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Aristotle's Definition of the Soul: Why Was it Misunderstood for Centuries? The Dubious
Lines Anim. II 1,412b1–4
Author(s): Abraham P. Bos
Source: Museum Helveticum, Vol. 69, No. 2 (Dezember 2012), pp. 140-155
Published by: Schwabe Verlagsgruppe AG
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/44081106
Accessed: 25-04-2019 08:21 UTC

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 Aristotle's Definition of the Soul: Why Was it Misunderstood
for Centuries? The Dubious Lines Anim. II l,412bl-4
By Abraham P. Bos , Amsterdam

Abstract: At least from AD 200 onwards Aristotle's definition of the soul has
been misinterpreted. The soul is not the entelechy of a body 'furnished with
organs' but of a body which is the soul's instrument (not only for producing
organs, but for perception and locomotion as well). But what made the mistake
so natural that nobody became suspicious in eighteen hundred years? No doubt
this was due to lines II l,412bl^ł of On the Soul , where the parts of plants are
called ' organa '. These lines must have originated from a marginal note like one
we find in ms E (Parisinus gr. 1853).

1. Introduction

Aristotle, On the Soul II 1 is of crucial importance.1 However, no justice has been

done to it in the exegetical tradition. In the first part of the chapter Aristotle
develops his famous definition of the soul.2 But for centuries this definition
has been misinterpreted.3 At least since Alexander of Aphrodisias (AD 200)
scholars have accepted the view that Aristotle interpreted the soul as: 'the first
entelechy of a natural body equipped with organs'.4.

1 Cf. M. Furth (1988) 147: "The pivotal section of the work is chapter 1 of Book ii" and C.H. Kahn
(1966) 67. See also W.D. Ross (1961) 10: "The conception of soul as the entelechy of the living
body is so much the central conception of the De Anima that ..."; see also p. 15.
2 Anim. II l,412b5-6: èvxtXé%em ti rcpioxri oíó^axoç (puaiicoû òpyaviicoô (text A. Jannone and E.
Barbotin 1966). Cf. 412a27-28.
3 That the text of Anim. II 1 was the source of many misunderstandings must be due to the fact
that the text as such was not intended for publication, but primarily for the author, Aristotle
himself. The Aristotelian Corpus must go back to his private archival material.
4 Cf. Alex. Aphrod. Anim. 16, 1 1 (ed. I. Bruns, 1887): eaxi yap opyaviKÒv atona xò e^ov rctaÍG) xe Kal
Siaipépovxa jieprļ Ó-uvá^eaiv ímripexeiaBai Ô')vá(xeva. Quaest. 54, 9-11. Because Aristotle
states in Hist. anim.V II (IX) 3,583bl5-28 that a male foetus is still cxvapGpov, àôiàpôpœxov
(unarticulated) during its first 40 days, scholars later concluded that such a foetus does not
yet contain a soul. Cf. G. Jerouschek (1988) 14-16; 41 and L.G.M. Spruit (1991) 68. D.A. Jones
(2004) 21-32 is much more accurate. But Aristotle does not say such a thing anywhere. And it
would clash with his views in Gener. anim. II 1 and Anim. II l,412b27 and 5,417bl6-18, where he
explicitly declares the soul to be present in semen. If Aristotle had really wanted to talk about 'a
body that possesses differentiated parts', he would have written ogołoć SiripGpto^ievov. But to effect
this differentiation, the soul always needs an 'instrumental body'. Aristotle's remarks in Anim. Ill
12,434b4-5;434al3 and II 7,418b9 should also have counted more significantly against Alexander
of Aphrodisias' interpretation. G.E.R. Lloyd (1996) 42, who talks about "the perceptive soul,
which is supplied by the male parent and is present, again potentially, only at the point when a

Museum Helveticum 69 (2012) 140-155

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 Aristotle's Definition of the Soul 141

