CLJ Bulletin 02/2010 CASE OF THE WEEK Print this page

COMPANY LAW: Corporate personality - Corporate veil - Piercing of - Circumstances when

Acorporate veil may be pierced

CONTRACT: Privity of contract - Trusts - Whether trusts an exception to the common law rule
of privity of contract

CIVIL PROCEDURE: Appeal - Fact, findings of - Concurrent findings of fact by trial and
intermediate appellate court - Whether there was unwarranted deduction based on faulty
judicial reasoning from admitted and established facts - Whether miscarriage of justice
occasioned - Whether concurrent findings rule of practice ought to apply

CIVIL PROCEDURE: Trial - Defendant fully conversant with facts but refusing to attend court
and give evidence - Consequences of - Whether evidence given by plaintiff ought to be presumed
to be true - Whether adverse inference ought to be drawn against defendant - Whether
defendant's failure to appear and give evidence at trial discredited defendant's case and
strengthened plaintiff's case - Whether trial judge's failure to consider effects of defendant's
failure to attend court and give evidence constituted a misdirection occasioning a miscarriage of
justice

EQUITY: Equitable remedies and reliefs - Constructive trust - Tracing - Plaintiff and defendant
agreeing to purchase property for business venture - Mutual understanding between plaintiff
and defendant that property to be registered in joint names and held in equal shares - Plaintiff
contributing towards purchase price - Defendant acquiring and registering property in her sole
name and denying plaintiff's right to the property - Whether constructive trust over property
created - Whether defendant held property on a constructive trust for the plaintiff - Whether
plaintiff entitled to trace her share of the property - Whether equitable for plaintiff to do so

EQUITY: Equitable remedies and reliefs - Specific performance - Plaintiff and defendant
agreeing to purchase property for business venture - Mutual understanding between plaintiff
and defendant that property to be registered in joint names and held in equal shares - Defendant
acquiring, registering property in her sole name and subsequently selling property to third party
- Third party not a bona fide purchaser - Whether constructive trust over property created -
Whether agreement may be specifically enforced against third party - Whether doctrine of
privity of contract applicable - Specific Relief Act 1950, s. 26(b)

EQUITY: Fraud in equity - Elements of - Whether intention to deceive a necessary ingredient in

equitable fraud

EVIDENCE: Adverse inference - Refusal of defendant to testify on own behalf - Consequences

of

EVIDENCE: Appeal - Interfering with findings of fact - Concurrent findings of fact by trial and
intermediate appellate court - Whether there was unwarranted deduction based on faulty
judicial reasoning from admitted and established facts - Whether miscarriage of justice
occasioned - Whether concurrent findings rule of practice ought to apply

EVIDENCE: Course of trial - Refusal to give evidence - Defendant fully conversant with facts
but refusing to attend court and give evidence - Consequences of

LAND LAW: Ownership - Restrictions in respect of non-citizens for purchase of property -

Constructive trust created over property in favour of non-citizen beneficiary - Whether prior
approval of State Authority required - Whether s. 433B of the National Land Code applied to
constructive trusts - Whether s. 433B of the National Land Code applied only to express trusts
registered under s. 344 of the National Land Code

PARTNERSHIP: Duties - Good faith - Mutual understanding between partners to purchase and
register property in their joint names - Mutual understanding that property to be held in equal
shares - One partner acquiring and registering property in her sole name and denying the
other's right to a half share in the property - Whether former partner breaching fiduciary duties
owed to the latter partner - Whether former partner guilty of equitable fraud in relation to the
latter's interest in the property

TRUSTS: Constructive trust - Circumstances when such a trust would arise - Role of equity in
constructive trusts - Rights of beneficiaries under a constructive trust

TRUSTS: Constructive trust - Property - Plaintiff and defendant agreeing to purchase property
for business venture - Mutual understanding between plaintiff and defendant that property to be
registered in joint names and held in equal shares - Plaintiff contributing towards purchase
price - Defendant acquiring and registering property in her sole name and denying plaintiff's
right to the property - Whether constructive trust over property created - Whether defendant
held property on a constructive trust for the plaintiff

TRUSTS: Resulting trust - Circumstances when such a trust would arise - Primary function of
court where a resulting trust is asserted - Whether court should begin by resorting to
presumptions - Whether court should first meticulously examine the facts to objectively ascertain
true intention of the parties

WORDS AND PHRASES: 'created in favour of any person or body as "trustee"' - National
Land Code, s. 433B - Whether such words referred to constructive trusts - Whether such words
referred to express trusts registered under s. 344 of the National Land Code

TAKAKO SAKAO v. NG PEK YUEN & ANOR

FEDERAL COURT, PUTRAJAYA
RICHARD MALANJUM CJ (SABAH & SARAWAK), ZULKEFLI MAKINUDIN FCJ,
GOPAL SRI RAM FCJ
[CIVIL APPEAL NO: 02(f)-20-2009(W)]
16 OCTOBER 2009
JUDGMENT

Gopal Sri Ram FCJ:

[1] The appellant is a Japanese citizen. She brought an action to establish that she was the
beneficial owner of a share in a shop-house of which the second respondent, a private limited
company is the registered proprietor. She failed before the High Court. Her appeal to the Court
of Appeal was dismissed. She now appeals to us pursuant to the leave granted by this court. The
facts have been fully rehearsed by the Court of Appeal in its judgment that is reported in [2009]
5 CLJ 200. We are therefore spared the task of regurgitating them here. Suffice that we state the
facts relevant to the issues in this appeal.

[2] The appellant and the first respondent were partners in the business of a restaurant. Sometime
in 1992, they decided to acquire the building in which the restaurant had its business. Each of
them was to contribute towards the purchase price. In the courts below, the appellant said that
she had provided a sum of RM214,610 as her contribution towards the price. That figure was
however corrected before us to RM194,610. But the courts below did not accept that this
payment had been made. They found for the far lesser sum of RM65,450. They also held that s.
433B of the National Land Code 1965 ("the Code") barred the appellant from enforcing any trust
that may have arisen in her favour by reason of her contribution towards the purchase price. We
will address these matters later in this judgment. It is the appellant's case that there was an
agreement or more appropriately, a mutual understanding, between her and the first respondent
that the building, when acquired, was to be purchased and registered in the joint names of herself
and the first respondent in equal shares. That did not happen. What however did happen was that
the first respondent purchased the property in question on 6 March 1992, for a sum of
RM950,000 and had it registered in her sole name. Part of the purchase price had been raised by
way of a loan from Perdana Finance Berhad. In mid-1996 the first respondent sold the property
to the second respondent company for a sum of RM1,930,000 part of which was raised by way
of a loan from Malayan Banking Berhad. In the meantime, the appellant lodged a caveat to
protect her interest in the property. She then instituted proceedings to enforce the trust she
claimed had arisen in her favour. Proceedings were also commenced by the first respondent for
the removal of the appellant's caveat. Both actions were tried together by the High Court which
found against the appellant. It dismissed the appellant's action and directed the removal of her
caveat. It also ordered the first respondent to refund the sum of RM65,450 with interest to the
appellant. The appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal which affirmed the High Court's orders.

