Root
Root
Root
Liquidation – Companies
o Establish locus standi:
o Inability to pay debts/Tests for insolvency
o Presumption of insolvency
o Disputing a debt on substantial grounds
o Regard to wishes of creditors and contributories and other factors
o Statutory Demand Format (including Individuals) – did not appear
Bankruptcy – Individuals
Alternatives to the Formal Insolvency Regime: Judicial Management
o JM Proceedings
Jurisdiction
Aims
Appointment of JMG
Locus Standi to appoint JMG
o Administration of JM
Effect
Duties
Moratorium
Approval
Costs, Expenses,
SOA in JM
o Discharge
Avoidance of Antecedent Transactions
o Unfair/Undue Preference
o Transaction at an undervalue
o Transactions made before the making of the winding up order
o Insolvent Trading
o Fraudulent Trading
Alternatives to the Formal Insolvency Regime: Schemes of Arrangement
o Objective
o Application to Court
Who can apply
Effect: Interim moratorium
o Creditor’s Meetings
Classification of creditors
Voting on the proposed scheme
o Court approval of the scheme
Effect of court order
Effect on third parties
o Administration of Scheme
Cross-Border Insolvency & Restructuring
1. LIQUIDATION
STATUTORY DEMAND
Please ensure that this demand is satisfied within 3 weeks
To:
Address:
We act for ______ in this matter. We are instructed by our client ______ claims that you
owe the sum of $ ______, full particulars of which are set out in PART A of this demand and
that it is payable immediately and, to the extent of the sum demanded, is unsecured. Further
interest will continue from the date of ______ until the full sum of $______ has been paid.
Take notice that if you fail to pay the above debt or secure or compound for it to the
creditor’s satisfaction within 3 weeks from the date of service of this statutory demand, you
will be deemed unable to pay the debt pursuant to Section 254(1) of the Companies’ Act and
our client may initiate a winding up application against you.
Grounds of Winding Up
“creditor”
Re People’s Parkway Development Pte Ltd [1991] SGHC “a person towards whom
under an existing obligation, the company may or will become subject to a present
liability to pay a sum of money on the happening of some future event or at some
future date”.
“contingent”, “prospective”
Contingent: Debt which will materialise out of an existing legal obligation on an event
which may or may not occur. Prospective: debt which will certainly become due in the
future. Stonegate Securities Ltd v Gregory [1980]
Creditors must
“the Court shall not hear the winding up application if made by … creditors until …
security for costs has been given as the Court thinks reasonable and a prima facie case
for winding up has been established to the satisfaction of the Court” [253(2)(c)]
254 Grounds for Winding Up [254(1)]
“The Court may order the winding up if the company … (a) by special resolution
resolved … (e) is unable to pay its debts”
Re Great Eastern Hotel (Pte) Ltd [1998] SGHC There are two tests of insolvency.
Note: practically this may be difficult because of lack of access to the financial
statements. There is the cash flow test (whether the company failed to meet a current
demand for a debt already due), and balance sheet insolvency test (whether there is a
deficit after balancing overall liabilities against assets). They rejected the quick assets
test (the company can only be said to be solvent if it is able to pay its debts out of its
own money).
Chip Thye v Phay Gi Mo [2004] The Court held that either test could be used because
“there is no single test for insolvency”.
BNP Paribas v Jurong Shipyard [2009] SGCA Jurong offered to place in escrow
funds for BNP, who refused and wanted to continue winding up Jurong. Jurong was
not an insolvent company and this was confirmed by its offer to secure BNP’s claim
for the crystallised loss. BNP ought to have commenced court proceedings instead, as
the court’s winding-up jurisdiction was not for the purpose of deciding a disputed
debt.
Cross-claim cases
Metalform [2007] Metalform owed Holland an undisputed debt. However, Metalform
argued that it had a bona fide cross claim on substantial grounds which exceeded the
undisputed debt. The court held that a cross-claim called into question the locus standi
of the creditor to present a winding-up petition against the debtor. It followed that a
winding-up petition should not be allowed in cross-claim cases, except in special
circumstances. The debtor company merely had to prove that there was a likelihood
that the winding-up petition might fail or that it was unlikely to succeed.
No triable issues
Chimbusco [2014] Abdullah sought an unconditional stay of bankruptcy proceedings.
The court refused and held that it will only set aside a statutory demand (and thereby
require a creditor to initiate a civil suit if he wishes to pursue the claimed debt further)
where the debtor is able to adduce evidence on affidavit that raises a triable issue. Rr
127 and 98(2) of Bankruptcy Act are consistent with the fundamental principle that
the insolvency mechanism, whether in the corporate or personal context, is not meant
to be used as a parallel procedure to procure payment of disputed debts.
English position: If dispute only on the quantum of debt and abundant evidence that
company was insolvent anyway, will allow to proceed. Re Tweeds Garages Ltd
[1962] Check BNP Paribas
BNP Paribas v Jurong Shipyard [2009] SGCA The court can adjourn the hearing of a
winding-up application.
Bank will exercise discretion to make the order
BNP Paribas v Jurong Shipyard [2009] The court will consider public interest
elements (its employees, the non- petitioning creditors, as well as the company’s
suppliers, customers and shareholders).
Raiffeisen Zentralbank v Continental Chemical [2010] The court will consider the
views of creditors, and less weight should be given to the views of secured creditors,
because they were entitled to proceed against their security.
1. Stop Proceedings
2. Court leave to commence proceedings
Re Wan Soon Construction [2005] SGHC Unsecured creditor Deschen registered writ of
seizure and sale on Wan Soon’s property on 28 June 20014. Wan Soon was put under JM and
sold the property to Ad Graphic, completed on 23 Jan 2005. The court held that Deschen did
not execute the WSS in time and should not be allowed to steal a march from other unsecured
creditors.
Exceptional leave to commence or continue proceedings
Jumabhoy Rafiq v Scotts Investment [2003]
Korea Asset Management [2004]
E. POWERS OF LIQUIDATOR
A. BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS
(6) “debt … claimed shall be full amount … less the … value of the security”
95(1) (1) “must include an explanation … of:
(a) purpose of the demand, and … if the debtor does not comply … bankruptcy
proceedings may be commenced;
(b) time within which the demand must be complied with;
(c) methods of compliance available; and
(d) debtor’s right to apply to the court to set aside the statutory demand.”
(2) “specify one or more named individuals … for … securing or compounding the
debt … and the address and telephone number of any … named”
Grounds of Winding Up
Improper Service
Wong Kwei Cheong v ABN-AMRO Bank [2002] Bank elected to advertise instead of
serving the stat demand at Wong’s premises, because the premises were locked and
the property was owned by a company. The court rejected this election and held the
bank had abused the process of court.
