America in Indochina 00 PDF

UNIT 12
AMERICANS IN INDOCHINA
CHAPTER 1 THE FRENCH IN INDOCHINA.......................................................................................................1

CHAPTER 2 COMMUNISM, GUERRILLAS AND FALLING DOMINOES .....................................................5
CHAPTER 3 SINK OR SWIM, WITH NGO DINH DIEM...................................................................................9
CHAPTER 4 FIGHTING AGAINST GUERRILLAS: THE STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM...................12
CHAPTER 5 EXIT NGO DINH DIEM AND THE GULF OF TONKIN INCIDENT .......................................16
CHAPTER 6 FIGHTING A GUERRILLA WAR ...................................................................................................22
CHAPTER 7 HOW MY LAI WAS PACIFIED ......................................................................................................25
CHAPTER 8 THE TET OFFENSIVE .....................................................................................................................30
CHAPTER 9 VIETNAMIZATION ........................................................................................................................36
CHAPTER 10 THE WAR IS FINISHED.................................................................................................................40
CHAPTER 11 WAS THE WHOLE THING A LIE OR A NOBLE CRUSADE...............................................43
by
Thomas Ladenburg, copyright, 1974, 1998, 2001, 2007
100 Brantwood Road, Arlington, MA 02476
781-646-4577
t.ladenburg@verizon.net
Page 1
Chapter 1
The French in Indochina
ietnam! Today the name conjures images of desperate fighting, a tragic loss of American lives, and
a foreign policy failure. In the early 1950's, few Americans had ever heard of that country.
Vietnam was not even a place one could
find on a map. However one could find a
French colony in Southeast Asia. What we
now call Vietnam was once owned and
run by France. From the late 1800's to
1954, Vietnam was part of a French colony
called French Indochina.
When the French first became
interested
in
Indochina
French
missionaries sought to convert the
Vietnamese to Catholicism, the religion of
France.
French
mer-chants
saw
opportunities to enrich themselves by
securing rice coffee, tea and rubber, and
the French government also was eager to
establish a strategic presence in Southeast
Asia.
This chapter briefly reviews the
early history of the French involvement in
Vietnam, and the effects of French
influence on the Vietnamese. The
information in this chapter will help
readers decide whether the United States
should have helped France to keep its
colony of French Indochina.
Life in Vietnam Before the
French
Before the French came to

Indochina, Vietnam, the Khmer Empire
(Cambodia), and the Laotian Kingdom
(Laos) were independent countries.
Vietnam had been ruled by neighboring
China for hundreds of years, but after centuries of resistance the Vietnamese people overthrew their
Chinese rulers and became independent. The tradition of armed struggle against foreign occupation had
a long and noble history in Indochina as the French as well as the U.S. later learned to their regret.
Page 2
In the three centuries preceding the French arrival, the Vietnamese were ruled by a series of
emperors whose nominal rule included collecting revenue. But, the taxes were modest and the emperor
had relatively little real power over the Vietnamese. "The edicts of the emperor," according to an old
Vietnamese saying, "stop at the edge of the village." The men who ruled the hundreds of small villages
and hamlets in which the vast majority lived were chosen locally based on their education, wisdom, and
family's status. The lives of the people in these villages were seldom affected by outside events. They
knew little of what was happening beyond the circle of the huts in which they lived, and fields on which
they tilled their crops.
Life in the villages was usually pleasant and peaceful. Much of Vietnam was well suited for
growing rice, and Chinese conquerors had taught the Vietnamese people the difficult art of planting and
harvesting this crop. The Vietnamese diet consisted mainly of rice and fish. A man was considered well
off if he had a water buffalo to help him in his farming. Most of his clothes were home-made, and he had
little need for goods made outside of his village. His religion was usually Buddhist, with its attending set
of beliefs, priests, and rituals. Women exercised a surprising amount of authority, and the level of
education in the villages was unusually high. On the average 4 out of 5 Vietnamese were taught to read
and write in their own language using the calligraphy introduced by the Chinese.
The French Come to Indochina
France did not set out to conquer Indochina all at once. Over a period of more than 350 years the
French gradually extended their control over Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. As early as the 16th century
European missionaries were welcomed in Indochina for their technical skills and connections to
European suppliers of modern weapons and western merchandise. The French East India Company, a
trade organization formed to expand trade and propagate Catholicism, gained a foothold in Indochina in
1668. Thereafter a pattern was established which continued for centuries. When French soldiers, traders,
or priests were attacked and/or killed in Indochina, the French would revenge the loss of their nationals,
and use the resistance to their authority as an excuse to extend their power. Vietnamese were forced to
surrender control over their land and to provide the French with special privileges. The French also took
part in wars between rival Vietnamese factions. As a reward from the winning faction, the French would
be given control over more land and the right to sell French goods and spread the French religion. In the
process, the French replaced local leaders with their nationals by 1925, a bureaucracy of some 5,000
Frenchmen ruled over a country totaling 30,000,000. In time, France had extended its control to
encompass Laos, North and South Vietnam, and Cambodia, which they called French Indochina.
The French Civilization: Religion and Culture
The French have traditionally taken great pride in what they called their 'civilization Francais.' This
included the language, religion, literature, poetry and music of France, as well as its culture, laws, form of
government, educational system, and technological achievements. One of the reasons the French gave for
expanding their colonial empire throughout the world was to spread this civilization to "inferior" native
peoples.
For the Vietnamese, spreading French civilization meant making them into Frenchmen. The French
taught the Vietnamese to speak their language. French priests converted the Vietnamese to Catholicism.
French teachers educated Vietnamese in French history, literature, and law. The Vietnamese were also
taught math, science, and engineering in special private schools attended by 20 percent of Vietnamese
boys. This prepared the smartest young Vietnamese, if their parents could afford it, to attend the French
colleges in Indochina or a university in France. In their new schools Vietnamese students took the same
courses in French history and literature that were taught in France. In this way, French culture was
Page 3
instilled in the brightest and wealthiest Vietnamese children, and young men were prepared to help the
French rule their country
French Civilization in Vietnam: Modern Life
The French made many changes in Vietnam. They modernized the country by building railroads
connecting the major cities. Of special pride to both the Vietnamese and the French was a railroad
connecting the northern capital, Hanoi, to Saigon the largest city in South Vietnam. In addition to the
railroads, the French imported trucks and cars, paved streets, and built roads and bridges.
Though it was confined primarily to larger cities and towns, the French brought electricity to
Vietnam. They made sections of Saigon and Hanoi into beautiful, modern cities with fine public parks,
and wide streets. They built hotels that are still in use. The outdoor restaurants, modern buildings, and
broad boulevards in Saigon resembled Paris. The French even started a law and medical school as well as
an excellent college, and they introduced the practice of modern medicine.
The French installed their own legal system in Vietnam which was based on the famous Napoleonic
Codes. Their system replaced the one used by the Vietnamese for hundreds of years. Before French
intervention, for example, women accused of adultery were trampled to death by elephants and people
found guilty of robbery were often beheaded. The French reduced penalties in those cases. They thought
their system of justice was far more humane than the one practiced in Vietnam. Since this system was
French, the French ran it. Vietnamese would be brought to trial in French courts, represented by French
lawyers before French judges.
The French also changed the schools of Vietnam. They replaced the hard to
learn Chinese characters with a far easier Roman alphabet used in Western
Europe. They educated about 20% of Vietnamese males usually the sons of the
well to do. Trained to pass the exams for French Universities, many Vietnamese
were able to complete their schooling in the land of their colonial rulers.
French Civilization in Vietnam - Economics
Until the late 1890's the French spent far more money expanding and
governing their Indochinese Empire than they collected in revenues. In 1897,
France sent a prominent politician, Paul Doumer, to govern Indochina. Doumer
was determined to put Indochina on a paying basis. He wanted the Vietnamese
to bear the administrative costs of running Indochina, and he wanted Indochina
to provide a market for French products and be a source of profitable investment
Paul Doumer
by French businessmen.
To raise money, Doumer encouraged the use of opium, which had hitherto been confined to a small
part of the Chinese population. Once more Vietnamese were addicted, Doumer leveled a tax on opium
which eventually raised 1/3rd of the revenue needed to govern Indochina. Heavy taxes were also placed
on the wine and salt trade. The Vietnamese who could or would not pay their taxes, lost their houses and
land, and often became day laborers.
Before the arrival of the French, the emperors did not allow rice to be sold outside the country. The
French, however, believed they could enrich themselves by exporting rice. They encouraged expanded
production of rice on lands that had been confiscated for non-payment of taxes. The French took over the
land of these unfortunate farmers and then hired them to plant and harvest the rice. As a result of these
practices Vietnam became the third largest rice exporting country in the world, only lagging behind
Page 4
Burma and Thailand. Despite the increase in production, many Vietnamese were not paid enough to buy
food for themselves and their families.
Vietnam also became well known for its rubber plantations. The famous Michelin tire company, for
example, bought up thousands of acres of land in Vietnam. Many of the Vietnamese who had lost their
land for failing to pay taxes were hired to work on these plantations. These poor peasants were forced to
work for the French and often suffered from malaria, dysentery, and malnutrition. From the French
perspective, these landless workers were fortunate to find employment.
The French also opened coal mines in Vietnam, and used unemployed and landless peasants to
work in them. As on the rice fields and the rubber plantations, the miners were barely paid a living wage.
The French Civilization in Vietnam Government
In Vietnam's cities, the French took all of the high government positions. In the countryside,
Vietnamese loyal to France played a more important role. Following orders from French government
officials they ran the smaller towns and villages, collecting taxes, supervising road construction and
repair, and enforcing French laws. But the highest paid among these Vietnamese officials made less
money than the lowest paid Frenchman.
The French were proud of the way they spread their civilization to Vietnam. They were equally
proud of the many Vietnamese who had become Catholics, spoke fluent French, and were educated in
French history and literature. But not all Vietnamese appreciated Frances contributions to their country.
There were many who would have been happy to rid their country of its French civilization and the
Frenchmen who forced it on the people of Vietnam. Armed resistance to French rule continued during the
entire colonial period.
Suggested Student Exercises:
1.Summerize the early history of Vietnamese people up to their domination by the French.
2. What changes did the French make in Indochina?
3. From the perspective of a landless peasant, a French official, or an objective observer, explain whether
and why you think that French rule was good for the Vietnamese.
Page 5
Chapter 2
Communism, Guerrillas and Falling Dominoes
orld War II had a profound effect on French Indochina. What the French called their civilizing
mission ended in the summer of 1941 with the Japanese invasion and occupation of Vietnam.
The French could not do anything to stop this incursion because World War II had started in
Europe, and Germany had smashed through Frances defenses in May, 1940 in its successful drive to
destroy its European rival.
Many Vietnamese initially welcomed the Japanese invaders. They believed they would suffer less
under domination by Asian rather than by European rulers. But others saw no reason for trading the
Japanese wolf for the French tiger. Vietnamese nationalists, who had struggled for years against French
occupation, redirected their energies to throw the Japanese out of Vietnam. Although well versed in the
language and culture of France, their fiery leader, Ho Chi Minh, maintained a revolutionary and
ideological commitment to rid his country of foreign rule. Minh had joined the French communist party
in the 1920's, maintained a commitment to socialism, and fought valiantly against Japanese occupation of
his country during World War II. He cooperated with American forces in Vietnam against the common
enemy. During that period, Ho played down his communist leanings and emphasized his love for his
native country. The organization he started (originally the Vietnam Independence League) was called the
Vietminh. It was dedicated to (1) freeing all of Vietnam, north and south from foreign rule; and, (2)
establishing a socialist government in Vietnam.
This chapter explains how the French tried to regain control of Vietnam after World War II and
how the Vietnamese fought for their independence. Readers will be asked to decide if the U.S. should
enter the war to help the French keep Vietnam and prevent the spread of communism.
The Second War for Vietnam
During the waning months of World War II, U.S. officials asked their British counterparts to occupy
South Vietnam and disarm the Japanese. The British took over the southern part of Vietnam, including
the city of Saigon. They disarmed the Japanese, put down a Vietnamese rebellion, and turned South
Vietnam over to the French. But in the North, in August 1945, the Japanese surrendered to Vietminh
troops under the command of Ho Chi Minh.
When the French made an agreement with Ho Chi Minh in March of 1946, it seemed that fighting
over the control of Vietnam might be avoided. Under this agreement, France promised to leave Vietnam
with the Vietminh in charge. But fighting broke out in November, 1946 before the last French troops left.
This began what will be referred to in these pages as the second war for Indochina. It would last longer
than World War II.
Fish, Oceans, and Guerrilla Tactics
In choosing to fight their war against superior French forces guerrilla style, Ho Chi Minh and his
Vietminh entourage followed the strategy developed by Mao Zedong, communist leader of China. This
Chinese rebel leader had fought a guerrilla war for more than 20 years against his Nationalist opponents,
and the war continued in neighboring China. Mao believed that the guerrilla is to the people, like a fish is
Page 6
to the ocean. Just as the fish swims in the ocean the guerrilla can only fight if the people in the country
he wants to free support him. Mao outlined three distinctly different but interrelated stages of guerrilla
warfare which were applied simultaneously:
1. Gain the support of the people specifically, the peasants in the countryside. This stage
required guerrillas to help the poor farmers with their problems. Guerrillas were instructed never
to take anything from local people, not even a needle or thread; they were expected to take part in
the harvest, feed the people, provide them with responsible jobs, give land to the landless peasants,
and/or under certain conditions kill landlords and unpopular government officials. Guerrillas
taught the people to read and write, and the more educated cadres taught the peasants Marxist
ideology. The guerrilla army would do anything to gain the people's support, respect and trust, in
order to eventually recruit them to fight in their organization.
2. Fight in small units using hit and run tactics. This strategy included blowing up the barracks
where the enemy eats and sleeps, killing unpopular officials, attacking policemen, and ambushing
enemy soldiers as they march to the defense of local installations. Guerrillas were taught to
immobilize their opponents by interrupting travel by road or rail in order to drive the enemy out of
the countryside and confine him to urban centers.
3. Obtain help from other Communist countries and use captured weapons to build a credible
conventional military force. When the enemy is sufficiently weakened, mount full-scale attacks
with conventional weapons. By this time, opposing forces will be so demoralized that the sight of a
hostile army will cause them to throw away their weapons and run.
Ho Chi Minh modeled his strategy according to the stages of guerrilla warfare. The basic strength
of his movement lay in support from the dispossessed who hated the French for what they had done to
them. Many Vietnamese peasants, it should be remembered, lost their lands for non-payment of taxes and
were forced to work for the French and rich Vietnamese. Educated Vietnamese had to take demeaning
jobs at low pay working for the French. The Vietminh knew what the people wanted, nursed their
grievances, and exploited the many mistakes made by colonial rulers.
U.S. Views of the Indochina Conflict
When the Vietnam War started in 1946 the U.S. opposed France's efforts to re-impose colonial rule.
The U.S. had freed the Philippines in 1946 and England would leave India in 1947. It seemed that the age
of western colonialism was over and the U.S., remembering its own Revolution, sided with the struggles
of third world people that were seeking their independence.
However, after the French fought the Vietnamese for four years, the United States changed its mind
and began to help France. Why did the U.S. change its mind?
The Domino Theory
In 1949, Mao Zedong and the Communist Party beat the Nationalists under Chiang Kai-shek. As a
result, all of mainland China came under Communist rule, raising American fears that communism
would soon spread throughout Asia. This fear was heightened in 1950 when communist North Korea
attacked an unsuspecting non-communist South Korea. Soon U.S. soldiers were fighting North Korean as
well as Chinese Communist troops in the hills of Korea. American leaders began to think differently
about Ho Chi Minh, their collaborator against Japan during World War II. After all, Ho Chi Minh, like
Mao Zedong and the North Korean leader, Kim Il Sung, was a Communist. Just as North Korea, with the
Page 7
support of the Soviet Union's, was trying to take South Korea, it seemed, Ho Chi Minh, with communist
China's help, was seeking to control North Vietnam. After that, people believed, communism could
spread to the rest of French Indochina, i.e. South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, followed by Thailand,
Burma, and maybe even India, the Philippines and so on.
President Dwight Eisenhower (1953-61) compared the spread of communism to the fall of a row of
dominoes, with the first knocking down the second all the way to the end of the line. This explanation,
known as the 'domino theory', provided many Americans with a clear and understandable image that
gave them a reason to support France against China and the Soviet backed forces in Southeast Asia.
Another Theory About Communism
Not all people believe that countries capitulate to communism like falling dominoes. Some believed
that communism is like a disease that strikes the weak but not the strong. According to this theory, abject
poverty, an extremely uneven distribution of wealth and the lack of hope, attracts people to Communism.
If poor farmers can get land of their own, they won't be persuaded to become Communists. If their
government treats them decently they would not want to live under a totalitarian regime. The most
effective way to defeat Communism, according to this theory, would be to help the common people in
foreign countries in their struggle against poverty, disease, and despair. To use Mao's metaphor, such aid
would dry up the 'ocean' in which the guerrillas swam and halt the spread of communism.
The Ink Blot Plan and Dienbienphu
Even with a several billion dollars of American aid that began in 1950, the French kept losing their
war against Ho's Vietminh. The French were able to hold the cities but kept losing in the countryside to
an enemy employing stages one and two of guerrilla warfare.
Hard pressed to reverse his string of loses, French general Henri Navarre, came up with a new
strategy to combat guerrilla warfare. It was called the inkblot plan. French troops would set up land-air
bases deep in Vietminh territory and expand outward from these bases like a drop of ink spreading over
a blotter. In this way, the French hoped to deny the Vietminh control of the countryside.
When the French applied their inkblot strategy deep in North
Vietnam at a narrow valley called Dienbeinphu the Vietminh were
ready to employ stage 3 of guerrilla warfare. After taking apart captured
U.S. artillery that the Chinese communists had taken from the
Nationalists in China, the Vietminh mounted the parts on bicycles and
laboriously pushed them up steep mountain trails overlooking the
French base. Every night they moved in a little closer to the French
encampment. Every morning they were able to fire more artillery shells
into the French base, gradually closing down the adjoining airport.
Parachuting into
Dienbeinphu in a futile
With no places to land their planes the French had to parachute