[3] Four main points arise in this appeal. First, whether the High Court's evaluation of the
appellant's evidence was correct, in particular as to the amount of her contribution to the
purchase price. Second, what rights, if any did the appellant acquire under the terms of the
mutual understanding between her and the first respondent? Third, whether the appellant may
enforce her rights, if any, against the second respondent. And fourth, whether s. 433B of the
Code applies to the instant case. Taking the first issue, it is significant that in the present instance
the first respondent did not attend court nor give evidence nor take any part in the case. All she
did was merely to put forward arguments on why the appellant's caveat ought to be removed. She
could have, if she wished, given evidence and challenged the appellant's evidence. But as already
noted she refrained from doing that. On the facts of this case, there were two persons who were
privy to the terms of the arrangement in question and the details of the payments made and the
purpose for which they were made: the appellant and the first respondent. The appellant took the
witness stand and gave her evidence on the terms of the arrangement and about the sums of
money she had provided and the purpose for which they were provided. No evidence was called
on the part of the first respondent to refute the appellant's testimony. Such an important omission
was missed by both courts below.

[4] In our judgment, two consequences inevitably followed when the first respondent who was
fully conversant with the facts studiously refrained from giving evidence. In the first place, the
evidence given by the appellant ought to have been presumed to be true. As Elphinstone CJ said
in Wasakah Singh v. Bachan Singh [1931] 1 MC 125 at p 128:

If the party on whom the burden of proof lies gives or calls evidence which, if it is believed, is
sufficient to prove his case, then the judge is bound to call upon the other party, and has no
power to hold that the first party has failed to prove his case merely because the judge does not
believe his evidence. At this stage, the truth or falsity of the evidence is immaterial. For the
purpose of testing whether there is a case to answer, all the evidence given must be presumed to
be true.

Now, what the trial judge did in the present case is precisely what he ought not to have done. He
expressed dissatisfaction with the appellant's evidence without asking himself that most vital
question: does the first defendant/ respondent have a case to answer? This failure on the part of
the trial judge is a serious non-direction amounting to a misdirection which occasioned a
miscarriage of justice. The trial judge was at that stage not concerned with his belief of the
appellant's evidence. She had given her explanation as to the discrepancies in the figures. And
her evidence does not appear to be either inherently incredible or inherently improbable. In these
circumstances it was the duty of the judge to have accepted her evidence as true in the absence of
any evidence from the first respondent going the other way. He however failed to direct himself
in this fashion thereby occasioning a serious miscarriage of justice.

[5] The second consequence is that the court ought to have drawn an adverse inference against
the first respondent on the amount of the appellant's contribution to the purchase price as well as
the existence and the terms of the mutual understanding or agreement that she had with the first
respondent. Where, as here, the first respondent being a party to the action provides no reasons
as to why she did not care to give evidence the court will normally draw an adverse inference.
See Guthrie Sdn Bhd v. Trans-Malaysian Leasing Corp Bhd [1991] 1 CLJ 9; [1991] 1 CLJ (Rep)
155. See also, Jaafar Shaari & Siti Jama Hashim v. Tan Lip Eng & Anor [1997] 4 CLJ 509
where Peh Swee Chin FCJ said: "The respondents had chosen to close the case at the end of the
appellants' case. Although they were entitled to do so, they would be in peril of not having the
evidence of their most important witness and of having an adverse inference drawn against them
for failing to call such evidence should the circumstances demand it." There are two other
authorities that are of assistance on the point. In Wisniewski v. Central Manchester Health
Authority [1998] PIQR 324, Brooke LJ when delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal
quoted from a number of authorities including the following passage from the speech of Lord
Diplock in Herrington v. British Railways Board [1972] AC 877:
The appellants, who are a public corporation, elected to call no witnesses, thus depriving the
court of any positive evidence as to whether the condition of the fence and the adjacent terrain
had been noticed by any particular servant of theirs or as to what he or any other of their servants
either thought or did about it. This is a legitimate tactical move under our adversarial system of
litigation. But a defendant who adopts it cannot complain if the court draws from the facts which
have been disclosed all reasonable inferences as to what are the facts which the defendant has
chosen to withhold.

Brooke LJ then went on to say this:

From this line of authority I derive the following principles in the context of the present case:

(1) In certain circumstances a court may be entitled to draw adverse inferences from the absence
or silence of a witness who might be expected to have material evidence to give on an issue in an
action.

(2) If a court is willing to draw such inferences, they may go to strengthen the evidence adduced
on that issue by the other party or to weaken the evidence, if any, adduced by the party who
might reasonably have been expected to call the witness.

(3) There must, however, have been some evidence, however weak, adduced by the former on
the matter in question before the court is entitled to draw the desired inference: in other words,
there must be a case to answer on that issue.

(4) If the reason for the witness's absence or silence satisfies the court, then no such adverse
inference may be drawn. If, on the other hand, there is some credible explanation given, even if it
is not wholly satisfactory, the potentially detrimental effect of his/her absence or silence may be
reduced or nullified.

The other case is Crawford v. Financial Institutions Services Ltd (Jamaica) [2005] UKPC 40,
where Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe when delivering the Advice of the Privy Council said:

It is well settled that in civil proceedings the court may draw adverse inferences from a
defendant's decision not to give or call evidence as to matters within the knowledge of himself or
his employees.

[6] Sarkar on Evidence 16th edn at p. 1837 states:

It is the bounden duty of a party personally knowing the whole circumstances to give evidence
and to submit to cross-examination. Non-appearance as a witness would be the strongest possible
circumstance to discredit the truth of his case Gurbakhsh v. Gurdial, A [1927] PC 230.

