PALOMERA, JOSHUA CARL L.

WEEK 8 CASES

1. PARRICIDE
a. PEOPLE V. IGNACIO, GR. NO. 107801 (B.1)
Facts: ​Rosaria Ignacio, then 44 years of age, lived with her husband, Juan Ignacio, 67 years
old, Residing with them was Rosaria's daughter, Milagros V. Cabanilla, by a previous marriage.
On the night of 09 February 1992, Rosaria and Juan had a heated argument. Milagros,
entreated them to stop but the couple were in no mood to heed her. The following night (10
February 1992), at dinner, Juan and Rosaria had another quarrel. Milagros peeped and saw by
the gas lamp that both were pulling a piece of lawanit and each tried to take possession of it.
Juan ultimately released the lawanit and turned to go for his bolo when Rosaria picked up a
palo-palo and hit Juan on the nape. Rosaria left the straggling Juan and surrendered to the
police at the municipal building. Rosaria voluntarily disclosed before Rolando (Son of Juan) and
Pat. San Diego that she hit Juan with a wooden club. Juan died the following day. Testifying in
her defense, Rosaria did not deny having inflicted the fatal wounds on her husband. According
to her, between 7 and in the evening of 10 February 1992, while she was resting on the wooden
bed near the kitchen, her husband arrived drunk. Armed with a bolo, he went around the
wooden bed and then faced her. She finally stood up, pulled his hair, got hold of a palo-palo and
hit him once on the head. The assault sent Juan hovering down the floor. Rosaria went to the
municipal hall and surrendered to police officer San Diego. Rosaria has interposed this appeal
praying that she be acquitted on the basis of self-defense or, in the alternative, that she be held
guilty only of homicide rather than of parricide.
Issue: Whether or Not the accused is guilty of parricide
HELD: ​YES. Appellant contends that, if at all, she should be convicted only of homicide, not
parricide, because "there was no clear evidence of marriage" between her and the victim. Here,
appellant not only declared in court that the victim was her fourth husband but she also swore
that they were married before a judge in Montalban, Rizal. The victim's son testified that his
father and appellant were husband and wife and appellant's daughter, Milagros, held the victim
to be her mother's husband. Appellant's own admission that she was married to the victim was a
confirmation of the semper praesumitur matrimonio and the presumption that a man and a
woman so deporting themselves as husband and wife had verily entered into a lawful contract of
marriage.
 b. PEOPLE V. SALES, GR NO. 177218 (B.2.)
Facts:
On September 19, 2002, brothers Noemar and Junior, then nine and eight years old,
respectively, left their home to attend the fluvial procession of Our Lady of Peñafrancia without
the permission of their parents. They did not return home that night. When their mother, Maria
Litan Sales (Maria), looked for them the next day, she found them in the nearby Barangay of
Magsaysay. Afraid of their father’s rage, Noemar and Junior initially refused to return home but
their mother prevailed upon them. When the two kids reached home a furious appellant
confronted them. Appellant then whipped them with a stick which was later broken so that he
brought his kids outside their house. With Noemar’s and Junior’s hands and feet tied to a
coconut tree, appellant continued beating them with a thick piece of wood.
When the beating finally stopped, the three walked back to the house, Noemar collapsed
and lost consciousness. Maria then told appellant to call a quack doctor. He left and returned
with one, who told them that they have to bring Noemar to a hospital. Appellant thus proceeded
to take the unconscious Noemar to the junction and waited for a vehicle to take them to a
hospital. As there was no vehicle and because another quack doctor they met at the junction
told them that Noemar is already dead, appellant brought his son back to their house.
Appellant denied that his son died from his beating since no parent could kill his or her
child. He claimed that Noemar died as a result of difficulty in breathing. In fact, he never
complained of the whipping done to him. Besides, appellant recalled that Noemar was brought
to a hospital more than a year before September 2002 and diagnosed with having a weak heart.
On the other hand, Maria testified that Noemar suffered from epilepsy. Whenever he
suffers from epileptic seizures, Noemar froths and passes out. But he would regain
consciousness after 15 minutes. His seizures normally occur whenever he gets hungry or when
scolded.
The trial court charged the accused guilty of parricide and slight physical injuries.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of parricide.