supplies down to their base camp. As the Vietminh crept closer even the
airdrops failed. The Vietminh and not the French were able to pick up
the supplies that came in by parachute. When one French colonel was
given a battlefield promotion, the champagne to help him celebrate as
well as his generals insignia landed among the Vietminh.
Page 8
By the Spring of 1954 the situation faced by the French was becoming more desperate every day.
Unless they received direct American military support, the French feared, it would only be a matter of
weeks before they would have to surrender 13,000 soldiers or lose them in an uneven battle. Following
such a devastating defeat on the heels of eight fruitless years of war in Southeast Asia France would be
forced to abandon all of Indochina. Rather than face a humiliating defeat in the hands of communist
forces the French made a dramatic request for more American aid.
When the French asked the United States for more help, Americas implacable foe of communism,
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, thought it would be a good idea. Vice-President Richard Nixon
agreed with the Secretary. Admiral Radford, the top U.S. military commander, thought 60 B -29's
stationed in the Philippines could break the siege at Dienbienphu. General Matthew Ridgeway, who had
commanded U.S. forces in Korea, disagreed with his boss. He did not think the war could be won from
the air and predicted it would take 7 American divisions to help the French win in Vietnam 12 if the
Chinese entered the war. The final decision of course, was not Dulles's, Nixon's, or Radford's, but
President Eisenhower's.
1. Explain the three stages of guerrilla warfare, and explain the domino theory, the sick man theory,
and the inkblot strategy.
2. Describe the battle of Dienbeinphu.
3. Do you think the U.S. should enter the war in Vietnam to help France prevent the spread of
communism before the French would be forced to surrender at Dienbeinphu? Why or why not?
Your answer should consider Ho Chi Minhs politics, the price of American involvement, and the
threat to the U.S. if Ho Chi Minh succeeds.
Page 9
Chapter 3
'Sink or Swim, with Ngo Dinh Diem'
ithout help from the U.S., the French had no choice but to surrender their remaining garrison
of 13,000 soldiers at Dienbeinphu. But the French were more successful in diplomacy then
they were at war. With the intervention of China's Prime Minister, Chou En-lai, the French
were able to salvage a temporary relief from total defeat. At the famous 14 Nation Geneva Conference,
the following "accords" were reached, most of them made in secret meetings with only a few players on
each side.
1. All fighting in Indochina would stop.
2. Vietnam would be temporarily divided into two sections, North and South, along the 17th
parallel.
3. Free elections would be held within two years to chose a government for a united Vietnam
4. Free movement would be allowed for Vietnamese in the North and South to migrate to the other
section.
5. A government under the puppet Emperor, Bao Dai would be allowed to operate in the meantime
and to make preparations for elections that would come by June, 1956.
6. Poland, Canada, and India would send representatives to supervise the fairness of the election.
After the French left Vietnam, the U.S. was the only country capable of preventing further spread of
communism in Southeast Asia. Without U.S. aid, South Vietnam would surely become a communist
country. According to the domino theory, other countries such as Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, etc., could
also become communist.
There was one person in Vietnam who might help stop spread of communism in Southeast Asia.
That one person was Ngo Dinh Diem, who replaced the playboy Emperor, Bao Dai and was elected
President of South Vietnam. Diem hated communism and all communists and he would do anything to
drive them out of his country.
President Eisenhower had a difficult decision to make: (1) support Diem, (2) draw the line against
communism somewhere else, or (3) do nothing to prevent the spread of communism in Southeast Asia.
At the end of this chapter, you will be asked to make a similar decision. For you, for President
Eisenhower, and for the American people, the choice in Vietnam was whether to 'sink or swim with Ngo
Dinh Diem.'
A Strong Anti-Communist Leader in South Vietnam
At Geneva, Ho Chi Minh agreed to stop fighting in part because he was sure he'd win an election in
South Vietnam. He thought that was a smart move because it would save money and lives. However, Ho
was prepared to take up arms if the elections were not held or if his side lost. When his Vietminh guerrilla
soldiers who lived in South Vietnam went home, they hid their weapons in case they were needed.
Meanwhile, a committed anti-communist, Ngo Dinh Diem came to power in South Vietnam. A
devout Catholic, Diem was educated in French schools in Vietnam. He rose rapidly to a post of governor
by the time he was 25 years old in 1926. In his post Diem tried to counter communist propaganda by
Page 10
writing pamphlets on improving the conditions of the peasants. In 1933 he was appointed Minister of the
Interior by the Emperor, Bao Dai, the puppet ruler of Vietnam whose strings were pulled by his French
handlers.
After three months in his new job, Diem quit because he would not go against the interests of his
country. As a result, the French stripped him of his honors and decorations, and Diem went into a selfimposed exile for the next 20 years. He spent most of that time in France and three years in a Catholic
monastery in New Jersey where he devoted his time to prayer and doing menial work. But he also met
with American and French leaders whom he impressed with his strong anti-Communist views. When the
French left Vietnam in 1954, the playboy emperor through whom they had ruled appointed Diem Prime
Minister. With help from the U.S., Diem was elected President of South Vietnam.
In his new position, Diem had no intention of holding the election promised at the Geneva
Agreement because he and President Eisenhower believed would result in a victory for Ho Chi Minh.
Diem was too strong an anti-Communist to allow Vietnam be united under Ho, and President
Eisenhower was ready to help him as the following excerpts from a letter by the U.S. President to Diem
dated October 23, 1954 indicates:
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:.