B. ALTERNATIVES TO BANKRUPTCY
Procedure
Application by OS and appoint a nominee [46 BA]
Court grants an interim order
Nominee reports the results, and implements proposal [53(1) BA]
C. BANKRUPTCY ADMINISTRATION
Bankrupt’s Duties
Assist OA in identifying and recovering the property of his estate [129 BA]
File Statement of Affairs [81(1) BA]
Submit accounts every 6 months [82 BA]
Bankrupt Offences
Failure to submit statement of affairs within 21 days [81(6) BA]
Failure to submit Income and Expenditure Statements [82(1)(a) BA]
Failure to hand over assets and income to OA [82(1)(b) BA]
Other offences [Part X BA]
Restrictions on Bankrupt
Standard Chartered Bank v Thomas Loh [2010] Lawyer was made bankrupt
when his partner ran away with bank moneys. Lawyer wanted to sue bank for
defamation. The court held that it was pain felt in relation to his character, and he
could sue in his own name after obtaining leave from court.
Takahashi Kenji v Koh Hiang Pin [2012] Bankrupt husband failed to obtain OA’s
sanction while maintaining an action for ancillary matters agains the wife. The
court held that the husband’s non-compliance meant the proceedings were null
and void, since OA’s consent cannot be granted retrospectively
131(1)(b) “shall not leave, remain or reside outside Singapore without … permission”
141(1)(a) “shall be guilty of an offence if … (a) either alone or jointly … obtains credit …
not less than $1,000 … without informing that person … [he] is an undischarged
bankrupt”
148(1) “who acts as director … or directly or indirectly takes part in … management of
any corporation, except with … leave … shall be guilty of an offence”
3. JUDICIAL MANGEMENT 227A-227X
Merits of JM
Rehabilitation, Preservation. This allows companies in financial trouble an opportunity to
rehabilitate and/or to preserve the company’s business as a going concern through
restructuring or reorganisation of operations and debt such as injection of fresh funds by
investor. This also preserves the interests of creditors on basis that they would be better
served under JM compared to winding up, the latter being a measure of last resort.
Procedure: JM
1. Application of JM by OS with Affidavit
a. Applicant nominates a public accountant [227B(3) CA]
b. JMG’s costs will be paid for [227J(3) CA]
2. JM Order in force for 180 days [227B(8) CA]
3. JM drafts a proposal and summons a meeting of creditors within 60 days [227M CA]
a. Approval threshold majority in number and value of creditors [227N(2) CA]
b. If the creditors reject, the court may make an interim order [227N(4) CA]
4. After approval, the JMG must manage according to the approved proposals [227P(1)
CA]
5. After approval, the creditors can also monitor via a committee of creditors [227O CA]
6. JMG applies for discharge after he has achieved the statutory purpose, or the statutory
purpose is impossible to achieve [227Q CA]
7. The creditors can also ask for a discharge [227R(1) CA]
Ranking of Claims
1. Fixed charge, retention of title, beneficiary of a trust
2. Preferential debts in ss 328(1)(a)(b)(c)(e) and (f), CA as elevated by s 328(5), CA: •
costs and expenses of winding up • employee wages and salary* • employee
retrenchment benefit* • work injury compensation • employee contributions (e.g. for
CPF) • remuneration of employee for vacation leave • GST payable before proof of
debt * shall not exceed an amount that is equivalent to 5 months salary or $12500,
whichever is lesser (s 328(2), CA)
3. Deferred floating charge under s 328(5), CA
4. Remaining preferential debts in ss 328(1)(d) and (g), CA not elevated by s 328(5), CA.
5. Unsecured creditor – pari passu principle
6. Contractually subordinated creditors
7. Statutorily subordinated creditors
Grounds of JM
Deutsche Bank AG v Asia Pulp & Paper [2003] SGCA In an unusual case,
insolvent APP tried to have the present management do consensual debt
restructuring while the creditor bank sought independent JM because of concerns
about transparency. The court held that there was evidence that present
management had made progress, and that the bank had to show there was a real
prospect that one or more of the 3 purposes would be achieved.
Re Bintan Lagoon Resort [2005] Creditors Winners Path had bought out other
creditors and appointed a manager. Other creditors alleged that WP had lied that
they would enter a restructuring agreement. The court refused because the
allegation was not made out. Further, the test in s 227B(10) was not merely
whether it was in the public interest to appoint a judicial manager, but rather
whether the court considered “that the public interest so require[d]”. It not only
had to be opportune but also importunate. Employees interests was not enough.
B. ADMINISTRATION OF JM
Electro Magnetic v DBS [1994] The bank claimed that since Electro owed them
money, they had a lien over Electro’s funds with them. The court disagreed and
held that the right of set-off was a contractual, personal right. Therefore, it was not
affected by the moratorium.
Altus Technology v OCBC [2009] Altus went bankrupt and Samsung tried to
recover funds it paid into OCBC, who refused. The court held that Samsung was
entitled to the right of contractual set-off, affirming Electro.
Duties/Powers of JMG
227G (1) “take … under his control all the property”
(2) “all powers … and duties … on the directors … shall be exercised and
performed by the JMG”
(3) “shall do all such things necessary for the management of the …
business … of the company”
(4) “include the powers … in the 11th Schedule” (etc. establish subsidiaries,
defend application for winding up, execute documents, appoint agents,
borrow money)
227H (1) “may … exercise his powers in relation to any property … subject to a
security”
227M (1)(a) “within 60 days … send … Registrar and … creditors a statement of
his proposals”
4. AVOIDANCE OF ANTECEDENT TRANSACTIONS
A. UNFAIR/UNDUE PREFERENCE
Grounds
329(1) (1) “any transfer … relating to property … against a company, which … done …
CA against an individual, would in his bankruptcy be void … under [98, 99, 103 BA]
shall in the event of the company being wound up be void”
Compulsory Winding Up
(2) “date which corresponds with … application for a bankruptcy order shall be
(a)(i) date of the making of the winding up application; or the date … which the
resolution to wind up the company voluntarily is passed, whichever is the earlier
Voluntary Winding Up
(2)(b) “the date upon which the winding up … commence[s]”
99 BA Application to restore unfair preference
(1) “where an individual … has … given an unfair preference, the [OA] may
apply for an order"
(2) “The court shall … make such order … for restoring the position”
Given to Associate
(5) “An individual who has given an unfair preference to a person who … was an
associate … shall be presumed … to have been influenced … by such a desire …
in [99(4) BA]
DBS v Tam Chee Chong (JM of Jurong High-Tech) [2011] Jurong gave a security document
to DBS, and the JM complained it was unfair preference. The court agreed, the facts showed
that Jurong wanted to give DBS a security because DBS had been kind to them. The court
held that it was sufficient that the desire to prefer was one of the factors which influenced the
decision; it need not be the sole or decisive factor.
