Rule 2526

G.R. No.
101682 December 14, 1992
SALVADOR D. BRIBONERIA, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, GERTRUDES B. MAG-ISA, married to and assisted
by PEDRO MAG-ISA, respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
On 17 October 1991, the petitioner filed with this Court a petition

for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals, Eleventh Division, * in CA-G.R. SP
No. 20114 dated 13 August 1990 as well as its resolution dated 9 September 1991 denying the
petitioner's for reconsideration.
Acting upon the petition, the Court required the private respondents to comment thereon. After the
private respondents had filed their comment, the Court resolved to consider the comment as answer
and to give due course to the petition and the case was deemed submitted for decision. 1
The antecedents are as follows:
On 23 May 1988, petitioner Salvador D. Briboneria, as plaintiff, filed a complaint 2 for Annulment of
Document and Damages, with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order
against private respondent Gertrudes B. Mag-isa, with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, docketed
therein as Civil Case No. 55961, alleginginter alia that:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Plaintiff, together with his wife Nonita A. Briboneria, are the registered owners (of)
a parcel of land located at 59 Amsterdam Street Provident Village, J. de la Peña,
Marikina, Metro-Manila, covered under Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-29859
(Copy attached herewith as Annex A) more particularly described as follows:
A parcel of land . . . situated in the Municipality of Marikina, Province

of Rizal, Island of Luzon . . . containing an area of THREE
HUNDRED (300) SQUARE METERS, more or less, . . .
Among the improvements on this parcel of land is plaintiff's residential house where
his wife and children used to stay until they migrated to the United States.
3. The abovementioned parcel of land was acquired and the residential house was
constructed through plaintiff's hard-earned salaries and benefits from his employment
abroad.
4. Plaintiff, as the duly registered owner, has declared the above-described parcel of
land and residential house for tax purposes under P.D. No. 464, copies of
Declaration of Real Property attached herewith as Annexes B and B-1.
5. Of late, plaintiff was surprised to learn that his wife Nonita A. Briboneria sold to
defendant Gertrudis B. Mag-isa by means of a Deed of Absolute Sale, copy attached
herewith as Annex C, the abovementioned house and lot.
6. Plaintiff, as the duly registered owner, never authorized or empowered Nonita A.

Briboneria or anybody for or on his behalf, stead or representation to enter into any
transaction regarding the sale, transfer or conveyance of the abovedescribed house
and lot.
7. Plaintiff had all along been expecting that the house and lot shall be for his family,
particularly his children.
8. As a result of the unauthorized sale, plaintiff was denied the use and enjoyment of
his properties since defendant Gertrudis B. Mag-isa had even leased the premises to
another who in turn had prohibited plaintiff from entering the premises.
9. By reason of the unlawful deprivation from him of his properties, plaintiff suffered
serious anxiety, fright, mental anguish and wounded feelings and further subjected
him to social humiliation and embarassment, particularly considering that the
abovementioned properties came from his hard-earned salaries and emoluments
from his employment abroad, for which defendants Mag-isa must be adjudged liable
for moral damages in an amount not less than ONE MILLION PESOS
(P1,000,000.00) or as may be equitably determined by this Honorable Court.
10. In order to serve as an example or correction for the public good, defendants
Mag-isa should likewise be adjudged liable for examplary damages in an amount not
less than ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) or as may be
equitably determined by this Honorable Court.
11. Plaintiff, in protection of his legitimate right and interests prejudiced by

defendants — Mag-isa, was constrained to engage the services of undersigned
counsel for P50,000.00, exclusive of appearance fees and expenses.
Plaintiff adopts the foregoing.
12. The next move of defendants — Mag-isa is to consolidate ownership over the
properties by means of the Deed of Absolute Sale (Annex C herein) which is
inceptually void.
13. Defendant Register of Deeds of Marikina would have no other alternative but to
give due course to the consolidation of ownership over the properties in the name of
defendants — Mag-isa which eventually causes grave and irreparable injury, untold
injustice and undue prejudice to plaintiff unless — a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, or
at least a Temporary Restraining Order is immediately issued by this Honorable
Court enjoining or restraining defendant Register of Deeds of Marikina, Metro-Manila
or any person acting on his behalf from consolidating ownership of the house and lot
covered under TCT No. N-29895 of the Registry of Deeds for the province of Rizal in
the name of defendants — Mag-isa or their heirs or successor-in-interest.
14. Plaintiff is ready and willing to post a bond in such amount as this Honorable
Court may equitable determine subject to such conditions and terms as may be
appropriately imposed thereon.
In due time, private respondent Gertrudes B. Mag-isa, as defendant, filed her answer 3 alleging as
follows:
1. Defendants admit their circumstances as alleged in paragraph 1, the age of

plaintiff but denies the rest of the allegations therein for lack of knowledge and/or
information sufficient to form a judgment as to the truths thereof.
2. Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph 2 that pursuant to Transfer

Certificate of Title No. N-29859 (Annex "A"), plaintiff together with his wife appears to
be the registered owners of the subject parcel of land but that is more apparent and
(sic) real considering that defendants have admittedly bought the land and the
improvements thereon and defendants were purchasers in good faith and for value.
3. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 3 for lack of knowledge and

information to form a judgment as to the truths, and granting arguendo that the
acquisition of the land and the construction of the house came from the salaries and
benefits of the plaintiff, said salaries and benefits are considered conjugal.

information sufficient to form a judgment as to the truth thereof although it may be of
judicial notice that the Office of the Provincial/Municipal Assessor motu
proprio accomplishes (sic) Annexes "B" and "B-1" and all tax declarations for that
matter based on existing records in said office.
5. Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph 5 in so far as the transaction of

absolute sale between them and defendant's (plaintiff's) wife who acted not only in
her behalf but also as attorney-in-fact of her husband, plaintiff in the instant case,
which transaction was actually known by and with the consent of or should at least
have been known to and with the consent of plaintiff as evidenced by a letter of
plaintiff to his wife, a xerox copy of which is attached hereto as Annex "1" and made
an integral part hereof.
6. Defendants deny the allegation in paragraph 6, the truth and fact being that
plaintiff's wife was duly authorized by a Special Power of Attorney to transact on and
sell the subject house and lot, a xerox copy of which marked Annex "2" is hereto
attached and made an integral part hereof.

information sufficiento (sic) form a judgment as to the truths thereof.
8. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 8 to the effect that he was denied
the use and enjoyment of his properties for the reason that as the owners of the
property, defendants have the absolute rights of use and enjoyment over said
properties with the prerogative to lease the same to any party of their choice, the
lessee with the right to exclude others from the use and enjoyment of the premises.
9. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraphs 9, 10 and 11 not only for lack of
knowledge and information to form a judgment as to the truths thereof but also
because said allegations have no factual and legal basis.
10. Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph 12 in so far as the prospective

registration of Annex "C" is concerned but deny the rest of the allegations for reasons
stated earlier to the effect that Annex "C" is a valid and binding sale, with defendants
as the purchasers in good faith and for value.
11. Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph 13 in so far as the ministerial

functions of defendant Register of Deeds but deny the rest of the allegations the
same being without any factual and legal basis for reasons essayed earlier.
information sufficient to form a judgment as to the truths thereof aside from the fact
that plaintiff's alleged readiness and willingness to post a bond will simply be
exercises in futility.
On 13 September 1988, after issues in the case had been joined, petitioner served on the private
respondent Mag-isa a request for admission 4 reading as follows:
ATTY. ALFREDO A. ALTO

Counsel for Defendant Mag-isa
Balaga-Luna Building
Malolos, Bulacan
Greeting:
Plaintiff, through counsel, respectfully requests your admission within ten (10) days
from service hereof pursuant to Rule 26, Rules of Court of the following:
The Material facts
1. That plaintiff, together with his wife Nonita A. Briboneria, are the registered owners
of a parcel of land together with the improvements thereon covered under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. N-29895 (Annex A-Complaint) located at 59 Amsterdam
Street, Provident Village, Marikina, Metro-Manila.
2. That plaintiff, as the duly registered owner had declared for the year 1988 the
parcel of land and residential house for tax purposes under P.D. 464.
3. That plaintiff's family used to live at the said residential house.
4. That defendant Mag-isa actually lives near the location address of plaintiff's
properties.
5. That defendant Mag-isa knows that plaintiff works abroad but he (plaintiff)
regularly comes home and stays with his family at their residential house
abovementioned.
6. That the abovementioned house and lot were acquired through plaintiff's hard-
earned salaries and benefits from his employment abroad.
7. That plaintiff has reserved the house and lot as a place to stay to (sic) with his
family upon his retirement from his employment.
8. That plaintiff had never authorized his wife or anybody for that matter to sell or to
dispose of the property covered under TCT No. N-29895.
9. That plaintiff never executed the alleged Special Power of Attorney dated
November 14, 1984 appended as Annex 2 — Answer.
10. That the alleged Special Power of Attorney mentions "Transfer Certificate of Title
No. N-29995 issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal."
11. That plaintiff never personally appeared before Notary Public Jose Constantino
upon whom the acknowledgment of said Special Power of Attorney was made.
12. That plaintiff never sold or disposed of, and never consented to the sale or
disposition of properties covered under TCT No. N-29995.
13. That plaintiff never received the consideration of the alleged sale, and he never
benefited therefrom in any manner.
14. That defendant Mag-isa never confirmed with plaintiff notwithstanding their being
neighbors, the authenticity of the alleged Special Power of Attorney and the validity
of the alleged Deed of Absolute Sale particularly considering that the subject matter
thereof involves plaintiff's properties.
15. That plaintiff was denied the use and enjoyment of his properties since defendant
Mag-isa had even leased the premises to another who in turn had prohibited plaintiff
from entering the premises.
The Material Documents
1. Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-29895 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal, copy
attached to the Complaint as Annex A.
2. The Declarations of Real Property filed by Salvador D. Briboneria pursuant to P.D.

