Republic of the Philippines Vs. Yang Chi Hao, G.R. No. 165332.

October 2, 2009

FACTS: A petition for naturalization was filed by respondents and this was opposed
by the OSG. The RTC ruled against the respondents but later on reversed itself in an
MR and granted the petition. Instead of filing an appeal, OSG filed a petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 alleging that it was grave abuse of discretion when RTC
reversed itself when there was no submission of any additional evidence. OSG also
contended that there was no need to appeal because ROC applies only suppletory to
naturalization law.

ISSUE: was resort to rule 65 proper?

RULING: No. Contrary to petitioner’s contention, appeal is mandatory in

naturalization laws as mandated under Sections 11 and 12 of Commonwealth Act
No. 473 (1939), or the Revised Naturalization Law. Also, a decision granting a
petition for naturalization becomes executory only two years after its promulgation.
As such, petitioner is not without a remedy to assail the grant of citizenship. In
addition, it may also move to have the naturalization certificate cancelled in the
proper proceedings, if it can be shown that the certificate was obtained fraudulently.

It must be noted that Rule 65 is an extraordinary remedy and may only be availed of
if there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy.

G.R. No. 175319. January 15, 2010 People of the Philippines Vs. Joselito Noque y
Gomez, 2nd Division

FACTS: In a buy-bust operation, law enforcers was able to recover dangerous drugs
from accused. He was charged with violations of Sections 15 and 16 of RA 6425 that
define and penalize the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of regulated
drugs. However the allegations in the Information refer to sale and possession of
shabu while the drug proven on trial was ephedrine. This prompted accused to file a
dismissal of the case.

ISSUE: WoN appellant’s conviction for the sale and possession of shabu, despite the
fact that what was established and proven was the sale and possession of ephedrine,
violated his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusations against him since the charges in the Informations are for selling and
possessing methamphetamine hydrochloride.

RULING: No. It must be noted that the offenses designated in the Informations are
for violations of Sections 15 and 16 of RA 6425, which define and penalize the
crimes of illegal sale and possession of regulated drugs. The allegations in the
Informations for the unauthorized sale and possession of shabu or
methamphetamine hydrochloride are immediately followed by the qualifying
phrase which is a regulated drug. Thus, it is clear that the designations and
allegations in the Informations are for the crimes of illegal sale and illegal
possession of regulated drugs. Ephedrine has been classified as a regulated drug by
the Dangerous Drugs Board in Board Resolution No. 2, Series of 1988.

G.R. No. 179792. March 5, 2010 LNS International Manpower Services Vs. Armando
Padua, Jr., 2nd Division

FACTS: Respondent Armando C. Padua, Jr. filed a Sworn Statement before the
Adjudication Office of the POEA against LNS and Sharikat Al Saedi International
Manpower (Sharikat) for violation of Section 2(b), (d), and (e) of Rule I, Part VI of
the 2002 POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and Employment
of Land-based Overseas Workers. Respondent Padua alleged that he applied as auto
electrician with petitioner LNS and assured of a job in Saudi Arabia. Respondent
paid to LNS the processing fees, medical expenses, and trade test. Respondent Padua
further alleged that it was another agency, Sharikat, which processed his papers and
eventually deployed him to Saudi Arabia. However, he returned to the Philippines
because he was not allegedly paid his salaries and also because of violations in the
terms and conditions of his employment contract.

In its answer, LNS admitted that Padua applied for employment abroad but he
withdrew all the documents he submitted to LNS. As proof, LNS attached the
withdrawal letter duly signed by Padua. Thus, LNS claimed that it could not be held
liable for non-issuance of receipt or misrepresentation. The POEA issued its order
finding LNS liable for non-issuance of receipt and misrepresentation. As to Sharikat,
the POEA found no sufficient evidence to hold it liable for the violations charged. On
appeal to the Secretary of DOLE, it dismissed the appeal of petitioner and affirmed
the ruling of the POEA. Aggrieved, petitioner filed with the CA a petition for
certiorari but it was dismissed.

ISSUE: Is petitioner liable for non-issuance of receipt and misrepresentation?

RULING: No. As a general rule, factual findings of administrative and quasi-judicial

agencies specializing in their respective fields, especially when affirmed by the CA,
must be accorded high respect, if not finality. However, the Court find out that the
factual findings do not conform to the evidence on record or are not supported by
substantial evidence, as in the instant case.

The self-serving and unsubstantiated allegations of respondent cannot defeat the

concrete evidence submitted by petitioner. In fine, for failure to adduce any shred of
evidence of payment made to petitioner, or that petitioner referred or endorsed
respondent for employment abroad to another agency, the charges of non-issuance
of receipt and misrepresentation against petitioner could not possibly prosper. By
the voluntary withdrawal of respondent’s application from petitioner, the latter
could not have been involved in the recruitment and placement of respondent and
consequently could not be held liable for any violation.
G.R. No. 165300. April 23, 2010 Atty. Pedro M. Ferrer Vs. Spouses Alfredo Diaz, et al.,
2nd Division

FACTS: The Diazes, represented by their daughter Comandante obtained from him a
loan of P1,118,228.00 secured by a Real Estate Mortgage Contract by way of second
mortgage over Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) and a Promissory Note payable
within six months or up to November 7, 1999. Comandante also issued to petitioner
post-dated checks to secure payment of said loan.