[7] In the present instance, there is no doubt that the first respondent had intimate knowledge of
the material facts relevant to the dispute and that she was privy to the several steps through
which the transaction had proceeded. Based on the authorities already cited, it is patently clear
that the trial judge in the present case ought to have held that the failure of the first respondent to
give evidence apart from discrediting her case strengthened the appellant's case on those vital
points that lay at the axis of the dispute between the parties. This, the trial judge clearly omitted
to do. Instead, he treated the first respondent's failure to appear and give evidence as a matter of
no apparent consequence. His non-direction upon such a crucial point as this certainly amounts
to a misdirection which has occasioned a miscarriage of justice. To conclude the first issue, it is
our judgment that there was no judicial appreciation of the appellant's evidence. A reasonable
tribunal correctly directing itself on the facts and the relevant law would have held that the
appellant had indeed contributed RM194,610 towards the purchase price of the building; that
there was a mutual understanding between the appellant and the first respondent that they shall
be beneficial co-owners of the property in question in equal shares; and that the first respondent
had acted in breach of that understanding.

[8] Learned counsel for the second respondent argued that this being a case in which there are
concurrent findings of fact by both courts below, we should not, in accordance with the settled
practice of this court, interfere with those findings. The short answer to that submission is that
the practice referred to applies to cases where the tribunal of fact at first instance as well as the
Court of Appeal have not misdirected themselves. To meet the argument thus advanced, we refer
to the speech of Viscount Simon in 'The Eurymedon' [1942] 73 Lloyd LR 217:

The appellants, therefore, start in this House under the considerable handicap that there are
concurrent findings of fact against them. I am far from saying that in these circumstances the
House has no jurisdiction to allow the appeal, but it would need very clear and convincing
reasoning to justify us to overthrowing what has already been decided. If it could be shown that
the course of events affirmed by the learned judge could not have occurred, that would be an
excellent reason for reversing his view - in these mundane happenings there is no more
conclusive argument than non est credendum quia impossible. If the impeached decision were
shown to be unwarranted deduction based on faulty judicial reasoning from admitted or
established facts, that might lead to its reversal.

As has been amply demonstrated, the present case is one in which there was an unwarranted
deduction based on faulty judicial reasoning from admitted and established facts. Hence this is
an appropriate case to which the concurrent findings rule of practice does not apply.

[9] We also approve and apply to the facts of the present instance the observations of Lord
Pearce in his dissenting speech in Onassis and Calogeropoulos v. Vergottis [1968] 2 Lloyd's
Report 403 at p 430:

The function of a Court of Appeal is to set aside a judgment that should not be allowed to stand
because it occasions a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice. That wrong or miscarriage of
justice may consist of a judgment in favour of a wrong party. It may also consist of a failure in
the judicial process to which both parties are entitled as of right, namely, the weighing of the
respective cases and contentions. Such failure may constitute a wrong or miscarriage of justice
even though it may appear that the appellant in the end failed to secure a judgment in his favour:
but the fact that the right party seems to have succeeded in the court below will naturally make a
Court of Appeal extremely reluctant to interfere, and it would only do so in the rarest cases. Such
matters are questions of degree.
In our judgment, the present instance is one in which so much of the judgment at first instance
that is based on facts should not be allowed to stand because it has occasioned a substantial
wrong or miscarriage of justice.

[10] The last case that we cite in answer to the second respondent's submission on the practice of
an apex court in an appeal in which there are concurrent findings is Srimati Bibhabati Devi v.
Kumar Ramendra Narayan Roy & Ors [1946] AC 508. In that case, the Privy Council held that:

... in order to obviate the practice, there must be some miscarriage of justice or violation of some
principle of law or procedure. That miscarriage of justice means such a departure from the rules
which permeate all judicial procedure as to make that which happened not in the proper sense of
the word judicial procedure at all. That the violation of some principle of law or procedure must
be such an erroneous proposition of law that if that proposition be corrected the finding cannot
stand; or it may be the neglect of some principle of law or procedure, whose application will
have the same effect. The question whether there is evidence on which the courts could arrive at
their finding is such a question of law.

We would observe that the present instance is a case in which both courts below neglected to
apply the true principle of law applicable to the fact pattern here thereby occasioning a
miscarriage of justice.

[11] The Court of Appeal did not address its mind in its judgment to any of the points discussed
earlier in this judgment. With respect, its approach should have been far more analytical of the
facts and of the proceedings at first instance. In particular, there is, despite a recitation of the line
of defence taken by the first respondent, no reference whatsoever to the consequence of her
having studiously refrained from entering the witness box. Applying Gurbakhsh v. Gurdial AIR
[1927] PC 230, it was her bounden duty to have informed the trial court of all the material
circumstances that were peculiarly within her knowledge. The Court of Appeal does not appear
to have noticed this aspect of the case at all. With respect, its judgment is, in this respect, equally
flawed as that of the trial judge.

[12] With that we turn now to consider the second issue. The question here is the legal
consequence of the mutual understanding between the appellant and the first respondent,
including the payments made by the former to the latter. It is, as we have earlier said, clear from
the totality of the circumstances that the appellant and first respondent were essentially partners
in a business venture. Here we find it appropriate to quote from the judgment of Dixon J in
James Birtchnell v. The Equity Trustees, Executors and Agency Co Ltd (1928-30) 42 CLR 384:

The relationship between partners is, of course, fiduciary. Indeed, it has been said that a stronger
case of fiduciary relationship cannot be conceived than that which exists between partners. 'Their
mutual confidence is the lifeblood of the concern. It is because they trust one another that they
are partners in the first instance; it is because they continue to trust one another that the business
goes on' (per Bacon VC in Helmore v. Smith [1890] 15 App Cas 223 at p 225, [1886] 35 Ch D
436 at p 444). The relation is based, in some degree, upon a mutual confidence that the partners
will engage in some particular kind of activity or transaction for the joint advantage only.
[13] As partners the appellant and the first respondent owed each other a duty to act with utmost
good faith towards each other. See, Blisset v. Daniel [1853] 68 ER 1022. The mutual
understanding that both partners would purchase in their joint names, with financial
contributions from each of them the building in which the business of their restaurant was being
conducted and hold it in equal shares formed an integral part of the partnership. Acting in breach
of her fiduciary duties the first respondent acquired the property and had it registered in her sole
name. She then sold it to the second respondent at a higher price and proceeded to deny the
appellant's right to a half share in it. Given the circumstances of this case, the first respondent
was clearly guilty of equitable fraud in relation to appellant's interest in the property in question.

