Deason Lawsuit Xerox

FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 02/13/2018 09:34 AM INDEX NO.
650675/2018
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 1 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 02/13/2018
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

COUNTY OF NEW YORK
____________________________________
DARWIN DEASON, )
)
Plaintiff, )
v. )
)
FUJIFILM HOLDINGS CORP., XEROX )
CORP., JEFF JACOBSON, GREGORY Q. ) Index No. ____________
BROWN, JOSEPH J. ECHEVARRIA, )
WILLIAM CURT HUNTER, ROBERT J. ) SUMMONS
KEEGAN, CHERYL GORDON )
KRONGARD, CHARLES PRINCE, ANN )
N. REESE, STEPHEN H. RUSCKOWSKI, ) Date Index No. Purchased: 2/13/2018
SARA MARTINEZ TUCKER, and )
URSULA M. BURNS, )
)
Defendants. )
)
___________________________________ )
TO THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANTS:
(See attached List of Defendants with Addresses)
YOU ARE HEREBY SUMMONED to answer the complaint in this action and to serve a
copy of your answer on the Plaintiff’s attorneys within twenty (20) days after the service of this
summons, exclusive of the day of service, or within thirty (30) days after service is complete if
this summons is not personally delivered to you within the State of New York. In case of your
failure to appear or answer, judgment will be taken against you by default for the relief
demanded in the complaint.
The basis of the venue designated is CPLR § 503(a). Plaintiff designates New York
County as the place of trial.
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FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 02/13/2018 09:34 AM INDEX NO. 650675/2018
Dated: February 13, 2018

New York, New York
KING & SPALDING LLP
By: /s/ Israel Dahan

Israel Dahan
Richard T. Marooney, Jr.
Peter Isajiw
1185 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036
Telephone No.: (212) 556-2114
Email: idahan@kslaw.com
Robert E. Meadows
(pro hac vice application forthcoming)
1100 Louisiana, Suite 4000
Houston, TX 77002
Telephone No.: (713) 276-7370
Email: rmeadows@kslaw.com
Counsel for Plaintiff
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DEFENDANTS SERVICE LIST
FUJIFILM HOLDINGS CORP. CHERYL GORDON KRONGARD

7-3 Akasaka 9-chome c/o Xerox Corp.
Tokyo, Japan 1070052 201 Merritt 7
P.O. Box 4505
FUJIFILM HOLDINGS CORP. Norwalk, CT 06856-4505
c/o Fujifilm Holdings America Corp.
200 Summit Lake Drive CHARLES PRINCE
Valhalla, NY 10595-1356 c/o Xerox Corp.
201 Merritt 7
XEROX CORP. P.O. Box 4505
201 Merritt 7 Norwalk, CT 06856-4505
P.O. Box 4505
Norwalk, CT 06856-4505 ANN N. REESE
c/o Xerox Corp.
JEFF JACOBSON 201 Merritt 7
c/o Xerox Corp. P.O. Box 4505
P.O. Box 4505
Norwalk, CT 06856-4505 STEPHEN H. RUSCKOWSKI
c/o Xerox Corp.
GREGORY Q. BROWN 201 Merritt 7
P.O. Box 4505
Norwalk, CT 06856-4505 SARA MARTINEZ TUCKER
c/o Xerox Corp.
JOSEPH J. ECHEVARRIA 201 Merritt 7
P.O. Box 4505
Norwalk, CT 06856-4505 URSULA M. BURNS
205 East 85th St., Apt. PH-2A
WILLIAM CURT HUNTER New York, NY 10028-3221
c/o Xerox Corp.
201 Merritt 7
P.O. Box 4505
Norwalk, CT 06856-4505
ROBERT J. KEEGAN
c/o Xerox Corp.
201 Merritt 7
P.O. Box 4505
Norwalk, CT 06856-4505
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SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