Petitioner further claimed that prior to this or on May 29, 1998, Comandante, for a
valuable consideration of P600,000.00, which amount formed part of the above
mentioned secured loan, executed in his favor an instrument entitled Waiver of
Hereditary Rights and Interests Over a Real Property (Still Undivided), and which
property is titled and registered in the name of my parents Alfredo T. Diaz and
Imelda G. Diaz, as evidenced by a Transfer Certificate of Title. On the basis of said
waiver, petitioner executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim which he caused to be
annotated at the back of the TCT.

The Diazes, however, reneged on their obligation as the checks issued by

Comandante were dishonored upon presentment. Despite repeated demands, said
respondents still failed and refused to settle the loan. Thus, petitioner filed on
September 29, 1999 a Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money Secured by Real
Estate Mortgage Contract against the Diazes and Comandante. At the Pangans’ end,
they alleged that they acquired the subject property by purchase in good faith and
for a consideration of P3,000,000.00 on November 11, 1999 from the Diazes
through the latter’s daughter Comandante. However, on December 21, 1999, they
were surprised upon being informed by petitioner that the subject land had been
mortgaged to him by the Diazes. As affirmative defense, the Pangans asserted that
the annotation of petitioner’s adverse claim on TCT No. RT-6604 cannot impair their
rights as new owners of the subject property. They claimed that the Waiver of
Hereditary Rights and Interests Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) upon which
petitioner’s adverse claim is anchored cannot be the source of any right or interest
over the property considering that it is null and void under paragraph 2 of Article
1347 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE: Is a waiver of hereditary rights in favor of another executed by a future heir

while the parents are still living valid?

RULING: Pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 1347 of the Civil Code, no
contract may be entered into upon a future inheritance except in cases expressly
authorized by law. For the inheritance to be considered “future”, the succession
must not have been opened at the time of the contract. A contract may be classified
as a contract upon future inheritance, prohibited under the second paragraph of
Article 1347, where the following requisites concur:
(1) That the succession has not yet been opened.

(2) That the object of the contract forms part of the inheritance; and,

(3) That the promissor has, with respect to the object, an expectancy of a right
which is purely hereditary in nature.

In this case, there is no question that at the time of execution of Comandante’s

Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest over a Real Property (Still Undivided),
succession to either of her parent’s properties has not yet been opened since both of
them are still living. With respect to the other two requisites, both are likewise
present considering that the property subject matter of Comandante’s waiver
concededly forms part of the properties that she expect to inherit from her parents
upon their death and, such expectancy of a right, as shown by the facts, is
undoubtedly purely hereditary in nature.

From the foregoing, it is clear that Comandante and petitioner entered into a
contract involving the former’s future inheritance as embodied in the Waiver of
Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) executed by
her in petitioner’s favor. The Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real
Property (Still Undivided) executed by Comandante in favor of petitioner as not
valid and that same cannot be the source of any right or create any obligation
between them for being violative of the second paragraph of Article 1347 of the Civil
Code.

G.R. No. 167567. September 22, 2010 San Miguel Corporation Vs. Bartolome Puzon,
Jr, First Division

FACTS: Puzon purchased SMC products on credit. To ensure payment and as

business practice, SMC required him to issued postdate checks equivalent to the
value of the products purchase on credit before the same were released to him. Said
checks were returned to puzon when the transaction covered by these checks were
paid or settled in full.

Puzon issued 2 checks for such transaction. On January 23, 2001 Puzon, together
with his accountant visited SMC Sales Office to allegedly settle his account and
requested to see the two checks he issued. However, when he got hold of the checks,
he immediately left the office bringing the checks with him. SMC sent a letter
demanding the return of the checks but was ignored by Puzon, hence a case for theft
was filed against him.

ISSUE: WoN the postdated checks issued by Puzon transferred ownership to

petitioner making him liable for theft?

RULING: No, the check still belongs to Puzon, hence not liable of theft. Negotiable
Instruments Law provides: Sec. 12. Antedated and postdated- The instrument is not
invalid for the reason only that it is antedated or postdated, provided this is not
done for an illegal or fraudulent purpose. The person to whom an instrument so
dated is delivered acquires the title thereto as of the date of delivery. (Underscoring
supplied.)Note however that delivery as the term is used in the aforementioned
provision means that the party delivering did so for the purpose of giving effect
thereto. Otherwise, it cannot be said that there has been delivery of the negotiable
instrument. Once there is delivery, the person to whom the instrument is delivered
gets the title to the instrument completely and irrevocably. If the subject check was
given by Puzon to SMC in payment of the obligation, the purpose of giving effect to
the instrument is evident thus title to or ownership of the check was transferred
upon delivery. However, if the check was not given as payment, but being mere
security for debt, there being no intent to give effect to the instrument, then
ownership of the check was not transferred to SMC.