Rulings:
Yes. All the elements of the crime of parricide is present in this case.
Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the
accused; (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a
legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of accused.
In the case at bench, there is overwhelming evidence to prove the first element, that is, a
person was killed. There is likewise no doubt as to the existence of the second element that the
appellant killed the deceased. It is sufficiently established by the positive testimonies of Maria
and Junior. As to the third element, appellant himself admitted that the deceased is his child.
As to the charge of Physical injuries, the victim himself, Junior testified that he, together
with his brother Noemar, were beaten by their father, herein appellant, while they were tied to a
coconut tree. He recalled to have been hit on his right eye and right leg and to have been
examined by a physician thereafter. Maria corroborated her son’s testimony.
 2. EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES
a. PEOPLE V. ABARCA, GR NO. 74433 (D.1)
Facts:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Palo, Leyte, sentencing
the accused-appellant Francisco Abarca to death for the complex crime of murder with double
frustrated murder. The case was elevated to this Court in view of the death sentence imposed.
With the approval of the new Constitution, abolishing the penalty of death and commuting all
existing death sentences to life imprisonment, we required the accused-appellant to inform us
whether or not he wished to pursue the case as an appealed case. In compliance therewith, he
filed a statement informing us that he wished to continue with the case by way of an appeal.
On July 15, 1984 at around 6:00 PM, accused Francisco Abarca went home and found
his wife, Jenny, and Khingsley Koh in the act of sexual intercourse. When the wife and Koh
noticed the accused, the wife pushed her paramour who got his revolver. The accused who was
then peeping above the built-in cabinet in their room jumped and ranaway. The accused went to
look for a firearm at Tacloban City. At around 6:30 p.m. he got an M-16 rifle and went back to
his house. He was not able to find his wife and Koh there. He proceeded to the hangout of
Kingsley Koh. The accused found Koh playing mah-jong and fired at him three times with his
rifle. Koh was hit and died instantaneously. Arnold and Lina Amparado who were occupying the
adjacent room were also hit by the shots fired by the accused. Arnold and Lina Amparado were
rushed to the hospital and were rendered timely medical assistance that prevented their deaths.
Legal Issues:
1. Whether or not Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code defining death inflicted under
exceptional circumstances can be applied in the instant case dissolving the criminal
liability of the accused for the murder of the deceased.
2. Whether or not the accused is liable for frustrated murder for the injuries suffered by the
Amparados.
Holding:
1. Yes, Article 247 can be applied in the instant case.
2. No, the accused is not liable for frustrated murder for the injuries suffered by the
Amparados.
Reasoning/Policy:
Article 247 qualifies death to be under exceptional circumstance when the following
elements are present: (1) that a legally married person surprises his spouse in the act of
committing sexual intercourse with another person; and (2) that he kills any of them or both of
them in the act or immediately thereafter.
There is no question that the accused surprised his wife and her paramour in the act of
sexual intercourse. That he went out to kill one of them immediately thereafter is however
vague. The length of time that passed between the time the accused discovered his wife having
sexual intercourse with the victim and the time the latter was actually shot took almost an hour.
It must be understood however that the shooting was the continuation of the pursuit of the victim
by the accused. The killing has been motivated by the same blind impulse and was the direct
by-product of the accused’s rage. Satisfying both provisions, Article 247 can therefore be
applicable in this case. As a result, accused is not criminally liable for the death of the deceased
as he was under exceptional circumstance upon employing the act of killing.
As a rule, one committing an offense is liable for all the consequences of his act.
However, that rule presupposes that the act done amounts to a felony. Ruling that Article247
can be applied in this case, accused was therefore not committing a felony when he killed the
deceased. Having not committing a felony, it therefore follows that the accused is not liable for
the unintended acts which followed, in this case, for the injuries suffered by the Amparados.
Summary of Ruling by SC:
The case at bar requires distinctions. Here, the accused-appellant was not committing
murder when he discharged his rifle upon the deceased. Inflicting death under exceptional
circumstances is not murder. It cannot therefore hold the appellant liable for frustrated murder
for the injuries suffered by the Amparados. For the separate injuries suffered by the Amparado
spouses, we therefore impose upon the accused-appellant arresto mayor (in its medium and
maximum periods) in its maximum period, arresto to being the graver penalty (than destierro).
The decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED. The accused-appellant is sentenced
to four months and 21 days to six months of arresto mayor. The period within which he has
been in confinement shall be credited in the service of these penalties. He is furthermore
ordered to indemnify Arnold and Lina Amparado in the sum of P16,000.00 as and for
hospitalization expense and the sum of P1,500.00 as and for Arnold Amparado's loss of earning
capacity. No special pronouncement as to costs.
 b. PEOPLE V. OYANIB, GR NO. 130634-35 (D.2)
FACTS:
Manolito and Tita begot 2 children and separated in fact due to differences. Manolito
kept custody of the children; Tita lived nearby renting a room at the 2nd floor of Llada’s house
For the sake of their children, Manolito tried to reconcile with Tita, but to no avail. Tita
was open about her relationship with other men and would flaunt it in front of Manolito
Manolito chanced upon Tita and Jesus in a very intimate situation by a hanging bridge. He
confronted them and reminded her that she was still his wife. They just ignored him and
threatened to kill him
Manolito went to the rented house of Tita to inform her of their child’s failing grade. When he
opened the door using a hunting knife, he caught Jesus and Tita having sex. Jesus and Tita
died of multiple stab wounds.
Accused surrendered and admitted the killings but invoked the exceptional circumstances under
RPC 247.
RTC convicted him of homicide and parricide; with 2 mitigating circumstances:
passion/obfuscation and voluntary surrender.
ISSUE: W/N accused is entitled to the exceptional privilege under RPC 247
HELD/ RATIO: Yes
An absolutory cause is present where the act committed is a crime but for reasons of
public policy and sentiment, there is no penalty imposed.
RPC 247 prescribes the following elements for such defense:
1. that a legally married person surprises his spouse in the act of committing sexual
intercourse with another person;
2. that he kills any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter; and
3. that he has not promoted or facilitated the prostitution of his wife (or daughter) or that he
or she has not consented to the infidelity of the other spouse
There is no question that the first element is present in the case at bar. The crucial fact
that accused must convincingly prove to the court is that he killed his wife and her paramour in
the act of sexual intercourse or immediately thereafter
Accused have acted within the circumstances contemplated in Article 247 of the Revised
Penal Code. Admittedly, accused-appellant surprised his wife and her lover in the act of sexual
intercourse. Blinded by jealousy and outrage, accused stabbed Jesus who fought off and kicked
the accused. He vented his anger on his wife when she reacted, not in defense of him, but in
support of Jesus. Hence, he stabbed his wife as well several times. Accused Manolito Oyanib y
Mendoza surrendered to the police when a call for him to surrender was made.
"The vindication of a Man's honor is justified because of the scandal an unfaithful wife
creates; the law is strict on this, authorizing as it does, a man to chastise her, even with death.
But killing the errant spouse as a purification is so severe as that it can only be justified when
the unfaithful spouse is caught in flagrante delicto; and it must be resorted to only with great
caution so much so that the law requires that it be inflicted only during the sexual intercourse or
immediately thereafter."(People v. Wagas)
 3. ELEMENTS OF MURDER
a. PEOPLE V. MAPALO, GR NO. 172608 (F.1)
FACTS:​ Appellant, together with Peter Doe, John Doe and Peter Doe, Jr., was charged before
the RTC of Agoo, La Union with the crime of Murder. During trial, the lone eyewitness for the
prosecution, Calixto Garcia, established that in the early morning of 13 February 1994, at
around 3:00 a.m., a fight erupted between Manuel Piamonte and the group of Lando Mapalo,
Jimmy Frigillana, and the appellant. He saw the appellant club Piamonte with a lead pipe from
behind, hitting him on the right side of the head. At that time when the appellant struck Piamonte
with a lead pipe, he saw Jimmy Frigillana and Lando Mapalo standing in front of Piamonte.
Later, he saw the dead body of Piamonte, which had suffered multiple stab wounds. Garcia
disclosed that he neither witnessed how Piamonte was stabbed, nor did he see the act of
stabbing Piamonte. He does not know who stabbed the latter. Apellant interposed the defense
of denial and alibi. The lower court, thereafter, convicted appellant of the crime of murder and
ruled that conspiracy was established by the prosecution. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
modified the decision of the lower court, convicting appellant of the crime of frustrated murder
and saying that conspiracy was not properly established.