464 for the year 1988, copies attached to the Complaint as Annexes B and B-1.
On 10 November 1988, the private respondents filed with the court a quo their Answer to Request
for Admission, 5alleging that most if not all the matters subject of petitioner's request for admission
had been admitted, denied and/or clarified in their verified answer dated 20 June 1988, and that the
other matters not admitted, denied and/or clarified were either irrelevant or improper.
On 18 November 1988, petitioner filed a Motion for summary

Judgment, 6 claiming that the Answer to Request for Admission was filed by private respondents
beyond the ten (10) day period fixed in the request and that the answer was not under oath; that,
consequently the private respondents are deemed to have admitted the material facts and
documents subject of the request for admission, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 26 of the Rules of
Court. The private respondents filed an opposition 7 to the motion for summary judgment, while the
petitioner filed a reply 8 to said opposition.
On 28 December 1988, the trial court issued an order 9 denying

the petitioner's motion for summary judgment. Petitioner moved for reconsideration 10 which the court
granted in its order dated 20 July 1989, setting aside the order of 28 December 1988. 11 The private
respondents, in turn, filed a Motion for Clarification and Reconsideration, to which the petitioner filed
an opposition. 12 On 1 February 1989, the trial court issued another order 13 this time setting aside its
order of 20 July 1989 and set the pre-trial conference on 22 February 1989.
The petitioner thereupon filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus to annul and set aside the order dated 1 February 1989 of the court a quo, alleging
that the said order was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. On 13
August 1990, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision, 14 dismissing the petition. Petitioner's motion
for reconsideration having been likewise denied, 15 he is now before us in the present petition.
Petitioner assails the respondent appellate court in holding that the matters of fact and the
documents requested to be admitted are mere reiterations and/or reproductions of those alleged in
the complaint. He claims that the material facts and documents described in the request for
admission are relevant evidentiary matters supportive of his cause of action. He further argues that
the private respondents have impliedly admitted the material facts and documents subject of the
request for admission on account of their failure to answer the request for admission within the
period fixed therein, and for said answer not being under oath.
The petition can not be upheld; the petitioner's contentions are devoid of merit.
To begin with, a cursory reading of the petitioner's complaint and his request for admission clearly
shows, as found by respondent appellate court, that "the material matters and documents set forth in
the request for admission are the same as those set forth in the complaint which private respondents
either admitted or denied in their answer." 16The respondent court therefore correctly held that this
case falls under the rule laid down in Po vs. Court of Appeals. 17 wherein this Court held:
A party should not be compelled to admit matters of fact already admitted by his
pleading and concerning which there is no issue (Sherr vs. East, 71 A2d, 752, terry
260, cited in 27 C.J.S. 91), nor should he be required to make a second denial of
those already denied in his answer to the complaint. A request for admission is not
intended to merely reproduce or reiterate the allegations of the requesting party's
pleading but should set forth relevant evidentiary matters of fact, or documents
described in and exhibited with the request, whose purpose is to establish said
party's cause of action or defense. . . .
Moreover, under Section 1, Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, 18 the request for admission must be
served directly upon the party; otherwise, the party to whom the request is directed cannot be
deemed to have admitted the genuineness of any relevant document in and exhibited with the
request or relevant matters of fact set forth therein, on account of failure to answer the request for
admission. 19
In one case, namely, CA-G.R. No. 20561-R, entitled "Jose Ledesma, Jr., Plaintiff-
Appellee, versus Guillermo Locsin, Defendant-Appellant", 20 the Court of Appeals in favorably
resolving the defendant-appellant's motion for reconsideration of its earlier decision (wherein it
affirmed the summary judgment of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental in favor of
plaintiff Jose Ledesma, Jr. upon failure of defendant Guillermo Locsin to answer a request for
admission served upon his counsel by the plaintiff) held in its Resolution dated 1 June 1963, as
follows:
The issue raised by the first two assigned errors is whether or not a request for
admission must be served directly on a party, and not his counsel, in order that said
request can be considered as validly served. In our decision which is sought to be
reconsidered, we held that a request for admission may be validly served upon
party's counsel. After a further review of the facts of the case and the circumstances
surrounding the same, we are now fully convinced that it should not be so.
The general rule as provided for under Section 2 of Rule 27 (now Section 2, Rule 13)
of the Rules of Court is that all notices must be served upon counsel and not upon
party. This is so because the attorney of a party is the agent of the party and is the
one responsible for the conduct of the case in all its procedural aspects; hence,
notice to counsel is notice to party. The purpose of the rule is obviously to maintain a
uniform procedure calculated to place in competent hands the orderly prosecution of
a party's case (Chainani v. Judge Tancinco, G.R. No. L-4782, Feb. 29, 1952; Capili
v. Badelles, G.R. No. L-17786, Sept. 29, 1962). However, the general rule cannot
apply where the law expressly provides that notice must be served upon a definite
person. In such cases, service must be made directly upon the person mentioned in
the law and upon no other in order that the notice be valid.
Whenever notice is necessary, it must appear that it was served on

the proper person, and there must be strict compliance with a statute
requiring service on a particular person, so that service on another
person is not sufficient.
In general, service of notice of a modal or formal step in a proceeding

on the attorney of record is sufficient, if not otherwise specifically
provided by statute or rule of court. (66 C.J.S. 658)
Thus, we see that section 7 of Rule 40, with regard to notice of pendency of an
appeal from an inferior court to a Court of First Instance, provides that "it shall be the
duty of the clerk of the court to notify the parties of that fact by registered mail", and
the Supreme Court construing said section held, in Ortiz v.Mania, G.R. No. L-5147,
June 2, 1953, that the notice of the pendency of the appeal must be served upon the
parties for said section being express and specific cannot be interpreted to mean that
the notice can be given to the lawyer alone.
Similarly, section 1 of Rule 20 (now Section 1, Rule 25) provides that "any party may
serve upon any adverse party written interrogatories", and Chief Justice Moran
commenting on this rule states that "the written interrogatories referred to in the
instant provision should be delivered directly to the adverse party." We see no valid
reason why a different rule should govern request for admission inasmuch as written
interrogatories and request for admissions are both modes of discovery.
Section 1 of Rule 23 (now Section 1, Rule 26) of the Rules of Court which expressly
states that "a party may serve upon any other party a written request" should receive
no other construction than that the request for admission must be served directly on
the party and not on his counsel. Section 2 of Rule 27 (now Section 2, Rule 13) of
the Rules of Court does not control the mode of service of request for admission. It
should be observed that the orders, motions and other papers mentioned in said
section have this property in common: they have to be filed with the court. A request
for admission, on the other hand, need not be filed with the court; it was intended to
operate extra-judicially and courts are not burdened with the duty to determine the
propriety or impropriety of the request for admission (I Moran's Comments on the
Rules of Court, 1957 ed., 372-73; I Francisco's Rules of Court, Part 2, p. 282).
. . . Permission of the court is not required to make such a request or
demand, or to file it, or serve it on the adverse party; but service must
be made in the manner specified by the statute or rule. (27 C.J.C.
277)
And the answer to the request for admission is likewise not a matter of record and
would require another step in procedure to bring it on record (Seranton Lackawanna
Trust Co. vs. McDermont, 1 Pa. Dist. & Co. 2nd 539, 55 Lack. Jur. 265, cited in 27
C.J.S. 277, fn 19). Section 2 of Rule 27 governs only those papers that have to be
filed in court and does not govern papers which, by the rules of procedure, do not
have to be filed in court.
In view of the foregoing, it is our considered opinion that the request for admission
made by plaintiff was not validly served and that, therefore, defendant cannot be
deemed to have admitted the truth of the matters upon which admissions were
requested and, consequently, the summary judgment rendered by the court a
quo has no legal basis to support it. This conclusion renders it unnecessary to
discuss the other assigned errors.
The plaintiff-appellee Jose Ledesma, Jr. filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari of the
aforesaid resolution, docketed as G.R. No.
L-21715. On 2 October 1963, this Court denied the petition, thus —
After a consideration of the allegations of the petition filed in case L-21715 (Jose
Ledesma, Jr. vs. Guillermo Locsin), for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals
referred to therein, THE COURT RESOLVED to dismiss the petition for lack of merit.
In the present case, it will be noted that the request for admission was not served upon the private
respondent Mag-isa but upon her counsel, Atty. Alfredo A. Alto. Private respondent Mag-isa,
therefore, cannot be deemed to have admitted the facts and documents subject of the request for
admission for having failed to file her answer thereto within the period fixed in the request.
WHEREFORE, the petition should be, as it is hereby, DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals
dated 13 August 1990 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 185145 February 5, 2014
SPOUSES VICENTE AFULUGENCIA and LETICIA AFULUGENCIA, Petitioners,

vs.
METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO. and EMMANUEL L. ORTEGA, Clerk of Court, Regional
Trial Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff, Province of Bulacan, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Section 6,1 Rule 25 of the Rules of Court (Rules) provides that "a party not served with written
interrogatories may not be compelled by the adverse party to give testimony in open court, or to give
a deposition pending appeal." The provision seeks to prevent fishing expeditions and needless
delays. Its goal is to maintain order and facilitate the conduct of trial.
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari2 are the April 15, 2008 Decision3 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 99535 which dismissed petitioners' Petition for Certiorari for lack of
merit and its October 2, 2008 Resolution4 denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.5
Factual Antecedents
Petitioners, spouses Vicente and Leticia Afulugencia, filed a Complaint6 for nullification of mortgage,
foreclosure, auction sale, certificate of sale and other documents, with damages, against
respondents Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. (Metrobank) and Emmanuel L. Ortega (Ortega) before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos City, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 336-M-2004
and assigned to Branch 7.
Metrobank is a domestic banking corporation existing under Philippine laws, while Ortega is the
Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of the Malolos RTC.
After the filing of the parties’ pleadings and with the conclusion of pre-trial, petitioners filed a Motion
for Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum Ad Testificandum7 to require Metrobank’s officers8 to appear
and testify as the petitioners’ initial witnesses during the August 31, 2006 hearing for the
presentation of their evidence-in-chief, and to bring the documents relative to their loan with
Metrobank, as well as those covering the extrajudicial foreclosure and sale of petitioners’ 200-square
meter land in Meycauayan, Bulacan covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 20411 (M). The
Motion contained a notice of hearing written as follows:
NOTICE
The Branch Clerk of Court

