EMILIA T. BIAGTAN, JUAN T. BIAGTAN, JR.

, APPEAL from a decision of the Court of First Instance

MIGUEL T. BIAGTAN, GIL T. BIAGTAN and of Pangasinan. Domingo, J.
GRACIA T. BIAGTAN, plaintiffs-appellees, vs. THE
INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY,LTD., The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
defendant-appellant. Tanopo, Millora, Serafica & Saez for plaintiffs-
appellees.
Insurance Law; Exception under double indemnity Araneta, Mendoza & Papa for defendant-
insurance clause.Under an Accidental Death Benefit
appellant.
Clause providing for an additional sum of P5,000.00 if the
death of the Insured resulted directly from bodily injury
MAKALINTAL, J.:
effected solely through external and violent means
sustained in an accident and independently of all other
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of
causes but expressly excepting therefrom a case where
death resulted from an injury intentionally inflicted by a
First Instance of Pangasinan in its Civil Case No. D-
third party, the insured who died under the following 1700. The facts are stipulated. Juan S. Biagtan was
circumstances is not entitled to the said additional sum, to insured with defendant Insular life Assurance
wit: That on the night... while the said life policy and Company under Policy No. 398075 for the sum of
supplementary contract were in full force and effect the P5,000.00 and, under a supplementary contract
59 denominated Accidental Death Benefit Clause, for an
VOL. 44, MARCH 5 additional sum of P5,000.00 if the death of the
29, 1972 9 Insured resulted directly from bodily injury effected
solely through external and violent means sustained in
Biagtan vs. The Insular
an accident x x x and independently of all other
Life Assurance Company,
causes. The clause, however, expressly provided that
Ltd. it would not apply where death resulted from an injury
house of the insured . . . was robbed by a band of
intentionally inflicted by a third party.
robbers who-were charged in and convicted by the Court of
On the night of May 20, 1964 or during the first
First Instance of Pangasinan for robbery with homicide;
that in committing the robbery, the robbers, on reaching hours of the following day a band of robbers entered
the staircase landing of the second floor, rushed towards the house of the insured Juan S. Biagtan. What
the doors of the second floor room, where they suddenly met happened then is related in the decision of the trial
a person near the door of one of the rooms who turned out court as follows:
to be the insured . . . who received thrusts from their sharp- x x x; that on the night of May 20, 1964 or the first hours of
pointed instruments, causing wounds on the body . . . May 21 1964, while the said life policy and supplementary
resulting in his death...
contract were in full force and effect, the house of insured were inflicted intentionally. The court, in ruling
Juan S. Biagtan was robbed by a band of robbers who were negatively on the issue, stated that since the parties
60 presented no evidence and submitted the case upon
60 SUPREME COURT stipulation, there was no proof that the act of
REPORTS receiving thrust (sic) from the sharp-pointed
ANNOTATED instrument of the robbers was intended to inflict
Biagtan vs. The Insular Life injuries upon the person of the insured or any other
Assurance Company, Ltd. person or merely to scare away any person so as to
charged in and convicted by the Court of First Instance of
ward off any resistance or obstacle that might be
Pangasinan for robbery with homicide; that in committing offered in the pursuit of their main objective which
the robbery, the robbers, on reaching the staircase landing was robbery.
of the second floor, rushed towards the doors of the second The trial court committed a plain error in drawing
floor room, where they suddenly met a person near the door the conclusion it did from the admitted facts. Nine
of one of the rooms who turned out to be the insured Juan S. wounds were inflicted upon the deceased, all by means
Biagtan who received thrusts from their sharp-pointed of thrusts with sharp-pointed instruments wielded by
instruments, causing wounds on the body of said Juan S. the robbers. This is a physical fact as to which there is
Biagtan resulting in his death at about 7 a.m. on the same no dispute. So is the fact that five of those wounds
day, May 21, 1964; caused the death of the insured. Whether the robbers
Plaintiffs, as beneficiaries of the insured, filed a claim had the intent to kill or merely to scare the victim or to
under the policy. The insurance company paid the ward off any defense he might offer, it cannot be
basic amount of P5,000.00 but refused to pay the denied that the act itself of in-
61
additional sum of P5,000.00 under the accidental
death benefit clause, on the ground that the insureds VOL. 44, MARCH 29, 61
death resulted from injuries intentionally inflicted by 1972
third parties and therefore was not covered. Plaintiffs Biagtan vs. The Insular Lift
filed suit to recover, and after due hearing the court a Assurance Company, Ltd.
quo rendered judgment in their favor. Hence the flicting the injuries was intentional. It should be noted
