HAZOP Procedure for company

RISK = CONSEQUENCE (IMPACT) x FREQUENCY ( LIKELIHOOD)

OF OCCURRENCE

A measure of the consequence of a hazard and the frequency with

which is likely to occur.

PHA , Hazards Identification & Risk Analysis by Nigel Hyatt

 HAZOP Procedure for company

WHAT ?
HAZOP is Hazard and Operability Analysis

WHEN ?
Hazop can be used at practically any stage. It is so widely used
that almost any form of process hazards analysis is referred to
as “ HAZOP”

ADVANTAGE ?
HAZOP is very thorough , because you force yourself to examine
most aspect

DISADVANTAGE?
HAZOP is very time consuming and costly. If not setup correctly
and managed properly , it can be ineffective. Needs leadership
by an Expert in the field of Hazop

PHA , Hazards Identification & Risk Analysis by Nigel Hyatt

 HAZOP Procedure for company

A hazard and Operability ( HAZOP) analysis is the systematic

identification of every credible deviation in the system or process , usually
a chemical manufacturing process from the design intent. This method
was used UK Imperial Chemical Industries in the 1960’s

The purpose of a Hazop is to review a process or operation systematically

to identify whether deviations from the desired practices could lead to
undesirable consequences

Hazop is usually requires a series of meeting during which the team ,

using process drawings , systematically evaluates the impact of the
deviations from the desired practices

The risks of deviations are assessed and if deemed unacceptable , the a

set of recommended action is determined

PHA , Hazards Identification & Risk Analysis by Nigel Hyatt

 What Is PHA ?

 Definition
“a system to identify, assess &
mitigate potential hazards to a
tolerable level by addressing not only
technology but also facility and human
using specific tools”
Objective :
To ensure that an adequate assessment of risk is carried out in order to
meet the
following :
1. To identify hazards and operability problems
2. To identify the consequences and evaluate the risk of hazard events
3. To analyse the adequacy of existing safeguards
4. To recommend additional safeguards to reduce the risks if necessary
PHA Tools

Which
technique?  Hazard and Operability study (HAZOP)
 Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA)
 Hazard Identification (HAZID)
 Hazard Analysis (HAZAN)
 Structured What-if Technique (SWIFT)
 Safety Integrity Level Assessment (SIL)
 Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA)
 Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)

It depends on:

The type of work

you are doing and
The type of potential
hazards
 HAZOP Process

Hazard & Existing

Operability Problems Safeguards

• Highly explosive fuel gas • Procedure

• Electric power • Alarm & operator intervention
• High pressure steam of 54 bar • Interlock, LSHH, PSHH
• High temperature superheated steam • Lab analysis
• N2, O2, Argon • Scheduled DOSH inspection
• Chemicals • Preventive Maintenance
 Tray collapsed
Tubes leak, not properly weld
Valve passing Additional safeguards
& recommendations
Consequence
& Hazard Risk
• Proper training program for new staff?
• PEOPLE - Fatality, injury • Additional transmitter or alarm?
• ENVIRONMENT - air, water, land, ecological • Verification checklist?
• ASSET: Equipment, asset damage/loss • Review inventory of critical spare part?
• REPUTATION: Loss of business, national
impact
Method Selection

CAUSE

DEVIATION

CONSEQUENCE

What-If Checklist
HAZOP

Failure Mode & Fault Tree

Effect Analysis Analysis (FTA)
(FMEA)
 Examples of PHA Applications

What FMEA HAZOP FTA

If/Checklist
Conceptual

Basic
Design
Detailed

Existing process

Process change

Decommissioning
 The Process Flow…
start

Managing Recommendations &

Tracking
Assurance Planning
Prioritized?Review/challenge? Compliancy & Review • Identify area of study/set
Assign action party Communicate any findings boundary
Follow-up/track to affected employee • Select Team comprises of PHA
Communicate to employees leader, scribe & members

Process Hazard Analysis (PHA)

Consequences Analysis
Hazard Review Hazard Identification
• Identify the potential
To cover Technology, Human source of leakages (HazId)
Errors, Facility Siting & Inherent Type of event – F, E,TR  Field tour
Safer Process
• Size of release  Previous MOC & Incident?
• To select the suitable tools e.g.
What-If?,HAZOP, FMEA, FTA,IPF • Effect to PEAR  Previous HazOp report?

Site visit for Up-to-date Resources –PHA

Facilities Data verification, Information and
through PIMS, SAP ergonomics study, Documentation practitioners &
Supporting records, e-HSEMS, e- fire safety review, e.g. P&ID, O&M,
cross-functional
subject matter expert
CPA
Elements MSDS, Area
Classification
 What is HAZOP?