Regional Trial Court
Branch 7, Malolos, Bulacan
Greetings:
Please submit the foregoing motion for the consideration and approval of the Hon. Court
immediately upon receipt hereof.
(signed)
Vicente C. Angeles9
Metrobank filed an Opposition10 arguing that for lack of a proper notice of hearing, the Motion must
be denied; that being a litigated motion, the failure of petitioners to set a date and time for the
hearing renders the Motion ineffective and pro forma; that pursuant to Sections 1 and 611 of Rule 25
of the Rules, Metrobank’s officers – who are considered adverse parties – may not be compelled to
appear and testify in court for the petitioners since they were not initially served with written
interrogatories; that petitioners have not shown the materiality and relevance of the documents
sought to be produced in court; and that petitioners were merely fishing for evidence.
Petitioners submitted a Reply12 to Metrobank’s Opposition, stating that the lack of a proper notice of
hearing was cured by the filing of Metrobank’s Opposition; that applying the principle of liberality, the
defect may be ignored; that leave of court is not necessary for the taking of Metrobank’s officers’
depositions; that for their case, the issuance of a subpoena is not unreasonable and oppressive, but
instead favorable to Metrobank, since it will present the testimony of these officers just the same
during the presentation of its own evidence; that the documents sought to be produced are relevant
and will prove whether petitioners have paid their obligations to Metrobank in full, and will settle the
issue relative to the validity or invalidity of the foreclosure proceedings; and that the Rules do not
prohibit a party from presenting the adverse party as its own witness.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On October 19, 2006, the trial court issued an Order13 denying petitioners’ Motion for Issuance of
Subpoena Duces Tecum Ad Testificandum, thus:
The motion lacks merit.
As pointed out by the defendant bank in its opposition, the motion under consideration is a mere
scrap of paper by reason of its failure to comply with the requirements for a valid notice of hearing as
specified in Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court. Moreover, the defendant
bank and its officers are adverse parties who cannot be summoned to testify unless written
interrogatories are first served upon them, as provided in Sections 1 and 6, Rule 25 of the Revised
Rules of Court.
In view of the foregoing, and for lack of merit, the motion under consideration is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.14
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration15 pleading for leniency in the application of the Rules
and claiming that the defective notice was cured by the filing of Metrobank’s Opposition, which they
claim is tantamount to notice. They further argued that Metrobank’s officers – who are the subject of
the subpoena – are not party-defendants, and thus do not comprise the adverse party; they are
individuals separate and distinct from Metrobank, the defendant corporation being sued in the case.
In an Opposition16 to the Motion for Reconsideration, Metrobank insisted on the procedural defect of
improper notice of hearing, arguing that the rule relative to motions and the requirement of a valid
notice of hearing are mandatory and must be strictly observed. It added that the same rigid
treatment must be accorded to Rule 25, in that none of its officers may be summoned to testify for
petitioners unless written interrogatories are first served upon them. Finally, it said that since a
corporation may act only through its officers and employees, they are to be considered as adverse
parties in a case against the corporation itself.
In another Order17 dated April 17, 2007, the trial court denied petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration.
The trial court held, thus:
Even if the motion is given consideration by relaxing Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court,
no such laxity could be accorded to Sections 1 and 6 of Rule 25 of the Revised Rules of Court which
require prior service of written interrogatories to adverse parties before any material and relevant
facts may be elicited from them more so if the party is a private corporation who could be
represented by its officers as in this case. In other words, as the persons sought to be subpoenaed
by the plaintiffs-movants are officers of the defendant bank, they are in effect the very persons who
represent the interest of the latter and necessarily fall within the coverage of Sections 1 and 6, Rule
25 of the Revised Rules of Court.
In view of the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration is hereby denied.
SO ORDERED.18
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari19 with the CA asserting this time that their Motion for Issuance
of Subpoena Duces Tecum Ad Testificandum is not a litigated motion; it does not seek relief, but
aims for the issuance of a mere process. For these reasons, the Motion need not be heard. They
likewise insisted on liberality, and the disposition of the case on its merits and not on mere
technicalities.20 They added that Rule 2121 of the Rules requires prior notice and hearing only with
respect to the taking of depositions; since their Motion sought to require Metrobank’s officers to
appear and testify in court and not to obtain their depositions, the requirement of notice and hearing
may be dispensed with. Finally, petitioners claimed that the Rules – particularly Section 10,22 Rule
132 – do not prohibit a party from presenting the adverse party as its own witness.
On April 15, 2008, the CA issued the questioned Decision, which contained the following decretal
portion:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed orders dated October 19,
2006 and April 17, 2007 in Civil Case No. 336-M-2004 issued by the RTC, Branch 7, Malolos City,
Bulacan, are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.23
The CA held that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed
Orders; petitioners’ Motion is a litigated motion, especially as it seeks to require the adverse party,
Metrobank’s officers, to appear and testify in court as petitioners’ witnesses. It held that a proper
notice of hearing, addressed to the parties and specifying the date and time of the hearing, was
required, consistent with Sections 4 and 5,24 Rule 15 of the Rules.
The CA held further that the trial court did not err in denying petitioners’ Motion to secure a
subpoena duces tecum/ad testificandum, ratiocinating that Rule 25 is quite clear in providing that the
consequence of a party’s failure to serve written interrogatories upon the opposing party is that the
latter may not be compelled by the former to testify in court or to render a deposition pending appeal.
By failing to serve written interrogatories upon Metrobank, petitioners foreclosed their right to present
the bank’s officers as their witnesses.
The CA declared that the justification for the rule laid down in Section 6 is that by failing to seize the
opportunity to inquire upon the facts through means available under the Rules, petitioners should not
be allowed to later on burden Metrobank with court hearings or other processes. Thus, it held:
x x x Where a party unjustifiedly refuses to elicit facts material and relevant to his case by
addressing written interrogatories to the adverse party to elicit those facts, the latter may not
thereafter be compelled to testify thereon in court or give a deposition pending appeal. The
justification for this is that the party in need of said facts having foregone the opportunity to inquire
into the same from the other party through means available to him, he should not thereafter be
permitted to unduly burden the latter with courtroom appearances or other cumbersome processes.
The sanction adopted by the Rules is not one of compulsion in the sense that the party is being
directly compelled to avail of the discovery mechanics, but one of negation by depriving him of
evidentiary sources which would otherwise have been accessible to him.25
Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration,26 which the CA denied in its assailed October 2,
2008 Resolution. Hence, the present Petition.
Issues
Petitioners now raise the following issues for resolution:
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERRORS IN REQUIRING NOTICE AND

HEARING (SECS. 4 AND 5, RULE 15, RULES OF COURT) FOR A MERE MOTION FOR
SUBPOENA OF RESPONDENT BANK’S OFFICERS WHEN SUCH REQUIREMENTS APPLY
ONLY TO DEPOSITION UNDER SEC. 6, RULE 25, RULES OF COURT.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED (REVERSIBLE) ERROR IN HOLDING THAT THE