present appeal by the insurer. that the exception in the accidental benefit clause
The only issue here is whether under the facts are invoked by the appellant does not speak of the
stipulated and found by the trial court the wounds purposewhether homicidal or notof a third party
received by the insured at the hands of the robbers in causing the injuries, but only of the fact that such
nine in all, five of them mortal and four non-mortal injuries have been intentionally inflictedthis
obviously to distinguish them from injuries which, in a private house. As the two of them, together with
although received at the hands of a third party, are the owner of the house, approached and stood in front
purely accidental. This construction is the basic idea of the main gate, a shot was fired and it turned out
expressed in the coverage of the clause itself, namely, afterwards that the watchman was hit in the abdomen,
that the death of the insured resulted directly from the wound causing his death. Under those
bodily injury effected solely through external and circumstances this Court held that it could not be
violent means sustained in an accident . . . and 62
independently of all other causes. A gun which 62 SUPREME COURT
discharges while being cleaned and kills a bystander; a REPORTS
hunter who shoots at his prey and hits a person ANNOTATED
instead; an athlete in a competitive game involving Biagtan vs. The Insular Life
physical effort who collides with an opponent and Assurance Company, Ltd.
fatally injures him as a result: these are instances said that the killing was intentional for there was the
where the infliction of the injury is unintentional and possibility that the malefactor had fired the shot to
therefore would be within the coverage of an scare the people around for his own protection and not
accidental death benefit clause such as that in necessarily to kill or hit the victim. A similar possibility
question in this case. But where a gang of robbers is clearly ruled out by the facts in the case now before
enter a house and coming face to face with the owner, Us. For while a single shot fired from a distance, and
even if unexpectedly, stab him repeatedly, it is by a person who was not even seen aiming at the
contrary to all reason and logic to say that his injuries victim, could indeed have been fired without intent to
are not intentionally inflicted, regardless of whether kill or injure, nine wounds inflicted with bladed
they prove fatal or not. As it was, in the present case weapons at close range cannot conceivably be
they did prove fatal, and the robbers have been considered as innocent insofar as such intent is
accused and convicted of the crime of robbery with concerned. The manner of execution of the crime
homicide. permits no other conclusion.
The case of Calanoc vs. Court of Appeals, 98 Phil. Court decisions in the American jurisdiction, where
79, is relied upon by the trial court in support of its similar provisions in accidental death benefit clauses
decision. The facts in that case, however, are different in insurance policies have been construed, may shed
from those obtaining here. The insured there was a light on the issue before Us. Thus, it has been held
watchman in a certain company, who happened to be that intentional as used in an accident policy
invited by a policeman to come along as the latter was excepting intentional injuries inflicted by the insured
on his way to investigate a reported robbery going on or any other person, etc., implies the exercise of the
reasoning faculties, consciousness, and clause of the proviso that excludes the (insurers)
volition. Where a provision of the policy excludes
1 liability, in case death or injury is intentionally
intentional injury, it is the intention of the person inflicted by any other person, applies to this case.
inflicting the injury that is controlling. If the injuries
2 In Butero v. Travelers Acc. Ins. Co., 96 Wis. 536, 65
suffered by the insured clearly resulted from the Am. St. Rep. 61, 71 S.W. 811, the insured was shot
intentional act of a third person the insurer is relieved three times by a person unknown late on a dark and
from liability as stipulated. 3 stormy night, while working in the coal shed of a
In the case of Hutchcrafts Exr. v. Travelers Ins. railroad company. The policy did not cover death
Co., 87 Ky. 300, 8 S.W. 570, 12 Am. St. Rep. 484, the resulting from intentional injuries inflicted by the
insured was waylaid and assassinated for the purpose insured or any other person. The inquiry was as to
of robbery. Two (2) defenses were interposed to the the question whether the shooting that caused the
action to recover indemnity, namely: (1) that the insureds death was accidental or intentional; and the
insured having been killed by intentional means, his Court found that under the facts, showing that the
death was not accidental, and (2) that the proviso in murderer knew his victim and that he fired with
the policy expressly exempted the insurer from intent to kill, there could be no recovery under the
liability in case the insured died from injuries policy which excepted death from intentional injuries