COUNTY OF NEW YORK
____________________________________
)
DARWIN DEASON, )
)
Plaintiff, )
v. )
)
FUJIFILM HOLDINGS CORP., XEROX )
CORP., JEFF JACOBSON, GREGORY Q. )
BROWN, JOSEPH J. ECHEVARRIA, ) Index No. ____________
WILLIAM CURT HUNTER, ROBERT J. )
KEEGAN, CHERYL GORDON ) COMPLAINT
KRONGARD, CHARLES PRINCE, ANN )
N. REESE, STEPHEN H. RUSCKOWSKI, )
SARA MARTINEZ TUCKER, and )
URSULA M. BURNS, )
)
Defendants. )
)
___________________________________ )
Plaintiff Darwin Deason, by and through his undersigned counsel, for his Complaint
against Defendants Fujifilm Holdings Corp. (“Fuji”), Xerox Corp. (“Xerox” or the “Company”),
and Jeff Jacobson, Gregory Q. Brown, Joseph J. Echevarria, William Curt Hunter, Robert J.
Keegan, Cheryl Gordon Krongard, Charles Prince, Ann N. Reese, Stephen H. Rusckowski, and
Sara Martinez Tucker (the “Director Defendants”), and Ursula M. Burns, alleges as follows:
NATURE OF ACTION
1. Plaintiff is the third-largest shareholder of Xerox and brings this action to enjoin a
change of control transaction and fraudulent scheme (“Transaction”) whereby Fuji will acquire
majority ownership and control of Xerox, a venerable American icon, for virtually nothing. As
Shigetaka Komori, Fuji’s Chairman and CEO, recently boasted to the Nikkei Asian Review, the
“scheme will allow us to take control of Xerox without spending a penny.”
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2. The Director Defendants—a majority of whom have secured for themselves
officer or director positions with the new combined entity—have breached their fiduciary duties
to Plaintiff and all other Xerox shareholders by negotiating and approving a transaction that
dramatically undervalues Xerox, provides a wholly inadequate control premium, if any, and
disproportionately favors Fuji. If the deal is consummated, Xerox shareholders will be virtually
powerless over the future direction of their investment and will have no opportunity to receive a
true control premium for their shares. Accordingly, the Transaction must be stopped dead in its
tracks.
3. Xerox and the Director Defendants are using their long-standing, top-secret joint
venture agreements with Fuji as an excuse to justify this one-sided transaction. Last week Xerox
publicly admitted in a slide presentation to shareholders that the Fuji-Xerox joint venture
agreements “Limit Xerox’s Strategic Flexibility,” a fact that was never previously disclosed to
Xerox shareholders in any of the Company’s prior public filings. Specifically, the joint venture
agreements contain a “crown jewel” lock-up right that allows Fuji to control Xerox’s intellectual
property and manufacturing rights in the $36 billion Asia-Pacific market in the event Xerox were
to sell just 30% of the Company to another suitor. This effectively blocks any chance of a
transparent and fair sale process. Shockingly, Xerox, the Director Defendants, and Defendant
Burns fraudulently concealed this material fact from shareholders and other investors for almost
17 years, and did not reveal it until after the transaction with Fuji was announced. In fact, the
“end game” for Xerox—a sale to Fuji—was decided 17 years ago with this undisclosed
“crown jewel” lock-up right granted to Fuji, and shareholders had absolutely no clue.
4. Fuji, however, handed Xerox and the Director Defendants a golden opportunity to
terminate the joint venture agreements through Fuji’s participation in a “WorldCom”-like
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accounting scandal at Fuji Xerox Co., Ltd. (“Fuji Xerox”), the Fuji-Xerox joint venture. In July
2017, Fuji released a more than 200-page independent investigation committee report that
contained stunning findings and sharply criticized Fuji for its prominent role in contributing to
the accounting scandal, given the substantial control Fuji had over Fuji Xerox’s operations. As a
result of the misconduct by Fuji and Fuji Xerox, Xerox had the right to terminate the joint
venture agreements. The self-interested Director Defendants, however, ignored the opportunity
or deliberately chose not to terminate the joint venture agreements. Had the Director Defendants
terminated the joint venture agreements, they would have been able to engage in a fair and
equitable bidding process and achieve a fair value and control premium for Xerox shareholders.
Indeed, the value of Xerox as a standalone company with no encumbrances on its intellectual
property and the licensing, manufacturing, and selling of its products in the Asia and Pacific Rim
markets is significantly greater than the value being provided to the Company and its
shareholders as part of the proposed Transaction.
5. Even worse, the Director Defendants have now agreed to make Fuji’s preemptive
“crown jewel” lock-up right permanent by agreeing in the Transaction documents not to
terminate any material agreement pending the closing of the Transaction, thereby blocking the
possibility of any market-check on the proposed Transaction. By making Fuji’s lock-up
permanent, the Director Defendants are further misleading Xerox shareholders when stating in
the public filings associated with the Transaction that shareholders have the right to accept and
consider new “unsolicited” offers, knowing full well such a right is illusory. It is nonsensical to
believe that the Director Defendants have the freedom to entertain new offers at this time and
that the Transaction with Fuji is not a fait accompli when Fuji has a permanent lock-up right over
one of Xerox’s most valuable assets under the terms of the proposed Transaction. The only way
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to facilitate a true market test is to eliminate Fuji’s blocking rights under the joint venture
agreement and the Transaction documents, and then test the market’s interest in the purchase of
Xerox with unfettered access to the Asia and Pacific Rim markets.
6. Simply put, the proposed Transaction is the product of deceit and bad faith
conduct by the Director Defendants and must be enjoined. The Director Defendants should be
compelled to go back to the drawing board, free Xerox from Fuji’s deal-restrictive “crown jewel”
lock-up, which the Company still has the legal right to do, and pursue a fair, transparent, and
equitable bidding process that is truly beneficial to Xerox’s shareholders. Without such
injunctive relief, Xerox shareholders will be irreparably harmed, as they will be forced to vote on
a transaction that was approved by a conflicted board without the benefit of a full and fair
shopping of an unencumbered Xerox to the open market. Once the Transaction closes, Xerox
shareholders will never get a second chance at a change of control transaction and premium.
7. Moreover, while Xerox has yet to disclose critical information about the manner
in which this Transaction was negotiated, considered, and ultimately approved, it is clear even at
this point that the conflicted Director Defendants swiftly negotiated the proposed Transaction
(over an abbreviated 45-day period) and agreed to terms that are catastrophic to Xerox
shareholders. Under the proposed structure of the Transaction, Xerox will combine with Fuji
Xerox, a longstanding joint venture created between Xerox and Fuji, with Fuji owning a 50.1%
controlling stake in the new, combined Fuji Xerox, and Xerox shareholders owning only 49.9%,
a minority stake in the new, combined Fuji Xerox. Shockingly, Fuji is being permitted to
purchase 50.1% of Xerox despite the fact that Xerox, relative to Fuji Xerox, has greater revenue,
greater EBITDA and greater operating profit. Allowing Fuji to purchase 50.1% of Xerox—just
enough to create its control—leaves the other 49.9% of Xerox shareholders hostage and subject
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to abuse by Fuji. Indeed, it is highly unusual and not the market-norm for the board of the target
company—such as the Director Defendants—to enter into a change of control transaction where
the buyer corporation will only own 50.1% of the combined entity as opposed to buying out all
of the shareholders in exchange for a customary control premium. Further evidence of the one-
sided nature of the Transaction is that Fuji will end up receiving over $120 million more in
annual cash dividends than it currently receives from the joint venture, while Xerox shareholders
will receive $0 in additional regular annual cash dividends. Notably, since the deal was first
disclosed to the market, and through the close of trading on February 9, 2018, Xerox’s stock
declined. It is unusual for the shares of the target of a M&A transaction to decline post-
announcement, but here the market has realized how unfavorable the Transaction is and it has
responded accordingly. 1
8. In an attempt to prevent this negative market reaction for Xerox shareholders, in
May 2017, Plaintiff, for the benefit of all Xerox shareholders, sent a letter to Defendant
Jacobson, the CEO of Xerox, raising serious concerns with respect to Xerox’s relationship with
Fuji and demanding that the Company’s management and Board immediately explore its legal
options with respect to its contractual relationship with Fuji and strategic alternatives to Fuji.
Defendant Jacobson, however, ignored Plaintiff’s letter and concerns. Again, on January 17,
2018, after being ignored for months and learning that Xerox was now in discussions with Fuji to
substantially alter the joint venture relationship between Xerox and Fuji, Plaintiff wrote a public
letter to the Director Defendants demanding the (i) release of the “secret” joint venture
agreements, and (ii) hiring of new and independent advisors to evaluate the Company’s strategic
1 Specifically, Xerox’s stock price went from $30.35, based on closing share price as of January 10, 2018
(i.e., the day prior to a Wall Street Journal story about the proposed Transaction), to $29.61, based on the
closing price as of February 9, 2018.
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options with Fuji, including the potential termination of the one-sided, value destroying joint
venture agreement in light of the Asian “WorldCom” accounting scandal at Fuji Xerox. Plaintiff
also voiced his displeasure with Defendant Jacobson’s “lethargic approach regarding Fuji.” But
once again, Plaintiff’s concerns fell on deaf ears, and the Director Defendants instead hurried to
complete this awful Transaction.
9. In short, by approving this unreasonably one-sided and grossly unfair Transaction,
the Director Defendants have breached their fiduciary duties of care, good faith, loyalty, candor,
and independence to Plaintiff and other Xerox shareholders, and Fuji, as an active participant in
the flawed Transaction, has aided and abetted such breaches of fiduciary duties. Thus, the Court
can and should enjoin the proposed Transaction as presently constituted so that Plaintiff and all
other Xerox shareholders are not irreparably harmed. If the proposed Transaction is permitted to
close, the opportunity for Xerox shareholders to benefit from a full and fair market check and to
receive a superior control premium will be lost forever because the improper, but terminable,
lock-up rights Fuji has under the joint venture agreements will become permanent.
THE PARTIES
10. Plaintiff is a resident of Dallas, Texas, has been one of the largest shareholders of
Xerox since 2010, and is the only shareholder of Xerox Series B preferred stock.
11. Defendant Fuji is a Japanese multinational photography and imaging company.
Fuji is incorporated under the laws of Japan with its principal place of business located in Tokyo,
Japan.
12. Defendant Xerox is a leading global provider of digital print technology and
related solutions. Xerox is incorporated under the laws of the State of New York with its
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principal executive offices located at 201 Merritt 7, Norwalk, Connecticut 06856-4505. Xerox is
publicly traded on the New York Stock Exchange under the symbol “XRX.”
13. Defendant Jeff Jacobson joined Xerox in 2012 and has been the CEO and a
member of the Xerox board since January 2017.
14. Defendant Gregory Q. Brown has been a member of the Xerox board since 2017.
15. Defendant Joseph J. Echevarria has been a member of the Xerox board since
2017.
16. Defendant William Curt Hunter has been a member of the Xerox board since
2004.
17. Defendant Robert J. Keegan has been a member of the Xerox board since 2010
and is the current Chairman of the Xerox board.
18. Defendant Cheryl Gordon Krongard has been a member of the Xerox board since
2016.
19. Defendant Charles Prince has been a member of the Xerox board since 2008.
20. Defendant Ann N. Reese has been a member of the Xerox board since 2003.
21. Defendant Stephen H. Rusckowski has been a member of the Xerox board since
2015.
22. Defendant Sara Martinez Tucker has been a member of the Xerox board since
2011.
23. The Defendants identified in paragraphs 13 through 22 are collectively referred to
herein as the “Director Defendants.”
24. Defendant Ursula M. Burns (“Burns”) was the Chairman of the Xerox board
between May 2010 and May 2017. Burns also served as the Company’s CEO from July 2009
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until May 2016. Given her senior positions at the Company, Burns was fully knowledgeable
about the Fuji Xerox joint venture, the governing joint venture agreements, and the undisclosed
“crown jewel” lock-up rights of Fuji under those agreements.
25. Non-party Fuji Xerox is a joint venture established between Fuji and Xerox dating
back to 1962. Fuji Xerox develops, manufactures, and distributes xerographic and document-
related products and services in Japan, China, Hong Kong, other areas of the Pacific Rim,
Australia, and New Zealand.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
26. This Court has personal jurisdiction over all of the Defendants pursuant to New
York Civil Practice Law and Rules (“CPLR”) §§ 301 and 302. Each of the Defendants either
resides in New York, or directly and/or through its subsidiaries, conducts continuous and
systematic business in New York.
27. Venue is proper in this County under CPLR § 503(a).
28. In addition, under the agreements governing this proposed Transaction, both Fuji
and Xerox agreed to submit to “the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of the State of New York
. . . for the adjudication of any Action or legal proceeding relating to or arising out of this
Agreement and the Transactions” and “irrevocably and unconditionally waive[d] any
objection . . . to the laying of venue in such courts and agrees not to plead or claim in any such
court that any such action or legal proceeding brought in any such court has been brought in an
inconvenient forum.” Also, Xerox’s by-laws provide that this Court shall have jurisdiction over
the types of claims asserted against Xerox and the Director Defendants in this action.
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FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. The Joint Venture Agreements And “Crown Jewel” Lock-Up The Company
Kept Secret And Hidden From Shareholders For Nearly Two Decades
The Joint Enterprise Contract (“JEC”)
29. On or about March 30, 2001, after a series of consolidations, acquisitions, and
territory expansions by Fuji Xerox, Xerox and Fuji entered into the JEC. 2 A copy of the JEC is
attached hereto as Exhibit A.
30. The JEC establishes the ownership structure that is in place today for Fuji Xerox.
Pursuant to Section 5.1 of the JEC, as of March 30, 2001, the holdings of Common Stock in Fuji
Xerox are as follows: Fuji directly holds 30,000,000 shares, or 75% of the total shares in Fuji
Xerox, and Xerox Limited (indirectly owned by Xerox Corp.) holds 10,000,000 shares, or the
remaining 25% of the total shares in Fuji Xerox.
31. Pursuant to Section 6.1 of the JEC, the Fuji Xerox board is comprised of 12
members, nine of whom were designated by Fuji and three by Xerox. In addition, pursuant to
Section 7.1 of the JEC, the executive directors of Fuji Xerox are nominated and appointed by
Fuji and Fuji is responsible “for the day-to-day management and supervision and the execution
of policy.” Thus, Fuji effectively has control over the day-to-day operations of Fuji Xerox.
32. Pursuant to Section 3.2 of the JEC, Fuji and Xerox are required to “deal with each
other in matters relating to Fuji Xerox and this Agreement with honesty and good faith in
accordance with the principles embodied in this Agreement and observing reasonable
commercial standards of fair dealing.”
2 The named Fuji party to the JEC is Fuji Photo Film Co., Ltd., which was renamed Fuji Holdings
Corporation in October 2006.
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33. Moreover, pursuant to Section 7.3 of the JEC, Fuji Xerox is required to “promptly
deliver to Fuji and Xerox: (i) annual audited consolidated financial statements prepared in
accordance with U.S. GAAP; (ii) quarterly unaudited financial statements; and (iii) such other
financial information as either Party may reasonably request in order to comply with reporting
requirements to which it is subject under applicable law or contractual obligations.”
34. Section 9.1 of the JEC governs the termination rights of the JEC. Specifically,
pursuant to Section 9.1(a)(iii), “either Party may terminate this Agreement if the other Party
materially breaches any of its covenants or agreements contained herein, and, if such breach is
susceptible of cure, the breaching Party has not cured such breach within sixty (60) days from
the date the Party seeking termination gives notice of breach . . . .”
35. In addition, pursuant to Section 9.1(a)(v):
if a Change of Control occurs and a Competitor (a) becomes the beneficial