This traditional hylomorphistic interpret

abandoned.5 The unity of the soul as first ente
not a unity with the visible body 'equipped wit
as first entelechy with its 'instrumental body'
soul's instrument for perception as well as its
Aristotle calls this instrumental body the ēļi
'vital heat',7 £|i(p')xoç 0ep|aoxr|ç, ejjAiro^oę 0ep|i
0epjiÓTT1ç ( Gener. anim. III 2,752a2; ll,762a20)
3,380a20), Çcoxikti Gepjióxriç {luv. 12 (6) 473
Spir. 9,485a28), xò (pDoiKÒv 0epjxóv {Meteor. IV
15,478al6), e' ±''fv%o<; oúoía {Mund. 4,394bll), c
etc. It has been claimed too often that Aristotle's On the Soul can be understood
without paying attention to Aristotle's doctrine of pneuma as vital principle.
And without any justification J. Annas has categorically stated: "Aristotle has no
overall coherent view of the biological role of pneuma ; perhaps he would have
developed one if he had lived longer."8

new animal is recognisable as such',' also fails to solve how this perceptive soul is added. From
Plutarch, Quaestiones Platonicae 8, 1006D (ed. H. Cherniss 1976) and [Hippolytus], Refutatio
Omnium Haeresium VII 24,1-2 (ed. M. Marcovich 1986) it is evident that before Alexander of
Aphrodisias a different exegesis of ' organikon ' was accepted. It is remarkable that these texts
have never been mentioned in commentaries on Aristotle, De Anima.
5 Cf. A.P. Bos (2003) 363-368.
6 There has been a change to the translation 'instrumental', 'serving as an instrument' in recent
times. See M.L. Gill (1989) 133; 220; G. Reale and A.P. Bos (1995) 288; G.E.R. Lloyd (1996) 41;
S. Everson (1997) 64; A.P. Bos (2003) esp. 69-122; See also J. Barnes (1999) 121; B. Schomakers
(2000) 219; 220; R. Ferwerda (2000) 19; id., (2005) 136; D. Gutiérrez-Giraldo (2001) 164; S. Menn
(2002) 110 n. 40; L.M. de Rijk (2002) vol. 1, 50 n. 145; L.P. Gerson (2005) 136; D. Quarantotto
(2005) 240; D. Bronstein (2006) 425; J. Dillon (2007) 55 n. 7; P. Gregoric (2007) 19 and 23; R.
King (2007) 323; R. Polanský (2007) 161; K. Corcilius (2008) 31: 'werkzeughaft'; F. Buddensiek
(2009) 311; M. Canarsa (2009) 76 n. 79; J. Dillon (2009) 353 n. 7 ('perhaps'); P. Macfarlane and
R. Polanský (2009) 113; M. Migliori (2009) 243-244; C. Shields (2009b) 283.
7 Cf. A.P. Bos and R. Ferwerda (2007) and (2008).
8 J. Annas (1992) 20. Cf. also D. Bronstein (2006) 426: "The De anima definition focuses on the
soul's relation to the visible body, while the biological works emphasize pneuma "; R. King
(2007) 323: "Now, there is hardly a whiff of pneuma in De An." In a more general sense I. Düring
(1966) 343-344: "Viele Gelehrte haben versucht, entweder eine aristotelische Theorie über
die Lebenswärme oder eine über das Pneuma zu rekonstruieren. Keiner dieser Versuche hält
einer Gegenüberstellung mit den vorliegenden Aussagen des Aristoteles stand, wahrscheinlich
deshalb nicht, weil Aristoteles die Aufstellung einer konsequenten Theorie nie zu Ende geführt
hat"; M.C. Nussbaum (1978) 143: "One of the thorniest exegetical problems confronting an
interpreter of MA is the theory of the symphyton pneuma , or innate breath, presented in the
treatise's penultimate chapter. The theory is internally obscure, one of a series of cryptic pointers
towards a fuller account of this pneuma that Aristotle may have planned, or even composed, but
which does not survive'; ibid. 161: 'But in the absence of the detailed account of its operations
that we suspect Aristotle at some point either wrote or planned, they strike us as a somewhat
incredible promotional effort"; ibid. 163: "We had better regard the theory as one in the course
of development and pneuma as a hypothetical gap-filler whose workings cannot be scrutinized
too closely"; G.E.R. Lloyd (1996) 46: "What little Aristotle has to say on the subject of pneuma