ISSUE: Whether appellant is guilty of frustrated murder.
HELD: No.​ We cannot convict appellant of Attempted or Frustrated Murder or Homicide. The
principal and essential element of attempted or frustrated homicide or murder is the assailant's
intent to take the life of the person attacked. Such intent must be proved clearly and
convincingly, so as to exclude reasonable doubt thereof. Intent to kill may be proved by
evidence of: (a) motive; (b) the nature or number of weapons used in the commission of the
crime; (c) the nature and number of wounds inflicted on the victim; (d) the manner the crime was
committed; and (e) words uttered by the offender at the time the injuries are inflicted by him on
the victim.
In the case at bar, no motive on the part of appellant to kill Piamonte was shown either
prior or subsequent to the incident. Nor can such intent to kill be inferred from his acts. It bears
reiterating that no injury on the body of the deceased was attributed to the appellant's act of
hitting the victim with a lead pipe.
Homicidal intent must be evidenced by the acts that, at the time of their execution, are
unmistakably calculated to produce the death of the victim by adequate means. We cannot infer
intent to kill from the appellant's act of hitting Piamonte in the head with a lead pipe. In the first
place, wounds were not shown to have been inflicted because of the act. Secondly, absent
proof of circumstances to show the intent to kill beyond reasonable doubt, this Court cannot
declare that the same was attendant.
 4. ELEMENTS OF HOMICIDE
a. ABELLA V. PEOPLE, GR NO. 198400 (H.1)
Facts:
On October 7, 1998, petitioner-accused Fe Perpetua Abella, a farmer, baker and trisicad
driver, was charged with frustrated homicide after he hacked one, BENIGNO ABELLA y
PERPETUA, with the use of a scythe, hitting the latter’s neck thereby inflicting the following
injuries: (1) hacking wound left lateral aspect neck; and (2) incised wound left hand dorsal
aspect. After the Information was filed, the petitioner remained at large and was only arrested by
agents of the National Bureau of Investigation on October 7, 2002. During the arraignment, the
petitioner pleaded not guilty. Pre-trial and trial thus proceeded.
The Prosecution evidence established that on September 6, 1998, at around 11:00 p.m.,
Benigno was watching television in his house. A certain Roger Laranjo arrived and asked
Benigno to pacify the petitioner, who was stirring trouble in a nearby store. Benigno and Amelita
found the petitioner fighting with Alejandro Tayrus and a certain Dionisio Ybañes (Dionisio).
Benigno was able to convince the petitioner to go home. Benigno and Amelita followed suit and
along the way, they dropped by the houses of Alejandro and Dionisio to apologize for the
petitioner’s conduct.
Benigno and Amelita were in Alejandro’s house when the petitioner arrived bringing with
him two scythes, one in each of his hands. Benigno instructed Alejandro and Dionisio to run
away. The petitioner wanted to enter Alejandro’s house, but Benigno blocked his way and asked
him not to proceed. The petitioner then pointed the scythe, which he held in his left hand, in the
direction of Benigno’s stomach, while the scythe in the right hand was used to hack the latter’s
neck once. Benigno fell to the ground and was immediately taken to the hospital while the
petitioner ran to chase Alejandro. Benigno incurred an expense of more than P10,000.00 for
hospitalization, but lost the receipts of his bills. He further claimed that after the hacking
incident, he could no longer move his left hand and was thus deprived of his capacity to earn a
living as a carpenter.
Dr. Ardiente, a surgeon from J.R. Borja Memorial Hospital, Cagayan de Oro City, who
rendered medical assistance to Benigno after the latter was hacked by the petitioner, testified
that Benigno sustained the abovementioned injuries. Benigno was initially confined in the
hospital on September 6, 1998 and was discharged on September 23, 1998. The defense relied
on denial and alibi as defenses. He claimed that from September 2, 1998 to October 2002, he
and his family resided in Buenavista, Agusan del Norte. Sitio Puli, Canitoan, Cagayan de Oro
City, where the hacking incident occurred, is about four (4) hours drive away. Fernando
Fernandez, a friend of petitioner, testified that on September 6, 1998, he saw the petitioner
gathering woods to make a hut. Later in the evening, at around 5:00 p.m., Urbano Cabag
spotted the petitioner drinking tuba in the store of Clarita Perpetua.