_______________ inflicted by any person.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is
1 Berger v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins, Co., 88 F. 241, 242.
2 Travelers Protective Assn. of America vs. Fawcett, 104 N.E. 991, reversed and the complaint dismissed, without
50 Ind. App. 111. pronouncement as to costs.
3 Continental Cas. Co. v. Klinge. 82 Ind. App. 277, 144 N.E.
Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando and Villamor,
246; Washington v. Union C. & Sur. Co., 115 Mo. App. 627, 91 S.C.
988; National L & Acci. Co. v. De Lopez(Tex. Civ. App.), 207 S.W. 160.
JJ.,concur.
Concepcion, C.J. and Reyes, J.B.L., J., concur
63 in the dissent of Justice Teehankee.
VOL. 44, MARCH 29, 63 Teehankee, J.,dissents in a separate opinion.
1972 Barredo, J., concurs in separate opinion.
Biagtan vs. The Insular Life Makasiar, J.,reserves his vote.
Assurance Company, Ltd.
intentionally inflicted by another person. In rendering BARREDO, J.: Concurring
judgment for the insurance company the Court held
that while the assassination of the insured was as to During the deliberations in this case, I entertained
him an unforeseen event and therefore accidental, the some doubts as to the correctness and validity of the
view upheld in the main opinion penned by Justice intervention on his part (of the insured) or, in other
Makalintal. Further reflection has convinced me, words, without any connivance with him (the insured)
however, that there are good reasons to support it. in order to augment the proceeds of the policy for his
64 beneficiaries, I am inclined to agree that death caused
64 SUPREME COURT by criminal assault is not covered by the policies of the
REPORTS kind here in question, specially if the assault, as a
ANNOTATED matter of fact, could have been more or less
Biagtan vs. The Insular Life anticipated, as when the insured happens to have
Assurance Company, Ltd. violent enemies or is found in circumstances that
At first blush, one would feel that every death not would make his life fair game of third parties.
suicidal should be considered accidental, for the As to the rest, I have no doubt that the killing of the
purposes of an accident insurance policy or a life insured in this case is as intentional as any intentional
insurance policy with a double-indemnity clause in act can be, hence this concurrence.
case death results from accident. Indeed, it is quite SEPARATE OPINION
logical to think that any event whether caused by fault,
negligence, intent of a third party or any unavoidable TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:
circumstance, normally unforeseen by the insured and
The sole issue at bar is the correctness in law of the
free from any possible connivance on his part, is an
lower courts appealed decision adjudging defendant
accident in the generally accepted sense of the term.
insurance company liable, under its supplementary
And if I were convinced that in including in the policy
contract de-
the provision in question, both the insurer and the
65
insured had in mind to exclude thereby from the VOL. 44, MARCH 29, 65
coverage of the policy only suicide whether unhelped 1972
or helped somehow by a third party, I would disregard
Biagtan vs. The Insular Life
the American decisions cited and quoted in the main
Assurance Company, Ltd.
opinion as not even persuasive authorities. But
examining the unequivocal language of the provision nominated Accidental Death Benefit Clause with the
in controversy and considering that the insured deceased insured, to plaintiffs-beneficiaries (excluding
accepted the policy without asking that it be made plaintiff Emilia T. Biagtan) in an additional amount of
clear that the phrase injury intentionally inflicted by P5,000.00 (with corresponding legal interest) and
a third party should be understood to refer only to ruling that defendant company had failed to present
injuries inflicted by a third party without any wilful
any evidence to substantiate its defense that the 5. (5)Any injuries received (a) while on police duty in
insureds death came within the stipulated exceptions. any military, naval or police organization; (b) in
Defendants accidental death benefit clause any not, civil commotion, insurrection or war or any
expressly provides: act incident
ACCIDENTAL DEATH BENEFIT, (hereinafter called the
_______________
benefit). Upon receipt and approval of due proof that the
death of the Insured resulted directly from bodily 1 Rec. on Appeal, pp. 7-8, italics furnished.
injuryeffected solely through external and violent means
sustained in an accident, within ninety days after the date 66
of sustaining such injury, and independently of all other 66 SUPREME COURT
causes, this Company shall pay, in addition to the sum REPORTS
insured specified on the first page of this Policy, a further ANNOTATED
sum equal to said sum insured payable at the same time Biagtan vs. The Insular Life
and in the same manner as said sum insured, provided, Assurance Company, Ltd.
that such death occurred during the continuance of this
Clause and of this Policy and before the sixtieth birthday of
1. thereto; (c) while travelling as a passenger or
the Insured.1