The evidence of SMC failed to establish that the check was given n payment of the
obligation of Puzon. There was no provisional receipt of official receipt issued for
the amount of the check.

People v. Duran, GR 175834, June 8, 2011 – First Division

FACTS: AAA was allegedly raped by her step father during the 1st, 2nd and 3rd week
of March 2001. However upon cross-examination on the victim, she gave different
dates and other facts not consistent with her direct testimony with regard to rape
incidents on the first and second week of March 2001. This prompted the accused to
file a dismissal based on such inconsistencies. Plaintiff’s argued that such matters
are not material and inconsequential to their case.

ISSUE: WoN such inconsistencies are enough to cast reasonable doubt and hence
acquit the accused for the first and second week?

RULING: Yes. The records show that such inconsistencies, during the cross
examination and the re-direct examination of the plaintiff, were apparent and
should have been given scant consideration. The witnesses’ testimony is totally
different from what she said during the cross-examination and was also different
from what she said during the re-direct. The Court was not convinced.

Jose R. Catacutan Vs. People of the Philippines, GR 175991, Aug. 31, 2011 – First
Division

FACTS: Petitioner Jose Catacutan was held guilty before the Sandiganbayan for the
violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019(Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) for his
refusal to implement the promotion and appointments of Georgito Posesano and
Magdalena A. Divinagracia as Vocational Supervisors III despite the directive of
CHED and the Civil Service commission. Catacutan questioned the judgment,
contending that he was denied due process when he was not allowed to present the
CA judgment, dismissing the adiminstrative case against him.

ISSUE: Whether or not the judgment, finding petitioner guilty of violating RA 3019,
was well founded despite the refusal of the trial court to admit the dismissal of the
administrative case as evidence.

HELD: The stubborn defiance by petitioner in carrying out the memorandum issued
by CHED was attended by ill motive and bad faith. Such factual finding by the Trial
courts, which was affirmed by the sandiganbayan, was based on the evidence
presented before it. The non-admittance of the dismissal of the administrative case
did not violate petitioner’s right to due process where such dismissal was not
relevant to the adjudication of the criminal case. After all, administrative
proceedings require a different quantum of proof compared to criminal proceedings,
the judgment in one is not dependent on the other.

Present in the case were the elements to find the petitioner guilty of violating
Sec3(e) of RA 3019, to wit: 1.that the accused was a public officer performing an
official function; 2) that he acted in bad faith; and 3) that injury was caused to
another party because of such act.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ADRIANO CABRILLAS, BENNY CABTALAN, G.R. No.
175980, February 15, 2012, DIVISION

FACTS: Accused Adriano and Benny killed and stabbed to death the victim. In the
presentation of witness for the prosecution, witness Wilfredo testified that both
men took turns in stabbing the victim while witness Jonalyn testified that both men
stabbed the victim in unison. Accused Benny also asserts that Wilfredo is not
credible since he only surfaced 3 years after the incident to testify against accused.

ISSUE: WoN minor inconsistencies pertaining to trivial matters affect the credibility
of witnesses as well as their positive identification of the accused as the
perpetrators of the crime?

RULING: No. Anent the first issue, the inconsistency merely pertains to the manner
the fatal stab wounds was inflicted on the victim. It is perfectly natural for different
witness to testify on the occurrence of a crime to give varying details since it all
depends on the observing position of the witness. Anent the second issue, a
deference or reluctance in reporting a crime does not destroy the truth of the charge
nor is it an indication of deceit. Absence of other circumstances that would show
that the charge was a mere concoction and that Wilfredo was impelled by some evil
motives, delay in testifying is insufficient to discredit his testimony.
Flordeliza Maria Reyes-Rayel vs. Philippine Luen Thai Holdings Corporation, et al.,
G.R. No. 174893 July 11, 2012, Division

FACTS: Petitioner is occupying a managerial position in the company. Due to some

communication mishap with her superiors in which altercation ensued, she was
ordered dismissed on the basis of lack of confidence. Petitioner now assails the
validity of her dismissal saying that there is no substantial evidence to establish
valid ground for her dismissal since various emails from her superiors illustrating
her accomplishments and commendations, as well as her “good” overall
performance rating negate loss of trust and confidence. She also insists that she was
not afforded due process since no investigation and hearing was conducted as
required by company policy.

ISSUE: WoN the company validly terminated petitioner?

RULING: Yes. Anent the first issue, an employer has a distinct prerogative and wider
latitude of discretion in dismissing managerial personnel who performs functions
which by their nature require the employer’s full trust and confidence. As
distinguished from rank and file personnel, mere existence of a basis for believing
that a managerial employee has breached the trust of the employer justifies
dismissal. “Loss of confidence” as a ground for dismissal does not require proof
beyond reasonable doubt as the law requires only that there be at least some basis
to justify it. When petitioner delivered dismal performance and displayed poor work
attitude as attested to by his co-workers, such constitute sufficient reasons for an
employer to terminate an employee on the ground of loss of trust and confidence.

Anent the second issue, petitioner’s contention is without merit. Jurisprudence has
held that due process requirement is met when there is simply an opportunity to be
heard and to explain one’s side even if no hearing is conducted.