate military commands
and set up systems to monitor compliance. Can also
assist by dedicating additional resources to DSF
implementers and organizing and administering a
DSF knowledge management system.

United State Agency

for International
Development (USAID)

USAID shares the same stabilization

goal in Afghanistan and as the lead
civilian agency providing human and
financial resources for conflict
mitigation & management it also
desires an effective assessment and
programming tool translatable to
other conflicts..

Same as above.

USAID is responsible for changes to the content and

also manages DSF of training and various contracts
related to it in Afghanistan. It also provides USAID
FSOs to PRTs and DSTs in who may utilize/assist with
the DSF in Afghanistan and who control how USAID
financial resources are allocated. It can also be
involved in a compliance monitoring and knowledge
management systems for the DSF.

Department of State
(DoS)

Interested in the DSF but less

committed to it and more focused on
strategic-level diplomatic issues and
Americas impending exit from
Afghanistan.

Interested in
stabilizing
Afghanistan but
with less concern
about the DSF or
how stabilization
funds are used.

Less influence than USAID or the military in how the

DSF is used since the former two have more
responsibilities related to stabilization
programming,. DSF is owned by USAID and while
DoS personnel may sit on SWGs they have less
influence on them than DoD or USAI D officials since
the latter two are in the lead on the ground in
Afghanistan. However, senior DoS personnel can
influence the degree to which the DSF is used an
how well it is used by exerting pressure.
Source: Developed by Robert Swope.

Stakeholder Matrix
Stakeholder

Position

Interests

Resources

Government of the
Islamic Republic of
Afghanistan (GIRoA)

Wants to see the DSF more

effectively used so that
programming will address the
sources of instability, especially
before ISAF leaves.

Supports more effective

ISAF/USAID stabilization
programming to help
address insecurity in the
country. Has worked with
ISAF to develop an Afghan
version of the DSF which
they would hope succeeds
as they seek to carry out
their own stabilization
programs.

Little to no influence in the way that the DSF is

operationalized, but can help with data collection
and analysis, particularly in making available
government archives and data collected from the
national statistics office. More influential in
terms of crafting and implementing an Afghan
version of the DSF.

Afghan Civilians (AC)

No position on the DSF, which

only microscopic few have
probably even heard about.
Yet would likely be supportive
of any tool that helps with
insecurity and violence unless
he/she profits form the
insecurity and violence.

Cares about safety and

improving the livelihoods
of themselves and their
families. No monolithic
interest as Afghanistan is a
diverse society with tribal
groups and factions that
compete against each
other for power and
resources.

Afghan civilians, if brought in by the Coalition, can

add value by providing insight as to whether or
not the data collected is valid and properly
analyzed. This is not always the case, however, as
some Afghans may let their own biases impact
their analysis. Afghan civilians can also add data
input during the collection process. Their ability
to affect implementation by SWGs is limited.

Source: Developed by Robert Swope.