otherwise in any form of submarine

A long list of exceptions and an Automatic transportation, or while engaging in submarine
Discontinuance clause immediately follow thereafter, operations; (d) in any violation of the law by the
thus: Insured or assault provoked by the Insured;(e) that
EXCEPTIONS. The Benefit shall not apply if the Insureds has been inflicted intentionally by a third
death shall result, either directly or indirectly, from any one party, either with or without provocation on the
of the following causes: part of the Insured, and whether or not the attack
or the defense by the third party was caused by a
1. (1)Self-destruction or self-inflicted injuries,whether violation of the law by the Insured;
the Insured be sane or insane; 2. (6)Operating or riding in or descending from any
2. (2)Bodily or mental infirmity or disease of any kind; kind of aircraft if the Insured is a pilot, officer or
3. (3)Poisoning or infection,other than infection member of the crew of the aircraft or is giving or
occurring simultaneously with and in consequence receiving any kind of training or Instruction or has
of a cut or wound sustained in an accident; any duties aboard the aircraft or requiring descent
4. (4)Injuries of which there is no visible contusions or therefrom; and
wound on the exteriorof the body, drowning and 3. (7)Atomic energy explosionof any nature
internal injuries revealed by autopsy excepted: whatsoever.The Company, before making any
payment under this Clause, shall have the right
 and opportunity to examine the body and make an Assurance Company, Ltd.
autopsy thereof. robbery, the robbers, on reaching the staircase landing
of the second floor, rushed towards the doors of the
AUTOMATIC DISCONTINUANCE. This Benefit second floor room, where they suddenly met a person
shall automatically terminate and the additional premium
near the door of one of the rooms who turned out to be
therefor shall cease to be payable when and if:
the insured Juan S. Biagtan who received thrusts from
1. (1)This Policy is surrendered for cash, paid-up their sharp-pointed instruments, causing wounds on
insurance or extended term insurance; or the body of said Juan S. Biagtan resulting in his death
2. (2)The benefit under the Total and Permanent at about 7 a.m. on the same day, May 21, 1964.3