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142 Abraham P. Bos

2. What Is Wrong with t

There is a fundamental err

first évT£Ài%£ia of a natura
faculties,' as formulated by W
(a) In the first place there is
something entirely different
furnished with organs' is alr
(b) Another objection to this
the beginner's error of dr
definiendum : 'the soul is the
(c) However, òpyocviKÓv nev
always 'instrumental', 'servin
only in the definition of s
which it does not have anyw
(d) Also, in that case it is tot
as évxeÀixeia. For at the mom
body furnished with organ
that the soul only enters a K

is notoriously obscure and has o

332: "Aristoteles' Äusserungen zum
einen Hut zu bringen". G. Freuden
Aristotle never completely worked
faces the interpreter is to make a
introducing the concept of pneuma
he sought to solve?" Freudenthal
toward a general theory of conna
functions"; id. (2009) 249. See now
9 Cf. Anim. Ill 9,432bl8: 'some par
183) - ¿lópiov òpyaviKÓv and b25
rcopeíaç -. H. Bonitz, Index Arist
added six more: Anim. Ill 9,432bl8
3,705b2; Gener. anim. II 6,742b2;
most of these
be co texts it might
' organikon ' must already be anh
about 'instrumental parts'. However
soul he means the body that is ne
10 Cf. C. Shields (2009) 282-283: 'Th
(1978) 275 n. 6 and F. Ricken SJ (
Interpretation versteht unter soma
allen anderen Stellen, die der Inde
Bedeutung; es wurde vielmehr gebr
Werkzeug dienen. Das mag zutref
anima II 1 anders gebraucht. Daß
(412bl-4) deutlich." See also M.D.
n. 23: "A major difficulty to Bos's
as a mistaken gloss".

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 Aristotle's Definition of the Soul 143

Ki>r|ļia. But Aristotle never talked about this in

the Soul II l,412b27 that semen of animals and
soul. And in Generation of Animals II l,735a
that directly after fertilization the Kt>r||j,a gr
vegetative function of its own soul.11
(e) An urgent question for the traditional
development of an embryo from the moment
which the embryo can be characterized as 'fur
(f) On the other hand the Aristotelian view wa
semen and in the fruit of a plant, 12 and theref
is also present, even if it is not a 'body furnis
potential for vegetative activity (and in the ca
perception and intellective activity). For the p
present with the existence of the soul, and long
the visible body have been formed.
(g) If the acoļia ôpyaviKÓv can be taken to desig
would also be complete agreement between
his On the Soul , which in so many respects se
biological writings and is frequently referre
written.
(h) It is then clear that Aristotle is referring
he declares that the soul cannot undergo all its
(i) And it is then clear what he means when he
a craft needs to use its instruments, so the sou
(j) It is then clear that the soul uses the veg
II 4,416b29; Spir. 9,485a28 -, '1/uxikt1 Gepjióxr
4,416b29 -, '|/dxikòv rcöp) as its instrumental
and generative functions. Aristotle can only
'ensouled fire' or 'ensouled air' (Anim. II 8,4

11 Cf. A.P. Bos (2009). In Anim. II 5,417bl6-18 Aristotl

the sensitive part (of the soul) is caused by the male pa
subject has sensation in the sense in which we spoke of t
Ô' aic0T|xiKo') fi jièv Tcpíóxri iiexaßoÄij yívexai 'mò xoû y
£7ciöxrinT1v Kai xò aia0ávea0ai Aristotle is not talking
suggested by the translations of W.S. Hett (1936) 99, W.D
history of the capacity is the imparting of it by the par
in J. Barnes (ed.) vol. 1 (1984) 664, but about the mom
Barbotin (1966) 45 and P.Thillet (2005) 122 make clear.
change ... takes place on conception." Cf. Gener. anim
conception man is a living being endowed with potential
is not yet actualized.
12 Cf. R. Polanský (2007) 159: "If we go back to the seed
only a potentiality. Seeds can remain in this condition of
rather disappointingly, he continues: "Perhaps this goes
being since the definition of soul may not apply to the

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144 Abraham P. Bos

souls as forms of the 'instrum

Alexander of Aphrodisias disa
(k) The soul uses its aioGrjT
aioOrļTiļpia are plainly differe
ears - of the visible body).
(1) The soul needs nvevļia as
( Anim . Ill 10,433bl9-20), just
(m) This explains why Aristot
need 'a body equipped with or
(n) In this reading, the definit
proposition in Generation o
every soul seems to have some
than the so-called elements, vi
(o) In this reading, we can r
proposition of On the Cosmo
- r' te èv (puToîç Kai Çcpoiç ...
Bearing Spirit (De Spiritu ),
wrongly dated almost a hundr
rcveūļaa is said to be connecte
called the soul's instrument
(p) Hence he can also say On
instruments of the soul, in re
an important role in his theor
(q) And hence Aristotle in O
as 'instrument of the soul'.15