We have been exploring ways and means to
permit our aid to Viet-Nam to be more effective and to
make a greater contribution to the welfare and stability
of the Government of Viet-Nam. I am, accordingly,
instructing the American Ambassador to Viet-Nam to
examine with you in your capacity as Chief of
Government, how an intelligent program of American
aid given directly to your Government can serve to
assist Viet-Nam in its present hour of trial, provided
that your Government is prepared to give assurances
as to the standards of performance it would be able to
maintain in the event such aid were supplied.1
To strengthen his position in South Vietnam, Diem
sent the playboy Emperor back to France. Diem gained
control over the army by promoting the generals who
President Eisenhower &
Secretary of State Dulles welcoming
backed his government and firing those who opposed
Ngo Dinh Diem to the U.S.
him. Diem appointed government officials loyal to him.
He made his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu chief of the secret
police. Nhu used ten different organizations to find out who supported his brother's government and
those who didn't. He even employed spies to spy on other spies. .
The Geneva Accord had allowed Vietnamese citizens in the South to move North and those in the
North to move South. Altogether 800,000 North Vietnamese, mostly Catholics, moved South. One
hundred thousand, mostly Vietminh soldiers from the North, came home. Diem was able to find jobs for
the many Catholics who escaped from Ho Chi Minh's government. These displaced Catholics formed the
largest single group in South Vietnam that supported Diem.
1 The Department of State Bulletin (November 15, 1954), pp. 735-736.
Page 11
Anti-Communism Under Ngo Dinh Diem

Meanwhile, Diem worked hard to rid South Vietnam of communist influence. Papers suspected of
printing news from a communist point of view were closed. The secret police under Diem's brother Nhu
informed on disloyal officials. Diem arrested thousands of Vietnamese who he thought supported the
Vietminh. Although reliable sources report a far higher number, the South Vietnamese government
admitted that 25,000 suspects were thrown in prison. Some of the suspects spent months being 'reeducated' with lessons on the evils of communism. Others were killed or jailed for years.
North Vietnam Under Ho Chi Minh
Meanwhile, in North Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh and his government engaged
in a campaign of terror directed against landlords and men who were
suspected of collaborating with the French.
Ho Chi Minh had peasants divided into five separate classes ranging from
landlord and rich peasants to farm workers. He decided that one out of twenty
Ho Chi Minh
farmers were landlords and sent officials to liquidate them. Their land
supposedly would be divided among the other nineteen farm workers. This goal of one in twenty had to
be met even if there were no landlords in a particular village.
Ho Chi Minh's state terrorism touched off a civil war in many villages. Peasants tried to get on the
good side of the government by denouncing others as landlords. Meanwhile opposition to the
government was put down without mercy. In Ho's own province 6,000 peasants were killed and/or
deported for demonstrating against his government. Furthermore, torture was freely used to root out
Vietnamese who had worked for the French and even those whose only crime was not being sufficiently
loyal to the Vietminh. Ho Chi Minh later apologized for these and other 'excesses' carried out in North
Vietnam, and blamed them on his Chinese advisors.
'Sink or Swim'
Although, American leaders were upset by the way Diem ran his government, there was little the
U.S. could do about it. If they tried to change Diem, he would complain. He'd say since he was fighting a
ruthless enemy in his country and government his tactics were absolutely necessary. As soon as his
problems with his communist adversaries were solved, Diem said, he'd go back to respecting the rights of
all of his people.
As one U.S. official put it, the U.S. had little choice. There was only one strong anti-Communist
leader in South Vietnam. There were no other alternatives, except communists. Like him or not, it was
'sink or swim, with Ngo Dinh Diem'.
1. After summarizing the main provisions of the Geneva Accord, comment on Eisenhowers policies
toward South Vietnam and Diem.
2. Should the Eisenhower administration have continued supporting No Diem Dinh despite his
faults? Why or why not?
Page 12
Chapter 4
Fighting Against Guerrillas: The Strategic
Hamlet Program
his chapter will describe a program designed to help beat Ho Chi Minh's Vietcong the
communist guerrilla organization attempting to overthrow the Diem government.
The program was called the Strategic Hamlet Program. The idea behind it was to get South
Vietnamese into special villages so they could protect themselves against the Vietcong (known as the VC).
The reader will learn about the program, its purpose, and about one village , An loc, that was taken over
by the VC. Readers will be asked whether to order an air attack against the village in order to drive the
VC out.
Vietminh Become the Vietcong
It should be recalled that Ngo Dinh Diem decided not to hold the national elections to unite North
and South Vietnam called for by the Geneva Accord. The promised elections that were supposed to have
been held in June of 1956 were never held.
In the meantime, Diem tried to gain control of hundreds of villages by appointing chiefs loyal to
him. He also removed people in the villages that may have fought for the Vietminh in the war against
France. As reported in Chapter 3, thousands of suspected Vietminh and their suspected sympathizers
were rounded up. With the exception of a few men in each village, Diems wide net came close to
catching all of the Vietminh left in South Vietnam.
The Vietminh had expected to win South Vietnam by free elections. Because Diem decided not to
hold these elections, Ho gave the word that the armed resistance would begin. In order to achieve the
victory for which he dedicated his life, Ho realized that his followers would have to fight, not vote.
Slowly Ho's followers got themselves organized again. They decided to call themselves the National
Liberation Front to emphasize the fact they were fighting for a united Vietnam. The Diem government
said they were the Vietnamese Communists (Vietcong or VC.)
Guerrilla Warfare: Stages 1 and 2
The VC often came into villages to recruit people to fight on their side. These recruiting missions
would often start with a few get acquainted visits to get to know the people and their problems.
Occasionally the VC would help people in a village who did not have enough food to feed their families
they might help plant or harvest crops, dig irrigation ditches, or supply seeds. They also encouraged
people to share their grievances against local officials, greedy landlords, or corrupt merchants, who were
blamed for all their problems
But the Vietcong did not always come to a village to do some noble deed. They might show their
power by killing an unpopular local leader who had been appointed by Ngo Dinh Diem, or by ridding
the area of a particularly wealthy and unpopular landlord or by terrorizing a popular leader to
discourage others from siding with the government of South Vietnam.
Page 13
Using many different methods, the Vietcong proved that they could do whatever they wanted in
the villages. They could be helpful, and they could kill people who did not cooperate with them. They
had more power than the South Vietnamese government because they were able to take over almost any
village at almost any given time.
The Vietcong did more than recruit peasants to side with them against Diem's government. They
attacked police stations, blew up bridges, ambushed South Vietnamese soldiers, and destroyed
government buildings. Diem had a real revolution on his hands that threatened to destroy his
government.
The Strategic Hamlet Program
President Ngo Dinh Diem realized that
he was losing South Vietnam to the Vietcong
village by village. He therefore decided to start
the strategic hamlet program which, with U.S.
aid, became the main way to prevent the spread
of communism in South Vietnam.
Strategic hamlets were special villages
built for loyal South Vietnamese. To encourage
the South Vietnamese to move into these
hamlets, there would be a school, a hospital,
electricity and some modern conveniences. A
barbed wire or a bamboo fence to keep the VC
out would surround the hamlet. The men in the
hamlets would be provided with weapons and
military training to enable them to defend
themselves and their families from the VC.
South Vietnamese Army defense forces would
be stationed in the region to come to the aid of
hamlets if necessary.
The main purpose of the strategic hamlet

program was to separate the loyal South
Vietnamese from the Vietcong. All the people
in the hamlets were considered 2 friendly.
Those living outside of the hamlets could be
thought of as the enemy. To use the analogy of the guerrilla and the people the hamlets were a way to
dry up the ocean that gives life to the fish (guerrillas).
The Strategic Hamlet Program gained the support of U.S. military planners and was advocated by
President Eisenhower as well as his successor, John F. Kennedy. By September 1962, over one-third of the
population of South Vietnam, an estimated 4,300,000 South Vietnamese, were living in strategic hamlets.
2 http://history.acusd.edu/gen/USPics2
Page 14
Problems with the Strategic Hamlet Program

The Hamlet Program was not without its faults. The following is a partial list:
Many peasants did not want to leave their own villages where their families had lived for
hundreds of years to go to these strategic hamlets.
Sometimes, the hamlets were too far away from the fields in which the peasants worked.
Often the promised military, medical, and agricultural supplies,, never got to the hamlets.
The supplies often disappeared somewhere on the road from Saigon. and they often reappear for sale in market places in towns and cities.
The village chiefs, appointed by Diem, were often unpopular. Many stole and cheated the
people in the hamlets.
What happened at An loc

There was no moon that night. Even alert guards might have had difficulty seeing the 50 men who
suddenly emerged from the jungle and ran toward the gate. They were wearing the plain peasant
clothing known to Americans as black pajamas. Each member of the village defense force was struck and
knocked down from behind with a single blow. Their throats were cut and they were left to die. The
guerillas captured the village chief, brought him in plain view for all in the hamlet to see. They killed the
chief and his family, while denouncing Diem and the South Vietnamese government. They blamed Diem
and his American advisors for forcing them into An loc in the first place. Then they dared the South
Vietnamese Army to come to the aid of the village.
Ten miles away, Captain Carnham's field
telephone rang it was Captain Cam of the
South Vietnamese army. He had just been told
that the Vietcong had captured An loc. His
soldiers were 10 miles away. It would be too
difficult for his men to drive the Vietcong out.
There were too many places on the road for
the enemy to hide and ambush his men. Cam
decided to ask Captain Carnham to bomb the
village and kill the invaders.
Carnham thought long and hard about
this request, before answering.
US evacuating wounded. Convoy had been
ambushed on way to support an advanced
camp.
Page 15

1. Comment on the rationale behind the strategic hamlet program and its and the strengths and
weaknesses of
2. Do you think that Captain Carnham should order an air strike of An loc as requested by his South
Vietnamese counterpart, Captain Cam? Consider, strength of the program, domino theory, and character
of Diem regime.
Epilogue
The story of An loc is based on an incident depicted in Robin Moore's book, The Green Berets, an
account of the elite US forces serving in Vietnam as counter-insurgency duty. In the real life story, the
U.S. ordered an attack on the hamlet by American air planes. Here is part of Robin Moore's description of
the results:
Badly wounded and burned children were dying everywhere. Men, women, and cows lay dead,
and smelled to high heaven. The South Vietnamese Army had come into the village after American
bombing and artillery had driven out the enemy. The [South Vietnamese] did not even have a man
wounded. The South Vietnamese had refused to fight the V.C. in armed combat.
Despite the good intentions of the United States its policies in Vietnam often paralleled the tragic
results dramatized in this chapter. The U.S. underwrote programs like the Strategic Hamlet plan to make
it easier to win the war. But the people who were supposed to be helped frequently were not consulted,
often did not cooperate, occasionally were corrupt, and seldom wanted to fight. As a result, the U.S. on
many occasions was called in to use its superior firepower that killed the very civilians they had come to
Vietnam to protect.
1. What is the moral of this story?
Page 16
Chapter 5
Exit Ngo Dinh Diem and the Gulf of Tonkin
Incident
thin, elderly Buddhist monk stopped in the middle of a Saigon street on June 11, 1963. He was
dressed in the usual manner of Buddhist priests: sandals and loose clothes that hung on him.
His face was serious as he sat down and crossed his legs while several monks and nuns stood
around him. One of them poured gasoline on
his head; another lit a match. The monk put his
hands together in prayer as his robe and then
his body were consumed by a bright flame.
Traffic stopped; shocked passers-by knelt in
prayer. When an ambulance finally arrived on
the scene the body remained on fire with only
the heart still intact.
Altogether 7 Buddhist monks burned

themselves to protest various aspects of
Diems policies, including bans on
celebrating Buddhas birthday
In the summer of 1963 other Buddhist

monks protested the policies of the U.S. backed
Diem government. Some also set themselves on
fire. The protests by these monks were only the
"tip of the iceberg." They represented a deepseated dissatisfaction with the government of
Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu.
The dissatisfaction was so great that it paralyzed
all efforts to win the war against the Vietcong.
Some example of the reasons for the South
Vietnamese unhappiness follow:
The jails were full of thousands of people, some communists, but others just enemies of the Ngo
brothers.
The brothers were Catholic while most South Vietnamese were Buddhist. Catholicism was
considered non-Vietnamese. It was the religion of the French who had conquered and ruled
Vietnam.
In August, 1963 Diem's brother Nhu rounded up thousands of monks, nuns, students and ordinary
citizens in a crack down on Buddhist temples all over the country, touching off a wave of fury
against the brothers
To stop real or imagined plots against them, the Ngo brothers constantly moved generals from one
army to another. They were most scared of generals who were popular with the soldier These
were the men, the brothers thought, who might use the army to take control of the government
away from them. The chiefs who the brothers appointed in the villages were hated. Many kept
Page 17
the money they were supposed to use for the hamlets. Anyone who complained could be
considered a communist and thrown in jail.
The government was so corrupt that everything had its price: a promotion in the army; a permit to
build a building; a passport granting permission to travel outside of Vietnam. Hardly anything
was done without money changing hands.
Exit Diem and Nhu
By 1963, President Kennedy and his advisors believed it would be impossible to win the war in
Vietnam with Diem and Nhu running the country. After some discussion among his advisors, President
Kennedy let the top American civilian leader in Saigon, Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, know that the
U.S. would not object to having someone other than Diem and Nhu in charge of the government. Lodge
passed the word to generals in Saigon. Caught in a series of contradicting instructions from President
Kennedy, Lodge later described his role in the coup as having sowed the seeds on orders from
Washington and then not having prevented their flowering.
On November 1, 1963, Nhu and Diem learned of the last of a series of military plots to get rid of
them. The brothers retreated to their underground shelter in the palace and made frantic telephone calls
to generals, commanders, and loyal government officials. However, nobody promised they would help
save them. Realizing they had lost all support, they appealed to Ambassador Lodge.
Lodge informed the brothers that the U.S. might get them safe conduct out of the country, but no
arrangements had been made to find a plane to fly them or a country that would accept them. The
brothers decided to escape on their own. They fled through a mile long tunnel, and came out in a Catholic
church where they were given communion. Shortly afterwards they were discovered by army plotters,
thrown into the back of an armored car, and killed.
Too Early to Celebrate
Word quickly spread that the brothers were dead. Hearing the news, people poured into the streets,
singing and dancing with great merriment. Jails were thrown open to free political prisoners; enemies of
the regime came out of hiding, chefs prepared sumptuous feasts, and the bars filled with revelers. There
was no denying that the people of Saigon were overjoyed that the hated Ngo brothers were gone
In Washington, DC, there was both shock and relief that Nhu and Diem had been eliminated. But
less than three weeks later, on November 22, 1963, there was a far greater shock in Washington when
President John Fitzgerald Kennedy was shot and killed in Dallas, Texas. As Americans mourned their
much-loved leader, Lyndon Baines Johnson became President of the United States.
Shortly after taking the oath of office, President Johnson made an important decision. He would
continue the war in Vietnam until the V.C. were defeated. He did not plan to be the first American
president to lose a war
From Bad to Worse
Winning in Vietnam turned out to be much more difficult than Lyndon Johnson had ever imagined.
The generals who had worked together to overthrow Diem and Nhu could not cooperate with one
another to form an effective and stable government. For the next 19 months they played a power game.
By shifting alliances with one another each sought to control the power and patronage that would allow
Page 18
them to give lucrative jobs to friends and relatives. No sooner would one group form a government than
another would rebel and replace it. There were 7 different governments in Saigon in the 19 months from
November 1963 to June 1965 producing a new set of leaders that would hold office on the average for
fewer than three months at a time.
While all this pushing and shoving was taking place in Saigon, no one in the countryside was
minding the store. As a result, one strategic hamlet after another collapsed. Some were taken over by the
Vietcong, but in many cases families of disgruntled peasants simply pulled up stakes and went back to
the villages where they had lived all their lives. Meanwhile the Vietnamese army was even less effective
than before Diems demise; American troops were playing a larger role in the war, pacification efforts
were failing, and the Vietminh presence in South Vietnam was increasing. It was becoming increasingly
obvious that the aid from the North and the lack of a coherent government action in the South was
dooming the American war effort. Unless some changes were made, Ho Chi Minh would unite Vietnam
under his leadership. President Johnson might still become the first American president to lose a war.
The Goldwater Challenge
1964 was an election year in the United States. The Republican candidate, Barry Goldwater, charged
President Johnson with not using enough force to win the war. In his acceptance speech before a jubilant
Republican National Convention in San Fransisco, Goldwater reeled off a series of accusations that
Johnson and the Democrats were soft on Communism. Charged by opponents with extremism,
Goldwater countered with the ringing declaration that:
Extremism in defense of liberty is no vice.