Disability Waiver of Premium Certificate is granted Defendant company, while admitting the above-
to the insured; or recited circumstances under which the insured met his
3. (3)The Insured engages in military, naval or death, disclaimed liability under its accidental death
aeronautic service in time of war; or benefit clause under paragraph 5 of its stipulated
4. (4)The policy anniversary immediately preceding the Exceptions on its theory that the insureds death
sixtieth birthday of the Insured is reached.
2
resulted from injuries intentionally inflicted by a
third party, i.e. the robbers who broke into the
It is undisputed that, as recited in the lower courts insureds house and inflicted fatal injuries on him.
decision, the insured met his death, as follows: that The case was submitted for decision upon the
on the night of May 20, 1964 or the first hours of May parties stipulation of facts that (1) insurance
21, 1964, while the said life policy and supplementary companies such as the Lincoln National Life Insurance
contract were in full force and effect, the house of Co. and Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada with which
insured Juan S Biagtan was robbed by a band of the deceased insured Juan S. Biagtan was also insured
robbers who were charged in and convicted by the for much larger sums under similar contracts with
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan for robbery with accidental death benefit provisions have promptly paid
homicide; that in committing the the benefits thereunder to plaintiffs-beneficiaries; (2)
______________
the robbers who caused the insureds death were
2 Idem, pp. 8-10, italics furnished. charged in and convicted by the Court of First Instance
of Pangasinan for the crime of robbery with homicide;
67
and (3) the injuries inflicted on the insured by the
VOL. 44, MARCH 29, 67
robbers consisted of five mortal and four non-mortal
1972
wounds. 4

Biagtan vs. The Insular Life

 The lower court thereafter rendered judgment inflicting the injury that is controlling xxx and to come
against defendant, as follows: within the exception, the act which causes the injury must be
There is no doubt that the insured, Juan S. Biagtan, met wholly intentional, not merely partly.
his death as a result of the wounds inflicted upon him by The case at bar has some similarity with the case
the malefactors on the early morning of May 21, 1964 by of Virginia Calanoc vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-8151,
means of thrusts from sharp-pointed instruments delivered promulgated December 16, 1965, where the Supreme Court
upon his person, and there is likewise no question that the ruled that the shot (which killed the insured) was merely to
thrusts were scare away the people around for his own protection and
______________ not necessarily to kill or hit the victim.
In the Calanoc case, one Melencio Basilio, a watchman
3 Idem, pp. 46-47. of a certain company, took out life insurance from the
4 Idem, pp. 37-38.
Philippine American Life Insurance Company in the
68 amount of P2,000.00 to which was attached a
68 SUPREME COURT supplementary contract covering death by accident.
REPORTS Calanoc died of gunshot wounds on the occasion of a
ANNOTATED robbery committed in the house of a certain Atty. Ojeda in
Manila. The insureds widow was paid P2,000.00, the face
Biagtan vs. The Insular Life value of the policy, but when she demanded payment of the
Assurance Company, Ltd. additional sum of P2,000.00 representing the value of the
made on the occasion of the robbery. However, it is supplemental policy, the company refused alleging, as main
defendants position that the killing of the insured was defense, that the deceased died because he was murdered
intentionally done by the malefactors, who were charged by a person who took part in the commission of the robbery
with and convicted of the crime of robbery with homicide by and while making an arrest as an officer of the law which
the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. contingencies were (as in this case) expressly excluded in
It must be noted here that no evidence whatsoever was the contract and have the effect of exempting the company
presented by the parties who submitted the case for from liability.
resolution upon the stipulation of factspresented by them. The facts in the Calanoc case insofar as pertinent to
Thus, the court does not have before it proof that the act of this case are, as found by the Court of Appeals in its
receiving thrust(s) from the sharp-pointed instrument of decision which findings of fact were adopted by the
the robbers was intended to inflict injuries upon the person Supreme Court, as follows:
of the insured or any other person or merely to scare away x x x that on the way to the Ojeda residence (which was then
any person so as to ward off any resistance or obstacle that being robbed by armed men), the policeman and Atty. Ojeda
might be offered in the pursuit of their main objective which passed by Basilio (the insured) and somehow
was robbery. It was held that where a provision of the policy
69
excludes intentional injury, it is the intention of the person
 VOL. 44, MARCH 29, 69 death was not sought (at least no evidence was presented to
1972 show it was), mid therefore was fortuitous. Accident was
Biagtan vs. The Insular Life defined as that which happens by chance or fortuitously,
without intention or design, and which is unexpected,
Assurance Company, Ltd. unusual and unforeseen, or that which takes place without
or other invited the latter to come along; that as the three
ones foresight or expectationan event that proceeds from
approached the Ojeda residence and stood in front of the main
gate which was covered by galvanized iron, the fence itself being
an unknown cause, or is an unusual effect of a known cause,
partly concrete and partly adobe stone, a shot was fired; x x x that and therefore not expected (29 Am. Jur. 706).
it turned out afterwards that the special watchman Melencio There is no question that the defense set up by the
Basilio was hit in the abdomen, the wound causing his defendant company is one of those included among the risks
instantaneous death x x x. excluded in the supplementary contract. However, there is
no evidence here that the thrusts with sharp-pointed
The Court of Appeals arrived at the conclusion that the instrument(which led to the death of the insured) was
death of Basilio, although unexpected, was not caused by an intentional; (sic) so as to exempt the company from liability.
accident, being a voluntary and intentional act on the part It could safely be assumed
of the one who robbed, or one of those who robbed, the
house of Atty. Ojeda. 70
In reversing this conclusion of the Court of Appeals, the 70 SUPREME COURT
Supreme Court said in part: REPORTS
x x x Nor can it be said that the killing was intentional for there ANNOTATED
is the possibility that the malefactors had fired the shot merely to
scare away the people around for his own protection and not Biagtan vs. The Insular Life
necessarily to kill or hit the victim. In any event, while the act Assurance Company, Ltd.
may not exempt the triggerman from liability for the damage done, that it was purely accidentalconsidering that the principal
the fact remains that the happening was a pure accident on the motive of the culprits was robbery, the thrusts being merely
part of the victim. intended to scare away persons who might offer resistance
With this ruling of the Supreme Court, and the utter or might obstruct them from pursuing their main objective
absence of evidence in this case as to the real intention of the which was robbery. 5