Liquidators v Progen Holdings [2010] The liquidators asked the court to set aside 10
transactions valued close to $11m to Progen Holdings. The court set them aside because
related parties had benefited, whereas directors ought to have considered the interests of the
creditors. Past practices of transfers when the company was still solvent was not relevant
because no new value was created.
Show Theatres v Shaw Theatres [2002] SGCA 3 directors from Show were also directors of
Shaw. Shaw provided shareholder loans to Show, and Show went insolvent but repaid the
loans. Show later went for winding up. The court held that Shaw was an associate, because
where two companies have a common director, they will be treated as connected because of
the need for transparency.
Living the Link s v Tina Tan [2016] SGHC Living had made inventory and share transfers to
associate family owned companies. The court held that these were unfair preference since it
is implausible that a desire to better the position of the associate companies did not operate
on Tina Tan’s mind at all when she procured these transfers to the family owned associate
companies to the exclusion of Living’s other creditors. Running account depicts a continuing
relationship of debtor and creditor with an expectation that further debits and credits will be
recorded. The fact that an impugned payment was made pursuant to a running account is by
itself insufficient to negate an intention to prefer – it must have been made with the intention
of obtaining new value to keep the business going.
B. TRANSACTION AT AN UNDERVALUE
329 CA
98 BA Application to restore transaction at undervalue
(1) “where an individual … has … entered into a transaction … at an
undervalue, the [OA] may apply for an order"
(2) “The court shall … make such order … for restoring the position”
Undervalue
(3) “makes a gift …or … enters into a transaction
(a) on terms that provide … no consideration
(b) in consideration of marriage; or
(c) for a consideration … which, in money or money’s worth, is significantly
less than the value”
Leun Wah Electric v Sigma [2006] Sigma sold electrical cables to subcontractor constructor
Electric, and claimed the sum when it became due. The court held that there was no
undervalue, because the assignment was made with the intention of paying off a pressing debt
which was in Electric’s commercial interests because it helped Electric to retain its principal
supplier and carry on projects.
Velstra v Dexia Bank NV [2005] Velstra made a mistaken payment out. The court held that
this process of giving provisional credit and subsequently assigning the remittance to the
bank was entirely an arrangement between the respondent and its customer which could have
no effect as to whom Velstra had intended to enter into a transaction with. A mistaken
payment would not fall under the ambit.
Encus International v Tenacious Investment [2016] The law is unsettled as to whether grant
of security can amount to a transaction for no consideration. Court expressed preference for
the view that a grant of security should be treated as transaction which required consideration
and which therefore could be undervalued. However, as the facts did not require a conclusion
on the matter, there was no definite holding on the issue.
259 CA “Any disposition of the property … including things in action … after the
commencement of the winding up … shall … be void.”
Kong Swee Eng v Rolles Rudolf Jurgen August [2011] The court held that avoidance can only
be invoked by company, not by the purchaser. A purchaser of shares, such as the plaintiff,
could not avoid completion in respect of agreements which were entered into prior to the
commencement of winding up, even if the company should subsequently be wound up.
QCD v Wah Nam Plastic Industry [1997] QCD wanted the balance of the purchase price of
goods sold to Wah Nam by the Reciever. The court held that “disposition” did not include the
process by which a person with a beneficial interest in the property obtains that property, or
the proceeds of realization from the company at a time when he is entitled to have it. The
word “disposition”, when used with reference to property, normally had the meaning of
connoting a change in beneficial ownership of an asset by transfer or other type of dealing.
Cheo Sharon Andriesz v Official Assignee [2013] Bankrupt husband transferred two
properties under a consent judgment in a divorce suit. The court held it was void because the
disposition was made by the bankrupt, and parties ought to conduct relevant bankruptcy
searches before the commencement of proceedings. This applied [77 BA]
[340(1) CA] “If … it appears that any [339(3) CA] “If … it appears that an
business … has been carried on with intent to officer … who was knowingly a party to the
defraud creditors … the Court … may contracting of a debt had … no reasonable …
declara that any person who was knowingly a ground of expectation … of the company …
party … shall be personally responsible, being able to pay the debt … the officer
without any limitation of liability” shall … be liable on conviction to a fine not
exceeding $2,000”
Liquidator of Leong Seng Hin Piling Pte Ltd v Chan Ah Lek [2007] Question whether a
person was carrying on a business was subjective, not objective. He must personally have
been dishonest.
SCHEMES OF ARRANGEMENT
Conclusion: As the Applicant has no assets whatsoever in Singapore, other than interests
in the vessels that may ply the Singapore port in future, I am unable to grant the
application, given the absence of clear statutory jurisdiction to do so, the forced
construction proposed and its far reaching implications.
Royal Bank of Scotland NV and others v TT International Ltd and another appeal
[2012] 2 SLR 213
Facts:
TT Intl was incorporated in Sg and listed on Sg Exchange
Financial crisis in 2008 significantly affected the coy’s business. Its financial position
became precarious when some bank creditors recalled their facilities and demanded
prompt repayment of the sums due.
Coy then appointed nTan Corporate Advisory Pte Ltd as an independent financial
advisor and announced that it would be implementing a SOA
On 29 Jan 2009, coy applied for and received approval from the court pursuant to
s210(1) CA to summon a meeting of its creditors to propose the scheme but key terms
could not be agreed on.
Despite the stalemate, coy proposed the scheme for voting by creditors in Sept 2009.
After the creditors had voted on 16 Oct 2009, they were informed that the proposed
scheme manager had not completed the adjudication of the proofs of debt.
On a much later date at 17 Dec 2009, proposed scheme manager reported that scheme
had been passed by majority of creditors representing 75.06% in value, barely
exceeding the sat threshold of 75%
Proposed scheme manager was also the nominee for the individual voluntary
arrangements filed by the chairman and an executive director (chairman’s wife) of the
coy
Opposing scheme creditors were then prompted to seek copies of proofs of debt and
other information. Coy provided some information based on a goodwill basis but
proposed scheme manager was adamant that access to relevant proofs could and would
not be given to opposing creditors.
HC disagreed with opposing creditors and approved the scheme
Objective of s210
Confers on a coy the power to compromise with creditors and members
Section is intended to provide machinery 1) for overcoming the impossibility or
impracticability of obtaining the individual consent of every member of the class
intended to be bound by the SOA and 2) preventing, in appropriate circumstances a
minority of class members frustrating a beneficial scheme
Procedure
Conflict of interest
To an extent, the proposed scheme manager is inherently in a position of conflict
because if he successfully resuscitates the company, he is remunerated, inter alia, for
managing the scheme and reviving the company. Therefore, there are undeniable
incentives for the proposed scheme manager to prefer the interests of his
appointers (not infrequently, the company itself as is the case here) over those of
their creditors from the outset. He must, nevertheless, seek to strike the right balance
and manage the competing interests of successfully securing the approval of his
proposed scheme and uncompromisingly respecting the procedural rights of all
involved in the scheme process. It must also be appreciated that an informed voting
process can only take place if all material information a creditor might need to
determine how to vote is made available
A proposed scheme manager goes too far when he begins to align his interests with
those of the company beyond what we have described above. The temptation to do so
is especially acute when his initial appointers are not the creditors, but the company’s
management.