owner of more than thirty percent (30%) of the total voting power of XEROX
CORP as described in clause (i) of the “Change of Control” definition, (b)
acquires control of more than thirty percent (30%) of the total voting power of the
surviving Person as described in clause (ii) of the “Change of Control” definition
or (c) acquires assets of XEROX CORP as described in clause (iii) of the “Change
of Control” definition, [FUJI] may terminate this Agreement upon written notice
to XEROX CORP. (Emphasis added.)
Thus, under the JEC, if Xerox engages in a transaction with a competitor for just 30% of Xerox,
Fuji has the right to terminate the JEC, which would then completely eliminate Xerox’s
governance and decision-making power with respect to the Fuji Xerox joint venture. At the
same time, however, Fuji would still retain the exclusive rights to Xerox intellectual property and
the manufacturing and selling of Xerox products in the Asia and Pacific Rim markets under the
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separate Technology Agreement, as described below. Indeed, Fuji would retain such exclusive
rights through at least March 2021. 3
36. Pursuant to Section 9.3 of the JEC, if the JEC is terminated or there is a winding
up of Fuji Xerox, the tradenames “Fuji” and “Xerox” and all rights thereto, as well as all other
intellectual property and rights thereto granted by the Parties to Fuji Xerox, shall continue or be
disposed of in accordance with applicable agreements, including without limitation the
Technology Agreement.
37. Pursuant to Sections 10.1 and 10.2 of the JEC, all disputes concerning the
agreement shall be referred to an independent arbitrator to be appointed by the Japan
Commercial Arbitration Association of Tokyo, Japan, in accordance with whose rules the
arbitration shall be conducted, and governed by Japanese law.
38. On March 30, 2001, Xerox filed a Form 8-K with the SEC, disclosing that it
entered into the JEC with Fuji. The 8-K provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
Registrant today confirmed that it has completed the sale of half of its stake in
Fuji Xerox Co., Ltd. to Fuji Photo Film Co., Ltd. for 160 billion Yen in cash,
approximately $1.3 billion based on the current exchange rate.
Under the agreement, Fujifilm’s ownership interest in Fuji Xerox increases from
50 percent to 75 percent. . . . .
39. Nowhere in that 8-K or any of the Company’s public filings with the SEC prior to
the announced change of control transaction on January 31, 2018—a 17-year period—did the
Company ever attach a copy of the JEC or disclose the material terms described above,
particularly the change of control provision that amounts to a “crown jewel” lock-up when
3 This lock-up right also effectively blocks any sales to non-competitors because no private equity firm
would buy Xerox without access to the Asian-Pacific market.
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combined with the intellectual property, licensing, and manufacturing rights Xerox granted to
Fuji and Fuji Xerox, as described below.
40. For example, in the Company’s Form 10-K for fiscal 2016, the Company
described the Fuji Xerox joint venture as follows:
Fuji Xerox is an unconsolidated entity in which we own a 25 percent interest, and