RTC Ruling:​ The RTC convicted the petitioner of the crime of Frustrated Homicide. Petitioner
Fe Abella was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of Six (6) years and One (1) day to
Eight (8) years of prision mayor as minimum to Ten (10) years and One (1) day to Twelve (12)
years of prision mayor as maximum. The petitioner then filed an appeal before the CA primarily
anchored on the claim that the prosecution failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the
existence of intent to kill which accompanied the single hacking blow made on Benigno’s neck.
 The CA Ruling: The CA affirmed petitioner’s conviction for frustrated homicide but
modified the sentence to imprisonment of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years of
prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor in its
medium period, as maximum.
The CA held that Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty for the
crime of consummated homicide is reclusion temporal, or twelve (12) years and one (1) day to
twenty (20) years. Under Article 50 of the same Code, the penalty for a frustrated crime is one
degree lower than that prescribed by law. Thus, frustrated homicide is punishable by prision
mayor, or six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, absent any mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the maximum of the
indeterminate penalty should be taken from the medium period of prision mayor. To determine
the minimum of the indeterminate penalty, prision mayor should be reduced by one degree,
which is prision correccional, with a range of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. The
minimum of the indeterminate penalty may be taken from the full range of prision correccional.
Issue: WON there is homicidal intent
Held:​ YES
To successfully prosecute the crime of homicide, the following elements must be proved
beyond reasonable doubt: (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed that person
without any justifying circumstance;​ (3) that the accused had the intention to kill, which is
presumed​; and (4) that the killing was not attended by any of the qualifying circumstances of
murder, or by that of parricide or infanticide​. Moreover, the offender is said to have
performed all the acts of execution if the wound inflicted on the victim is mortal and
could cause the death of the victim without medical intervention or attendance. ​In cases
of frustrated homicide, the main element is the accused’s intent to take his victim’s life. The
prosecution has to prove this clearly and convincingly to exclude every possible doubt regarding
homicidal intent. And the intent to kill is often inferred from, among other things, the means the
offender used and the nature, location, and number of wounds he inflicted on his victim.
The petitioner invokes the doctrine in Pentecostes, Jr. to argue that homicidal
intent is absent, in Pentecostes, Jr., the victim was shot only once in the arm, a non vital
part of the body.​ The attending physician certified that the injury would require medical
attendance for ten days, but the victim was in fact promptly discharged from the hospital the
following day. In Benigno’s case, he sustained an 11-centimeter long hacking wound in the neck
and a 4-cm long incised wound in his left hand caused by the unsterile scythe used by the
petitioner. Dr. Ardiente testified that ​"it is possible to have complications resulting from
these injuries because the wounds were extensive and they were big and they were open
wounds, so there is a possibility of infections resulting from these kinds of wounds, and
the instrument used was not a sterile instrument contaminated with other things."​ No
complications developed from Benigno’s wounds which could have caused his death, but he
was confined in the hospital for a period of 17 days.
From the foregoing, this Court concludes and thus agrees with the CA that the ​use of a
scythe against Benigno’s neck was determinative of the petitioner’s homicidal intent
when the hacking blow was delivered. It does not require imagination to figure out that ​a single
hacking blow in the neck with the use of a scythe could be enough to decapitate a person
and leave him dead.​ While no complications actually developed from the gaping wounds in
Benigno’s neck and left hand, it ​perplexes logic to conclude that the injuries he sustained
were potentially not fatal considering the period of his confinement in the hospital.​ A
mere grazing injury would have necessitated a lesser degree of medical attention.
This Court likewise finds wanting in merit the petitioner’s claim that an intent to kill is
negated by the fact that he pursued Alejandro instead and refrained from further hacking
Benigno. What could have been a fatal blow was already delivered and there was no more
desistance to speak of. ​Benigno did not die from the hacking incident by reason of a timely
medical intervention provided to him, which is a cause independent of the petitioner’s
will​. All told, this Court finds no reversible error committed by the CA in affirming the RTC’s
conviction of the petitioner of the crime charged.

5. TUMULTUOUS AFFRAY (J.1)

a. PEOPLE V. WACOY, GR NO. 213792
FACTS:
Wacoy and Quibac were charged with the crime of homicide.