 HAZOP comes from the phrase “HAZard and OPerability study”

 It is a systematic method (team-based) for examining complex

facilities or processes to find actual / potentially hazardous
procedures / operation. These hazards shall be eliminated or
mitigated to a tolerable level (ALARP)

 Identification & assessment of hazards related to process deviation

or changes in process operating envelope
 Importance of HAZOP

 How can we operate plants safety if we do not know the

hazards?
 How can we control the hazards if we don’t understand their
potential of release and impacts.
 How can we be confident that we are controlling the hazards if
we don’t know how we expect our controls to perform?
 How can we improve on the safeguards to ensure that the
hazards are adequately mitigated?
 General way of doing HAZOP

 By considering the plant on section-by-section, line-by-line and

item-by-item; develop suitable node

 By defining ‘normal operation’

 By considering deviations from ‘normal operation

By using a keyword matrix to initiate discussion

 General assumptions while doing HAZOP study

 One failure at a time (no double jeopardy) unless

 It has the potential to happen
 It has happened before
 The system will perform as the design intent
 The system is operated and maintained in line with the design
intent
Protective systems/safeguarding are functioning as designed
 Outline of HAZOP Technique

 HAZOP systematically review deviations from design intent

 The study shall consists of a team of knowledgeable and
experience personnel
 Use guidewords to stimulate creative thinking
 Identify significant consequences and reasonable causes (reject
small, unimportant issues e.g. small release from valve packing)
 Review the available safeguards
 Develop recommendations to manage risks
 Proceed to the next deviation
 Put risk ranking for each of the cause (preferably later)
 Outline of HAZOP Technique

 The results are qualitative in nature (quantitative

assessment is available by using QRA)
 Effective duration is 4-5 hours per day depending on the
team
 Further study may be required more in-depth analysis (i.e.
quantitative method) and it should be noted
HAZOP Process

Divide system into nodes and state design intent

For each node, select parameter

Deviation List Causes

No
Possible?
Yes
No
Consequence?
Yes

Existing
Yes No
SAFEGUARD Proposed Option
sufficient?
HAZOP Process Flow Detail

Identify a Node

Describe design intent & operating condition

Consider first or next Guide Word

Identify all Causes and record

Identify all Consequences and record

List existing Safeguards and record

Identify the Risk Ranking and record

Provide any recommendations and record

No
Last Guide Word?

Yes
Take a new Node
 HAZOP Process Flow

1. Identify a Node
2. Describe design intent and operating condition

 A node is defined as a segment of the system which have distinct

design intent
 The boundary of the node should be selected such that it is
manageable for the team to analyze
 Typical node: One major equipment (vessel/column/storage tank etc),
associated minor equipment (pumps/valves etc), instrumentation and other
ancillary equipment
 Team must understand the design intent of the node – specific information
on how the node is operated under design conditions (specific pressure,
temperature, flow etc)
 HAZOP Process Flow

 Normally, a node follows the process flow

 Start at an isolation point (valve or equipment item) of where the
line enters the node being analyzed (INLET BOUNDARY)
 Continue to the next change of design intent
OR
Continue to where a critical parameter (e.g. flow, pressure, temperature)
changes
OR
Continue to the next equipment item

 The point of where the node stops is known as OUTLET BOUNDARY

 Practical Tips for Node Selection

 Aim for nodes which is planned to take no more than 1 – 2 hours to

study
 Aim for not more than 5 causes for the first Guide Word
 If the team needs to analyze the node in parts, then break the node
into smaller nodes
 HAZOP Leader and Scribe may choose the nodes before the study session
starts. The proposed nodes shall be agreed by the team members
 Be prepared to change the nodes if the team is struggling to analyze it
 Example of Selection of Node: HAZOP Study on MOC

Replacement of PV-1100
Node No: 3
The following are nodes/area of study for HAZOP: AGI
 Node 1: Line from V6-0204 to AGI
 Node 2: Line from V6-0207 to AGI
 Node 3: AGI
PV-1100