Application to facts
Here the proposed Scheme Manager was also surprisingly the nominee for the IVAs
filed by Mr Sng and Ms Tong. The success of those IVAs in turn depended heavily on
the success of the Scheme.
This additional relationship with Mr Sng and Ms Tong, key personnel of the
Respondent, was inappropriate because it put the proposed Scheme Manager in an
unacceptable position of unavoidable conflict of interest.
Application
Here, proposed scheme manager did not do so. Prior to the meeting, scheme creditors
were not provided by the proposed scheme manager with a list of scheme creditors and
corresponding quanta of their claims that had been admitted for purpose of voting
The proposed Scheme Manager eventually reported the results of the Scheme Meeting
slightly over two months later in the Chairman’s Report on 17 December 2009 (see
above at [21]). As a consequence of the proposed Scheme Manager’s unexplained
conduct of the Scheme Meeting, doubts were understandably sown in the minds of
some opposing creditors about the integrity of the voting process.
Before the scheme meeting took place, the proposed scheme manager should have
o Complete adjudicating all proofs of debt
o Provide all scheme creditors present with the full list of scheme creditors antheir
corresponding quanta
A proposed scheme manager who cannot comply with the above prior to the scheme
creditors’ meeting should act prudently and seek from the court leave to defer the
meeting until after the adjudication is completed.
Right of scheme creditor to appeal chairman’s decisions to admit or reject its own
and other creditors’ proof of debt
Chairman of a s 210 creditors’ meeting has three options when assessing a contentious
claim for the purpose of voting.
o First, he might admit the claim wholly.
o Second, he might reject a claim wholly or partially, in which case he should
provide to the creditor written grounds of his rejection. Chairman’s decisions
should not be peremptory. His duty to give reasons puts the onus on him to look
at each proof more carefully in the proper exercise of his quasi-judicial
function. This requirement also improves the transparency of the voting process
o Third, if the chairman has doubts whether a proof should be admitted or
rejected, he should mark it as objected to and allow the creditor to vote subject
to the vote being declared invalid in the event of the objection being sustained.
Chairman may often require further evidence in support of a proof.
When deciding which proportion of a creditor’s claim to admit (or to
allow a creditor to vote, when his proof is marked as objected to), the
chairman need only make a “reasonable estimate” or a “just
estimate” of the claim by doing his best with the factual material the
claimant furnishes, without undertaking any detailed inquiry.
Chairman’s decisions in admitting or rejecting proofs for purpose of voting are subject
to appeal to the court . However, such appeals to court should only be taken after the
votes have been counted and it can be seen whether the vote in question would affect
the result , preferably concurrently during the sanction stage
In such an appeal, court should be slow in overriding the professional judgment of a
chairman in admitting or rejecting proofs of debt. The court will not ordinarily interfere
with the chairman’s decisions based on his professional judgment unless it was affected
by bad faith, a mistake as to the facts, an erroneous approach to the law or an error of
principle and that the court’s role is not to engage in its own valuation of a claim
Nonetheless, the court has to be satisfied that the proposed scheme manager has acted
on the correct principles in his quasi-judicial role as chairman of a s 210 creditors’
meeting. If a proof of debt is not capable of substantiation without the need for serious
investigation or exertion, then the chairman should at least make the necessary
enquiries regarding the proof.
f the court determines that a creditor’s claim was wrongly admitted or rejected for the
purpose of voting and the scheme would not have been approved but for that wrongful
admission or rejection, then the scheme must fail as the statutory supermajority of
three-fourths in value of the creditors has not been satisfied.
Contingent claims
Here the appropriate comparator was an insolvent liquidation. Without the Scheme, the
liquidator would distribute the contingent claimants a portion of the Respondent’s
assets (on a pari passu basis) based on the “just estimate” (see s 327(1) of the Act) of
their contingent claims. Under the Scheme, the contingent claimants would be able to
claim under the terms of the Scheme if their claims crystallised within five years of the
Scheme’s effective date.
However, even so, it seemed that contingent creditors would assess the Scheme
primarily based on its effectiveness in preserving the Respondent’s economic value (so
as to satisfy their claims), as the rest of the creditors in the general class of unsecured
creditors would. In that light, we saw no reason to classify those contingent creditors
separately. It cannot be overlooked that the separate classification of any group of
creditors allows that group a minority veto and courts must be careful not to allow the
test for classification to become “an instrument of oppression by a minority”
Related creditors
Court may discount or disregard altogether the votes of those who, though entitled to
vote at a meeting as a member of the class concerned, have such personal or special
interests in supporting the proposals that their views cannot be regarded as fairly
representative of the class in question
Norm for the votes of related party creditors to be discounted in light of their special
interests to support a proposed scheme by virtue of their relationship to the company.
Next qn: extent to which each related party creditors’ vote should be discounted
Wholly-owned subsidiaries
Most of the related parties are wholly-owned subsidiaries
The votes of wholly-owned subsidiaries should be discounted to zero. Wholly-
owned subsidiaries are entirely controlled by their parent company, ie, the Respondent
in this case. Indeed, we view the Respondent’s wholly-owned subsidiaries as
extensions of the Respondent itself. If the Respondent were to wind up any of its
wholly-owned subsidiary creditors, the debts owing to those wholly-owned subsidiary
creditors (save for those debts owed by the wholly-owned subsidiary creditors to
genuine third party creditors) would be extinguished and the assets of the wholly-
owned subsidiary creditors would be the Respondent’s.
Contingent creditors
Contingent creditor should not be allowed to vote the full amount of his contingent
claim as if it had actually been proven
Generally speaking, a creditor with a contingent claim of $10m (with a 80% chance of
crystallisation within five years of the scheme’s effective date ) should only be allowed
to vote with 80% of the voting weight given to a creditor with an actual claim of $10m
that had crystallised by the ascertainment date
Contingent claimants should generally vote according to the likelihood of their claims
crystallising.
Significance:
An application for leave to convene a meeting is not the appropriate forum to consider
the merits and fairness of the scheme.
The role of the court is primarily to decide whether a meeting should be called and the
manner in which it should be conducted.
Note: TT International does not require inter partes OS, ex partes summons is sufficient
SAAG Oilfield (2012) SGCA Workmen argued that their tort claims were covered by
insurance and they should not be classed as creditors. The court held that they were creditors.