[14] The authorities make it clear that if a trustee or other fiduciary acquires property in breach
of trust or by means of other unconscionable conduct, he or she holds it on a constructive trust
for the true beneficiary. Traditionally, courts have declined to provide a definition of a
constructive trust. As Edmund Davies LJ said in Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. Herbert Smith & Co
[1969] 2 Ch 276, 300:

English law provides no clear and all-embracing definition of a constructive trust. Its boundaries
have been left perhaps deliberately vague, so as not to restrict the court by technicalities in
deciding what the justice of a particular case may demand. But it appears that in this country
unjust enrichment or other personal advantage is not a sine qua non. Thus in Nelson v. Larholt
[1948] 1 KB 339, it was not suggested that the defendant was himself one penny better off by
changing an executor's cheques; yet, as he ought to have known of the executor's want of
authority to draw them, he was held liable to refund the estate, both on the basis that he was a
constructive trustee for the beneficiaries and on a claim for money had and received to their use.
Nevertheless, the concept of unjust enrichment has its value as providing one example among
many of what, for lack of a better phrase, I would call 'want of probity,' a feature which recurs
through and seems to connect all those cases drawn to the court's attention where a constructive
trust has been held to exist.

[15] In Paragon Finance plc v. DB Thakerar & Co [1999] 1 All ER 400, Millett LJ (later Lord
Millett) explained the concept of a constructive trust in terms that is difficult to improve:

A constructive trust arises by operation of law whenever the circumstances are such that it would
be unconscionable for the owner of property (usually but not necessarily the legal estate) to
assert his own beneficial interest in the property and deny the beneficial interest of another. In
the first class of case (and this is the class with which we are presently concerned), however, the
constructive trustee really is a trustee. He does not receive the trust property in his own right but
by a transaction by which both parties intend to create a trust from the outset and which is not
impugned by the plaintiff. His possession of the property is coloured from the first by the trust
and confidence by means of which he obtained it, and his subsequent appropriation of the
property to his own use is a breach of that trust. Well known examples of such a constructive
trust are McCormick v. Grogan [1869] 4 App. Cas. 82 (a case of a secret trust) and Rochefoucald
v. Boustead [1897] 1 Ch. 196 (where the defendant agreed to buy property for the plaintiff but
the trust was imperfectly recorded). Pallant v. Morgan [1953] Ch. 43 (where the defendant
sought to keep for himself property which the plaintiff trusted him to buy for both parties) is
another. In these cases the plaintiff does not impugn the transaction by which the defendant
obtained control of the property. He alleges that the circumstances in which the defendant
obtained control make it unconscionable for him thereafter to assert a beneficial interest in the
property.

[16] In our considered judgment, the fact pattern of the appellant's case presents no difficulty. It
falls squarely within the parameters of a constructive trust. The first respondent did not receive
the property in question in her own right. She acquired it pursuant to the mutual arrangement
between her and the appellant and with the aid of monies provided by the latter. The cumulative
circumstances, in particular the nature of the pre-existing fiduciary relationship and the
arrangement to jointly own the property in equal shares, show an intention to create a trust from
the outset which the appellant does not impugn. Additionally, there is a strong element of unjust
enrichment or lack of probity on the part of the first respondent. The appellant's claim against the
first respondent is as a beneficiary under a constructive trust. It is therefore a proprietary claim
and not merely monetary, that is to say, for money had and received.

[17] The trial judge largely influenced by the fact that the appellant had contributed towards the
purchase of the property classified the equitable obligation here as a resulting trust. In this he fell
into error because he completely overlooked the pre-existing fiduciary relationship between the
parties and the mutual understanding they had to acquire the property in their joint names in
equal shares. It is perhaps appropriate here to consider the two concepts, namely the resulting
trust and the constructive trust. The device of a resulting trust was invented by the Court of
Chancery to give effect to the implied intention of parties in relation to the acquisition and
disposal of moveable or immovable property. See, Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v.
Islington LBC [1996] AC 669, where Lord Browne-Wilkinson said:

Under existing law a resulting trust arises in two sets of circumstances: (A) where A makes a
voluntary payment to B or pays (wholly or in part) for the purchase of property which is vested
either in B alone or in the joint names of A and B, there is a presumption that A did not intend to
make a gift to B: the money or property is held on trust for A (if he is the sole provider of the
money) or in the case of a joint purchase by A and B in shares proportionate to their
contributions. It is important to stress that this is only a presumption, which presumption is easily
rebutted either by the counter-presumption of advancement or by direct evidence of A's intention
to make an outright transfer: see Underhill and Hayton, Law of Trusts and Trustees, pp. 317 et
seq.; Vandervell v. Inland Revenue Commissioners [1967] 2 AC 291, 312 et seq.; In re
Vandervell's Trusts (No. 2) [1974] Ch. 269, 288 et seq. (B) Where A transfers property to B on
express trusts, but the trusts declared do not exhaust the whole beneficial interest: ibid and
Quistclose Investments Ltd. v. Rolls Razor Ltd (In Liquidation) [1970] AC 567. Both types of
resulting trust are traditionally regarded as examples of trusts giving effect to the common
intention of the parties. A resulting trust is not imposed by law against the intentions of the
trustee (as is a constructive trust) but gives effect to his presumed intention.

[18] When A purchases Blackacre in B's name, providing, let us say, the whole of the purchase
price, equity presumes that the common intention of the parties is for B to hold Blackacre on a
trust that results to A. This is referred to as a presumed resulting trust. That a trust should result
to A is fair and just because A provided all the money and B provided nothing. But if A is B's
husband, parent or guardian or otherwise stands in loco parentis to B, then equity presumes that
the common intention of the parties is to make a gift of Blackacre to B. This is referred to as the
presumption of advancement. However, as the Court of Appeal pointed out in Heng Gek Kiau v.
Goh Koon Suan [2007] 6 CLJ 626 the correct approach to cases where a gift is asserted is:

... for a court first to determine the true intention of the purchaser. The question whether the
purchaser in a particular case had a donative intention is to be determined objectively through a
meticulous examination of the facts and evidence of the surrounding circumstances. If after such
an examination the court concludes that there was a donative intention on the part of the
purchaser that is the end of the matter and there is no room for the operation of the presumption
of resulting trust or advancement as the case may be. It is only where there are no or insufficient
facts or evidence from which a fair inference of intention may be drawn that a court should turn
to presumptions as a last resort to resolve the dispute.