3. So Where Does the Mi

But how then is it possible tha

ôpyaviKÓv as 'a body equipped
case of Alexander of Aphrodis
years after Aristotle's active
version of Aristotle's philosop
predecessor. Plotinus dealt w
But with regard to modern
R. Bolton, F. Ricken, and R
gave scholars cause to read òp

13 Cf. G. Reale and A.P. Bos (1995

14 This passage has usually also been
there about 'living bodies' of plants
15 On this passage, which has been w
§ 7 below and A. P. Bos, Hermes (2

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 Aristotle's Definition of the Soul 145

organs'. For after Aristotle has introduced the

the Greek text continues as follows:
412bl^: 'The parts of plants are instruments too, though very simple ones:
e.g., the leaf protects the pericarp, and the pericarp protects the fruit (mprcóç);
the roots are analogous to the mouth, for both these draw in food' (W.S. Hett,
1936, 69 - with changes) - "Opyava ôè Kai xà xa>v cpuxcov ļieprļ, àXXà navxeAxoç
ànXâ , oiov xò (p')M,ov TcepucaprcíoD aKenaajia, xò ôè 7cepiKap7iiov mprcou.
ai ôè píÇai xéo oxópxxxi àvakoyov. aļicpco yàp eÀ,K£i xrļv xpocpf|v -. This passage
undoubtedly persuaded many later readers that acojia òpyaviKÓv must refer to
the body of a plant with its leaves and fruit as instrument/organ for protecting
the seeds/fruit, and just so to the body of animals and humans with their various
bodily parts.
But there is a problem with these four lines. They bring up the very notion
of 'fruit' (mprcóç) which Aristotle mentions in the same chapter as an example
of 'a body that possesses soul' (412b27).
And they immediately raise the question how 'the (anhomoiomerous)
instruments' of a plant, like the skin and the flesh of the fruit, are formed from the
seed of a parent plant. Aristotle is very keen on this. In On the Life-Bearing Spirit
4,483al2 he also attacks those who claim that breath is the most fundamental
system of life in all living beings, by asking how the lungs of a new animal or
human being are formed in an embryo that does not yet breathe - xò |ièv yàp
àvarcveív öxav a7tota)0Tļ xfjç kuoÚgíiç, fļ ó' ércupopà Kai fļ xpo(pīļ Kai Í;uviaxa|jivoD
Kai Çdv£gxtikóxoç - (text A. Roselli 1992). A plant's roots and leaves, too, must
be produced by a soul-principle as entelechy. But this principle can only do so
in an indissoluble unity with an operative principle that is material.16 (Cf. Phys.
II 8,199b7-8: "Exi ávayicrj arcépjLia yevéaGai 7tpã>xov, òXka jllt1 e')0i)ç xà Çqxx.) For
the real 'work' (epyov) of the vegetative soul is concoction (rcéxxeiv, xpéípeiv).
And for this purpose the vegetative soul requires an instrument, and only later
'organs'. In On the Soul II 4,416b29 Aristotle calls this instrument 'vital heat'.
And he identifies this heat there as that which 'effects' (épyáÇexai) the typical
function of the vegetative soul, i.e. the concoction of food (cf. Spir. 9,485a28).

4. Who Is the Author of Lines 412bl-4?

We can certainly note that the proposition advanced in lines 412bl^l seems
soundly Aristotelian. Aristotle talks repeatedly about leaves and fruits of plants.
And elsewhere in his work we also find him saying that the roots of a plant
are an equivalent of the mouth of animals and human beings. Precisely in On

16 For plants it can be said: 'their psychical principle is corporeal and impeded in its motion' - rj xfļ<;
'|/')Xf|ç àpxn noXkiû ÔucTKivTiTÓç èaxi Kai aíoiiaxcóÔriç -, Part. anim. IV 10,686b23-7a6.This passage
shows that the fact that plants have their roots 'below' is due to their low-quality soul-principle.

