What If Fmea FTA ETA What-If/Check List PHA
What If Fmea FTA ETA What-If/Check List PHA
What If Fmea FTA ETA What-If/Check List PHA
Qualitative
Semi-Qantitative elemtns may be included Quantitative
Only What-If, What-If/Checklist PHA and HAZOP are included in this file
HAZOP Hazards and Operability Analysis
HAZOP was developed by Lawley (1974) of ICI. Based on early publication by Elliott & Owen (1968).
HAZOP is a more involved qualitative method used to identify both hazards and operability problems using ‘guide
words’ to prompt team members in identifying deviations that can lead to the failures. Similar to a Failure Mode
and Effect Analysis (FMEA), HAZOP identifies failure modes of a process, their causes and resulting
consequences. However, rather than starting with failures, HAZOP uses guide words to identify deviations from
intended operations, and then traces back to the possible causes and failure modes. The basis for a HAZOP is a
critical examination of information found in a process flow sheet, a plant layout, equipment specification or a
Piping and Instrument Drawing (P&ID).
P&ID Reference
HAZOP Principles include: See tabs: Ex HAZOP 1 CL and Example
1 Guide Word Ex HAZOP 2
2 Element
3 Deviation
4 Causes
5 Consequences
5 Safeguards/Control Measures
6 Recommendations / Actions
Common HAZOP Analysis Process Parameters
Addition Pressure Frequency Flow
Composition Temperature Viscosity Mixing
Level Time Voltage Separation
pH Speed Toxicity Reaction
HAZOP requirements
Experienced
Defined facilitator Observation
design and
intent Interview
HAZOP
Review By Documentation Follow-up
Team
Multidiscip Available
linary Information
team Team HAZOP P&Ids,
Experience
Worksheet
Safeguards/ Recommend
Deviation Causes Consequences Controls ation/Action
Risk Factor
(Optional)
HAZOP Worksheet contents may vary.
Figure 6.7 HAZOP Study Process Steps
Gather
Define Breakdown
Define Purpose and Plan HAZOP documents,
Responsibilities Process into
Scope Study interviews,
Assembly Team Elements
observations
Report Findings