[Fuji] owns a 75 percent interest. Fuji Xerox develops, manufactures and
distributes document processing products in Japan, China, Hong Kong, other
areas of the Pacific Rim, Australia and New Zealand. We retain significant rights
as a minority shareholder. Our technology licensing agreements with Fuji Xerox
ensure that the two companies retain uninterrupted access to each other's portfolio
of patents, technology and products.
Nowhere in the 2016 10-K, which was signed by Director Defendants Jacobson, Brown,
Echevarria, Hunter, Keegan, Krongard, Prince, Reese, Rusckowski and Tucker, and Defendant
Burns, did the Company disclose the existence of the JEC or any of its material terms,
particularly the preclusive change of control provision therein.
41. Likewise, the Company’s Form 10-K for fiscal 2015, which was signed by the
Director Defendants Hunter, Keegan, Prince, Reese, Rusckowski, and Tucker, and Defendant
Burns, contained the same barebones description of the Fuji Xerox joint venture and failed to
disclose the existence of the JEC or any of it its material terms, including the preclusive change
of control provision therein. In fact, by not disclosing the material joint venture agreements to
shareholders over the past 17 years, the Company and its officers and directors throughout that
period were asking shareholders to vote on the hundreds of director elections and multiple
compensation and governance matters, and the hundreds of Xerox-related M&A transactions
during that period, based on wholly incomplete and misleading information.
42. On January 31, 2018, nearly two decades after signing the JEC, the Company and
the Director Defendants finally released a copy of the JEC in response to Plaintiff’s persistent
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demand that they do so. And now that the JEC has been released, it is obvious why the
Company and the Director Defendants wanted to keep the terms of the JEC a secret from
investors and the general public all these years—they did not want shareholders and the public at
large to know that Fuji essentially had a blocking position on Xerox and its ability to sell itself to
anyone other than Fuji.
43. Notably, the Company’s deliberate decision to keep the terms of the JEC hidden
from Xerox shareholders violated its own corporate governance policy. Xerox’s Disclosure
Policy and Guidelines, adopted in February 2001 and updated on November 15, 2008, require
the Company and its board to disclose all material information to investors. Specifically, the
Disclosure Policy and Guidelines state that “[a]ny information concerning the company is
considered material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would consider
it important in determining whether to buy, sell or hold, or engage in other transactions
concerning the company’s securities.” Clearly, a reasonable investor would find the JEC’s
restrictive change of control provision important in deciding whether to buy, sell, or hold Xerox
stock. Indeed, Plaintiff’s persistent demand for the release of the JEC, as described below,
confirms its materiality to his investment in Xerox. By keeping the JEC and its material terms a
secret and omitted from the Company’s SEC filings, Xerox and the Director Defendants
defrauded Plaintiff (and all other Xerox shareholders), and the Director Defendants breached
their fiduciary duties of disclosure to Plaintiff (and all other Xerox shareholders).
The March 2001 Side Letter
44. Along with the JEC, Xerox and Fuji entered into a Side Letter on or about March
30, 2001, whereby they agreed, among other things, that “[t]he Parties shall cause [Fuji Xerox]
to continue to deliver to [Xerox] in a timely manner and in English financial and other data,
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including but not limited to the following: (a) annual audited financial data prepared in
accordance with U.S. GAAP and XC disclosure requirements; (b) quarterly unaudited financial
data in accordance with U.S. GAAP; and (c) tax receipts, tax returns, balance sheet and profit
and loss by legal entity, tax packages for depreciation, fixed assets, reserves and other financial
information and local statutory annual reports.” A copy of the Side Letter is attached hereto as
Exhibit B. Thus, under the Side Letter, which was also kept a secret from Plaintiff and other
shareholders until very recently, Fuji is required to ensure that Fuji Xerox deliver to Xerox
financial statements in accordance with U.S. GAAP—which it failed to do, as described below.
45. In addition, the Side Letter provides that it shall be governed by, and construed in
accordance with, the internal laws of Japan. Also, the Side Letter constitutes an integral part of
the JEC and shall be deemed incorporated therein.
The Technology Agreement And Master Program Agreement
46. As part of the joint venture, Xerox had a Technology Agreement with Fuji Xerox,
which began in 1999, was amended in March 2001, and further amended in April 2006. The
term of the Technology Agreement is five years, automatically renewed for an additional five
years unless either party gives notice not to renew at least six months prior to any renewal
expiration date. A copy of the Technology Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit C.
47. Under the Technology Agreement, Xerox granted Fuji Xerox a “royalty-free,
exclusive license” to, among other things, Xerographic patents, technical information and
copyrights of Xerox and its Subsidiaries so Fuji Xerox could manufacture, use, lease, sell,
distribute, and reproduce Xerox products in the listed territories. In addition, Xerox agreed “to
use commercially reasonable efforts to prevent the sale by a third party inside the Territory of
Xerox’s Xerographic Products unless such sale has been approved in writing by Fuji Xerox.”
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48. The “Territory” covered by the 2006 Technology Agreement included Japan, the
People’s Republic of China, the Special Administrative Region of Hong Kong of the People’s
Republic of China, the Special Administrative Region of Macau of the People’s Republic of
China, Taiwan, the Philippines, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea), the
Republic of Korea (South Korea), Thailand, Kampuchea (Cambodia), Laos, Vietnam, Indonesia,
Singapore, Malaysia, Myanmar (Burma), Australia, New Zealand, Negara Brunei Darussalam,
Republic of Fiji, Republic of Kiribati, Republic of Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Kingdom of
Tonga, Republic of Vanuatu, Western Samoa, Tuvalu, Micronesia, but excluding United States
territories, possessions or dependencies (the “Territory”).
49. Xerox also granted Fuji Xerox “(i) an exclusive license to use Xerox Trademarks
to manufacture, have made, use, lease, sell, distribute or otherwise dispose of Xerographic
Products in the Territory; (ii) a non-exclusive license to use Xerox Trademarks to manufacture,
have made, use, lease, sell, distribute or otherwise dispose of all other Products in the Territory;
and (iii) a limited right, on a case by case basis and upon the prior written permission of Xerox,
to use the ‘Fuji Xerox Co., Ltd.’ name on the nameplate attached to certain products sold outside
of the Territory . . . .”
50. Xerox also granted Fuji Xerox (i) an option to receive a non-exclusive right and
license to non-Xerographic, non-marking, Document Processing Activities (“DPA”) technical
information, copyrights and patents, subject to a royalty for certain products; and (ii) a right of
first offer with respect to non-Xerographic marking products.
51. The Technology Agreement provides that “[a]ll computations relating to the
determination of the amount of royalties and payments due and payable under this Agreement
shall be made in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles in the United States
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of America, as reflected in the practice of independent certified public accountants of
international reputation acceptable to both Parties.” In addition, “[e]ach payment of royalties by
Fuji Xerox or Xerox shall be accompanied by a written statement in English, certified as true and
accurate by a responsible executive of the reporting Party . . . .” Also, Fuji Xerox must “keep
full and accurate records and accounts which may bear upon amounts, if any, payable pursuant to
this Agreement.” The Technology Agreement further provides that each Party shall “comply
with all applicable laws and regulations” and shall be responsible “for making all legally
required notification to all federal, state and local agencies in each Party’s respective territory.”
52. Under the clear terms of the Technology Agreement, Xerox has the right to
terminate the Technology Agreement upon a material breach by Fuji Xerox of any of the
covenants or provisions, and upon the expiration of a 60-day cure period, unless such breach is
not capable of being cured—in which case, the termination is effective immediately.
53. In light of the admitted, massive accounting fraud committed by Fuji Xerox, as
described below, Fuji Xerox materially breached its obligations and covenants under the
Technology Agreement and, therefore, Xerox had the legal right to terminate the Technology
Agreement. Moreover, the breaches by Fuji Xerox were not capable of being cured and would
permit Xerox to terminate the Technology Agreement immediately.
54. Importantly, a termination of the Technology Agreement immediately terminates
all rights and licenses of Fuji Xerox to Xerox intellectual property under the Technology
Agreement, except with respect to the licenses relating to the Xerox trademarks, which terminate
after a thirty-day period. Thus, by terminating the Technology Agreement, Xerox would take
back full control over its intellectual property and the licensing, manufacturing, and selling of its
products in the Asia and Pacific Rim markets. In addition, a termination of the Technology
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Agreement constitutes a termination of the prior Technology Agreements by and between Xerox
and Fuji Xerox, dated March 1, 1999, as amended and restated in March 2001. 4
55. On September 9, 2013, Xerox and Fuji Xerox entered into a Master Program
Agreement (“Master Agreement”) under which the parties determined their rights and
relationship concerning product development and mass production deals. A copy of the Master
Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit D. The Master Agreement is automatically terminated,
without action of either party, if the Technology Agreement is terminated. However, individual
program specific agreements (“PSA”), which are agreements that govern program specific terms
and conditions for the design and development and the sale and purchase of certain products and
deliverables, remain in effect and can be terminated or expire in accordance with their terms.
Thus, for the same reasons Xerox had the legal right to terminate the Technology Agreement, it
also had the legal right to terminate the Master Agreement.
56. Like the JEC, the specific terms of the Technology Agreement and Master
Agreement were only recently disclosed to investors due to Plaintiff’s repeated demand for their
release. Thus, the Company and its officers and directors during a 17-year period of non-
disclosure were deceiving Xerox shareholders and asking them to vote on Company-related
matters based on incomplete and misleading information.
B. The Recent “Asian WorldCom” Accounting Fraud Scandal At Fuji Xerox