While President Johnson did not want to be accused of not doing enough to win the war in Vietnam
he was confronted by a growing chorus of anti-Vietnam war demonstrators who accused him of sending
American boys to needlessly die in Asia. Beset by both sides of the debate over Vietnam, Lyndon Johnson
needed an incident that would unite public opinion behind him. On August 2 and 4, 1964, it seemed that
he had one which would suit his purposes.
The Gulf of Tonkin Incident
The C Turner Joy in 1964
A few days after the event, Americans heard that an

American destroyer, the U.S.S Maddox, had been attacked by
North Vietnamese PT (patrol torpedo) boats. It seemed there
had been no cause for this attack, which took place outside the
three mile limit that the French had claimed belonged to them
when they ruled Indochina. The Maddox had escaped with one
bullet hole but was forced to dodge torpedoes from three North
Vietnamese boats. The fighting ended with one of the patrol
boats sunk and the others badly damaged. President Johnson's
response to the August 2 incident was a restrained but hard
warning to the North Vietnamese that another attack would lead
to 'grave consequences'.
with the ascent of President Nguyen Van Thieu in June, 1965 some measure of stability was established
and the same leader remained in power for ten years.
Page 19
Two days later another incident took place. The second event occurred at night, and involved two
ships, the Maddox and another destroyer, the C. Turner Joy. These ships, it was reported, were attacked by
North Vietnamese PT boats while they were in international waters (assuming North Vietnam still held to
the 3 mile territorial limits claimed by the French.) This time, Johnson did not play down the incident.
The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution
Upon hearing of the second occurrence, President Johnson ordered a full-scale air attack on North
Vietnam. The targets, chosen a long time before the incident, included 14 huge oil storage tanks, and the
North Vietnamese 54 boat navy. About half the ships were destroyed.
The day after these air strikes, President Johnson spoke to the nation on TV:
The North Vietnamese have decided to attack the U.S. This fact is plain for all the world to see. If
we do not challenge these attacks, they will continue.
But this was not the first time they have provoked us
For 10 years, three American Presidents, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and myself, have been trying to
protect South Vietnam from the communist government of North Vietnam. All we have wanted
to do is to have North and South Vietnam:
honor their international obligations
leave each other alone;
settle their differences peacefully;
try to better the lives of their people by fighting against poverty, disease and ignorance
Peace requires that we and our allies stand tall against the attacks from North Vietnam.
President Johnson then introduced the following resolution to Congress which had
actually been in preparation since February 1964:
Whereas ships from communist Vietnam, broke the rules of international law and attacked U.S.
ships;
Whereas these attacks are part of a plot of this communist country waging war against its
neighbors . . .
And whereas the U.S. is helping the people of Southeast Asia to protect their freedom and live in
peace.
Resolve that Congress agrees with and supports the President to take all needed steps to repel any
armed attack against U.S. forces and to prevent further aggression by communist North Vietnam.
Page 20

1. What was the situation in South Vietnam and the U.S. during the eight-month period prior to the Gulf
of Tonkin incident and how might it affect the war effort?
2. Do you agree with President Johnson's analysis of the situation in Vietnam as expressed in the Gulf of
Tonkin Resolution? Explain.
3. Would you have voted for the above Resolution? Why or why not?
Page 21
Epilogue
Congress voted overwhelmingly for the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. The vote was 89 to 2, in the
Senate and there was not a single dissenting vote in the House of Representatives. President Johnson got
what he had long desired during the Vietnam war: The power needed to do what he thought necessary to
'prevent further aggression' in Vietnam.
In retrospect, one sees that President Johnson was not completely honest in his description of the
events in the Tonkin Gulf. Was the Maddox in international waters when it was attacked? It was 10 miles
from the shores of North Vietnam. Most countries claim their territorial waters extend to 12 miles. When
the French ruled Vietnam, they only claimed 3 miles - and North Vietnam never officially declared their
territorial waters. But China, its ally and neighbor in the North, claimed a 12 mile limit
Whether in international waters or not, the Maddox was on a support mission for South
Vietnamese commandos. They were sent in PT boats to identify targets along the coast of North Vietnam.
The Maddox was supposed to pick up signals of North Vietnamese radar. From this information
Vietnamese and American military planners could find what parts of the coast were being defended.
While the incident on August 2nd occurred pretty much the way it was reported, the second
incident did not. On the night of August 4, 1964 the seas in the Gulf of Tonkin were rough; the crew was
expecting an attack. Experts now believe that heavy seas made waves appear like PT boats on the radar
screen. The bullets fired by the Turner Joy were probably shot at these phantoms. Captain Herrick of the
Maddox had reported his doubts about the incident, saying his crew had not made any "actual visual
sightings," and blamed the blips supposedly revealing enemy ships on "freak weather effects."
President Johnson had been told that the second incident was probably a case of mistaken identity.
That is not what he wished to hear. The President went ahead with the speech written before he learned
the truth. One of his aids even said, "We don't know what happened, but it had the desired result." The
outlines of the resolution had een written five months before the incident took place. The President had
used the Gulf of Tonkin incidents to get what he wanted from Congress -- the power to expand the war in
Vietnam.
A Serious Question
We know that President Lyndon Johnson had purposely misled (some would say lied to) the
American people on the events in the Gulf of Tonkin. Their support for the U.S. government was asked
on the basis of this misleading information. We know from previous chapters that the American people
were not told the whole truth about Ngo Dinh Diem and Ngo Dinh Nhu, democracy in South Vietnam,
the Strategic Hamlet Program, and the progress that was made in the Vietnam war.
The events in this chapter necessarily give rise to two important questions. (1) does the President of
the United States have the right to lie to the American people to give him/her the power to carry out
policies he/she thinks are good for the country; and (2) if the government lies to the American people to
get their support, are the people who were deceived by their government still morally bound to support
its conduct of that war by paying taxes and fighting for it?
Page 22
Chapter 6
Fighting a Guerrilla War
hen President Johnson decided to escalate the war by sending American soldiers to Vietnam,
these men were given the near-impossible task of rooting out an unseen enemy in hundreds of
small villages throughout the country. Because the Americans did not trust the South
Vietnamese Army, it was assigned the easier task of guarding the 'secure areas'. U.S. soldiers were given
the difficult job of clearing enemy forces out of what was considered hostile country. The enemy might
be gathered in battalion strength one day, and completely disappear the next. Villagers who appeared to
be friendly might be working with the National Liberation Front. It was almost impossible to distinguish
between those who sided with the Government of Vietnam and those who backed the NLF. It was
equally difficult to define who actually was a member of the NLF. Was it a woman who worked in the
association of the old people and/or a child who carried messages for the Vietcong? Was a teen-age boy
forced to dig tunnels for the V.C., and/or a wealthy farmer who felt he had to pay taxes to the NLF, an
enemy of the U.S.? Or was the enemy a woman whose husband was jailed as a suspected NLF organizer
and/or an entire village, angry at the terrible treatment it received from Government of South Vietnam
(GVN) officials.
Added to these difficulties were dilemmas caused by anti-guerrilla warfare. In 'search and destroy'
operations, U.S. troops were sent to unfriendly
villages to look for hidden supplies of food
prepared to feed the enemy. But how was one to
know whether the rice buried in the villager's hut
was intended for the Vietcong or simply hidden
from the Army of the Republic of Vietnam?
US soldier and family of suspected Vietcong
How could an American soldier know for

sure that the young boy with his hands behind
his back was holding a grenade or a piece of
fruit? And, how could Americans be certain that
fire from a seemingly peaceful hamlet was a sign
that a strong contingent of enemy troops were in
the area, or was simply intended by a lone
gunman to alienate another village by drawing
return volleys from US soldiers?
The following accounts, reported in the words of Vietnam veterans, describe the problems they had
in fighting against an unseen enemy and their reactions in the face of uncertainty.
The Only Vietnamese I Ever Got Close to
I met this girl in a village store. She was about 17 or 18, sort of pretty and very shy. I guess she
was the only Vietnamese I ever got close to. By then I spoke a little of their language and I found
she was studying English and math. I said I could help her in both subjects and twice we took a
short walk to the end of the village. She was afraid of me at the beginning, but later she got over it,
and I started to look forward to being with her.
Page 23
One day we were on this patrol. It was raining, and suddenly, we were caught in an ambush. Our
guns returned the fire. We hit them hard and then called in the gunships for support.
Then, maybe thirty minutes after, the firing stopped and we moved out to look for the wounded
and to take a body count. There was a bunch of bodies around, all V.C., and all women. One of
them was my little girlfriend, now dead, bullets through her head and chest. She had an automatic
near her. I was shocked. She was a V.C. 3
They Said I Was Doing My Duty