malefactors in making a thrust with their sharp-pointed It is respectfully submitted that the lower court
instrument on any person, the victim in particular, the case
committed no error in law in holding defendant
falls squarely within the ruling in the Calanoc vs. Court of
insurance company liable to plaintiffs-beneficiaries
Appeals case.
It is the considered view of this Court that the under its accidental death benefit clause, by virtue of
insured died because of an accident which happened on the the following considerations:
occasion of the robbery being committed in his house. His
 1. The case of Calanoccited by the lower court is 5 Idem, pp. 49-54, italics furnished.
6 98 Phil. 79.
indeed controlling here. This Court, there construing a
6

similar clause, squarely ruled that fatal injuries 71

inflicted upon an insured by a malefactor(s) during the VOL. 44, MARCH 29, 71
latters commission of a crime are deemed accidental 1972
and within the coverage of such accidental death Biagtan vs. The Insular Life
benefit clauses and the burden of proving that the Assurance Company, Ltd.
killing was intentional so as to have it fall within the mains that the happening was a pure accident on the part of
stipulated exception of having resulted from injuries the victim. The victim could have been either the policeman
intentionally inflicted by a third party must be or Atty. Ojeda for it cannot be pretended that the
discharged by the insurance company. This Court malefactor aimed at the deceased precisely because he
there clearly held that in such cases where the killing wanted to take his life. 7

does not amount to murder, it must be held to be a 2. Defendant company patently failed to discharge its
pure accident on the part of the victim, compensable burden of proving that the fatal injuries were inflicted
with double-indemnity, even though the malefactor is upon the deceased intentionally, i.e. deliberately. The
criminally liable for his act. This Court rejected the lower court correctly held that since the case was
insurance-companys contrary claim, thus: submitted upon the parties stipulation of facts which
Much less can it be pretended that Basilio died in the did not cover the malefactors intent at all, there was
course of an assault or murder considering the very nature
an utter absence of evidence in this case as to the real
of these crimes. In the first place, there is no proof that the
intention of the malefactors in making a thrust with
death of Basilio is the result of either crime for the record is
barren of any circumstance showing how the fatal shot was their sharp-point-ed instrument(s) on any person, the
fired. Perhaps this may be clarified in the criminal case victim in particular. From the undisputed
now pending in court as regards the incident but before facts, supra, the robbers had rushed towards the
8