Under Fuji’s Watch
57. In April 2017, Fuji publicly announced that its board of directors had formed an
independent investigation committee to conduct a review of suspected fraudulent accounting
practices at Fuji Xerox. On June 12, 2017, Fuji announced that it received the investigation
4 The Technology Agreement provides that the “Brand Provisions” of the agreement are governed by
New York law and all other provisions of the agreement are governed by Japanese law. In addition, all
disputes shall be submitted to the International Chamber of Commerce in San Francisco, California, and
the language of such proceeding shall be English.
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report from the independent investigation committee. On July 26, 2017, Fuji released a full
English translation of the more than 200-page independent investigation committee’s report and
a 75-page summary of the report. A copy of the full report and summary is attached hereto as
Exhibit E.
58. The report detailed a massive accounting fraud at Fuji Xerox, which had a
profound impact on Fuji Xerox’s financial statements and, in turn, Xerox’s own financial
statements. In total, the investigation committee identified aggregate adjustments to Fuji Xerox’s
financial statements of approximately 40 billion Japanese Yen, or U.S. $360 million, which
primarily related to overstatements in revenue at Fuji Xerox’s New Zealand and Australian
subsidiaries. According to news reports, the financial impact of the accounting fraud was “70
percent over [Fuji’s] initial estimate” after Fuji discovered the involvement of a second overseas
unit, Fuji Xerox Australia. Pushkala Aripaka & Stephen Nellis, Fujifilm flags bigger hit from
improper accounting at overseas units, Reuters (June 11, 2017 8:42 a.m.).
59. The report also sharply criticized Fuji for its prominent role in contributing to the
accounting scandal, given the substantial control Fuji had over Fuji Xerox’s operations. The
report featured Fuji’s President and Chief Operating Officer, Kenji Sukeno.
60. More specifically, the report stated that “[n]o adequate system has been built and
managed at [Fuji] in order to share [Fuji Xerox’s] information, and it cannot be denied that this
point very likely delayed the discovery of the inappropriate accounting practice . . . .” The
report further found that “[t]here were occasions when [Fuji] should have started its own,
independent investigation, and this point . . . presumably is one of the factors that caused a
delay in discovery of the inappropriate accounting practice in the Matter.” (Emphases added.)
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The findings of Fuji’s independent investigation committee show that Fuji failed to exercise
proper oversight of Fuji Xerox.
61. The report also exposed Fuji’s “hands off” approach to managing and monitoring
the operations of Fuji Xerox, despite Fuji’s obligation under the JEC to be responsible “for the
day-to-day management and supervision” of Fuji Xerox. Among other things, the report states:
[Fuji Xerox] has an Officer Nomination and Compensation Committee, and two
of the four members are Mr. VV and Mr. WW from [Fujifilm Corporation].
However, according to an interview with [Fuji] General Manager of Corporate
Planning Division Mr. UU, it seems that in reality the Officer Nomination and
Compensation Committee accepted personnel proposals from [Fuji Xerox] as-is,
and there are doubts as to whether it functioned adequately to monitor the
execution of [Fuji Xerox’s] individual operations.
62. The Fuji Xerox accounting scandal had devastating and far-reaching effects. In
June 2017, New Zealand First’s Leader, Winston Peters, released a statement on the fraud,
stating that it “could be one of the largest corporate frauds in New Zealand history.” Anne
Gibson, Fuji Xerox NZ operations had ‘inappropriate’ accounting: report, NZ Herald (June 13,
2017 7:21 a.m.). Peters continued, “This will be big news internationally and drags our
country’s name through the mud.”
63. Critically, the Fuji Xerox fraud had a substantial impact on the reported financial
statements of Xerox. On August 7, 2017, Xerox publicly disclosed in its Form 10-Q for the
period ending June 30, 2017 that it had determined that its cumulative share of the revised
amount of the total adjustments identified as part of the investigation into the Fuji Xerox fraud
was approximately $90 million and impacted fiscal years 2009 through 2017. In fact, as a result
of Fuji Xerox’s fraud, Xerox needed to restate its previously issued annual and interim
consolidated financial statements for 2014, 2015, and 2016, and the first quarter of 2017.
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C. The Director Defendants’ Unjustified Failure To Exercise Xerox’s Termination

Rights Under The Joint Venture Agreements Prior To Negotiating And
Approving The Proposed Transaction
64. In light of the admitted and indisputably massive accounting fraud at Fuji Xerox,
and Fuji’s lack of proper management and supervision of Fuji Xerox, which led to Fuji Xerox
providing Xerox with financial statements that were false and not in accordance with U.S. GAAP
and Xerox having to restate its own financial statements, Fuji and Fuji Xerox breached their
respective contractual obligations and covenants under the JEC, Side Letter, and Technology
Agreement.
65. As a result of these breaches, the Company had the legal right and the Director
Defendants had the fiduciary obligation to pursue termination of these joint venture agreements,
and even seek damages against Fuji Xerox and Fuji resulting from the accounting fraud. By
doing so, the Company would have freed itself from Fuji’s “crown jewel” lock-up right and
taken back complete control over its intellectual property and the licensing, manufacturing and
selling of its products in the Asia and Pacific Rim markets. With such freedom and control,
Xerox would be in a significantly greater position to negotiate a strategic alternative with Fuji or
another competitor or third party.
66. But instead of pursuing Xerox’s legal rights and remedies, the Company and the
Director Defendants decided to keep the JEC and related agreements in place and pursue the
extremely unfavorable Transaction with Fuji and Fuji Xerox, as described in more detail below.
In fact, there is no evidence that the Director Defendants even explored such termination options
or legal remedies against Fuji and Fuji Xerox as a result of the acknowledged massive
accounting fraud. The Director Defendants’ failure to pursue obvious and advantageous legal
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remedies available to Xerox is incomprehensible and constitutes a violation of their fiduciary
obligations to the Company and all its shareholders.
D. Plaintiff Raises Serious Concerns With Xerox Management And Xerox’s