“‘creditors’ … is to be given a wide meaning and includes persons having any
pecuniary claim against the company, including unliquidated, prospective or
contingent claims” [42] citing Re Glendale (1982) NSW
“wide interpretation … for the term ‘creditors’” [69]
Court advised that to avoid “unwittingly approve schemes of arrangement which had
the unintended effect of binding tort claimants in circumstance where such claimants
had never heard of the scheme and had no chance to object to it”, that “evidence
should normally be adduced, from a responsible officer of the company, to the effect
that the company has received no notice of any pecuniary claim against it” and that it
would “be appropriate to qualify the definition by adding an exclusion” of such
people [68]
Court has power to impose a legal moratorium to restrain any further proceedings against
the company except with the leave of the court
Power includes adjourning a winding up application, staying any actions or proceedings
against the company and restraining a debenture holder from appointing a receiver and
manager
Application by inter partes summons give persons affected by stay of proceedings an
opportunity to be heard
Application may be brought either before, after or concurrently with an application under
s.210(1) of the Act.
A proposal of the Scheme must be placed before the court – Re Kuala Lumpur
Held:
Applicant must be dealt with summarily, by hearing inter partes, with an opportunity
given to the known creditors on record to make their representation and not ex parte
S176(1) gives the court discretion only if there are no winding-up proceedings initiated
prior to the application. If there are, then any such application under s176(1) must
be made in the very winding-up proceedings by making the petitioners and the
supporting creditors and the presiding judge in the winding-up court would then
come to a decision either to make an order for the arrangement thus granted a
stay under s222 of CA or refuse the application
Held:
S176(10) is not pegged to s176(1)
In making a s 176(10) order, there must be a proposal of the scheme of compromise
or arrangement (not necessarily ready for presenting to the creditors to be voted
upon) but with sufficient particulars to enable the court to assess that it is feasible
and merits due consideration by the creditors when it is eventually placed before
them in detailed form. Further, the court has to be satisfied that there is or there would
be a bona fide s 176(1) application. It is unnecessary that the proposal must emanate
from the company to its members or to the creditors; the proposal could emanate from
anybody. It is also not necessary that there should be a scheme in a complete form
capable of being presented to the creditors for being voted on.
Re Punj Lloyd Pt Ltd and another matter [2015] SGHC 321- duty to disclose
Facts:
Two companies in question are Punj Lloyd (PLPL) and its subsidiary Sembawang
Engineers and Construction Pte Ltd (SEC).
PLPL is a wholly owned subsidiary of Punj Lloyd Limited (PLL), a company listed on
the India stock exchange
Both PLPL and SEC have run into financial difficulties
Both companies then sought orders from the Court under s210(1) CA for meetings of
creditors to be called to consider restructuring of its debts by way of SOA. PLPL‘s
scheme would also be dependent on SEC’s scheme being approved. The companies
scheme involve ultimately, PLL assuming liabilities subject to it obtaining approval
from its creditors and other entities
Some concerns were then raised by creditors in respect of certain transactions within
the group.
Held:
Duty to disclose
Factors to consider under s210(1)
o Fairness of classification of creditors
o Anything showing futility of meeting
o Matters that may otherwise indicate possible abuse of process
The duty to disclose material information exists to ensure that the Court has all
necessary information before it to be able to make a considered determination in
respect of those factors. This obligation can be seen to be derived from the fact that the
applicant company needs to move the court to exercise its statutory power to permit a
meeting to be called.
In Ng Huat, what was found to be material non-disclosure were matters going to the
likelihood of viability of the scheme – bankruptcy hearing of a putative white knight as
well as an opposing creditor that had obtained an arbitration award in its favour. Both
of these mean that the scheme would not be successfully adopted
Here, there was no material non-disclosure
Held:
S210 (10) permits the court to order restraining of further proceedings if
o There has been no order or resolution for the winding up of the coy; and
o An arrangement has been proposed between the coy and its creditors
S210(10) does not expressly require that there be any application under s210(1) – it
only refers to the proposal of an arrangement, not its actual presentation at a
meeting of creditors or approval by that meeting
It is only necessary that the proposal is detailed enough to allow the Court to
consider its feasibility. As noted in Re GAE, completeness is not required. It is to be
expected that refinements and modifications will be needed before any meeting is
sought. Further, I did not think that feasibility had to be decided conclusively: close
scrutiny of the merits of the proposal or its viability and likely acceptance by the
creditors should not be carried out at this stage. What the Court needed to assess was
whether on the face of the proposal the Court could conclude that there was a
reasonable prospect of the scheme working and being acceptable to the general run
of creditors. So long as the court could make this broad brush assessment, sufficient
particularity would have been given.
Court should be careful to ensure that there is no attempt to game the system by
companies seeking the benefit of s210(10) restraint orders without putting
forward a serious proposal. There is a need to ensure a bona fide proposal
It should also be clear that an application under s 210(1) should be made shortly
thereafter and if not, a sufficient explanation and proposed timelines should be given.
Here, the Applicants committed to a 10 week timeline, and volunteered to appear in
court on a regular basis to provide updates.
CREDITORS’ MEETINGS
If there is no realistic prospect of a scheme receiving the requisite approval, the court
should not act in vain in granting the application for the meeting to be convened
After leave is granted to convene creditors’ meeting,
o Notice of meeting & explanatory statement must be sent to creditors
o Explanatory statement must:
explain nature of scheme
state any material interests of company’s directors and shareholders
contain full and fair disclosure of information reasonably necessary to
enable recipients to determine how to vote
Royal Bank of Scotland NV and others v TT International Ltd and another appeal
[2012] 2 SLR 213
Held:
In considering an application under s 210 of the Act, a court has to consider the
overall fairness of the scheme and the prospects of its acceptance by 75% in value
of the creditors
Court think that there was little prospect of the scheme receiving the approval of the
requisite three-fourths in value of the creditors. Court should not act in vain.
Wah Yuen Electrical Engineering Pte Ltd v Singapore Cables Manufacturers Pte Ltd
[2003] 3 SLR(R) 629
Facts:
Applt which had a winding up petition against it, presented a SOA under the
Companies Act for the consideration of its creditors.
Scheme provided that creditors whose claims were less than a stipulated amount would
be paid in full and subordinated the claims of its directors and a related coy to the rest
of the creditors
More than 75% in value of creditors voted in support of the scheme. Here, creditors
were not divided into any classes and voted together at the same meeting
Rspdt opposed as had the claims of the related parties been discounted, scheme would
have received the support of less than 75% in value of creditors
Judge below refused to sanction the scheme
Held, dismissed the appeal due to lack of transparency on Wah Yuen’s part:
When approving the scheme under s210 of the Act, the duty of the court is to consider
o Whether the statutory provisions have been complied with
o Whether scheme is fair and reasonable to creditors as a whole
o Whether the coy and majority creditors are acting bona fide
o Whether the minority is being coerced to promote the interest of the majority
CLASSIFICATION OF CREDITORS
The underlying concern is not only limited to majority oppression of the minority, but
also ensuring that minority does not unfairly thwart the majority if undue fragmentation
of creditors is required
Royal Bank of Scotland NV and others v TT International Ltd and another appeal
[2012] 2 SLR 213
• Company’s solicitors must ““unreservedly disclose all material information to the court
to assist it in arriving at a properly considered determination on how the scheme
creditors’ meeting is to be conducted. Any issues in relation to the possible need for
separate meetings for different classes of creditors ought to be unambiguously brought
to the attention of the court hearing the application.”