We were outside Bac Lier, out on an eighteen-man patrol with fifteen ARVNs. Our orders were to
move ahead and seek out, and not hesitate to shoot at anything suspicious. We were about ten
kilometers from town when there was some shooting. It lasted about ten minutes.
My God, how I remember that damned day. Hot and sticky the mosquitoes were driving' me
crazy. And there was this little boy, about eight or nine. He was climbing out of a tree. I grabbed
him and blurted out in Vietnamese what little I knew 'Who are you and what are you doing
here?'
He was afraid of me and pulled away. He had his hand opened behind his back, like he was hiding
something. 'Grab him,' someone screamed, 'he's got something.' I made a move for him and his
hand moved again. 'Shoot' .
Because of my training, because I was afraid and this was the first enemy I had come across, I fired
at him. again, and again until I emptied my whole M-2 carbine at him. When I look again, he was
cut in two, with his guts all around. I vomited. I wasn't told; I wasn't trained for that. It was outand-out murder; I can never forgive myself and I can never forget it. They're the enemy, but
they're fighting for their country. Then I told the psychiatrist and the Catholic chaplain, they said
I was only doing my duty.4
It Was a Big Thing to Kill a North Viet in Battle
A platoon had been ambushed; we were sent out to help, but got pinned down ourselves in a rice
paddy, for a whole day. It was my first contact with North Vietnamese. We managed to circle the
village while they tried to break out. Finally, they pulled out, leaving this guy who had been
carrying a Chinese rifle. He had a bad wound.
By now we were all fed up with gooks. We'd lost a lot of men that day and nobody wanted to
doctor him. Nobody. Also, nobody wanted to call for a dust-off (evacuation by helicopter) so my
platoon sergeant said I should finish him off with my .45. I went up to where he was lying and
moaning and waited for about thirty minutes, hoping he'd die first; then I closed my eyes and fired
and missed. I didn't want to kill him. I remember very well just sitting there looking at him.
And he wouldn't die. Finally, the sergeant came up and said I'd have to do something. Was I
chicken? So I fired.
3 Quoted in Murray Polner, No Victory Parades: The Return of the Vietnam, Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
New York, 1971, pp. 102-103
4 Quoted in ibid., p. 82
Page 24
When I walked back to the other men, they were all proud of me. It was a big thing to kill a North
Viet in battle and this, so to speak, was in battle. He was an enemy and we didn't even have
enough coptors to take out our own wounded. It was a battle. Everyone said I was a good soldier.5
They Were Sent to Kill a Whole Country
They (those who opposed the war) couldn't stand the system lying to them. They found
themselves, if they were in combat, killing people who were innocent. They're going to come back
home and ask themselves why? There is no reason this time like when Hitler or the Japs were
around. They were sent to a foreign country to kill a whole country, and now we have the godawful lifetime job of having to atone for it. At least some of us do.6 7
Why Don't Anybody Talk About That?
I've seen VC kill civilians deliberately. I never saw Americans do it deliberately. Why don't
anybody talk about that?
One time we were on guard and I heard some crying coming from a nearby hamlet. The next
morning we went to see, and with my own eyes I saw. The VC had come and gone and left a sixtyfive year old man hanging and a small girl dead. So who's doing what killing and what
terrorizing'?8
We Were There to Help
On one patrol we were in another village giving out C-rations to two women and five kids. My
buddy was at the well and a medic was treating the kids for some kind of infection. All of a sudden
some women grabbed their kids and went inside their hooches [huts]. Twenty seconds later we
were under fire by VC and we took three casualties. One of our guys got hit in the jugular vein.
Those women could have saved our guys, who were in that god-forsaken place to help them, to
give them what we had in our country Instead, they said nothing. We were there to help. The
Vietnamese are so stupid they can't understand that a great people want to help a weak people.
The Vietnamese are afraid of the VC. They take all the Americans have to offer and give us
nothing, and give the VC all they have and take nothing. It doesn't make sense. 910

1. If the teacher directs, prepare two or three of the stories to tell to your class. What do these stories tell
you about the problems faced by soldiers fighting this war?
5 Quoted in ibid., p. 39.

6 Quoted in ibid., p 78.
7 Pictured in Gerald Danzer, et. al., The Americans, McDonald Littell: Evanston, Illinois, 1998). P. 981
8 Quoted in ibid., pp. 21-22.
9 Quoted in ibid., p. 23-24.
10
Page 25
Chapter 7
How My Lai Was Pacified
11
alley was at the drainage ditch on the eastern edge of the village, where about seventy to
eighty old men, women, and children not killed on the spot had been brought. Calley
ordered the dozen or so platoon members there to push the people into the ditch, and three
or four GIs did. Calley ordered his men to shoot into the ditch. Some refused, others obeyed. One
who followed Calley's order was Paul Meadlo, who estimated that he killed about twenty-five
civilians. Calley joined in the massacre. At one point, a two-year-old child who somehow survived
the gunfire began running towards the hamlet. Calley grabbed the child, threw him back in the
ditch, then shot him. 12
You have just read part of a description of what happened at My Lai in Vietnam. The man held
responsible for the events in My Lai on March 16, 1968 claimed he was acting under orders, and higher
ups should be held responsible for his actions. Spiro Agnew, Vice-President of the United States thought
that it was unfair to punish a patriotic American boy who answered his countrys call to duty and allow
Americans who deserted and skipped off to Canada to go free. Some wanted Callley's superior, Captain
Medina, who spent most of the day just 150 yards away from My Lai, to be punished. Americans strongly
opposed to the war thought that the top officials in the U.S. government who were responsible for blanket
bombings in Vietnam that killed hundreds of thousands were also chargeable for individual acts of
brutality committed by American soldiers not properly instructed to respect the lives of innocent
civilians.
This chapter examines the many questions raised by the My Lai incident and the trial of Lt. William
Calley that followed.
My Lai: The Cast of Characters
The reader should know the people whose names are closely associated with the My Lai massacre:
Paul Meadlo with Calley at My Lai. He said he was told to shoot prisoners in a ditch and obeyed
orders; Meadlo was granted immunity from prosecution and testified at the court martial trial.
Hugh Carter told to shoot civilians. He shot himself in the foot to avoid carrying out these
orders.
Lt. William Calley the U.S. soldier directly accused of killing and ordering the death of 350
innocent civilians. He said he was carrying out orders.
11
12 Testimony by Hugh Thompson in Doug Linder, An Introduction to the Court Martial Trial, My Lai
home page.
Page 26
Captain Ernest Medina Captain of Charley Company, 150 yards away from where the killing
took place. He said he did not know what was going on, and did not give orders to kill civilians; he
also claimed only 20-28 civilians were killed at My Lai.
General Westmoreland U.S. Commander in Vietnam. He said he knew nothing about My Lai,
and that U.S. soldiers always acted according to the rules of war.
President Johnson President during the military build up in Vietnam. He misled the American
public, directed the escalation of the war, and was ultimately responsible for the manner in which it
was prosecuted.
Preparation for My Lai
Under the command of Captain Ernest Medina, Charley Company was patrolling an area where
the Vietcong 48th Battalion was operating. On February 25, 1968, 18 men in Charley Company were killed
or injured crossing a minefield. Two weeks later a popular soldier was killed. At the funeral service,
Captain Medina told his men not to be afraid to show their feelings.
The next day, Charley Company was scheduled for action around My Lai, Captain Medina
allegedly told his men to 'destroy everything with life'. Medina later denied this in court. But he admitted
to allowing his soldiers to believe that the only people in the area would be enemy soldiers.
What Happened at My Lai?
Early on March 16, 1968, Lt. Calley and his
platoon were flown to My Lai. When they arrived,
another helicopter cleared the landing place by
covering the area with bullets. Calley and his men
landed without drawing enemy fire. Calley
entered the village and ordered his men to round
up Vietnamese for questioning. But he never
questioned them. Instead, Calley and other
soldiers in his platoon began to kill women,
children and old men.
QuickTime and a
Photo - JPEG decompressor
are needed to see this picture.
One group of 15 - 20 women and children

were in a temple where they were kneeling, crying,
and praying. American soldiers came up behind
them and shot all of them in the head.
13
Meanwhile, Calley had 80 women, children,

and old men taken out of their huts and brought
to the center of the village. Calley told Private
Meadlo that he knew what to with them. When he
came back 10 minutes later, Calley saw these prisoners were still alive. He then ordered Meadlo to "waste
(kill) them" and the private obeyed. Calley helped out, firing somewhere between 250-300 shots into the
crowd.
Publication of this and other pictures
taken at My Lai by Ronald Haeberle on the
day of the massacre led to an official
investigation and eventual a trial of five
13 LIFE, December 5, 1969 Pathfinder.com/photo/essay/mylai/mylaihp.htm

Page 27
Altogether some 350 old men, women, and children were killed at My Lai that day. None of the
men were of military age. The Vietcong in the area had plenty of time to leave My Lai before Calley
arrived. No enemy shot at American soldiers that day. The only American hurt was Carter, who shot
himself in the foot to avoid carrying out orders to kill Vietnamese civilians.
There was some question where Captain Medina was on March 16. He said, he never entered My
Lai while the shooting was going on, but several soldiers including Calley said he saw him there. He
admitted his helicopter landed about l5O yards away from the village.
In his report at the end of the day, Captain Medina stated that 125 Vietcong had been killed, and 3
weapons captured. He later admitted that there were 20-38 civilian casualties.
Word of My Lai Gets Out Slowly
Medina's report on My Lai made first page news in some American newspapers. But no one in
Saigon or in America seemed to be surprised that so many enemies could be killed and only three
weapons captured. None of the men on the 60 helicopters that flew over My Lai that day believed what
they saw there was so unusual that a special report was needed. An official photographer took pictures of
women tied and shot, and ditches full of dead women and children. It was not until Life magazine
published these pictures seventeen months later that American public showed concern about the incident.
Faced with overwhelming evidence that a massacre had taken place, the Army launched an investigation
and brought Calley to trial.
The Rules of War
Some people have considered it an exercise in futility. Nevertheless, over the centuries,
international lawyers and judges have drawn up a series of laws known as the "rules of war." These
international rules, revised at the Geneva Convention in 1949, include the following:
It is forbidden to kill or wound an
enemy that has surrendered.
The attack or bombardment, by
whatever means, of undefended
towns, villages, or buildings, is
prohibited.
QuickTime and a
Photo - JPEG decompressor
Volunteer corps" (or guerrilla

fighters) have the same rights
and duties as armies. 14
Bodies of dead left lying on the side of the road

just out-
During their military training, U.S. soldiers, including Calley, were supposedly instructed about the
rules of war (Calley claimed he never was). But once they got to the rice paddies of Vietnam, little if
anything was said about these rules, and many didn't believe they should be applied in Vietnam.
14 LIFE, December 5, 1969 Pathfinder.com/photo/essay/mylai/mylaihp.htm

Page 28
At his trial in 1971, Lt. Calley's main defense was that he was obeying orders and that he could be
court martialled for refusing to obey them. He had been told by Medina that everyone in My Lai was an
enemy, and:
Not to let anyone get behind us. It was paramount in our mission that we would have to go
through My Lai 4,5, and 6 as secondary objectives and then our primary objective was My Lai 1.
When we went through there again he stressed let no one get behind you while moving through
there. Everyone and everything would be destroyed. The only remark he made as to civilians
was[t]hat all civilians had left the area. And anyone there should be considered enemies.15
After the case had been presented, the judge instructed the jury to decide whether:
"a man of ordinary sense and understanding would know the order (Calley followed or thought he
followed) was unlawful"

1. Review what you think are the important facts in this case, including the definitions given for war
crimes.
2. Do you think there should be such a thing as a war crime, and do you think one was committed at My
Lai?
3. Do you think Lt. Calley was guilty of having committed crimes that should result in a prison sentence
of at least ten years. Or do you think he was he a loyal soldier merely following orders?
4. Aside from Calley, how far up and down the chain of command should responsibility for My Lai go?
Explain.
15 Quoted in Arthur Everett, Katheryn Johnson, and Harry Rosenthal, Calley, Dell Publishing Company,
New York, 1971, p. 262.
Page 29
Epilogue
After deliberating for a record thirteen days, the military jury found Lt. Calley guilty of first-degree
murder and sentenced him to life in prison. Following an overwhelming popular opposition to the
verdict, President Richard Nixon ordered Calley transferred from a military stockade to house arrest. In
1974 Calley was paroled, in 1976 he was married and found a job selling jewelry in his father-in-laws
store.
Whether or not one believes that Calley was
innocent, his case raised the issue once more about what
responsibility individuals in nations at war, from the top
military and civilian leaders to the ordinary soldiers on
the field of battle, have to avoid the death of noncombatants. This question is particularly crucial when one
realizes that the number of civilians killed by direct and
deliberate actions of US soldiers was a very small per cent
of the total 1.5 million Vietnamese who died in the war.
Most of these died because of the 14 million tons of
explosives (seven times more than used in all of World
War II), amounting to 700 pounds for every man woman
and child in Vietnam North and South. These bombs
created an estimated 26 million craters, contaminating
20% of all the land in the country. Aside from powerful
Children fleeing a misdirected
bombs, the U.S. often used an effective skin burning jelly
(napalm) that could not be extinguished and burned right down to the bone; they repeatedly used antipersonnel weapons that would blow the leg off a man, woman, or child; and they routinely used a
defoliating, cancer-causing contaminate called agent orange to destroy areas where enemy troops may be
seeking cover. Before setting their helicopters down near villages, U.S. soldiers commonly sprayed the
area with bullets that often killed civilians. Furthermore, the U.S.s actions forced a third of Vietnams
population out of the countryside and into crowded towns and cities, creating 870,000 orphans, and
driving 200,000 women into prostitution.
In the light of the horrors just described, Calleys crime was only a miniscule sample of what the
United States did in an effort to save the Vietnamese from communism. If Lt. Calley indeed was guilty of
deliberately murdering Vietnamese civilians one should ask who should be held responsible for the
policies which resulted in the death of many thousand times the number that died at My Lai.
In discussing the issue of responsibility, one might again consider the words of Albert Speer,
Hitlers architect, as he contemplated his own guilt:
In the final analysis I myself determined the degree of my evasion . . . . Whether I knew or did not
know, or how much or how little I knew, is totally unimportant when I consider what horrors I
ought to have known about and what conclusions would have been natural ones to draw from the
little I did know. Those who asked me are fundamentally expecting me to offer justifications. But I
have none. No apologies are possible.16
16 Quoted in Daniel Ellsberg, Papers on the War, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1972, pp.275-76
Page 30
Chapter 8
The Tet Offensive
or over 20 years, government officials told the American people that they were winning
the war in Indochina. Americans heard encouraging words about the war as far back as
1950, when General MacArthur predicted that 150,000 top French troops should end this war in 4
months." In 1951 President Harry Truman assured Americans that "the Communist attacks in
Indochina have been stopped." Similar statements came from President Eisenhower, AttorneyGeneral Robert Kennedy Vice-President Hubert Humphrey, and of course, President Lyndon
Johnson. Perhaps the most famous optimistic statement was made by U.S. commander, General
Westmoreland, who assured Americans, "there is light in the end of the tunnel."
The Success Offensive
By 1967, many people both in and out of the government, had started to wonder how long the
U.S. would be fighting in Vietnam. They saw too little progress over too many years. To make sure
they would have a winning attitude, President Johnson started his 'Success Offensive'. Its
purpose was to maintain popular support for the war. The President had computerized
printouts published in the newspapers to prove that the U.S. was winning. These printouts
showed that:
there was a decrease in attacks by the Vietcong.