Edward Benito (Benito), at around 3 o'clock in the afternoon of April 11, 2004, he was
eating corn at a sari-sari store located at Bungis Ambongdolan, Tublay, Benguet, when he
heard a commotion at a nearby establishment. Upon checking what the ruckus was all about, he
saw his cousin, Elner Aro (Aro), already sprawled on the ground. He saw Wacoy kick Aro's
stomach twice, after which, Wacoy picked up a rock to throw at Aro but was restrained from
doing so. As Aro stood up, Quibac punched him on the stomach, causing him to collapse and
cry in pain. Thereafter, Aro was taken to the hospital.
Aro was diagnosed to be suffering from "blunt abdominal trauma with injury to the
jejunum... he sustained a perforation on his ileum that caused intestinal bleeding, and that his
entire abdominal peritoneum was filled with air and fluid contents from the bile. However, Aro
suffered cardiac arrest during the operation, and while he was revived through cardiopulmonary
resuscitation, he lapsed into a coma after the operation due to financial constraints, Aro was
taken out of the hospital against the doctor's orders and eventually, died the next day.
ISSUE: WON THERE IS Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray to that of Homicide
HELD:
NO. ​There was no tumultuous affray between groups of persons in the course of which Aro
died. On the contrary, the evidence clearly established that there were only two (2) persons,
Wacoy and Quibac, who picked on one defenseless individual, Aro, and attacked him
repeatedly, taking turns in inflicting punches and kicks on the poor victim. There was no
confusion and tumultuous quarrel or affray, nor was there a reciprocal aggression in that fateful
incident.
 6. ELEMENTS OF MUTILATION
a. AGUIRRE V. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, GR NO. 170723 (DD.1)
FACTS:
On June 11,2002 petitioner Gloria Aguirre instituted a criminal complaint for the violation
of Revised Penal Code particularly Articles 172 and 262, both in relation to Republic Act
No.7610 against respondents Pedro Aguirre, Olondriz, Dr. Agatep, Dr. Pascual and several
John/Jane Doe alleging that John/Jane Doe upon the apparent instructions of respondents
Michelina Aguirre-Olondriz and Pedro Aguirre actually scouted, prospected, facilitated solicited
and/or procured the medical services of respondents Dr. Pascual and Dr. Agatep on the
intended mutilation via bilateral vasectomy of Laureano Aguirre.
Olondriz denied that the prospected, scouted, facilitated, solicited and/or procured any false
statement mutilated or abused his common law brother, Laureano Aguirre. She further contends
that his common law brother went through a vasectomy procedure but that does not amount to
mutilation.
Dr. Agatep contends that the complainant has no legal personality to file a case since
she is only a common law sister of Larry who has a legal guardian in the person of Pedro
Aguirre. He further contends that Vasectomy does not in any way equate to castration and what
is touched in vasectomy is not considered an organ in the context of law and medicine.
The Assistant City Prosecutor held that the facts alleged did not amount to mutilation, the
vasectomy operation did not deprived Larry of his reproductive organ.
Gloria Aguirre then appealed to the Secretary of the DOJ but Chief State Prosecutor dismissed
the petition stating that the Secretary of Justice may motu propio dismiss outright the petition if
there is no showing of any reversible error in the questioned resolution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents are liable for the crime of mutilation
RULING:
No, the court held that Article 262 of the Revised Penal Code provides that
Art. 262. Mutilation. – The penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed upon any person who shall intentionally mutilate another by depriving him, either totally
or partially, of some essential organ for reproduction.
Any other intentional mutilation shall be punished by prision mayor in its medium and
maximum periods.
A straightforward scrutiny of the above provision shows that the elements [55] of
mutilation under the first paragraph of Art. 262 of the Revised Penal Code to be 1) that there be
a castration, that is, mutilation of organs necessary for generation; and 2) that the mutilation is
caused purposely and deliberately, that is, to deprive the offended party of some essential
organ for reproduction.
According to the public prosecutor, the facts alleged did not amount to the crime of
mutilation as defined and penalized above, i.e., “[t]he vasectomy operation did not in any
way deprived (sic) Larry of his reproductive organ, which is still very much part of his physical
self.