Relationship With Fuji, And Demands Exploration Of Strategic Alternatives
To Fuji And Release Of The Top-Secret Joint Venture Agreements
67. For nearly a decade, Plaintiff has been one of the top five shareholders of Xerox.
In May 2017, acting for the benefit of all Xerox shareholders and their investments in the
Company, Plaintiff sent a letter to Defendant Jacobson, the CEO of Xerox, raising “critical and
timely” concerns with respect to Xerox’s relationship with Fuji and demanding that the
Company’s management and board immediately explore its legal options with respect to its
contractual relationship with Fuji and strategic alternatives to Fuji. A copy of Plaintiff’s May
2017 letter to Jacobson is attached hereto as Exhibit F.
68. Specifically, Plaintiff told Defendant Jacobson the following:
The market’s perception of Xerox’s relationship with Fuji is concerning. The lack
of clarity regarding the parties’ relative rights, the importance of Asia to Xerox's
future, and the off-market nature of the terms of the arrangement all give me great
pause. The recent accounting scandal at Fuji Xerox has only exacerbated my
concerns. I believe that it is urgent for Xerox to explore its strategic alternatives
regarding Fuji, including exercising Xerox’s rights under its agreements to
market check the overall relationship and its terms.
Further, the perception by the market that Xerox is inextricably intertwined with
Fuji in a market as important as Asia has created a potentially major loss in value
for Xerox in any change in control of the company. It is difficult to conceive of a
matter which would require more focus and energy from the board than this.
While I firmly support your review of these matters, I also want to caution you
and the board that time is not our friend and that this matter should be concluded
with all haste as the window of opportunity to optimize Xerox’s relationship, to
the extent it continues, with Fuji is now.
The joint venture was entered into over 50 years ago, and its terms appear to
have only become worse for Xerox over time. Looking in from the outside given
the opaque disclosures, the arrangement now favors Fuji and I see today's
circumstances as a great opportunity to build value for Xerox. This management
team and board did not get Xerox into this situation, but a revised relationship
with Fuji or others that is more favorable to the company and its shareholders
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would be a great start to the new era at Xerox. I will continue to pursue updates
from you, and thank you for your discussions with my firm. Please advise the
board of directors of this letter and my concerns. (Emphases added.)
69. Despite the justifiable and sound concerns raised by Plaintiff in his May 2017
letter, Defendant Jacobson and the rest of the Xerox board ignored Plaintiff’s pleas and, instead,
furthered and expanded Xerox’s relationship with Fuji as evident by the contemplated
Transaction.
70. In December 2017, Jonathan Christodoro, a Xerox board member at the time, sent
a letter to Defendant Keegan, the Chairman of the board, announcing his resignation given his
belief that the board was making decisions and going down a path that was inconsistent with his
beliefs and not in the best interest of the Company and its shareholders.
71. On January 17, 2018, after being ignored for months and learning that Xerox was
now in discussions with Fuji to substantially alter the joint venture relationship between Xerox
and Fuji, Plaintiff wrote a public letter to the Director Defendants (a copy of which is attached
hereto as part of Exhibit F), which stated as follows:
For nearly a decade, I have been one of the top five shareholders of Xerox
Corporation (the “Company” or “Xerox”) and today am the third largest
shareholder of the Company. During that period, despite a litany of challenges
and disappointments too numerous to list here, I have not taken the step of writing
a public letter to the Board of Directors of the Company (the “Board”), instead
preferring to engage with Xerox privately, following the sale of my company,
Affiliated Computer Services, Inc., to Xerox in 2010.
Today, in order to protect all Xerox shareholders and to ensure that the Company
does not take further steps to damage our collective shareholding investment, I am
changing my long-standing position to publicly demand that Xerox immediately
disclose its critical joint venture agreement with Fujifilm Holdings Corporation
(“Fuji”) in accordance with the unambiguous disclosure requirements of the U.S.
securities laws. I further demand that the Board hire new and independent
advisors following discussions with us to evaluate the Company’s strategic
options with Fuji, including the potential termination of what I suspect but am
unable to yet confirm is a one-sided value destroying agreement disfavoring
Xerox, that Fuji has repeatedly breached, including last year through the Asian
“WorldCom” accounting scandal at Fuji Xerox. I wrote to the Board over eight
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months ago on this matter (attached), and I have repeatedly spent time and
resources to explore these issues and request the relevant documents from the
Company to no avail. I am very disappointed in Mr. Jacobson and his lethargic
approach regarding Fuji.
As you well know, shareholders and potential shareholders have been perplexed
and put off of the Company by the venture with Fuji, speculating at the incredible
materiality of its secret terms, from change of control provisions to manufacturing
most of Xerox’s products to all manner of potential terms that incredibly in 2018
are not disclosed by the Company at all. In this era of corporate governance, to
omit disclosures of this magnitude and materiality is breathtaking.
Furthering the harm, we read with interest that Xerox is now in discussions with
Fuji to substantially alter its relationship with Fuji, which was material enough to
warrant front page news in many of the most prominent financial news services,
but left shareholders and potential shareholders guessing as to how to evaluate a
change to a bedrock agreement guiding the Company’s future that is nowhere
disclosed in its voluminous public filings.
It is now on record in a recent Wall Street Journal article that the venture has
raised serious doubts in the minds of many Xerox investors and has moved
overwhelmingly in Fuji’s favor over time (see Wall Street Journal, “In Talks,
Fujifilm Outshines Xerox”). At a time when the Board should be aggressively
pursuing our shareholder rights to terminate the Fuji venture and liberate the
Company globally, to instead plot in secret in violation of the law to cook up a
short term band-aid is insufficient and unwise in the extreme and warrants
shareholder action.
All shareholders deserve to know now what Xerox’s rights are under the central
existing agreement governing the Company’s future so that they can engage the
Company, provide their views and make their investment and voting decisions
with at least the minimum cards on the table. At a time when the Company
appears to be bellying back up to a bar that has been unforgiving to Xerox that is
doubly so.
72. Once again, Plaintiff’s demand that the Director Defendants explore the
Company’s ripe termination rights of the joint venture agreements and liberate the Company to
explore strategic alternatives to its relationship with Fuji fell on deaf ears. Instead, the Director
Defendants finally disclosed copies of the joint venture agreements—which only further
confirmed the serious concerns raised by Plaintiff about Xerox’s one-sided, value-destroying
agreements with Fuji—and hurried to complete this awful Transaction.
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E. The Conflicted Director Defendants Approve A Dramatically One-Sided,