Node No:1

Node No: 2 From Glycol

From LP fuel
From V6-0207 From V6-0204
gas
 HAZOP Process Flow

3. Consider Guide Word

Guide Word Process Deviation Definition

NO, NOT or The complete negation of the design No part of the intention is
NONE or operating intent achieved
Quantitative increase of the More of the intention occurs or is
MORE OF
parameter achieved
Quantitative decrease of the Less intention occurs or is
LESS OF
parameter achieved
Qualitative increase of the All the intention is achieved with
AS WELL AS
parameter some addition
Qualitative decrease of the Only some of the intention is
PART OF
parameter achieved
The reverse of the operating
REVERSE Logical opposite of the design intent
intention occurs
OTHER THAN Something else happens No part of the intention occurs
Deviations obtained by using Guide Words
Parameter Guide Word Deviation
Flow No/Less No/Less Flow
Flow More More Flow
Flow Reverse Reverse Flow
Pressure More High Pressure
Pressure Less Low Pressure
Temperature More High Temperature
Temperature Less Low Temperature
Level More High Level
Level Less Low Level
Reaction More More Reaction
Reaction Other Other Reaction
Composition Other Off-specification
Contamination Other Contamination
Relief Other Relief
Sampling Other Sampling
Service No Power Failure
Service No Instrument Air Failure
Service No Cooling Water Failure
Service No Steam Failure
Service No Nitrogen Failure
Service No No Flushing Oil
Maintenance Other Maintenance
 Consider other modes of operation

 Normal Operation

 Reduced Throughput / Turndown

 Routine Start Up

 Routine Shutdown

 Commissioning

 Emergency

 Special Modes of Operation

Other Guide Words

Phase : Gas / liquid / solid

Composition : Two phase / changes with time / slugging / additives
Testing : Equipment / hydrocarbon streams / effluents /
sampling points
Operation : Operability / maintainability
Electrical : Area classification / isolation / earthing
Instrument : Sufficient for control / too many / correct location /
consistent philosophy / separate tapping for alarm
and IPF
 Global Guide Words

 Toxicity
 Commissioning / start up
 Shutdown (isolation / purging)
 Breakdown (including services and utility failures)
 Effluent
 Noise
 Fire / explosion  Corrosion / erosion
 Safety equipment  Previous precaution
 Materials of construction  Accessibility
 Quality, consistency & reliability  Orientation
 Efficiency and reliability  Safety/ ESD
 Ignition  Environmental
 Engineering issues  Viscosity
 HAZOP Process Flow

4. Identify all Causes

 The Causes identified must be within the Node

 It must be a credible scenario
 Typically done using a brainstorming technique without considering
the Consequences
 It is possible that there are none or no new Cause identified for a
specific Deviation
 HAZOP Process Flow

Examples of Causes for NO

FLOW
 Wrong routing
 Blockage
 Incorrect blind plate insertion
 Isolation in error
 Burst pipe
 Large leakage
 Incorrectly installed check valve
 Equipment failure (fail-close valve, pump, filter etc)
 Incorrect pressure differential
 HAZOP Process Flow

Examples of Causes for MORE

PRESSURE
 Surge problems
 Thermal overpressure
 Isolation of relief devices
 Positive displacement pump running
 Failed open PCV
 Incorrect design pressure
 Gas breakthrough (inadequate venting)
 Connection to high pressure system
 Specification of pipes, vessels, fittings & instruments
 HAZOP Process Flow

Examples of Causes for OTHER

COMPOSITION
 Phase change
 Settling of slurries
 Leaking isolation valves, exchanger tubes
 Incorrect feedstock specification
 Process control upsets
 Uncontrolled reaction by intermediate or by-products
 HAZOP Process Flow

Examples of Causes for RELIEF

 Wrong relief philosophy (process / fire etc)

 Unsuitable type of relief device, blocking
 Unsuitable relief device location
 Multi-phase flow
 Effect of debottlenecking on relief capacity
 Effect of inlet/outlet piping & manifold configuration
 HAZOP Process Flow

Examples of Causes for INSTRUMENTATION

 Wrong control philosophy

 Wrong fail-safe philosophy
 Unsuitable instrument location and response time
 Time available for operator intervention
 Panel arrangement and location
 Fire protection
 Unsuitable set points of alarms, trips and authorization of changes
 Alarm and trip testing, auto/manual switches and human error
 HAZOP Process Flow

Examples of Causes for SERVICE FAILURE

Failure of
 Instrument air, steam, water & nitrogen
 Hydraulic power, electric power
 Telecommunications, computer and interfaces
 Heating and ventilation

Contamination of
 Instrument air, steam, nitrogen
 HAZOP Process Flow

Examples of Causes for ABNORMAL

OPERATION
 Purging
 Flushing
 Start up
 Normal shutdown
 Emergency operation
 Emergency shutdown
 Inspection of operating machines
 HAZOP Process Flow