PETITIONERS MUST FIRST SERVE WRITTEN INTERROGATORIES TO RESPONDENT BANK’S
OFFICERS BEFORE THEY CAN BE SUBPOENAED.27
Petitioners’ Arguments
Praying that the assailed CA dispositions be set aside and that the Court allow the issuance of the
subpoena duces tecum/ad testificandum, petitioners assert that the questioned Motion is not a
litigated motion, since it seeks not a relief, but the issuance of process. They insist that a motion
which is subject to notice and hearing under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 is an application for relief
other than a pleading; since no relief is sought but just the process of subpoena, the hearing and
notice requirements may be done away with. They cite the case of Adorio v. Hon. Bersamin,28 which
held that –
Requests by a party for the issuance of subpoenas do not require notice to other parties to the
action. No violation of due process results by such lack of notice since the other parties would have
1âwphi 1
ample opportunity to examine the witnesses and documents subpoenaed once they are presented in
court.29
Petitioners add that the Rules should have been liberally construed in their favor, and that
Metrobank’s filing of its Opposition be considered to have cured whatever defect the Motion suffered
from.
Petitioners likewise persist in the view that Metrobank’s officers – the subject of the Motion – do not
comprise the adverse party covered by the rule; they insist that these bank officers are mere
employees of the bank who may be called to testify for them.
Respondents’ Arguments
Metrobank essentially argues in its Comment30 that the subject Motion for the issuance of a
subpoena duces tecum/ad testificandum is a litigated motion, especially as it is directed toward its
officers, whose testimony and documentary evidence would affect it as the adverse party in the civil
case. Thus, the lack of a proper notice of hearing renders it useless and a mere scrap of paper. It
adds that being its officers, the persons sought to be called to the stand are themselves adverse
parties who may not be compelled to testify in the absence of prior written interrogatories; they are
not ordinary witnesses whose presence in court may be required by petitioners at any time and for
any reason.
Finally, Metrobank insists on the correctness of the CA Decision, adding that since petitioners failed
up to this time to pay the witnesses’ fees and kilometrage as required by the Rules,31 the issuance of
a subpoena should be denied.
Our Ruling
The Court denies the Petition.
On the procedural issue, it is quite clear that Metrobank was notified of the Motion for Issuance of
Subpoena Duces Tecum Ad Testificandum; in fact, it filed a timely Opposition thereto. The technical
defect of lack of notice of hearing was thus cured by the filing of the Opposition.32
Nonetheless, contrary to petitioners’ submission, the case of Adorio cannot apply squarely to this
case. In Adorio, the request for subpoena duces tecum was sought against bank officials who were
not parties to the criminal case for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. The situation is different
here, as officers of the adverse party Metrobank are being compelled to testify as the calling party’s
main witnesses; likewise, they are tasked to bring with them documents which shall comprise the
petitioners’ principal evidence. This is not without significant consequences that affect the interests
of the adverse party, as will be shown below.
As a rule, in civil cases, the procedure of calling the adverse party to the witness stand is not
allowed, unless written interrogatories are first served upon the latter. This is embodied in Section 6,
Rule 25 of the Rules, which provides –
Sec. 6. Effect of failure to serve written interrogatories.
Unless thereafter allowed by the court for good cause shown and to prevent a failure of justice, a
party not served with written interrogatories may not be compelled by the adverse party to give
testimony in open court, or to give a deposition pending appeal.
One of the purposes of the above rule is to prevent fishing expeditions and needless delays; it is
there to maintain order and facilitate the conduct of trial. It will be presumed that a party who does
not serve written interrogatories on the adverse party beforehand will most likely be unable to elicit
facts useful to its case if it later opts to call the adverse party to the witness stand as its witness.
Instead, the process could be treated as a fishing expedition or an attempt at delaying the
proceedings; it produces no significant result that a prior written interrogatories might bring.
Besides, since the calling party is deemed bound by the adverse party’s testimony,33 compelling the
adverse party to take the witness stand may result in the calling party damaging its own case.
Otherwise stated, if a party cannot elicit facts or information useful to its case through the facility of
written interrogatories or other mode of discovery, then the calling of the adverse party to the witness
stand could only serve to weaken its own case as a result of the calling party’s being bound by the
adverse party’s testimony, which may only be worthless and instead detrimental to the calling party’s
cause.
Another reason for the rule is that by requiring prior written interrogatories, the court may limit the
inquiry to what is relevant, and thus prevent the calling party from straying or harassing the adverse
party when it takes the latter to the stand.
Thus, the rule not only protects the adverse party from unwarranted surprises or harassment; it
likewise prevents the calling party from conducting a fishing expedition or bungling its own case.
Using its own judgment and discretion, the court can hold its own in resolving a dispute, and need
not bear witness to the parties perpetrating unfair court practices such as fishing for evidence,
badgering, or altogether ruining their own cases. Ultimately, such unnecessary processes can only
constitute a waste of the court’s precious time, if not pointless entertainment.
In the present case, petitioners seek to call Metrobank’s officers to the witness stand as their initial
and main witnesses, and to present documents in Metrobank’s possession as part of their principal
documentary evidence. This is improper. Petitioners may not be allowed, at the incipient phase of
the presentation of their evidence-in-chief at that, to present Metrobank’s officers – who are
considered adverse parties as well, based on the principle that corporations act only through their
officers and duly authorized agents34 – as their main witnesses; nor may they be allowed to gain
access to Metrobank’s documentary evidence for the purpose of making it their own. This is
tantamount to building their whole case from the evidence of their opponent. The burden of proof
and evidence falls on petitioners, not on Metrobank; if petitioners cannot prove their claim using their
own evidence, then the adverse party Metrobank may not be pressured to hang itself from its own
defense.
It is true that under the Rules, a party may, for good cause shown and to prevent a failure of justice,
be compelled to give testimony in court by the adverse party who has not served written
interrogatories. But what petitioners seek goes against the very principles of justice and fair play;
they would want that Metrobank provide the very evidence with which to prosecute and build their
case from the start. This they may not be allowed to do.
Finally, the Court may not turn a blind eye to the possible consequences of such a move by
petitioners. As one of their causes of action in their Complaint, petitioners claim that they were not
furnished with specific documents relative to their loan agreement with Metrobank at the time they
obtained the loan and while it was outstanding. If Metrobank were to willingly provide petitioners with
these documents even before petitioners can present evidence to show that indeed they were never
furnished the same, any inferences generated from this would certainly not be useful for Metrobank.
One may be that by providing petitioners with these documents, Metrobank would be admitting that
indeed, it did not furnish petitioners with these documents prior to the signing of the loan agreement,
and while the loan was outstanding, in violation of the law.
With the view taken of the case, the Court finds it unnecessary to further address the other issues
raised by the parties, which are irrelevant and would not materially alter the conclusions arrived at.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed April 15, 2008 Decision and October 2, 2008
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 99535 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 106094 December 28, 1992
PSCFC FINANCIAL CORPORATION (NEW PSCFC BUSINESS CORPORATION), petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. HERMINIO I. BENITO, Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 132, Makati,
Metro Manila, NOTARY PUBLIC ENRIQUE I. QUIASON, and BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS &
MORTGAGE BANK, respondents.
RESOLUTION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
At issue in this petition for review is whether a request for admission directed to an adverse party
under Sec. 1, Rule 26, of the Rules of Court may be answered only by his counsel.
On 17 March 1988, petitioner PSC Financial Corporation (PSCFC) filed a complaint against private
respondent Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank (Banco Filipino) for annulment of foreclosure
proceedings and damages with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, docketed as Civil
Case No. 88-368.
Petitioner PSCFC alleges that as land developer it availed itself of the Home Financing Plan of
Banco Filipino and borrowed from the latter the amount of P6,630,690.00 as "developer loan." As
security, petitioner constituted a mortgage over several lots in Pasay City which properties were not
yet sold at that time to third parties. It was agreed that under the Home Financing Plan, the
"developer loan" would mature only after the lots shall have been subdivided and improved and then
sold to third persons who would then be substituted as mortgagors to the extent of the loan value of
the lots and houses bought by them. However, on 25 September 1987, without the loan having
matured as none of the lots have been conveyed to buyers, such that the latter could now take the
place of petitioner as mortgagors, the mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed and a certificate of
sale was executed in favor of private respondent Banco Filipino.
In their answer of 10 June 1988, private respondents admitted the loan of P6,630,690.00 for which
petitioner had executed a promissory note secured by a real estate mortgage on the properties
described in the complaint. However, they denied that petitioner had availed itself of Banco Filipino's
Home Financing Plan, averring instead that under the promissory note and the contract of mortgage,
the subject loan would fall due "1 year from date" or on 5 January 1986 and that upon default of
petitioner, Banco Filipino could immediately foreclose the mortgage under Act No. 3135 as in fact it
did, upon compliance with the legal requirements with respect to extrajudicial foreclosures.
On 21 June 1988, petitioner served upon Banco Filipino a written request for admission of the truth
of certain matters set forth as follows:
1. The plaintiff (PSCFC) ... was ... granted by you under BF Home Financing Plan, on
the security of mortgages constituted on the lands acquired, under the terms of which
the developer loans, despite the contents of the covering promissory notes and
security instruments, would mature only after the development of the acquired lands
into residential subdivision and the resale of the ... lots ... to interested third parties
who would then be substituted as mortgagors ...
2. ... in 1984, availing itself of your said Home Financing Plan, the plaintiff obtained
from you a loan ... of P6,630,690.00 for which it signed in your favor a promissory
note on the security of a mortgage constituted on ... lots, which were not then yet
sold to any third person ...
3. ... on September 25, 1987, without the said loan having yet matured for the reason
that none of the ... lots had yet been the subject of sale to third persons such that
substitution of the latter as mortgagors in your favor could not yet be had, a
certificate of sale was executed by the Notary Public over the ... lands in your favor.1
On 27 June 1988, petitioner received Banco Filipino's answer to its request for admission signed by
its counsel, Atty. Philip Sigfrid A. Fortun. Counsel admitted, inter alia, petitioner's mortgage loan as
well as the fact that Banco Filipino was engaged in land development loans. However, respondent
denied that petitioner availed itself of the Home Financing Plan, including the agreement that the
maturity of the debt would depend on the resale of the mortgaged subdivision lots.
On 8 August 1988, petitioner made a second request for admission on respondent Banco Filipino
impliedly objecting to the first reply having been made by its lawyer, Atty. Fortun, who was not even
an attorney yet when Banco Filipino inaugurated its financing plan in February 1968 and therefore
did not have personal knowledge of the financing scheme. The second request called on Banco
Filipino to admit that it did not send a formal notice of its intention to foreclose the mortgage and that
there was no publication of the notice of foreclosure in a newspaper of general circulation.
By way of response made 26 August and 4 November 1988, respondent Banco Filipino objected to
the matters requested on the ground of irrelevancy and denied all the rest. In its motion of 7
November 1988, petitioner asked the trial court for a ruling that the matters sought to be admitted in
its second bid for admission should be considered as impliedly admitted when the answer was made
by a lawyer who was not qualified to do so as he had no direct and personal knowledge of the
matters sought to be admitted. In insisting that only a client could make a binding admission in
discovery proceedings, petitioner cites Koh v. IAC. 2 It even went to the extent of quoting in its petition, found on pages
15 -16, certain paragraphs supposedly taken therefrom which are not actually found therein, except the last paragraph which states: "... All
the parties are required to lay their cards on the table so that justice can be rendered on the merits of the case."
In any case, the lower court was not persuaded, so that petitioner went to the Court of Appeals
maintaining that there was a tacit admission of the matters included in its second request for
admission as the answer thereto was signed only by Atty. Fortun who had no personality to do so.
The appellate court sustained the trial court; hence, this instant recourse.
Petitioner submits that the answer to the request for admission under Rule 26 should be made by
the party himself and nobody else, not even his lawyer. Consequently, failure of respondent Banco
Filipino, upon whom the call for admission was served, to render the required sworn statement
would constitute an implied admission of the facts sought to be admitted. Thus, it must be the part
itself who must respond to the request for admission and that a mere reply made and verified by its
counsel alone is insufficient and contrary to the Rules and the intent behind recourse to modes of
discovery.
The argument is untenable. Section 21 of Rule 138 states —
Sec. 21. Authority of attorney to appear. — An attorney is presumed to be properly