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146 Abraham P. Bos

the Soul II 4,416a4-5, when A

criticizes Empedocles, he not
plants, if we are to identify
cbç fļ Ke(paĀjļ tcöv Çcocov, oiix
Kai xaùxà xoîç ëpyoïç - (tra
IV 10,686b35-7al he says: ai
8')vaļiiv. Cf. On Youth l,46
xò KaÀxyujievov Gxójia xoîç Ç
In Physics II 8,199a23-26 he
we come to see clearly that i
the end - leaves, e.g. grow to
Tc poio vx i Kai év xoîç cpDXoî
xà (p')ĀAa xrjç xov Kaprcov e
Barnes ed. vol. 1, 340).
He continues in 199a26: 'If t
plants grow leaves for the sa
for the sake of nourishment
(puxa xà cpi)ÀA,a ëvem xéov K
xpo(prjç ... - And in 199b9 he
sake of which, though the de
ëveoxi xò eveKa xod, fļxxov ô
So the content of lines 41
cannot be accepted as havin
where they now stand.17 In
cannot yet talk about plant
genesis starts with the pre
the basis of the four sublun
has been about up till now.
In Generation of Animals
moment of fertilization no
is present, but that all part
species, must be produced by
as entelechy and as specific
male semen and female me
of physical ocojaa, but it p
fluid also consists evidently
(407b21;414a24) (from the m
K')Tļļj,a resulting from ferti
generative, nutritive functio

17 G. Picht (1987) 325 already not

eingeschobene ze Anmerkung, die
auch auf die Pflanzen angewend
eingeschobenen Randnotizen, wie

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 Aristotle's Definition of the Soul 147

operative in it. At the moment of fertilization t

homogeneous components (avoļioioļiepri), like
and the hands and feet of a human being. And
be explained as a living body of a plant, anim
always calls such a living body an 'ensouled bo
he also says very simply in II l,412al3 that they a
(bodies).
Nor does omission of lines 412b 1-4 affect the train of thought of Aristotle's
argument. We could even regard line 412a28 as concluding the construction of
Aristotle's definition of soul and could continue in 412b4 with ei 6rļ (with VX) xi
Koivóv ... , as a summary of the entire preceding argument.18
Lines 412bl-4 must therefore have been added by a reader or commentator
who supported the psychological view of Alexander of Aphrodisias.
And the fact that there were such readers emerges very clearly from the
famous manuscript E (Parisinus gr. 1853, from the 10th century), which is the
oldest manuscript in which On the Soul has been passed down, but which
contains in many parts an intriguingly different reading of the Greek text from
the majority of some eighty manuscripts. In discussing this textual matter we
will have to bear in mind that according to M.C. Nussbaum (1992) 2 the text of
On the Soul is 'unusually corrupt'.19
A.Torstrik (1862) 124 states that in this manuscript (fol. 187 bis, 1. 15) there
is a note explaining the word òpyaviKÓv in the text of 412bl.This note reads:
"For the soul is not the first entelechy of fire; I mean the calorific power,
even if that is also a natural body. But, because it is not furnished with organs,
the soul is not its entelechy. òpyaviKÓv is what possesses organs, via which the
vital functions manifest themselves." - où yocp fļ rcpcoxri xoö rcupòç évxeÀixeia
T|. ^eyco ôf| il OepļiavTiicrļ Súvapaç. kocÍtoi Kai xoûxo cpDoiKÓv éoxi acoļia. ócÀÃ'
ènei o')K òpyaviKÓv, o')k ëoxiv f] TipcoiTļ aàxov évxeXéxeia '|n>xr|. òpyaviKÓv 5é
èaxi tò ë'xov öpyava Si' cov ai mxà xò ÇÍ1v èvépyeiai yivovxai. - That is to say:
this reader considered that Aristotle's words 'natural body' could be linked to
an elementary body, and specifically to vital heat. But he himself believes that
Aristotle must be referring to a body equipped with organs. And so he states
that xoioöxov in 412a28 is not a purely modifying demonstrative pronoun, but
a limiting one. In his view, Aristotle means a 'natural body' which must also
be òpyaviKÓv, and therefore is not a simple body, but a body 'furnished with
organs'. He seems to be led here by the text of Aristotle's On the Soul , but gives
it a fundamentally different meaning from the one intended by Aristotle and