In arriving at this conclusion the Court of Appeal in that case applied with approval the
following passage in the judgment of Gabriel Moss QC (sitting as a Deputy High Court judge) in
Kyriakides v. Pippas [2004] EWHC 646 (Ch) which we also regard as being good law:

Where there is no declaration (of intention), the court puts itself in the position of a jury and
considers all the circumstances of the case, so as to arrive at the purchaser's real intention: Snell
para 9-15. It is only where there is no evidence to contradict the presumption that it will prevail:
Ibid. The case-law has developed in such a way that even 'comparatively slight evidence' will
rebut the presumption and a 'less rigid approach should also be adopted to the admissibility of
evidence to rebut the presumption of advancement': Lavelle v. Lavelle [2004] EWCA Civ 223
(CA) per Lord Phillips MR at para 17.

I suspect the position we have now reached is that the courts will always strive to work out the
real intention of the purchaser and will only give effect to the presumptions of resulting trust and
advancement where the intention cannot be fathomed and a 'long-stop' or 'default' solution is
needed.

[19] In our judgment, the primary function of the court in a case where a resulting trust is
asserted or a gift is alleged arising from a disposition of property is clear. It is to determine
whether the initial disponor intended to make a gift of the property be it movable or immovable,
or whether he or she intended it to be held by the disponee in trust for some other person or
persons, including the disponor or the disponee or both. A court when called upon to decide
whether a resulting trust or a gift was intended in given circumstances should not begin by
resorting to presumptions. It must meticulously examine the facts to objectively ascertain the true
intention of the parties. If the intention of the parties when objectively determined was that the
particular property was to be held on a resulting trust then that is the conclusion the court should
declare. However, if the intention was that the disponee of the property was to have it as a gift,
there can then be no question of a resulting trust being implied. It is only when there is absent
any indication of what was intended by the parties that the court should resort to presumptions.
Were it otherwise, the court may be arriving at an incorrect conclusion based on a presumption
when the evidence points in quite the opposite direction. As Devlin LJ (later Lord Devlin) said in
Berry v. British Transport Commission [1961] 3 All ER 65, 75:
... presumptions of law ought to be used only where their use is strictly necessary for the ends of
justice. They are inherently undesirable ... because they prevent the court from ascertaining the
truth, which should be the prime object of a judicial investigation, and because, if they are
allowed to multiply to excess, the law will become divorced from reality and will live among
fantasies of its own.

[20] A constructive trust is imposed by law irrespective of the intention of the parties. And it is
imposed only in certain circumstances. Two examples readily available (apart from the facts of
this case and those illustrations provided by Millet LJ in Paragon Finance plc v. DB Thakerar &
Co) are (i) where there is a specifically enforceable contract for the sale of property (moveable of
immovable), the vendor holds the property on a constructive trust for the purchaser: see, Wong
Siew Choong Sdn Bhd v. Anvest Corporation Sdn Bhd [2002] 3 CLJ 409; and (ii) where a gift
made as a donatio mortis causa fails, the intended beneficiary of the gift holds it in trust for the
donor. As may be seen, the vendor in the first illustration and the purportedly dying donor or the
beneficiary in the second did not create any trust. Nor did they intend to do so. What equity does
in those circumstances is to fasten upon the conscience of the holder of the property a trust in
favour of another in respect of the whole or a part thereof.

[21] As earlier observed, we are of the view that the appellant at all material times was entitled to
a half share in the trust property as a beneficiary under a constructive trust. She was entitled to
claim it from the first respondent and to trace her half share in the property into the hands of
anyone who acquired it. But equity will not assist the victim of a breach of trust to trace trust
property where it will be inequitable to do so, for example because the property to be traced has
gone into the hands of a bona fide acquirer for value or because it has gone into the general funds
of a charity (see Re Diplock's Estate [1948] 2 All ER 429).

[22] That brings us to the third issue. And that is whether the trust in the appellant's favour may
be enforced against the second respondent. We are of the view that it may. There are two
reasons. In the first place, as the trial judge correctly held, the second respondent was not a bona
fide purchaser for value. He found that the second respondent company was in substance the alter
ego of the first respondent's common law husband with whom she undoubtedly cohabited. He
held, and held correctly, that the knowledge of the first respondent was to be attributed to the
husband and thence to the second respondent company. In our judgment, the approach adopted
by the trial judge is correct both on principle and authority. As for principle, the starting point is
no doubt the doctrine of corporate personality. The general rule is that a company has an
existence that is separate and distinct from its shareholders. It finds expression in the seminal
case on the subject, Salomon v. A Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22. Lord Halsbury LC there
stated the rule thus:

... once the company is legally incorporated it must be treated like any other independent person
with its rights and liabilities appropriate to itself, and that the motives of those who took part in
the promotion of the company are absolutely irrelevant in discussing what those rights and
liabilities are.

The Lord Chancellor however provided for cases in which the veil of incorporation may be
lifted. He said:
If there was no fraud and no agency, and if the company was a real one and not a fiction or a
myth, every one of the grounds upon which it is sought to support the judgment is disposed of.

The proposition when inverted states that if there is fraud or an agency relationship or if the
company is a myth or fiction, the doctrine of corporate personality does not insulate the
shareholders or directors from being assailed directly.

[23] A more recent statement of the doctrine of corporate personality is to be found in the case of
Woolfson v. Strathclyde Regional Council [1978] SLT 159 which is authority for the proposition
that a litigant who seeks the court's intervention to pierce the corporate veil must establish
special circumstances showing that the company in question is a mere facade concealing the true
facts.