more of the enemy were being killed in battle.
more hamlets were 'pacified'.
fewer soldiers from North Vietnam were coming into South Vietnam.
Officers were told to produce numbers to be processed into data by computers to show that we
were winning the war. If they did not do that, they could be criticized for 'failing to have a winning
attitude.'
All of this good news, as we shall see, came much closer to fooling the American people than the
Vietcong.
North Vietnamese Strategy
As you remember, the Vietminh won the First Indochina War against France in 1954 with a surprise
attack on Dienbienphu. The loss of Dienbienphu after eight years of fighting convinced the French that it
was time to stop the war. As a result they made the best deal they could at the Geneva Conference in 1954
and pulled all of their forces out of Indochina.
In the summer of 1967, military planners in Hanoi led by General Giap were preparing a
dramatic attack which they hoped would persuade the American people to end the war. The North
Vietnamese were wise enough to realize that they could not win a battle against American
forces similar to their victory over the French in Dienbienphu. Instead, they planned a
Page 31
simultaneous attack on Saigon and nearly all of the major cities and towns in South Vietnam.
They anticipated that this coordinated attack would lead to a sudden mass uprising against the
Government of South Vietnam. Failing a mass uprising, such an attack might, at the very least,
cause Americans to oppose the war. For tactical as well as political reasons the attack was
planned for the Tet (lunar New Year) celebrations, the longest and most important Vietnamese
holiday.
During previous Tet holidays both sides had stopped fighting for three days. During those
holidays, one half of the South Vietnamese army often returned to their homes to celebrate with friends
and family. In this year the Tet holiday came six weeks before the voters of New Hampshire would
decide who would represent their state in the Democratic and Republican Presidential Convention later
that year. Not entirely by accident the Tet Offensive was timed for the moment the American political
system was most open to change.
Preparations for the Tet Offensive
The planned Tet offensive involved about a combined 67,000 Vietcong and Democratic Republic of
(North) Vietnam, about one-third of their entire armed forces. It required a massive movement of men
and supplies over hundreds of miles of jungle trails coupled with careful coordination of separate units in
widely scattered parts of the country. The Vietminh and Vietcong had no planes, tanks, trucks,
helicopters, or sophisticated communications equipment. Yet they planned an attack against an army of
nearly 1,000,000 South Vietnamese soldiers and civil defense units and over 500,000 U.S. servicemen. The
U.S. forces commanded the most modern and sophisticated military equipment and communications gear
ever produced and included 2,600 airplanes, 3,000 helicopters, and 3,500 armed vehicles.
The planning and preparations for the Tet attack were made right under the noses of the American
forces and the ARVN [Army of the Republic of (South) Vietnam]. Thousands of people must have known
about it, but gave no warning either to the U.S. or to the South Vietnamese.
The Tet Offensive in Saigon
The attacks were launched on January 30, 1968, striking some one-hundred towns and cities. The
most dramatic success of the Tet offensive was the attack on the South Vietnamese capital of Saigon.
Imagine the impact on American citizens who had been led to believe that the enemy was on the verge of
defeat. Now the evidence was as clear as the picture on the TV screen; that not even the American
embassy in Saigon, headquarters for U.S. diplomats, was safe. A suicide squad of some 19 Vietcong had
blasted its way through the high walls surrounding the embassy compound. The squad held out for six
hours until finally silenced by helicopter gunships who left their bullet riddled corpses strewn all over the
lawns and walks outside of the embassy.
The Vietcong who invaded Saigon itself were not so easily removed. Some five battalions had
infiltrated into the city along with several weeks' supply of food and ammunition. It took weeks to end
their determined resistance. In the process, American planes and artillery destroyed whole sections of
Saigon, including the captured radio station and the only low-income housing project in the nation.
Although they were completely unsuccessful in starting a revolution against the GVN, the Vietcong had
started to organize their own governments in some sections of the city.
The Tet Offensive and Counterattacks in Hue and Elsewhere
Page 32
Other cities in South Vietnam were also hit hard and in some cases with more success than in
Saigon. In the ancient Vietnamese capital city of Hue, the Vietcong and DRV forces scored their greatest
triumph. Despite the 500 and 700 pound bombs dropped on the city, the communist forces remained in
Hue for most of the month. By the time they were driven out, some 10,000 soldiers and civilians in Hue
were killed. The city was reduced to rubble and rotting corpses.
When the last of the communists were finally out of Hue a horrible sight awaited returning citizens.
The Vietcong had arrested some 3,000 noncombatants (supposedly 'enemy agents') and brutally
murdered them by bashing in their heads with clubs and sticks or shooting them from close range. This
inexcusable mass murder served to support the argument of those who believed the United States must
remain in Vietnam to prevent a 'blood bath' which would be directed primarily against South Vietnamese
who had cooperated with the United States and served in the South Vietnamese army and/or
government.
In another battle, in the fertile, southern Mekong delta section of Vietnam, allied forces completely
destroyed a town in order to drive out the communist forces. An American official explained this event to
a questioning reporter with the often-quoted words:
We had to destroy it [the town] in order to save it.17
Some one-hundred towns were 'saved' from the Vietcong and North Vietnamese troops at the cost
of 165,000 Vietnamese civilians killed and the loss of homes for some 2,000,000 people.
Commenting on Tet and its aftermath, one American official complained, "[I]n six weeks here, we
have seen that the [South Vietnamese] Government cannot protect the people, or control them, or
administer them, or help them recover."18
The enemy suffered such heavy casualties it took them more than a year to rebuild their forces.
Their losses caused a loss of morale among the usually highly motivated and committed communist
combatants. General Westmoreland, however, remained optimistic. "The Tet offensive," he wrote, "had
the effect of a 'Pearl Harbor'; the South Vietnamese government was intact and stronger; the armed forces,
particularly those of the Vietcong were much weaker."19 The General was so "confident" that he asked
for 206,000 more American soldiers. Westmoreland wanted to bring troop strength in Vietnam up to
700,000.
The 1968 Election Campaign
As far as the anti-war movement in the U.S. was concerned the Tet Offensive could not have come
at a better time. Its immediate effect in the U.S. was quickly felt in New Hampshire. When the antiVietnam war Democrat, Senator Eugene McCarthy, filed his candidate papers for the New Hampshire
primary on January 3, 1968, few thought he had any chance of winning. The Tet Offensive started 27 days
later and suddenly there were hundreds of college and even high school students in New Hampshire
ringing doorbells, mailing literature, and making phone calls to support the Senator. Despite an increase
in enthusiasm most experts did not think McCarthy would win more than 25% of the New Hampshire
17 Quoted in Frances Fitzgerald, Fire in the Lake, The Vietnamese and the Americans in Vietnam (Boston:
Little, Brown, and Company), 1972, p. 93.
18 Quoted in Francis Fitzgerald, op. cit., p. 396.
19 ibid., p. 398.
Page 33
vote. When the votes were counted on March 12, 1968, candidate McCarthy was only 230 votes shy of an
outright victory over President Johnson. The anti-war movement had scored its first significant victory.
Four days after the primary, one of President Johnson's worst nightmares came true when
Robert F. Kennedy announced that he would seek the Democratic presidential nomination.
With the popular brother of the former president a serious and dangerous candidate, Johnson
suffered another shock. Members of his own cabinet now announced opposition to his Vietnam
policies. His new Secretary of Defense, Clark Clifford unexpectedly advised President Johnson
to stop bombing North Vietnam and to seek a political settlement. Three years of nearly
continuous bombing in both North and South Vietnam, Clifford informed the President, had
completely failed to halt the flow of enemy troops and supplies. Continued bombing would
prevent meaningful peace talks. Johnson received similar advice from a specially gathered panel
of 'wise men' who had served in high offices under previous Presidents. Meanwhile, he was
bracing for what he had been warned would be a defeat in the Wisconsin primary by Eugene
McCarthy.
Shaken by this lack of support, the President sought more advice but did not share his plans with
his advisors. Thus the entire nation was
shocked and many were pleasantly surprised
only three weeks after the New Hampshire
primary when President Lyndon Johnson
announced that he had ordered a partial
bombing halt of North Vietnam and had decided
New York Times headline announcing
that:
President Johnson wont run for reelection.
I shall not seek and I will not accept the

nomination of my Party for another term as your President.
As April and May followed March, Eugene McCarthy and Robert

Kennedy continued to campaign for the anti-war vote. The former President's
brother dramatically won the Indiana primary (about the same day Martin
Luther King was assassinated by a white supremacist in Memphis, Tennessee)
only to lose to McCarthy in Oregon. The show down between the two peace
candidates came with the California primary in the first week of June. Robert
Kennedy had proved himself popular with all kinds of voters from 'hard-hats'
to racial minorities, rich and poor, well educated and working class. His
popularity was proved by the rousing reception he received in Watts, the
African-American sector of Los Angels that had been the scene of a harrowing
race riot. Robert Kennedy went on to win the California primary, which almost
insured him the Democratic nomination. But then tragedy once again struck
the Kennedy family and the country. On his way from the podium after
delivering his victory statement on June 5, 1968, Robert Kennedy was shot and
killed by Sirhan Sirhan, an Arab nationalist. The American people were
stunned by the loss of the man who so many thought would become President
and end the war in Vietnam.
The anti-War Movement at Its Apex
A mortally
wounded
RFK
Page 34
Stung by the loss of the one who might have been able to win the election and end the
war, extremists in the anti-war movement decided they would express their rage at the
Democratic Convention in Chicago later that summer. Abbie Hoffman formed an organization
known as the Youth International Party (Yippies) and called for its followers to stage guerrilla
theatre in Chicago. He wanted them to expose what he and others saw as the depravity and
bigotry of the police and to express their hostility for the system which drove the U.S. into the
Indochina war. Thousands of students stormed into Chicago where Mayor Richard Daley
prepared 12,000 policemen to keep order in his city at any cost. The result was a massive
confrontation that served to divide the nation even further.
On August 28, 1968, at the convention hall in Chicago, the Democrats were about to nominate
Hubert Horatio Humphrey to run for President. Not far away, an embittered crowd was chanting:
'Hey, Hey, LBJ
How many kids did you
Kill today?'
'Ho, Ho, Ho Chi Minh

The NLF is going to win'
But peace was not going to come either to Vietnam or the streets of Chicago. Armed with billy
clubs, the Chicago police force waited for the demonstrators on Michigan Avenue. As the front line of
marchers tried to stop, those in the rear pushed them forward. From his third floor window in the
Blackstone Hotel, reporter Theodore White could hear, see, and almost feel the surging crowd and the
heavy contact of bodies below as the demonstrators crashed into the firm line of policemen. "Stop the
War, Stop the War," the crowd yelled while their red flags of Revolution and North Vietnam banners
waved defiantly. No U.S. flags could be seen among the demonstrators, except for those sewn on the seats
of pants. Rolls of toilet paper, ripe fruit, and glass bottles came flying out of hotel windows and crashed
among the blue helmets on the street below.
More screams and swear words followed, and then a flying wedge of policemen cracked its way
into the crowd to break it up. Demonstrators ran with policemen following in hot pursuit smashing hard
clubs on young skulls. As blood spilled over the streets
youngsters were dragged by their legs with their heads bumping along the sidewalk and pushed into
waiting police vans. Both sides paused, regrouped, and another wedge of policemen charged into the
crowd and then more sickening cracks on skulls and more blood on the streets.20
20 Account based on Theodore H. White, The Making of the President, 1968, Atheneum Press, 1969, pp.
346-49.
Page 35
A picture taken of the Chicago confrontation with demonstrators which was

called a police riot in a prestigious government commission
Nixon Elected President