18 As does R.D. Hicks (1907) 50; G. Biehl/O. Apelt (1926) 31;W.S. Hett (1936) 68;W.D. Ross (1956)
and (1961). A. Jannone and E. Barbotin (1966) read ôé.
19 For the manuscript tradition, see A. Forster (1912); M. de Corte (1933), P. Siwek (1961) and
(1965), A. Jannone and E. Barbotin (1966) xxiv-xlv (who were not yet able to use P. Siwek (1965),
but do sharply criticize the treatment of the manuscript tradition by W.D. Ross (1961) p. xxv).
See now also P.Thillet (2005) 11-16, who was able to do justice to the work of P. Siwek (1965).

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 148 Abraham P. Bos

cancels out everything that

the genesis of living beings.
The words which he uses op
can be clearly recognized as n
Aphrodisias.20 Note, too, that
the manuscripts, can easily b
from the margin of the text.

5. The Problem of the Two Versions of On the Soul

Above we already pointed out that there are two textual traditions of Aristotle's
On the Soul which cannot be explained as the result of ordinary copying errors.
Most modern editions print a number of 'fragments' from manuscript E, in
particular from book II, which differ strikingly from the reading of the majority
of manuscripts. Moreover, manuscript E is the oldest manuscript of De Anima
known to us and dates from the 10th century.
In his 1862 text edition with critical commentary A. Torstrik printed both
traditions underneath each other and argued that we are dealing with an earlier
and later redaction of On the Soul by Aristotle's own hand! In his view, the
differences point to improvements and qualifications by the author of the text
himself. He writes in his Praefatio (p. i): ea est earum recensionum auctoritas
ut ea quae mutilata est et neglecta aut eodem jure sit Aristoteli adscribenda quo
vulgata aut vero melius (cf. Ill; 113). A negative effect of this is that Torstrik
ascribes the earlier redaction to Aristotle too and so is forced to posit that it was
insufficiently clear or even erroneous. The proposition that the two redactions
were made by Aristotle himself has not been adopted by other modern authors.21

6. 'Natural Bodies9 as Instruments of the Soul in II 4,415bl8

In connection with the problem of the two redactions of On the Soul we also
need to pay attention to the striking passage in On the Soul II 4,415bl8, where
Aristotle states categorically: Tor all the natural bodies are instruments of
the soul.' - tkxvtoc yap xa (pDoim acojiaxa tî1ç öpyava. - Does Aristotle
perhaps mean there that the degree to which a combination of the four

20 Cf. Alexander of Aphrodisias, Mantissa 104, 15: eoxiv xò Ôúvajaei Çcotjv e'xov xò Ôvvá^ievov Çfjv,
xoDxéaxiv xò ëxov öpyava rcpòç xàç mxà xò Çr|v évepyeíaç Kai eaxiv igov xò 'ôvvájiei Çcoriv exov'
xép 'òpyaviKÓv'. Cf. also Anim. 16, 2-4: acojiaxoç yáp, Kai aa)|iaxoç «puoiKoí). où yàp xexviKoû, cbç
xò xoí) àôpiávxoç. Kai (pDaiKoö oúx antań) áç xò 7rupóç, àXXà a')v0éxo') xe Kai òpyaviKoi). 24, 6:
rcpòç ôe xàç Kaxà xaúxriv èvepyeíaç XP^xai òpyaviKoíç ^lépeai xoí) aá)n.axo<;. For a critique on
the position of Alexander in Simplicius (?), In De Anim. Comm. cf. M. Pērkams (2003).
21 Cf. especially P. Siwek (1965) 176-179.

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 Aristotle's Definition of the Soul 149

sublunary elements is present in the 'body

the quality and level of life that a certain livi
in the sense that a plant or tree has a soul-
is predominantly earthy? And that a fish
soul-principle of which the soul-body conta
mammal has a soul-principle of which the sou
take the principal distinctions in living natur
distinction of the elements and their natural
against the pressing problem that the relev
always been interpreted in an entirely differ