Examples of Causes for IGNITION

SUPPRESSION
 Grounding arrangement
 Insulated vessel/equipment
 Low conductance fluids
 Two liquid phases
 Splash filling of vessel
 Insulated components
 Dust and powder handling
 Electrical area classification
 Flame arrestors
 Hot work and hot surfaces
 Auto-ignition and pyrophoric materials
 HAZOP Process Flow

Examples of Causes for SAFETY EQUIPMENT

 Fire and gas detection

 Testing of emergency equipment
 Emergency shutdown
 First aid, medical resources
 Fire fighting response time
 Effluent disposal
 Emergency plan & training
 Hazards created by others
 Toxic and hazardous properties of process materials
 HAZOP Process Flow

5. Identify all Consequences

 Consequences shall be linked to the cause identified

 Safeguards is not considered in Consequences determination
(assume the safeguards fail)
 Consequences can be within the Node or outside of the Node
(upstream and downstream)
 One Cause can lead to many Consequences (list all of them)
 Can be listed under People, Environment, Asset and Reputation
 Meaningful and significant
 Can be listed one by one starting from not-so-worse consequence
until the worst case scenario
 Examples of consequences

People
First aid injury, minor injury, major injury, fatality

Environment
Local spillage, effluent discharge to river, black smoke

Asset
Equipment crack, valve damage, fire/explosion on storage tank

Reputation
Media attention, public inquiry, disrepute to international image
 HAZOP Process Flow

6. List existing Safeguards

 It is the designed system or administrative controls to prevent,

detect or mitigate the Consequences
 May list the safeguards based on the Causes
 Something to think about:
i. Does an indicator or a gauge being considered as a safeguard?
ii. Does working procedure being considered as a safeguard?
 HAZOP Process Flow

 Safeguards for any system could be listed based on the system’s

Layers of Protection theory.
 HAZOP Process Flow

7. Identify the Risk Ranking

 The Risk Ranking for each Consequence shall be identified by

utilizing the PGB Risk Matrix
 Consequence vs. Probability = Risk Ranking
 In general, there are three levels of Risk Ranking i.e. HIGH
MEDIUM and LOW
 The “Consequence” rating shall take into consideration of the
detection and mitigation safeguards available
 The “Probability” rating shall take into consideration of the
prevention safeguards available
Sample of Risk Matrix

CONSEQUENCE INCREASING LIKELIHOOD ------>

A B C D E
Never heard Has Has Has Has
of in the happened in happened happened happened
industry the industry. once in the several times several
company per year in times per
the company. year in
company
Assets
People (P) Environment (E) Loss (A) Reputation (R)

Negligible 1 time in > 20 1 time 1 time 1 time in < 6

years between 4 to between 6 months
20 years months to 4
years
P0 E0 A0 R0
No injury No effect No loss No Impact L L L L L
A1
P1 E1 Slight loss R1 L L L L L
Slight Injury Slight effect < 10k Slight Impact
A2
P2 E2 Minor Loss R2 L L L M M
Minor Injury Minor Effect 10k ~ 100k Limited Impact
A3
P3 E3 Local Loss R3
Major Injury Localised effect Considerable Impact L L M M H
100k ~ 0.5 M
A4
P4 E4 Major Loss R4
Major effect National Impact L M M H H
Fatalities
0.5M ~ 10M

P5 E5 A5 R5
Fatalities Massive effect Extensive Loss International Impact M M H H H
> 10 M
 HAZOP Process Flow

8. Provide any Recommendations

 If the team decided that the existing Safeguards are inadequate to

prevent, detect or mitigate the Consequences, they may recommend
additional safeguards to protect the system
 The Recommendations must address the issue and bring the risk to
an acceptable level i.e. LOW
 The Recommendations must be clear and use 3Ws – WHAT, WHY
and WHERE
 A further study may also be recommended because HAZOP is not a
tool to solve safety issues in detail
 Cost of the recommendations SHALL NOT be an issue for the HAZOP
analysis team
 HAZOP Team Selection

 The team shall consist of

o HAZOP leader – to facilitate the study
o Scribe – to record the study
o Operation personnel
o Multi-disciplinary members, depending on the scope of
the study (e.g. instrument, electrical, mechanical,
inspection, piping, civil, HSE)
 Balance of skills, knowledge and experience
 Willing contributors, able to express thoughts clearly
 Process Engineer & Operation Personnel’s Responsibilities

 Provide simple description of the system

 Provide design intention for each process unit
 Provide information in process conditions and design conditions
 Provide operational specialist input to the analysis

 Check design for operational issues

 Ensure design compatibility with existing work practices
 Check design for operating procedure and training requirements