authorized to represent any cause in which he appears, and no written power of
attorney is required to authorize him to appear in court for his client ... 3
Petitioner has not shown that the case at bar falls under any of the recognized exceptions as found
in Art. 1878 of the Civil Code which enumerates the instances when special powers of attorney are
necessary, or in Rule 20 of the Rules of Court on pre-trial where the parties and their attorneys are
both directed to appear before the court for a conference; so that for counsel to appear at the pre-
trail in behalf of the client, he must clothe the former with an adequate authority in the form of a
special power of attorney or corporate resolution.
Section 23 of Rule 138 provides that "(a)ttorneys have authority to bind their clients in any case by
any agreement in relation thereto made in writing, and in taking appeals, and in all matters of
ordinary judicial procedure ..."
Thus, when Rule 26 states that a party shall respond to the request for admission, it should not be
restrictively construed to mean that a party may not engage the services of counsel to make the
response in his behalf. Indeed, the theory of petitioner must not be taken seriously; otherwise, it will
negate the principles on agency in the Civil Code, 4 as well as Sec. 23, Rule 138, of the Rule of
Court.5
Nonetheless, even assuming arguendo that Atty. Philip Sigfrid Fortun overstepped his authority, it is
only his client, respondent Banco Filipino, which has the prerogative to impugn his acts and not
petitioner, the adverse party. Interestingly, Banco Filipino has not objected to the response made by
its counsel in its behalf.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolves to: (a) DENY the instant petition for utter lack of merit; and,
(b) REQUIREcounsel for petitioner, ATTY. LUTGARDA C. BAQUIRAN-PERALTA, of the BALGOS &
PEREZ LAW OFFICE, 5th Floor, Corinthian Plaza, Paseo de Roxas, Makati, Metro Manila,
to SHOW CAUSE within ten (10) days from notice hereof why she should not be administratively
dealt with for misquoting the text of the decision in Koh v. IAC, supra, to support her position and
attain a favorable judgment for her client.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 102390 February 1, 2002
REY LAÑADA, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SPS. ROGELIO and ELIZA HEMEDEZ, respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 102404
NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC. and FRANCIS SANTOS, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SPS. ROGELIO and ELIZA HEMEDEZ, respondents.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
May the counsel of a party to whom a written request for admission is addressed under Section 1,
Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, answer such request for his client? This is the question posed for
resolution in these two (2) consolidated petitions for review on certiorari1 of the Decision of the Court
of Appeals dated July 24, 19912 that resolved the issue in the negative.
The facts attending the tragic incident that triggered the filing in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Laguna of Civil Case No. B-2762, an action for damages, by the spouses Rogelio Hemedez and
Eliza Garcia Hemedez, are as follows:
The Union of Filipro Employees (UFE) declared a strike on account of alleged unfair labor practices
committed by Nestle Philippines, Inc. (Nestle) and put up a picket line in front of the company’s
factory in Niugan, Cabuyao, Laguna. On October 27, 1987, the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) enjoining the UFE, its sympathizers
and agents to desist from "blocking, barricading and obstructing the points of ingress and egress"
from Nestle’s Cabuyao plant. To enforce the TRO, Nestle sought the assistance of both the 224th
Philippine Constabulary (PC) Company in Camp Eldridge, Los Baños, Laguna, under the command
of PC/Capt. Rey Lañada, and the members of the Cabuyao police department under the command
of P/Maj. Lorenzo T. Malaga, as well as the fire brigade of Cabuyao. In order that it could transfer its
products from the Cabuyao factory to its warehouse in Taguig, Metro Manila during the strike, Nestle
hired the trucks of the Alimagno brothers, Constancio, Jr., who was then the Officer-in-Charge of
Cabuyao, and Jesus.
On October 29, 1987, Alexander Asinas of the UFE and Francis Santos of Nestle agreed to
constitute a panel to discuss about the said trucks and the scabs allowed to sneak into the Cabuyao
plant, as the matter did not appear to have been covered by the TRO. However, in apparent bad
faith, Santos signaled both the PC contingent to disperse the strikers at the barricades in front of the
plant gate, and the overloaded cargo trucks waiting inside the compound to proceed with getting out
of the plant. Thus, the PC contingent, both in uniform and in plain clothes, and armed with armalites,
began hitting the strikers with truncheons as water cannons from fire trucks assisted them in the
dispersal operation that resulted in the arrest of fourteen (14) strikers and injuries to many others.
With gate cleared, the cargo trucks began leaving the compound with some turning to the right and
others to the left into the national road. Although stones thrown by some strikers broke the
windshields of some trucks, all five (5) trucks succeeded in leaving the compound.
That was the situation in the dispersal operation when Dr. Vied Vemir Garcia Hemedez arrived in the
area on board his car, a Ford Escort 4-door sedan, model 1975, with plate No. DOG-689, on his way
home from his masteral class at the University of the Philippines College of Public Health. He
stopped his car not knowing that the sixth ten-wheeler truck owned by Jesus Alimagno and driven by
Pacifico Galasao, was then leaving the Nestle compound in full speed. To avoid stones being thrown
at his direction, Galasao was driving in a crouching position. However, considering the length of the
truck that was also overloaded, Galasao lost control of it. After turning left to the national road, the
truck zigzagged northward until it reached the soft shoulder on the right side of the national road
where Galasao abruptly swerved the truck to the left to avoid the strikers. However, he was not able
to swerve the truck back to the right to stay on course on the road. Because Galasao did not stop
nor slow it down, the truck went diagonally across to the left side of the road, bumped the car of Dr.
Hemedez, and dragged it until the car turned upside down. In Galasao’s attempt to straighten his
course, he also side-swept a house off the road, rammed down a beauty parlor, and run over and
killed two (2) persons sitting on a bench near the parlor facing the Iglesia ni Cristo chapel. The truck
stopped as it crashed into the chapel’s reinforced concrete wall and post. Galasao rose from his
seat, got off the truck, and, apparently anticipating an attack, proceeded to the chapel with a lead
pipe in hand while his helpers armed themselves with stones.
Pinned down by his overturned car, Dr. Hemedez mustered strength to ask someone to inform his
parents, through a doctor friend, about the incident as he pleaded with people around to extricate
him from under the truck. Capt. Lañada and some PC soldiers immediately rushed to the truck to
prevent people from looting it. At that moment, the brothers of Dr. Hemedez, namely, Roel, Emeterio
and Rogelio, Jr., followed by their mother, Mrs. Eliza Hemedez, and her daughter, Andora, arrived.
Roel and Emeterio tried to pull Dr. Hemedez out of his car to no avail. Roel cut the ropes holding the
canvass covering the load of the truck in preparation for its being lifted, and asked the PC soldiers to
unload or allow them to unload the truck’s cargo. The soldiers referred Roel to Capt. Lañada who,
however, refused to unload the cargo of the truck for fear that the cargo might be looted. Mrs.
Hemedez made the same plea to Capt. Lañada and Jesus Alimagno who had arrived in the area,
but she was met with the same adamant refusal to unload the cargo for fear that there might be
looting, notwithstanding that Dr. Hemedez was the godson of Constancio Alimagno, Sr. It was two
(2) hours later when the cargo was finally unloaded to other trucks that Dr. Hemedez was finally
pulled out from under Galasao’s truck, and brought to the Perpetual Help Hospital in Biñan, Laguna
where he died shortly after arrival thereat. He died due to "Intra-thoracic hemorrhage, massive, due
to severe impact (Vehicular Accident)." Mrs. Hemedez witnessed in pain the agony of her helpless
son as a consequence of the refusal of Capt. Lañada and the PC soldiers to help them save his life.
The Hemedez family tried to pay Funeraria Dionicio for the funeral services rendered for Dr.
Hemedez but its owner, Dionicio Hemedez, refused to accept payment on the ground that Miguela
Alimagno, the mother of Jesus, undertook to pay for it.3
On December 8, 1987, the spouses Rogelio and Eliza Hemedez, parents of Dr. Hemedez, filed Civil
Case No. B-2762 in the RTC of Laguna against Nestle, Jesus Alimagno, Francis Santos, Pacifico
Galasao, and PC/Capt. Rey Lañada, praying for the award of Thirty Thousand Pesos (₱30,000.00)
as indemnity for Dr. Hemedez’ death, Eleven Million Four Hundred Thousand Pesos
(₱11,400,000.00) representing loss of earnings of the deceased, Eighty Thousand Pesos
(₱80,000.00) as actual compensation for the destruction of his car, moral and exemplary damages,
and attorney’s fees.
In their answer to the complaint, Nestle and Santos denied liability for the death of Dr. Hemedez.
They interposed as special and affirmative defenses that Nestle and Belltown Transport Services,
Inc., an independent contractor, had a "trucking and hauling agreement" whereby Belltown agreed to
"make deliveries of the products of Nestle" and assumed "liability for any injuries or damages to
properties" that would arise from the agreement. They alleged that the accident happened in the
course of an illegal strike and hence, the proximate cause of Dr. Hemedez’ death "was the violent
assault by the strikers against the truck." They averred that the complaint should be dismissed for
failure to implead UFE, its officers and striking members, as indispensable parties. They alleged
further that the incident happened outside of Nestle’s premises and that when they came to know
about it, they ordered the lifting of the truck by Nestle’s own forklift. The delayed unloading of the
cargo from the truck thus rested upon Belltown’s "sole judgment." They set up a cross-claim against
Galasao in order that he could reimburse them should they be adjudged liable, and a counterclaim
for attorney’s fees for what they called an unfounded suit.
For his part, Capt. Lañada dismissed the claims for his liability. He asserted that the unruly mob’s
attack on the trucks that built up a "monstrous traffic jam" caused the incident. While he and his men
exerted all efforts to save all casualties and not just Dr. Hemedez, the plaintiffs misconstrued his
acts "as refusal in their obsessive and hysterical desire to extricate their stricken relative from the
place of the accident without regard to the welfare and well-being of the larger throng of persons
some of whom were also injured who were just as well entitled to or deserving protection from the
contingent of PC soldiers." He interposed a counterclaim for moral damages and attorney’s fees
arising from the plaintiffs’ having unjustly impleaded him in the "baseless suit" designed to be a
speculative monetary claim against Nestle.
Thereafter, the Hemedez spouses served the defendants a request for admission of the truth of the
facts set forth in their complaint and the genuineness of each of the documents appended thereto.
Through their respective counsel, Nestle and Santos, Capt. Lañada, and Alimagno and Galasao filed
their verified answer to the request for admission.
Contending that under Section 2 of Rule 26 of the Rules of Court the parties themselves and not
their counsel should personally answer the request for admission and hence the answer filed by their
counsel in their behalf was "by nature based on hearsay," they sought the striking out of said
answers. On the other hand, the defendants asserted that they observed the rules in filing their
answers, through their lawyers, to the request for admission.
Hence, the trial court4 issued an Order dated April 10, 1989 denying for lack of merit the Hemedez
spouses’ motion to strike out the defendants’ answers and/or declare the matters sought to be
admitted as impliedly admitted. It held that the grounds relied upon by plaintiffs’ counsel in his
motion were "more formal than substantial" for several reasons. First, by signing and verifying the
answer to the request for admission, the counsel of a defendant or defendants "reposed upon
himself the same undertaking the defendant would have undertaken had he been the one who
verified" the answer. Second, since the purpose of verification is merely to serve as an assurance
that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not the product of imagination, and that
the pleading is filed in good faith, the absence of verification is formal and not
jurisdictional. Third, the defendants were bound by the acts of the counsel of their choice. Fourth, the
generalizations made in the answer were expected because the plaintiff’s requests for admission
were substantially identical with the allegations in their complaint. The lower court concluded:
A cursory reading of the adverted answers to the complaint would show that defendants have
substantially complied with the requirements of the rules by so specifically denying the matters which
they could not admit and indicating the reasons why they could not admit or deny the specific
matters sought to be admitted, thus leaving such matter controverted. The veracity, therefore, of
their denial or uncommitted stand, is a matter that could be determined only in a full blown trial on
the merit where parties could amply support their respective claim.
The Hemedez spouses sought a reconsideration of that Order through an omnibus motion (a)
asserting that the matters sought to be admitted were "decisive on the respective liabilities of all
defendants"; (b) stressing the need to resolve the relevancy and materiality of the specific matters
requested to be admitted and which were neither admitted nor denied by the defendants; and (c)
seeking permission to amend the complaint to implead as indispensable parties-defendants Belltown
Transport Services, Inc., Magnolia Freight Services, and Constancio Alimagno, Jr.
Nestle, Santos and Capt. Lañada opposed the omnibus motion on the grounds that: (a) it was filed
out of time, (b) it raised no new matters not already taken up in the questioned Order, and (c) to
allow amendment of the complaint would result in delay in the proceedings.
On July 24, 1989, the lower court denied the omnibus motion except the prayer to amend the
complaint. It stressed that in that particular stage of the proceedings, the court could not "make a
categorical ruling as to the veracity of the denials made by defendants of certain facts based on
immateriality, irrelevancy or for lack of information until after it has considered in a full blown trial all
the evidence presented and pertinent to the issue of the case."
Refusing to budge from their stand, the Hemedez spouses sought the review of both Orders of the
lower court via a petition for certiorari that was filed on August 16, 1989 and docketed in this Court
as G.R. No. 89399. The First Division of this Court referred the petition to the Court of Appeals
where it was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 18894. On July 24, 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered the
Decision annulling the lower court’s Orders of April 10, 1989 and July 24, 1989, granting the motions
to strike out the answers subject of the requests for admission and declaring each of the matters
requested to be impliedly admitted, and remanding the case to the court a quo for proper
proceedings.
Hence, the instant consolidated petitions for review on certiorari. As earlier stated, the petitioners
offer for resolution the principal issue of whether or not an answer to a request for admission signed
and sworn to by the counsel of the party so requested is sufficient compliance with the provisions of
Rule 26 of the Rules of Court. In other words, should a person to whom a request for admission is
addressed personally answer the request? Two (2) other collateral issues need resolution: (a)
whether or not each answer of the requested party-defendant to the statements sought to be
admitted is a specific denial in accordance with the rules, and (b) whether or not the motion for
reconsideration of the questioned Order of April 10, 1989 was timely filed.
The provision of Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, the matrix upon which the resolution of these
petitions rests, state:
SEC. 2. Implied admission. – Each of the matters of which an admission is requested shall be
deemed admitted unless, within a period designated in the request, which shall not be less than ten
(10) days after service thereof, or within such further time as the court may allow on motion and
notice, the party to whom the request is directedserves upon the party requesting the admission a
sworn statement either denying specifically or setting forth in detail the reasons why he cannot
truthfully either admit or deny those matters.
Objections on the ground of irrelevancy or impropriety of the matter requested shall be promptly
submitted to the court for resolution." (Underscoring supplied.)5
The issue for resolution thus calls for an interpretation of the phrase "the party to whom the request
is directed." This is not the first time that the Court is faced with the issue of whether a party
requested to make admissions may reply or answer through his counsel. In PSCFC Financial
Corporation v. Court of Appeals,6 the petitioner therein served upon the Banco Filipino Savings and
Mortgage Bank, a written request for admission of the truth of certain factual matters. Through Philip
Sigfrid A. Fortun, who was not yet a lawyer when Banco Filipino inaugurated its financing plan in
1968, Banco Filipino made the requested admissions but denied that the financing corporation had
availed of the Home Financing Plan subject of controversy. Obviously objecting to the reply, the
petitioner therein made a second request for admission. In resolving the issue of whether or not the
answer to the request for admission under Rule 26 "should be made by the party himself and
nobody else, not even his lawyer," the Court issued a Resolution stating as follows:
The argument is untenable. Section 21 of Rule 138 states –
SEC. 21. Authority of attorney to appear. – An attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to