(A) The standard interpretation is: 'all bodies o

of soul.' R.D. Hicks (1907) 65 translates: 'for all
of soul: and this is as true of the bodies of
explains on p. 343 that, according to the in
should read 'all natural bodies' as 'all natur
II l,412all-15, 'where natural bodies are classified as animate and inanimate.
In fact acojot is slipping into this narrower meaning in 412b26-3a4.' Hicks
has clearly felt that there is something strange about his view that Aristotle's
focus here is on living natural bodies. He is aware that Aristotle repeatedly
characterizes the elementary bodies as 'natural bodies'
For this reason A. Torstrik (1862) 139 had proposed to correct cpDGiKcc
aco^cexa to e^iļro/a acojiaxa, believing that cpDGim gcoikxtcc also include the
elements and other non-living bodies ('haud dubie etiam elementa et inanima
corpora his verbis comprehendantur'). Hence Torstrik says: 'much better is Kal
mv to acofia opyavov xfļ which is read by MS E. In this he sees a deliberate
correction and improvement of the text. But this 'improvement' is motivated by
the interpretation of On the Soul II 1 as hylomorphistic.
J.A. Smith in W.D. Ross (ed.), vol. 3 (1931) had: "all natural bodies are
organs of the soul. This is true of those that enter into the constitution of plants
as well as of those which enter into that of animals." (Likewise in J. Barnes ed.
(1984) vol. 1, 661.) Smith was apparently unwilling to identify 'natural bodies'
with the bodies of living creatures. But he is forced into a subterfuge, adding the
words '<that enter into the constitution:^, in order to make the transition from
elementary bodies to the living bodies of animals and plants.23

22 Cf. Gener. anim. III 1 1 ,761bl3-21. 1 have argued this position in A.P. Bos, Review of Metaphysics
(2010) 827-831.
23 But it is unclear in Smith whether Aristotle describes the elementary bodies as 'instruments of
the soul' or the bodies of plants and animals. See also P. Gohlke (1947) 66; U.M. van den Berg
(1953) 109; J. Tricot (1959) 88: "car tous les corps naturels <vivants>";W.D. Ross (1961) 229. A.
Jannone and E. Barbotin (1966) 39: "tous les corps naturels [vivants] sont de simples instruments
de l'âme"; P.Thillet (2005) 115 : "Tous les corps naturels, en effet, sont des instruments de l'âme;
c'est le cas des corps des animaux'.' A very free translation is M. Baštit (1996) 32: "Tous les corps

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 150 Abraham P. Bos

(B) I subjoin the following cr

(a) Everywhere else Aristot
sense of 'elementary bodies
natural bodies are the prin
' some natural bodies possess
about the soul as the princip
in 415bll about the soul as t
gcojicxtcov -. It is therefore
means the same as 'living bod
(b) We should consider, to
Aristotle's definition of th
about the necessity of a 'n
entire tradition from Alexan
visible body 'equipped with
possibly be Aristotle's mean
412b5 'natural body' was ta
human being'.) However, as
òpyaviKÓv has been rejecte
speaking about a special sou
very clearly that Aristotle a
its instrumental body.25 (T
general rejection of the trea
Could it not be, then, that
into a Procrustean bed owin
soul by Alexander of Aphro
elementary (natural) bodies a

dotés d'une nature organique sont

commentary on p. 96: "It cannot be
He notes that the words 'instruments for soul' should not be taken in the sense that the soul uses
these instruments. For the soul is final cause here and there is no question of the soul 'acting
as agent'. This statement by Hamlyn is at odds with Aristotle's definition of the soul (properly
understood) and with Anim. 1 3,407bl3-26 and Spir. 9,485a30-bl5. M. Ransome Johnson (2005)
75 translates in 415bl6: 'animate bodies' and in 415bl8 'natural bodies' but takes these again as
'natural bodies of animals' and plants.
24 Cf. A.P. Bos (2003) 74-78.
25 Arist. Spir. 9,485b6-15. Cf. A.P. Bos and R. Ferwerda (2008) 177-180. The authenticity of De
Spiritu has been defended also by P. Macf ariane (2007).
26 See R. Polanský (2007) 210: "the natural bodies utilized by soul need hardly thus be restricted to
bodies of animals and plants - the claim is for all natural bodies - since nonliving natural bodies
can also serve as instruments for soul." Note, too, that Aristotle is arguing in this passage that
nature, like the mind, works with a view to a goal. This goal of nature is the mature specimen of
a kind which is capable of reproduction. Pace D.W. Hamlyn, the soul for Aristotle is always the
immanent productive principle ( Gener : anim. II l,735a2-4), but as immaterial formal principle
the soul can only produce thanks to the 'instrumental body' with which it is inextricably linked.
So Aristotle is probably saying here: 'all four sublunary elements are instruments of the soul,