that is done anything that might be said on the point would doors of the second floor room, where they suddenly
be a mere conjecture. Nor can it be said that the met a person . . . who turned out to be the insured
killingwas intentional for there is the possibility that the Juan S. Biagtan who received thrusts from their
malefactor had fired the shot merely to scare away the sharp-pointed instruments. The thrusts were indeed
people aroundfor his own protection and not necessarily to properly termed purely accidental since they seemed
kill or hit the victim. In any event, while the act may not to be a reflex action on the robbers part upon their
exempt the triggerman from liability for the damage done, being surprised by the deceased. To argue, as
the fact re-
_______________ defendant does, that the robbers intent to kill must
necessarily be deduced from the four mortal wounds
inflicted upon the deceased is to beg the question. 4. It has long been an established rule of
Defendant must suffer the consequence of its failure to construction of so-called contracts of adhesion such as
discharge its burden of proving by competent evidence, insurance contracts, where the insured is handed a
e.g. the robbers or eye-witnesses testimony, that the printed insurance policy whose fine-print language has
fatal injuries were intentionally inflicted upon the long been selected with great care and deliberation by
insured so as to exempt itself from liability. specialists and legal advisers employed by and acting
3. Furthermore, plaintiffs-appellees properly assert exclusively in the interest of the insurance company,
in their brief that the sole error assigned by defendant that the terms and phraseology of the policy,
company, to wit, that the fatal injuries were not particularly of any exception clauses, must be clearly
accidental as held by the lower court but should be expressed so as to be easily understood by the insured
held to have been intentionally inflicted, raises a and any ambiguous, equivocal or uncertain terms are
question of factwhich defendant is now barred from to be construed strictly and most strongly against the
raising, since it expressly limited its appeal to this insurer and liberally in favor of the insured so as to
Court purely on questions of law, per its notice of effect the dominant purpose of indemnity or payment
appeal. Defendant is therefore confined to raising
9 to the insured, especially where a forfeiture is
only questions of law and no other questions involved.
_______________ The Court so expressly held in Calanoc that:
x x x While as a general rule the parties may limit the
7 Idem, at page 83, italics furnished.
8 At page 3.
coverage of the policy to certain particular accidents and
9 Rec. on Appeal, p. 56.
risks or causes of loss, and may expressly except other risks
or causes of loss therefrom (45 C.J.S. 781-782), however, it
72 is to be desired that the terms and phraseology of the
72 SUPREME COURT exception clause be clearly expressed so as to be within the
REPORTS easy grasp and understanding of the insured,for if the terms
ANNOTATED are doubtful or obscure the same must of necessity be
Biagtan vs. The Insular Life interpreted or resolved against the one who has caused the
Assurance Company, Ltd. obscurity. (Article 1377, new Civil Code) And so it has been
generally held that the terms in an insurance policy, which
under Rule 42, section 2 of the Rules of Court and is
10
are ambiguous, equivocal, or uncertain xxx are to be
deemed to have conceded the findings of fact of the construed strictly and most strongly against the insurer,
trial court, since he thereby waived all questions of and liberally in favor of the insured so as to effect the
facts. dominant purpose of indemnity or payment to the insured,
especially where a forfeiture if involved (29 AM. Jur., 181),
and the reason for this rule is that the insured usually has The Court has but recently reiterated this doctrine
no voice in the selection or arrangement of the words in Landicho vs. GSIS and again applied the
13