[24] The "fraud" of which Lord Halsbury spoke in Salomon v. A Salomon & Co Ltd includes
equitable fraud. In the recent Australian case of The Bell Group Ltd (In liquidation) v. Westpac
Banking Corporation (No 9) [2008] WASC 239; 70 ACSR 1, Owen J discussed the distinction
between equitable fraud and fraud at common law. His Honour said:

4849. One of the leading Australian texts on equitable principles is R Meagher, D Heydon and M
Leeming, Meagher, Gummow and Lehane's Equity Doctrines and Remedies (4th ed 2002).
When I refer to this text from time to time in these reasons I will do so by the shortened phrase
'Meagher, Gummow and Lehane'. At [12-050] the authors set out a non-exhaustive list of factual
and legal situations that have traditionally been treated as species of equitable fraud. They
include:

(a) misrepresentation by persons under an obligation to exercise skill and discharge reliance and
trust (for example in fiduciary relationships), and inducements to contract or otherwise for the
representee to act to his detriment in reliance on the representation;

(b) the use of power to procure a bargain or gift, resulting in disadvantage to the other party;

(c) conflict of interest against a duty arising from a fiduciary relationship; and

(d) agreements which are bona fide between the parties but in fraud of third persons.

4850. All of these categories can be seen, to varying degrees, in the claims brought by the
plaintiffs in the equitable fraud causes of action. The last category is of particular interest
because it encompasses the imposition and deceit species referred to as the Earl of Chesterfield
fourth limb. I will come to that doctrine shortly.

22.2.1.2. Equitable fraud and common law fraud compared

4851. The term common law fraud is often used to describe the tort of deceit, or the making of
fraudulent misrepresentations. The tort of deceit is said to encompass cases where the defendant
knowingly recklessly makes a false statement, with the intention that another will rely on it to his
or her detriment.
4852. Derry v. Peek [1889] UKHL 1; [1889] 14 App Cas 337 illustrates the principle that
honesty is a duty of universal obligation, existing independently of contract or fiduciary
obligations. In Derry v. Peek, the House of Lords rejected the argument that a claim of
negligence would support an action for fraudulent misrepresentation. In so doing, their Lordships
set the standard for common law fraud. Lord Herschell said, at 374, that to succeed, a plaintiff
must prove 'that a false representation has been made (1) knowingly, or (2) without belief in its
truth or (3) recklessly, careless whether it be true or false'. In other words, there must be a lack of
an honest belief in the truth of the representation. In Armitage v. Nurse [1997] EWCA Civ 1279;
[1998] Ch 241; [1997] 3 WLR 1046, Millett LJ discussed the meaning of 'actual fraud' in the
context of an exemption clause. At 1053, his Lordship described actual fraud as connoting, at
least, 'an intention on the part of the trustee to pursue a particular course of action, either
knowing that it is contrary to the interests of the beneficiaries or being recklessly indifferent
whether it is contrary to their interests or not.

4853. This, then, marks out a significant difference between common law fraud and equitable
fraud. The latter does not require proof of an actual intention to deceive.

To summarise, a plea of fraud at common law will not succeed absent proof of an intention to
deceive. Such an intention is not an ingredient of equitable fraud which is, essentially speaking,
unconscionable conduct in circumstances where there exists or is implied or imposed a
relationship of trust or confidence.

[25] In Frame v. Smith [1987] 42 DLR (4th) 81, Wilson J usefully identified some of the
principal features of such a relationship. Her ladyship said:

Relationships in which a fiduciary obligation have been imposed seem to possess three general
characteristics:

(1) the fiduciary has scope for the exercise of some discretion or power.

(2) the fiduciary can unilaterally exercise that power or discretion so as to affect the beneficiary's
legal or practical interests.

(3) the beneficiary is peculiarly vulnerable to, or at the mercy of, the fiduciary holding the
discretion or power.

Very little need be said about the first characteristic except this, that unless such a discretion or
power is present there is no need for a superadded obligation to restrict the damaging use of the
discretion or power: see, for example, RH Deacon & Co Ltd v. Varga, DuDomaine; Third Party
[1972] 30 DLR (3d) 653; affirmed 41 DLR (3d) 767.

With respect to the second characteristic it is, of course, the fact that the power or discretion may
be used to affect the beneficiary in a damaging way that makes the imposition of a fiduciary duty
necessary. Indeed, fiduciary duties are frequently imposed on those who are capable of affecting
not only the legal interests of the beneficiary but also the beneficiary's vital non-legal or
'practical' interests. For example, it is generally conceded that a director is in a fiduciary
relationship to the corporation. But the corporation's interest which is protected by the fiduciary
duty is not confined to an interest in the property of the corporation but extends to non-legal,
practical interests in the financial well-being of the corporation and perhaps to even more
intangible practical interests such as the corporation's public image and reputation. Another
example is found in cases of undue influence where a fiduciary uses a power over the beneficiary
to obtain money at the expense of the beneficiary. The beneficiary's interest in such a case is a
pecuniary interest. Finally, in Reading v. AG [1951] AC 507 (HL), a British soldier who was
unable (sic) to smuggle items past Egyptian guards because these guards excused uniformed
soldiers from their inspections was held to be a fiduciary. The Crown's interest was a 'practical'
or even a 'moral' one, namely that its uniform should not be used in corrupt ways. The soldier-
fiduciary had no power to change the legal position of the British Crown, so how could the
Crown's legal interests have been affected by the soldier's action? The same can be said of the
Crown's interest in AG v. Goddard [1929] 98 LJKB 743, where the Crown was able to recover
bribes which had been paid to its employee, a sergeant in the metropolitan police. In my view,
what was protected in that case was not a 'legal' interest but a vital and substantial 'practical'
interest.

The third characteristic of relationships in which a fiduciary duty has been imposed is the
element of vulnerability. This vulnerability arises from the inability of the beneficiary (despite
his or her best efforts) to prevent the injurious exercise of the power or discretion combined with
the grave inadequacy or absence of other legal or practical remedies to redress the wrongful
exercise of the discretion or power. Because of the requirement of vulnerability of the
beneficiary at the hands of the fiduciary, fiduciary obligations are seldom present in dealings of
experienced businessmen of similar bargaining strength acting at arm's length: see, for example,
Jirna Ltd v. Mister Donut of Canada Ltd [1971] 22 DLR (3d) 639; affirmed 40 DLR (3d) 303.
The law takes the position that such individuals are perfectly capable of agreeing as to the scope
of the discretion or power to be exercised, ie, any 'vulnerability' could have been prevented
through the more prudent exercise of their bargaining power and the remedies for the wrongful
exercise or abuse of that discretion or power, namely damages, are adequate in such a case.