Wah Yuen Electrical Engineering Pte Ltd v Singapore Cables Manufacturers Pte Ltd
[2003] 3 SLR(R) 629
Classification of creditors
For voting purposes, s 210(3) requires the creditors to be divided into separate classes
if “their rights are so dissimilar that they cannot sensibly consult together with a view
to their common interest. Each class vote must comply with the % requirements in
s210(3) before the scheme can be put before the court for its approval. This is to
minimize the risk that the majority may push through the scheme at the expenses of the
minority, whose rights may be dissimilar
Related party creditors did not constitute a separate class of creditors for voting
purposes simply because they were related parties. This is because “the test is based
on similarity or dissimilarity of legal rights against the company, not on similarity
or dissimilarity of interests not derived from such legal rights. The fact that
individuals may hold divergent views based on their private interests not derived
from their legal rights against the company is not a ground for calling separate
meetings
Here, no difference whether related parties should be classified differently
Wah Yuen should have put 1) those who stood to recover 100% of their claims and 2)
those whose claims were subordinated to the rest of the creditors, into separate classes
for voting purposes. Rights of these two groups of creditors were so dissimilar form the
remaining creditors that they could not sensibly consult together with a view to the
common interest
Although related party votes are counted for purposes of determining whether the
statutory majority has been reached, the courts have consistently attributed less
weight to such votes when asked to exercise their discretion in favour of a scheme.
This is because the related party may have been motivated by personal or special
interests to disregard the interests of the class as such and vote in a self-centred
manner. In the present case, we found no reason to abandon our traditional reserve
because Wah Yuen’s continued reticence on the related party debts prevented the court
from making a competent assessment of the bona fides of the related party votes.
CLASSES OF CREDITORS
Secured creditors
Contingent creditors
Creditors with priority and preferential claims and are receiving payment in full
compared to those receiving payment in part
Related party creditors
Creditors whose claims are subordinated in liquidation
Section 210(1) of CA
Section 227X(a) of CA
In judicial management pursuant to Section 227X(a):
o Majority in number representing ¾ in value of the creditors present and voting at
the meeting
o No need for division of creditors into different classes
Royal Bank of Scotland NV and others v TT International Ltd and another appeal
[2012] 2 SLR 213
Section 210(3) of CA
Royal Bank of Scotland NV and others v TT International Ltd and another appeal
[2012] 2 SLR 213
The Oriental Insurance Co Ltd v Reliance National Asia Re Pte Ltd [2008] 3 SLR(R)
121 – extension of time for filing proofs of debt after court has approved the scheme
Issue: whether the court retains a residual jurisdiction to extend the time for a creditor to
file its proof of debt after the court has approved a SOA pursuant to s210 of CA
Facts.
Reliance wanted to implement SOA. Reliance sent a letter to all Scheme Creditors,
including the applt.
Applied to the SGHC for permission to convene a creditor’s meeting.
Sent the notice of the Court Meeting, Explanatory Statement and documents setting out
the terms and conditions of the scheme to the applt. Oriental received these documents.
By way of several letters, Oriental was supposedly informed that the deadline for
submitting the completed Proof of Debt Form in the Claims Cut-off Date was 12.00
midnight on 14 May 2007.
Oriental however alleged that it did not the above letterss.
After Nov 2006, Reliance also sent a further 6 emails to Oriental to remind them to
submit its proof of debt before the cut-off date
Reliance also alleged that it tried to contact Oriental on 11 May 2007 twice.
In July 2007, Oriental was informed that it had failed to file its proof of debt in time
and therefore its claim of approx. US$20m was deemed to be of 0 value.
Whether court has jn to extend the time for filing proofs of debt in a court-approved
scheme
English approach will mean that once the court has approved SOA, it no longer has
jurisdiction to grant an extension of time for a creditor to file its proof of debts in
respect of that scheme regardless of the circumstances save in cases of obvious
mistakes in the document which sets out the scheme
English approach seems intuitively restrictive as it does not cover the situation where
there is no fraud and that the failure to file a claim in time is not attributable to the fault
of the creditor nor does it prejudice any of the parties.
The better view would be to treat an extension of time in respect of a court-approved
scheme as a matter of procedure rather than a matter going to the substance or
materiality of the commercial dimension of the scheme. (Australian approach)
o This would mean that a grant of an extension of time will not be seen as
detracting from the principle that a court-approved scheme should not be altered
in substance.
o Further, such an application would not be viewed as raising a late objection to
the scheme that will jeopardize the certainty of the scheme’s validity
Wah Yuen Electrical Engineering Pte Ltd v Singapore Cables Manufacturers Pte Ltd
[2003] 3 SLR(R) 629
Held, CA refused to sanction the scheme duet to lack of transparency on the
circumstances in which related coy debts were incurred;
Whether Wah Yuen was sufficiently forthcoming on the related party debts
Although Wah Yuen acknowledged that it was in possession of all that was necessary
to establish the evidence of the related party debts, it did not produce any of the
evidence. Rather, they dismissed Singapore Cables’ concerns by telling them they
could raise objections before the court when the scheme came up for court’s approval.
Wah Yuen could not legitimately expect its creditors to be satisfied with the mere
assertion that the movements were “not unusual” when the proposed scheme required
them to decide if they should relinquish their claims in toto in exchange for only a
limited return
Here, court withheld approval because it found that creditors were not in a position to
assess the fairness and reasonableness of the scheme. Creditors were not given
sufficient facts to exercise an informed vote.
The estimated realizable value vis-à-vis each creditor in a liquidation scenario was not
reliable because it was based on unaudited information. This means that the creditors
could not determine whether the returns under the proposed SOA were in fact greater
than what they could expect in a liquidation
Twenty First Century Oils Sdn Bhd v Bank of Credit Commerce (M) Bhd & Ors (No. 2)
[1993] 2 MLJ 353
Eltraco International Pte Ltd v. Sennet Electrical Engineering Pte Ltd and Others
[2003] SGHC 40
Held:
A scheme of arrangement duly passed and sanctioned by the court inherited a statutory
effect upon the relationship between the debtor company and its creditors.