represent any cause in which he appears, and no written power of attorney is required to authorize
him to appear in court for his client x x x .
Petitioner has not shown that the case at bar falls under any of the recognized exceptions as found
in Art. 1878 of the Civil Code which enumerates the instances when special powers of attorney are
necessary, or in Rule 20 of the Rules of Court on pre-trial where the parties and their attorneys are
both directed to appear before the court for a conference; so that for counsel to appear at the pre-
trial in behalf of his client, he must clothe the former with an adequate authority in the form of a
special power of attorney or corporate resolution.
Section 23 of Rule 138 provides that "(a)ttorneys have authority to bind their clients in any case by
any agreement in relation thereto made in writing, and in taking appeals, and in all matters of
ordinary judicial procedure x x x ."
Thus, when Rule 26 states that a party shall respond to the request for admission, it should not be
restrictively construed to mean that a party may not engage the services of counsel to make the
response in his behalf. Indeed, the theory of petitioner must not be taken seriously; otherwise, it will
negate the principles on agency in the Civil Code, as well as Sec. 23, Rule 138, of the Rules of
Court.
Nonetheless, even assuming arguendo that Atty. Philip Sigfrid Fortun overstepped his authority, it is
only his client, respondent Banco Filipino, which has the prerogative to impugn his acts and not
petitioner, the adverse party. Interestingly, Banco Filipino has not objected to the response made by
its counsel in its behalf. (Italics supplied.)7
In the case at bar, neither is there a showing that petitioners Nestle and Santos did not authorize
their respective counsel to file in their behalf the respective answers requested of them by private
respondents in the latter’s written request for admission. As this Court has said, there is no reason to
strictly construe the phrase "the party to whom the request is directed" to refer solely or personally to
the petitioners themselves.
Moreover, as correctly observed by the lower court, the subject matters of the request for admission
are the same as the ultimate facts alleged in the complaint for which private respondents have filed
their respective answers. Private respondents thus desired the petitioners to admit once again the
very matters they had dealt with in their respective answers. In Po v. Court of Appeals, this Court
said:
A party should not be compelled to admit matters of fact already admitted by his pleading and
concerning which there is no issue (Sherr vs. East, 71 A2d, 752, Terry 260, cited in 27 C.J.S. 91),
nor should he be required to make a second denial of those already denied in his answer to the
complaint. A request for admission is not intended to merely reproduce or reiterate the allegations of
the requesting party’s pleading but should set forth relevant evidentiary matters of fact, or
documents described in and exhibited with the request, whose purpose is to establish said party’s
cause of action or defense. Unless it serves that purpose, it is, as correctly observed by the Court of
Appeals, "pointless, useless," and "a mere redundancy."8
The Court reiterated that ruling in Briboneria v. Court of Appeals9 and in Concrete Aggregates
Corporation v. Court of Appeals.10 In the latter case, the Court emphasized that the rule on admission
as a mode of discovery is intended "to expedite trial and to relieve parties of the costs of proving
facts which will not be disputed on trial and the truth of which can be ascertained by reasonable
inquiry." Thus, if the request for admission only serves to delay the proceedings by abetting
redundancy in the pleadings, the intended purpose for the rule will certainly be defeated.
Moreover, as the Court has observed in Briboneria, Sec. 1 of Rule 26 requires that the request for
admission must be served directly upon the party requested. Otherwise, that party cannot be
deemed to have admitted the genuineness of any relevant matters of fact set forth therein on
account of failure to answer the request for admission. It is thus unfair and unreasonable for private
respondents to expect the petitioners to answer the requests for admission that they in fact did not
personally receive. Private respondents’ failure to serve copies of the request for admission directly
upon the petitioners themselves suffices to warrant denial of the motion to strike out petitioners’
responses to said request.
The application of the rules on modes of discovery rests upon the sound discretion of the court. In1âw phi1
the same vein, the determination of the sanction to be imposed upon a party who fails to comply with
the modes of discovery rests on the same sound judicial discretion.11 It is the duty of the courts to
examine thoroughly the circumstances of each case and to determine the applicability of the modes
of discovery, bearing always in mind the aim to attain an expeditious administration of justice.12 It
need not be emphasized that upon the court’s shoulders likewise rests the burden of determining
whether the response of the requested party is a specific denial of the matters requested for
admission.
While the Court upholds the petitioners’ contention on the propriety of an answer to a request for
admission being filed by counsel, there is no merit in their contention on the late filing of private
respondents’ omnibus motion. It is indeed a fact that private respondents received a copy of the
questioned Order of April 10, 1989 on April 26, 1989 and that they filed the omnibus motion by
registered mail only on June 21, 1989 or fifty-six (56) days thereafter. Petitioners contend that the
omnibus motion should have been filed within the 15-day reglementary period as required by
Section 39 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. Suffice it to state that the Order sought to be
reconsidered by the lower court did not finally dispose of the merits of the case so that it should be
covered by the reglementary period stated in Section 39. That section speaks of "final orders"13 and
not interlocutory ones or those that leave "something to be done by the court before the case is
finally decided on the merits."14 By denying the motion to strike out the answers of private
respondents to petitioners’ request for admission, the lower court did not terminate the proceedings.
When it ruled on the omnibus motion which petitioners believe was filed out of time, the lower court
simply disposed of a matter that was, in a manner of speaking, getting in the way of the expeditious
disposition of the case. Private respondents who should be most interested in the speedy disposition
of the case unfortunately and unwittingly caused its delay by a request for admission that only
achieved nothing but further delay in the proceedings.
WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions for review on certiorari are GRANTED. The questioned
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 24, 1991 is SET ASIDE, and the Regional Trial Court of
Laguna is ordered to proceed with dispatch in the resolution of Civil Case No. B-2762.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 190818 November 10, 2014
METRO MANILA SHOPPING MECCA CORP., SHOEMART, INC., SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC.,
STAR APPLIANCES CENTER, SUPER VALUE, INC., ACE HARDWARE PHILIPPINES, INC.,
HEAL TH AND BEAUTY, INC., JOLLIMART PHILS. CORP., and SURPLUS MARKETING
CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs.
MS. LIBERTY M. TOLEDO, in her official capacity as the City Treasurer of Manila, and THE
CITY OF MANILA,Respondents.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
The Court hereby resolves the Manifestation and Motion1 dated August 2, 2013 filed by petitioners
Metro Manila Shopping Mecca Corp., Shoemart, Inc., SM Prime Holdings, Inc., Star Appliances
Center, Super Value, Inc., Ace Hardware Philippines, Inc., Health and Beauty, Inc., Jollimart Phils.
Corp., and Surplus Marketing Corporation (petitioners), seeking the approval of the terms and
conditions of the parties' Universal Compromise Agreement2dated June 1, 2012 (UCA) in lieu of the
Court's Decision3 dated June 5, 2013 (subject Decision) which denied petitioners' claim for tax
refund/credit of their local business taxes paid to respondent City of Manila.
In their Manifestation and Motion, petitioners alleged that pursuant to the UCA, the parties agreed to
amicably settle all cases between them involving claims for tax refund/credit, including the instant
case.4 The pertinent portions of the UCA provide:5
2.b. It is further agreed that there shall be no refunds/tax credit certificates to be given or
issued by the City of Manilain the following cases:
2.b.1. SC GR 190818 (CTA EB No. 480)entitled "Supervalue, Inc., Ace Hardware