employed and that the language of the contract is selected provisions of Article 1377 of our Civil Code that The
with great care and deli- interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a
_______________
contract shall not favor the party who caused the
10 SEC 2. Appeal on pure question oflaw.Where the appellant obscurity.
states in his notice of appeal or record on appeal that he will raise only 5. The accidental death benefit clause assuring the
questions of law, no other questions shall be allowed, and the evidence
need not be elevated. (Rule 42) insureds beneficiaries of double indemnity, upon
11 See 2 Morans Comments on Rules of Court, 1970 Ed pp. 456-457 payment of an extra premium, in the event that the
and cases cited therein. insured meets violent accidental death is contractually
73 stipulated as follows in the policy: that the death of
VOL. 44, MARCH 29, 73 the insured resulted directly from bodily
1972 injury effected solely through external and violent
Biagtan vs. The Insular Life meanssustained in an accident, supra. The policy then
Assurance Company, Ltd. lists numerous exceptions, which may be classified as
beration by experts and legal advisers employed by, and follows:
acting exclusively in the interest of, the insurance company. Injuries effected through non-external
(44 CJ.S., p. 1174) meanswhich are excepted: self-destruction, bodily or
Insurance is, in its nature, complex and difficult for the mental infirmity or disease, poisoning or infection,
lay man to understand. Policies are prepared by experts who injuries with no visiblecontusions or exterior wounds
know and can anticipate the bearing and possible (exceptions 1 to 4 of policy clause);
complications of every contingency. So long as insurance Injuries caused by some act of the insured which
companies insist upon the use of ambiguous, intricate and is
technical provisions, which conceal rather than frankly _______________
disclose, their own intentions, the courts must, in fairness to
those who purchase insurance construe every ambiguity in Italics furnished.
12

favor of the insured. (Algoe vs. Pacific Mut. L. Ins. Co., 91 L-28866, prom. March 17, 1972, per Concepcion, C.J., and cases
13

Wash. 324, LRA 1917A, 1237.) cited therein.

An insurer should not be allowed, by the use of obscure 74
phrases and exceptions, to defeat the very purpose for which 74 SUPREME COURT
the policy was procured. (Moore vs. Aetna Life Insurance REPORTS
Co., LRA 1915D, 164). 12

ANNOTATED
 Biagtan vs. The Insular Life by external and violent meansin the very language
Assurance Company, Ltd. of the policy.
proscribed by the policy, and are therefore similarly It is obvious from the very classification of the
excepted: injuries received while on police duty, while exceptions and applying the rule of noscitus a
travelling in any form of submarine transportation, sociis, that the double-indemnity policy covers the
or in any violation of law by the insured or assault insured against accidental death, whether caused by
provoked by the insured, or in any aircraft if the fault, negligence or intent of a third party which is
insured is a pilot or crew member; [exceptions 5 (a), (c) unforeseen and unexpected by the insured. All the
and (d), and 6 of the policy clause]; and associated words and concepts in the policy plainly
Accidents expressly excluded: where death exclude the accidental death from the coverage of the
resulted in any riot, civil commotion, insurrection or policy only where the injuries are self-inflicted or
war or atomic energy explosion. (Exceptions 5[b] and 7 75
of policy clause). VOL. 44, MARCH 29, 75
The only exception which is not susceptible of 1972
classification is that provided in paragraph 5(e), the People vs. Imperio
very exception herein involved, which would also attended by some proscribed act of the insured or are
except injuries in-flicted intentionally by a third party, incurred in same expressly excluded calamity such as
either with or without provocation on the part of the riot, war or atomic explosion.
insured, and whether or not the attack or the defense Finally, the untenability of herein defendant
by the third party was caused by a violation of the law insurers claim that the insureds death fell within the
by the insured. exception is further heightened by the stipulated fact
This ambiguous clause conflicts with all the other that two other insurance companies which likewise
four exceptions in the same paragraph 5 particularly covered the insured for much, larger sums under
that immediately preceding it in item (d) which similar accidental death benefit clauses promptly paid
excepts injuries received where the insured has the benefits thereof to plaintiffs-beneficiaries.
violated the law or provoked the injury, while this I vote accordingly for the affirmance in toto of the
clause, construed as the insurance company now appealed decision, with costs against defendant-
claims, would seemingly except also all other injuries, appellant.
intentionally inflicted by a third party, regardless of Decision reversed.
any violation of law or provocation by the insured,and
defeat the very purpose of the policy of giving the
insured double indemnity in case of accidental death