The Oriental Insurance Co Ltd v Reliance National Asia Re Pte Ltd [2008] 3 SLR(R)
121
Section 210 of CA
Daewoo Singapore Pte Ltd v. CEL Tractors Pte Ltd [2001] 2 SLR(R) 791- guarantor’s
rights
Facts:
Rspdt, CEL proposed a SOA with their creditors, of whom Daewoo was one
Daewoo had a personal guarantee given by a director of CEL in respect of monies
owed to them
Scheme contained a term to the effect that upon due performance by CEL of its
obligations under the scheme, Daewoo would release the guarantor from his
obligations under the guarantee
Daewoo voted against the scheme but it was approved by the requisite majority of the
creditors
Daewoo then argued that SOA under s210 of CA bound only the coy and its creditors,
and could not discharge or affect the liability of a 3P guarantor to the coy’s debts
Held:
There was no reason in principle why the scheme could not incorporate the term. It
was permissible in law to incorporate in a scheme an involvement or participation
by an outsider who was not a party to it. Hence, there was nothing to prevent CEL
from proposing, as part of a wider scheme, that Daewoo would, upon implementation
of the scheme, discharge not only CELS’s debts and liabilities, but also the guarantor’s
liabilities for its debts and liabilities. Whether the term was agreeable to Daewoo was a
different matter which depended on the circumstances of the case, and what Daewoo
had to offer as a quid pro quo for the discharge of these liabilities
Where a scheme of arrangement or compromise, containing such a term, was approved
by all the creditors of the company, it was binding on the company as well as its
creditors. In such a case, there was no need for the company to invoke s 210 as the
scheme was entirely contractual. Section 210 was only invoked where it was not
practicable to secure the unanimous agreement of all the creditors, and when the
scheme was approved by the requisite majority of the creditors and the court, it bound
all of them
Econ Piling Pte Ltd and another v Sambo E&C Pte Ltd and another matter [2010] 3
SLR 764: scheme can release joint debtor’s liabilities if there is express provision to
do so
Facts:
Econ Piling and NCC were partners in a JV to submit a joint bid to construct two
underground stations.
After securing the bid, the JV subcontracted certain parts of the work to Sambo
However, Econ fell into financial difficulties and was put into judicial management.
SOA was proposed by the judicial manager and received approval from ¾ in value of
Econ’s creditors and had been sanctioned by the court
One week after the scheme was approved and a month prior to the court’s sanction,
Sambo commenced an ad hoc arbitration against the JV in respect of claims arising
from the sub contract
Questions of law were then referred:
o Whether the terms of the scheme required the consent of Econ before Sambo
could commence an ad hoc arbitration against it
o Whether the joint debts of Econ as a plaintiff in any JV, were compromised or
settled in accordance with the Scheme
o Whether the liability of NCC incurred in the JV had been similarly
compromised
Held:
Second question: No claim can be brought against Econ in respect of joint debt and
liabiltiies
Terms of the scheme were widely drafted to cover all claims by a creditor against
Econ. This meant that the joint debts and liabilities of Econ as a partner in any joint
venture, including the JVA, were compromised or settled in accordance with the terms
of Scheme in that no claim could be brought against Econ in respect of such joint debts
and liabilities.
ADMINISTRATION OF A SCHEME
PRIORITY OF PAYMENTS
Scheme manager
Creditors whose debts are incurred post-scheme
Unsecured creditors afforded priority in winding up pursuant to Section 328 Companies
Act
Section 328 CA
TERMINATION OF A SCHEME
Scheme document will set out termination events, which might include:
o A certain duration
o Occurrence of certain events of default
o Final payment or distribution made to creditors and full implementation of scheme
o Vote at a meeting of creditors or on decision of the scheme manager
CROSS-BORDER ASPECTS OF INSOLVENCY LAW & RESTRUCTURING
JURISDICTION
Section 350(1) CA
Definition of unregistered company
350.—(1) For the purposes of this Division, “unregistered company” includes a foreign
company and any partnership, association or company consisting of more than 5 members
but does not include a company incorporated under this Act or under any corresponding
previous written law.
Section 350(2) CA
Provisions of Division cumulative
(2) This Division shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of, any provisions contained in
this or any other written law with respect to the winding up of companies by the Court and
the Court or the liquidator may exercise any powers or do any act in the case of unregistered
companies which might be exercised or done by it or him in winding up companies.
Section 351
Winding up of unregistered companies
351.—(1) Subject to this Division, any unregistered company may be wound up under this
Part, which Part shall apply to an unregistered company with the following adaptations:
(a) the principal place of business of such company in Singapore shall for all the purposes of
the winding up be the registered office of the company;
(b) any action or other proceeding has been instituted against any member for any debt or
demand due or claimed to be due from the company or from him in his character of member,
and, notice in writing of the institution of the action or proceeding having been served on the
company by leaving it at its principal place of business in Singapore or by delivering it to the
secretary or a director or chief executive officer or by otherwise serving it in such manner as
the Court approves or directs, the company has not within 10 days after service of the notice
paid, secured or compounded for the debt or demand or procured the action or proceeding to
be stayed or indemnified the defendant to his reasonable satisfaction against the action or
proceeding and against all costs, damages and expenses to be incurred by him by reason
thereof;
(c) execution or other process issued on a judgment, decree or order obtained in any court in
favour of a creditor against the company or any member thereof as such or any person
authorised to be sued as nominal defendant on behalf of the company is returned unsatisfied;
or
(d) it is otherwise proved to the satisfaction of the Court that the company is unable to pay its
debts.
(4) In this section, “to carry on business” has the same meaning as in section 366.
ADMINISTRATION
Winding up of foreign coy in its place of incorporation – principal winding up
Winding up of same coy in foreign jurisdiction – ancillary winding up
Part XI of CA
RBG Resources plc (in liquidation) v Credit Lyonnais [2006] 1 SLR(R) 240
Facts:
Applicant, CL relying on s377(3) of CA, wanted its debt owing from RBG resources to
be paid from the Sg liquidation estate of RBG before monies were transmitted to the
English liquidation estate
CL also applied for an order that its proof of debt be admitted against the Sg liquidation
estate of RBG
Sg liquidators of RBG and another creditor objectd to the application
Note the assumption proceeded on: RBG had a place of business in Sg and was not
registered under Pt XI Div 2 of CA
Held, court cannot order CL’s proof of debt to be admitted against the Sg liquidation
estate of RBF:
If a foreign coy failed to be registered in Sg before it went into liquidation, principle in
s377(3)(c) did not apply
RBG’s liability to CL was not incurred in Sg but in England
Common law ancillary liquidation doctrine: A liquidator appointed by the Singapore
court to administer the affairs of a foreign company concurrently in liquidation in its
principal place of incorporation, is to recover the foreign company’s assets within the
jurisdiction for the purpose of achieving a pooling of all the foreign company’s assets
worldwide. It would entail transmission of the Singapore assets to the principal place of
liquidation to be administered by the principal liquidator
***Beluga Chartering GmbH (in liquidation) v Beluga Projects (Sg) Pte Ltd (in
liquidation) and Anor [2014] 2 SLR 81
Common law ancillary liquidation doctrine & effect of foreign insolvency proceedings
on claims before Sg court
Facts:
1st applt, Beluga Chartering GmbH (in liquidation), was a coy incorporated in
Germany.