Although the majority of the American people probably still supported the war, a very large part of
the general public had stopped believing their government. This 'credibility gap' was the result of the
years of official optimism about the war was continually contradicted by the news coming from Vietnam.
As a result of this loss of trust, increasingly larger numbers of Americans believed that the war, even if it
could be won, was not worth fighting, supporting, or continuing. The brutal repression by the Chicago
police only served to upset the anti-Johnson Democrats and further polarize the nation.
Public opinion, however, turned against the anti-war movement. Many Americans saw the badly
dressed and foul-mouthed demonstrators on their TV screens and sympathized with the police. They
were happy to see the police bash the heads of the young protesters, who they thought were rude and
unpatriotic.
In the general elections that fall, Richard Nixon became the candidate to beat. Calling for 'peace
with honor', and claiming to have a secret plan to end the war in Vietnam, Nixon won the votes of those
who continued to support it. He defeated the Democratic candidate, Vice-President Hubert Horatio
Humphrey by a very small margin. The comparatively large vote for third party anti-integrationist and
pro war George Wallace, however, showed the majority of the American people supported the war. The
silent majority, to which Nixon appealed, was more numerous than the noisy, anti-war minority.
1. Describe the timing, success, and effect of the Tet Offensive.
2. How and why was the anti-war movement energized and eventually frustrated?
3. Did the events preceding the Convention (including the lies told the American people and the death of
American leaders) justify the rage expressed by the demonstrators or the tactics they used to protest the
war.
Page 36
Chapter 9
Vietnamization
hile he was on the campaign trail in 1968, presidential candidate Richard Nixon claimed he had
a 'secret plan' to end the Vietnam War. When the details of the plan were finally revealed in
1969, they turned out to be the complete withdrawal of all U.S. combat ground forces, and
their replacement by South Vietnamese forces on an orderly scheduled timetable.21 What Richard
Nixon proposed to do was to end the Vietnam War by turning the fighting over to the Vietnamese. While
President Nixon Vietnamized the war he secretly entered into negotiations with the North Vietnamese,
and, also secretly, bombed suspected enemy bases in North and South Vietnam and even in Cambodia. In
the course of four years these negotiations accompanied by vietnamization and bombing resulted in a
peace agreement that was supposed to allow free elections in the South.
This chapter discusses President Nixon's vietnamization plan and the
peace treaty he negotiated. After reading the chapter you will be asked to
evaluate the plan and the treaty.
President Nixon
QuickTime and a
TIFF (Uncompressed) decompressor
President Nixon
How the U.S. 'Vietnamized' the Vietnam War

The U.S. was not the first nation to try to vietnamize the Vietnam war.
The French had tried it, but it did not work for them. President Eisenhower
and Kennedy sent military advisors to teach the Vietnamese how to fight, but
the South Vietnamese army never became an effective fighting force and U.S.
troops were called in to save South Vietnam. So, what was Nixon going to do
that would lead to a different outcome?
One thing that Nixon did was to spend much more money to arm the South Vietnamese. He gave
them the best guns, planes, artillery, etc. in the U.S. arsenal. He spent billions of dollars on rapid-fire
machine guns, modern tanks, and the best M-16 rifles. He turned 1,200 airplanes and 600 helicopters over
to the South Vietnamese, providing them the 4th biggest air force in the world. Nixon also spent a great
deal of money training the South Vietnamese to fight. He brought their officers to the best military
academies in the United States. Vietnamese soldiers were taught to use and repair their new weapons.
They were trained to use napalm bombs, support ground troops with air cover, and conduct effective
'search and destroy' operations.
U.S. units were withdrawn from Vietnam as South Vietnamese troops were pronounced ready to
take over their combat positions. With U.S. participation in the war ever decreasing, President Nixon was
spared the violent anti-war protests that disturbed Lyndon Johnson during his last years in office. The
Vietnamization policy seemed to be working.
President Nixon Expands the War to Cambodia
In order to buy time for the South Vietnamese, President Nixon thought the U.S. should shut down
enemy supply lines from North Vietnam. Supplies came to the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese army
21 http://www.tamu.edu/scom/pres/speeches/rmnvietnam.html
Page 37
along a series of jungle paths through Laos and Cambodia known as the Ho Chi Minh trail. Enemy food
and weapons would be stored in secret hideouts in Cambodia and brought into Vietnam when they were
needed. Nixon therefore decided to bomb these trails and places where supplies were stored and to keep
these raids a military secret. Even though it meant flying B-52's about 4,000 miles from bases in the
Pacific, Nixon went ahead with these raids. These bombings, which were secret to the US public but not
to the people targeted, were not effective. The bombs could not reach deep into underground supply
bases dug by the Vietcong unless the B-52's were fortunate enough to score several hundred direct hits.
On April 30, 1970, President Nixon escalated the war in Indochina even further by ordering U.S.
troops to invade Cambodia. In addition to the supplies, Nixon hoped to find and destroy the North
Vietnamese field headquarters. Nixon had the support of the military government of Cambodia, who the
U.S. had encouraged to take control of their country from the once popular but ineffective leader, Prince
Sihanouk. But the President did not have the support of the U.S. Congress nor the American people.
Effects of the Invasion of Cambodia
U.S. soldiers invading Cambodia succeeded
in destroying hundreds of tons of enemy supplies
but not the enemy headquarters which had been
closed several weeks before the troops arrived. But
this attack stirred up a hornet's nest of enraged
demonstrators in the U.S. In Kent State, Ohio,
protest lead to tragedy. On May 4, 1970 the
National Guard fired on demonstrators, killing 4
and wounding 11 innocent bystanders. The longterm result of the invasion, was the downfall of the
military government that had encouraged it. As a
result, the Khmer Rouge, under the murderous
dictator, Pol Pot, took control of Cambodia. Under
his merciless regime, over one million Cambodians
were put to death.
Morning death of Jeffrey Miller at
Kent State
The invasion of Cambodia may have bought

more time to train and arm the Vietnamese. But the real
test for this army 22was what it could do in battle.

The South Vietnamese Army in Laos
On February 8, 1971, the Army of the Republic of (South) Vietnam began an attack on Laos. Its
purpose was to break up concentrations of North Vietnamese troops, interrupt the flow of supplies from
North Vietnam, and test how well the army could fight. As the ARVN entered Laos, North Vietnamese
troops fell back as if in full retreat. But just at the incisive moment, the North Vietnamese sprung their
trap and attacked South Vietnamese forces from three sides. The South Vietnamese immediately called
for air cover, but the bombs intended for the North Vietnamese hit the troops they were called to protect.
Pushing the panic button, South Vietnamese soldiers ran and called for helicopters to rescue them. When
the whirly birds finally arrived, military discipline broke down completely. Fearing they would be left
behind, South Vietnamese soldiers clawed one another trying to climb into the helicopters even if it
meant just hanging on to its landing runners. As the helicopters barely cleared surrounding trees South
22 www.cris.com/~Mppa/ethics.html
Page 38
Vietnamese soldiers were scraped off the runners and dropped to their death on the ground. It was a
terrible scene a military rout -- and a clue that Vietnamization was not working.
The Peace Agreement of 1972
Under President Nixon, formal negotiations with the North Vietnamese began in January, 1969. In
August of that year, foreign policy advisor Henry Kissinger had met secretly in Paris with his North
Vietnamese counterpart. When they met again in February 1970, the talks were so secret that Nixon's
Secretary of State, William Rogers, did not know they were being held. It was not until January 25, 1972
that President Nixon told the world that Kissinger had been secretly negotiating with the North
Vietnamese.
Little progress was made in the negotiations during the summer of 1972. In October, however, with
presidential elections only a few weeks away, North Vietnam proposed an in place cease fire, allowing
North Vietnamese troops to remain in South Vietnam. In exchange the North Vietnamese dropped their
insistence that the South Vietnamese government, still under President General Nguyen Thieu, be
disbanded. Instead, the South and the North Vietnamese would arrange for a new government to
supervise free elections which would determine the future of South Vietnam. Combined with other issues
such as returning prisoners of war, the final treaty included the following, and in many ways resembled
the 1954 Geneva Accords:
1. North Vietnamese, Vietcong, and South Vietnamese soldiers would stop fighting and hold on to
all territory they occupied at the time of the cease-fire.
2. American troops would leave South Vietnam.
3. North Vietnamese troops could stay in South Vietnam
4. American Prisoners of War (POWs) would be returned while U.S. troops leave Vietnam.
5. The government of South Vietnam would allow a commission consisting of North and South
Vietnamese to prepare for a democratic election.
6. The newly elected government would take over and run Vietnam.
South Vietnam Opposes the Peace Treaty
General Thieu had served as the chief executive officer of South Vietnam for seven years. He did
not like the peace treaty that allowed a communist army of 145,000 soldiers and guerrillas to remain in
South Vietnam while the United States completed its troop withdrawal. But Nixon got Thieus approval
by making several concessions: He ordered bombings of Hanoi and Haiphong, the communist capital and
port city. He turned more weapons over to Thieu and he wrote him a personal letter dated January 5,
1973 promising him more aid if needed, and warned him of dire consequences if he did not cooperate.
The peace treaty ending U.S. participation in the Vietnam War was finally signed on January 27, 1973.
The question we must ask ourselves was the price too high; or was the treaty too favorable to the
north.
Page 39

1. Describe Nixon's Vietnam policy and then evaluate it considering these possibilities:
a. Nixon expanded the war and continued the killing for four more years than necessary.
b. Nixon did the right thing. The U.S. had to give President Thieu a chance to hold out against
North Vietnam after the U.S. left.
c. Nixon sold out the South Vietnamese. He should have stayed until all North Vietnamese troops
left South Vietnam.
Page 40
Chapter 10
The War is Finished
his chapter tells the story of the collapse of the South Vietnamese army and government. It raises
the question whether the U.S. deserted its ally at the end of a noble, if unsuccessful, effort or if it
simply had made a serious mistake from the beginning.
Readers will remember that the final peace agreement signed on January 27, 1973, allowed
President Thieu and his government to remain in power during the U.S. withdrawal. The treaty also
allowed the North Vietnamese to stay in South Vietnam, and called for an election to unite North and
South Vietnam. The election would be supervised by a 'National Council of Reconciliation', and not the
present government of South Vietnam. This Council was to be set up 'immediately after the cease-fire.'
North Vietnamese government officials were prepared to use the election to take control of South
Vietnam. They gave orders for their followers in the south to prepare for a political campaign. If they did
not win, of course, North Vietnam still had a 145,000-man army in South Vietnam.
President Thieu, however, never planned to allow a communist take over of South Vietnam by way
of an election. "If we allow the communists to operate," he said, "we will lose control of the country." That
explains his order to his police the day after he signed the Paris Peace Accord, to kill Vietnamese "who
suddenly begin taking a communist tone."
Violations of the Cease Fire
As it turned out, both sides cheated on the peace agreement before it even went into effect. Shortly
after he accepted the in-place cease-fire, Henry Kissinger telegraphed Thieu to take more territory from
the Vietcong. The day before the agreement was signed, the Vietcong took over some 300 villages
controlled by South Vietnam. On the first day of the peace agreement the South Vietnamese government
started attacking these villages to drive the Vietcong out.
From the winter of 1973 to the spring of 1975, the South Vietnamese government more or less
followed the orders given by President Thieu. Communists were arrested and put in jail. No steps were
taken to form the National Council of Reconciliation that was supposed to prepare for an election. And no
elections were held.
Corruption in South Vietnam
According to an old Vietnamese expression, 'a house leaks from the top.' President Thieu promoted
military officers based on their loyalty to him, and not their ability and performance as soldiers. He did
nothing to stop the corruption in his government. Thieu' s wife and her friends made millions of US
dollars buying and selling real estate in Saigon. They made their purchases based on what they knew the
government wanted to buy. Generals kept the money that was supposed to pay their soldiers. Army
officers sold weapons and ammunition to the Vietcong. Soldiers who were supposed to deliver military
supplies to the ARVN sold them on the black market. People who criticized the government were
arrested and thrown in jail. At the very bottom of this chain of corruption, the South Vietnamese soldier
did not have enough money to feed his family. Poorly motivated, led, trained, and fed, when the time
came, he was not prepared to fight.
Page 41
Stage 3 of Guerrilla War