Philippines, Inc., H and B Inc., Metro Manila Shopping Mecca Corp., SM Land, Inc. (formerly
Shoemart, Inc.), SM Prime Holdings, Inc., Star Appliance Center, Inc., Surplus Marketing
Corp. versus The City of Manila and the City Treasurer [of] Manila," which emanated from an
Order in favour of the SM Group issued by Branch 47 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila in
Civil Case No. 03-108175 entitled "Ace Hardware Phils., Inc., SM Prime Holdings, Inc., Star
Appliance Center, Inc., Supervalue, Inc., Watsons Personal Care Stores (Phils.) Inc. versus
The City of Manila and the City Treasurer of Manila," and is currently pending before the
Supreme Court. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In their Comment (with Manifestation of Earnest Apology to the Supreme Court)6 dated June 4, 2014,
respondent City of Manila and Liberty Toledo, in her capacity as Treasurer of the City of Manila
(respondents), confirmed the authenticity and due execution of the UCA. They, however, submitted
that the UCA had no effect on the subject Decision since the taxes paid subject of the instant case
was not included in the agreement.7
The Court adopts the terms and conditions of the UCA pertinent to this case.
A compromise agreement is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions,

avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced.8 It contemplates mutual concessions and
mutual gains to avoid the expenses of litigation; or when litigation has already begun, to end it
because of the uncertainty of the result.9 Its validity is dependent upon the fulfillment of the requisites
and principles of contracts dictated by law; and its terms and conditions must not be contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public policy, and public order.10 When given judicial approval, a compromise
agreement becomes more than a contract binding upon the parties. Having been sanctioned by the
court, it is entered as a determination of a controversy and has the force and effect of a judgment. It
is immediately executory and not appealable, except for vices of consent or forgery. The
nonfulfillment of its terms and conditions justifies the issuance of a writ of execution; in such an
instance, execution becomes a ministerial duty of the court.11
A review of the whereas clauses12 of the UCA reveals the various court cases filed by petitioners,
including this case, for the refund and/or issuance of tax credit covering the local business taxes
payments they paid to respondent City of Manila pursuant to Section 21 of the latter’s Revenue
Code.13 Thus, contrary to the submission of respondents, the local business taxes subject of the
instant case is clearly covered by the UCA since they were also paid in accordance with the same
provision of the Revenue Code of Manila. 1âwphi 1
In this relation, it is observed thatthe present case would have been rendered moot and academic
had the parties informed the Court of the UCA’s supervening execution.14 Be that as it may, and
considering that: (a) the UCA appears to have been executed in accordance with the requirements
of a valid compromise agreement; (b) the UCA was executed more than a year prior to the
promulgation of the subject Decision; and (c) the result of both the UCA and the subject Decision are
practically identical, i.e., that petitioners are not entitled to any tax refund/credit, the Court herein
resolves to approve and adopt the pertinent terms and conditions of the UCA insofar as they govern
the settlementof the present dispute.
WHEREFORE, the petitioners’ Manifestation and Motion dated August 2, 2013 is GRANTED. The
Decision dated June 5, 2013 of the Court is hereby SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, the terms and
conditions of the Universal Compromise Agreement between the parties pertinent to the instant case
are APPROVED and ADOPTED as the Decision of the Court.
The parties are ordered to faithfully comply with the terms and conditions of the said agreement.
This case is considered closed and tenninated. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 186979 August 11, 2010
SOCORRO LIMOS, ROSA DELOS REYES and SPOUSES ROLANDO DELOS REYES and
EUGENE DELOS REYES Petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES FRANCISCO P. ODONES and ARWENIA R. ODONES, Respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the August
14, 2008 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A. GR. SP No. 97668 and its Resolution2 dated
March 9, 2009 denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
The impugned Decision affirmed the resolution dated November 16, 20063 and Order dated January
5, 20074 of the trial court, which respectively denied petitioners’ Motion to Set for Preliminary Hearing
the Special and Affirmative Defenses5 and motion for reconsideration.6
The antecedents:
On June 17, 2005, private respondents-spouses Francisco Odones and Arwenia Odones, filed a
complaint for Annulment of Deed, Title and Damages against petitioners Socorro Limos, Rosa Delos
Reyes and Spouses Rolando Delos Reyes and Eugene Delos Reyes, docketed as Civil Case No.
05-33 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Camiling, Tarlac, Branch 68.
The complaint alleged that spouses Odones are the owners of a 940- square meter parcel of land
located at Pao 1st, Camiling, Tarlac by virtue of an Extrajudicial Succession of Estate and Sale
dated, January 29, 2004, executed by the surviving grandchildren and heirs of Donata Lardizabal in
whom the original title to the land was registered. These heirs were Soledad Razalan Lagasca,
Ceferina Razalan Cativo, Rogelio Lagasca Razalan and Dominador Razalan.
It took a while before respondents decided to register the document of conveyance; and when they
did, they found out that the land’s Original Certificate of Title (OCT) was cancelled on April 27, 2005
and replaced by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 329427 in the name of herein petitioners.
Petitioners were able to secure TCT No. 329427 by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale allegedly
executed by Donata Lardizabal and her husband Francisco Razalan on April 18, 1972.
Petitioners then subdivided the lot among themselves and had TCT No. 329427 cancelled. In lieu
thereof, three new TCTs were issued: TCT No. 392428 in the names of Socorro Limos and spouses
Rolando Delos Reyes and Eugene Delos Reyes, TCT No. 392429 in the names of Spouses delos
Reyes and TCT No. 392430 in the name of Rosa Delos Reyes.
Respondents sought the cancellation of these new TCTs on the ground that the signatures of
Donata Lardizabal and Francisco Razalan in the 1972 Deed of Absolute Sale were forgeries,
because they died on June 30, 1926 and June 5, 1971, respectively.7
In response, petitioners filed a Motion for Bill of Particulars8 claiming ambiguity in respondents’ claim
that their vendors are the only heirs of Donata Lardizabal. Finding no merit in the motion, the trial
court denied the same and ordered petitioners to file their answer to the complaint.9
In their answer,10 petitioners pleaded affirmative defenses, which also constitute grounds for
dismissal of the complaint. These grounds were: (1) failure to state a cause of action inasmuch as
the basis of respondents’ alleged title is void, since the Extrajudicial Succession of Estate and Sale
was not published and it contained formal defects, the vendors are not the legal heirs of Donata
Lardizabal, and respondents are not the real parties-in-interest to question the title of petitioners,
because no transaction ever occurred between them; (2) non-joinder of the other heirs of Donata
Lardizabal as indispensable parties; and (3) respondents’ claim is barred by laches.
In their Reply, respondents denied the foregoing affirmative defenses, and insisted that the
Extrajudicial Succession of Estate and Sale was valid. They maintained their standing as owners of
the subject parcel of land and the nullity of the 1972 Absolute Deed of Sale, upon which respondents
anchor their purported title.11 They appended the sworn statement of Amadeo Razalan declaring,
among other things that:
(2) Na hindi ko minana at ibinenta ang nasabing lupa kay Socorro Limos at Rosa delos
Reyes at hindi totoo na ako lang ang tagapagmana ni Donata Lardizabal;
xxxx
(4) Ang aming lola na si Donata Lardizabal ay may tatlong (3) anak na patay na sina Tomas
Razalan, Clemente Razalan at Tomasa Razalan;
(5) Ang mga buhay na anak ni Tomas Razalan ay sina; 1. Soledad Razalan; 2. Ceferina
Razalan; 3. Dominador Razalan; at 4. Amadeo Razalan. Ang mga buhay na anak ni
Clemente Razalan ay sina 1. Rogelio Lagasca (isang abnormal). Ang mga buhay na anak ni
Tomasa Razalan ay sina 1. Sotera Razalan at 2 pang kapatid;
x x x x12
Thereafter, petitioners served upon respondents a Request for Admission of the following matters:
1. That the husband of the deceased Donata Lardizabal is Francisco Razalan;
2. That the children of the deceased Sps. Donata Lardizabal and Francisco Razalan are
Mercedes Razalan, Tomasa Razalan and Tomas Razalan;
3. That this Tomasa Razalan died on April 27, 1997, if not when? [A]nd her heirs are (a)
Melecio Partido surviving husband, and her surviving children are (b) Eduardo Partido
married to Elisa Filiana, (c) Enrique Razalan Partido married to Lorlita Loriana, (d) Eduardo
Razalan Partido, (e) Sotera Razalan Partido married to James Dil-is and (f) Raymundo
Razalan Partido married to Nemesia Aczuara, and all residents of Camiling, Tarlac.
4. That Amadeo Razalan is claiming also to be a grandchild and also claiming to be sole
forced heir of Donata Lardizabal pursuant to the Succession by a Sole Heir with Sale dated
January 24, 2000, executed before Atty. Rodolfo V. Robinos.
5. That Amadeo Razalan is not among those who signed the Extra[j]udicial Succession of
Estate and Sale dated January 29, 2004 allegedly executed in favor of the plaintiffs, Sps.
Francisco/Arwenia Odones;
6. That as per Sinumpaang Salaysay of Amadeo Razalan which was submitted by the
plaintiffs, the children of Tomasa Razalan are Sotera Razalan and 2 brothers/sisters. These
children of Tomasa Razalan did not also sign the Extra[j]udicial Succession of Estate and
Sale;
7. That there is/are no heirs of Clemente Razalan who appeared to have executed the
Extra[j]udicial Succession of Estate and Sale;
8. That Soledad Razalan Lagasca, Ceferina Razalan Cativo, Rogelio Lagasca Razalan and
Dominador Razalan did not file any letters (sic) of administration nor declaration of heirship
before executing the alleged Extra[j]udicial Succession of Estate and Sale in favor of
plaintiffs.13
Respondents failed to respond to the Request for Admission, prompting petitioners to file a Motion to
Set for Preliminary Hearing on the Special and Affirmative Defenses,14 arguing that respondents’
failure to respond or object to the Request for Admission amounted to an implied admission
pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 26 of the Rules of Court. As such, a hearing on the affirmative
defenses had become imperative because petitioners were no longer required to present evidence
on the admitted facts.
Respondents filed a comment on the Motion, contending that the facts sought to be admitted by
petitioners were not material and relevant to the issue of the case as required by Rule 26 of the
Rules of Court. Respondents emphasized that the only attendant issue was whether the 1972 Deed
of Absolute Sale upon which petitioners base their TCTs is valid.15
In its Resolution dated November 16, 2006, the RTC denied the Motion and held that item nos. 1 to
4 in the Request for Admission were earlier pleaded as affirmative defenses in petitioners’ Answer,
to which respondents already replied on July 17, 2006. Hence, it would be redundant for
respondents to make another denial. The trial court further observed that item nos. 5, 6, and 7 in the
Request for Admission were already effectively denied by the Extrajudicial Succession of Estate and
Sale appended to the complaint and by the Sinumpaang Salaysay of Amadeo Razalan attached to
respondents’ Reply.16 Petitioners moved for reconsideration17 but the same was denied in an Order
dated January 5, 2007.18
Petitioners elevated this incident to the CA by way of a special civil action for certiorari, alleging
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in issuing the impugned resolution and order.
On August 14, 2008, the CA dismissed the petition ruling that the affirmative defenses raised by
petitioners were not indubitable, and could be best proven in a full-blown hearing.19
Their motion for reconsideration20 having been denied,21 petitioners are now before this Court
seeking a review of the CA’s pronouncements.
In essence, petitioners contend that the affirmative defenses raised in their Motion are indubitable,
as they were impliedly admitted by respondents when they failed to respond to the Request for
Admission. As such, a preliminary hearing on the said affirmative defenses must be conducted
pursuant to our ruling in Gochan v. Gochan.22
We deny the petition.
Pertinent to the present controversy are the rules on modes of discovery set forth in Sections 1 and
2 of Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, viz:
Section 1. Request for admission. – At any time after issues have been joined, a party may file and
serve upon any other party a written request for the admission by the latter of the genuineness of
any material and relevant document described in and exhibited with the request or of the truth of any
material and relevant matter of fact set forth in the request. Copies of the documents shall be
delivered with the request unless copies have already been furnished.
SEC. 2 Implied admission. – Each of the matters of which an admission is requested shall be
deemed admitted unless, within a period designated in the request, which shall be not less than
fifteen (15) days after service thereof, or within such further time as the court may allow on motion,
the party to whom the request is directed files and serves upon the party requesting the admission a
sworn statement either denying specifically the matters for which an admission is requested or
setting forth in detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully either admit or deny those matters.
xxxx
Under these rules, a party who fails to respond to a Request for Admission shall be deemed to have
impliedly admitted all the matters contained therein. It must be emphasized, however, that the
application of the rules on modes of discovery rests upon the sound discretion of the court.
As such, it is the duty of the courts to examine thoroughly the circumstances of each case and to
determine the applicability of the modes of discovery, bearing always in mind the aim to attain an
expeditious administration of justice.23
The determination of the sanction to be imposed upon a party who fails to comply with the modes of
discovery also rests on sound judicial discretion.24 Corollarily, this discretion carries with it the
determination of whether or not to impose the sanctions attributable to such fault.
As correctly observed by the trial court, the matters set forth in petitioners’ Request for Admission
were the same affirmative defenses pleaded in their Answer which respondents already traversed in
their Reply. The said defenses were likewise sufficiently controverted in the complaint and its
annexes. In effect, petitioners sought to compel respondents to deny once again the very matters
they had already denied, a redundancy, which if abetted, will serve no purpose but to delay the
proceedings and thus defeat the purpose of the rule on admission as a mode of discovery which is
"to expedite trial and relieve parties of the costs of proving facts which will not be disputed on trial
and the truth of which can be ascertained by reasonable inquiry."25
A request for admission is not intended to merely reproduce or reiterate the allegations of the
requesting party’s pleading but should set forth relevant evidentiary matters of fact described in the
request, whose
purpose is to establish said party’s cause of action or defense. Unless it serves that purpose, it is
pointless, useless, and a mere redundancy.26
Verily then, if the trial court finds that the matters in a Request for Admission were already admitted
or denied in previous pleadings by the requested party, the latter cannot be compelled to admit or
deny them anew. In turn, the requesting party cannot reasonably expect a response to the request
and thereafter, assume or even demand the application of the implied admission rule in Section 2,
Rule 26.
In this case, the redundant and unnecessarily vexatious nature of petitioners’ Request for Admission
rendered it ineffectual, futile, and irrelevant so as to proscribe the operation of the implied admission
rule in Section 2, Rule 26 of the Rules of Court. There being no implied admission attributable to
respondents’ failure to respond, the argument that a preliminary hearing is imperative loses its point.
Moreover, jurisprudence27 has always been firm and constant in declaring that when the affirmative
defense raised is failure to state a cause of action, a preliminary hearing thereon is unnecessary,
erroneous, and improvident.
In any event, a perusal of respondents’ complaint shows that it was sufficiently clothed with a cause
of action and they were suited to file the same.
In an action for annulment of title, the complaint must contain the following allegations: (1) that the
contested land was privately owned by the plaintiff prior to the issuance of the assailed certificate of
title to the defendant; and (2) that the defendant perpetuated a fraud or committed a mistake in
obtaining a document of title over the parcel of land claimed by the plaintiff.28
Such action goes into the issue of ownership of the land covered by a Torrens title, hence, the relief
generally prayed for by the plaintiff is to be declared as the land’s true owner.29 Thus, the real party-
in-interest is the person claiming title or ownership adverse to that of the registered owner.30
The herein complaint alleged: (1) that respondents are the owners and occupants of a parcel of land
located at Pao 1st Camiling, Tarlac, covered by OCT No. 11560 in the name of Donata Lardizabal
by virtue of an Extrajudicial Succession of Estate and Sale; and (2) that petitioners fraudulently
caused the cancellation of OCT No. 11560 and the issuance of new TCTs in their names by
presenting a Deed of Absolute Sale with the forged signatures of Donata Lardizabal and her
husband, Francisco Razalan.
The absence of any transaction between petitioners and respondents over the land is of no moment,
as the thrust of the controversy is the respondents’ adverse claims of rightful title and ownership
over the same property, which arose precisely because of the conflicting sources of their respective
claims.
As to the validity of the Extrajudicial Succession of Estate and Sale and the status of petitioners’
predecessors-in-interest as the only heirs of Donata Lardizabal, these issues go into the merits of
the parties’ respective claims and defenses that can be best determined on the basis of
preponderance of the evidence they will adduce in a full-blown trial. A preliminary hearing, the
objective of which is for the court to determine whether or not the case should proceed to trial, will
not sufficiently address such issues.
Anent the alleged non-joinder of indispensable parties, it is settled that the non-joinder of
indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. The remedy is to implead the
non-party claimed to be indispensable. Parties may be added by order of the court on motion of the
party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times as are just. It is only when
the plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, that the latter
may dismiss the complaint.31 In this case, no such order was issued by the trial court. 1aw phi 1
Equally settled is the fact that laches is evidentiary in nature and it may not be established by mere
allegations in the pleadings and can not be resolved in a motion to dismiss.32
Finally, we cannot subscribe to petitioners’ contention that the status of the heirs of Donata
Lardizabal who sold the property to the respondents must first be established in a special
proceeding. The pronouncements in Heirs of Yaptinchay v. Hon. Del Rosario33 and in Reyes v.
Enriquez34 that the petitioners invoke do not find application in the present controversy.
In both cases, this Court held that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special
proceeding and not in a civil action. It must be noted that in Yaptinchay and Enriquez, plaintiffs’
action for annulment of title was anchored on their alleged status as heirs of the original owner
whereas in this case, the respondents’ claim is rooted on a sale transaction. Respondents herein are
enforcing their rights as buyers in good faith and for value of the subject land and not as heirs of the
original owner. Unlike in Yaptinchay and Enriquez, the filiation of herein respondents to the original
owner is not determinative of their right to claim title to and ownership of the property.
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the instant Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated August 14, 2008 and its Resolution dated March 9, 2009 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No.

