References: Process.
References: Process.
References: Process.
Fig. 1 shows thc variation o f the average PSNR with rate for both Introduction: Thc advanced encryption standard (AES) is a 128-bit
imolementations of the matchineI. nursuits encoders. We can see fmm block cipher with a 128-, 192- or 256-bit secret kcy [I]. A daca block
this Figure that the use ofthe gcneralised hit-planes scheme consistently of the AES is expressed as an array of 4 x 4 bytes with row and
imoroves the oerfomance ofthe matching_Dursuits
. . . for
encoder from 121 column indices, i, j (0, I , 2, 3 ) . The input block is passed through
all rates. In addition, this improvement increases with the hit rate. a round function which is itcrated 10 times. At the same time, the
Indeed our results are comnatible with the best ones in the literature, 128-bit secret key is input to a key schedule to obtain round keys for
that have been obtained using sophisticated adaptive shategics [3]. Note use in each round. Each round function consists of SubBytes, a
that the knee on the curves around 20 kbit/s is due to the increase of the nonlinear 8 x 8 S-box byte substitution; ShiftRaws, a cyclic shift of
frame rate from 7.5 to 10 fratne/s. each row by different byte offsets; MixColumns, a linear combination
of all 4 bytes in the same column; and KcyAddition. an exclusive-OR
*1 (XOR) o f the data block with the round key. Each round is identical
42- except that an extra KeyAddition is added before the first round and
Mixcolumns is excluded from the last round.
40-
38- .....
..
_
..........
......
.....
...
XOR patterns and huncuted differentials: Let a pair of AES . data
1 blocks P and P* differ in certain (active) bytc positions and are equal
5 36-
in athcr (passive) byes.
v)
a 31-
... MP (Mother) DeJinirion I ; An XOR pattcm is a 4 x 4 array that specifies the active
32- ...... MPGBP (Silent) and passive byte positions of a pair of AES data blocks P and P*
MP (Silent)
30- Consider the influence of the round hnction components on the
201: , , , , , , , , , dismbution of the active bytes in the XOR pattem. SubBytcs operates
on each byte independently hence it does not affect the XOR pattem.
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
rate, kbitk KeyAddition does not affect the XOR panem either because XORing
twice with thc mund key cancels out its effect. ShiftRows only shifts an
Fig. 1 Yarinfion of average PSNR wirh rale f i r Mother and Silml active byte to another position in the same row but docs not diffuse it
sequences over to other bytc positions. MixColumns causes an active byte to
Conclusions: We have proposed a novel algorithm far performing sprcad to all four byte positions in the same column. T I C input XOR
greedy decompositions on redundant dictionaries. Instead of generat- pattem and its corresponding output XOR pattern after i rounds of the
ing at its output a sequence of pairs comprising indenes o f atoms and AES are collectively known as an i-round truncated differential.
It is obvious that MixColumns greatly influences the behaviour of
-
corresmndine coefficients. as in the classical MP aleorithm, it only
mncatcd differentials as it causes the sole diffusion of active bytes.
generates a sequence of indexes of atoms. The results obtained are
vely promising, yielding a significant improvement over the classical Since MixColnmns operates on each column of the data block inde-
MP-based video compression algorithm [2]. pendently, it is sufficient to consider the XOR pattems of these
individual columns, which are called the column XORs. The distribu-
tion ofthe individual input and output column XORs of MinColumns is
0 IEE 2002 31 Jonuurv 2002 given in Table I [2]. The '1' in the column XOR denotes an activc byte
while a '0' denotes a passive byte.
R. Caetano, E.A.B. da Silva and A.G. Ciancio Phan and Siddiquk impossible differenlials: In [2], Phan and Siddiqi
(PEE/COPPElDELiEE/Uni"~~~idnde Federal do Rio de Jnneiro, constructed a class of gcneralised 4-round impossible differentials of
Cx. P 68504, Rio de Janeiro, RJ 21Y45-970, Brazil) the AES by concatenating two probabiliq-one truncated differentials
E-mail: eduardo@lps.ufrj.br such that they form a contradiction [3] in the middle, hcnce causing
.=
# E 11255
0.984
@ =always
the second round, the output of ShiftRows is an X O R pattem with
thrcc active bytes in each column. After MixCalumns, we have an
output XOR panern with at least two active bytes in each column, due
*wri1ten as a mw for con,,enience to proposition 2.
Proposition I : An input column XOR with two active bytes in any Theorem 2: There exists a class of generalised 4-round impossible
position causes an output column XOR with at least three active differentials of the form (3, I ) .
bytes.
Proof o/ Theorem 2: We apply the two-round probability-onc
Proposirion 2: An input column XOR with thrce active bytes in any truncated differential in Lemma 2 to the firs1 two rounds of the
position causes an output column XOR with at least two active bytcs. ABS. We then consider from the other end, an input XOR pattem with
only one active byte in any position. Then, an XOR panem with only
one active byte also appears after going through the inverse Shif-
Lemma I : There exists a probability-one truncated differential with
tRows. In round three, after going through inverse MixColumns, wc
an input XOR pancrn with two active bytes whose row and column
have an XOR panem with only onc column with all active bytes while
indices i, j satisfy thc condition:
the rest have all passive bytes. Going through another inverse
6~ ) 4 # 6'- i') mud 4.
i mod where i # i' and j #j' (1) ShiftRows causes an XOR pattcm with only one active byte in each
column at the end of round 2. This contradicts with the truncatcd
and the output XOR pattcm of which after two rounds has at least three diffcrcntial in thc first two rounds (Lemma 2), hence causing a four-
active bytcs in each column. round impossible differential.
Conclusion: We have presented two new classes of Sour-round Electronic filters for time-constant extraction: In 151.
. . the problem
. US
impossible differentials of the AES by applying the miss-in-the- fitting measured data on a linear combination of exponential functions
middle technique in a more flexible manner. These can be used in is solved by basis orthonormalisation. The solution is cast into an
an impossible differential cryptanalytic attack on reduced round adaptive filtering operation.
variants of the AES. Fig. 1 shows the architecnrre of the filter. The part drawn in
solid lines refers to extraction of n = 2 exponential components only.
Extension of the scheme is suggested by dashed lines.
0 IEE 2002 6 November 2001
Electronics Letlers Onlim No: 20020347
Dol: 10.1049/e1:20020347
R.C.W. Phan (Swinburne Samwuk Institute of techno lo^. 1st Flour,
State Complex, Sarowok, 935 76 Kuching, Malaysia)
E-mail: rphan@swinbume.edu.my
References
1 National Instihlte of Standards and Technology: 'Drafi FlPS for the
..I, 2s , -1
r
_''
ABS', 2001 V
2 and SlUUlQU, M.U.: 'Generalized Impossible Differentials of
PHAN, R.C.W.,
...
Advanced Encryption Standard', Electron. Let., 2001.37, (14), pp. 896- Fig. 1 Archilecture of oduptivrfilter
898
3 BIHAM. E., BlRYUKoV A,, and SIIAMIR, A,: 'Miss in the Middle Attacks on Transfer fwctions shown in hones
Idea and Kihufu'. Proceedings of Fast Software E n c ~ p t i o n'99, 1999, Dashed boxes suggest extension (0 order n greeei than NIo
pp. 124-138, (LNCS 1636)
The data signal d(t) must be reversed in time, and a first approxima-
tion of time constants {I,), i = 1, . . . ,n chosen. Functions