[26] An instance of equitable fraud analogous to the present case is Jones v. Lipman [1962] 1 All
ER 442. In that case, the first defendant after agreeing to sell his property to the plaintiffs for
£5,250 sold and transferred it to a company of which he and his solicitors' clerk were
shareholders and directors for £3,000. The plaintiffs sued for and obtained a decree of
specific performance against the company of which Russell J (later Lord Russel of Killowen)
said:

The defendant company is the creature of the defendant, a device and a sham, a mask which he
holds before his face in an attempt to avoid recognition by the eye of equity - an equitable
remedy is rightly to be granted directly against the creature in such circumstances.

In Sunrise Sdn Bhd v. First Profile (M) Sdn Bhd & Anor [1997] 1 CLJ 529, Chong Siew Fai (CJ,
Sabah & Sarawak) said that in:
cases where there are signs of separate personalities of companies being used to enable persons
to evade their contractual obligations or duties, the court would disregard the notional
separateness of the companies.

His lordship was there, of course, referring to the legal basis upon which judicial intervention has
occurred in cases such as Jones v. Lipman. And there you have the authority to support the trial
judge's approach.

[27] So here. The first respondent sold and transferred trust property to the second respondent
which was a device and a sham, a mask which the first respondent's husband held before his face
in an attempt to avoid recognition by the eye of equity. Accordingly, this is a case in which there
are special circumstances showing that the second respondent company is a mere facade
concealing the true facts. The trial judge was therefore correct in holding the second respondent
accountable to the appellant for the trust property.

[28] The second reason is to be found in statute. But before we proceed further, it is convenient
at this stage to examine the reason advanced by the Court of Appeal for the appellant's inability
to enforce her rights against the second respondent. Here is the relevant passage:

The appellant's claim is only against the first respondent and not against Glamour Land or even
Malayan Banking. Both these latter respondents are strangers to the agreement between the
appellant and the first respondent as regards the property. The appellant's two main complaints
are that in breach of the agreement between her and the first respondent, the latter had unlawfully
registered the property in her sole name. The first respondent had also concealed that fact. And
this want of registration of the appellant's name as a co-owner happened despite the request by
the first respondent from the appellant for contributions towards the solicitors' fees,
compensation payment to the vendor, quit rent, assessment and stamp duty involved in the
purchase of the property, which the appellant promptly had contributed to. The above payments
were in addition to the appellant's contribution towards the purchase price. The first respondent
had represented in writing to the appellant that the property would be 'for our food business' (RR
457-458).

The registration issue apart, the appellant's next serious contention was that, sometime in mid-
1996 the first respondent with mala fide intent, purportedly sold the property to Glamour Land
for the sum of RM1,930,000 in an attempt to defeat her interest. The appellant had alleged that
Glamour Land was not a bona fide purchaser and had colluded with the first respondent. It was
further alleged that the owner of Glamour Land in fact was the husband of the first respondent.
Glamour Land was averred to have attempted to create a legal charge on the said property in
favour of Malayan Banking in order to defeat the appellant's interest.

[29] The Court of Appeal in the foregoing passage appears to argue that the second respondent is
not liable to the appellant because it was not privy to the agreement between the former and the
first respondent. This completely overlooks and indeed gives the go-by to the trial judge's
specific finding that the second respondent was not a bona fide purchaser of the trust property. It
also overlooks s. 26(b) of the Specific Relief Act 1950 which provides:
Except as otherwise provided by this Chapter, specific performance of a contract may be
enforced against:

(a) either party thereto;

(b) any other person claiming under a party to the contract by a title arising subsequently to the
contract, except a transferee for value who has paid his money in good faith and without notice
of the original contract.

The simple answer to the problem contemplated by the Court of Appeal is that the finding by the
trial judge that the second respondent had not acquired the trust property in good faith takes the
case out of the saving clause in s. 26(b). It follows that the agreement between the appellant and
the first respondent was, even as a contract, enforceable against the second respondent company.

[30] There is a further answer. Once it is recognised, as it was by the trial judge and as it ought to
have been by the Court of Appeal, that the obligation sought to be enforced was a trust, it would
have become apparent that the doctrine of privity of contract had nothing to with the fact pattern
here. For it is settled law that trusts are an exception to the common law rule of privity of
contract. See, Beswick v. Beswick [1968] AC 58.

[31] Based on the facts as found by the trial judge on the issue under discussion, it is crystal clear
that the conscience of the second respondent was tainted with knowledge of the trust.
Accordingly, the appellant is clearly entitled to enforce the trust against both the first and second
respondents.

[32] All that remains to be decided is whether s. 433B of the Code stands in the way of
enforcement of the trust established in the appellant's favour. This is the fourth issue. In a gist,
the section requires a foreigner - and the appellant is a foreigner - to obtain, by way of an
application in writing, the prior approval of the relevant State Authority to "acquire land by way
of a disposal under Division II". It also permits, in subsection (1)(c), upon like condition, the
transfer or transmission to, or the vesting in, or the creation in favour of any person or body as
"trustee", or of two or more persons or bodies as "trustees", where the trustee or one of the
trustees, or where the beneficiary or one of the beneficiaries, is a non-citizen. It was the view of
the courts below that the facts of the appellant's case came within the section. As for the trial
judge, he held that the trust in the appellant's favour did not come into existence until the first
respondent had paid the vendor of the property in question the purchase price in full. As for the
Court of Appeal, it appears to have taken the view that the resulting trust in the appellant's favour
was "created" when the "moneys were funnelled to the first respondent. The appellant had
entrusted her contribution with the first respondent expecting her share and contribution to be
used for her benefit in the joint venture. The fact that she was in Japan away from the hub of the
business, let alone the fact that the first respondent persuaded her to part with her money, showed
that the first respondent was expected to register her as the co-owner of the property in the
business venture. The appellant still retained her proprietary rights, whether expressly or by
implication, never intending that her beneficial interest be taken away from her and that the
interest in the contribution to eventually revert to her on demand." The other finding made by the
Court of Appeal is in the following terms: "The appellant failed to obtain the prior written
approval of the state authority as required under s. 433B(1) read together with s. 433C of the
Code. The appellant was beneficially entitled under the resulting trust over the property acquired
by the first respondent but no evidence was adduced that the dealing was prior to 1 January
1993."