16 Match 2011: winding-up order was made against Beluga Chartering in Germany
and liquidator was appointed.
17 Feb 2012: HC made winding up order against Beluga Chartering in Sg and
liquidators were appointed
1st and 2nd rspdt were companies incorporated in Sg and were wholly owned
subsidiaries of Beluga Chartering. Sg subsidiaries then brought a claim against Beluga
Chartering for about $1.5m for agency work performed for them and obtained
judgment in default
Beluga Chartering’s only asset in Sg was the sum of US$840,647.42 that was owned
by non-party deugro to Beluga
Sg liquidators then filed an application referring to qns of law, namely whether Sg
liquidators were entitled to remit the deugro Asset to the seat of the principal
liquidation in Germany despite the existence of Sg subsidiaries’ unsatisfied judgment
debt.
Application of s377(3)(c)
S365 would operate as a condition precedent for the application of all provisions in Div
2 of Pt XI save for s368. It would be triggered when a foreign coy:
o Has actually been registered under s368(1)
o Comes under the liability to register under s368(1) because it intends to
establish a place of business or commence carrying on business in Sg. This is a
liability that continues even after it actually does commence business or
establishes a place of business here without being registered
S377(3)(c) would thus apply to Beluga Chartering only if it was under the obligation to
register under s368
Beluga Chartering was not carrying on business in Sg and was not obliged to register
under s368
Winding up of Beluga Chartering, an unregistered foreign coy, was thus governed
primarily by Div 5 of Pt X and Sg liquidators were not subject to obligations under
s377(3)(c)
Since there is no express statutory provision dealing with the relationship between Sg
liquidator and foreign liquidator. As such, Beluga Chartering’s application to remit Sg
assets to Germany had to be decided on the basis of common law
Whether court has a discretion to ring-fence local assets for locally incurred debts
notwithstanding the common law ancillary liquidation doctrine
Traditional common law position gives the court a general power to order the remittal
of realised assets to the principal place of liquidation. But it does not have the power to
authorise the local liquidator to ignore the statutory insolvency scheme so as “to
deprive creditors proving in a [local] liquidation of their statutory rights under that
scheme”
For the Sg subsidiaries (unsecured creditors), their only claim to a stat priority for the
judgment debt was the ring-fencing provision under s377(3)(c) which was not available
to them. No evidence was put to show that a general pari passu distribution would not
be ordered in the German liquidation. As such, court has the power to hold that Sg
liquidators were at liberty to remit Sg assets to German liquidator for
distribution.
Remittal of assets to a foreign liquidator would be permitted even if the
distribution in the foreign liquidation differs from that mandated by Singapore’s
statutory insolvency scheme, as long as it is not contrary to principles of justice or
local public policy. The mere fact that the foreign insolvency scheme differs from
the local insolvency scheme would not suffice to constitute injustice.
In a case such as the present where there was no indication that the scheme of
distribution would differ and the only known creditors (namely, the Singapore
Subsidiaries) were not preferential creditors and had no priority under the local
statutory scheme, there would have been no basis for not remitting the local assets.
Court does not have a discretion under common law that extended to a positive power
to ring-fence assets even when there was no statutory basis for doing so. It has never
been thought that the court has the power to confer on a creditor a priority that it does
not otherwise have under the statutory regime.
Section 377(7) CA
“Section 328 shall apply to a foreign company wound up or dissolved pursuant to this section
as if for references to a company there were substituted references to a foreign company.”
RBG Resources plc (in liquidation) v Credit Lyonnais [2006] 1 SLR(R) 240
Held:
Section 377(3)(c) would apply only in the domestic liquidation of a foreign company
where that company was registered under Division 2 of Part XI of the Companies Act
Beluga Chartering GmbH (in liquidation) v Beluga Projects (Sg) Pte Ltd (in liquidation)
and Anor [2014] 2 SLR 815
*Ref above
Held:
S377(3)(c) may apply in the domestic liquidation of a foreign company in Singapore,
regardless of whether that foreign company was registered under Division 2 of Part XI
Registration under Division 2 of Part XI was not a condition precedent to the operation
of S377(3)(c)
S377(3)(c) applied subject to the court’s discretion to disapply the operation of the
section
Part XI of CA
See s350 and s377(2)(b)
Section 377(2)(b)
(2) If a foreign company goes into liquidation or is dissolved in its place of incorporation or
origin —
(a) each person who immediately prior to the commencement of the liquidation proceedings
was an authorised representative shall, within 14 days after the commencement of the
liquidation or the dissolution or within such further time as the Registrar in special
circumstances allows, lodge or cause to be lodged with the Registrar notice of that fact and,
when a liquidator is appointed, notice of such appointment; and
(b) the liquidator shall, until a liquidator for Singapore is duly appointed by the Court, have
the powers and functions of a liquidator for Singapore.
Official Receiver of Hong Kong v Kao Wei Tseng [1990] 1 SLR(R) 315
CA held that powers and functions of a liquidator under S377(2)(b) of CA were limited
to enabling that foreign liquidator to only collect and recover the assets of that foreign
coy in Sg.
S377(2)(b) did not confer upon the foreign liquidator all the powers and functions of a
liquidator appointed by the SGHC
Beluga Chartering GmbH (in liquidation) v Beluga Projects (Sg) Pte Ltd (in liquidation)
and Anor [2014] 2 SLR 815
Extra: What is the effect of foreign insolvency proceedings on claims before the Sg court
If an insolvent foreign company – whether registered or unregistered – is not
concurrently wound up in Singapore, the application of the ancillary liquidation
doctrine does not arise, and any issues that arise before the Singapore courts would
instead involve questions of recognition.
There are broadly two types of recognition that the Singapore courts may be requested
to grant: (a) recognition of the title of the foreign liquidator and (b) recognition of the
foreign proceedings.
JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT
Part VIIIA of CA
Deutsche Bank AG v Asia Pulp & Paper Co Ltd [2003] 2 SLR(R) 320
Facts:
Applt (Deutsche Bank and BNP) were creditors of the rspdt, APP
APP was a Sg incorporated holding coy for about 150 foreign subsidiaries. Widjaja
family were the controlling shareholders of APP
APP group was insolvent and declared its intention to begin consensual debt
restructuring with its creditors
Applt petitioned to have APP placed under JM as there was cause for concern that the
restructuring was not carried out in a timely, fair and transparent manner
Section 210 CA