101682 December 14, 1992

SALVADOR D. BRIBONERIA, petitioner,

On 17 October 1991, the petitioner filed with this Court a petition

The antecedents are as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

A parcel of land . . . situated in the Municipality of Marikina, Province

6. Plaintiff, as the duly registered owner, never authorized or empowered Nonita A.

11. Plaintiff, in protection of his legitimate right and interests prejudiced by

Plaintiff adopts the foregoing.

1. Defendants admit their circumstances as alleged in paragraph 1, the age of

2. Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph 2 that pursuant to Transfer

3. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 3 for lack of knowledge and

4. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 4 for lack of knowledge and

5. Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph 5 in so far as the transaction of

7. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 7 for lack of knowledge and

10. Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph 12 in so far as the prospective

11. Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph 13 in so far as the ministerial

ATTY. ALFREDO A. ALTO

The Material facts

3. That plaintiff's family used to live at the said residential house.

The Material Documents

2. The Declarations of Real Property filed by Salvador D. Briboneria pursuant to P.D.

On 18 November 1988, petitioner filed a Motion for summary

On 28 December 1988, the trial court issued an order 9 denying

Whenever notice is necessary, it must appear that it was served on

In general, service of notice of a modal or formal step in a proceeding

G.R. No. 185145 February 5, 2014

SPOUSES VICENTE AFULUGENCIA and LETICIA AFULUGENCIA, Petitioners,

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

The Branch Clerk of Court

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

The motion lacks merit.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Petitioners now raise the following issues for resolution:

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERRORS IN REQUIRING NOTICE AND

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED (REVERSIBLE) ERROR IN HOLDING THAT THE

The Court denies the Petition.

Sec. 6. Effect of failure to serve written interrogatories.

G.R. No. 106094 December 28, 1992

PSCFC FINANCIAL CORPORATION (NEW PSCFC BUSINESS CORPORATION), petitioner,

The argument is untenable. Section 21 of Rule 138 states —

Sec. 21. Authority of attorney to appear. — An attorney is presumed to be properly

G.R. No. 102390 February 1, 2002

REY LAÑADA, petitioner,

G.R. No. 102404

NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC. and FRANCIS SANTOS, petitioners,

DE LEON, JR., J.:

The argument is untenable. Section 21 of Rule 138 states –

SEC. 21. Authority of attorney to appear. – An attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to

G.R. No. 190818 November 10, 2014

2.b.1. SC GR 190818 (CTA EB No. 480)entitled "Supervalue, Inc., Ace Hardware

A compromise agreement is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions,

This case is considered closed and tenninated. No costs.

G.R. No. 186979 August 11, 2010

1. That the husband of the deceased Donata Lardizabal is Francisco Razalan;

We deny the petition.

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