[33] With respect, the findings of the trial judge and those of the Court of Appeal suffer from
serious errors of principle. Both courts below assumed quite incorrectly that this was a case of a
resulting trust. As earlier explained, a resulting trust is one that equity seeks to imply as
representing the presumed common intention of the parties in given circumstances. The equitable
obligation in the present case ought to have been classified as a constructive trust. At the risk of
repetition, and for the reasons earlier provided, a constructive trust is not "created" by
individuals. It arises by operation of law.

[34] In our judgment, what s. 433B(1)(c) refers to when it says "created in favour of any person
or body as 'trustee'" is an express trust registered in accordance with s. 344 of the Code. It does
not include within its purview constructive trusts which arise by operation of law. Had
Parliament intended that result, it would have said so in clear terms. In any event, there is a guide
to statutory construction that presumes that Parliament knows the existing law. It knew, when it
enacted s. 433B, that a constructive trust is not created by the act of parties; that it is imposed by
law, in given circumstances. Accordingly it is our considered view that s. 433B has no
application to the constructive trust imposed upon the first respondent. It follows that the courts
below erred in the way in which they interpreted the section - without regard to the true nature of
the trust that they were dealing with. It also follows that it is irrelevant for present purposes
whether the section is prospective or retrospective; whether it came into effect before or after the
events occurred in this case that led to the imposition of a constructive trust in the appellant's
favour. As for s. 433B(1)(a), this too does not apply because the appellant did not at any time - to
quote the words of the section - "acquire land by way of a disposal under Division II" of the
Code. What did happen was that as early as 1992, the parties had agreed to acquire the property
in question in equal shares. But that never happened. Instead, the first respondent, in breach of
her fiduciary duties had the property registered solely in her own name. In other words, the first
respondent did 'acquire land by way of a disposal under Division II" of the Code. But s. 433B
does not apply to her as she is not a foreigner. It was merely a consequence of the first
respondent's unlawful acts that a constructive trust was imposed upon her in respect of a one half
share in the property. And that is something to which s. 433B does not apply. We would ex
abundanti cautela add that this is not a case in which the appellant deliberately sought to evade
complying with the section by having the property registered in the first respondent's name. She
was guilty of no such equitable misconduct. Had she been, the result may well have been
different. See, for example, Suntoso Jacob v. Kong Miao Ming & Anor [1984] 1 LNS 32 where a
resulting trust was defeated on grounds of public policy. This is a case where the appellant as a
victim of equitable fraud committed upon her by the first respondent is regarded by equity as a
beneficiary under a constructive trust. As we have already said, s. 433B does not apply to
constructive trusts.

[35] For the reasons already given, we would allow this appeal and set aside the orders of the
courts below. We hereby direct the registrar of this court to fix a date on which we may hear
counsel on the terms of the relief that ought to be granted and the appropriate order as to costs,
that is to say, whether costs should be awarded on a party-party basis or on a common fund basis
or on an indemnity basis. The deposit in court shall be refunded to the appellant.

******

Case(s) referred to:

Berry v. British Transport Commission [1961] 3 All ER 65 (foll)
Beswick v. Beswick [1968] AC 58 (refd)
Blisset v. Daniel [1853] 68 ER 1022 (refd)
Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. Herbert Smith & Co [1969] 2 Ch 276 (foll)
Crawford v. Financial Institutions Services Ltd (Jamaica) [2005] UKPC 40 (foll)
Frame v. Smith [1987] 42 DLR (4th) 81 (foll)
Gurbakhsh v. Gurdial AIR [1927] PC 230 (refd)
Guthrie Sdn Bhd v. Trans-Malaysian Leasing Corp Bhd [1991] 1 CLJ 9; [1991] 1 CLJ (Rep)
155 SC (refd)
Heng Gek Kiau v. Goh Koon Suan [2007] 6 CLJ 626 CA (foll)
Herrington v. British Railways Board [1972] AC 877 (refd)
Jaafar Shaari & Siti Jama Hashim v. Tan Lip Eng & Anor [1997] 4 CLJ 509 SC (foll)
James Birtchnell v. The Equity Trustees, Executors and Agency Co Ltd (1928-30) 42 CLR 384
(foll)
Jones v. Lipman [1962] 1 All ER 442 (foll)
Kyriakides v. Pippas [2004] EWHC 646 (Ch) (refd)
Onassis and Calogeropoulos v. Vergottis [1968] 2 Lloyd's Report 403 (foll)
Paragon Finance plc v. DB Thakerar & Co [1999] 1 All ER 400 (foll)
Re Diplock's Estate [1948] 2 All ER 429 (refd)
Salomon v. A Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22 (foll)
Srimati Bibhabati Devi v. Kumar Ramendra Narayan Roy & Ors [1946] AC 508 (refd)
Sunrise Sdn Bhd v. First Profile (M) Sdn Bhd [1997] 1 CLJ 529 FC (foll)
Suntoso Jacob v. Kong Miao Ming & Anor [1984] 1 LNS 32 (refd)
The Bell Group Ltd (In liquidation) v. Westpac Banking Corporation (No 9) [2008] WASC 239
(foll)
'The Eurymedon' [1942] 73 Lloyd LR 217 (refd)
Wasakah Singh v. Bachan Singh [1931] 1 MC 125 (foll)
Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v. Islington LBC [1996] AC 669 (foll)
Wisniewski v. Central Manchester Health Authority [1998] PIQR 324 (foll)
Wong Siew Choong Sdn Bhd v. Anvest Corporation Sdn Bhd [2002] 3 CLJ 409 HC (refd)
Woolfson v. Strathclyde Regional Council [1978] SLT 159 (foll)

Legislation referred to:

National Land Code, ss. 344, 433B, 433C
Specific Relief Act 1950, s. 26(b)

Other source(s) referred to:

Sarkar on Evidence, 16th edn, p 1837
For the appellant - Manjit Singh Saini; M/s Harun Idris, Yeoh & Partners
For the 2nd respondent - S Parameswary (K Gheethabai with him); M/s Tay, Tee & Nasir

[Appeal from Court of Appeal, Civil Appeal No: W-02-1236-2005]

[Editor's note: For the Court of Appeal judgment, please see Takako Sakao v. Ng Pek Yuan &
Ors And Another Appeal [2009] 5 CLJ 200.]

Reported by Andrew Christopher Simon