Undervalued Change Of Control Transaction With Fuji And Shockingly
Make Fuji’s “Crown Jewel” Lock-Up Right Permanent
73. On January 31, 2018, Xerox and Fuji announced that they have entered into a
definitive agreement to combine Xerox into Fuji Xerox. On February 5, 2018, Xerox filed a
Form 8-K and attached copies of the Transaction agreements, including a Redemption
Agreement and a Share Subscription Agreement. Pursuant to the terms of these agreements, Fuji
Xerox, which is currently owned 75% by Fuji and 25% by Xerox, will become a wholly-owned
subsidiary of Xerox, with Fuji Xerox taking out a loan for an amount up to $6.1 billion, along
with cash on hand (if any), to acquire Fujifilm’s ownership interest in Fuji Xerox. Following the
acquisition, Fuji will use the $6.1 billion of proceeds to purchase newly issued shares of Xerox,
giving it a 50.1% of ownership interest in Xerox, with Xerox’s current shareholders owning
49.9% of the combined company. Xerox will then take out a $2.5 billion loan to pay current
Xerox shareholders a special cash dividend of $2.5 billion, approximately $9.80 per share of
common stock of Xerox. In addition, after closing, the combined entity will repay the loan taken
out by Fuji Xerox to fund the acquisition of Fuji’s ownership interest.
74. With respect to the corporate governance of the new, combined entity, Defendant
Jacobson, the current CEO of Xerox and a member of the Xerox board, will serve as the CEO of
the new combined entity. Additionally, the board of the new combined entity will have twelve
members, seven appointed by the Fuji board (one of whom will be Jacobson) and five
independent directors from the current Xerox board. Thus, a majority of the current ten (10)
member Xerox board who approved this proposed Transaction will obtain executive or board
positions in the new Fuji Xerox.
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75. This complex and opaque Transaction approved by the conflicted Director
Defendants dramatically undervalues the Company and gives Fuji majority ownership and
control over Xerox without Fuji having to spend a single penny or having to provide any realistic
control premium to Xerox shareholders. Notably, change of control premiums for comparable
transactions generally average approximately 25%-30% over market price. In fact, to the extent
there is any premium or value creation through this Transaction, that is because the
overwhelming majority of synergies would come from Xerox, and not Fuji. Not surprisingly, in
the Company’s recent public disclosures concerning this Transaction, and in a clear effort to
mislead shareholders and make the Transaction look more attractive than it really is, the
Company valued itself (excluding its 25% share in the Fuji Xerox joint venture) at a lower
EBITDA multiple than its current market value (including its 25% share in the joint venture).
76. Moreover, the conflicted Director Defendants failed to comply with their
fiduciary duties by agreeing to terms that disproportionately favor Fuji and create extreme post-
Transaction risk for Xerox shareholders. For example, Fuji is being allowed to purchase only
50.1% of Xerox despite the fact that Xerox, relative to Fuji Xerox, has greater revenue, greater
EBITDA, and greater operating profit. Also, allowing Fuji to purchase 50.1% of Xerox—just
enough to create its control—leaves the other 49.9% of Xerox shareholders hostage and subject
to abuse by Fuji. Indeed, it is highly unusual and not the market-norm for the board of the target
company—such as the Director Defendants—to approve a change of control transaction where
the buyer corporation only owns 50.1% of the combined entity, as opposed buying out all of the
shareholders in the deal.
77. Further evidence of the one-sided nature of the Transaction is that under the new
dividend structure agreed to by Fuji and Xerox for the new combined Fuji Xerox, Fuji will end
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up receiving over $120 million more in annual cash dividends than it currently receives from the
joint venture, while Xerox shareholders will receive $0 in additional regular annual cash
dividends. Simply put, this is a one-sided, disastrous deal for Xerox shareholders. It is therefore
no surprise that Xerox’s stock price has not experienced the usual rise after an announced change
of control transaction, but instead has seen a decline in its stock price as Xerox shareholders
clearly understand how unfavorable this transaction is for them.
78. Additionally, the Director Defendants abdicated their fiduciary duties to Xerox
shareholders by lying to Xerox shareholders in the current disclosures related to the proposed
Transaction. Specifically, the Director Defendants have led Xerox shareholders to believe that
they had no way out of Fuji’s deal-restrictive “crown jewel” lock-up rights under the joint
venture agreements and, therefore, they are essentially forced to do a deal with Fuji. This is
simply not true. The Director Defendants have had the legal right to terminate the joint venture
agreements and Fuji’s “crown jewel” lock-up right since last year, prior to any negotiation or
approval of this proposed Transaction, in light of the massive accounting fraud committed by
Xerox Fuji, under the watchful eye of Fuji. And had they exercised such rights, the Company
would have freed itself from Fuji’s “crown jewel” lock-up right and taken back complete control
over the use of its intellectual property and the licensing, manufacturing, and selling of its
products in the Asia and Pacific Rim markets. With such freedom and control, Xerox would be
in a significantly greater position to negotiate a strategic alternative with Fuji, another
competitor, or third party. Yet, the Director Defendants consciously chose not to take such action
and instead proceeded with the totally one-sided and economically starved Transaction with Fuji.
79. Even worse, the Director Defendants have made it impossible to now consider
any alternative proposal prior to the shareholder vote because, under the Share Subscription
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Agreement entered into as part of this Transaction, the Director Defendants have shockingly
made the previously undisclosed, terminable and admitted deal-restrictive “crown jewel” lock-up
right of Fuji under the joint venture agreements permanent. A copy of the Share Subscription
Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit G. Specifically, under Section 4.01(b)(xiv) of the Share
Subscription Agreement, the Director Defendants have agreed not to amend, waive or terminate
any Xerox “Material Contract,” which includes the joint venture agreements, and to allow Fuji to
seek specific performance if Xerox breaches this provision of the Agreement. In other words,
the Director Defendants have effectively given Fuji a “get-out-of-jail-free” card and released the
Company’s ability to pursue legally sound and ripe termination rights under the joint venture
agreements and thereby undo the prohibitive “crown jewel” lock-up right Fuji has therein. Thus,
Xerox shareholders were left in the dark about Fuji’s “crown jewel” lock-up right for nearly two
decades and, when finally informed about it, they are left to discover that the Director
Defendants have actually agreed to make Fuji’s lock-up permanent. Such bad faith conduct by
the Director Defendants is simply inexcusable.
80. In fact, by making Fuji’s “crown jewel” lock-up right permanent, the Director
Defendants are further misleading shareholders by stating in the public filings associated with
the Transaction that they have the right to accept and consider new “unsolicited” offers, knowing
full well such a right is illusory. It is absurd to believe that the Director Defendants truly have
the freedom to entertain new offers at this time when Fuji has a permanent lock-up right under
the terms of the proposed Transaction. Also, the Company will have to pay a whopping $183
million to Fuji if it accepts another offer. The reality is that the only way the Director
Defendants can truly engage in a fair and equitable bidding process is if Fuji’s “crown jewel”
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lock-up is immediately terminated, which the Company has the legal right to do, and potential
bidders can then make a bid for Xerox with complete access to the Asia and Pacific Rim markets.
81. On February 9, 2018—more than a week after announcing the proposed
Transaction—Xerox finally came clean to shareholders and admitted in its public disclosures
concerning the Transaction that Fuji’s “crown jewel” lock-up right under the joint venture
agreements—which it kept hidden from Plaintiff and other shareholders for nearly two
decades—has prevented the Company from entering into a change of control transaction with
anyone other than Fuji. As Xerox stated in a recent slide presentation to shareholders: “Existing
Joint Venture Agreements Limit Xerox’s Strategic Flexibility.” A copy of the Xerox slide
presentation is attached hereto as Exhibit H. The following is the portion of the presentation
confirming Fuji’s stranglehold on Xerox as a result of the “crown jewel” lock-up rights Fuji has
under the joint venture agreements:
82. Given such an admission, it is abundantly clear that the Director Defendants could
not—and did not—conduct any true and fair bidding process in connection with this proposed
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Transaction and, even worse, without Court intervention, they are precluded from doing so now
because of the permanent blocking rights Fuji has under the Share Subscription Agreement.
CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

COUNT I
BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY

(AGAINST THE DIRECTOR DEFENDANTS)
83. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1–82
above as if fully set forth herein.
84. The Director Defendants stand in a fiduciary relationship with Plaintiff and the
other public shareholders of Xerox and owe them, as well as the Company, fiduciary duties of
care, good faith, loyalty, candor, and independence. To this end, the Director Defendants are
required to not act in bad faith, with deceit, and to avoid conflicts of interest. In addition, in
undertaking a change of control transaction, the Director Defendants are required to act in the
best interest of Xerox shareholders and attempt to obtain a control premium that is fair and
adequate. Indeed, shareholders do not get a second bite at the apple when dealing with a change
of control premium. The Director Defendants are also required to ensure that the process
surrounding the negotiation, consideration and approval of such transaction is fair and free of
“deal protection” devices that impede the Company and shareholders ability to conduct a market-
check on the proposed Transaction.
85. As described above, in negotiating and approving the proposed Transaction, the
Director Defendants, individually and acting as a part of a common plan, breached their fiduciary
duties of care, good faith, loyalty, candor, and independence to Plaintiff and Xerox’s other
shareholders.
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86. Among other things, the Director Defendants did not act in the best interests of
the Company and its shareholders by negotiating and ultimately approving a Transaction that
disproportionately favors Fuji, significantly undervalues the Company, and provides a wholly
inadequate, if any, change of control premium to Plaintiff and all other Xerox shareholders. The
Director Defendants also improperly structured the Transaction in a manner that leaves the
remaining, minority 49.9% of Xerox shareholders hostage to Fuji, the majority shareholder. It
also enables Fuji to receive over $120 million more in annual cash dividends than it currently
receives from the joint venture, while Xerox shareholders, in contrast, receive $0 in additional
regular annual cash dividends.
87. The Director Defendants also failed to pursue a fair and transparent bidding
process given the existence of the unlawful and secretive “crown jewel” lock-up right Fuji has
under the joint venture agreements. Indeed, the Director Defendants have admitted that Fuji’s
“crown jewel” lock-up limited Xerox’s strategic alternatives. Even worse, the Director
Defendants agreed to make Fuji’s deal-prohibitive lock-up rights permanent. Such a permanent
lock-up right clearly prevents the proposed Transaction from undergoing a fair and equitable
market-check.
88. Moreover, the Director Defendants have knowingly made disclosures to Plaintiff
and other Xerox shareholders concerning the Transaction that are false and misleading and
violate the Company’s own disclosure policies. These misleading disclosures include failing to
adequately inform shareholders of the existence of Fuji’s “crown jewel” lock-up right under the
joint venture agreements and the Company’s legal right to terminate such lock-up right prior to
any negotiation and approval of the proposed Transaction. In fact, the Director Defendants
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participated in the Company’s 17-year fraud about the nature and material terms of the joint
venture agreement.
89. Also, the Director Defendants, who are part of the “old guard” and are beholden
to the Defendant Jacobson, the CEO, were conflicted when they approved the Transaction. In
fact, at least a majority of the Director Defendants will have executive and board positions with
the new combined entity.
90. As a result of the Director Defendants’ numerous breaches of their fiduciary
duties, Plaintiff faces an imminent risk of irreparable injury and has no adequate remedy at law.
Indeed, if the proposed Transaction is permitted to close, the opportunity for Xerox shareholders
to benefit from a full and fair market check and receive a superior control premium will be lost
forever because the improper, but terminable, lock-up rights Fuji has under the joint venture
agreements will become permanent. Accordingly, the Court should enjoin the proposed
Transaction.
COUNT II
AIDING AND ABETTING BREACHES OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES

(AGAINST FUJI)
92. Fuji is a knowing and active participant in this flawed and unfair Transaction
approved by the Director Defendants. Thus, Fuji has aided and abetted the Director Defendants’
breaches of fiduciary duties to Plaintiff and all other Xerox shareholders.
93. Among other things, in negotiating the Transaction, Fuji knew that the proposed
Transaction disproportionately favored Fuji both on the economics and structure. Even Fuji’s
CEO has acknowledged this fact when boasting to the Nikkei Asian Review, the “scheme will
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allow us to take control of Xerox without spending a penny.” Indeed, Fuji exploited its already
superior position to obtain a deal patently unfair to Xerox shareholders.
94. Moreover, Fuji knew that the Company and the Director Defendants were not
being truthful and candid with Xerox shareholders about Fuji’s “crown jewel” lock-up rights
under the joint venture agreements. Indeed, Fuji assisted the Director Defendants in continuing
to deceive Xerox shareholders and keep the existence of Fuji’s “crown jewel” lock-up rights a
secret until after the proposed Transaction was announced and Fuji’s “crown jewel” lock-up
rights became permanent.
95. Fuji also knew that the permanent “crown jewel” lock-up right it received and
demanded from the Director Defendants as part of the Transaction was an improper preclusive
“deal protection” device and would prevent the Director Defendants from engaging in any true
market-check.
96. As a direct result of Fuji’s aiding and abetting of the Director Defendants’ breach
of their fiduciary duties, Plaintiff has been harmed and faces an imminent risk of irreparable
injury, and has no adequate remedy at law.
97. The Court should therefore preliminarily, and if necessary, permanently enjoin
Fuji, and all persons acting in concert with it, from proceeding with the contemplated
Transaction and any further aiding of the Director Defendants’ breaches of their fiduciary duties
to Plaintiff and other shareholders.
COUNT III
COMMON LAW FRAUD

(AGAINST XEROX, THE DIRECTOR DEFENDANTS AND BURNS)
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99. As a major shareholder and investor in Xerox, Plaintiff relied on the truth and
accuracy of the Company’s public statements and filings. Plaintiff had every reason to believe
that the public filings signed by the Director Defendants and Burns were truthful and did not
omit information that would be material to him and other Xerox investors.
100. As described above, however, the Company, the Director Defendants and Burns
knowingly and repeatedly made public statements and filings that were false and misleading. To
this end, the Company, Director Defendants and Burns—many of whom were officers or
directors of the Company for many years—were fully aware of the material terms of the joint
venture agreement, particularly the “crown jewel” lock-up rights these agreements provided to
Fuji; yet they kept that critical information a secret from Plaintiff and other shareholders for
many years.
101. In fact, nowhere in the Company’s annual financial reports for fiscal 2015 or
2016, which were signed by the Director Defendants and Burns, did they disclose the material
terms of the joint venture agreements, particularly the “crown jewel” lock-up rights these
agreements provided to Fuji. Significantly, there was nothing stopping the Company, the
Director Defendants, or Burns from disclosing these material terms to Plaintiff and other Xerox
shareholders.
102. Had Plaintiff been made aware of the material provisions in the joint venture
agreements, particularly the “crown jewel” lock-up rights these agreements provided to Fuji, he
would have altered his decision-making with respect to the purchase and sale of his Xerox
stockholdings.
103. As a result, Plaintiff has been damaged in an amount to be determined at trial.
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PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for relief and judgment, including:
a) preliminarily and permanently enjoining the Director Defendants and Fuji, and all
persons acting in concert with them, from proceeding with the proposed Transaction;
b) directing the Director Defendants to immediately comply with their fiduciary
obligations to Plaintiff, the Company and other Xerox shareholders;
c) directing the Director Defendants to eliminate the improper lock-up provisions in
the joint venture agreements and Transaction agreements;
d) directing the Director Defendants to remedy all of their false and misleading
disclosures to Plaintiff and Xerox shareholders;
e) directing Fuji to cease its unlawful aiding and abetting the Director Defendants’
breaches of fiduciary duty;
f) awarding damages in favor of Plaintiff and against the Director Defendants as a
result of their fraudulent conduct and breaches of fiduciary duties in an amount to be determined
at trial;
g) reimbursement of Plaintiff’s costs and expenses incurred in this action, including
his reasonable attorneys’ fees; and
h) such other and further relief as may be just and proper.
Dated: February 13, 2018 KING & SPALDING LLP

New York, New York
By: /s/ Israel Dahan

Israel Dahan
Richard T. Marooney, Jr.
Peter Isajiw
1185 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036
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Telephone No.: (212) 556-2114

Email: idahan@kslaw.com
Robert E. Meadows
(pro hac vice application forthcoming)
1100 Louisiana, Suite 4000
Houston, TX 77002
Telephone No.: (713) 276-7370
Email: rmeadows@kslaw.com
Counsel for Plaintiff
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FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 02/13/2018 09:34 AM INDEX NO.

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

TO THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANTS:

(See attached List of Defendants with Addresses)

Dated: February 13, 2018

KING & SPALDING LLP

By: /s/ Israel Dahan

Counsel for Plaintiff

DEFENDANTS SERVICE LIST

FUJIFILM HOLDINGS CORP. CHERYL GORDON KRONGARD

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

“scheme will allow us to take control of Xerox without spending a penny.”

2. The Director Defendants—a majority of whom have secured for themselves

terminate the joint venture agreements through Fuji’s participation in a “WorldCom”-like

shareholders as part of the proposed Transaction.

possibility of any market-check on the proposed Transaction. By making Fuji’s lock-up

8. In an attempt to prevent this negative market reaction for Xerox shareholders, in

complete this awful Transaction.

9. In short, by approving this unreasonably one-sided and grossly unfair Transaction,

11. Defendant Fuji is a Japanese multinational photography and imaging company.

member of the Xerox board since January 2017.

and is the current Chairman of the Xerox board.

23. The Defendants identified in paragraphs 13 through 22 are collectively referred to

herein as the “Director Defendants.”

“crown jewel” lock-up rights of Fuji under those agreements.

Australia, and New Zealand.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

systematic business in New York.

27. Venue is proper in this County under CPLR § 503(a).

The Joint Enterprise Contract (“JEC”)

attached hereto as Exhibit A.

remaining 25% of the total shares in Fuji Xerox.

commercial standards of fair dealing.”

requirements to which it is subject under applicable law or contractual obligations.”

the date the Party seeking termination gives notice of breach . . . .”

35. In addition, pursuant to Section 9.1(a)(v):

if a Change of Control occurs and a Competitor (a) becomes the beneficial

rights through at least March 2021. 3

disposed of in accordance with applicable agreements, including without limitation the

agreement shall be referred to an independent arbitrator to be appointed by the Japan

arbitration shall be conducted, and governed by Japanese law.

Fuji and Fuji Xerox, as described below.

described the Fuji Xerox joint venture as follows:

Fuji Xerox is an unconsolidated entity in which we own a 25 percent interest, and

particularly the preclusive change of control provision therein.

during that period, based on wholly incomplete and misleading information.

anyone other than Fuji.

it important in determining whether to buy, sell or hold, or engage in other transactions

The March 2001 Side Letter

the JEC and shall be deemed incorporated therein.

The Technology Agreement And Master Program Agreement

expiration date. A copy of the Technology Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit C.

territories, possessions or dependencies (the “Territory”).

license to non-Xerographic, non-marking, Document Processing Activities (“DPA”) technical

first offer with respect to non-Xerographic marking products.

of America, as reflected in the practice of independent certified public accountants of

international reputation acceptable to both Parties.” In addition, “[e]ach payment of royalties by

permit Xerox to terminate the Technology Agreement immediately.

54. Importantly, a termination of the Technology Agreement immediately terminates

Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit D. The Master Agreement is automatically terminated,