The South Vietnamese had failed to take the first steps that were supposed to lead to the Council of
National Reconciliation that would run free and democratic elections. The North Vietnamese
subsequently prepared for their final military campaign. After years of guerrilla warfare, North Vietnam
was prepared for Stage 3 large unit attacks. The famous Ho Chi Minh trail, that for years had been
used to infiltrate men and supplies into South Vietnam, was a narrow jungle trail under protective
covering of trees. North Vietnam converted the trail into an all-weather highway. It stretched from North
Vietnam, through Laos and Cambodia and into the Mekong delta, south of Saigon. With its various
feeder roads, it covered 12,000 miles. A 3,000-mile long pipeline was built to supply needed gas for the
North Vietnamese army. The road even had rest, service and repair stations. Anti-aircraft guns guarded
the roadway. Trucks, tanks and armed cars drove south down these roads. The Vietnamese had come a
long way from their guerrilla war days, and when the time came, they would be ready to strike.
Stage 3 of guerrilla warfare, full army attacks, began on March 10, 1975. First the South Vietnamese
Air Force was chased off by Russian anti-aircraft guns. Then North Vietnamese tanks poured in to their
first targeted town, Banmethout. Suddenly confronted by Russian tanks and a well-armed enemy, South
Vietnamese troops panicked and fled.
President Thieu decided to give up all of his positions near the North Vietnam border to
concentrate his troops in the southern region around Saigon. Then he changed his mind and ordered a
defense of the North. But the army general defending Pleiku fled by plane, leaving his soldiers and their
families to escape on their own. Before long some 200,000 leaderless men, women, and children were
fleeing toward Danang on the coast. But Danang itself was under attack. Soon, the South Vietnamese
army had turned into a terrorized mob of fleeing men. They used their weapons, if at all, to shoot
civilians in their path. Reaching the water's edge:
the soldiers went down to the beach, where some threw away their weapons and their uniforms
and dived into the sea to swim out to waiting American ships, while others commandeered boats
and then began firing at one another on the open water. Soon the scenes in Danang were repeated
in cities through most of South Vietnam. In one city, the soldiers were shooting at the owners of
the restaurants where they ate. Something deeper than the collapse of an army's discipline was
taking place. It was the disintegration of a society that had been pulverized by war and corrupted
by foreign invaders for thirty years. A society that had lost all sense of self-respect and that
despised itself for its subservience to one foreign master after another a society that had been
turned into a literal brothel for millions of soldiers from foreign countries was tearing itself
apart in a fury of self-destruction.23
Similar scenes were taking place in other cities. Thieu's million-man army equipped with excellent
American weapons simply self-destructed seeking some kind of safety, somewhere other than in
Vietnam.
The Last Days of Saigon
This spreading panic threatened Saigon as that city prepared to defend itself. Gerald Ford, formerly
Nixons vice-President, became commander in chief in 1974 after Richard Nixon resigned because of his
23 The New Yorker, (April 14, 1975), pp. 27-28.
Page 42
involvement in the cover up of a break-in of the Democratic Party headquarters in Watergate. President
Ford and his Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, asked Congress for another $700 million to defend the
rest of South Vietnam. But Congress, by this time tired of the long war, refused. Kissinger, Thieu and
others later blamed the U.S. Congress for the defeat, which followed.
Desperate Americans and Vietnamese escaping

from Saigon, April 30, 1975
One month after the fall of

Danang the North Vietnamese army
marched into Saigon. As the enemy army
approached the capital, the ARVN
collapsed completely and surrendered
with hardly a fight. With it, billions of
dollars of U.S. equipment fell into the
hands of North Vietnam. Meanwhile
men, women and children tried
desperately to escape the enemy. Fifty
thousand people fled Saigon the week
before the communist forces arrived.
Seven thousand were air lifted by
helicopter to waiting U.S. ships off shore
in the last 18 hours. The million
Vietnamese who had depended on the
U.S. had good reason to fear living under
control of the victorious communist army
after 29 years of brutal warfare.

Although the outcome certainly could not please the U.S., at least the long war was finally over.
1. Describe and try to account for the failure of the 1973 peace agreement and the subsequent collapse of
the South Vietnamese government in the Spring of 1975.
2. Do you think that Congress made the right decision not to vote for an additional $700 million to defend
Saigon? Why or why not?
3. Given the final outcome of the war, evaluate U.S. policy in Vietnam - a mistake from the beginning or a
noble, but unsuccessful effort. Explain. (Note: last chapter focuses totally on this question).
Page 43
Chapter 11
Was the 'Whole Thing a Lie' or a 'Noble
Crusade'
"If Vietnam was such a mistake, how come the leaders of our country, the wisest men we
have, the men we elected in free and democratic votes, the men who have all the facts, how
come they sent us in?"24
his chapter presents two totally different points of view on the U.S. role
in Vietnam. General William Westmoreland, U.S. commander during
the escalation of the conflict, presents the hawks side. Westmoreland
firmly believed in the cause for which the war was being fought. After retiring
from the army he became a spokesperson supporting U.S. actions in Vietnam. He
believed the main issue of the war, in John F. Kennedy's words, was "to assure the
survival and success of liberty."
Donald Duncan, formerly a master sergeant in the Special Forces, presents
the dove position. A once gung-ho member of an elite fighting team, Duncan
became increasingly disillusioned by what he saw in Vietnam, eventually
concluding that "there was no freedom to preserve in Vietnam . . . only antiCommunism." He turned down a field commission to the rank of Captain and
retired from the army in 1965. His was one of the first outspoken criticisms voiced
against our Vietnam policy, and it caused quite a stir when it was first published
in 1966.
General William Westmoreland:
A Noble Crusade
History may judge that American aid to South
Vietnam constituted one of man's more noble
crusades, one that had less to do with the domino
theory and a strategic interest for the United
States than with the simple equation of a strong
nation helping an aspiring nation to reach a point
where it had some reasonable chance to achieve
and keep a degree of freedom and human
dignity. Even though American resolve fell short
in the end, it remains a fact that few countries
have ever engaged in such idealistic
magnanimity and no gain nor attempted gain for
human freedom can be discounted.
General
Westmoreland
Sergeant Donald Duncan:

The Whole Thing Was a Lie
The whole thing was a lie. We weren't preserving
freedom in South Vietnam. There was no
freedom to preserve. To voice opposition to the
government (in South Vietnam) meant jail or
death. Neutralism was forbidden and punished.
Newspapers that didn't say the right thing were
closed down. People are not even free to leave,
and Vietnam is one of those rare countries that
don't fill its America visa quota. Its all there to
see once the red film is removed from the eyes.
We are the Russian tanks blasting the hopes of an
Asian Hungary (a European country that the
USSR invaded in 1956.)
24 Quoted in Murray Polner, No More Victory Parades: The Return of the Vietnam Veteran, Holt,
Rinehart, and Winston, New York. 1971, p. 37.
25 William Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, Doublday, New York, 1980, p. 422
Page 44
If only the Communists are to assist people of

emerging nations, what hope is there for those
who aspired to freedom? We may well be unable
to afford to be the worlds policemen, but neither
can we afford to fail to live up to the
responsibilities that the accidents of a wealthy
land and generous fate have placed upon us. We
tend in this age of cynicism to put down
idealism, patriotism, and zeal; but if there are to
be no more Vietnams, is there to be no more
support of aspiring freedom, or protection of the
weak against the strong? What of John F.
Kennedy's stirring pledge to "assure the survival
of liberty? As many have observed, the price of
freedom is never cheap, nor is even the survival
of existing freedom.25 .
It is not democracy we brought to Vietnam

its anti-Communism. This is the only choice the
people of the village have. This is why most of
them have embraced the Viet Cong and shunned
the alternative [in this case Diem's rule] The
people remember that when they were fighting
the French for their national independence it was
the Americans who helped the French. Its the
American anti-Communist bombs that kill their
children. It's American anti-Communism that has
supported one dictator after another in Saigon.
When anti-Communist napalm burns their
children it matters little that the anti-Communist
Special Forces medic comes to apply bandages.
26
Student Exercises:
1.
Answer each of the following as completely as you can.
a. What do you imagine were the different

military experiences of Sergeant Duncan and
General Westmoreland?
b. c. What were the major arguments made by
General Westmoreland?
d. e. . What were the major arguments made by

Sergeant Duncan?
f. Review other information you have about
Vietnam and come to class prepared to share it.
2. Do you think that Vietnam was "a lie from the beginning," "a noble crusade," or
"a well-intentioned mistake." Briefly explain your argument, and cite examples from what you have
studied in this unit.
3.
If your teacher directs, expand your argument into a major essay of about 600 words.
essay should cover three of the following topics:
Your
A. The reasons the U.S. became involved in the war:

Did the U.S. have good reasons for getting involved?
B. Comparison of the two sides:
Did the U.S. make the right decision in supporting the South Vietnamese government?
C. The means the U.S. used to fight the war:
Did the U.S. use the best available methods?
D. The outcome of the war:
What is the final lesson can be learned from or outcome?
Your essay should contain:
a. A thesis statement, an outline foreshadowing your major argument) (about 50 words)
b. A main body which develops your arguments with a strong connective tissue of facts and logic (about
450 words) covering at least three of the suggested topics.
26 Donald Duncan, "The Whole Thing Was a Lie," Ramparts, February, 1966, pp. 23-24.
Page 45
c. A major summary which restates your position, and (if you wish) a conclusion which states the lessons
the U.S. should have learned from the war (about 100 words.)
Extra Credit: Comparisons with Iraq
Use your knowledge of what you learned about Vietnam and what you know about the war in Iraq to
answer one or both of the following questions:
What would Sergeant Duncan and General Westmoreland most likely have to say about the Iraq war??
With whom do you agree, and why? Your answer should point to the major similarities and/or
differences between the two wars.
Come to class with an essay of not fewer than 150 words to support your views and be prepared to
present them, listen to those who disagree and either defend or change your opinion.

America in Indochina 00 PDF

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

America in Indochina 00 PDF

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

America in Indochina 00 PDF

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

UNIT 12

CHAPTER 1 THE FRENCH IN INDOCHINA.......................................................................................................1

Before the French came to

Thomas Ladenburg, copyright, 1974, 1998, 2001, 2007

Thomas Ladenburg, copyright, 1974, 1998, 2001, 2007

Thomas Ladenburg, copyright, 1974, 1998, 2001, 2007

Thomas Ladenburg, copyright, 1974, 1998, 2001, 2007

With no places to land their planes the French had to parachute

Thomas Ladenburg, copyright, 1974, 1998, 2001, 2007

Thomas Ladenburg, copyright, 1974, 1998, 2001, 2007

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:.

Anti-Communism Under Ngo Dinh Diem

Thomas Ladenburg, copyright, 1974, 1998, 2001, 2007

Thomas Ladenburg, copyright, 1974, 1998, 2001, 2007

The main purpose of the strategic hamlet

Problems with the Strategic Hamlet Program

What happened at An loc

Thomas Ladenburg, copyright, 1974, 1998, 2001, 2007

Suggested Student Exercises:

Thomas Ladenburg, copyright, 1974, 1998, 2001, 2007

Altogether 7 Buddhist monks burned

In the summer of 1963 other Buddhist

Extremism in defense of liberty is no vice.

The C Turner Joy in 1964

A few days after the event, Americans heard that an

honor their international obligations

leave each other alone;

settle their differences peacefully;

Thomas Ladenburg, copyright, 1974, 1998, 2001, 2007

Suggested Student Exercises:

Thomas Ladenburg, copyright, 1974, 1998, 2001, 2007

Thomas Ladenburg, copyright, 1974, 1998, 2001, 2007

US soldier and family of suspected Vietcong

How could an American soldier know for

They Said I Was Doing My Duty

Suggested Student Exercises:

5 Quoted in ibid., p. 39.

One group of 15 - 20 women and children

Meanwhile, Calley had 80 women, children,

13 LIFE, December 5, 1969 Pathfinder.com/photo/essay/mylai/mylaihp.htm

Volunteer corps" (or guerrilla

Bodies of dead left lying on the side of the road

14 LIFE, December 5, 1969 Pathfinder.com/photo/essay/mylai/mylaihp.htm

Suggested Student Exercises:

The Success Offensive

there was a decrease in attacks by the Vietcong.

Thomas Ladenburg, copyright, 1974, 1998, 2001, 2007

I shall not seek and I will not accept the

As April and May followed March, Eugene McCarthy and Robert

Thomas Ladenburg, copyright, 1974, 1998, 2001, 2007

'Ho, Ho, Ho Chi Minh

Thomas Ladenburg, copyright, 1974, 1998, 2001, 2007

A picture taken of the Chicago confrontation with demonstrators which was

Nixon Elected President

Thomas Ladenburg, copyright, 1974, 1998, 2001, 2007

How the U.S. 'Vietnamized' the Vietnam War

The invasion of Cambodia may have bought

test for this army 22was what it could do in battle.

Thomas Ladenburg, copyright, 1974, 1998, 2001, 2007