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 Aristotle's Definition of the Soul 151

We might then consider that Aristotle is alrea

alternative to the theories criticized in I 5,411
related differences in quality of life to differenc
of nvevļia with these elements.
If that is the case it becomes evident that Aristotle's use of the notion of an
'instrument' in On the Soul 1 3,407b25-26, II 1, 412a28 and b6, and in II 4,415b7
and bl8 provides the necessary explanation of the difference in quality of life,
an explanation which is given nowhere else. Living beings differ through the
quality of their vital functions (epya) and these functions need an instrumental
body which is adequate. An instrument which may be used for the process of
concoction is not at the same time adapted to sense-perception or locomotion.
However, in that case the reading we find in E cannot be attributed to
Aristotle himself, but is the result of a revision influenced by Alexander of
Aphrodisias' interpretation of On the Soul II l.27
Thus the text of On the Soul repeatedly gives cause to suspect that the
reading of the text has been influenced by its interpretation. The fact that
many readers after Alexander of Aphrodisias took it for granted that Aristotle
was referring to the concrete, anhomoiomerous, visible body has probably
sometimes encouraged the addition of the article before 'body' in the Greek
text.28
Remarkable, too, is what happens in MS E with the passage in I l,402a25-26.
An overwhelming majority of the manuscripts reads there: ëxi ôè rcóiepov xéov
èv ÔDvá^ei övtcöv iļ jjxxäAov évie^éxeiá xiç. But E uniquely reads there: iļ jaóvov
évxeÀéxeiá tiç. This reading cannot possibly be an unfortunate slip of the pen.
The E reading does not accept that Aristotle is posing the dilemma that the soul
either belongs to matters which are in potency or it does not. The author of E
reads jióvov because he identifies the distinction 'in potency' and 'in act' with the
distinction between 'first entelechy' and 'second entelechy'. Hence his answer
to the question 'does the soul (also) belong to what is in potency, or is it only
entelechy?' is categorical: the soul is not just entelechy, but is also in potency!
However, the writer is not voicing Aristotle's view here, but that of his
reinterpreter Alexander of Aphrodisias.

and this applies to the instrumental bodies of the soul of both plants and animals.' That is to say:
the soul of a plant, too, accomplishes 'work' of its own, the conversion of food into parts of the
living body, and the plant soul needs an 'instrumental body' for this.
27 W.D. Ross (1956) 211 also observed more agreement between Alexander's text and this new
version of book II in MS E than with the other reading of book II.
28 E.g. Anim. I l,403a6; a9; alò; Phys. VII 2,244bl2 (cf. Top. IV 5,125bl6).

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 152 Abraham P. Bos

7. Did On the Soul II 4,415b

under the Influence of A

We also note that in On the S

an extra sentence of which
author than Aristotle himself.
415b6-8: <It is> identical not numerically but specifically. <For that reason
the seed of animals and plants is an instrument of their soul.> It is the soul that
is the cause and first principle of the living body.' - translation W.S. Hett (1936)
85-87 with changes.
The Greek text reads in the edition of A. Jannone and E. Barbotin (1966)
39, if we add the extra sentence: Kal Siajiévei oùk aùxò oKk' oiov aúxó. ApiGjićo
jxèv ox>% ëv, e'iôei ó' ëv <èoxi. Aiórcep xò OTcépjaa xâ>v Çcocov Kai cpuxcov opyavov éaxi
TÍ1Ç '|n)xfiç>. "Eoxi 8e i] vļ/D^Tļ xoû Çcovxoç acojiaxoç aixia Kai àp%f|, etc.
The sentence may have been lost through parablepsia But the fact that
the sentence was not reinstated in the other manuscripts will certainly have
been partly due to the incompatibility of its content with the hylomorphistic
interpretation of On the Soul which had become prevalent since Alexander of
Aphrodisias.29

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Correspondence:
Abraham P. Bos
Frans Lisztlaan 2,
2102 CK Heemstede
The Netherlands
apbos@xs4all.nl

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