 Provide details of process chemistry

 Provide details of process hazards
 Typical information required

 As built / latest P&ID of the plant

 PFD and material balances
 Design parameters: temperature, pressure, flow etc
 Operating parameters: temperature, pressure, flow etc
 Equipment data sheet / drawing
 Marked up P&ID / drawing of the system as reference
 Operating procedures
 Schedule of alarm/trip setting
 Cause & effect matrix
 Interlock logic chart
 Properties and hazards of process materials
 HAZOP Team dynamics

 Everyone shall be involved

o Encourage quiet people, manage loud people

 Maintain attention and motivation

o Concentrate on the task

 Appropriate pace
o Not too rush or too drawn out

 Appropriate orientation
o Primarily process rather than content oriented
 HAZOP Procedure – Existing Plant

Occupational Safety & Health Administration( OSHA) process

safety management ( PSM) regulation 29 CFR 1910.119
-Requires company to update or revalidate their PHA at least
every 5 years

-In addition , the US Environment Protection Agency’s (EPA) risk

management program rule , 40 CFR Part 68 requires companies
to performe quatitative off-site consequences analysis

PHA , Hazards Identification & Risk Analysis by Nigel Hyatt

 Scheduled hazard study on existing plant

Risk assessment in this context is the process of quantifying the level of

risk associated with the operation of the equipment / machine

It should be a structured and systematic process that answers the following

4 specifics questions:-

i) How severe are potential injuries?

ii) How frequently are employees exposed?

iii) What is possibility of avoiding the hazards if it does occur?

iv) What is the likelihood of an injury should a safety control system fail ?

PHA , Hazards Identification & Risk Analysis by Nigel Hyatt

Pilot Plant & Operational Lab
 Pilot Plant & Operational Lab

HAZOP – GROUP PRESENTATION

HAZOP – GROUP PRESENTATION
 How to perform HAZOP process ?

1. Preparation
 P&ID
 PFD plus material and energy balances
 Equipment specifications
 Layout drawing

2. Facilitator and Process Engineer

Break P&ID down into nodes

 Nodes are equipment items

 If nodes are too small you can loose sense of analysis and incur excessive
repetition

 If nodes are too large , hard to handle and becomes confusing

PHA , Hazards Identification & Risk Analysis by Nigel Hyatt

How to perform HAZOP process ?

3. Prepare HAZOP outline with List of Deviations

4. Assemble HAZOP team

5. Facilitators Explains
The facilitator or one of the team members explains the purpose and scope of the
HAZOP and sets the rules of the study

6. Process Engineer Explains

Process in general
Immediate Node being Hazoped

7. HAZOP Each Node Using Deviation Listed in Outline Working Through the
P&ID
Produce Hazop worksheet recording the following :
 Cause
 Consequence
 Safeguards
 Action & recommendation
 Remarks
 How to perform HAZOP process ?

8.At the End of HAZOP , the Facilitators Issues Preliminary

HAZOP Report consisting of
Attendance
Outline
Detail report
Action/ recommendation Register.

9. Issues Final Report Giving Full Details

PHA , Hazards Identification & Risk Analysis by Nigel Hyatt

Example of Single Node on Boiler System

Boiler Feed Water for F4- 781

LA 7809

LALL 7809
LC
7810A Steam LT 7809
LT 7810 drum
LSLL 7809

BV

Water drum
Economizer NC
PI 7801
FC 7810 FC 7810

PI 7802 BV
PI 7810 TI 7801
PT 7801
FT 7810
FV 7810 TI 7801
FY 7810

From BFW
Header

BV BV BW-3"-7801-D6103-H(N20B)
NODE 1
NC
NC
Demin Water
TW-1"-7801-A1031-H(N20A)
HAZOP Worksheet

Design intent:
Replacement of B/Valve at
NODE D/ Stream & U/ Stream FV
1 7801

DEVIATIO CONSEQUENC SAFEGUARD RISK ACTION BY/ DATE: STAT

GUIDE CAUSES REMARKS & US
N ES S RANKING
WORD RECOMMENDATION
S P E A R
More More 1.Increased  PI 7801  To install L L M L 1. MTA
Pressure  BV at backpressure , PI vibration sensor ( Q3 Fy
Econo on Steam 7802 to all ST pump 2010/11)
mizer turbine and PI
partial 2.ST tripped 7810
ly (indicati
close on only

No Pressure L L M L
1.,No water LSLL 7809 To implement “ 1.POA
BV at supply to Tagging system “ to ( 1st May 2010 )
U/stream or steam drum critical valve
D/ Stream leading to low
FV 7810 is level
fully close 2.Boiler tripped
3.Slow down the
process
Less Less
NA
pressure